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Begin New Search Political Geography China Content Type Working Paper Publication Year within 3 Years

51. PRC Foreign and Military Policy, 1977-81: Shades of Mao, the Imprint of Deng

Author:
Frederick C. Teiwes and Warren Sun
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
China Studies Centre, The University of Sydney
Abstract:
This Working Paper is a draft chapter for a book on the poorly understood CCP elite politics of the early post-Mao period, tentatively entitled Hua Guofeng, Deng Xiaoping, and the Dismantling of Maoism. Conventional wisdom pictures the period up to the December 1978 Third Plenum as a struggle between Hua and Deng, reflecting neo-Maoist v. reformist tendencies, and won by Deng at the plenum. In fact, there was broad consensus between them, Hua was more proactive in key areas, and there is no evidence of anything approaching a power struggle. This paper, however, deals with an area where elements of accepted views of Deng hold up. In essence, Deng held both the foreign policy and particularly PLA portfolios, notably where they concerned the crucial relationships with the US, Soviet Union, Japan, and Vietnam. In external relations Deng was broadly regarded to have performed brilliantly, while Hua was thought a mere cypher. Overall, Hua was clearly secondary in external relations, but he took the bold step of initiating relations with revisionist Yugoslavia, made the most telling proposal in the high-level negotiations with the US, and deeply impressed dominant European leaders Margaret Thatcher and Helmut Schmidt. Deng’s foreign policy outlook was deeply influenced by Mao, he could push Mao’s “horizontal line” concept to counterproductive extremes, almost losing the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty, and rather than brilliantly negotiating US normalization, the Chinese side was slow to grasp the outcome that was always there. Most significant, and revealing of the underlying dynamic of CCP politics, was the war against Vietnam. This was truly Deng’s war, opposed by not only Hua, but also by a broad array of senior civilian and PLA officials, including surviving marshals. This was essentially the first time since his return to work in 1977, in contrast to persuading his colleagues through intense effort, that Deng simply asserted his authority. Neither here or elsewhere, was argument decisive as it had generally been under Hua’s leadership to that point. What was decisive was Deng’s enormous prestige as the most outstanding of the surviving “old revolutionaries” who achieved the success of 1949. It was the same factor that allowed Deng’s quiet coup against Hua at the turn of 1979-80, with no significant resistance from Hua or anyone else, and with no explanation being made in any official forum until well after the fact.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Politics, Governance, Leadership, and Normalization
Political Geography:
China and Asia

52. Australia’s Response to the China Threat: The Case for Engagement

Author:
David S. G. Goodman
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
China Studies Centre, The University of Sydney
Abstract:
The dominance of the China Threat discourse in Australia’s public affairs suggests poor prospects for any continued Australia-China relations, let alone positive interactions of mutual benefit. An exploration of alternative ways to approach Australia’s relationship with China may though prove not only more constructive but also better future-proofed. The first step is to recognize that while China certainly poses challenges to Australia the perception of threat is more relevant to the USA. The second is the recognition of differences and the development of ways to mediate those differences. And the third is to build on the complementarities for the benefit of both Australia and China, not just through economic but also through social interactions. As Europe discovered in the 1950s, the development of mutual understanding of other peoples, their cultures, and their social and economic systems is a precursor not simply to respect and the avoidance of unwarranted prejudice, but to cooperation for a wider public good.
Topic:
Security, Hegemony, Conflict, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Australia

53. Digitalization of Special Economic Zones in China

Author:
Jie (Jeanne) Huang
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
China Studies Centre, The University of Sydney
Abstract:
Special Economic Zones (SEZ) have become the forefront in China to test legal and technological reforms for digital trade. This chapter explores three cutting-edge case studies in China’s SEZs: the Beijing blockchain-based Single Window deposit box; newly established big data exchanges in Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai SEZs; and pilot projects in financial, medical care and automobile industries to flow data across the border in the Shanghai SEZ. It scrutinizes China's experiments in the context of its applications to join CPTPP and DEPA. It argues that the development of Chinese domestic law for digital trade is shifting away from the traditional paradigm that uses international commitments to push domestic reform or make domestic law according to international law. The development of Chinese domestic law for digital trade relies much more on China’s domestic needs than what FTAs negotiations require. FTAs are increasingly becoming a tool for China to shape international law rather than a benchmark for legislating domestic Chinese law.
Topic:
Development, Economics, International Trade and Finance, Hegemony, and Digitalization
Political Geography:
China and Asia

54. A US failure in Ukraine Crisis could lead to a conflagration in Middle East, Asia

Author:
Efraim Inbar
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
China could learn that US determination is melting away, and its threats can be ignored. An attack on Taiwan could follow.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Hegemony, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

55. Could Biden construct a new world order through détente with Russia?

Author:
Efraim Inbar
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Such a scenario would give the US a leg up against China’s totalitarianism and expansionist aims, and bridge the age-old schism with Russia
Topic:
Diplomacy, Hegemony, Rivalry, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

56. Japan’s Expanded Regional Security Role: The Challenge of China

Author:
Eyal Ben-Ari
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Japan’s steady build-up of its substantial military power is based on a realistic view of meeting current security challenges, especially those presented by China.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Japan, China, and Asia

57. China's Course to Carbon Neutrality

Author:
Cory Combs
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
China is in the midst of a wholesale economic transformation, driven by the central government’s pursuit of sustainability in all its forms: economic, social, and environmental. At the heart of this transformation sit Xi Jinping’s “dual carbon” targets: one to peak emissions before 2030, and the other to achieve carbon neutrality before 2060. However, such straightforward guiding targets belie the monumental complexity of unraveling and then rebuilding the fossil fuel–driven economy that enabled China’s rapid rise as a global economic power. The difficulties of moving China’s economy up the value chain – particularly from low-grade, emissions-intensive industrial manufacturing toward high value-add, green and low-carbon production – are compounded by the immense political frictions posed by entrenched interests and bureaucratic inertia. In this context, it is imperative for observers – particularly those keen on engaging with China during its grand green transformation experiment – to understand the many pieces, players, and problems involved. To this end, this report takes stock of China’s planning and reform efforts across the domains of climate, energy, and industrial upgrading since the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021–2025) was adopted. It then assesses the key drivers and constraints shaping these efforts, with the aim of elucidating the most likely path ahead – even as Beijing itself continues to map it out.
Topic:
Climate Change, Environment, Economy, Sustainability, and Carbon Emissions
Political Geography:
China and Asia

58. China’s 20th Party Congress Leadership Reshuffle: Stasis or Sweep?

Author:
Christopher K Johnson
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
President and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping successfully thwarted another “Twitter coup” in late September 2022, making clear he will remain China’s top leader for at least the next five years. But there is much less certainty about who else will make up the new leadership team at the 20th Party Congress that will assist Xi in guiding the country through its most challenging period in decades. There are virtually no hard rules in CCP politicking limiting the range of possible outcomes, and even the “norms” that are often cited as governing the process of choosing a new leadership lineup are, at best, loose conventions rather than predictable practices. Xi’s extreme centralization of power also means that China’s already deeply opaque political system is even more so, and more than two and a half years of COVID isolation for China has made it much more challenging to glean authoritative insights. Nevertheless, one still gets a very clear sense that the personnel arrangements for the party congress are largely in hand, and that Xi Jinping is firmly in command and very comfortable with them. If we accept that as the baseline, it is possible to deduce the most likely scenarios for personnel turnover at the apex of CCP power and decision-making, the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC). As with so many things in Xi Jinping’s unique political universe, it seems that the outcome will probably be one of two fairly binary, and perhaps nearly equally likely, possibilities. The first, a “stasis” scenario, would see very little change to the PBSC as Xi either strictly adheres to the convention, followed since 2002, that officials 68 or older must retire, or largely abides by it except for some PBSC incumbents, most probably Premier Li Keqiang, who may step down even though he is 67. In the second “sweep” scenario, Xi could adjust the age criteria downward or just outright ignore it, creating a lot more room for new entrants to the PBSC.
Topic:
Leadership, Domestic Politics, Political Parties, Xi Jinping, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

59. China’s National ETS and the Power Market: How the ETS Can Achieve Significant Emission Reductions

Author:
Yan Qin, Alistair Ritchie, and Yi Chen
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
China’s newly established national emissions trading system (ETS) is intended to serve as the primary tool in assisting China in meeting its "dual carbon" target of CO2 peaking before 2030 and carbon neutrality by 2060. It is the largest ETS globally, accounting for 40 percent of China's CO2 emissions and more than 10 percent of worldwide emissions, with the potential to double its current size once industrial sectors are added. In its initial phase, it covers the power sector, particularly more than 2,000 enterprises operating coal- and gas-fired power stations. However, some critical challenges need to be overcome before the ETS can fulfill its emissions reduction potential in the power sector by driving fuel switching away from coal and toward renewables and low-carbon fuels through the carbon price. China's National ETS and The Power Market: How the ETS Can Achieve Significant Emission Reductions examines these challenges in relation to both the ETS itself and its interactions with the power market. It also proposes a policy pathway to address these challenges and unlock their potential to drive significant and cost-effective CO2 emissions reductions in the power sector and raise large amounts of revenue to fund the transition to carbon neutrality across the expanding ETS sectors.
Topic:
Climate Change, Markets, Carbon Emissions, and Energy
Political Geography:
China and Asia

60. Assessing the groundwork: Surveying the impacts of climate change in China

Author:
Stephan Robin
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
The immediate and unprecedented impacts of climate change are becoming increasingly apparent across China, as they are for many parts of the world. Since June 2022, China has been battered by record-breaking heatwaves, torrential downpours, flooding disasters, severe drought and intense forest fires. In isolation, each of those climate hazards is a reminder of the vulnerability of human systems to environmental changes, but together they are a stark reminder that climate change presents a real and existential threat to prosperity and well-being of billions of people. Sea-level rise will undermine access to freshwater for China’s coastal cities and increase the likelihood of flooding in China’s highly urbanised delta regions. Droughts are projected to become more frequent, more extreme and longer lasting, juxtaposed with growingly intense downpours that will inundate non-coastal regions. Wildfires are also projected to increase in frequency and severity, especially in eastern China. China’s rivers, which have historically been critical to the county’s economic and political development, will experience multiple, overlapping climate (and non-climate) impacts. In addition to these direct climate hazards, there will also be major disruptions to the various human systems that underpin China, such as China’s food and energy systems as are discussed in this report. These impacts deserve greater attention from policy analysts, particularly given that they’ll increasingly shape China’s economic, foreign and security policy choices in coming decades. This report is an initial attempt to survey the literature on the impact that climate change will have on China. It concludes that relatively little attention has been paid to this important topic. This is a worrying conclusion, given China’s key role in international climate-change debates, immense importance in the global economy and major geostrategic relevance. As the severity of climate change impacts continue to amplify over the coming decades, the significance of this gap will only grow more concerning.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, National Security, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
China and Asia-Pacific

61. Chinese Cyber Nationalism During the Pandemic: A Discourse Analysis of Zhihu

Author:
Talkeetna Saiget
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
The COVID-19 global pandemic has elicited a rise in cyber nationalism in China, as the world’s most populous nation outperformed the “scientifically” advanced western nations in the handling of the crisis. Chinese netizens on social messaging platform Zhihu cite upsurging cases of COVID-19 and death tolls in western countries as evidence of China’s zero-COVID strategy success, and have generated a new trend of Chinese cyber nationalism. Within this new trend, positive perceptions of western countries and their ideologies declined greatly. As previous studies have predicted, Chinese netizens are becoming more and more disappointed in western countries and “have no choice but to side with China.” This has also prompted China to be more confident in challenging the global narrative and seeking to guide the international order on COVID-related issues amid the China-US rivalry and thus facilitating a strong emotion of “China against the West.” However, this strong surge of emotion does not accurately translate into support of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s zero-COVID-19 policy.
Topic:
Nationalism, COVID-19, Cyberspace, and Zero-COVID
Political Geography:
China and Asia

62. Rising from the Ashes: The Future of Arms Control

Author:
Victor Mizin and Yue Yuan
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
This paper employs a comparative approach to provide an initial comprehensive analysis of the political interactions, contemporary nuclear policies, and military strategies and capabilities of China, Russia, and the United States in the context of the unstable international security landscape. At a time when the global arms control regime is teetering on the brink of disintegration, the authors aim to offer practical and feasible policy recommendations for remodeling the arms control regime from the Chinese and Russian perspectives. The authors stress the need to revive “traditional” arms control and advocate the search for ways to control emerging military technologies. This paper endeavors to present a two-pronged vision proposed by representatives of two major global players.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and International Security
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and United States of America

63. US-Taiwan Deterrence and Defense Dialogue: Responding to Increased Chinese Aggressiveness

Author:
Jeffrey Ordaniel
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Taiwan is already under attack by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) politically, economically, psychologically, and militarily—the latter through more aggressive Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) gray zone military operations short of actual direct conflict. This multidimensional threat requires a multidimensional response in ways that complement and enhance military deterrence. PRC behavior represents a global problem that demands a global response. PRC pressure on Taiwan has increased considerably over the past year, even before Beijing used the visit by House Speaker Nancy Pelosi as an excuse to further ramp up pressure. The August 2022 PLA military exercise around Taiwan appears aimed at further creating a “new normal” that could reduce warning times should Beijing invade. However, such PRC actions are not “normal.” They are unilateral, destabilizing, and, in some instances, illegal changes to the status quo. Such Chinese pressure tactics, combined with the “wake up call” provided by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, have sensitized the citizens and governments of Taiwan, the United States, and the international community to the growing possibility—if not probability—of a PRC invasion and have increased public perceptions about the need and willingness to defend Taiwan democracy. The PRC’s nuclear build-up is also a great cause of concern. This concern is driven not by the threat of nuclear war (given US nuclear superiority) but by the possibility of nuclear blackmail aimed at discouraging Washington from getting involved in a Taiwan confrontation. Taiwanese are concerned about crisis escalation (especially to the nuclear level) but worry more about the PRC deterring the United States. The United States, working closely with allies and other like-minded states, should be more proactive and less reactive in responding to increased PRC aggressive behavior. With the US Department of Defense (DoD) in the lead, the US Government needs to better assess Chinese strengths and weaknesses vis-à-vis Taiwan with an eye toward countering strengths and exploiting weaknesses, while also examining ways to broaden the challenge along multiple fronts in cooperation with various allies and partners. Think tanks can and should supplement this analysis. While continued strong support for Ukraine is important to demonstrate Western resolve and prevent more Russian territorial gains, the PRC remains the “pacing threat” and thus should remain the focus of US national security policy and defense procurement strategy.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Deterrence, Dialogue, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

64. The Digital Silk Road and China’s Influence on Standard Setting

Author:
Alex He
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for International Governance Innovation
Abstract:
China is striving to become a leader in international standard setting, and the Digital Silk Road, part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative to expand its global infrastructure and markets, is key to realizing this goal. Both roads depend on standard connectivity, fuelled by Chinese private companies that are the driving force behind China’s growing role as a leader in technology development and shaping standards in both domestic and global markets. However, China faces strong competition to gain more influence in international standard-setting bodies, which are dominated by the European Union and the United States.
Topic:
Infrastructure, Digital Economy, Trade, Digital Culture, Silk Road, and Digitalization
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

65. Chinese Mining Companies and Local Mobilization in Myanmar

Author:
Xue Gong
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Since the 2010s, China has invested enormous amounts of capital in major infrastructure construction projects in developing countries around the world, including in Southeast Asia. Many argue that China aims to export its development model to the world, but Chinese actors have also at times sought to address project concerns at least to some degree. The question is this: how are Chinese business actors adapting to the local contexts, legal and regulatory requirements, technical standards, and community norms in the places where they operate? To answer that question, it is important to focus on the interactive dynamics between Chinese players and local civic actors (such as local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), faith-based organizations, community groups, government-owned NGOs, activists, associations, and other networks in exile) in Myanmar that can collectively be termed local societal actors. By tracing Chinese local engagement activities involving a major Chinese-backed resource-extraction project, the Letpadaung copper mine, this paper argues that the past few decades of China’s deep embeddedness and interests in Myanmar’s political economy forced Chinese businesses to adapt to Myanmarese societal demands, by way of a local community-based approach. Beijing knows that projects supported by Myanmar’s government today might not have the same traction tomorrow. Therefore, when pressure has built, Chinese actors have paid greater heed to demands from local residents in projects’ host countries, even at times integrating these demands to adjust existing Chinese strategies, choices, and behaviors. That said, these concessions have not caused these disputes to entirely disappear, and the staying power of these Chinese adaptations is open to question, particularly amid the political upheaval Myanmar has weathered since the 2021 coup. A key variable in these changes is the power of the local societal actors: when they are strong and supported by local institutions, Chinese business actors often are more adaptive to local demands and take greater steps, including with local partners, to win support from local societal actors. Because the interactions between local institutions and local societal actors vary by place and time, Chinese responses to local actors and practices also do vary in different periods. In sum, it is clear that Chinese actors are making progress at the local level by showing their adaptability not just in terms of the Letpadaung copper mine case but also on other shared development projects in Myanmar. Nonetheless, Chinese actors’ approach to local community engagement is subject to the local context and specifically to what extent local institutions have the capacity and will to support local societal demands.
Topic:
Civil Society, Infrastructure, Institutions, Coup, and Mining
Political Geography:
China, Southeast Asia, and Myanmar

66. Negotiating Local Business Practices With China in Benin

Author:
Folashade Soule
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Commercial negotiations between Benin and China demonstrate how both sides navigate the dynamics of Africa-China business-to-business relationships. In Benin, Chinese and local Beninese officials engaged in drawn-out negotiations on a deal to construct a business center aimed at deepening business links between Chinese and Beninese merchants. Strategically located in Cotonou, Benin’s principal economic city, the center aims to promote investment and wholesale businesses by serving as a hub for China’s business-to-business relations not just in Benin but regionally in West Africa, especially in the large and growing neighboring market of Nigeria. This paper relies on original research and fieldwork conducted in Benin from 2015 to 2021 and the author’s access to draft and final contracts from the negotiations, which allow for a side-by-side comparative textual analysis, as well as initial field interviews and follow-up interviews with key negotiators, Beninese businessmen, and former Beninese students in China. The paper shows how Chinese and Beninese authorities negotiated the establishment of the center and, above all, how Beninese authorities made Chinese negotiators adapt to local Beninese labor, construction, and legal norms and put pressure on their Chinese counterparts. This strategy meant that negotiations took longer than usual to complete. China-Africa cooperation is often characterized by speedy negotiations, an approach that in some cases turns out to be harmful—since this can allow vague and unfair clauses to be featured in final contracts. The negotiations over the Chinese business center in Benin is a good example of how well-coordinated negotiators that take their time and work in coordination with various counterparts throughout the government can help facilitate better outcomes in terms of high-quality infrastructure and compliance with prevailing construction, labor, environmental, and business norms, while also preserving a good bilateral relationship with China.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, Bilateral Relations, and Business
Political Geography:
Africa, China, Asia, and Benin

67. How Huawei’s Localization in North Africa Delivered Mixed Returns

Author:
Tin Hinane El Kadi
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Trade between China and North Africa has increased significantly since the early 2000s, but it has largely reproduced patterns of unequal exchange. Since they were unveiled, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Chinese government’s 2016 Arab Policy Paper have signaled the promise of a qualitative shift in China’s engagement with the region. China has committed to increase investments in high-value-added sectors and to boost cooperation in science and technology with countries across North Africa. The digital space is a notable aspect of recent China–North African partnerships. Chinese tech firms are becoming ever more important actors in North Africa through the Digital Silk Road, the digital component of the BRI. North African governments see the Digital Silk Road as an opportunity to help bridge the digital divide and bolster their own national efforts to build digital economies and create high-quality jobs for the millions of unemployed university graduates across the region. In recent years, the region has become home to notable Digital Silk Road projects such as smart cities, satellite navigation centers, data centers, and network infrastructure. Huawei’s localization strategies in Algeria and Egypt show that, far from imposing a one-size-fits-all blueprint on other countries, as Beijing is often depicted as doing in U.S. and European media and policy discussions, Chinese tech players adapt their engagement depending on local development agendas. Flexibility, customization, and services tailored to local demand have been cornerstones of Huawei’s localization strategies in North Africa. Accommodating local development priorities is central to Huawei’s success in globalizing its business ventures. The Chinese firm has responded favorably to Algeria’s and Egypt’s attempts to leverage foreign companies for conducting more value-added activities within their respective economies. Among other things, Huawei opened its first African factory in Algeria, employing Algerians to assemble products for and beyond the Algerian market. It also launched an OpenLab for conducting research and development (R&D) activities in Egypt and established partnerships with several universities in the region to train local students. However, closer scrutiny of Huawei’s localization in both Algeria and Egypt indicates that the company improved its brand image without engaging in meaningful capacity building. For all its success at winning the hearts of government officials across the region, Huawei has engaged in training, manufacturing, and R&D in a way designed to maintain the firm’s technological edge. The Chinese tech giant has managed to localize seemingly developmental activities in North Africa without contributing much to technological upgrading. North African governments should take lessons from China’s playbook of how it became a technological superpower. This means adopting policies that could maximize the benefits of Chinese and non-Chinese investments by ensuring positives spillovers and protecting potential local tech champions. Increasing economic integration across North African countries and moving beyond fragmented bilateral commercial negotiations with China are two steps that may help level the playing field with the Asian giant.
Topic:
Development, Science and Technology, Telecommunications, Huawei, and Digital Space
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Algeria, North Africa, and Egypt

68. Public responses to foreign protectionism: Evidence from the US-China trade war

Author:
David Steinberg and Yeling Tan
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
America's recent turn toward protectionism has raised concerns about the future viability of the liberal international trading system. This study examines how and why public attitudes toward international trade change when one's country is targeted by protectionist measures from abroad. To address this question, the authors fielded three original survey experiments in the country most affected by US protectionism: China. First, they find consistent evidence that US protectionism reduces Chinese citizens' support for trade. This finding is replicated in parallel experiments on technology cooperation, and further validated outside of the China context with a survey experiment in Argentina. Second, they show that responses to US protectionism reflect both a "direct reciprocity" logic—citizens want to retaliate against the United States specifically—and a "generalized reciprocity" logic that reduces support for trade on a broader, systemic basis.
Topic:
Economics, International Trade and Finance, Protectionism, and Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

69. Space Traffic Management: Time for Action

Author:
Mir Sadat and Julia Siegel
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Outer space has long been characterized as “contested, congested, and competitive.” More than four thousand eight hundred active satellites currently orbit Earth, representing over forty nations, and nearly twenty-five thousand satellites are projected to join by 2030. Moreover, spacefaring entities are testing the limits of space exploration: Visionary space companies are aiming to launch space tourism programs and send humans to space within the decade, and governments and militaries are increasing activity in cislunar space—the sphere formed by the Earth-Moon radius—to leverage advantageous orbital regions. As humanity expands its frontiers deeper into the galaxy, the threats to US and allied space capabilities will continue to increase. Yet, despite the proliferation of space activity, the ability of international and national bodies to track and regulate space objects—often referred to as space traffic management (STM)—reflects a past era wherein few actors conducted limited operations in space. The current state of STM can be more aptly described as space situational awareness (SSA), or the mere knowledge of objects in orbit. Global actors (including national governments, corporations, and international organizations) track space objects and notify satellite operators when the probability of collision is notable. While collision avoidance maneuvers are standard when there is a one in ten thousand chance of collision, it is ultimately up to the operators to determine whether and when they will move. The limits of this decentralized approach to SSA were illustrated in September 2019 when a European Space Agency satellite veered off path to avoid a Starlink satellite whose operator missed an email notification signaling a high probability of collision.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, National Security, and Space
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, Asia, and United States of America

70. Will economic statecraft threaten western currency dominance? Sanctions, geopolitics, and the global monetary order

Author:
Carla Norrlof
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The return of great power rivalry is stoking renewed fears of weakening Western currency dominance. Financial sanctions are becoming the preferred economic tool for accomplishing geopolitical goals. These instruments are especially popular with the United States and Europe. In response, rival great powers, notably China and Russia, are diversifying away from Western currencies and developing counterstrategies to maintain economic and foreign policy autonomy. As other countries are hit by increasingly punishing Western sanctions, the incentive to join Russia and China’s alternative international monetary order increases. New analysis, published in this report, shows early signs that some countries may be trying to diversify away from the dollar. A growing circle of countries attempting to evade the Western-centric financial and currency order may over time erode the dollar and the euro’s sizeable lead, though will likely fall well short of ending their global dominance. This report analyzes these trends and quantifies the extent of reserve diversification following Russia’s 2022 war on Ukraine. It also assesses the polarity of the international currency order since the onset of the euro in 2002. Reserve diversification out of the dollar, and into the euro, has been modest, though Chinese renminbi reserves grew after Russia’s February offensive in Ukraine. Dollar unipolarity declined acutely in 2017 as the number of countries sanctioned by the United States increased and the US President Donald J. Trump threatened to revoke alliance commitments. Using economic statecraft while retaining global economic influence will require the United States to keep its economic house in order and allies close, if the current unipolar currency order is to survive.
Topic:
Economics, Monetary Policy, Sanctions, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

71. Microchips and Semiconductors: The U.S. Seeks Autonomy

Author:
Andrzej Dąbrowski
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The United States has turned to support of the domestic microchip industry in response to the increased risk of Chinese aggression against Taiwan, one of the leading producers, as well as to address disruptions in supply chains caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. A law on this passed with bipartisan consent and is intended to help finance a more resilient American sector towards global changes in manufacturing these components. Thanks to the CHIPS Act, the U.S. can reduce its dependence on microchip imports and undermine China’s ability to dominate the market.
Topic:
Markets, Science and Technology, Autonomy, Industry, Supply Chains, Semiconductors, and Microchips
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

72. Cooperation and Peril: Germany Attempts a Policy Balance with China

Author:
Łukasz Jasiński
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The COVID-19 pandemic, the Russian aggression against Ukraine, and the resulting disruption of supply chains have intensified the ongoing debate in Germany over the preferred shape of German-Chinese relations. Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s government sees China as both a partner and rival. Reducing dependence on China is challenging due to its scale and the strength of the pro-China business lobby. This unsteady position will cause tensions in relations with partners, including the U.S., and conflicts within the governing coalition. Germany will continue to develop trade relations with China while blocking Chinese investment in critical sectors.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Trade, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Germany

73. Japan Focuses Policy on Economic Security

Author:
Oskar Pietrewicz
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Japan is stepping up efforts to increase its economic security. In August, some new regulations came into force aimed at strengthening, among others, the resilience of supply chains and developing technological potential. Japan is thus responding to the challenges of China’s policy, the U.S.-China rivalry, and global technological progress. Improving economic security will require the government to cooperate with both Japanese business and international partners, including the U.S. and the EU.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Regulation, Supply Chains, and Economic Security
Political Geography:
Japan, China, and Asia

74. China Tightens Policy towards Taiwan

Author:
Marcin Przychodniak
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
China treated the visit of Speaker of the House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan at the beginning of August as an expression of U.S. efforts to change the status quo in the region. The reaction of the Chinese authorities was calculated as a controlled escalation of tensions in the Taiwan Strait, but without the risk of direct military confrontation. Harsh rhetoric, military exercises around the island, and the limitation of dialogue with the U.S. confirmed the intention of China to take over Taiwan in the coming years. For the EU, this means the need to intensify support for Taiwan, including the development of political and economic contacts.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Territorial Disputes, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

75. Inside China’s Techno-Security State

Author:
Tai Ming Cheung
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
Abstract:
Since coming to power, Xi Jinping has significantly elevated the importance of national security and technological innovation in the country’s overall priorities. He has invested considerable time, effort, and political capital to establish an expansive techno-security state based upon his strategic and ideological vision. This brief examines the five major methods Xi’s administration has undertaken to develop its techno-security state: developing a national security state, innovation-driven development, military strengthening, military-civilian fusion, and economic securitization.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Industrial Policy, International Security, Innovation, Strategic Competition, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

76. Digitalisation for Sustainable Infrastructure: The Road Ahead

Author:
Carlo Secchi and Alessandro Gili
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:
In today’s tumultuous and fast-changing times, digitalisation and technology are game changers in a wide range of sectors and have a tremendous impact on infrastructure. Roads, railways, electricity grids, aviation, and maritime transport are deeply affected by the digital and technological transition, with gains in terms of competitiveness, cost-reduction, and safety. Digitalisation is also a key tool for fostering global commitment towards sustainability, but the race for digital infrastructure is also a geopolitical one. As the world’s largest economies are starting to adopt competitive strategies, a level playing field appears far from being agreed upon. Why are digitalisation and technology the core domains of global geopolitical competition? How are they changing the way infrastructure is built, operated, and maintained? To what extent will road, rail, air, and maritime transport change by virtue of digitalisation, artificial intelligence, and the Internet of Things? How to enhance cyber protection for critical infrastructure? What are the EU’s, US’ and China's digital strategies?
Topic:
Science and Technology, Infrastructure, European Union, Sustainability, and Digitalization
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

77. China’s Infrastructure Projects in the Middle East: Lessons from China’s Engagement Elsewhere

Author:
Dominika Urhová
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:
In our latest issue of Iqtisadi, Ms. Dominika Urhova discusses the economic strategy and role of China in the Middle East, and analyzes the implications of China's growing influence in the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, Economics, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Strategic Engagement
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, and Asia

78. World Economy Winter 2022: Strong headwinds for global economic activity

Author:
Klaus-Jurgen Gern, Stefan Kooths, Ulrich Stolzenburg, Jan Reents, and Nils Sonnenberg
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
Global growth has decelerated over the course of the year under the impact of high energy prices and great uncertainty. Monetary policy, which is being tightened very quickly in view of high inflationary pressure across the board, is now also putting a drag on economic activity. Overall, production remained on an upward trend into the fall, with impetus coming from easing supply bottlenecks and the continuing normalization of activity in those sectors of the economy particularly affected by the Covid-19 pandemic. Towards the end of the year, however, economic momentum weakened noticeably further. The major advanced economies in particular are currently facing a period of weak economic activity despite considerable fiscal support measures. At the same time, the problems for the Chinese economy remain significant. While global output (measured on a purchasing power parity basis) at 3.2 percent is expected to grow by 0.3 percentage points more this year than expected in September, we continue to forecast an increase of only 2.2 percent next year. For 2024, our expectation has even been reduced slightly to 3.2 percent, mainly because we do expect the US economy to recover slowly. Inflation is likely to have peaked and is expected to slow significantly over the forecast horizon thanks to lower commodity prices and easing economic tensions. However, underlying inflation is not likely to return to target levels until the end of the forecast period.
Topic:
Monetary Policy, Economy, Business, COVID-19, and Emerging Economies
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

79. World Economy Autumn 2022: Global growth falters

Author:
Klaus-Jurgen Gern, Stefan Kooths, Ulrich Stolzenburg, Jan Reents, and Nils Sonnenberg
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
In spring 2022, world economic growth came to a standstill amid high inflation, persistent supply bottlenecks and elevated uncertainty. In many countries real wages are declining significantly dampening private consumption even though extra savings accumulated during the pandemic are still available to mitigate the adverse impact to some extent. At the same time financial conditions have also deteriorated as central banks tightened their policies. In China, the strict zero-covid policy and problems in the real estate sector are slowing economic activity. Against this backdrop, the outlook for the global economy has deteriorated further. We have, again, lowered our forecast and are now expecting global output to increase by only 2.9 percent this year and 2.2 percent next year (calculated on a purchasing power parity basis). The forecast assumes that commodity prices will gradually decline in line with forward prices, which will over time reduce the upward pressure on prices and provides the foundations for an economic upturn in 2024. However, the pass-through of higher commodity prices into consumer prices is probably not yet complete and wage increases are likely to intensify in many countries. Consequently, underlying inflation is likely to remain higher than in the years before the Covid crisis and remain above central bank targets over the forecast horizon.
Topic:
Monetary Policy, Business, COVID-19, Zero-COVID, Emerging Economies, and Advanced Economies
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

80. Country, Culture or Competition - What Drives Attitudes Towards Immigrants in Sub-Saharan Africa?

Author:
Malte Becker, Ralf Krüger, and Tobias Heidland
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
Sub-Saharan Africa is becoming an increasingly important destination for international migration. The region hosts immigrants from other African countries and from other parts of the world, such as China. Given high poverty levels and weak social security systems in Sub-Saharan Africa, host populations might fear increasing competition for resources and labor, potentially resulting in negative attitudes towards immigrants. We provide the first systematic study of attitudes towards immigrants in Sub-Saharan African countries that uses a causal framework. Using a survey experiment in Uganda and Senegal, we study both attitudes towards immigrants in general and towards specific immigrant groups. In particular, we focus on Chinese immigrants, whose increasing presence in Africa is seen by many as the most important contemporary geopolitical shift involving the continent. We find that attitudes towards immigrants are mainly driven by sociotropic cultural and sociotropic economic concerns. Furthermore, immigrants from China are perceived less positively and economically more threatening than immigrants in general.
Topic:
Development, Migration, Immigration, Sustainability, and Attitudes
Political Geography:
Africa and China

81. Tracking Chinese Aid through China Customs: Darlings and Orphans after the COVID-19 Outbreak

Author:
Andreas Fuchs, Lennart Kaplan, Krisztina Kis-Katos, Sebastian Schmidt, Felix Turbanisch, and Feicheng Wang
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
Since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, China's mask and vaccine diplomacy have been widely discussed, but the debate relies on a few stylized data points. This article introduces a systematic way to measure China's foreign aid in almost real-time through official customs records of exported aid goods. Our results show significant shifts in China's aid after the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. First, medical aid skyrocketed after the outbreak. It was initially dominated by face masks and other protective equipment and later by vaccines. This came at the expense of non-medical aid, which was 16.3 percent below its pre-pandemic level. Second, China's aid became global, clearly extending beyond the Global South. Third, in the aftermath of the initial outbreak in March 2020, China's aid became less responsive to both recipient need and political friendship, which can be mainly attributed to the rise of aid through non-government sources. However, in the vaccine diplomacy period of 2021, economic needs and political factors have regained their original importance.
Topic:
Development, Diplomacy, Public Health, Vaccine, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China and Asia

82. Brothers in arms: The value of coalitions in sanctions regimes

Author:
Sonali Chowdhry, Julian Hinz, Katrin Kamin, and Joschka Wanner
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
This paper examines the impact of coalitions on the economic costs of the 2012 Iran and 2014 Russia sanctions. By estimating and simulating a quantitative general equilibrium trade model under different coalition set-ups, we (i) dissect welfare losses for sanction-senders and target; (ii) compare prospective coalition partners and; (iii) provide bounds for the sanctions potential — the maximum welfare change attainable — when sanctions are scaled vertically, i.e. across sectors up to an embargo, or horizontally, i.e. across countries up to a global regime. To gauge the significance of simulation outcomes, we implement a Bayesian bootstrap procedure that generates confidence bands. We find that the implemented measures against Iran and Russia inflicted considerable economic harm, yielding 32 – 37% of the vertical sanctions potential. Our key finding is that coalitions lower the average welfare loss incurred from sanctions relative to unilateral implementation. They also increase the welfare loss imposed on Iran and Russia. Adding China to the coalition further amplifies the welfare loss by 79% for Iran and 22% for Russia. Finally, we quantify transfers that would equalize losses across coalition members. These hypothetical transfers can be seen as a sanctions-equivalent of NATO spending goals and provide a measure of the relative burden borne by coalition countries.
Topic:
Globalization, International Trade and Finance, Markets, Sanctions, Alliance, and Embargo
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

83. Partnerships for Policy Transfer: How Brazil and China Engage in Triangular Cooperation with the United Nations

Author:
Laura Trajber Waisbich and Sebastian Haug
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:
This paper offers a comparative analysis of Brazilian and Chinese partnerships with the United Nations (UN) as a mechanism and channel for policy transfer. In international policy travel flows, China and Brazil currently hold privileged places as hubs from which development-related policies travel and through which they circulate. Both countries have invested in systematising their development experience and transferring development policies within their regions and beyond – often through triangular cooperation, i.e. South–South cooperation supported by third actors such as UN entities. So far, however, this variegated engagement has remained under the radar of scholarly attention. To address this gap, we examine 35 policy transfer partnerships – 17 for Brazil and 18 for China – forged with different parts of the UN system over the last two decades. In order to offer a first systematic account of partnership trajectories, we provide an overview of partnership types (namely projects, programmes and policy centres) and transfer dimensions (including the policies themselves, transfer agents and governance arrangements). Our comparative mapping presents an evolving landscape: while Brazil was first in institutionalising robust policy transfer partnerships with numerous UN entities and then slowed down, China started more cautiously but has significantly expanded its collaboration with the UN system since 2015. The partnerships analysed cover a substantial range of sectors, with a particular focus – for both Brazil and China – on agricultural policies. While Brazilian partnerships with the UN primarily engage with linkages between agriculture and social protection, however, China–UN partnerships focus more on productivity and market linkages. As the first comprehensive mapping and comparative analysis of Brazilian and Chinese policy transfer partnerships with the UN, this paper contributes to a better understanding of (triangular) cooperation schemes between international organisations and their member states, as well as debates about how policies deemed as successful travel around the globe.
Topic:
Development, International Cooperation, United Nations, and Partnerships
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Brazil, and South America

84. How Does Urban Rail Development in China and India Enable Technological Upgrading?

Author:
Emmanuel Theodore Asimeng and Tilman Altenburg
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:
The socioeconomic wellbeing of urban areas depends on a well-functioning transportation system that makes it easier for people to access goods and services. Whereas most urban areas in emerging economies are expanding in size and human population, high motorisation and inadequate public transport services have resulted in congestion, traffic accidents and increasing transport-related greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Urban rail development can help address the current transportation problem because trains can move a large number of people at high speed, provide reliable services, contribute to lower GHGs and have a low accident rate. However, urban rail is expensive and requires many technical and technological capabilities often unavailable in emerging economies because they are technology latecomers. This paper examines how two emerging economies, China and India, have adopted industrial policies to develop local capabilities for urban rail technology. The paper shows how the Chinese government has moved from purchasing urban rail technology from multinational companies (MNCs) to the current situation where it has developed local capabilities, owns rail technology patents and competes with the same MNCs on the international market. The paper also demonstrates how India is gradually improving the local manufacturing of rail subsystems as opposed to importation. Overall, the paper suggests a pathway to industrial policy adoption that demonstrates how emerging economies can catch up with urban rail technology development to address their local transportation needs.
Topic:
Development, Industrial Policy, Science and Technology, Multinational Corporations, Urban, and Railways
Political Geography:
China, India, and Asia

85. Modernizing the People's Liberation Army: The Human Factor

Author:
Marc Julienne and Constantin Lagraulet
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The tremendous demographic challenges facing China will not significantly affect the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in the immediate future, but will become more problematic in the medium and long term. The rapid aging of the population and the resulting socio-economic imbalances will put pressure on defense budgets, military wages and the general attractiveness of the army. For the time being, the PLA’s primary goal in terms of human resources is to build a less oversized, more professional army, prepared for high-intensity combat. This objective is in line with the institutional reform of 2016, which shortened the chain of command and strengthened the political and ideological control of the Communist Party of China (CPC) over the PLA through an overhaul of the Central Military Commission (CMC). This reform also involved a major restructuring of China’s armed forces. The PLA is pursuing a streamlining target that emphasizes quality over quantity. This qualitative improvement concerns equipment, forces and chains of command, and is driven by the need to elevate modernity, operational effectiveness and interoperability. An analysis of the evolution of the PLA Navy Marine Corps and the People’s Armed Police (PAP) demonstrates this qualitative upgrading trend and the prioritization of combat readiness. To integrate increasingly modern and complex equipment, the PLA is also focusing on recruiting and retaining young conscripts and volunteers with a high level of education, in order to increase the number of commissioned and non-commissioned officers. The major reforms being carried out thus aim to enhance the status of the military so as to strengthen its economic and social attractiveness. On the other hand, the PLA, like other armies around the world, is confronted with societal phenomena such as internet addiction, near-sightedness and obesity, which hinder its ambitions and force it to make trade-offs in its selection standards.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Demographics, Modernization, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, East Asia, and Asia

86. “Open” Telecom Networks (Open RAN): Towards a Reconfiguration of International Competition in 5G?

Author:
Mathilde Velliet
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
In line with the anti-Huawei diplomatic campaign of the Trump and Biden administrations, the United States has promoted an alternative: Open RAN, a concept defined by "open" network architectures. At the intersection of 5G geopolitics and standards, what risks and opportunities does Open RAN present for European technological sovereignty? The Radio Access Network (RAN) is the radio part of a mobile telecommunications system that enables the connection between a mobile device (such as a phone or computer) and the core network. While traditionally a single vendor (such as Huawei, Ericsson, or Nokia) provides a “proprietary” or “closed” solution for this part of the network, Open RAN (Open Radio Access Network) is a concept describing disaggregated architectures that divide the RAN into several bricks connected by open interfaces. The objective is to allow the operator to buy these hardware and software bricks from various suppliers, and to choose freely the most suitable option for each part. In the current context of a concentrated 5G market, dominated by three major manufacturers and even facing the risk of an Ericsson-Nokia duopoly with the exclusion of Huawei from many countries, telecom operators emphasize the flexibility and diversification of suppliers allowed by Open RAN, which would allow both more innovation and cost reduction. In line with its diplomatic campaign against “unreliable” Chinese suppliers, the United States has actively promoted Open RAN as an alternative. However, Open RAN seems far from being a panacea for Europe: in addition to the difficulties that remain in terms of maturity, security, performance and transparency of the specification process, it risks increasing European dependence on foreign suppliers. Although Huawei is not part of the international bodies working on Open RAN (such as the Telecom Infra Project or the O-RAN Alliance), many companies close to the Chinese political and military authorities are. Beyond the question of supplier security, American lobbying is linked to the commercial opportunity that Open RAN represents for American companies, currently leaders in the cloud, software and generic hardware components…even though they do not have a major 5G champion. Open RAN is therefore an issue at the crossroads of the geopolitics of 5G and standards, to which the European Union is beginning to provide a common political and analytical response, despite the diversity of positions among member states.
Topic:
5G, Telecommunications, and International Competition
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

87. How China’s Foreign Aid Fosters Social Bonds With Central Asian Ruling Elites

Author:
Nargis Kassenova
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
China has become a global power, but there is too little debate about how this has happened and what it means. Many argue that China exports its developmental model and imposes it on other countries. But Chinese players also extend their influence by working through local actors and institutions while adapting and assimilating local and traditional forms, norms, and practices. With a generous multiyear grant from the Ford Foundation, Carnegie has launched an innovative body of research on Chinese engagement strategies in seven regions of the world—Africa, Central Asia, Latin America, the Middle East and North Africa, the Pacific, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. Through a mix of research and strategic convening, this project explores these complex dynamics, including the ways Chinese firms are adapting to local labor laws in Latin America, Chinese banks and funds are exploring traditional Islamic financial and credit products in Southeast Asia and the Middle East, and Chinese actors are helping local workers upgrade their skills in Central Asia. These adaptive Chinese strategies that accommodate and work within local realities are mostly ignored by Western policymakers in particular. Ultimately, the project aims to significantly broaden understanding and debate about China’s role in the world and to generate innovative policy ideas. These could enable local players to better channel Chinese energies to support their societies and economies; provide lessons for Western engagement around the world, especially in developing countries; help China’s own policy community learn from the diversity of Chinese experience; and potentially reduce frictions.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Foreign Aid, and Elites
Political Geography:
China, Central Asia, and Asia

88. A Historical Evaluation of China’s India Policy: Lessons for India-China Relations

Author:
Vijay Gokhale
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The violent clash in the Galwan valley in eastern Ladakh in 2020 fundamentally altered the dynamics of the India-China relationship. China’s increasing transgressions and attempts at coercion in the border areas since 2008–2009 have put the boundary question to the center of the India-China relationship. The salience of this question has also increased because the geopolitical backlash to China’s actions in 2020 has been greater than in previous instances, and because India’s policymakers and strategic community are no longer willing to give Beijing the benefit of the doubt regarding its intentions and actions. This has prompted a comprehensive relook in India at the past, present, and future of the relationship. While much of this has focused on the relationship from the Indian perspective and on trying to understand India’s China policy, the current chill in ties has highlighted the necessity of understanding China’s India policy. Thus, using Chinese sources, this paper analyzes the drivers of that policy and the options available to Indian policymakers to engage with, adapt to, and mold it. This paper argues that from the time of Mao Zedong’s rise to the helm of the Chinese Communist Party and the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, China’s India policy has been shaped by its view of the larger great power strategic triangle of China, the Soviet Union (later Russia), and the United States. As this triangle has evolved, this has had a direct effect on the India-China relationship. For much of the past seventy years, China was the weakest corner of the triangle and therefore driven by goals of security and status. In that context, it saw India—another large, developing country in Asia—as a competitor for security and status alike. As a result, China always looked at India through the lens of its own relations with the Soviet Union and the United States. It did not view India on its own merits, or credit it with agency, but as unequal as well as untrustworthy. China’s objective during the Cold War was to keep India as neutral as possible. In the post–Cold War period, the goal evolved to limit through containment and coercion India’s capacity to harm China’s strategic goal of hegemony. This paper analyzes China’s India policy in three phases. In the first phase between 1949 and 1962, China viewed the United States as its primary adversary and its core objective was to keep India neutral and away from the U.S. camp on matters of concern to Beijing. Flowing from this was the secondary objective of utilizing India’s influence in the developing world to build “Asian solidarity” to stem U.S. inroads into Asia.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Territorial Disputes, and Military
Political Geography:
China, India, and Asia

89. How Malaysian Politics Shaped Chinese Real Estate Deals and Economic Development

Author:
Guanie Lim
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Iskandar Malaysia is the oldest and by far the most prominent economic corridor in Malaysia. Located in the southernmost state of Johor, the corridor came to host several real estate developments (such as Princess Cove and Forest City) involving multinational corporations (MNCs) from China almost immediately after the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was launched in 2013. On one level, the infrastructure-spending spree associated with the BRI helped boost Malaysia’s economy as Chinese real estate MNCs invested in Iskandar Malaysia to grow their overseas portfolios. However, their involvement in the corridor disrupted the existing dynamics between Malaysia’s central and local governments. Although these Chinese projects offered an opening for Johor’s state government to counter Putrajaya’s dominance in the economic corridor, some swiftly became a magnet for divisive electoral campaigning and voter anger. Combined with several socioeconomic issues, the discontent generated by these Chinese real estate projects contributed to the unexpected defeat of the long-ruling United Malays National Organization (UMNO) in Malaysia’s May 2018 general election. Chinese real estate MNCs have sought to adapt to these shifting dynamics, yet it is uncertain to what degree their adaptive strategies will bear fruit amid a looming real estate crisis back in China and other related issues. Ultimately, Chinese real estate investment has been both a tool and an enabler of efforts undertaken by various Malaysian stakeholders, rather than the all-powerful China-imposed juggernaut that some commentators on Malaysia’s development over the last two decades have tended to see. Despite the allure of lucrative real estate deals, it is equally important to recognize the potential pitfalls when local politics go awry. Events in Iskandar Malaysia demonstrate that it is politically unsustainable to push real estate projects that are too expensive for most local residents to afford.
Topic:
Politics, Entrepreneurship, Risk, Economic Development, and Real Estate
Political Geography:
China, Malaysia, and Asia

90. Localization and China’s Tech Success in Indonesia

Author:
Gatra Priyandita, Dirk Van Der Kley, and Benjamin Herscovitch
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
On average, Indonesians distrust China and many Chinese firms. Yet Huawei and to a lesser extent ZTE have successfully positioned themselves as trusted cybersecurity providers to the Indonesian government and the Indonesian nation. This has been no easy feat given long-held Indonesian animosity toward China. Many Chinese companies have faced protests over concerns they were taking local jobs. Huawei and ZTE have suffered no such fate. Nor has there been a broad coalition of Indonesian voices against using Chinese technology in critical telecommunications infrastructure. In short, Indonesians care a lot more about Chinese cement plants than they do about Huawei involvement in 5G networks. Gatra Priyandita Gatra Priyandita is an analyst at the International Cyber Policy Centre at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, where he leads a project researching cyber-enabled intellectual property theft. He is a political scientist by training and specializes in the study of foreign policy and security in Southeast Asia. He holds a PhD in political science from the Australian National University. This is a vastly different conversation to those happening in rich liberal democracies. Huawei and ZTE have been able to achieve success in Indonesia, despite a sense of ambivalence among the Indonesian political and defense establishment about Chinese intentions and growing Western scrutiny over the use of Chinese technology in broadband networks. As other papers in this series have demonstrated, Huawei and ZTE needed to localize their strategies. Like elsewhere in the world, available evidence suggests that part of Huawei’s and ZTE’s value proposition is cheaper prices (compared to those of competitors) for high-quality technology. But that is only part of the story. Huawei has positioned itself as Indonesia’s cybersecurity provider of choice by offering enormous cybersecurity and other related training programs across the country for groups ranging from senior government officials to students in rural Indonesia. Much of this training is technically focused on practical vocational skills with a hope that students one day will become customers. In addition, the company offers an attractive maintenance and upkeep package. Since the mid-2000s, Chinese information and communications technology (ICT) firms have created training centers in partnership with local Indonesian telecoms companies and universities to train the next generation of Indonesian engineers and tech specialists. Government agencies are also increasingly targets of training and capacity-building programs, with Huawei claiming that 7,000 government officials have participated in its training programs. The Indonesian government, corporations, and ordinary citizens alike have welcomed Huawei and ZTE as essential partners in their efforts to build both the infrastructure and human capital necessary to prosper in the twenty-first century’s digital economy. What Huawei and ZTE offer is knowledge transfer, not technology transfer. The technology is still being built in China by Chinese firms. Huawei’s role in training relates instead to capacity building. Indonesians will install, maintain, and use the networks. China will build the hardware. There is also evidence that China has had some rhetorical success in pushing its version of cyberspace governance. Beijing’s preferred cyberspace governance language was inserted into a memorandum of understanding between Indonesia’s National Cyber and Crypto Agency and the Cybersecurity Administration of China. However, it is difficult to see how the memorandum has influenced Indonesia’s cybersecurity governance in practice. One of the concerns often leveled by rich liberal democracies is that reliance on Chinese tech will end up aligning the political interests of countries like Indonesia with those of China. Other key worries are China’s pervasive espionage and the enduring (though as yet unrealized) risk that Chinese companies with a dominant role in an ICT ecosystem could be used by Beijing to apply coercive political pressure. Despite Indonesia’s embrace of Huawei and ZTE, political leaders in Jakarta have not simply disregarded the hard security questions posed by upgrading ICT equipment, especially when foreign suppliers are involved. Indonesian officials simply rate the need for development and cybersecurity-related capacity building higher than the risk of using Chinese ICT hardware in their critical infrastructure systems. If rich liberal democracies are concerned about this trend, then they need to offer workable alternatives that place Indonesia’s enormous digital development needs at the heart of any value proposition. It is unlikely that Indonesia will stop using Chinese hardware in its infrastructure, but alternatives could prevent overreliance.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Telecommunications, and Localization
Political Geography:
China, Indonesia, and Asia

91. Russia’s National Security Narrative: All Quiet on the Eastern Front

Author:
Eugene Rumer and Richard Sokolsky
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The two defining features of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy have been an increasingly adversarial relationship with the West and an increasingly close partnership with China. These drivers have been the salient feature of official Russian national security documents for the past three decades. Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. national security community has viewed Russian strategic thinking as misguided because it failed to see China as the real threat to Russia. This view ignores the Kremlin’s preoccupation with Europe as the most important strategic theater where its interests are at stake, and where they are threatened by the West’s superior capabilities and ambitions. This view also ignores how unimportant—relative to Europe—the Asia-Pacific is for Russia. Russia’s partnership with China is secured, however, by a set of coherent and complementary strategic rationales, which supersede frequent concerns in the Russian strategic community at large about China and its growing capabilities and intentions vis-à-vis Russia. Those concerns appear to have little impact on Russian policy. Notwithstanding those concerns in Russia’s unofficial national security discourse, China’s footprint on its foundational national security and foreign policy documents is invisible—and China, as a source of military threat to Russia, does not appear to be part of the Kremlin’s calculus. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has long been the pacing challenge of Russian military modernization, and the main contingency for which it has been preparing has been future conflict in the European theater. For the Putin regime, there is no alternative to Russia’s “no limits” partnership with China. Moreover, even if Putin were no longer on the scene, a successor regime would have powerful economic, geopolitical, demographic, and military-strategic incentives to maintain this partnership. An adversarial relationship with China would pit Russia against two superior powers in two widely separated geographic theaters. The war in Ukraine has cemented the Russian-Chinese partnership for the foreseeable future.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, and Ukraine

92. Engaging China on Strategic Stability and Mutual Vulnerability

Author:
George Perkovich
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The United States and Chinese governments, for the foreseeable future, will have the resources to keep each other’s societies vulnerable to nuclear mass destruction. If these governments are not self-destructive, they will want to keep their competition from escalating into armed conflict that could lead to nuclear war. The constructs of strategic stability and mutual vulnerability can help significantly if both governments embrace them and interpret them similarly or even if the leaders of the two countries accurately understand how they differ in their perspectives on them. Unfortunately, to date, on these issues the United States and China are like a quarrelling married couple who tried therapy for one or two appointments, found it dissatisfying, and then alternated in making excuses for not trying again, perhaps with a different therapist or format. Each says they have tried and the other doesn’t listen or understand. Both suspect that the other isn’t saying what they really feel or want; what they really feel is hostility and distrust and what they really want is to get richer and more powerful without being hassled or attacked. It would be easier if they could just go their separate ways, but the property and wealth they depend on will be lost (or at least severely diminished) if they split up or do each other harm. This paper suggests that U.S. and allied interests require persistence in inviting China to dialogue on strategic stability; to demonstrate goodwill, the United States should acknowledge mutual vulnerability as a fact and necessary policy. The need for both moves is reflected in the fact that neither government has defined what it might mean by stability or mutual vulnerability. To help test intentions and prompt harder thinking, the paper plays the role of therapist and offers definitions of both concepts—strategic stability and mutual vulnerability—so that the two sides can critique them more freely and without recrimination. These definitions are broader and deeper than usual, reflecting the growing problem of managing escalation of conventional conflict to nuclear war, the scenario that drives U.S. and Chinese concerns and military posturing. Further, broader definitions are necessary to comprehend the dangers stemming from the entanglement of conventional, cyber, and nuclear weapons and command and control systems. The paper then sketches four benefits of declaring mutual vulnerability, contrary to opponents of the idea, before discussing steps that the United States and China could subsequently take to reflect and build each other’s confidence in such a policy. Finally, if perceived U.S. requirements in the future will be greater than the arsenal needed to deter or defeat Russia or China alone, how will Russia and China be persuaded not to try to build up to balance the additional U.S. force? In other words, if the United States is in two separate but interacting arms races (and deterrence relationships), how could each opponent (China and Russia) be persuaded to negotiate limits on their arsenal lower than the total the United States would insist on possessing to deter two nuclear opponents? Answers to these questions will affect strategic stability and mutual vulnerability of all parties but will take a long time to develop. To begin the process, the paper suggests asking Chinese leaders whether their silence on Putin’s nuclear first-use threats means that China has changed its own policy on nuclear use or that it never took a no-first-use policy seriously in the first place. Is China concerned that the capabilities that the United States and its allies may develop to strengthen defenses against Russia could be used against China too, and if so, might arms control be a wiser approach? Ultimately, the paper suggests that if China and the United States can sustain a process of serious dialogue, they will keep their relationship from worsening even if they cannot formally restrain their competition. And if dialogue leads one to ask the other for deeds to demonstrate goodwill, the paper has suggested some such deeds that could be undertaken with no security hazard and only slight political risk. No one should have the illusion that happiness is in this couple’s future. All this work would be to allow a nonviolent cohabitation that is better than the alternative of destitute divorce or murder-suicide.
Topic:
Government, Nuclear Weapons, Strategic Stability, and Vulnerability
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

93. Why Brazil Sought Chinese Investments to Diversify Its Manufacturing Economy

Author:
Celo Hiratuka
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, economic relations between Brazil and China have grown significantly. The main driver of this process has been China’s enormous demand for agricultural, energy, and mineral commodities. On the one hand, Brazil’s strong competitiveness in these products has helped the country consolidate its role as an important supplier to China, increasing exports and turning China into the main destination for Brazilian exports since 2009.1 On the other hand, China, by virtue of its status as the “factory of the world,” has established itself as the main supplier of manufactured products to Brazil.2 Nonetheless, Brazilian scholars, think tanks, and private manufacturing firms have raised concerns. They have done so despite the great boost in bilateral trade flows; the favorable trade balance for Brazil; and the leveraging of businesses in several Brazilian sectors such as soybeans, iron ore, and oil. These concerns are related to the excessive concentration of Brazilian exports in a few products, the environmental impacts of these exporting activities, and the effects of strong Chinese manufacturing competition on Brazil’s domestic market. These worries have become more significant when one considers the growing importance of manufacturing changes with the diffusion of Fourth Industrial Revolution technologies and the search for new renewable energy sources and environmental sustainability. For Brazil, this matter reflects a need to advance bilateral relations beyond existing export trade volumes and toward new drivers of more diversified economic growth that will help the country escape a specialization in commodities. The fortunes of the Chinese company BYD in Brazil are highly relevant to these trends. BYD is a company that has diversified from the production of batteries into different innovative industrial sectors, such as renewable energy and electric vehicles. BYD has also been expanding rapidly in international markets, and in that process it chose Brazil as an important market, where it has built factories to produce electric bus chassis, photovoltaic panels, and batteries for electric buses. BYD’s trajectory in Brazil certainly has not been smooth. On the contrary, the firm has had to adapt to market fluctuations and, above all, to changes in the Brazilian government’s economic policies, which have made the company’s experience in the country quite turbulent. Despite this, BYD survived its first years in Brazil and more recently has been showing signs of continuing to invest in the Brazilian market. Analysis of BYD’s experience in Brazil shows, on the one hand, that there are important possibilities for new economic relations with China that go beyond trade in commodities, with productive investments that can potentially help Brazil simultaneously incorporate more knowledge-intensive activities and drive positive environmental impacts by generating renewable energy and reducing carbon emissions. On the other hand, the story of BYD also shows that the transformation of these possibilities into effective benefits requires coordinated actions on the part of Brazilian policymakers to offer a long-term horizon for Chinese investments. In that spirit, Brazil must craft a long-term strategy for its economic relationship with China to increase the odds that bilateral engagement can advance in a new and more sustainable, mutually beneficial direction.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Economy, Investment, Manufacturing, and Engagement
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Brazil, and South America

94. What China Is Learning From West African Managerial Practices

Author:
Abdoulkadre Ado
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Joint ventures have enabled Chinese companies to cultivate a presence in three West African countries—Ghana, Niger, and Nigeria. Investing in joint ventures has enabled Chinese cultural adaptation by emphasizing training programs in languages commonly spoken in West Africa, embracing local management styles, and assimilating some local practices. This has been especially true in three key economic sectors: free trade zone promotion and related services, transportation and aviation, and oil and gas. Chinese firms are also complementing these growing business arrangements with the use of local languages, social media outreach, and other forms of local engagement with West Africans. In doing so, Chinese organizations have responded to some of the demands of their African partners in local, state, and central government posts. It would be beneficial for African governments, businesses, and corporate managers to explore further ways to incentivize Chinese government decisionmakers and Chinese businesses to use joint ventures more often as the vehicle for their investments in Africa. To deepen the impact of such efforts, they should also encourage Chinese organizations active in West Africa, and across the continent in general, to embrace the use of local languages, especially for conducting business, and to train more Chinese expatriates to use African managerial philosophies that have proven to respect local values while being effective in African markets. Research on China’s engagement abroad and Chinese firms’ business operations in foreign countries often argues that Chinese organizations are not keen to adapt to local contexts. As a result, some analysts of China-Africa relations argue, or at least imply, that China does things as it wishes in Africa and that African countries have little agency in shaping how Chinese governmental and commercial players operate in their countries. Some analysts have even characterized African countries’ relationships with Beijing as the “Chinisation of Africa.”1 This line of thinking tends to assume that local contexts have mattered little for Chinese economic activities in Africa so far. But Chinese commercial engagement in Africa is increasingly adaptative to local contexts, conditions, and complexities. In Ghana, Niger, and Nigeria, Chinese actors are adjusting their ways of doing business to consider local realities with respect to both formal and informal institutions. For one thing, the Chinese players who are active in these three countries are acknowledging and mobilizing African practices and cultural traditions to support their own business goals and sometimes those of their local partners. The level of Chinese economic engagement tends to differ from one African country to another, with some places being more welcoming of a Chinese commercial presence than others. The specific patterns of Chinese adaptation also tend to vary between different parts of Africa. For instance, these adaptations may look different in a Francophone country like Niger than they would in a country like Nigeria. Niger is a nation where China’s adaptation differs from its adaptation in Ghana or Nigeria since language and managerial practices partly are derived from various French and British cultural traditions and colonial imprints in those three African countries.
Topic:
Business, Engagement, Management, and Adaptation
Political Geography:
Africa, China, Asia, and West Africa

95. China Is Playing by Turkey’s Media Rules

Author:
Çağdaş Üngör
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Chinese players have localized their strategies to improve China’s image in Turkey in recent years. Although China and Turkey have long maintained friendly relations at the official level, Turkish people remained notably skeptical of China throughout the 2000s. Indeed, Turkey’s unfavorable public opinion has been a constant headache for China, whose propaganda outlets in the country produce little Turkish language content that actually resonates with domestic audiences. Turkey also has few explicitly pro-China voices and no sizable overseas Chinese community, which has made positive public relations into an uphill battle for Beijing. But having acknowledged these weaknesses in recent years, the Chinese regime has opted for strategies that aim at building a new synergy with local actors in the Turkish mediasphere. Beijing has adapted to the local rules of Turkish media and sought new opportunities to elevate China’s image in Turkey by leveraging its friendly ties with Ankara. The Turkish government, which exerts substantial influence over domestic media, has provided new platforms for China to realize its soft power goals within a largely polarized setting with little press freedom. In this context, Turkey’s progovernment newspapers have published “advertorials” celebrating the achievements of the Chinese Communist Party. Similarly, journalists from Turkey’s state-owned Anadolu Agency have participated in Chinese-sponsored press tours to Xinjiang, where Beijing has sought to undercut the Turkish narrative around abuses against the Uyghurs. On the other end of Turkey’s polarized ideological spectrum, China has also appealed to left-wing opposition groups through its narratives, which emphasize the country’s anti-imperialist credentials. Such messaging strategies may already have produced some results in Turkey, as the most recent opinion polls reflect a gradual increase in the number of Turkish citizens who perceive China as a potential partner.
Topic:
Media, Domestic Politics, and Soft Power
Political Geography:
China, Turkey, Middle East, and Asia

96. Hard Cash and Soft Power: When Chinese Firms Win EU Contracts

Author:
Allison Carragher
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The European Union is a committed defender of open markets. This extends to its public procurement mechanisms, which remain open to all bidders. EU policymakers have developed tools intended to defend the bloc’s interests in the face of increased economic and strategic competition from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), but few policymakers understand how the European public views the debate. As the first major EU-funded, China-built infrastructure project, the Pelješac Bridge in Croatia provides a unique opportunity to conduct a thorough analysis of European public opinion toward EU tendering policy and Chinese companies. Brussels has labelled the PRC a partner for cooperation and negotiation, an economic competitor, and a systemic rival,1 but the nuances of this policy remain difficult to ascertain. Projects and policies presented by China as “cooperation” often contain elements of economic competition or are leveraged by the PRC for strategic gain. However, this dichotomy has not filtered down to citizens. Extensive polling reveals that Croatians share very few of the concerns of EU policymakers. Furthermore, the PRC state-owned construction firm enjoys more visibility than the EU, which provided hundreds of millions of euros for the project. In terms of soft power, which is here defined as the ability of a country to shape the narrative, the Pelješac Bridge has been a resounding success for the PRC. The Croatian public has largely embraced the PRC’s preferred image of itself as a reliable and trustworthy economic partner and a benign power that does not interfere in domestic affairs. This opinion diverges from official EU policy and glosses over evidence of the PRC’s unfair economic practices, environmental and labor shortcomings, and interference in European democracies. Notably, the PRC’s soft-power gains were achieved on the EU’s own dime. It is not in the EU’s interest to bankroll the economic and soft-power ambitions of its systemic rival. As a democratic institution, the EU has a responsibility to both respond to public opinion and educate its citizenry when EU interests are at stake. In this case, the EU should recalibrate its tendering policy to be fairer and better aligned with its own economic and strategic interests. This process is currently underway, but it should also be extended to co-financing arrangements like the Team Europe approach, which combines traditional EU assistance with support from individual EU member states and international financial institutions. These policies must also be paired with renewed efforts at visibility and branding. Lastly, there is a need to collect and publish better data on the end users of EU funds in order to evaluate successes and identify future issues.
Topic:
Infrastructure, European Union, Economy, Business, Soft Power, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China and Asia

97. Networks and Competitive Advantage in a Contested World

Author:
Jennifer Kavanagh
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
In an increasingly multipolar world and amid challenges from China, Russia, and elsewhere, the United States faces a complex set of foreign policy demands and the real risk of becoming overextended. Networks—of states, businesses, and individuals—offer policymakers a way to prioritize and reduce global commitments while advancing core U.S. interests. Leveraging the right networks in the right ways can extend U.S. influence, support the economic and physical security of Americans, and compete with adversaries at sustainable cost. Today’s policymakers understand the power of networks but need more guidance on how to build and employ them as tools of competition in a contested world rather than a world of open borders and markets. Influence networks—networks primed to spread and amplify U.S. power, enhance U.S. competitiveness, and protect national interests—have three characteristics. They are attraction networks, organized around places and issues where countries and corporations are already interacting, meeting common needs with customized resources. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), for instance, is organized around a shared need for infrastructure across the Global South and embeds Chinese influence by tailoring agreements to each partner’s local conditions. The United States has used attraction effectively in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, but most U.S. foreign investment has been centralized and top-down. They are gated networks with clear criteria for entry, access, and exit. Gates capture network power and direct it toward specific goals. The European Union (EU) has used gated economic markets to build significant regulatory power and geopolitical relevance. The United States has tended toward universalism but employs gates in some security networks, like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and is turning toward gates in economic networks with friendshoring initiatives in some industries. Finally, they are distributed networks that have robust ties between members throughout the network, allowing influence to flow quickly along more pathways and facilitating collective action. The United States has often relied on less resilient hub-and-spoke networks to retain control. U.S. Indo-Pacific security alliances are hub-and-spoke, while NATO is more distributed, enabling more rapid, coordinated responses and wider spread of U.S. influence. Networks with these characteristics can help policymakers tackle their hardest problems. For example, better use of influence networks can support U.S. efforts to prioritize and fully resource the more significant challenge posed by China by pushing forward changes that advance European security autonomy and by building and mobilizing needed, distributed networks in the Indo-Pacific theater. Influence networks can inform U.S. strategies for building ties to hedging states that offer access to key resources or strategic locations—for example, by focusing on shared local needs of potential partners and U.S. comparative advantages and by creating distributed business or civil society partnerships. Finally, influence networks provide ways to approach the Russia-China relationship that support U.S. security and economic interests, including avoiding the isolation of either. These examples begin to illustrate how influence networks can improve U.S. strategies toward foreign policy challenges by offering policymakers a way to prioritize commitments, capitalize on U.S. strengths, and avoid overextension that harms U.S. interests. Additional exploration and application of these networks will investigate these and other foreign policy challenges in more depth.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Networks, Strategic Competition, and Multipolarity
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and United States of America

98. Multidomain Deterrence and Strategic Stability in China

Author:
Lora Saalman
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
Over the past few years, China has displayed a wide range of advances in military capabilities and infrastructure, including its test of a hypersonic glide vehicle coupled with a fractional orbital bombardment system and evidence of new intercontinental ballistic missile silos. While China and the United States remain at political odds, there are indications that China’s strategies in space, cyberspace and nuclear domains are increasingly converging with those of the USA, as well as Russia. A key question is whether this strategic convergence is a stabilizing or destabilizing phenomenon. To answer the question, this paper explores the current state of Chinese discussions on multidomain deterrence and strategic stability, with a focus on active defence and proactive defence. It then examines how these concepts are manifesting themselves in China’s postural and technological indicators, including pre-mating of nuclear warheads to delivery platforms, expanded nuclear arsenal size, possible shifts towards launch on warning, integration of dual-capable systems, and advances in machine learning and autonomy. It concludes with a discussion of what these trends mean for future strategic stability talks.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Nonproliferation, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
China and Asia

99. China’s Development Path: Government, Business, and Globalization in an Innovating Economy

Author:
Yin Yi and William Lazonick
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:
We employ the “social conditions of innovative enterprise” framework to analyze the key determinants of China’s development path from the economic reforms of 1978 to the present. First, we focus on how government investments in human capabilities and physical infrastructure provided foundational support for the emergence of Chinese enterprises capable of technological learning. Second, we delve into the main modes by which Chinese firms engaged in technological learning from abroad—joint ventures with foreign multinationals, global value chains, and experienced high-tech returnees—that have contributed to industrial development in China. Third, we provide evidence on achievements in indigenous innovation—by which we mean improvements in national productive capabilities that build on learning from abroad and enable the innovating firms to engage in global competition—in the computer, automobile, communication-technology, and semiconductor-fabrication industries. Finally, we sketch out the implications of our approach for current debates on the role of innovation in China’s development path as it continues to unfold.
Topic:
Development, Economics, Globalization, Infrastructure, Hegemony, and Innovation
Political Geography:
China and Asia

100. Geopolitics is Local – Ramifications of Chinese Projects for Human Security in Serbia

Author:
Maja Bjelos and Vuk Vuksanovic
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Belgrade Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
This report examines the Chinese presence in Serbia through a human security lens, in terms of how it impacts the quality of life and the security of local communities. China’s “no-strings attached” financing of infrastructure has become attractive for Serbia’s ruling elite after the global financial crisis of 2008. However, it took Chinese companies almost a decade to take over two state-owned giants – the Smederevo Steel Mill and the RTB Copper Smelter – and invest in the construction of a new tyre factory. To maintain social peace, employment and legitimise themselves among the constituents, the ruling elite invested a lot of effort in facilitating the arrival of Chinese capital. This effort included drafting laws that suited PRC investors, donating arable land and providing subsidies, circumventing environmental and construction standards, turning a blind eye to labour and human rights violations, and making many other concessions at the expense of citizens and the local communities. Lack of transparency and public scrutiny is common to all PRC investments. In a short period of time, the profit-oriented exploitation of natural resources by PRC investors has led to various environmental hazards that have endangered public health and human existence, causing environmental (anti-government) protests and resentment towards the Chinese. But combating environmental threats and rule of law violations associated with the Chinese projects is difficult, especially since the Serbian government is willing to quell criticism and provide such projects with full political backing. The research was conducted in three Serbian cities with large PRC investments – Smederevo, Bor and Zrenjanin – to establish the impact of these projects on local communities and how they affect human security, understood in terms of human rights and human dignity. Several forms of human security endangerment were observed in the course of the research project: environmental hazards, public health, socio-economic and human rights, rule of law, cross-cultural issues and surveillance.
Topic:
Security, Bilateral Relations, Hegemony, and Local
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and Serbia