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Begin New Search Political Geography China Content Type Working Paper Publication Year within 5 Years

61. Chinese Cyber Nationalism During the Pandemic: A Discourse Analysis of Zhihu

Author:
Talkeetna Saiget
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
The COVID-19 global pandemic has elicited a rise in cyber nationalism in China, as the world’s most populous nation outperformed the “scientifically” advanced western nations in the handling of the crisis. Chinese netizens on social messaging platform Zhihu cite upsurging cases of COVID-19 and death tolls in western countries as evidence of China’s zero-COVID strategy success, and have generated a new trend of Chinese cyber nationalism. Within this new trend, positive perceptions of western countries and their ideologies declined greatly. As previous studies have predicted, Chinese netizens are becoming more and more disappointed in western countries and “have no choice but to side with China.” This has also prompted China to be more confident in challenging the global narrative and seeking to guide the international order on COVID-related issues amid the China-US rivalry and thus facilitating a strong emotion of “China against the West.” However, this strong surge of emotion does not accurately translate into support of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s zero-COVID-19 policy.
Topic:
Nationalism, COVID-19, Cyberspace, and Zero-COVID
Political Geography:
China and Asia

62. Rising from the Ashes: The Future of Arms Control

Author:
Victor Mizin and Yue Yuan
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
This paper employs a comparative approach to provide an initial comprehensive analysis of the political interactions, contemporary nuclear policies, and military strategies and capabilities of China, Russia, and the United States in the context of the unstable international security landscape. At a time when the global arms control regime is teetering on the brink of disintegration, the authors aim to offer practical and feasible policy recommendations for remodeling the arms control regime from the Chinese and Russian perspectives. The authors stress the need to revive “traditional” arms control and advocate the search for ways to control emerging military technologies. This paper endeavors to present a two-pronged vision proposed by representatives of two major global players.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and International Security
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and United States of America

63. US-Taiwan Deterrence and Defense Dialogue: Responding to Increased Chinese Aggressiveness

Author:
Jeffrey Ordaniel
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Taiwan is already under attack by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) politically, economically, psychologically, and militarily—the latter through more aggressive Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) gray zone military operations short of actual direct conflict. This multidimensional threat requires a multidimensional response in ways that complement and enhance military deterrence. PRC behavior represents a global problem that demands a global response. PRC pressure on Taiwan has increased considerably over the past year, even before Beijing used the visit by House Speaker Nancy Pelosi as an excuse to further ramp up pressure. The August 2022 PLA military exercise around Taiwan appears aimed at further creating a “new normal” that could reduce warning times should Beijing invade. However, such PRC actions are not “normal.” They are unilateral, destabilizing, and, in some instances, illegal changes to the status quo. Such Chinese pressure tactics, combined with the “wake up call” provided by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, have sensitized the citizens and governments of Taiwan, the United States, and the international community to the growing possibility—if not probability—of a PRC invasion and have increased public perceptions about the need and willingness to defend Taiwan democracy. The PRC’s nuclear build-up is also a great cause of concern. This concern is driven not by the threat of nuclear war (given US nuclear superiority) but by the possibility of nuclear blackmail aimed at discouraging Washington from getting involved in a Taiwan confrontation. Taiwanese are concerned about crisis escalation (especially to the nuclear level) but worry more about the PRC deterring the United States. The United States, working closely with allies and other like-minded states, should be more proactive and less reactive in responding to increased PRC aggressive behavior. With the US Department of Defense (DoD) in the lead, the US Government needs to better assess Chinese strengths and weaknesses vis-à-vis Taiwan with an eye toward countering strengths and exploiting weaknesses, while also examining ways to broaden the challenge along multiple fronts in cooperation with various allies and partners. Think tanks can and should supplement this analysis. While continued strong support for Ukraine is important to demonstrate Western resolve and prevent more Russian territorial gains, the PRC remains the “pacing threat” and thus should remain the focus of US national security policy and defense procurement strategy.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Deterrence, Dialogue, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

64. The Digital Silk Road and China’s Influence on Standard Setting

Author:
Alex He
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for International Governance Innovation
Abstract:
China is striving to become a leader in international standard setting, and the Digital Silk Road, part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative to expand its global infrastructure and markets, is key to realizing this goal. Both roads depend on standard connectivity, fuelled by Chinese private companies that are the driving force behind China’s growing role as a leader in technology development and shaping standards in both domestic and global markets. However, China faces strong competition to gain more influence in international standard-setting bodies, which are dominated by the European Union and the United States.
Topic:
Infrastructure, Digital Economy, Trade, Digital Culture, Silk Road, and Digitalization
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

65. Chinese Mining Companies and Local Mobilization in Myanmar

Author:
Xue Gong
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Since the 2010s, China has invested enormous amounts of capital in major infrastructure construction projects in developing countries around the world, including in Southeast Asia. Many argue that China aims to export its development model to the world, but Chinese actors have also at times sought to address project concerns at least to some degree. The question is this: how are Chinese business actors adapting to the local contexts, legal and regulatory requirements, technical standards, and community norms in the places where they operate? To answer that question, it is important to focus on the interactive dynamics between Chinese players and local civic actors (such as local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), faith-based organizations, community groups, government-owned NGOs, activists, associations, and other networks in exile) in Myanmar that can collectively be termed local societal actors. By tracing Chinese local engagement activities involving a major Chinese-backed resource-extraction project, the Letpadaung copper mine, this paper argues that the past few decades of China’s deep embeddedness and interests in Myanmar’s political economy forced Chinese businesses to adapt to Myanmarese societal demands, by way of a local community-based approach. Beijing knows that projects supported by Myanmar’s government today might not have the same traction tomorrow. Therefore, when pressure has built, Chinese actors have paid greater heed to demands from local residents in projects’ host countries, even at times integrating these demands to adjust existing Chinese strategies, choices, and behaviors. That said, these concessions have not caused these disputes to entirely disappear, and the staying power of these Chinese adaptations is open to question, particularly amid the political upheaval Myanmar has weathered since the 2021 coup. A key variable in these changes is the power of the local societal actors: when they are strong and supported by local institutions, Chinese business actors often are more adaptive to local demands and take greater steps, including with local partners, to win support from local societal actors. Because the interactions between local institutions and local societal actors vary by place and time, Chinese responses to local actors and practices also do vary in different periods. In sum, it is clear that Chinese actors are making progress at the local level by showing their adaptability not just in terms of the Letpadaung copper mine case but also on other shared development projects in Myanmar. Nonetheless, Chinese actors’ approach to local community engagement is subject to the local context and specifically to what extent local institutions have the capacity and will to support local societal demands.
Topic:
Civil Society, Infrastructure, Institutions, Coup, and Mining
Political Geography:
China, Southeast Asia, and Myanmar

66. Negotiating Local Business Practices With China in Benin

Author:
Folashade Soule
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Commercial negotiations between Benin and China demonstrate how both sides navigate the dynamics of Africa-China business-to-business relationships. In Benin, Chinese and local Beninese officials engaged in drawn-out negotiations on a deal to construct a business center aimed at deepening business links between Chinese and Beninese merchants. Strategically located in Cotonou, Benin’s principal economic city, the center aims to promote investment and wholesale businesses by serving as a hub for China’s business-to-business relations not just in Benin but regionally in West Africa, especially in the large and growing neighboring market of Nigeria. This paper relies on original research and fieldwork conducted in Benin from 2015 to 2021 and the author’s access to draft and final contracts from the negotiations, which allow for a side-by-side comparative textual analysis, as well as initial field interviews and follow-up interviews with key negotiators, Beninese businessmen, and former Beninese students in China. The paper shows how Chinese and Beninese authorities negotiated the establishment of the center and, above all, how Beninese authorities made Chinese negotiators adapt to local Beninese labor, construction, and legal norms and put pressure on their Chinese counterparts. This strategy meant that negotiations took longer than usual to complete. China-Africa cooperation is often characterized by speedy negotiations, an approach that in some cases turns out to be harmful—since this can allow vague and unfair clauses to be featured in final contracts. The negotiations over the Chinese business center in Benin is a good example of how well-coordinated negotiators that take their time and work in coordination with various counterparts throughout the government can help facilitate better outcomes in terms of high-quality infrastructure and compliance with prevailing construction, labor, environmental, and business norms, while also preserving a good bilateral relationship with China.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, Bilateral Relations, and Business
Political Geography:
Africa, China, Asia, and Benin

67. How Huawei’s Localization in North Africa Delivered Mixed Returns

Author:
Tin Hinane El Kadi
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Trade between China and North Africa has increased significantly since the early 2000s, but it has largely reproduced patterns of unequal exchange. Since they were unveiled, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Chinese government’s 2016 Arab Policy Paper have signaled the promise of a qualitative shift in China’s engagement with the region. China has committed to increase investments in high-value-added sectors and to boost cooperation in science and technology with countries across North Africa. The digital space is a notable aspect of recent China–North African partnerships. Chinese tech firms are becoming ever more important actors in North Africa through the Digital Silk Road, the digital component of the BRI. North African governments see the Digital Silk Road as an opportunity to help bridge the digital divide and bolster their own national efforts to build digital economies and create high-quality jobs for the millions of unemployed university graduates across the region. In recent years, the region has become home to notable Digital Silk Road projects such as smart cities, satellite navigation centers, data centers, and network infrastructure. Huawei’s localization strategies in Algeria and Egypt show that, far from imposing a one-size-fits-all blueprint on other countries, as Beijing is often depicted as doing in U.S. and European media and policy discussions, Chinese tech players adapt their engagement depending on local development agendas. Flexibility, customization, and services tailored to local demand have been cornerstones of Huawei’s localization strategies in North Africa. Accommodating local development priorities is central to Huawei’s success in globalizing its business ventures. The Chinese firm has responded favorably to Algeria’s and Egypt’s attempts to leverage foreign companies for conducting more value-added activities within their respective economies. Among other things, Huawei opened its first African factory in Algeria, employing Algerians to assemble products for and beyond the Algerian market. It also launched an OpenLab for conducting research and development (R&D) activities in Egypt and established partnerships with several universities in the region to train local students. However, closer scrutiny of Huawei’s localization in both Algeria and Egypt indicates that the company improved its brand image without engaging in meaningful capacity building. For all its success at winning the hearts of government officials across the region, Huawei has engaged in training, manufacturing, and R&D in a way designed to maintain the firm’s technological edge. The Chinese tech giant has managed to localize seemingly developmental activities in North Africa without contributing much to technological upgrading. North African governments should take lessons from China’s playbook of how it became a technological superpower. This means adopting policies that could maximize the benefits of Chinese and non-Chinese investments by ensuring positives spillovers and protecting potential local tech champions. Increasing economic integration across North African countries and moving beyond fragmented bilateral commercial negotiations with China are two steps that may help level the playing field with the Asian giant.
Topic:
Development, Science and Technology, Telecommunications, Huawei, and Digital Space
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Algeria, North Africa, and Egypt

68. Public responses to foreign protectionism: Evidence from the US-China trade war

Author:
David Steinberg and Yeling Tan
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
America's recent turn toward protectionism has raised concerns about the future viability of the liberal international trading system. This study examines how and why public attitudes toward international trade change when one's country is targeted by protectionist measures from abroad. To address this question, the authors fielded three original survey experiments in the country most affected by US protectionism: China. First, they find consistent evidence that US protectionism reduces Chinese citizens' support for trade. This finding is replicated in parallel experiments on technology cooperation, and further validated outside of the China context with a survey experiment in Argentina. Second, they show that responses to US protectionism reflect both a "direct reciprocity" logic—citizens want to retaliate against the United States specifically—and a "generalized reciprocity" logic that reduces support for trade on a broader, systemic basis.
Topic:
Economics, International Trade and Finance, Protectionism, and Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

69. Space Traffic Management: Time for Action

Author:
Mir Sadat and Julia Siegel
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Outer space has long been characterized as “contested, congested, and competitive.” More than four thousand eight hundred active satellites currently orbit Earth, representing over forty nations, and nearly twenty-five thousand satellites are projected to join by 2030. Moreover, spacefaring entities are testing the limits of space exploration: Visionary space companies are aiming to launch space tourism programs and send humans to space within the decade, and governments and militaries are increasing activity in cislunar space—the sphere formed by the Earth-Moon radius—to leverage advantageous orbital regions. As humanity expands its frontiers deeper into the galaxy, the threats to US and allied space capabilities will continue to increase. Yet, despite the proliferation of space activity, the ability of international and national bodies to track and regulate space objects—often referred to as space traffic management (STM)—reflects a past era wherein few actors conducted limited operations in space. The current state of STM can be more aptly described as space situational awareness (SSA), or the mere knowledge of objects in orbit. Global actors (including national governments, corporations, and international organizations) track space objects and notify satellite operators when the probability of collision is notable. While collision avoidance maneuvers are standard when there is a one in ten thousand chance of collision, it is ultimately up to the operators to determine whether and when they will move. The limits of this decentralized approach to SSA were illustrated in September 2019 when a European Space Agency satellite veered off path to avoid a Starlink satellite whose operator missed an email notification signaling a high probability of collision.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, National Security, and Space
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, Asia, and United States of America

70. Will economic statecraft threaten western currency dominance? Sanctions, geopolitics, and the global monetary order

Author:
Carla Norrlof
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The return of great power rivalry is stoking renewed fears of weakening Western currency dominance. Financial sanctions are becoming the preferred economic tool for accomplishing geopolitical goals. These instruments are especially popular with the United States and Europe. In response, rival great powers, notably China and Russia, are diversifying away from Western currencies and developing counterstrategies to maintain economic and foreign policy autonomy. As other countries are hit by increasingly punishing Western sanctions, the incentive to join Russia and China’s alternative international monetary order increases. New analysis, published in this report, shows early signs that some countries may be trying to diversify away from the dollar. A growing circle of countries attempting to evade the Western-centric financial and currency order may over time erode the dollar and the euro’s sizeable lead, though will likely fall well short of ending their global dominance. This report analyzes these trends and quantifies the extent of reserve diversification following Russia’s 2022 war on Ukraine. It also assesses the polarity of the international currency order since the onset of the euro in 2002. Reserve diversification out of the dollar, and into the euro, has been modest, though Chinese renminbi reserves grew after Russia’s February offensive in Ukraine. Dollar unipolarity declined acutely in 2017 as the number of countries sanctioned by the United States increased and the US President Donald J. Trump threatened to revoke alliance commitments. Using economic statecraft while retaining global economic influence will require the United States to keep its economic house in order and allies close, if the current unipolar currency order is to survive.
Topic:
Economics, Monetary Policy, Sanctions, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

71. Microchips and Semiconductors: The U.S. Seeks Autonomy

Author:
Andrzej Dąbrowski
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The United States has turned to support of the domestic microchip industry in response to the increased risk of Chinese aggression against Taiwan, one of the leading producers, as well as to address disruptions in supply chains caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. A law on this passed with bipartisan consent and is intended to help finance a more resilient American sector towards global changes in manufacturing these components. Thanks to the CHIPS Act, the U.S. can reduce its dependence on microchip imports and undermine China’s ability to dominate the market.
Topic:
Markets, Science and Technology, Autonomy, Industry, Supply Chains, Semiconductors, and Microchips
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

72. Cooperation and Peril: Germany Attempts a Policy Balance with China

Author:
Łukasz Jasiński
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The COVID-19 pandemic, the Russian aggression against Ukraine, and the resulting disruption of supply chains have intensified the ongoing debate in Germany over the preferred shape of German-Chinese relations. Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s government sees China as both a partner and rival. Reducing dependence on China is challenging due to its scale and the strength of the pro-China business lobby. This unsteady position will cause tensions in relations with partners, including the U.S., and conflicts within the governing coalition. Germany will continue to develop trade relations with China while blocking Chinese investment in critical sectors.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Trade, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Germany

73. Japan Focuses Policy on Economic Security

Author:
Oskar Pietrewicz
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Japan is stepping up efforts to increase its economic security. In August, some new regulations came into force aimed at strengthening, among others, the resilience of supply chains and developing technological potential. Japan is thus responding to the challenges of China’s policy, the U.S.-China rivalry, and global technological progress. Improving economic security will require the government to cooperate with both Japanese business and international partners, including the U.S. and the EU.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Regulation, Supply Chains, and Economic Security
Political Geography:
Japan, China, and Asia

74. China Tightens Policy towards Taiwan

Author:
Marcin Przychodniak
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
China treated the visit of Speaker of the House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan at the beginning of August as an expression of U.S. efforts to change the status quo in the region. The reaction of the Chinese authorities was calculated as a controlled escalation of tensions in the Taiwan Strait, but without the risk of direct military confrontation. Harsh rhetoric, military exercises around the island, and the limitation of dialogue with the U.S. confirmed the intention of China to take over Taiwan in the coming years. For the EU, this means the need to intensify support for Taiwan, including the development of political and economic contacts.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Territorial Disputes, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

75. Inside China’s Techno-Security State

Author:
Tai Ming Cheung
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
Abstract:
Since coming to power, Xi Jinping has significantly elevated the importance of national security and technological innovation in the country’s overall priorities. He has invested considerable time, effort, and political capital to establish an expansive techno-security state based upon his strategic and ideological vision. This brief examines the five major methods Xi’s administration has undertaken to develop its techno-security state: developing a national security state, innovation-driven development, military strengthening, military-civilian fusion, and economic securitization.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Industrial Policy, International Security, Innovation, Strategic Competition, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

76. Digitalisation for Sustainable Infrastructure: The Road Ahead

Author:
Carlo Secchi and Alessandro Gili
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:
In today’s tumultuous and fast-changing times, digitalisation and technology are game changers in a wide range of sectors and have a tremendous impact on infrastructure. Roads, railways, electricity grids, aviation, and maritime transport are deeply affected by the digital and technological transition, with gains in terms of competitiveness, cost-reduction, and safety. Digitalisation is also a key tool for fostering global commitment towards sustainability, but the race for digital infrastructure is also a geopolitical one. As the world’s largest economies are starting to adopt competitive strategies, a level playing field appears far from being agreed upon. Why are digitalisation and technology the core domains of global geopolitical competition? How are they changing the way infrastructure is built, operated, and maintained? To what extent will road, rail, air, and maritime transport change by virtue of digitalisation, artificial intelligence, and the Internet of Things? How to enhance cyber protection for critical infrastructure? What are the EU’s, US’ and China's digital strategies?
Topic:
Science and Technology, Infrastructure, European Union, Sustainability, and Digitalization
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

77. China’s Infrastructure Projects in the Middle East: Lessons from China’s Engagement Elsewhere

Author:
Dominika Urhová
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:
In our latest issue of Iqtisadi, Ms. Dominika Urhova discusses the economic strategy and role of China in the Middle East, and analyzes the implications of China's growing influence in the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, Economics, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Strategic Engagement
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, and Asia

78. World Economy Winter 2022: Strong headwinds for global economic activity

Author:
Klaus-Jurgen Gern, Stefan Kooths, Ulrich Stolzenburg, Jan Reents, and Nils Sonnenberg
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
Global growth has decelerated over the course of the year under the impact of high energy prices and great uncertainty. Monetary policy, which is being tightened very quickly in view of high inflationary pressure across the board, is now also putting a drag on economic activity. Overall, production remained on an upward trend into the fall, with impetus coming from easing supply bottlenecks and the continuing normalization of activity in those sectors of the economy particularly affected by the Covid-19 pandemic. Towards the end of the year, however, economic momentum weakened noticeably further. The major advanced economies in particular are currently facing a period of weak economic activity despite considerable fiscal support measures. At the same time, the problems for the Chinese economy remain significant. While global output (measured on a purchasing power parity basis) at 3.2 percent is expected to grow by 0.3 percentage points more this year than expected in September, we continue to forecast an increase of only 2.2 percent next year. For 2024, our expectation has even been reduced slightly to 3.2 percent, mainly because we do expect the US economy to recover slowly. Inflation is likely to have peaked and is expected to slow significantly over the forecast horizon thanks to lower commodity prices and easing economic tensions. However, underlying inflation is not likely to return to target levels until the end of the forecast period.
Topic:
Monetary Policy, Economy, Business, COVID-19, and Emerging Economies
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

79. World Economy Autumn 2022: Global growth falters

Author:
Klaus-Jurgen Gern, Stefan Kooths, Ulrich Stolzenburg, Jan Reents, and Nils Sonnenberg
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
In spring 2022, world economic growth came to a standstill amid high inflation, persistent supply bottlenecks and elevated uncertainty. In many countries real wages are declining significantly dampening private consumption even though extra savings accumulated during the pandemic are still available to mitigate the adverse impact to some extent. At the same time financial conditions have also deteriorated as central banks tightened their policies. In China, the strict zero-covid policy and problems in the real estate sector are slowing economic activity. Against this backdrop, the outlook for the global economy has deteriorated further. We have, again, lowered our forecast and are now expecting global output to increase by only 2.9 percent this year and 2.2 percent next year (calculated on a purchasing power parity basis). The forecast assumes that commodity prices will gradually decline in line with forward prices, which will over time reduce the upward pressure on prices and provides the foundations for an economic upturn in 2024. However, the pass-through of higher commodity prices into consumer prices is probably not yet complete and wage increases are likely to intensify in many countries. Consequently, underlying inflation is likely to remain higher than in the years before the Covid crisis and remain above central bank targets over the forecast horizon.
Topic:
Monetary Policy, Business, COVID-19, Zero-COVID, Emerging Economies, and Advanced Economies
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

80. Country, Culture or Competition - What Drives Attitudes Towards Immigrants in Sub-Saharan Africa?

Author:
Malte Becker, Ralf Krüger, and Tobias Heidland
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
Sub-Saharan Africa is becoming an increasingly important destination for international migration. The region hosts immigrants from other African countries and from other parts of the world, such as China. Given high poverty levels and weak social security systems in Sub-Saharan Africa, host populations might fear increasing competition for resources and labor, potentially resulting in negative attitudes towards immigrants. We provide the first systematic study of attitudes towards immigrants in Sub-Saharan African countries that uses a causal framework. Using a survey experiment in Uganda and Senegal, we study both attitudes towards immigrants in general and towards specific immigrant groups. In particular, we focus on Chinese immigrants, whose increasing presence in Africa is seen by many as the most important contemporary geopolitical shift involving the continent. We find that attitudes towards immigrants are mainly driven by sociotropic cultural and sociotropic economic concerns. Furthermore, immigrants from China are perceived less positively and economically more threatening than immigrants in general.
Topic:
Development, Migration, Immigration, Sustainability, and Attitudes
Political Geography:
Africa and China