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1. China's Political-Economy, Foreign and Security Policy: 2023

Author:
Center for China Analysis
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
It has now been three months since the 20th Party Congress convened in Beijing on October 15. While the Congress set Xi Jinping’s ideological, strategic, and economic direction for the next five years, much has happened since then that the Chinese leadership did not anticipate. Principal among these surprises was the spontaneous eruption in late November of public protests across multiple Chinese cities against the economic and social impact of the Chinese Communist Party’s “dynamic zero-COVID” policy. These protests resulted in an unprecedented U-turn on December 8 from China’s relentless pursuit of its three-year-long national pandemic containment strategy to the Party now seeking desperately to restore economic growth and social calm. This shift has in turn generated major public pressures on the Chinese health system as hospitals struggle to cope with surging caseloads and mortalities. All of these developments stand in stark contrast to the political, ideological, and nationalist self-confidence on display at the 20th Party Congress. In October, Xi Jinping swept the board by removing any would-be opponents from the Politburo and replacing them with long-standing personal loyalists. Xi also proclaimed China’s total victory over COVID-19, contrasting the Party’s success with the disarray its propaganda apparatus had depicted across the United States and the collective West. Despite faltering economic growth, Xi had doubled down in his embrace of a new, more Marxist approach to economic policy which prioritized planning over the market, national self-sufficiency over global economic integration, the centrality of the public sector over private enterprise, and a new approach to wealth distribution under the rubric of the Common Prosperity doctrine. At the same time, Xi’s 2022 Work Report, delivered at the Congress, abandoned Deng Xiaoping’s long-standing foreign policy framework that “peace and development are the principal themes of the time” and instead warned of growing strategic threats and the need for the military to be prepared for war. As part of a continuing series on China’s evolving political economy and foreign policy, this paper’s purpose is threefold: to examine the political and economic implications of this dramatic change in China’s COVID-19 strategy; to analyze what, if any, impact it may have on China’s current international posture; and to assess whether this represents a significant departure from the Party’s strategic direction set at the 20th Party Congress last October. The paper concludes that the Party changed course on COVID-19 for two reasons: (1) it feared that not doing so would threaten its unofficial social contract with the Chinese people based on long-term improvements in jobs and living standards; and (2) that a structural slowdown in growth could also undermine China’s long-term strategic competition against the United States. This paper also concludes that the stark nature of the December 8 policy backflip, together with the Chinese health system’s lack of preparedness for it, has dented Xi Jinping’s political armor for the medium term. This setback comes on top of internal criticism of Xi’s broader ideological assault on the Deng-Jiang-Hu historical economic growth formula that Xi has prosecuted since 2017, as well as Xi’s departure from Deng’s less confrontational foreign policy posture that characterized previous decades. Nonetheless, these policy errors remain manageable within Chinese elite politics, where Xi still controls the hard levers of power. Furthermore, many of these changes on both the economy and external policy are more likely to be short-to-medium term and therefore tactical in nature, rather than representing a strategic departure from the deep ideological direction laid out for the long-term in Xi’s October 2022 Work Report. While these changes to current economic and foreign policy settings are significant in their own right, there is no evidence to date that Xi Jinping’s ideological fundamentals have changed.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Political Economy, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China and Asia

2. Taiwan Strait Crises: Island Seizure Contingencies

Author:
Andrew Chubb
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
Conflict across the Taiwan Strait could disrupt East Asia’s extensive trade links, sever global production chains, generate serious shocks to regional economies, upend Asia’s security architecture, and, potentially, escalate into a catastrophic superpower war. Many regional states — including U.S. allies — are beginning to seriously consider how they would respond to a potential use of force by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). But analytic attention has focused overwhelmingly on the worst-case scenario of a PRC invasion, largely ignoring more likely contingencies calculated to stay below the threshold of lethal force. It is in this “gray zone” that the PRC has made strategic advances in the East and South China Seas in recent years. This paper argues that, compared with an invasion or blockade of Taiwan’s main island, an operation to capture one or more offshore islands currently controlled by the Republic of China (ROC or Taiwan) would offer Beijing considerable advantages. In an immediate tactical sense, it would offer Beijing greater flexibility and escalation control, lower risk of civilian casualties, and less likelihood of sparking a strong Taiwanese response or U.S. intervention. Strategically, such an operation could open up an array of options for further probes, faits accomplis, information gathering, and coercive pressure on ROC forces—and, in the case of the Penghu (Pescadores) Islands, substantial opportunities for enhanced surveillance, reconnaissance, and logistical support for a future invasion of the main island. Domestically, in contrast with a bloody and potentially catastrophic all-out invasion or a blockade that would risk conflict with the United States, outlying island seizure could offer Beijing a low-risk yet highly symbolic rallying point in a period of likely economic struggles and rising social dissatisfaction. Policymakers and strategists on all sides of politics in Taiwan, the United States and elsewhere need to carefully consider how they would respond to such contingencies, in order to enable an effective international response.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Territorial Disputes, Geopolitics, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

3. Understanding Alignment Decisions in Southeast Asia: A Review of U.S.-China Competition in the Philippines

Author:
William Piekos
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
The United States and China are engaged in an ongoing struggle for the alignment commitments of Southeast Asian governments, employing a variety of measures to entice, cajole, and threaten states to alter their policy behavior. Caught between this competition, countries in Southeast Asia weigh their alignment options in search of the strategy viewed by the ruling regime as most likely to ameliorate risk and increase its prospects for survival. While nonalignment through hedging is a sought-after option, most often smaller states align with the major power that offers inducements (over coercion), as the material and diplomatic benefits bolster regimes’ claim to performance-based legitimacy and its domestic stability and security. A review of the Philippines’ geopolitical positioning during the Benigno Aquino III (2010–2016) and Rodrigo Duterte (2016–2022) administrations reveals that inducements and coercion have played a significant role in the country’s alignment decisions. During the Aquino administration, coercive measures taken by China in the South China Sea and continued security and diplomatic inducements from the United States underscore the respective approaches of Beijing and Washington. The candidacy and election of Duterte, however, switched this dynamic, and the new president courted and received promises of Chinese economic assistance to support his domestic growth strategy and downplayed U.S. ties in pursuit of a more independent foreign policy. In the end, continued Chinese provocations in the South China Sea and domestic security challenges led Duterte to call upon U.S. assistance once again, and Duterte was unable to initiate a full reconsideration of Manila’s position. Still, his strategic flirtation with China underscores the importance of performance-based legitimacy and the impact of inducements and coercion in shaping the foreign policy choices of smaller states. The findings of this study suggest that Washington’s focus on great power competition and sanctions handicaps U.S. foreign policy in Southeast Asia and beyond. The Philippines’ leaders focused on securing their domestic political prospects and legitimacy; criticism and coercive measures were largely ineffective for the United States or China in gaining influence over policy decisions. Washington should more often consider the promise and provision of inducements—while remaining sensitive to human rights concerns, governance issues, and liberal norms—to support the needs of Southeast Asian states, incentivize more transparent behavior, and increase the likelihood that these states will support U.S. interests in the future.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Philippines, North America, Southeast Asia, and United States of America

4. China Adapts Policy in Response to Russia's Aggression Against Ukraine

Author:
Marcin Przychodniak
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
China perceives the Russian aggression against Ukraine as an expression of resistance to the U.S. and NATO hegemony and an important element of building a new international order that marginalises the West. Based on this, China is strengthening strategic cooperation with Russia, striving to weaken the international position of the U.S., the EU, and their partners, while testing reactions to a possible escalation of Chinese actions towards Taiwan, for example. President Xi Jinping expressed this policy course during his March visit to Russia. At the same time, China is trying to gain support from the countries of the Global South. This approach means a continuation of China’s assertive policy towards the European Union, among others.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia

5. Evolution, not Revolution: Japan Revises Security Policy

Author:
Oskar Pietrewicz
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
In December last year, the government of Kishida Fumio adopted three documents adapting Japan’s security policy to the deteriorating international situation. Its security and national defence strategies highlight challenges from China, Russia, and North Korea, as well as an increase in non-military threats. A third document specifies the need for a record increase in defence spending. Japan’s readiness to deepen cooperation with the U.S. and European countries and its criticism in its assessment of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine create the conditions for the further development of Japan’s cooperation with NATO and the Polish-Japanese dialogue on security.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Japan, China, Asia, and North Korea

6. China’s Response to Türkiye’s Volatile Authoritarianism

Author:
Ceren Ergenç and Kenan Göçer
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
This paper investigates Türkiye’s evolving relations with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a large-scale program of infrastructure investment and project financing proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013. The paper digs deeply into cases from two sectors—transportation and energy—focusing on how heightened and changing local expectations among Turks for these prospective BRI projects have shaped choices and outcomes, including China’s. In so doing, it explores how these shifting Turkish perceptions affect the implementation of BRI projects in Türkiye. This paper has several goals: it seeks to understand the reasons behind these local changes, the role of the state and private sector in Türkiye in these changes, and the way China has responded so far. Of course, domestic factors are not the only ones that shape the implementation of BRI projects in Türkiye or elsewhere; regional and global trends have had an impact too.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Infrastructure, Authoritarianism, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Investment
Political Geography:
China, Turkey, Middle East, and Asia

7. Fighting Against Internal and External Threats Simultaneously: China’s Police and Satellite Cooperation with Autocratic Countries

Author:
Chisako T. Masuo
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
What direction will the Xi Jinping administration’s foreign policy take over the coming years, and how will that affect the existing international order? The Chinese Communist Party harbours a strong sense of crisis about the internal and external threats colliding to supposedly destabilise its regime, and thus aims to strengthen cooperation with developing countries in order to prevent such danger. The Xi administration is consequently strengthening police and law-enforcement cooperation inside the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, which includes Russia. Besides, China has launched a new initiative of collaborating with Moscow on satellite systems to monitor the entire Earth, in order to accumulate big data on various issues. The current Chinese foreign policy, which pursues a cultivation of deeper relations with autocratic countries by providing them with surveillance technologies, is likely to deepen the global divide with liberal democracies.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, International Order, and Satellite
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

8. China-US Competition in the Balkans Impact, regional responses, and larger implications

Author:
Ivan Lidarev
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
This strategic update from Sotirov Visiting Fellow Dr Ivan Lidarev analyses the competition between China and the US in the Balkans, striving to answer three broad research questions about its impact on the region. The paper analyses how the China-US competition has shaped the strategic framework in which Balkan states operate; how Balkan nations have responded strategically to this competition; and what the long-term implications of the regional US-China competition are.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Strategic Competition, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
China, Eastern Europe, Balkans, and United States of America

9. China’s Global Strategy as Science Fiction

Author:
William A. Callahan
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
Xi Jinping is leading China in a new direction, but how are we to understand his global strategy? For most countries, to understand domestic and international politics we would analyse authoritative sources – leaders’ speeches, official documents and statistics, elite interviews and essays, and public opinion surveys. In the 2000s these methods worked well to probe Chinese politics. But since civil society and independent thought have been severely restricted under Xi, it’s necessary to go beyond such “factual” sources. To understand China’s global strategy, it’s best to read fiction, especially Chinese science fiction. This essay critically analyses Liu Cixin’s novels, The Wandering Earth and the Three Body Problem trilogy, to probe how Chinese sci-fi pushes us to think creatively about key topics: the relation of humans and technology, the relation of science and politics, and the relations between political communities, i.e. are we doomed to existential struggle, or can we engage with difference in creative and productive ways?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Science and Technology, Grand Strategy, Novels, and Science Fiction
Political Geography:
China and Asia

10. China’s Provinces as Global Actors: Evidence from China-Africa Relations

Author:
Charlotte Lenz
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
With the launch in the early 2000s of China’s ‘Going Global’ Strategy, Chinese provinces became one group of actors participating in China’s South-South relations. In this Strategic Update, Charlotte Lenz investigates the role of Chinese provinces as foreign policy actors and explains their internationalisation strategies, challenging the prevalent perception of China as a unitary actor on the world stage. Drawing on evidence from Africa-China relations, the report identifies two strategies employed by Chinese provinces in pursuit of their foreign policy interests: (1) Formal and informal “twinning” as a collaborative model between central and local actors, wherein central actors design policies and provincial governments execute projects; (2) and “clustering” according to a sectoral logic of investment and diplomacy in which a certain Chinese province engages a certain foreign country. Despite ongoing bureaucratic centralisation under Xi Jinping, provinces continue to pursue their own internationalisation strategies to help meet local economic and employment targets. Understanding their agency, interests and limitations is thus key to deriving a better understanding of China’s evolving global presence.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Investment, and Internationalization
Political Geography:
Africa, China, and Asia

11. China’s Grand Vision and the Persian Gulf

Author:
Anoushiravan Ehteshami
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
China’s engagement with Asian regions beyond its geographical periphery has grown exponentially since the 1990s and this is nowhere more evident than in West Asia and the Persian Gulf subregion. While energy drove China’s early interactions with the Gulf states, within two decades after the Cold War the relationships had evolved into much tighter networks of partnerships. China’s relations with the Gulf states, however, has not been uniform and the case studies of the United Arab Emirates and Iran highlight the complexities of China’s strategy in this subregion and the ways in which it actively pursues its diverse set of interests.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Partnerships, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
China, Iran, Middle East, and Gulf Nations

12. Reinventing Soft Power: The Strong Impact of China’s Soft Power “Shortcomings” on the Global South

Author:
Tanina Zappone
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
After being introduced into the Chinese academic debate in the 1990s, the notion of soft power has undergone such a process of “Sinicisation” that some scholars now wonder if the original concept has been gradually “reinvented” in China. Given worsening opinions about the PRC in the US and Europe over the last years, many analysts have stressed the weakness of China’s soft power, pointing to its state-centred approach and lack of an attractive set of values to be emulated as the main shortcomings. However, China’s growing influence in the Global South shows that these analyses have misevaluated the real goals and motivations of China’s soft power. The Russia-Ukraine war provides telling examples of the successful dynamics of China’s “defensive” or “negative” version of soft power and suggests it has significant impact in the least industrialised countries.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, and Soft Power
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Ukraine, Asia, and Global South

13. China and the Global South: Many Initiatives, One Narrative

Author:
Marina Rudyak
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Since its 2013 launch, the China-led Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has stirred heated debates. Despite Beijing framing it as win-win cooperation, concerns mounted over BRI’s risks for involved countries, especially in the Global South. China’s narrative merely signals a search for an effective communication strategy and international discourse power, while its understanding of development remains constant. Developing countries play a crucial role in China’s pursuit of global status. Firstly, it positions itself as the advocate for developing nations, promoting “diverse paths to modernisation” and “true multilateralism”. Secondly, China aims to redefine major power by prioritising development and security over liberal democracy.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, Infrastructure, Multilateralism, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Modernization
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Global South

14. Negotiating Local Business Practices With China in Benin

Author:
Folashade Soule
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Commercial negotiations between Benin and China demonstrate how both sides navigate the dynamics of Africa-China business-to-business relationships. In Benin, Chinese and local Beninese officials engaged in drawn-out negotiations on a deal to construct a business center aimed at deepening business links between Chinese and Beninese merchants. Strategically located in Cotonou, Benin’s principal economic city, the center aims to promote investment and wholesale businesses by serving as a hub for China’s business-to-business relations not just in Benin but regionally in West Africa, especially in the large and growing neighboring market of Nigeria. This paper relies on original research and fieldwork conducted in Benin from 2015 to 2021 and the author’s access to draft and final contracts from the negotiations, which allow for a side-by-side comparative textual analysis, as well as initial field interviews and follow-up interviews with key negotiators, Beninese businessmen, and former Beninese students in China. The paper shows how Chinese and Beninese authorities negotiated the establishment of the center and, above all, how Beninese authorities made Chinese negotiators adapt to local Beninese labor, construction, and legal norms and put pressure on their Chinese counterparts. This strategy meant that negotiations took longer than usual to complete. China-Africa cooperation is often characterized by speedy negotiations, an approach that in some cases turns out to be harmful—since this can allow vague and unfair clauses to be featured in final contracts. The negotiations over the Chinese business center in Benin is a good example of how well-coordinated negotiators that take their time and work in coordination with various counterparts throughout the government can help facilitate better outcomes in terms of high-quality infrastructure and compliance with prevailing construction, labor, environmental, and business norms, while also preserving a good bilateral relationship with China.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, Bilateral Relations, and Business
Political Geography:
Africa, China, Asia, and Benin

15. Cooperation and Peril: Germany Attempts a Policy Balance with China

Author:
Łukasz Jasiński
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The COVID-19 pandemic, the Russian aggression against Ukraine, and the resulting disruption of supply chains have intensified the ongoing debate in Germany over the preferred shape of German-Chinese relations. Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s government sees China as both a partner and rival. Reducing dependence on China is challenging due to its scale and the strength of the pro-China business lobby. This unsteady position will cause tensions in relations with partners, including the U.S., and conflicts within the governing coalition. Germany will continue to develop trade relations with China while blocking Chinese investment in critical sectors.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Trade, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Germany

16. China Tightens Policy towards Taiwan

Author:
Marcin Przychodniak
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
China treated the visit of Speaker of the House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan at the beginning of August as an expression of U.S. efforts to change the status quo in the region. The reaction of the Chinese authorities was calculated as a controlled escalation of tensions in the Taiwan Strait, but without the risk of direct military confrontation. Harsh rhetoric, military exercises around the island, and the limitation of dialogue with the U.S. confirmed the intention of China to take over Taiwan in the coming years. For the EU, this means the need to intensify support for Taiwan, including the development of political and economic contacts.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Territorial Disputes, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

17. China’s Infrastructure Projects in the Middle East: Lessons from China’s Engagement Elsewhere

Author:
Dominika Urhová
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:
In our latest issue of Iqtisadi, Ms. Dominika Urhova discusses the economic strategy and role of China in the Middle East, and analyzes the implications of China's growing influence in the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, Economics, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Strategic Engagement
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, and Asia

18. Modernizing the People's Liberation Army: The Human Factor

Author:
Marc Julienne and Constantin Lagraulet
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The tremendous demographic challenges facing China will not significantly affect the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in the immediate future, but will become more problematic in the medium and long term. The rapid aging of the population and the resulting socio-economic imbalances will put pressure on defense budgets, military wages and the general attractiveness of the army. For the time being, the PLA’s primary goal in terms of human resources is to build a less oversized, more professional army, prepared for high-intensity combat. This objective is in line with the institutional reform of 2016, which shortened the chain of command and strengthened the political and ideological control of the Communist Party of China (CPC) over the PLA through an overhaul of the Central Military Commission (CMC). This reform also involved a major restructuring of China’s armed forces. The PLA is pursuing a streamlining target that emphasizes quality over quantity. This qualitative improvement concerns equipment, forces and chains of command, and is driven by the need to elevate modernity, operational effectiveness and interoperability. An analysis of the evolution of the PLA Navy Marine Corps and the People’s Armed Police (PAP) demonstrates this qualitative upgrading trend and the prioritization of combat readiness. To integrate increasingly modern and complex equipment, the PLA is also focusing on recruiting and retaining young conscripts and volunteers with a high level of education, in order to increase the number of commissioned and non-commissioned officers. The major reforms being carried out thus aim to enhance the status of the military so as to strengthen its economic and social attractiveness. On the other hand, the PLA, like other armies around the world, is confronted with societal phenomena such as internet addiction, near-sightedness and obesity, which hinder its ambitions and force it to make trade-offs in its selection standards.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Demographics, Modernization, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, East Asia, and Asia

19. How China’s Foreign Aid Fosters Social Bonds With Central Asian Ruling Elites

Author:
Nargis Kassenova
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
China has become a global power, but there is too little debate about how this has happened and what it means. Many argue that China exports its developmental model and imposes it on other countries. But Chinese players also extend their influence by working through local actors and institutions while adapting and assimilating local and traditional forms, norms, and practices. With a generous multiyear grant from the Ford Foundation, Carnegie has launched an innovative body of research on Chinese engagement strategies in seven regions of the world—Africa, Central Asia, Latin America, the Middle East and North Africa, the Pacific, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. Through a mix of research and strategic convening, this project explores these complex dynamics, including the ways Chinese firms are adapting to local labor laws in Latin America, Chinese banks and funds are exploring traditional Islamic financial and credit products in Southeast Asia and the Middle East, and Chinese actors are helping local workers upgrade their skills in Central Asia. These adaptive Chinese strategies that accommodate and work within local realities are mostly ignored by Western policymakers in particular. Ultimately, the project aims to significantly broaden understanding and debate about China’s role in the world and to generate innovative policy ideas. These could enable local players to better channel Chinese energies to support their societies and economies; provide lessons for Western engagement around the world, especially in developing countries; help China’s own policy community learn from the diversity of Chinese experience; and potentially reduce frictions.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Foreign Aid, and Elites
Political Geography:
China, Central Asia, and Asia

20. A Historical Evaluation of China’s India Policy: Lessons for India-China Relations

Author:
Vijay Gokhale
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The violent clash in the Galwan valley in eastern Ladakh in 2020 fundamentally altered the dynamics of the India-China relationship. China’s increasing transgressions and attempts at coercion in the border areas since 2008–2009 have put the boundary question to the center of the India-China relationship. The salience of this question has also increased because the geopolitical backlash to China’s actions in 2020 has been greater than in previous instances, and because India’s policymakers and strategic community are no longer willing to give Beijing the benefit of the doubt regarding its intentions and actions. This has prompted a comprehensive relook in India at the past, present, and future of the relationship. While much of this has focused on the relationship from the Indian perspective and on trying to understand India’s China policy, the current chill in ties has highlighted the necessity of understanding China’s India policy. Thus, using Chinese sources, this paper analyzes the drivers of that policy and the options available to Indian policymakers to engage with, adapt to, and mold it. This paper argues that from the time of Mao Zedong’s rise to the helm of the Chinese Communist Party and the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, China’s India policy has been shaped by its view of the larger great power strategic triangle of China, the Soviet Union (later Russia), and the United States. As this triangle has evolved, this has had a direct effect on the India-China relationship. For much of the past seventy years, China was the weakest corner of the triangle and therefore driven by goals of security and status. In that context, it saw India—another large, developing country in Asia—as a competitor for security and status alike. As a result, China always looked at India through the lens of its own relations with the Soviet Union and the United States. It did not view India on its own merits, or credit it with agency, but as unequal as well as untrustworthy. China’s objective during the Cold War was to keep India as neutral as possible. In the post–Cold War period, the goal evolved to limit through containment and coercion India’s capacity to harm China’s strategic goal of hegemony. This paper analyzes China’s India policy in three phases. In the first phase between 1949 and 1962, China viewed the United States as its primary adversary and its core objective was to keep India neutral and away from the U.S. camp on matters of concern to Beijing. Flowing from this was the secondary objective of utilizing India’s influence in the developing world to build “Asian solidarity” to stem U.S. inroads into Asia.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Territorial Disputes, and Military
Political Geography:
China, India, and Asia

21. Localization and China’s Tech Success in Indonesia

Author:
Gatra Priyandita, Dirk Van Der Kley, and Benjamin Herscovitch
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
On average, Indonesians distrust China and many Chinese firms. Yet Huawei and to a lesser extent ZTE have successfully positioned themselves as trusted cybersecurity providers to the Indonesian government and the Indonesian nation. This has been no easy feat given long-held Indonesian animosity toward China. Many Chinese companies have faced protests over concerns they were taking local jobs. Huawei and ZTE have suffered no such fate. Nor has there been a broad coalition of Indonesian voices against using Chinese technology in critical telecommunications infrastructure. In short, Indonesians care a lot more about Chinese cement plants than they do about Huawei involvement in 5G networks. Gatra Priyandita Gatra Priyandita is an analyst at the International Cyber Policy Centre at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, where he leads a project researching cyber-enabled intellectual property theft. He is a political scientist by training and specializes in the study of foreign policy and security in Southeast Asia. He holds a PhD in political science from the Australian National University. This is a vastly different conversation to those happening in rich liberal democracies. Huawei and ZTE have been able to achieve success in Indonesia, despite a sense of ambivalence among the Indonesian political and defense establishment about Chinese intentions and growing Western scrutiny over the use of Chinese technology in broadband networks. As other papers in this series have demonstrated, Huawei and ZTE needed to localize their strategies. Like elsewhere in the world, available evidence suggests that part of Huawei’s and ZTE’s value proposition is cheaper prices (compared to those of competitors) for high-quality technology. But that is only part of the story. Huawei has positioned itself as Indonesia’s cybersecurity provider of choice by offering enormous cybersecurity and other related training programs across the country for groups ranging from senior government officials to students in rural Indonesia. Much of this training is technically focused on practical vocational skills with a hope that students one day will become customers. In addition, the company offers an attractive maintenance and upkeep package. Since the mid-2000s, Chinese information and communications technology (ICT) firms have created training centers in partnership with local Indonesian telecoms companies and universities to train the next generation of Indonesian engineers and tech specialists. Government agencies are also increasingly targets of training and capacity-building programs, with Huawei claiming that 7,000 government officials have participated in its training programs. The Indonesian government, corporations, and ordinary citizens alike have welcomed Huawei and ZTE as essential partners in their efforts to build both the infrastructure and human capital necessary to prosper in the twenty-first century’s digital economy. What Huawei and ZTE offer is knowledge transfer, not technology transfer. The technology is still being built in China by Chinese firms. Huawei’s role in training relates instead to capacity building. Indonesians will install, maintain, and use the networks. China will build the hardware. There is also evidence that China has had some rhetorical success in pushing its version of cyberspace governance. Beijing’s preferred cyberspace governance language was inserted into a memorandum of understanding between Indonesia’s National Cyber and Crypto Agency and the Cybersecurity Administration of China. However, it is difficult to see how the memorandum has influenced Indonesia’s cybersecurity governance in practice. One of the concerns often leveled by rich liberal democracies is that reliance on Chinese tech will end up aligning the political interests of countries like Indonesia with those of China. Other key worries are China’s pervasive espionage and the enduring (though as yet unrealized) risk that Chinese companies with a dominant role in an ICT ecosystem could be used by Beijing to apply coercive political pressure. Despite Indonesia’s embrace of Huawei and ZTE, political leaders in Jakarta have not simply disregarded the hard security questions posed by upgrading ICT equipment, especially when foreign suppliers are involved. Indonesian officials simply rate the need for development and cybersecurity-related capacity building higher than the risk of using Chinese ICT hardware in their critical infrastructure systems. If rich liberal democracies are concerned about this trend, then they need to offer workable alternatives that place Indonesia’s enormous digital development needs at the heart of any value proposition. It is unlikely that Indonesia will stop using Chinese hardware in its infrastructure, but alternatives could prevent overreliance.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Telecommunications, and Localization
Political Geography:
China, Indonesia, and Asia

22. Russia’s National Security Narrative: All Quiet on the Eastern Front

Author:
Eugene Rumer and Richard Sokolsky
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The two defining features of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy have been an increasingly adversarial relationship with the West and an increasingly close partnership with China. These drivers have been the salient feature of official Russian national security documents for the past three decades. Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. national security community has viewed Russian strategic thinking as misguided because it failed to see China as the real threat to Russia. This view ignores the Kremlin’s preoccupation with Europe as the most important strategic theater where its interests are at stake, and where they are threatened by the West’s superior capabilities and ambitions. This view also ignores how unimportant—relative to Europe—the Asia-Pacific is for Russia. Russia’s partnership with China is secured, however, by a set of coherent and complementary strategic rationales, which supersede frequent concerns in the Russian strategic community at large about China and its growing capabilities and intentions vis-à-vis Russia. Those concerns appear to have little impact on Russian policy. Notwithstanding those concerns in Russia’s unofficial national security discourse, China’s footprint on its foundational national security and foreign policy documents is invisible—and China, as a source of military threat to Russia, does not appear to be part of the Kremlin’s calculus. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has long been the pacing challenge of Russian military modernization, and the main contingency for which it has been preparing has been future conflict in the European theater. For the Putin regime, there is no alternative to Russia’s “no limits” partnership with China. Moreover, even if Putin were no longer on the scene, a successor regime would have powerful economic, geopolitical, demographic, and military-strategic incentives to maintain this partnership. An adversarial relationship with China would pit Russia against two superior powers in two widely separated geographic theaters. The war in Ukraine has cemented the Russian-Chinese partnership for the foreseeable future.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, and Ukraine

23. Networks and Competitive Advantage in a Contested World

Author:
Jennifer Kavanagh
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
In an increasingly multipolar world and amid challenges from China, Russia, and elsewhere, the United States faces a complex set of foreign policy demands and the real risk of becoming overextended. Networks—of states, businesses, and individuals—offer policymakers a way to prioritize and reduce global commitments while advancing core U.S. interests. Leveraging the right networks in the right ways can extend U.S. influence, support the economic and physical security of Americans, and compete with adversaries at sustainable cost. Today’s policymakers understand the power of networks but need more guidance on how to build and employ them as tools of competition in a contested world rather than a world of open borders and markets. Influence networks—networks primed to spread and amplify U.S. power, enhance U.S. competitiveness, and protect national interests—have three characteristics. They are attraction networks, organized around places and issues where countries and corporations are already interacting, meeting common needs with customized resources. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), for instance, is organized around a shared need for infrastructure across the Global South and embeds Chinese influence by tailoring agreements to each partner’s local conditions. The United States has used attraction effectively in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, but most U.S. foreign investment has been centralized and top-down. They are gated networks with clear criteria for entry, access, and exit. Gates capture network power and direct it toward specific goals. The European Union (EU) has used gated economic markets to build significant regulatory power and geopolitical relevance. The United States has tended toward universalism but employs gates in some security networks, like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and is turning toward gates in economic networks with friendshoring initiatives in some industries. Finally, they are distributed networks that have robust ties between members throughout the network, allowing influence to flow quickly along more pathways and facilitating collective action. The United States has often relied on less resilient hub-and-spoke networks to retain control. U.S. Indo-Pacific security alliances are hub-and-spoke, while NATO is more distributed, enabling more rapid, coordinated responses and wider spread of U.S. influence. Networks with these characteristics can help policymakers tackle their hardest problems. For example, better use of influence networks can support U.S. efforts to prioritize and fully resource the more significant challenge posed by China by pushing forward changes that advance European security autonomy and by building and mobilizing needed, distributed networks in the Indo-Pacific theater. Influence networks can inform U.S. strategies for building ties to hedging states that offer access to key resources or strategic locations—for example, by focusing on shared local needs of potential partners and U.S. comparative advantages and by creating distributed business or civil society partnerships. Finally, influence networks provide ways to approach the Russia-China relationship that support U.S. security and economic interests, including avoiding the isolation of either. These examples begin to illustrate how influence networks can improve U.S. strategies toward foreign policy challenges by offering policymakers a way to prioritize commitments, capitalize on U.S. strengths, and avoid overextension that harms U.S. interests. Additional exploration and application of these networks will investigate these and other foreign policy challenges in more depth.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Networks, Strategic Competition, and Multipolarity
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and United States of America

24. Embedding Human Rights in European and US China Policy

Author:
Malin Oud
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Europe and the United States share an interest in promoting human rights in China but often struggle to affect change in this regard. Because of ineffective approaches and low political commitment, human rights are a marginalized issue in transatlantic China policy and an afterthought to commercial interests. European and US policymakers have attempted to compartmentalize their approach to China, keeping human rights separate from commercial and other interests. This does little to advance human rights, and it only seems to encourage more assertive and coercive behavior by China. During the last few years, the Western assumption that trade and foreign capital would transform China into a more open and democratic society has been replaced by a disillusioned realization that its rise as a superpower is reshaping the international order. Under President Xi Jinping, China has evolved from its previous position as rule-taker and status quo-keeper at the UN to become an assertive rule-maker and international norm entrepreneur. Its vulnerability to external pressure has declined while its power to exert pressure and economic coercion on others has increased. China no longer presents its political and economic model merely as different from but as superior to that of the liberal democracies in the West. For several years now, European and US policymakers have declared an “end of naivety” in relation to China. After years of debating how to make the EU more resilient and robust, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has “given birth to geopolitical Europe,” in the words of its chief diplomat, Josep Borrell. It remains to be seen whether this moment of clarity will translate into a more principled defense of human rights and investment in democratic resilience. For this to happen, there needs to be a broader reckoning with how Western countries for decades mishandled the authoritarian challenge to the international order, often because they were pursuing stronger economic ties with the same governments they now see as systemic rivals.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Human Rights, Business, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

25. Next-generation Perspectives on Taiwan

Author:
Bonnie S. Glaser
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Over the past few years, Taiwan has received a surge of international attention. As the coronavirus pandemic began to spread worldwide in 2020, Taiwan emerged as a success story with relatively low numbers of cases and deaths. In the global battle against the virus, it provided medical supplies, medicine, and technology to countries in need, cooperated on vaccine research and development, and shared its best practices. The pandemic’s impact on global semiconductor supply chains also led to heightened interest in Taiwan, which dominates the foundry market, or the outsourcing of semiconductor manufacturing. The island is home to the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, which produces more than 90 percent of global output of the most advanced semiconductors and is gearing up to launch next-generation three-nanometer chips this year. Another reason for increased attention to Taiwan stems from international awareness of China’s growing diplomatic and military pressure on the island. Since President Tsai Ing-wen assumed office in 2016, Beijing has poached eight of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies and blocked it from participating in international organizations, including the World Health Organization. The Chinese military flew nearly 1,000 warplanes in Taiwan’s air-defense identification zone in 2021. China has also stepped up its use of disinformation, United Front tactics, and other measures to widen splits within Taiwan’s political system and induce pessimism among its people about their future to achieve its goal of taking over the island. With the upswing of global interest in Taiwan, there is a pressing need for greater knowledge about the many factors that make it so crucial to the world. The Taiwan-US Policy Program (TUPP) was launched in 2017 to provide future leaders a deeper understanding of Taiwan and its relations with the United States through meetings with officials and experts in Washington, followed by a visit to Taiwan to gain first-hand exposure to its politics, culture, and history. Experiencing Taiwan influences how these future leaders approach their work, their writing, and their overall worldview. It imbues them with an appreciation for Taiwan’s experience and commitment to the principles of democracy and human rights that undergird the existing international order. It also reinforces the importance of maintaining robust bilateral relations and strengthening international support for the preservation of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. After a two-year hiatus due to the coronavirus pandemic, TUPP resumed in January 2022 for a virtual session. Although holding virtual meetings with officials and experts from Taiwan and the United States was not ideal, the program was nonetheless successful in achieving its goals. Each participant gained insights into Taiwan and its role in their respective fields. This year’s cohort also included for the first time a few experts from Europe, expanding the program’s reach. Over time, TUPP seeks to create a body of global experts with knowledge about Taiwan and support for sustaining and expanding its ties to the world. Hopefully, TUPP will contribute to ensuring that Taiwan remains peaceful and prosperous. The contributions here, written by nine of the eleven members of the 2022 TUPP delegation, underscore the importance of deeper study and understanding of Taiwan. I sincerely hope that they stimulate even greater global interest in Taiwan and its future.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, European Union, COVID-19, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

26. Six Lessons from a Decade of Asia Strategy Simulations

Author:
Zack Cooper
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
How can the United States and its allies and partners succeed in the Indo-Pacific and better prepare for long-term competition in the region? Since the US rebalance to Asia began, the German Marshall Fund of the United States has brought together rising experts from Asia, Europe, and the United States to examine this question through a series of workshops and simulations conducted via the Young Strategists Forum (YSF). The discussions that have taken place during these sessions suggest six lessons about effective long-term strategies for the Indo-Pacific. First, trying to maintain the status quo is neither realistic nor strategic. Established powers tend to describe their objectives in terms of maintaining the status quo. This aim is not just unrealistic, but often deprives them of the ability to adjust the existing order in potentially beneficial ways. US leaders must present a vision of the future that is defined by looking forward not backward. Second, the United States needs to calibrate its responses to near-term crises with an eye to mobilizing the largest possible balancing coalition in the long run. In the simulations, US teams often miss short-term opportunities that could yield long-term benefits. Thinking strategically sometimes means allowing other countries to recognize that they face a serious threat today and cannot simply rely on the United States to solve problems. Third, overreaching by China presents opportunities for the United States. Over the last decade, China’s growth in power has been accompanied by increased assertiveness, in YSF simulations and in real life. China’s behavior creates opportunities for US and other leaders to create and expand coalitions that can push back against it. Fourth, acknowledging the reality of impending multipolarity in the Indo-Pacific can benefit the United States. US experts, including participants in YSF simulations, often tend to see the competition in the Indo-Pacific as largely bipolar between the United States and China. Regional actors, however, typically regard the Indo-Pacific as increasingly multipolar. By championing the rise of new power centers, the United States can foster a regional order that is broadly supportive of its interests yet less dependent on US guarantees. Fifth, focusing on “swinging” states as well as “swung” states pays dividends for the United States. Over the last five years, the United States has done an impressive job of bringing together those countries that are most willing to push back against China. But the region’s “swinging” states—those that have not yet made a clear alignment decision—deserve more attention. Quick wins with these actors are unlikely, but sustained engagement today can set the stage for realignment tomorrow. Finally, building robust coalitions requires US leadership. Many of the lessons we have learned over the last decade have to do with the importance of recognizing that other countries have greater capacity for independent action than is often acknowledged by US observers. That does not mean that US leadership is unimportant—in fact, YSF simulations suggest that it is critical if other states are to join coalitions to push back against China. The United States often labels its various allies as “lynchpins” or “keystones” in the region, but the fact remains that the most effective regional groupings are still reliant on its coordinating role, especially when it comes to China.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Strategic Planning, Simulation, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

27. "Best and Bosom Friends" Putin, Xi and the Challenge to the West

Author:
Michael Cox
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
In this latest Strategic Update, LSE IDEAS co-founder Professor Michael Cox highlights China as a significant player in the current tragedy occurring within Ukraine. Prof Cox traces the relationship between the People’s Republic and the USSR, through to the latter’s collapse into the Russian Federation, their formation of a strategic partnership against a unipolar post-Cold War order, and the rise in power of Xi Jinping alongside two international crises caused by Russian aggression in Ukraine. This Update finds that, whilst there are limits to their shared interests, China is politically committed to its Russian partner, and this status-quo leaves us in a more dangerous world.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Partnerships, Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Asia

28. China’s Digital Silk Road in Indonesia: Progress and implications

Author:
Zulfikar Rakhmat
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
This Strategic Update discusses the progress of China’s Digital Silk Road in Indonesia, a major destination, in both its hard and soft aspects, as well as the potential impact of its implementation. Chinese companies are offering a response to Indonesia’s needs, but concerns exist, especially surrounding security and surveillance, that Indonesia’s increasing reliance on China could also further erode its democracy.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Economy, Surveillance, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:
China, Indonesia, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

29. Can Chancellor Scholz Save the West? The New German Government and Global Geopolitics

Author:
Maximilian Terhalle
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
In the wake of Chancellor Angela Merkel’s departure from the German Chancellorship, her successor, Olaf Scholz, inherits a Germany which has been lacking in strategic vision and an acute foreign policy for a considerable amount of time. Maximilian Terhalle asks, can Chancellor Scholz provide this vision for his country, and imbue NATO and the EU with a coherent and unified foreign policy in the face of threats from China, Russia, and a divided ‘West’?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, European Union, Geopolitics, Olaf Scholz, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and Germany

30. After the Russian “Ruse,” China Looks for New Friends

Author:
Galia Lavi
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
With the Russian invasion of Ukraine, it would seem that Beijing and Moscow should be a united front against the West. But in actuality, China has been surprised by the scale of the Russian aggression and is now rethinking its position in the geopolitical arena. How will this affect the Middle East?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and Asia

31. The US–Italy Economic Relations in a Divided World

Author:
Adriana Castagnoli
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
In 2021, bilateral trade returned to the sustained pace it had prior to the Covid pandemic. Direct investment also grew – crucially, not just Italian investment in the United States but the other way round too. While Italy’s economic ties with Russia and China remain potential hotspots, Rome has never questioned its Atlantic orientation. Nevertheless, possible austerity policies following sanctions against Russia could spread social discontent that populist parties can exploit for consensus purposes in the 2023 general election, rekindling anti-Americanism rooted in different segments of Italian society.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Foreign Direct Investment, Economic Policy, Trade, and Energy
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Italy, and United States of America

32. Porosity of Tajik-Afghan Border Making Beijing’s Involvement in Region More Ominous

Author:
Paul A. Goble
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
In most parts of the world, the lines on maps separating countries are true borders. That is, they are controlled by the governments on one or both sides. But in some places, they remain the quasi-open frontiers they were in the past or have reemerged as such because of recent political changes; those borders are highly porous zones, where people and goods can move more or less freely in one or both directions without much regard to the powers that be. Such situations invite outside involvement that can ramp up quickly and disturb preexisting international arrangements. One poignant example is the adjoining border area shared by Tajikistan and Afghanistan. In recent years, that frontier has attracted attention because of the danger that Islamist militants from Afghanistan could cross it to move north into Tajikistan and beyond. But another danger is emerging: China is establishing increasing control over Tajikistan and, thus, is putting itself in a position to project power southward from Tajikistan into Afghanistan. If Beijing does so, that could fundamentally change the security situation and geopolitical balance in Central and South Asia as a whole.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Territorial Disputes, and Borders
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, China, South Asia, Central Asia, Asia, and Tajikistan

33. Confrontation, Cooperation or Isolation? What will China’s Foreign Policy Look Like During Biden’s Presidency

Author:
Branimir Vidmarovic
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:
As the globally difficult 2020 came to an end, China is entering a challenging and perilous period unlike any other in its long history. COVID-19 pandemic, widely believed to have originated in Chinese Wuhan, severely damaged China’s international image, especially among Western democracies. At the beginning of the millennium, Chinese policymakers reached a conclusion that favorable political and security environment presented China with a ‘strategic window of opportunity’ for the next 15 to 20 years, during which the country should strive to achieve its economic, social and security development goals. It was believed that at some point, the West would become wary and agitated by China’s rise – which would in turn lead to a shift towards less favorable conditions.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Hegemony, and Isolation
Political Geography:
China and Asia

34. One Belt One Voice: Chinese Media in Italy

Author:
Francesca Ghiretti and Lorenzo Mariani
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Chinese media are the voice of the Chinese Communist Party at home and abroad. It is no surprise therefore that collaborations between Chinese and foreign media have been attracting more international attention. One issue that has not been yet explored is the nature and implications of the inclusion of two important Italian media actors such as Rai (the state-run broadcasting company) and Ansa (Italy’s main press agency) in the Memorandum of Understanding signed by Italy in support of the Belt and Road Initiative in 2019. These deals fit in a broader picture of an Italian media environment that is being increasingly targeted by Chinese media. However, the impact that such an effort has had on the Italian public opinion has been very limited so far and the Italian media landscape keeps offering free and varied information. Paper prepared in the framework of the IAI project “When Italy Embraces the BRI”.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Mass Media, Public Opinion, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and Italy

35. Silk Road Academic Connections: China–Italy Cooperation in Higher Education and Its Implications for the West

Author:
Nicola Casarini
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Cooperation in higher education and research is a positive aspect of the broader Italy–China relationship as it contributes to the advancement of the scientific and cultural environment in both countries. China has invested considerable sums to promote cooperation and exchanges with the Italian academy, including through the establishment of a dozen Confucius Institutes and a number of Confucius Classrooms. Italian universities have set up academic partnerships with Chinese entities on almost every subject. These have improved Italy’s research outlook, but have also posed inevitable risks of self-censorship and kowtowing to Chinese wishes. Moreover, there has been a surge of academic sponsorships by Chinese firms, in particular ICT companies such as ZTE and Huawei, which raise further concerns for Italy’s security interests and cooperation with its Western allies.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Education, Science and Technology, Higher Education, and Research and Development
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and Italy

36. China in Italy: Risk Assessment and Preventive Solutions

Author:
Beatrice Gallelli and Lorenzo Mariani
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Italy’s 2019 decision to sign a Memorandum of Understanding with China in support of the Belt and Road Initiative sparked a heated debate at home and abroad. The possibility of Italy upgrading its trade and investment relations with China through the shortcut of a political endorsement of President Xi Jinping’s flagship foreign-policy initiative was framed as either a heaven-sent opportunity or a serious strategic threat. Two years on, most of the concerns pointed out in the debate, especially regarding infrastructures, have proven unsubstantiated (although the economic opportunities for which the Italian Government wished have also failed to materialise). However, cooperation initiatives between Italian and Chinese entities in sectors often overlooked in the mainstream debate, such as media and academic partnerships, do present risks. The creation of an interagency China Information and Coordination Unit would help to prevent – or, at least, to minimise – such risks. Paper prepared in the framework of the IAI project “When Italy Embraces the BRI”.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Education, Science and Technology, Mass Media, Foreign Direct Investment, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and Italy

37. The Belt and Road Initiative in Italy: The Ports of Genoa and Trieste

Author:
Francesca Ghiretti
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
In March 2019, Italy signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in support of PRC President Xi Jinping’s flagship infrastructure and connectivity project, the Belt and Road Initiative. The MoU was accompanied by a series of commercial agreements, including two between the ports of Genoa and Trieste and the state-owned enterprise China Communications Construction Company (CCCC). The European Union and the United States expressed concerns about the agreements as they feared that CCCC would eventually obtain a controlling share of the ports, not unlike that recently secured by the China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO) with Greece’s Port of Piraeus. However, existing legal constraints, an open international and national debate, and the vague nature of the agreements concerned have so far kept these fears from materialising. Paper prepared in the framework of the IAI project “When Italy embraces the BRI”.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Infrastructure, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and Italy

38. China's Belt and Road Initiative in Italy: An Analysis of Financial Cooperation

Author:
Nicola Bilotta
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Financial cooperation is essential to boosting bilateral economic ties, providing firms with more effective instruments to operate in foreign markets. It should come as no surprise, then, that financial cooperation was a pillar of the 2019 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) reached between Italy and China in support of the latter’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). However, a preliminary analysis of BRI-related commercial agreements between Italian financial institutions and their Chinese counterparts shows that they have not resulted in any ground-breaking development. These Memoranda have apparently just added a “BRI” badge to pre-existing trends of collaboration. The BRI-related MoUs in the field of financial cooperation do not, for the time being at least, justify concerns that China may gain an economic foothold in Italy large enough to win it much political influence. A more realistic risk is that these MoUs may undermine a common European approach to China, weakening the negotiating stance of the European Union’s. Paper prepared in the framework of the IAI project “When Italy embraces the BRI”.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Political Economy, Governance, Finance, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and Italy

39. The Road from Galwan: The Future of India-China Relations

Author:
Vijay Gokhale
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
China and India struggle to comprehend each other’s international ambitions. The misperceptions that follow lead to a lack of trust, border skirmishes, and potentially worse. On June 15, 2020, Indian and Chinese troops engaged in a brawl that left twenty Indian soldiers dead while causing an unspecified number of Chinese casualties. The clash is a part of a broader border standoff along the Galwan River between the two forces on the Line of Actual Control that is yet to be resolved. The Indian strategic community is broadly in agreement that this border dispute marks an implacable decline in India-China ties. They argue that the very basis of relations that emerged after former Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to Beijing in 1988 has been shaken, if not destroyed. Yet, how did the two countries manage to reach this nadir in ties, and furthermore, what does the Galwan clash signify for the future of Sino-Indian relations? This paper argues that, long before the present border dispute occurred, Sino-Indian relations had been steadily declining due to rampant misperceptions of the other side, contributing to a lack of trust. The most fundamental misperception between the two countries is the inability to comprehend each other’s international ambitions, yielding the fear that their foreign policies are targeted against the other. This paper traces the impact and development of these misperceptions on Sino-Indian ties through three different phases before considering the future of the relationship after the Galwan dispute.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Territorial Disputes, and Borders
Political Geography:
China, South Asia, India, and Asia

40. How China lends: A rare look into 100 debt contracts with foreign governments

Author:
Anna Gelpern, Sebastian Horn, Scott Morris, Brad Parks, and Christoph Trebesch
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
China is the world’s largest official creditor, but basic facts are lacking about the terms and conditions of its lending. Very few contracts between Chinese lenders and their government borrowers have ever been published or studied. This paper is the first systematic analysis of the legal terms of China’s foreign lending. The authors collect and analyze 100 contracts between Chinese state-owned entities and government borrowers in 24 developing countries in Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Oceania, and compare them with those of other bilateral, multilateral, and commercial creditors. Three main insights emerge. First, the Chinese contracts contain unusual confidentiality clauses that bar borrowers from revealing the terms or even the existence of the debt. Second, Chinese lenders seek advantage over other creditors, using collateral arrangements such as lender-controlled revenue accounts and promises to keep the debt out of collective restructuring (“no Paris Club” clauses). Third, cancellation, acceleration, and stabilization clauses in Chinese contracts potentially allow the lenders to influence debtors’ domestic and foreign policies. Even if these terms were unenforceable in court, the mix of confidentiality, seniority, and policy influence could limit the sovereign debtor’s crisis management options and complicate debt renegotiation. Overall, the contracts use creative design to manage credit risks and overcome enforcement hurdles, presenting China as a muscular and commercially savvy lender to the developing world.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Debt, Government, and Banking
Political Geography:
China and Asia

41. The Vision Group on U.S.-ROK Relations: Insights and Recommendations

Author:
KEI
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI), with the generous support of the Korea Foundation, organized six “Vision Group” roundtable conversations with leading American scholars and commentators to discuss the United States’ relationship with the Republic of Korea. The first was held in December 2019, the last in November 2020. The intent was to consider the future of relations during a time of change. The Vision Group comprised a wide range of expertise and opinion. This record conveys some of the insights and recommendations that arose during the conversations.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Economics, and Human Rights
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

42. Limits of Public Diplomacy and Soft Power: Lessons from the THAAD Dispute for South Korea's Foreign Policy

Author:
Maximilian Ernst
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
This paper examines South Korea’s foreign policy towards China before, during, and after the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense dispute to investigate the limits of South Korea’s public diplomacy and soft power. South Korea’s official public diplomacy has the objective to “gain global support for Korea’s policies,” following Joseph Nye’s narrow definition of soft power. South Korea furthermore ranks high in the most relevant soft power indices. Based on the case of Chinese economic retaliation against South Korea in response to THAAD deployment, this paper argues that public diplomacy and soft power only work in the absence of traditional security contentions, but fail in the presence of such security contentions. The THAAD case also demonstrates the utility of traditional diplomacy, based on high-level summits and negotiations, to solve the very disputes that South Korea’s latent public diplomacy and soft power were unable to alleviate.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, and Weapons
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, and Korea

43. Understanding American Voter Attitudes Toward U.S.-China Climate Cooperation

Author:
The Asia Society Policy Institute and Data for Progress
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
After four years of U.S. absence from the global climate stage, a majority of voters—including a plurality of Republican voters—agree the United States should take ambitious actions to address climate change and lead the world in tackling the climate crisis, even if China and other countries do not increase their own ambition. With the exception of nuclear disarmament, a majority of voters see climate change as the most important issue for the United States and China to cooperate on—more so than tackling COVID-19. At the same time, competing with China to become the world leader in the development of clean energy technologies drives up support among voters across the political spectrum for the United States ramping up its own clean energy industry. Similarly, voter support for the United States enhancing its climate ambition increases if China takes additional steps. Despite voters expressing apprehension toward partnering with China on innovation and trade in a number of sectors like automobiles and healthcare, voters are also very receptive to a potential partnership around clean energy development. However, voters want President Biden to also uphold his campaign promise to devise policies that will hold China “accountable” for its climate commitments. Voters support this more than any of Biden’s other proposals for global climate action. With this in mind, voters support the idea of the United States providing competitive financing for renewable energy projects to Belt and Road Initiative countries and instituting a carbon border tax as possible ways to increase pressure on China to do more both at home and abroad. For instance, an overwhelming majority of voters think China should aim to achieve carbon neutrality much sooner than 2060. Notably, a near majority of voters are also supportive of the U.S. military and Chinese military working together even more to assess climate risks and improve disaster preparedness around the world. Though President Biden may face some roadblocks from Republicans who are less supportive of U.S.-China climate cooperation than Democrats and independents, messaging around maintaining U.S. leadership over China on climate action and clean energy development clearly resonates with Republican voters.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Climate Change, Public Opinion, Voting, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China and United States of America

44. Countering Zero-Sum Relations in the Middle East: Insights from the Expert Survey

Author:
Flavio Fusco
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Building on emerging debates on the need to develop de-escalation mechanisms for the Middle East, the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) and the Brussels-based Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS), with support from the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, launched a one-year research and outreach project entitled “Fostering a New Security Architecture in the Middle East”. Connected to the research, an expert survey targeting European, US, Russian, Middle Eastern and Chinese experts and practitioners was conducted on key themes, principles and approaches associated with a potential new security architecture for the region. The results of the survey – first published in an edited book volume jointly published by IAI and FEPS in November 2020 – are analysed below, complete with tables and infographics on key themes associated with the research project and the search for new, inclusive mechanisms for dialogue and de-escalation in the Middle East.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Security, Foreign Policy, and Politics
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Middle East, and United States of America

45. China’s Digital Yuan: An Alternative to the Dollar-Dominated Financial System

Author:
Rajesh Bansal and Somya Singh
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Central bank digital currencies (CBDC) are digital tokens issued by central banks. In a way, they are the digital version of cash; their value is guaranteed by a central bank. Unlike money held in credit cards and mobile wallets, CBDCs are not a mere representation of physical money stored elsewhere. Instead, they are a complete replacement for currency notes. While several countries are developing their digital currencies, China is well positioned to take the lead with the digital yuan. This paper highlights ways in which China can use its digital yuan to internationalize the renminbi (RMB) and gradually chip away at the hegemony of the dollar. The first part of the paper focuses on the dollar’s dominance in the global financial system and the privileges the United States accrues as a result of the dollar being the world reserve currency. The United States has a tight grip on the world’s payment rails, especially in the case of cross-border transactions. For example, the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT)—the largest cross-border payment clearinghouse in the world—has to comply with and implement unilateral U.S. sanctions. These sanctions seriously hinder trade and damage the economies of the countries affected by them, as was the case with Iran, which lost $150 billion worth of revenue as a result of U.S. sanctions.1 Once a country is cut off from SWIFT’s network, it becomes extremely difficult for it to trade with the rest of the world. Thus, via the dollar’s dominance and its geopolitical muscle, the United States is positioned to maintain a tight grip on the world’s financial system. In an increasingly multipolar world, this outdated, decades-old system of the dollar as the apex currency and the United States’ position of power that allows it to pursue its own geopolitical interests has become outdated. The U.S. dollar’s hegemony has been challenged by economies like those of the European Union (EU), Russia, and China. Of all the countries, China finds itself in a dominant position to gain from this transition. In order to challenge the dollar’s hegemony and internationalize its currency, China will have to move away not just from the dollar but also from the payment rails dominated by the dollar. The best way to simultaneously do both would be to introduce a new payment rail like CBDCs. This paper analyses the way the launch of China’s CBDCs could greatly enhance its currency internationalization prospects. Considering China’s growing economy and influence over the world, the paper argues that China’s CBDC launch could bring a period of momentous change in the global financial system. In order to challenge the dollar, China will have to build the payments infrastructure required to facilitate the use of its digital yuan. It will also have to incentivize other countries to adopt its digital currency. China’s ability to successfully promote its currency using CBDCs will depend heavily on the country’s ability to relax capital controls and maintain the world’s trust in its institutions. China’s geopolitics will play a key role here. In the last decade, some of China’s major geopolitical efforts have set the stage for its CBDC launch. As China continues to use its foreign policy and technological capabilities to grow its influence in the global financial system, the launch of the digital yuan could be a significant step forward in this direction. This paper examines the reasons for China’s past efforts at currency dominance and explores ways in which the country can use its CBDC to further internationalize its digital yuan.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Finance, Economy, Central Bank, and Currency
Political Geography:
China and Asia

46. India’s Fog of Misunderstanding Surrounding Nepal–China Relations

Author:
Vijay Gokhale
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
India’s postindependence ties with Nepal were predicated on the intimate cultural and historical links between the two countries. As India’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, noted, “though Nepal was an independent country, it was very closely allied to India in culture and tradition and we did not look upon it as a foreign country.” New Delhi also regarded China as an “interloper” in Nepal in 1950 who threatened India’s security and interests in the region, ignoring at least a century of Sino-Nepali history centering around Tibet. This paper argues that New Delhi’s close relationship with Nepal, bound in history and culture, and the misperception about China’s relations with Nepal before 1950 have contributed to a skewed understanding of Sino-Nepali relations. The Working Paper looks at the impact that New Delhi’s misperceptions of Sino-Nepali relations, termed the “fog of misunderstanding,” has had in the context of the triangular relations between China, India, and Nepal. The paper is divided into four sections arranged chronologically. The first section looks at the historical Sino-Nepali relationship from the mid-eighteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries. It establishes that this early relationship was centered on Tibet. While the Gorkha kings of Nepal sought to preserve their trade privileges in the region, the Chinese were concerned about the security of their southwestern frontier. Notably though, Beijing’s concern with security does not appear to have extended into any desire to conquer Nepal. This section also touches upon British India’s policy toward Nepal in the nineteenth century, and the subsequent approach that the government of independent India took in the first few years, without an adequate appreciation of Kathmandu’s history with China. As a consequence, India developed a suspicious attitude toward Beijing’s desire to re-establish ties with Kathmandu after the Chinese Civil War, and shaped its policy toward Nepal with this factor in mind. The second section delves into Indian and Chinese policies toward Nepal in the period from 1955 until the end of the monarchy in 2008. It showcases how, during this long period, the three kings of Nepal sought to leverage their ties with China in order to maintain some semblance of balance and how China, in turn, followed a limited but strategic approach that was centered on the kings. The fog of misunderstanding continued to shroud India’s attitude to Nepal-China relations during this period and, consequently, India’s Nepal policy lacked a working template to manage relations with a smaller neighbor sandwiched between India and China in a way that would preserve New Delhi’s influence in a positive way. In contrast to China’s political approach, New Delhi fluctuated between the monarchy and an assortment of democratic political parties, suggestive of a provincial approach in New Delhi’s dealing with Kathmandu. As a result, China’s approach ensured that its main objective in Nepal, namely the security of its southwestern frontier, was secured with a relatively low-risk and low-cost strategy. The third section deals with the aftermath of the fall of the Nepali monarchy, 2008 to 2016. During this important period, New Delhi had a fresh opportunity to reset ties by providing the support to democratic forces in Nepal, that could have resulted in a transformation of the Indo-Nepali ties. However, India appeared to hew to its traditional policy. China, on the other hand, quickly built new ties with the post-monarchical dispensation. India’s perceived actions as a result of the adoption of the new constitution of Nepal plunged Indo-Nepali ties to a nadir. It seems to have pushed Kathmandu to strengthen its relationship with China. This section of the paper also outlines the changing nature of China’s policy and objectives in Nepal, especially in the second decade of the twenty-first century, and its possible implications on the future course of the triangular relationship, as well as for India-Nepal relations. It postulates that under President Xi Jinping, China’s policy toward Nepal has shifted from protecting its periphery to a broader goal of bringing Nepal under its strategic control. This section highlights the political and economic levers that Beijing is using to build a preeminent position in Nepal. The paper concludes with an assessment of options available to all three countries going forward, and India’s options in Nepal in the face of China’s new policy in the region. It suggests that a decisive reset in policy toward Nepal is required to restore healthy relations that are based on mutual respect and mutual sensitivity. New Delhi may need to re-orient its thinking toward Nepal in the context of triangular relations, including on the boundary issue and the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship that have been long-standing irritants in the India-Nepal relationship. Nepal, for its part, should also reflect carefully on whether its leveraging of China might become counterproductive in the light of changing strategic balance in its vicinity, and the implications of giving up the policy of balance for one that tilts decisively toward Beijing. The paper concludes that there is sufficient scope and opportunity for course correction by India, and that through sustained efforts India may be able to preserve its influence and security in Nepal and counter China’s expanding footprint.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
China, South Asia, India, Asia, and Nepal

47. China’s Influence in South Asia: Vulnerabilities and Resilience in Four Countries

Author:
Deep Pal
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
China’s economic and political footprint has expanded so quickly that many countries, even those with relatively strong state and civil society institutions, have struggled to grapple with the implications. There has been growing attention to this issue in the United States and the advanced industrial democracies of Japan and Western Europe. But “vulnerable” countries—those where the gap is greatest between the scope and intensity of Chinese activism, on the one hand, and, on the other, local capacity to manage and mitigate political and economic risks—face special challenges. In these countries, the tools and tactics of China’s activism and influence activities remain poorly understood among local experts and elites. Both within and beyond these countries, meanwhile, policy too often transposes Western solutions and is not well adapted to local realities. This is especially notable in two strategic regions: Southeastern, Central, and Eastern Europe; and South Asia. China’s economic and political profile has expanded unusually quickly in these two regions, but many countries lack a deep bench of local experts who can match analysis of the domestic implications of Chinese activism to policy recommendations that reflect domestic political and economic ground truth. To address this gap, the Carnegie Endowment initiated a global project to better understand Chinese activities in eight “pivot” countries in these two strategic regions. The project’s first objective was to enhance local awareness of the scope and nature of Chinese activism in states with (1) weak state institutions, (2) fragile civil societies, or (3) countries where “elite capture” is a feature of the political landscape. Second, the project aimed to strengthen capacity by facilitating a sharing of experiences and best practices across national boundaries. Third, the project sought to develop policy prescriptions for the governments of these countries, as well as the United States and its strategic partners, to mitigate and respond to activities inimical to political independence or well-balanced economic growth and development. To establish a comprehensive picture of China’s activities and their impact, this project dug deeply into Chinese activism in four case countries in each region—eight countries in total. We began by holding workshops, so that influencers across countries could share experiences and compare notes. Invited participants included policymakers, experts, journalists, and others—all with deep local knowledge, steeped in their countries’ politics, economies, and civil societies. In Europe, the four countries were Georgia, Greece, Hungary, and Romania, and in South Asia, Bangladesh, Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. Cross-national discussions among these regional participants aimed to raise awareness, discuss the implications of China’s growing activism in their countries, and compare notes on the diverse ways in which these various countries had managed the rapid influx of Chinese capital, programs, people, technology, and other sources of influence.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Development, Economy, Engagement, Regionalism, and Resilience
Political Geography:
Bangladesh, China, South Asia, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Maldives

48. China’s Influence in Southeastern, Central, and Eastern Europe: Vulnerabilities and Resilience in Four Countries

Author:
Erik Brattberg, Philippe Le Corre, Paul Stronski, and Thomas de Waal
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
China’s presence has brought socioeconomic opportunities to Georgia, Greece, Hungary, and Romania. Yet it has exacerbated governance shortfalls, undermined elements of political and economic stability, and complicated the European Union’s ability to reach consensus on key issues.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Governance, European Union, Political stability, Resilience, and Economic Stability
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Greece, Romania, Hungary, Georgia, and United States of America

49. Between a Rock and a Hard Place: How Should South Korea Manage its Relations with the United States and China?

Author:
Zhiqun Zhu
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
This paper deals with one of the most critical issues in contemporary international relations: how China’s rise challenges foreign policies of U.S. allies, with a focus on the Republic of Korea (ROK) or South Korea. South Korea has been carefully hedging between the United States and China, its traditional security patron and largest trade partner, respectively. Strategic rivalry between the two great powers has put South Korea in an awkward position as pressure grows from the two powers to pick a side. Using a modified dual-track economics-security nexus framework, this paper suggests that the United States and China each has a significant impact on South Korea’s security and economic policies, making it important but challenging for South Korea to simultaneously manage relations with the two great powers. So far, South Korea has maintained these two sets of relationships remarkably well, but it may be difficult to continue with business as usual in the years ahead. For its own national interests, South Korea must seek to preserve the status quo under which it can continue to benefit from good relations with both great powers. The paper also proposes that South Korea should form a “middle power coalition” with like-minded nations to deflect pressures and avoid the dilemma of having to choose sides.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Alliance, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

50. Shaping the Indo-Pacific? Japan and Europeanisation

Author:
Yee-Kuang Heng
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
In this Strategic Update, Professor Yee-Kuang Heng investigates European power projection and presence in the Indo-Pacific, and its converging nature with Japan’s attempt to shape the regional environment in its favour. While UK threat perceptions have converged significantly with Japan’s since former Prime Minister David Cameron’s promulgation of a “golden era” in relations with China, managing expectations of Japan’s attempt to ‘shape’ and encourage Europeanisation remains crucial. But is it fair to conclude that Japan has been successful in encouraging a stronger European presence to help it shape the Indo-Pacific order?
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Europeanization, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Japan, China, United Kingdom, Europe, and Indo-Pacific

51. Strategic Report

Author:
Zaid Eyadat and Moh'd Khair Eiedat
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic Studies (CSS)
Abstract:
This is not a historical nor chronological report. It is rather “a working paper”. The purpose of this rather brief report is to reflect on three major issues: first, what are the characteristics of the world we live in? How stable and predictable is it? Are those in power know what are they doing? Or is it the blind leading the blind? Is our sense of uncertainty and thus unpredictability a product of mental crisis related to one in a lifetime pandemic experience? or is it more structural with long historical span? The second question is how dangerous and out of control is the Middle east region? Or is it? The Abraham Accords promise a new dawn for the region? Paradise is just around the corner or the calm preceding the storm? The third question, where does Jordan fit in these wider circles of activities both global and regional? Deliberately we left out of the report any serious considerations of the economic aspect challenge facing Jordan which is both self-evident and widely recognized. Moreover, the emphasis is on the geostrategic aspects of security related to the global level, the regional level and that of Jordan. Let us first look at the world.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Nuclear Power, Geopolitics, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Jordan

52. Is Serbia Still a Troublemaker in the Balkans?

Author:
Faruk Ajeti
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
As one of the largest countries of the Balkans, Serbia’s troubled past also poses big dilemmas for the future. Its latest political and military cooperation with Russia and China appears to be an effort to build a strategic neutrality with “Serbian characteristics.” But at what cost?
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Neutrality, and Cooperation
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eastern Europe, Serbia, and Balkans

53. Iran’s foreign policy: Buying time until the US presidential elections

Author:
Mariette Hagglund
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
A key issue dominating Iran’s foreign policy agenda is the future of the Iran nuclear deal with regard to the next US president. Non-state armed groups mark the core of Iran’s leverage in the region, but Iran is currently looking into diversifying its means of influence. Although Iran considers its non-aligned position a strength, it is also a weakness. In an otherwise interconnected world, where other regional powers enjoy partnerships with other states and can rely on external security guarantors, Iran remains alone. By being more integrated into regional cooperation and acknowledged as a regional player, Iran could better pursue its interests, but US attempts to isolate the country complicate any such efforts. In the greater superpower competition between the US and China, Iran is unlikely to choose a side despite its current “look East” policy, but may take opportunistic decisions.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, and Elections
Political Geography:
United States, China, Iran, Middle East, Asia, and North America

54. Combating China’s COVID-19 Propaganda Offensive to Undermine the United States on the Global Stage

Author:
John Lee
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Throughout the United States, it is becoming increasingly clear that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is exploiting COVID-19 in an effort to reshape the global order and enhance China’s international leadership at the expense of the US. A range of prominent commentators further assert that the Trump administration bears much of the blame for this turn of events. This argument tends to rest on twin assumptions:1 China is winning the battle of narratives when it comes to comparative national competence and its decisiveness in responding to its COVID-19 outbreak. The Trump administration is damaging America’s standing by getting off to a bad start in its response to the pandemic, exposing the underlying weaknesses of American institutions and preparedness for such a crisis. These arguments correctly acknowledge that the global pandemic is occurring within a context of US-China strategic, political, and economic competition and/or rivalry. This is the point of warnings to the administration that there is more at stake than containing and managing the virus, even if that is the immediate priority.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Economics, Health, National Security, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China and East Asia

55. Exploring India's Strategic Futures

Author:
Arzan Tarapore
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
Abstract:
he method of major/minor trends developed in this report suggests that the roots of apparently surprising future behavior can be found in a close reading of a target state’s history. Using this method, the report outlines three unlikely but plausible alternative futures of India as a strategic actor. The first scenario envisions India as a Hindu-nationalist revisionist power hostile to Pakistan but accommodating of China; in the second, it is a militarily risk-acceptant state that provokes dangerous crises with China; and in the third scenario, India is a staunch competitor to China that achieves some success through partnerships with other U.S. rivals like Russia and Iran. These scenarios are designed not to predict the future but to sensitize U.S. policymakers to possible strategic disruptions. They also serve to highlight risks and tensions in current policy.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, Europe, India, Asia, and North America

56. A New Horizon for the Korea-India Strategic and Sustainable Partnership under Korea's New Southern Policy

Author:
Choong Yong Ahn
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
India and South Korea, Asia’s third- and fourth-largest economies, respectively, established a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) in 2010 and upgraded their relationship to a special strategic partnership in 2015. South Korean President Moon Jae-in’s “New Southern” policy and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s “Act East” policy share important objectives and values through which Korea and India can maximize their potential to pursue high tech-oriented, win-win growth. Both countries face the great challenge of diversifying their economic partners in their respective geo-economic domains amid newly emerging international geo-economic dynamics as well as rapidly changing Fourth Industrial Revolution technologies. Given the two countries’ excessive dependence on the Chinese market and potential risks and uncertainties involved in the U.S.-China trade war and related security conflicts, South Korea and India need to deepen bilateral linkages in trade, investment, and cultural contacts. South Korea-India cooperation is crucial in promoting plurilateralism, prosperity, and harmony in East Asia. This paper suggests a specific action agenda to fulfill mutual commitments as entailed in the “Special Strategic Partnership” between these two like-minded countries of South Korea and India.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Science and Technology, Bilateral Relations, and Industry
Political Geography:
United States, China, South Asia, India, Asia, South Korea, and Korea

57. Framing an Indo-Pacific Narrative in India-South Korea Ties

Author:
Jagannath P. Panda
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Both India’s and South Korea’s strategic choices are deeply influenced by the rapidly evolving Indo-Pacific construct, particularly amid a mounting U.S.-China rivalry. With India’s “Look/Act East” policy and South Korea’s “New Southern Policy” offering a perfect stage for deepened mutual cooperation, both nations need to further their relations to build Asia’s future while advancing their respective national interests. With both countries following stringent foreign policies as a result of the actions of their immediate neighbors, they present a geopolitically strategic complementarity for their relationship to prosper and emerge as one of the most important relationships in the region. Seoul’s hesitation to overtly embrace the “Indo-Pacific” concept is not really a barrier; rather a geo-political overture to discard the balance of power politics and pursue an autonomous foreign policy. India’s preference for the “Indo-Pacific” is equally based on strategic autonomy, imbibing universal values and an inclusive regional order. Both countries emphasize a free and rules-based Indo-Pacific and have immense potential to establish security and connectivity partnerships as the keystone of their bilateral ties. With India and South Korea understanding the economic importance versus security ramifications of China, and with Japan’s reemergence as a key regional, if not global actor, both countries need to bring serious strategic intent to their relationship. Making use of the ASEAN platform and bilateral dialogues, South Korea and India have the potential to become one of the strongest Indo-Pacific partners of the 21st century
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
China, South Asia, India, Asia, South Korea, Korea, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

58. Defeating Threat Air Defences: the Return of the DEAD

Author:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
For the past two decades the US and its allies have faced a very limited surface-to-air threat in wars in which they have engaged. This is now changing as the worsening security environment and the emergence of near-peer rivals once again raises the spectre of a strongly contested air domain. A central element of the renewed challenge is the surface-to-air missile (SAM) system. China and Russia have fielded and continue to develop SAM systems across all range categories – and to offer many of these for export – that pose a credible threat to air operations. The US, and to an even greater extent the Europeans, have reduced emphasis and expenditure on what is known as the suppression of enemy air defence (SEAD) role. Counter-insurgency rather than counter-integrated air-defence operations have been the priority since the turn of the century. There is now, however, the renewed challenge of being able to carry out air operations in airspace defended by the latest generations of point-, short-, medium- and long-range SAM systems. Low-observable aircraft only offer a partial solution, particularly as the US and its allies will operate mixed fleets of stealthy and non-stealthy combat aircraft at least until around the middle of the century. The latter types of aircraft remain at greater risk from SAM threats than low-observable aircraft, and their operational utility will depend partly on the wider capacity to counter surface-based threat missile systems. SEAD is an asset-intensive capability, particularly in the early days of a conflict, and has traditionally involved dedicated platforms as well as fighter ground-attack aircraft. In SEAD operations in the 1990s, such as Operation Allied Force during the 1999 Kosovo conflict, up to one-third of strike missions were tasked against ground-based air defences. While the force mix will change as uninhabited systems are increasingly adopted in the inventory, a variety of crewed and uninhabited aircraft and associated weaponry will still be required for the task, and will be required in numbers greater than are available in current inventories if faced by a peer or near-peer threat. Collating what is known as an electronic order of battle against peer and near-peer rivals should once again become a priority, as should the capacity to counter, disable or destroy surface-to-air threat systems.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

59. China's Rise as a Global Security Actor: Implications for NATO

Author:
Meia Nouwens and Helena Legarda
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
In December 2019, for the first time, NATO leaders recognised China as a new strategic point of focus for the Alliance. This reflects growing concern among NATO members surrounding China’s geopolitical rise and its growing power-projection capabilities, as well as the impact that these may have on the global balance of power. Today, China is not only taking a central role in Indo-Pacific security affairs but is also becoming an increasingly visible security actor in Europe’s periphery. As such, the question of how to deal with an increasingly global China has been an important part of Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg’s NATO 2030 reflection process. China poses a wide range of challenges to NATO. Beijing sees the Alliance as a United States-centric outfit that may be used by Washington to contain China, and has therefore tried to influence individual NATO members’ decisions in order to weaken the Alliance’s unity. Close ties between China and Russia, especially in the security and military spheres, have also been a source of concern for NATO allies. Besides the Chinese and Russian navies’ joint exercises in the Baltic and Mediterranean seas, there is also the potential for the two sides to further coordinate – or at least align their behaviour – on issues of relevance to the Alliance, including hybrid warfare and cyber espionage, arms-control issues, and their approach to Arctic governance, among others. China’s defence spending and military-modernisation process, along with the growing strength of its defence industry, have led to the proliferation of more advanced military platforms around the world. Beijing is also expanding its stockpile of missiles, some of which have the range to reach NATO countries. China’s military-power-projection capabilities have likewise edged towards Europe as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has expanded its international presence over the last few years. While NATO allies may have agreed that China presents a number of challenges to the Alliance’s security, they have yet to achieve consensus on how to address them. Some of these issues lie beyond NATO’s traditional areas of competence and will require expertise best provided by partners of the Alliance rather than the Alliance itself. NATO allies will need to prioritise how, when, where and with which partners to use their combined resources to deal with them. At the same time, the Alliance acknowledges that China is not its adversary. NATO thus must find areas of common interest where it can continue to cooperate with China, albeit with a more clear-eyed approach than it has done in the past. Addressing the opportunities and problems posed by China as a cohesive alliance will be more important than ever.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Hegemony
Political Geography:
China, Europe, North Atlantic, Asia, and North America

60. Iran's Influence in the Middle East

Author:
Jadranka Polovic
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:
The Middle East as one of the most heterogeneous and politically conflicting regions in the world and has long been at the center of international interest. Faced with sectarian wars and comprehensive social crises for decades the Middle East, due to its geostrategic importance and especially the imperative of controlling the region’s vast energy resources, has once again become a battle ground for major powers whose interests affect the concentration of participants in the region. The competition between global powers and growing influence of Russia and China, who undermine the US power and European Union’s influence and also undermine established alliances in the Middle East, undoubtedly require a rethinking of Western strategies for the region. A series of geopolitical challenges, especially after September 11 attacks against the United States, as a result of military interventions and civil wars (Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Syria) and uprisings (Arab Spring) and thus the collapsed regional order, confronted the international community with the changing nature of security threats, as well as with the new balance of power of regional and international actors in the Middle East. Among the many aspects of the Middle East conflicts, the fundamental issue of regional security today is the Sunni-Shiite conflict, which has since the invasion of Iraq in 2003 directly defined the approaches and policies of great powers and significantly changed regional dynamics. In this context, Iran’s role is particularly significant. Namely, over the last two decades, Iran has consolidated its goals in the Persian Gulf and strategically expanded its influence to other countries in the Middle East, primarily Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen. The growing influence of Shiite Iran, and its close relations with Shiite communities in the region with which it forms a strategic coalition, have become a key geopolitical challenge for the international community.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Energy Policy, International Cooperation, Natural Resources, and Hegemony
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Iran, Middle East, Asia, North America, and United States of America

61. Putting A Spoke In The Wheel: Russian Efforts To Weaken U.S.-led Alliance Structures In Northeast Asia

Author:
James D. J. Brown
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Russia is widely accused of employing a range of instruments—both overt and covert—to undermine Western unity. However, to what extent is Russia engaged in comparable activities to weaken the South Korean and Japanese alliances with the United States? This paper answers this question by assessing Moscow’s actions in the domains of diplomacy, information, the military, and the economy. It finds that Russia is indeed aiming to encourage Seoul and Tokyo to distance themselves from Washington and from each other. In particular, Moscow is committed to deterring U.S. allies from facilitating the deployment of additional units of U.S. missile defense systems within the region. Across the four domains, it is only in the economic field that Russia is found to lack leverage. Overall, Moscow has achieved several tactical victories, but has yet to seriously damage U.S.-led alliance structures within the region. All the same, Seoul and Tokyo must remain watchful of Moscow’s activities, especially since there are signs of increased cooperation between Russia and China in exploiting wedge issues between the United States and its allies, thereby potentially combining China’s economic weight with Russia’s skills in influence operations.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Economy, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, and United States of America

62. Don’t be rude, don’t be docile! How to manage freedom of manoeuvre in tense bilateral diplomacy

Author:
Hans Mouritzen
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Bilateral diplomacy has become increasingly important in today’s multipolar world. A number of cases are analysed in this DIIS Working Paper, where Nordic countries have been ‘disciplined’ in bilateral diplomacy by the emerging great powers of Russia, China, or India. Compared to the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, with US unipolarity and EU normative power, the Nordics have experienced a narrowing of their freedom of manoeuvre. It is no longer possible, without significant costs, to criticise these great powers’ internal affairs or foreign policies based on allegedly universal values. In general, it is crucial for decision-makers not to overstep their state’s freedom of manoeuvre. But on the other hand, they should not be too docile and desist from occasionally challenging its limits. Trial balloons or parallel action with related countries might do exactly that.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Power Politics, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Russia, China, India, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and United States of America

63. Defending the Maritime Rules-Based Order: Regional Responses to the South China Sea Disputes

Author:
Rebecca Strating
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
The seas are an increasingly important domain for understanding the balance-of-power dynamics between a rising People’s Republic of China and the United States. Specifically, disputes in the South China Sea have intensified over the past decade. Multifaceted disputes concern overlapping claims to territory and maritime jurisdiction, strategic control over maritime domain, and differences in legal interpretations of freedom of navigation. These disputes have become a highly visible microcosm of a broader contest between a maritime order underpinned by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and challenger conceptions of order that see a bigger role for rising powers in generating new rules and alternative interpretations of existing international law. This issue examines the responses of non-claimant regional states—India, Australia, South Korea, and Japan—to the South China Sea disputes.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Territorial Disputes, Geopolitics, Maritime, and Jurisdiction
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, United States of America, and South China Sea

64. Taiwan's 2020 Election and Its Implications for the New Southbound Policy

Author:
H. H. Michael Hsiao and Alan H. Yang
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
The elections in January 2020 marked a new era for Taiwan, clearly demonstrating citizens’ resistance to China. The results showed that incumbent President Tsai Ing-wen, leader of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), was re-elected with a landslide victory of 8.17 million votes (57.1%) which is higher than the previous record high of 7.65 million votes obtained by the Kuomintang (KMT) President Ma Ying Jeou in 2008. Michael Hsiao and Alan Yang, Chairman and Executive Director, respectively, of the Taiwan‐Asia Exchange Foundation in Taiwan, explain that “The Taiwanese people firmly defended Taiwan’s sovereignty and cherished democracy through free and open elections.”
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Sovereignty, Elections, and Democracy
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

65. Mongolia's Response to Increasing U.S.-China-Russia Rivalry in Asia

Author:
Alicia Campi
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
Dr Alicia Campi, President of the Mongolia Society, explains that “The [“Third Neighbor”] policy was reinterpreted in content and meaning to include cultural and economic partners as diverse as India, Brazil, Kuwait, Turkey, Vietnam, and Iran. With increased superpower rivalry in its region, Mongolia has expanded this basic policy.”
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Partnerships, and Economy
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Turkey, India, Mongolia, Asia, Kuwait, Brazil, North America, and United States of America

66. Prospects for India-Taiwan Relations

Author:
Niranjan Jose
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on International Policy (CIP)
Abstract:
This year’s border stand-off in the Galwan Valley between China and India following China’s encroachment into Indian territory, is a reminder of India’s perennial problems with Beijing. The latest violation is an example of the staunch stance China has adopted against India. Neither nation is interested in a full-fledged confrontation. In this scenario, New Delhi has no option but to engage with Beijing to resolve the dispute through dialogue; however discussion and confidence-building initiatives by itself will not lead India towards problem-solving. China’s confrontational approach towards India and the border disagreement set the right background as to why it could not be a better opportunity for India to meaningfully engage with Taiwan. India and Taiwan both are Asian democracies pursuing an effective resolution of dynamic social and ethnic problems, and both face aggressive Chinese security policies aimed at establishing regional hegemony. From a strategic security perspective, both India and Taiwan are deeply concerned about the rising assertiveness of Beijing in the region. The China element can become a tool for moving closer to the strategic communities in New Delhi and Taipei. India and Taiwan have a variety of mutual concerns, ranging from controlling China’s growth to a political and economic partnership. For Taiwan, China’s current trade war with the US has made several Taiwanese firms keen to reduce their vulnerability on China. Indian government initiatives such as Smart Cities, Make in India, Digital India, and Start-up India were launched to increase India’s viability for foreign investors, making it an attractive destination for Taiwanese corporations.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:
China, India, Taiwan, and Asia

67. 11th U.S.-China High-Level Political Party Leaders Dialogue

Author:
Joshua Cavanaugh
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EastWest Institute
Abstract:
A select delegation of leaders from the U.S. Democratic and Republican Parties and the global business community traveled to Beijing, China to meet with senior officials from the Communist Party of China (CPC) on November 18-21, 2019. The discussions were part of the 11th U.S.-China High-Level Political Party Leaders Dialogue organized by the EastWest Institute (EWI) in partnership with the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (IDCPC). Launched in 2010, the U.S.-China High-Level Political Party Leaders Dialogue seeks to build understanding and trust between political elites from the U.S. and China through candid exchanges of views on topics ranging from local governance to foreign policy concerns. The dialogue process consistently involves sitting officers from the CPC and the U.S. Democratic and Republican National Committees. In the 11th iteration of the dialogue, the CPC delegation was led by Song Tao, minister of IDCPC. Gary Locke, former secretary of the United States Department of Commerce, former governor for the state of Washington and former United States Ambassador of China; and Alphonso Jackson, former secretary of the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development; lead the U.S. Democratic and Republican delegations, respectively. Throughout the dialogue, members of both delegations spoke freely on relevant topics including foriegn policy trends, trade disputes and emerging areas of economic cooperation. EWI facilitated a series of meetings for the U.S. delegation, which included a productive meeting with Wang Qishan, vice president of the People’s Republic of China at the Great Hall of the People. The delegates also met with Yang Jiechi, director of the Office of the Central Commission for Foreign Affairs; Dai Bingguo, former state councilor of the People’s Republic of China; and Lu Kang, director of the Department of North American and Oceanian Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The U.S. delegates visited the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and met with their president, Jin Liqun, as well as the Schwarzman College at Tsinghua University to engage prominent scholars on the future of the U.S.-China relationship.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Trade and Finance, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
United States, China, Asia, and North America

68. Dealing with China: Lessons Learned from Three Case Studies

Author:
Christopher W. Bishop
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
The idea for this paper began after several conversations with Canadian friends and colleagues about the cases of Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor. On December 10, 2018, Chinese officials detained the two Canadian citizens for “endangering state security”, 10 days after Canadian authorities arrested Meng Wanzhou, Huawei’s chief financial officer, on an extradition warrant from the United States, where she was wanted for bank fraud. Despite Chinese statements denying any connection between the two Michaels and Meng, some Canadians have argued the only way to gain their release is for Canada to release Meng – a classic “prisoner exchange”. Others, however, have argued just as forcefully that trading Meng for the two Canadians would only give legitimacy to China’s “hostage diplomacy”. One friend asked me if China had ever done anything like this before. How had those cases been resolved, and what would China do this time? Those were good questions. As a U.S. Foreign Service officer who has spent much of my career working on China – including at the U.S. embassy in Beijing from 2015-2018, where I analyzed the Communist Party leadership and China’s state security apparatus – I had some insight into Chinese foreign policy. I also had a personal connection to one of the cases. I knew Michael Kovrig – he had been one of my counterparts at the Canadian embassy in Beijing – and I had great respect for his work as a diplomat, and later as a senior advisor at the International Crisis Group. Moreover, because I was now on leave from the U.S. Department of State to serve as a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow in Canada, I had time to look for some answers. And so I began trying to identify and analyze similar cases from the recent past. This paper is the result. It represents my own views, and although the Department of State has allowed me to publish it in my personal capacity, it does not necessarily reflect the views of the Department or the U.S. government.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Affairs, Prisons/Penal Systems, and Finance
Political Geography:
China, Canada, Asia, North America, and United States of America

69. Russia in Africa: Is Great Power Competition Returning to the Continent?

Author:
Agnieszka Paczyńska
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:
Since 2014 Russian economic, political and security engagement in Africa has grown significantly. This policy brief analyses the motives and recent changes in Russia's Africa policy, and discusses implications for German and European cooperation with Africa.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Power Politics, Investment, and Trade
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, China, and United States of America

70. Broadening the Transatlantic Partnership to Address the China Challenge

Author:
Carisa Nietsche
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The COVID-19 pandemic has been a turning point in Europe’s calculus regarding China. Beijing’s ham-fisted mask diplomacy, attempt to rewrite the pandemic’s origins and use of the World Health Organisation to advance the objectives of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) underscored for Europe the nature of Beijing’s objectives. Europe has grown more attuned to the “strategic challenge” China poses in the economic, technology and global governance realms as a result. The growing convergence between US and European perspectives on China provides a solid foundation for future cooperation between the transatlantic partners. Yet, addressing the China challenge will require broadening beyond the transatlantic partnership and bringing Indo-Pacific partners to the table.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Communications, Partnerships, Cybersecurity, Transatlantic Relations, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

71. Italy, Atlanticism and the Biden Administration: Greater Convergence to Defuse Ambiguity on China

Author:
Dario Cristiani
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
In September 2019, the once anti-establishment Five Star Movement (Movimento Cinque Stelle – M5S) agreed to enter a ruling alliance with the Democratic Party (Partito Democratico – PD).[1] By establishing this “yellow-red” coalition government with what was considered its political nemesis, the M5S managed to preserve its presence in power and avoid early elections. However, its influence gradually weakened, as attested to by poor performances in local elections. The M5S’s declining political fortunes and the changing composition of the government have a significant foreign policy dimension, especially if addressed through the lens of Italy–US relations. The PD is a solidly pro-Atlanticist party in Italy. The M5S, despite its evolution towards greater pragmatism over the years, remains a source of concern, being still perceived as the most pro-China actor within the Italian political landscape.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Geopolitics, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, Italy, and United States of America

72. Domestic and International (Dis)Order: A Strategic Response

Author:
Aspen Strategy Group
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Aspen Institute
Abstract:
The Aspen Strategy Group recently released Domestic and International (Dis)Order: A Strategic Response bringing together preeminent experts to explore race, democracy, and political divisions on the American home front; the future of U.S.-China relations; the global economy; and U.S. foreign policy priorities for 2021. Contributors include: Madeleine K. Albright, Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Zoë Baird, Robert D. Blackwill, Nicholas Burns, Kurt M. Campbell, Diana Farrell, Peter Feaver, Michael J. Green, Naima Green-Riley, Jane Harman, Kay Bailey Hutchison, Wolfgang Ischinger, Aditi Kumar, Anja Manuel, David McCormick, John McLaughlin, Shivshankar Menon, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., David H. Petraeus, Tom Pritzker, Condoleezza Rice, Senator Tim Scott, Anne-Marie Slaughter, Torrey Taussig, and Philip Zelikow.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, International Cooperation, Race, Military Strategy, Democracy, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

73. China in One Country: interdependence or globalisation 'with Chinese characteristics'?

Author:
George Magnus
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
Globalisation has faltered, and faces significant political challenges. In both the US and China, voices are calling for a reduction of economic interdependence between the two countries. In the US, this has taken the name of decoupling, in China, self-reliance. At the same time, China’s President, Xi Jinping has vocally championed globalisation in various global fora in recent years. Understanding of China’s systems of government and business, as well as its global interests, is lacking when compared to that of the US. In this Strategic Update, George Magnus investigates what is meant when China’s leadership speaks of globalisation, and what the implications of the answer are for the rest of the world.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Globalization, and Leadership
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

74. Economic Diplomacy in the 21st Century: Principles and Challenges

Author:
Linda Yueh
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
Economic diplomacy in the 21st century will face a different set of challenges stemming from the changed global economy, US-China tensions, as well as a backlash against globalisation, among others. Therefore, the conduct of economic diplomacy, i.e., how a country manages its foreign economic relations including trade and investment, must adapt. The framework for economic diplomacy should seek to balance commercial openness with strategic foreign policy aims, broadly defined. It should situate a country within the 21st century global economy with its new drivers, promote a rules-based system in order to mitigate Great Power tensions, and recognise that all foreign economic policy is ultimately also domestic. There is no one general approach but there are several principles, each with their own challenges, for governments to consider, which is set out in this Strategic Update.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Investment, Trade, and Economic Diplomacy
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

75. All Hands on Deck: the Crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Need for US Leadership

Author:
Alexandros Zachariades
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
Crisis has returned to the Eastern Mediterranean where Greek and Turkish economic interests, legal claims, and armed forces are squaring off. In this Strategic Update, Alexandros Zachariades explores how the two NATO powers arrived at the current confrontation, how the contest intersects with issues ranging from China to Libya, and how the international community can resolve the tension.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, NATO, Economics, and Leadership
Political Geography:
China, Turkey, Greece, Libya, United States of America, and Mediterranean

76. Battleground Southeast Asia: China's Rise and America's Options

Author:
Charles Dunst
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
Southeast Asia, while still a reservoir of goodwill for the US, has in recent years come increasingly under China's umbrella. In this Strategic Update, Charles Dunst analyzes China's expansion there, discusses Southeast Asians' American predeliction, and offers steps the US can take to "win back" the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, International Affairs, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Southeast Asia, and United States of America

77. The Role of the Philippines in the World

Author:
Kyra Lüthi
Publication Date:
11-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:
First association most people have when they think about Asia are countries like China, Japan or India, as they are big countries, present for a long time on the world map. During the past decades, Hong Kong and Singapore have also gained a lot of attraction worldwide as business comprise the world’s most ancient civilizations. So regardless of a country’s geographical size and sustainability, each one is vital in playing a role in the global economic and political order. Unfortunately, more often than not, the South East Asian countries and most specifically and finical hubs of Asia. These are indeed the key players in Asia but the biggest continent in the world is not only composed of these few states. It is home to 48 countries and 4.5 billion people with different ethnicities and cultures that the Philippines, if not forgotten, is commonly underestimated in the contribution that it provides in the international arena due to the multiple misconceptions about the country’s general conditions. But in reality, the Philippines has always been in the global scheme from the earliest times up to today, therefore it is important and relevant to learn more about its history, involvement and influence on relations in Asia and globally.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Japan, China, India, Asia, Philippines, Singapore, and Hong Kong

78. In Dire Straits? Implications of US-Iran Tensions for the Global Oil Market

Author:
Ilan Goldenberg, Jessica Schwed, and Kaleigh Thomas
Publication Date:
11-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
Abstract:
In recent months, Iran has responded to rising tensions with the United States—particularly the US launch of the “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran—by attacking oil tankers and infrastructure in the Persian Gulf region around the Strait of Hormuz (the Strait). These actions have been designed to signal to the United States, the Gulf states, and the international community that the American strategy of strangling Iran economically will not be cost-free, and to Saudi Arabia in particular that it is highly vulnerable to Iranian retaliation. As the Strait of Hormuz is one of the world’s most critical energy chokepoints, the implications of Iran’s efforts merit close scrutiny and analysis. This study was designed to examine three scenarios for military conflict between Iran and the United States and assess the potential impacts on global oil prices—as one specific representation of the immediate economic impact of conflict—as well as broader strategic implications. The three scenarios are: Increasing US-Iran tensions that ultimately lead to a new “Tanker War” scenario similar to the conflict of the 1980s, in which Iran attacks potentially hundreds of ships in the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman over a prolonged period while also launching missiles at Gulf oil infrastructure. An escalation of tensions between Iran and the United States in which Iran significantly increases the scope and severity of missile attacks directed at major oil and energy infrastructure in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. A major conflict between Iran and the United States that includes damage to Gulf oil infrastructure and a temporary closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Its main conclusions are: The risk of a major military confrontation between the United States and Iran has increased in recent months but still remains relatively low, as neither the United States nor Iran wants war. That said, the September 14, 2019, attack on the Abqaiq and Khurais facilities was a strategic game changer and shows that the biggest risk is a prolonged, low-intensity military conflict. The fact that Iran was willing to conduct such an attack was a surprise to most analysts and to the US government and its Gulf partners. The level of accuracy it showed in the strike demonstrated a technical proficiency the US government and outside analysts did not believe Iran had. In the more moderate and likely conflict scenarios, increasing tensions between the United States and Iran are unlikely to dramatically affect global oil prices. The most profound costs in the more likely scenarios are not energy-related but security-related. Even in the less escalatory scenarios, the United States would be forced into long-term deployments of a large number of air and naval assets that would need to remain in the Middle East for years at a cost of billions of dollars. Such deployments would take away resources that would otherwise be dedicated to managing great power competition with China and Russia. In the more extreme conflict scenarios, major loss of life and an even bigger and longer-term American military deployment would be expected. In the lower likelihood scenario of a major military confrontation between the United States and Iran, global oil prices would be dramatically affected, though price impacts would not be prolonged. All assumptions about the potential impacts on oil prices are based on the supposition that the United States protects global shipping lanes, but that theory deserves further scrutiny. For more than a generation, the United States has viewed securing global shipping lanes that are critical for commerce and energy as a core vital interest. But given the isolationist tendencies in the United States and President Donald Trump’s attitude that America should stop underwriting the defense of its allies, it is conceivable he may choose not to respond in the types of scenarios described in this paper or demand that countries most dependent on oil trade from the Gulf—most notably China—step up instead. Another wild card for oil prices in a major crisis scenario would be President Trump’s unpredictable policies regarding the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. Typically, an administration would be expected to coordinate an international response with the International Energy Agency (IEA) to release the SPR of a number of countries, but this cannot be assumed in the current administration. Though these conclusions are to some extent comforting, the authors acknowledge that a key issue with any analysis of this situation is the unpredictability of the United States. In the present moment, neither US adversaries nor partners know quite what to expect—and, for that matter, neither does the US government or its observers.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Energy Policy, Oil, and Global Political Economy
Political Geography:
United States, China, Iran, Middle East, and Asia

79. Change and Continuity in Japan-Russia Relations: Implications for the United States.

Author:
Paul Saunders and John Van Oudenaren
Publication Date:
03-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Abstract:
The report provides a synthesis of Japanese and American expert perspectives on the recent history, current state and future prospects for Japan-Russia relations. The authors examine the political, diplomatic, security, economic and energy dynamics of this important, but understudied relationship. They also assess how the Japan-Russia relationship fits within the broader geopolitical context of the Asia-Pacific region, factoring in structural determinants such as China’s rise and the level of U.S. presence in the region. Finally, the authors consider potential policy implications for the United States, paying special attention to how shifts in relations between Tokyo and Moscow could impact the U.S.-Japan alliance. As Saunders observes in his introduction to the volume, the currently shifting strategic environment in the Asia-Pacific region, which is a central factor in Tokyo and Moscow’s efforts to foster constructive relations, also raises a host of questions for the US-Japan alliance. What are the prospects for Japan-Russia relations? What are Russian and Japanese objectives in their bilateral relations? How does the Trump administration view a possible improvement in Russia-Japan relations and to what extent will U.S. officials seek to limit such developments? Is the U.S.-Russia relationship likely to worsen and in so doing to spur further China-Russia cooperation? Could a better Russia-Japan relationship weaken the U.S.-Japan alliance? Or might it in fact serve some U.S. interests?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Japan, China, Europe, and Asia

80. China’s Belt and Road Initiative and Its Energy-Security Dimensions

Author:
Frank Umbach
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is officially neither a Chinese “Marshall Plan” nor a geopolitical master strategy. At present, it involves 84 countries, rising from 65 countries in 2015, and 15 Chinese provinces. Over the last year, the number of countries being concerned or ambivalent about China’s motivations and strategic objectives behind the BRI have increased. Despite officially supporting China’s BRI, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) also warned last April, that China is supporting unneeded and unsustainable projects in many countries, leading to heavy and unpayable debt burdens. In ASEAN, Chinese investments are welcomed but there are also misgivings about the BRI’s strategic objectives which may constrain ASEAN’s policy options. As China is presently and will remain the single most influential country in global energy markets in the next decades, it is not surprising that its infrastructure plans of building railways, highways and ports are often interlinked with China’s energy and raw materials projects abroad and its domestic energy policies. This paper analyses the energy dimensions of the BRI and its strategic implications for its wider economic, foreign and security policies in Southeast Asia, South Asia, Central Asia and the Middle East.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Energy Policy, Military Strategy, ASEAN, and IMF
Political Geography:
China, South Asia, Central Asia, Middle East, Asia, and Southeast Asia

81. China’s Belt and Road Initiative: A Perception Survey of Asian Opinion Leaders

Author:
Pradumna B. Rana, Chai Wai-Mun, and Ji Xianbai
Publication Date:
11-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), officially unveiled in 2013, is China’s landmark foreign and economic policy initiative to achieve improved connectivity, regional cooperation, and economic development on a trans-continental scale. China has promoted the BRI as a cooperative initiative that will lead to a win- win situation for both China and BRI partner countries. However, there are many different views and pushbacks against the BRI and suspicions of China’s underlying intentions. Impacts of the BRI can be assessed either through a model-based quantitative study or through a broadly representative survey. Our paper used the latter approach as we were not aware of any such study in the past. We implemented an online survey from 20 June to 19 July 2019 which over 1,200 Asian opinion leaders responded to. Asian opinion leaders were defined as policy makers, academics, businesses, and media practitioners from 26 Asian countries that have signed a BRI agreement with China. Stakeholders’ perspectives on the following issues were solicited: (i) why China might have been interested in launching the BRI; (ii) perceived benefits and risks to countries participating in the BRI; and (iii) policies that the stakeholders would like to recommend both to China and their own governments. Though mixed views on the specifics of the BRI emerged, respondents generally felt that the BRI was a positive development facilitating international economic cooperation and development. The recommendations of this survey should be of some use in making the BRI a truly win-win initiative for all.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Imperialism, Economic Policy, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Global Focus

82. Building Development Partnership: Engagement Between China and Latin America

Author:
Haibin Niu
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Carter Center
Abstract:
The full-fledged economic ties between China and Latin America and the Caribbean are important indicators of China’s role as a global player. In the ongoing and heightened debate about China’s rise, China’s impact on Latin America is being discussed by scholars and policymakers worldwide. Though there are doubts about China’s intentions and impact on Latin America, China has developed a more substantial and meaningful policy framework to build development partnership with the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, International Cooperation, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Latin America

83. Working paper on the relations between Russia and China

Author:
Jens Bastian
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:
Working paper by the independent economic analyst Jens Bastian, focusing on relations between China and Russia is published by ELIAMEP. More specifically, in the text entitled “The Embrace Between the Russian Bear and the Panda Bear: An Emerging Sino-Russian Axis” it is argued that: “The depth and momentum of Sino-Russian strategic cooperation is deepening and accelerating. Defense and security, the various bilateral energy arrangements, the synergies resulting from the combination of the Eurasian Economic Union and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), reflect the wider range of joint activities of the two states”.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Eurasia

84. US-China Trade Tensions: Impact on Mexico | Estados Unidos-China Tensiones Comerciales: Impacto en Mexico

Author:
COMEXI
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Mexican Council on Foreign Relations (COMEXI)
Abstract:
For the mid- or long-term, no country in the world—and much less Mexico—benefits from a strained environment in which there is no adherence to international trade rules. However, for the short-term, a strained trade environment produces adjustments to the supply chains, which could benefit competitors of those economies that are currently in conflict. Mexico, the second supplier of the United States only behind China, could reassert its position as a credible competitor of the Asian economy in the US. Likewise, in the context of trade friction, or even just the threat of a conflict, Mexico could strengthen its trade positioning in China by replacing part of the US offering. /// En el mediano o largo plazo, a ningún país del mundo, y menos a México, le conviene que exista un clima de tensiones donde no se respeten las reglas del comercio internacional. Ahora bien, en el corto plazo, el clima de tensiones comerciales genera ajustes en las cadenas de suministro, lo cual puede beneficiar a los competidores de las economías en conflicto. México, el segundo proveedor de Estados Unidos sólo después de China, puede reafirmar su posición como competidor creíble de la economía asiática en Estados Unidos, así como fortalecer su posición comercial en China, al sustituir parte de la oferta estadounidense, en un contexto de fricciones comerciales o su amenaza.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economy, Economic Growth, Trade Wars, Exports, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Mexico, and United States of America

85. Strategic autonomy for European choices: The key to Europe's shaping power

Author:
Giovanni Grevi
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:
Multi-level competition is on the rise in the international system and the standoff between the US and China risks becoming a defining feature of international affairs. However, the future is not predestined: the European Union (EU) will play a major role in the development of the international order, whether through its absence or its engagement. This Discussion Paper follows recent European Policy Centre publications and debates dedicated to revamping Europe’s approach to an increasingly challenging international context, which have delivered recommendations to: equip Europe with the tools to govern interdependence and mitigate confrontation; take a strong stance in defence of Europe while not endorsing a zero-sum interpretation of global affairs; turn the EU into a global shaping power by pursuing a ‘rules-first’ strategy; and frame Europe’s strategic autonomy in comprehensive terms, including the economic, technological and security and defence dimensions.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Affairs, European Union, and Strategic Autonomy
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and United States of America

86. Chinese, Japanese, and Korean Inroads into Central Asia: Comparative Analysis of the Economic Cooperation Roadmaps for Uzbekistan

Author:
Timur Dadabaev
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
China, Japan, and South Korea have regarded Central Asia as a new Asian frontier in their foreign policies since the collapse of the Soviet Union. With time, their policies evolved into regionbuilding initiatives exemplified by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Belt and Road Initiative, Central Asia plus Japan Dialogue Forum, and Korea-Central Asia Cooperation Forum. This paper raises the following research questions: What are the areas of interest for China, Japan, and Korea in their relations with Central Asian states and Uzbekistan in particular? What are the patterns of agenda setting in establishing intergovernmental cooperation? What are the particular projects that these states initiate? What are the objectives of projects initiated within these areas of interest? How competitive or complementary are these projects of China, Japan, and Korea? Throughout, Chinese, Japanese, and Korean “Silk Road” roadmaps with Uzbekistan are discussed to highlight their similarities and differences.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economy, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Central Asia, Asia, South Korea, and Uzbekistan

87. US foreign policy tools in the era of disinformation: Deficiencies prevent effective response to malign information operations

Author:
Deborah A. McCarthy
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Russia, China, Iran and ISIS use information operations to undermine the national security objectives of the United States and its allies. However, the US’s international response has been weak. Internal constraints have limited more effective counter-measures. In particular, the lack of a coordinated White House-level strategy, dispersed authorities and little cooperation with private social media companies can be identified as causal factors. Additional steps by the Trump Administration to counter foreign disinformation will aim to protect the 2020 presidential elections rather than to push back on efforts to undermine US leadership abroad.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Science and Technology, ISIS, Social Media, and Disinformation
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, Europe, Iran, Middle East, Asia, and North America

88. Seven Chinas A Policy Framework

Author:
David Kelly
Publication Date:
02-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The debate about China’s changing role in global affairs is often framed as a dichotomous choice between a peacefully rising China that seeks to be a constructive stakeholder and an increasingly dangerous China that is challenging the status quo, both in terms of its norms and the place of the United States. The reality is more complicated. There are not only signs of both elements, but the foundations shaping Chinese behavior is multifold. Most international relations scholars examine China through one or another version of realism or liberalism. David Kelly, head of research at China Policy, offers an alternative approach that examines the nature of Chinese identity, or rather, Chinese identities, plural, and how they exhibit themselves in Chinese foreign policy. Using his renowned skills in reading Chinese-language official documents and the broader commentary, Kelly teases out seven narratives that Chinese tell themselves and the world, and he provides a codebook for explicating shifting Chinese behavior in different arenas. Kelly concludes that some of these narratives facilitate cooperation, but most point toward deep-seated tensions between China and the West in the years ahead.

Topic:
Foreign Policy, Globalization, Imperialism, and Conflict
Political Geography:
United States, China, Asia, North America, and Asia-Pacific

89. Perspectives on Taiwan Insights from the 2017 Taiwan-U.S. Policy Program

Author:
Bonnie S. Glaser and Matthew Funaiole
Publication Date:
03-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The papers in this compendium were written by the 10 members of the 2017 CSIS Taiwan-U.S. Policy Program (TUPP) delegation. TUPP provides a much-needed opportunity for future leaders to gain a better understanding of Taiwan through first-hand exposure to its politics, culture, and history. Each participant was asked to reflect on his or her in-country experience and produce a short article analyzing a policy issue related to Taiwan. These papers are a testament to the powerful impact that follows first-hand exposure to Taiwan.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:
United States, China, Taiwan, Asia, and Asia-Pacific

90. Security Implications of China’s Military Presence in the Indian Ocean

Author:
Zack Cooper
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The issue: China’s increased military presence in the Indian Ocean should not come as a surprise. China is following in the traditional path of other rising powers; it is expanding its military operations to match its interests abroad. The security implications of China’s push into the Indian Ocean region are mixed. In peacetime, these efforts will certainly expand Chinese regional influence. In wartime, however, China’s Indian Ocean presence will likely create more vulnerabilities than opportunities. China’s military forays into the Indian Ocean have triggered a series of warnings. The term “string of pearls” was first used to refer to Chinese basing access in the Indian Ocean by a 2004 report for the U.S. Department of Defense. That report suggested China’s growing regional presence could “deter the potential disruption of its energy supplies from potential threats, including the U.S. Navy, especially in the case of a conflict with Taiwan.” Other scholars have warned that Beijing seeks to “dominate” the Indian Ocean region. Others suggest that the Chinese government is simply following its expanding trading interests and seeking to secure its supply lines against disruption. Although China’s presence in the Indian Ocean may permit it to increase its regional influence, Chinese facilities and forces would be highly vulnerable in a major conflict. Thus, the security implications of China’s push into the Indian Ocean region are mixed. In peacetime, these efforts will certainly expand Chinese regional influence. In wartime, however, China’s Indian Ocean presence will likely create more vulnerabilities than opportunities.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Imperialism, Military Strategy, and Maritime
Political Geography:
United States, China, India, Taiwan, Asia, and Indian Ocean

91. China’s Maritime Silk Road Initiative: Economic Drivers and Challenges

Author:
Matthew Funaiole and Jonathan Hillman
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The issue: China’s Maritime Silk Road Initiative (MSRI) seeks to connect Beijing with trading hubs around the world. Beijing insists the MSRI is economically motivated , but some observers argue that China is primarily advancing its strategic objectives. This article examines several economic criteria that should be used when analyzing port projects associated with the MSRI. China’s leaders have mapped out an ambitious plan, the Maritime Silk Road Initiative (MSRI), to establish three “blue economic passages” that will connect Beijing with economic hubs around the world.1 It is the maritime dimension of President Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which could include $1–4 trillion in new roads, railways, ports, and other infrastructure. Within this broad and ever-expanding construct, Chinese investments have been especially active in the Indo-Pacific region, raising questions about whether it is China’s economic or strategic interests that are driving major port investments.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Imperialism, Maritime, and Trade
Political Geography:
China and Asia

92. Ministers For Foreign Affairs 1972-83

Author:
Melissa Conley Tyler and John Robbins
Publication Date:
11-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Australian Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA) is pleased to present the latest book in the Australian Ministers for Foreign Affairs series. In May 2016 the AIIA held a one-day forum to examine the achievements of Australia’s foreign ministers between 1972-83. This forum and publication is the third book in the AIIA’s Australian Ministers for Foreign Affairs series following on from Ministers for Foreign Affairs 1960-72 and R.G. Casey: Minister for External Affairs 1951-60.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Cold War, Diplomacy, Human Rights, and International Cooperation
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, China, Indonesia, Asia, and Australia

93. Domestic Constraints on South Korean Foreign Policy

Author:
Scott A. Snyder, Geun Lee, You Young Kim, and Jiyoon Kim
Publication Date:
01-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
Despite becoming influential on the world scene, South Korea remains a relatively weak country surrounded by larger, more powerful neigh- bors. This contrast between its global rank as a top-twenty economy and its regional status as the weakest country in Northeast Asia (with the exception of North Korea) poses a paradox for South Korean for- eign policy strategists. Despite successes addressing nontraditional security challenges in areas such as international development, global health, and UN peacekeeping, South Korea is limited in its capacity to act on regional security threats. South Korea has historically been a victim of geopolitical rivalries among contenders for regional hegemony in East Asia. But the coun- try’s rise in influence provides a glimmer of hope that it can break from its historical role by using its expanded capabilities as leverage to shape its strategic environment. The pressing dilemma for South Korean strategic thinkers is how to do so. As the regional security environment becomes more tense, South Korea’s strategic options are characterized by constraint, given potentially conflicting great-power rivalries and Pyongyang’s efforts to pursue asymmetric nuclear or cyber capabilities at Seoul’s expense. South Korea’s relative weakness puts a premium on its ability to achieve the internal political unity necessary to maximize its influence in foreign policy. Students of Korean history will recall that domestic factionalism among political elites was a chronic factor that hamstrung Korea’s dynastic leadership and contributed to its weakness in dealing with outside forces.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

94. Russia-India relations: Long-term obstacles remain despite sectoral achievements

Author:
Marcin Kaczmarski
Publication Date:
10-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Despite concrete achievements in energy and military-technical cooperation, long-term trends, such as Russia’s growing dependence on China, India’s tilt towards the US, and tense Sino-Indian relations are not conducive to closer strategic cooperation between Moscow and New Delhi.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Energy Policy, and International Cooperation
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, India, and Asia

95. Europe’s connectivity strategy and the challenge of China: Rivalry, reciprocity, or both?

Author:
Bart Gaens
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The EU’s new strategy for connecting Europe and Asia, implicitly a response to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, is an important first step in promoting European priorities in terms of connectivity. However, uncertainties, including those surrounding the financial implications, remain.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and European Union
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

96. The Sino-Russian and US-Russian relationships: Current developments and future trends

Author:
Marcin Kaczmarski, Mark Katz, and Teija Tiilikainen
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The great-power system has been in constant change since the end of the Cold War. The US became the hegemonic power, and under its shelter, the European Union was able to transform into a European-wide political body. Soon, a group of leading regional powers started to question the universalist aspirations of the Western-led international order. Two members of this club in particular were not satisfied with the role of a regional hegemon and had more global ambitions. China has already become the largest trading nation globally, and Chinese foreign policy has assumed an assertive tone. China has both the potential to challenge US hegemony, as well as the political will to use it. Russia’s project to achieve a global great-power status, on the other hand, is inspired by its historical identity and its alleged humiliation by the West after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russia longs for recognition of its great-power status in particular from the US. This report focuses on relations between China and Russia on the one hand and the US and Russia on the other. It analyses the current developments and future trends in these relationships, as well as their implications for the EU.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, and Hegemony
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, Europe, Asia, and North America

97. The Dragon and Great Power Rivalry at the Top of the World: China’s Hawkish, Revisionist Voices Within Mainstream Discourse on Arctic Affairs

Author:
David Curtis Wright
Publication Date:
09-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
This paper discusses China’s Arctic policy white paper, covers China’s appreciation of the region’s strategic value, and samples scholarly articles across the wide spectrum of opinion and policy recommendation regarding China’s participation in Arctic affairs. It describes the articles, offers translated segments from them, and refers readers who want to read more about the articles and more extensive translated passages from them to the Appendix, where they are included in fuller form. This paper’s main contention and conclusion is that the military and strategic dimensions of China’s interests in the Arctic are part and parcel of mainstream Chinese discourse on the Arctic today. One important motivation behind China’s burgeoning interest and engagement in Arctic affairs is the eventual utilisation of the region as strategic space from which to threaten the security of North America. China’s activities in the Arctic bear close, careful, and continuous scrutiny. It is imperative that Canada not succumb to the siren song of complacency and inaction regarding China’s ambitions in the Arctic region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Power Politics, Military Affairs, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, North America, and Arctic

98. The Chinese Perception of the U.S.-China-ROK Triangle

Author:
Yun Sun
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Since being applied to U.S.-Soviet-China trilateral relations after the Sino-American rapprochement in the early 1970s, the notion/theory of “strategic triangles” has been widely used to examine many trilateral relations. The model of “U.S.-China plus one” is popular among students of U.S.-China relations and, consequently, the policy community has witnessed an increasing amount of scholarship on triangles among U.S.-China-India, U.S.-China-Japan, U.S.-China-Russia, and even U.S.-China-Taiwan. Unsurprisingly, this begs the question whether a strategic triangle could be construed and constructed among the United States, China, and South Korea. Generally speaking, despite the trilateral nature of U.S.-China-ROK relations, the Chinese policy community rarely subscribes to the existence of a strategic triangle among the U.S., China, and South Korea. This is not necessarily because South Korea does not carry the same strategic weight as the two great powers, but more importantly is because China does not see South Korea as possessing the strategic autonomy to act as an independent player in the trilateral relations. Although arguably such autonomy might exist in economic and trade relations, on key political and security issues, the Chinese see South Korea as invariably constrained by the U.S.-ROK military alliance and unable to form its own independent national security policy. In writing about the post-Cold War period with an emphasis on geopolitics, Chinese authors do not often treat South Korean policy or Sino-ROK relations as autonomous. Given the great weight given to the U.S. role, it is important, therefore, to take a triangular approach in assessing these writings centered on South Korea. I do so first explaining in more detail why the “strategic triangle” framework does not apply, then examining views on how this triangle has evolved in a period of rising Chinese power relative to U.S. power and fluctuating U.S.-ROK relations as the leadership in Seoul changed hands, and finally returning to the triangular theme to grasp how this shapes China’s understanding of Seoul’s policies with emphasis on the ongoing Moon Jae-in era.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Economy, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and South Korea

99. Russia-China Relations and the West

Author:
Marcin Kaczmarski
Publication Date:
03-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Transatlantic Relations
Abstract:
This paper is part of CTR's Working Paper Series: "Russia and the West: Reality Check." U.S. domination in global politics provided a powerful incentive for the post-Cold War rapprochement between Russia and China. The worsening of Russia’s relations with the West since 2014 made Moscow even more willing to offer significant concessions to Beijing. However, closer Russian-Chinese cooperation predates the Russian-Western crisis over Ukraine and reaches back to the 2008-2009 global economic crisis. Even the growing power asymmetry has not dissuaded Moscow from deepening its cooperation with China. This challenged widespread Western expectations that Russia would be eager to cooperate with the West in order to compensate for China’s increasing advantage. Hence, a potential improvement of Russian-Western relations is highly unlikely to result in the weakening of Russian-Chinese ties
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Energy Policy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, Trump, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America

100. Fears of War on the Korean Peninsula

Author:
Dario Kuntić
Publication Date:
10-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:
War is lurking on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea has embarked on an accelerated buildup of weapons of mass destruction and modernization of its already large conventional force. It has been consistently testing a series of ballistic and intercontinental missiles, performing nuclear tests, and accelerating toward development of a fully functional nuclear weapon that could strike the United States. The North Korean regime is now estimated to have as many as twenty nuclear warheads and could soon be able to make some to �it on the missiles necessary to deliver them. With time running out, Washington may come to the conclusion that a preventive military strike against North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs is the only way to deprive Pyongyang of capability to launch a nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missile on the US. On a visit to Seoul in March this year, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson left open the option of a military strike to prevent the development of nuclear weapons program from advancing too far, vowed to defend allies in the region, and ruled out negotiations with Pyongyang. As Washington and Pyongyang escalate their war of words, with both sides hinting it could end with a nuclear con�lict, the prospect of serious con�lict is stronger than ever.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Nonproliferation, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea