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Begin New Search Topic Defense Policy Political Geography Asia Content Type Working Paper

1. US strategy and force posture for an era of nuclear tripolarity

Author:
Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The term “nuclear tripolarity” describes a world in which China has joined the United States and Russia as a leading nuclear power. As China modernizes its existing nuclear forces and deploys new weapons, it is on track to roughly double its deployed nuclear arsenal in the next few years—from approximately 350 to 700 deliverable warheads. The US Department of Defense projects that China will go further, expanding its arsenal to at least 1,500 warheads by 2035.1 At those force levels, China’s arsenal would be comparable to US and Russian deployed nuclear forces, currently capped at 1,550 by the New START Treaty.2 What are the consequences of emerging tripolarity for US nuclear strategy and force posture? If the United States retains its current approach to nuclear force planning, the growth of China’s arsenal (and the ongoing modernization of Russia’s nuclear weapons) will likely compel the United States to significantly increase its own arsenal. The easiest way to do so would be to upload one to two thousand additional warheads from US reserves onto existing delivery systems when the New START treaty expires in 2026. Unfortunately, a major increase in US forces would likely mark just another step in an intensifying arms competition among the three leading nuclear powers, since China and Russia would then feel pressure to respond.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Geopolitics, Deterrence, and Multipolarity
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

2. The NewSpace market: Capital, control, and commercialization

Author:
Robert Murray
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Commercial opportunities in space-based technologies are expanding rapidly. From satellite communications and Earth observation to space tourism and asteroid mining, the potential for businesses to capitalize on these emerging technologies is vast and known as “NewSpace.”1 The NewSpace model is important for governments to understand because the dual-use nature of space, specifically its growing commercialization, will influence the types of space-based technologies that nations may leverage, and consequently, impact their national security paradigms. By capitalizing on the private sector’s agility and combining it with the essential research efforts and customer role played by the public sector, the NewSpace industry can play a critical function in addressing current and future national security challenges through public-private codevelopment. As the NewSpace industry expands, the role of government is evolving from being the primary developer and operator of space assets to facilitating their commercialization, while still prioritizing key advancements. US and allied governments can capitalize on this competitive landscape by strategically investing in areas that align with their national security objectives. However, it is crucial for them to first understand and adapt to their changing roles within this dynamic environment. Indeed, the benefits of the burgeoning NewSpace industry extend beyond the United States. International collaboration and competition in this area can lead to faster technological advancements and economic gains. The global NewSpace landscape is driving down costs, increasing access to space, and fostering innovation that can improve not only economic well-being, but also impact national security models. To that end, this memo will examine the broad state of the space market, discuss the industry drivers, and propose recommendations for US and allied policymakers as they consider future government investments in those enabling space-based activities that support wider national security ambitions.
Topic:
Defense Policy, International Trade and Finance, National Security, Science and Technology, European Union, Space, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, Canada, Asia, and United States of America

3. Evolution, not Revolution: Japan Revises Security Policy

Author:
Oskar Pietrewicz
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
In December last year, the government of Kishida Fumio adopted three documents adapting Japan’s security policy to the deteriorating international situation. Its security and national defence strategies highlight challenges from China, Russia, and North Korea, as well as an increase in non-military threats. A third document specifies the need for a record increase in defence spending. Japan’s readiness to deepen cooperation with the U.S. and European countries and its criticism in its assessment of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine create the conditions for the further development of Japan’s cooperation with NATO and the Polish-Japanese dialogue on security.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Japan, China, Asia, and North Korea

4. NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept. Analysis and implications for Austria

Author:
Loïc Simonet
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
Adopted at the Madrid Summit in June 2022, the long-overdue NATO’s new Strategic Concept provides a clear set of guidelines for the Atlantic Alliance in a mid-term perspective. The war in Ukraine has provided the Allies with a powerful catalyst to reconsider NATO’s identity, core missions, as well as their vision of Russia and China. NATO’s new deterrence and defence-centric approach has already entailed a major shift in our security architecture, especially on Europe’s eastern flank. Without undermining its historical neutrality, Austria might reinterpret it in light of NATO’s “reset” and use this opportunity to reinvigorate its partnership with the Alliance.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Partnerships, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, and Balkans

5. Countering United Front Work: Taiwan’s Political Warfare System

Author:
Mariah Thornton
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
This strategic update introduces the challenges posed by China’s united front work, which has significantly expanded due to unprecedented institutional elevation and support under Xi Jinping. Mariah argues that Taiwan—a country that has effectively resisted China’s united front activities for several decades—can serve as an instructive case for other democratic countries in institutionalising counter-interference operations. The briefing initially explores the origins of Taiwan’s political warfare system, its evolution from the martial law era to democratisation in the 1990s, and how this history informs the institution’s modern structure and operations. The information presented in this report was compiled during a period of fieldwork in Taiwan from late September to early November 2022, in which she interviewed dozens of political warfare officers as well as Taiwanese defence and security experts–a majority of whom have chosen to remain anonymous. In the conclusion, Mariah offers broad policy recommendations based on these findings that may be applicable to other countries experiencing united front work activities and or seeking to institutionalise counter-interference operations.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Politics, Public Opinion, Propaganda, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

6. Japan and the War in Ukraine

Author:
Eyal Ben-Ari
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Two weeks after the war began, Japan announced that its new National Security Strategy scheduled to be published this year would recategorize Russia from “partner” to “security challenge,” thus placing it alongside China and North Korea.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Japan, China, Europe, and Asia

7. Ukraine War Distracts US from China, Legitimizes Nuclear Bombs

Author:
Efraim Inbar
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is distracting the US from the Chinese threat and erodes the nuclear taboo.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Conflict, Rivalry, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, Asia, North America, and United States of America

8. Space Traffic Management: Time for Action

Author:
Mir Sadat and Julia Siegel
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Outer space has long been characterized as “contested, congested, and competitive.” More than four thousand eight hundred active satellites currently orbit Earth, representing over forty nations, and nearly twenty-five thousand satellites are projected to join by 2030. Moreover, spacefaring entities are testing the limits of space exploration: Visionary space companies are aiming to launch space tourism programs and send humans to space within the decade, and governments and militaries are increasing activity in cislunar space—the sphere formed by the Earth-Moon radius—to leverage advantageous orbital regions. As humanity expands its frontiers deeper into the galaxy, the threats to US and allied space capabilities will continue to increase. Yet, despite the proliferation of space activity, the ability of international and national bodies to track and regulate space objects—often referred to as space traffic management (STM)—reflects a past era wherein few actors conducted limited operations in space. The current state of STM can be more aptly described as space situational awareness (SSA), or the mere knowledge of objects in orbit. Global actors (including national governments, corporations, and international organizations) track space objects and notify satellite operators when the probability of collision is notable. While collision avoidance maneuvers are standard when there is a one in ten thousand chance of collision, it is ultimately up to the operators to determine whether and when they will move. The limits of this decentralized approach to SSA were illustrated in September 2019 when a European Space Agency satellite veered off path to avoid a Starlink satellite whose operator missed an email notification signaling a high probability of collision.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, National Security, and Space
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, Asia, and United States of America

9. North Korea Continues to Develop Its Nuclear Forces

Author:
Oskar Pietrewicz
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
North Korea is conducting further missile tests to check new types of weapons and increase the credibility of its nuclear deterrence. The adoption of a new nuclear doctrine that allows pre-emptive nuclear strikes also serves this purpose. North Korea is taking advantage of the period of tension between the U.S., Russia, and China, which prevent the UN Security Council from adopting further sanctions. In this situation, the U.S. and its allies should strengthen defence and deterrence capabilities against North Korea and set achievable goals to reduce the risk of escalation of tensions before possible negotiations.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Sanctions, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

10. Inside China’s Techno-Security State

Author:
Tai Ming Cheung
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
Abstract:
Since coming to power, Xi Jinping has significantly elevated the importance of national security and technological innovation in the country’s overall priorities. He has invested considerable time, effort, and political capital to establish an expansive techno-security state based upon his strategic and ideological vision. This brief examines the five major methods Xi’s administration has undertaken to develop its techno-security state: developing a national security state, innovation-driven development, military strengthening, military-civilian fusion, and economic securitization.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Industrial Policy, International Security, Innovation, Strategic Competition, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

11. US-Taiwan Deterrence and Defense Dialogue: Responding to Increased Chinese Aggressiveness

Author:
Jeffrey Ordaniel
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Taiwan is already under attack by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) politically, economically, psychologically, and militarily—the latter through more aggressive Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) gray zone military operations short of actual direct conflict. This multidimensional threat requires a multidimensional response in ways that complement and enhance military deterrence. PRC behavior represents a global problem that demands a global response. PRC pressure on Taiwan has increased considerably over the past year, even before Beijing used the visit by House Speaker Nancy Pelosi as an excuse to further ramp up pressure. The August 2022 PLA military exercise around Taiwan appears aimed at further creating a “new normal” that could reduce warning times should Beijing invade. However, such PRC actions are not “normal.” They are unilateral, destabilizing, and, in some instances, illegal changes to the status quo. Such Chinese pressure tactics, combined with the “wake up call” provided by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, have sensitized the citizens and governments of Taiwan, the United States, and the international community to the growing possibility—if not probability—of a PRC invasion and have increased public perceptions about the need and willingness to defend Taiwan democracy. The PRC’s nuclear build-up is also a great cause of concern. This concern is driven not by the threat of nuclear war (given US nuclear superiority) but by the possibility of nuclear blackmail aimed at discouraging Washington from getting involved in a Taiwan confrontation. Taiwanese are concerned about crisis escalation (especially to the nuclear level) but worry more about the PRC deterring the United States. The United States, working closely with allies and other like-minded states, should be more proactive and less reactive in responding to increased PRC aggressive behavior. With the US Department of Defense (DoD) in the lead, the US Government needs to better assess Chinese strengths and weaknesses vis-à-vis Taiwan with an eye toward countering strengths and exploiting weaknesses, while also examining ways to broaden the challenge along multiple fronts in cooperation with various allies and partners. Think tanks can and should supplement this analysis. While continued strong support for Ukraine is important to demonstrate Western resolve and prevent more Russian territorial gains, the PRC remains the “pacing threat” and thus should remain the focus of US national security policy and defense procurement strategy.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Deterrence, Dialogue, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

12. Takeaways From a Time of Increased Friction: South Korea-Japan Security Cooperation From 2015 to Present

Author:
Naoko Aoki
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
South Korea and Japan share common challenges and liberal democratic values but have been unable to build a close security relationship, due mainly to their political differences. This paper examines the two countries’ defense cooperation in the bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral arenas over the past six years to explore how the external security environment, as well as bilateral political problems, have affected their joint activities. The paper’s analysis shows that defense cooperation between South Korea and Japan is not always a binary choice between full cooperation or no cooperation. The two countries not only weigh external threats and bilateral problems, but also ponder such factors as U.S. encouragement to adjust the scope of their cooperation. The paper also shows that while the main constraint for security cooperation between South Korea and Japan is their historical animosity, in recent years, frictions involving the countries’ armed forces have become a new reason for limiting cooperation. As a result, grassroots military-to-military exchanges between the two countries, which in the past continued despite political problems, have largely stopped since late 2018. The paper concludes by proposing that South Korea and Japan work to restore routine bilateral working-level exchanges. It also recommends that the United States continue to urge the two countries to cooperate, and that multilateral exercises be employed as forums for cooperation between the two armed forces, as that is an area that is least impacted by bilateral problems.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, and South Korea

13. Takeaways From a Time of Increased Friction: South Korea-Japan Security Cooperation From 2015 to Present

Author:
Naoko Aoki
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
South Korea and Japan share common challenges and liberal democratic values but have been unable to build a close security relationship, due mainly to their political differences. This paper examines the two countries’ defense cooperation in the bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral arenas over the past six years to explore how the external security environment, as well as bilateral political problems, have affected their joint activities. The paper’s analysis shows that defense cooperation between South Korea and Japan is not always a binary choice between full cooperation or no cooperation. The two countries not only weigh external threats and bilateral problems, but also ponder such factors as U.S. encouragement to adjust the scope of their cooperation. The paper also shows that while the main constraint for security cooperation between South Korea and Japan is their historical animosity, in recent years, frictions involving the countries’ armed forces have become a new reason for limiting cooperation. As a result, grassroots military-to-military exchanges between the two countries, which in the past continued despite political problems, have largely stopped since late 2018. The paper concludes by proposing that South Korea and Japan work to restore routine bilateral working-level exchanges. It also recommends that the United States continue to urge the two countries to cooperate, and that multilateral exercises be employed as forums for cooperation between the two armed forces, as that is an area that is least impacted by bilateral problems.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

14. ASEAN Matters for America/America Matters for ASEAN

Author:
East-West Center
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
This project maps the trade, investment, employment, business, diplomacy, security, education, tourism, and people-to-people connections between the United States and the 10 member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) at the national, state, and local levels. Part of the Asia Matters for America initiative, this publication, the one-page connections summaries for states, and the AsiaMattersforAmerica.org website are resources for understanding the robust and dynamic US-ASEAN relationship.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Agriculture, Diplomacy, Health, and Infrastructure
Political Geography:
Asia, North America, Southeast Asia, and United States of America

15. Australia as a Rising Middle Power

Author:
Malcolm Davis
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
This paper examines the key drivers shaping Australia’s role as a middle power in an era of intensifying US-China strategic competition. These drivers include the influence of strategic geography; its historical legacy in international affairs; the impact of its economic relationships with states in the Indo-Pacific region; the changing demands of defence policy, including the potential offered by rapid technological change; and, the impact of climate change, resource constraints and demographic factors. The paper considers three possible scenarios that will shape Australia’s middle power policy choices – a US-China strategic equilibrium; a “China crash” scenario that promotes a more nationalist and assertive Chinese foreign policy; and a third “major power conflict” scenario where competition extends into military conflict. The paper concludes that Australia cannot maintain a delicate balance between its strategic alliance with the US and trading relationship with China. It argues there is a need for Australia to adopt a deeper strategic alliance with the US while promoting closer ties with its partners in the Indo-Pacific and supporting the growth of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific region to counterbalance growing Chinese power. Australia needs to embrace an Indo-Pacific step up, and as a middle power, reduce the prospect of a Sino-centric regional order emerging.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nationalism, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
United States, China, Asia, Australia, and Indo-Pacific

16. China Global Security Tracker, No.6

Author:
Helena Legarda
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
China hits back after NATO calls it a security challenge, dormant Chinese hacking group resumes attacks, and more.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Diplomacy
Political Geography:
United States, China, Europe, North Atlantic, Beijing, Asia, Vietnam, and Sri Lanka

17. European defence policy in an era of renewed great-power competition

Author:
Douglas Barrie, Lucie béraud-Sudreau, Henry Boyd, Nick Childs, Bastain Giegerich, James Hackett, and Meia Nouwens
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
In 2019, European governments’ combined defence spending, when measured in constant 2015 US dollar terms, surpassed the level reached in 2009, before the financial and economic crisis led to a series of significant defence-spending cuts. However, a different strategic paradigm – one that Europe is struggling to adjust to and which is once more a concern for European governments – has re-appeared in this past decade: great-power competition. Russia attempted to change international borders in Europe through the use of force in 2014 by annexing Crimea and continues to support an armed insurgency in eastern Ukraine. Moscow’s challenge to Euro-Atlantic security exists in multiple dimensions: as both a conventional military and also a hybrid-warfare issue, with Russia working to dislocate existing societal alignments and disrupt political processes in Western states. The poisoning of a former Russian intelligence officer (and of his daughter) in the United Kingdom, attributed by the British government to Russia, underlines further how much the character of conflict has changed. How to manage the challenge Russia poses without simply reverting to Cold War logic remains a worrying problem for governments in NATO and the European Union member states. Meanwhile, European security establishments are beginning to recognise the growing political, economic and military influence of a rising China. Although less of an immediate challenge, China’s growth in these areas has possible profound consequences in the long run. Indeed, in December 2019, NATO declared: ‘We recognise that China’s growing influence and international policies present both opportunities and challenges that we need to address together as an Alliance.’2 For the United States, China has already become the pacing military threat. The US Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, released in June 2019, opens with the assertion that ‘the Indo-Pacific is the Department of Defense’s priority theater’. In other words, the European theatre is not. European analysts and officials have begun to wonder whether the US might begin to see Europe through an Asian lens, seeking to generate European commitments to the Indo-Pacific region, or at the very least getting Europeans to take on greater responsibility for their own security and thereby freeing up US resources. Although there will be some elements of the US military presence in Europe that are indispensable to US military action in other regions of the world, that might not be enough to sustain Washington’s firm commitment to European security in the future, regardless of who occupies the White House. Significantly, not even the US has the capability to fight two major wars simultaneously any more, meaning binary choices regarding focus are inevitable. As some observers have argued, Europeans need to urgently assess what Washington’s choices in this regard – and their implications for Europe – might look like. Considering both how to deter Russia and what a European contribution to containing China might entail represents a major challenge for Western European nations, which have relegated defence to a secondary position, as almost a discretionary activity. European states partially demobilised in the 1990s and early 2000s, intellectually and in terms of their force structures, in response to the end of the Cold War. For example, according to IISS data, in 1990 West Germany alone was thought to be able to field 215 combat battalions and the UK 94. Today it is a fraction of that. However, security challenges relating to regional instability, crisis management and transnational terrorism – which all dominated the previous two decades – have not disappeared. On the contrary, all these still demand attention and the investment of European resources. While there is a growing recognition among Europe’s analytical community, and some governments, that things cannot simply continue as before in terms of regional security and defence, coherence and resolve among core actors in the Euro-Atlantic sphere have weakened. The US administration has intensified its call for better transatlantic burden sharing, at the same time displaying a cavalier attitude to the collective-defence commitment enshrined in NATO. France’s President Emmanuel Macron has also expressed severe doubts about the viability of NATO’s collective-defence mission. In addition, the British decision to leave the European Union in 2020 implies that the EU has lost one of its most militarily experienced and one of its most capable member states. There is a tendency among many observers and some politicians to argue that European NATO and EU member states need to clarify the political dimension of their defence ambition, via-à-vis greater strategic autonomy, before resolving the problem of how to meet this ambition militarily, at what cost and in what time frame. Indeed, at times, the debate about European strategic autonomy seems to focus more on the degree of independence from the US that its various proponents would like to achieve and less on the military requirement that autonomy is meant to respond to. It is now widely accepted across Europe that Europeans need ‘to do more’ for their own security and defence. Most of the intellectual energy allocated to this aspiration is spent on achieving better coordination – and even a level of integration – among European armed forces. This is useful, but only if it is directed at building capability to provide for the defence of Europe. The existing military capabilities of the European NATO member states fall short when compared to the force requirements generated by the political–military level of ambition as defined by NATO, or for that matter the EU.5 However, this should not be an excuse to lower the level of ambition, nor should the assumption that Europeans are unable to defend themselves be declared an inevitability. Defence output is the result of political, financial and military choices by governments. To think systematically about the challenge of providing capabilities that can meet Europe’s emerging military requirements, The International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Hanns Seidel Foundation convened a group of thinkers and practitioners from Germany and the UK. The group took seriously the US assertion that Europe needs to be able to provide for its own defence. If Europeans can achieve this, they will be valuable partners to the US in upholding and strengthening the liberal international order on which Euro-Atlantic prosperity and security depend. Meeting twice in 2019, the group discussed threat assessments, debated European capability gaps and scoped potential approaches to addressing them. The following pages draw on the group’s deliberations but do not represent a consensus position.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, European Union, and Military Spending
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North Atlantic, Asia, and North America

18. The case for NATO’s global partnership with India

Author:
Abdurrahman Utku Hacioglu
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
India is a country rarely discussed in any of NA- TO’s operational activities, regional dialogues, or global partnerships. This rarity, however, is likely to change because of shifting political and economic trends, emerging threats from outside NATO’s tradi- tional Euro-Atlantic area, and the necessity to adapt to changing circumstances. Taking account of the emerging multi-polarity in the Asia-Pacific and the US resistance to change, India will become a key country to counter-balance China’s and Russia’s growing influ- ence, to project stability and strengthen security in the Asia-Pacific region in the near future. NATO should take advantage of the opportunity, consider India as a key strategic partner, and include India within NA- TO’s growing strategic partnership framework as a “Partner Across the Globe”.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and Collective Defense
Political Geography:
Russia, North Atlantic, India, Asia, and North America

19. Assessing Chinese defence spending: proposals for new methodologies

Author:
Meia Nouwens
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Little is known about how China’s growing defence budget is allocated, particularly following recent structural reforms. In the absence of publicly available information and new research on Chinese defence economics, outside observers consider the official data to be incomplete. Publications addressing Chinese defence spending often claim that ‘it is widely believed’ official Chinese statistics exclude key categories of military-related spending. For instance, in 2003, one analyst wrote that ‘it is widely accepted that the official budget released by the Chinese every year accounts for only a fraction of actual defense spending. In particular, whole categories of military expenditure are believed to be missing from official figures.’ The methodologies employed by research institutions, such as the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), to estimate China’s total military spending date back to the late 1990s. Furthermore, existing estimates do not take into account China’s recent military reorganisation under President Xi Jingping’s direction, which began in 2015, and a wide range of defence reforms. For example, in 2018, the Chinese authorities integrated the China Coast Guard (CCG), the People’s Armed Police (PAP) and the maritime militias into the Central Military Commission’s (CMC’s) command structure. It is currently unclear how this restructuring has affected China’s defence spending. In addition, China’s defence spending could have been affected by the increasing fulfilment of weapons procurements by domestic firms. Therefore, a reassessment of China’s defence spending and the methodologies employed is required.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, and Budget
Political Geography:
China and Asia

20. Defeating Threat Air Defences: the Return of the DEAD

Author:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
For the past two decades the US and its allies have faced a very limited surface-to-air threat in wars in which they have engaged. This is now changing as the worsening security environment and the emergence of near-peer rivals once again raises the spectre of a strongly contested air domain. A central element of the renewed challenge is the surface-to-air missile (SAM) system. China and Russia have fielded and continue to develop SAM systems across all range categories – and to offer many of these for export – that pose a credible threat to air operations. The US, and to an even greater extent the Europeans, have reduced emphasis and expenditure on what is known as the suppression of enemy air defence (SEAD) role. Counter-insurgency rather than counter-integrated air-defence operations have been the priority since the turn of the century. There is now, however, the renewed challenge of being able to carry out air operations in airspace defended by the latest generations of point-, short-, medium- and long-range SAM systems. Low-observable aircraft only offer a partial solution, particularly as the US and its allies will operate mixed fleets of stealthy and non-stealthy combat aircraft at least until around the middle of the century. The latter types of aircraft remain at greater risk from SAM threats than low-observable aircraft, and their operational utility will depend partly on the wider capacity to counter surface-based threat missile systems. SEAD is an asset-intensive capability, particularly in the early days of a conflict, and has traditionally involved dedicated platforms as well as fighter ground-attack aircraft. In SEAD operations in the 1990s, such as Operation Allied Force during the 1999 Kosovo conflict, up to one-third of strike missions were tasked against ground-based air defences. While the force mix will change as uninhabited systems are increasingly adopted in the inventory, a variety of crewed and uninhabited aircraft and associated weaponry will still be required for the task, and will be required in numbers greater than are available in current inventories if faced by a peer or near-peer threat. Collating what is known as an electronic order of battle against peer and near-peer rivals should once again become a priority, as should the capacity to counter, disable or destroy surface-to-air threat systems.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

21. China's Rise as a Global Security Actor: Implications for NATO

Author:
Meia Nouwens and Helena Legarda
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
In December 2019, for the first time, NATO leaders recognised China as a new strategic point of focus for the Alliance. This reflects growing concern among NATO members surrounding China’s geopolitical rise and its growing power-projection capabilities, as well as the impact that these may have on the global balance of power. Today, China is not only taking a central role in Indo-Pacific security affairs but is also becoming an increasingly visible security actor in Europe’s periphery. As such, the question of how to deal with an increasingly global China has been an important part of Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg’s NATO 2030 reflection process. China poses a wide range of challenges to NATO. Beijing sees the Alliance as a United States-centric outfit that may be used by Washington to contain China, and has therefore tried to influence individual NATO members’ decisions in order to weaken the Alliance’s unity. Close ties between China and Russia, especially in the security and military spheres, have also been a source of concern for NATO allies. Besides the Chinese and Russian navies’ joint exercises in the Baltic and Mediterranean seas, there is also the potential for the two sides to further coordinate – or at least align their behaviour – on issues of relevance to the Alliance, including hybrid warfare and cyber espionage, arms-control issues, and their approach to Arctic governance, among others. China’s defence spending and military-modernisation process, along with the growing strength of its defence industry, have led to the proliferation of more advanced military platforms around the world. Beijing is also expanding its stockpile of missiles, some of which have the range to reach NATO countries. China’s military-power-projection capabilities have likewise edged towards Europe as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has expanded its international presence over the last few years. While NATO allies may have agreed that China presents a number of challenges to the Alliance’s security, they have yet to achieve consensus on how to address them. Some of these issues lie beyond NATO’s traditional areas of competence and will require expertise best provided by partners of the Alliance rather than the Alliance itself. NATO allies will need to prioritise how, when, where and with which partners to use their combined resources to deal with them. At the same time, the Alliance acknowledges that China is not its adversary. NATO thus must find areas of common interest where it can continue to cooperate with China, albeit with a more clear-eyed approach than it has done in the past. Addressing the opportunities and problems posed by China as a cohesive alliance will be more important than ever.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Hegemony
Political Geography:
China, Europe, North Atlantic, Asia, and North America

22. Increasing Nuclear Threats through Strategic Missile Defense

Author:
Greg Thielmann
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
Growing concerns about third-country nuclear threats led the United States to withdraw from the ABM Treaty’s constraints on the size and scope of ballistic missile defense arsenals in 2002. Inaccurate and alarmist projections of “rogue state” ICBM threats were critical in winning support for the decision to withdraw from the treaty and to sustain the multi-billion dollar annual price tag for developing, deploying, and expanding strategic missile defenses. But 18 years after Washington abandoned the treaty, North Korea is the only rogue state that could pose a near-term nuclear threat against the American homeland—and U.S. missile defense interceptors and radars have not even delivered high confidence of being able to protect against this threat. Meanwhile, the absence of limits on U.S. strategic missile defenses and prudent, worst-case concerns in Moscow and Beijing about their future expansion are fueling resistance to additional nuclear arms reductions and stability measures. The end result is that the exponential threats posed by Russia and China are getting worse and the chances of a disastrous nuclear arms race are increasing. This analysis argues that the nuclear threat confronting the United States is multilateral, three-dimensional, and interrelated. Unless the United States acknowledges the role of missile defenses in this complicated reality, it will not be able to realize the full benefits that arms control offers.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Nuclear Power, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

23. Italy, Atlanticism and the Biden Administration: Greater Convergence to Defuse Ambiguity on China

Author:
Dario Cristiani
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
In September 2019, the once anti-establishment Five Star Movement (Movimento Cinque Stelle – M5S) agreed to enter a ruling alliance with the Democratic Party (Partito Democratico – PD).[1] By establishing this “yellow-red” coalition government with what was considered its political nemesis, the M5S managed to preserve its presence in power and avoid early elections. However, its influence gradually weakened, as attested to by poor performances in local elections. The M5S’s declining political fortunes and the changing composition of the government have a significant foreign policy dimension, especially if addressed through the lens of Italy–US relations. The PD is a solidly pro-Atlanticist party in Italy. The M5S, despite its evolution towards greater pragmatism over the years, remains a source of concern, being still perceived as the most pro-China actor within the Italian political landscape.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Geopolitics, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, Italy, and United States of America

24. A candle in the dark: US national security strategy for artificial intelligence

Author:
Tate Nurkin and Stephen Rodriguez
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
AI is expected to have a transformational impact on the future of geopolitics, defense, and security. The emerging geopolitical and security context influencing the future of AI technology development has been driven by the erosion of traditional geopolitical frameworks, increased conflict between liberalism and authoritarianism, the pervasiveness of social media use and 4IR-driven digitization of industries, as well as the ability of more actors to affect strategic and operational environments. However, the future of AI will depend on the decisions of great power competitors—the US, China and Russia—global trends development, and the management of uncertainties associated with emerging technologies. In this fluctuating environment, where the US is engaged in a high-stakes competition with is near-peer adversaries, and AI is enabling paradigm-shifting changes in public and private sector operations, how should the US respond? In this new Atlantic Council Strategy Paper, A Candle in the Dark: US National Security Strategy for Artificial Intelligence, Tate Nurkin and Stephen Rodriguez provide an integrated strategy to respond to this key issue. According to Former US Secretary of Defense Dr. Ashton B. Carter, author of the foreword, this paper “effectively articulates the current technological landscape and offers a coherent strategic framework for the United States and its allies to harness AI’s upside potential, while mitigating downside risks and defending against emerging threats.” In a world full of uncertainties, this paper provides a holistic way forward for the US to leverage the full potential of AI while maintaining America’s technological competitiveness.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Intelligence, National Security, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Entrepreneurship, Drones, Conflict, and Disinformation
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, Asia, North America, and United States of America

25. Present at the re-creation: A global strategy for revitalizing, adapting, and defending a rules-based international system

Author:
Ash Jain and Matthew Kroenig
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, the United States and other leading democracies built an international system that ushered in an almost 70-year period of remarkable peace and prosperity. After three decades of largely uncontested primacy, however, this rules-based system is now under unprecedented challenge, both from within and without. We need a new strategy— one ambitious enough to meet the moment, and one innovative enough to fit the challenges and opportunities of the 21st century.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and NATO
Political Geography:
China, Canada, Asia, North America, and United States of America

26. China’s New 2019 Defense White Paper

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
For all the furor over Iran and the Gulf, or Britain and Brexit, the most important foreign news of the month is what would normally be a relatively obscure Chinese official document: China’s National Defense in the New Era. This White Paper was issued on July 22nd in both Chinese and English. Unlike China’s previous defense white papers — the most recent of which came out in 2015 and was blandly reassuring to the point of being vacuous — the new White Paper picks up the gauntlet that the U.S. threw down in its 2017 National Security Strategy and in 2018 National Defense Strategy. Both of these documents effectively made China the key objective in strengthening U.S. military forces and single it out as America’s primary strategic competitor. China’s National Defense in the New Era is a clear and detailed 51-page response to the massive shift in U.S. strategy from a focus on counterterrorism and extremism to competition and possible conflict with China and Russia. It flags the fact that America and China are now competing superpowers, and that China’s growing military forces are developing to the point where they will be able to challenge the United States. More than that, the detailed contents of the White Paper are a direct response to the official U.S. reports on Chinese Military Power issued by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and by the Defense Intelligence Agency.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Intelligence, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

27. Korea, the JCPOA, and the Shifting Military Balance in the Gulf

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
03-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The analysis concludes that the sudden breakdown in the latest round of U.S.-Korean nuclear arms control talks in Vietnam should scarcely come as a surprise to anyone. Both sides sought too much too soon and did so despite a long history of previous failures. Heads of state engaged before their staffs had reached a clear compromise and did so seeking goals the other leader could not accept. It is not clear that an agreement was reachable at this point in time, but each side's search for its "best" ensured that the two sides could not compromise on the "good." This failure sent yet another warning that agreements like the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear arms agreement with Iran that offers major progress in limiting a nation's nuclear weapons efforts can be far better than no agreement, and of the danger in letting the perfect become the enemy of the good. The failed U.S. negotiations with Korea sends a warning that any set of compromises that preserves Iran's compliance with the JCPOA, and creates a structure where negotiation can continue, will be better than provoking a crisis with Iran that can end in no agreement at all and alienate America's European allies in the process.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Denuclearization, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

28. The Return of Political Warfare

Author:
Seth G. Jones
Publication Date:
02-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The Trump administration’s National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy outline a U.S. shift from counterterrorism to inter-state competition with China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. However, U.S. policymakers need to be prepared for much of this competition to occur at the unconventional level, since the costs of conventional and nuclear war would likely be catastrophic. U.S. strategy is evolving from a post-9/11 focus on counterterrorism against groups like al Qaeda and the Islamic State to competition between state adversaries. As the National Defense Strategy notes, “Inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. national security.”1 This shift has significant implications for the U.S. military, since it indicates a need to improve U.S. capabilities to fight—and win—possible wars against China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea if deterrence fails. Though it is prudent to prepare for conventional—and even nuclear—war, the risks of conflict are likely to be staggering. Numerous war games and analyses of U.S. conflicts with Russia in the Baltics, China in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea, and North Korea on the Korean peninsula suggest the possibility of at least tens of thousands of dead and billions of dollars in economic damages. In addition, these conflicts could escalate to nuclear war, which might raise the number of dead to hundreds of thousands or even millions. According to one analysis, for example, a U.S. war with China could reduce China’s gross domestic product (GDP) by between 25 and 35 percent and the United States’ GDP by between 5 and 10 percent. The study also assessed that both countries could suffer substantial military losses to bases, air forces, surface naval forces, and submarines; significant political upheaval at home and abroad; and huge numbers of civilian deaths.2 These costs and risks will likely give Washington, Moscow, Beijing, Tehran, and even Pyongyang pause, raising several questions. Will these high costs deter the possibility of conventional and nuclear war? If so, what are the implications for the United States as it plans for a rise in inter-state competition? The Cold War offers a useful historical lens. NATO planners prepared for a possible Soviet and Warsaw Pact invasion of Western Europe. The U.S. military, for example, deployed forces to the Fulda Gap, roughly 60 miles outside of Frankfurt, Germany, as one of several possible invasion routes by Soviet and other Warsaw Pact forces. NATO also planned for nuclear war. The United States built up its nuclear arsenal and adopted strategies like mutually assured destruction (MAD). The concept of MAD assumed that a full-scale use of nuclear weapons by two or more opposing sides would cause the annihilation of both the attacker and the defender. The threat of such heavy costs deterred conflict, despite some close calls. During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the two superpowers nearly went to war after a U.S. U-2 aircraft took pictures of Soviet medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic nuclear missiles (MRBMs and IRBMs) under construction in Cuba. But Washington and Moscow ultimately assessed that direct conflict was too costly. Deterrence held. Instead, the United States and Soviet Union engaged in intense security competition at the unconventional level across Latin America, Africa, Asia, and Europe. Both countries backed substate groups and states to expand their power and influence. Under the Reagan Doctrine, for example, the United States provided overt and covert assistance to anticommunist governments and resistance movements to roll back communist supporters. The Soviets did the same and supported states and substate actors across the globe. In addition, the Soviets adopted an aggressive, unconventional approach best captured in the phrase “active measures” or aktivnyye meropriatia. As used by the KGB, active measures included a wide range of activities designed to influence populations across the globe. The KGB established front groups, covertly broadcast radio and other programs, orchestrated disinformation campaigns, and conducted targeted assassinations. The Soviets used active measures as an offensive instrument of Soviet foreign policy to extend Moscow’s influence and power throughout the world, including in Europe. Unlike the Cold War, the United States confronts multiple state adversaries today—not one. As the National Defense Strategy argues, the United States is situated in “a security environment more complex and volatile than any we have experienced in recent memory” where “the central challenges to U.S. prosperity and security is the reemergence of long-term, strategic competition by what the National Security Strategy classifies as revisionist powers.” But based on the likely costs and risks of conventional and nuclear war with China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, much of the competition will likely be unconventional—and include what former U.S. State Department diplomat George Kennan referred to as “political warfare.” The term political warfare refers to the employment of military, intelligence, diplomatic, financial, and other means—short of conventional war—to achieve national objectives. It can include overt operations like public broadcasting and covert operations like psychological warfare and support to underground resistance groups.3 The United States’ adversaries today are already engaged in political warfare. Russia, for instance, utilizes a range of means to pursue its interests, such as technologically sophisticated offensive cyber programs, covert action, and psychological operations. Moscow has conducted overt operations like the use of RT and Sputnik, as well as semitransparent and covert efforts. It has also become increasingly active in supporting state and substate actors in countries like Ukraine, Syria, Afghanistan, and Libya to expand its influence in the Middle East, Asia, Europe, and even North Africa. Finally, Russia is attempting to exploit European and transatlantic fissures and support populist movements to undermine European Union and NATO cohesion, thwart economic sanctions, justify or obscure Russian actions, and weaken the attraction of Western institutions for countries on Russia’s periphery. Iran is using political warfare tools like propaganda, cyber attacks, and aid to substate proxies to support its security priorities, influence events and foreign perceptions, and counter threats. Tehran is also assisting state and substate actors in Yemen, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Bahrain, and Afghanistan. Iran supports Shia militia groups in Iraq, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria, and Houthi rebels in Yemen. In the South China Sea, China is pouring millions of tons of sand and concrete onto reefs, creating artificial islands. It is also conducting a sophisticated propaganda campaign, utilizing economic coercion, and using fleets of fishing vessels to solidify its assertion of territorial and resource rights throughout the Pacific. Finally, Beijing is targeting the U.S. government, its allies, and U.S. companies as part of a cyber-espionage campaign. With political warfare already alive and well with the United States’ state adversaries, there are several implications for U.S. defense strategy. First, U.S. policymakers need to be prepared for significant inter-state competition to occur at the unconventional level, since the costs and risks of conventional and nuclear war may be prohibitively high. This should involve thinking through trade-offs regarding force posture, procurement, acquisition, and modernization. A U.S. military that predominantly focuses on preparing for conventional or nuclear war with state competitors—by modernizing the nuclear triad, building more resilient space capabilities, acquiring more effective counter-space systems, equipping U.S. forces with high-technology weapons, and emphasizing professional military education (PME) to fight conventional wars—may undermine U.S. unconventional readiness and capabilities. Second, even organizations that already engage in some types of political warfare—such as U.S. Special Operations Command and the U.S. intelligence community—will need to continue shifting some of their focus from counterterrorism to political warfare against state adversaries. This might include, for example, providing more aid to the Baltic States to conduct an effective resistance campaign against unconventional action by Moscow. Or it might involve aiding proxies in countries like Syria and Yemen to counter Iranian-backed organizations. It could also include improving the border security capabilities and effectiveness of Ukrainian military and police units against Russian-backed rebels. Third, the United States should invest in resources and capabilities that allow the military and other U.S. government agencies to more effectively engage in political warfare—and to provide agencies with sufficient authorities to conduct political warfare. One example is improving capabilities to conduct aggressive, offensive cyber operations. Other examples might include advanced electronic attack capabilities, psychological warfare units, security force assistance brigades, and precision munitions. Recognizing that other powers routinely conduct political warfare, George Kennan encouraged U.S. leaders to disabuse themselves of the “handicap” of the “concept of a basic difference between peace and war” and to wake up to “the realities of international relations—the perpetual rhythm of struggle, in and out of war.” Kennan’s advice may be even more relevant today in such a competitive world.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, Europe, Asia, and North Korea

29. Trump’s 2019 Missile Defense Budget: Choosing Capacity over Capability

Author:
Tom Karako and Wes Rumbaugh
Publication Date:
02-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
President Trump’s 2019 budget request includes $12.9 billion for missile defense programs, including $9.9 billion for the Missile Defense Agency and about $3 billion in modernization in the military services, building upon the acceleration initiated in the $323 million FY 2017 Above Threshold Reprogramming and the FY 2018 Budget Amendment of $2.0 billion. The proposed budget continues the recent trend of procurement consuming a greater portion of overall missile defense spending, reflecting a choice for prioritizing near-term capacity over longer-term capability. With the exception of two new Pacific radars and a modest effort for tracking hypersonic threats, the request includes strikingly few changes to the program of record. The submission fails to address past shortfalls for more research and development of new missile defense technologies and capabilities, most significantly with its lack of real movement toward a space-based sensor layer for tracking and discrimination, as opposed to merely missile warning. Pursuit of more advanced capabilities will require substantial programmatic changes in the 2020 budget, or with a budget amendment later this year, if such capabilities are recommended by the forthcoming Missile Defense Review. On February 12, the Department of Defense (DoD) released its budget request for FY 2019, which included a total of $12.9 billion for missile defense-related activities. The proposed topline for the Missile Defense Agency comes in at $9.9 billion, comprising $2.4 billion for procurement, $6.8 billion for research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E), $500 million for operations and maintenance (O&M), and $206 million for military construction (MILCON). The $9.9 billion request is a 26 percent increase from the FY 2018 budget request of $7.9 billion. Funding for ballistic missile defense within the services includes about $3 billion, largely for the procurement of Patriot Advanced Capability-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (PAC-3 MSE) and Standard Missile-6 (SM-6) interceptors. Overall, the budget reflects a near-term focus on capacity of existing programs, even at the expense of capability improvements. In its current form, the request boosts funding for all four families of interceptors. For homeland missile defense, this includes the continued improvements to the capacity and reliability of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system by continuing to deploy an additional 20 interceptors, several testing spares, and a new missile field at Fort Greely, Alaska. The request also deepens the magazines for Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), Aegis, and Patriot interceptors, continuing a procurement-heavy trend from last year.1 The focus on capacity does not answer the question, however, how missile defense efforts will be adapted to the new reality of great power competition described by the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy.2 One of the few new muscle movements in the entire budget is the addition of two radars in the Pacific for discriminating long-range missile threats to the homeland. The idea of a discrimination radar for Hawaii had been publicly floated over the past two years, and had previously been part of the yet-unpassed appropriations marks from the House and Senate appropriations committees. The Hawaii radar is scheduled for a 2023 deployment, with an additional radar deployed by 2024 at a yet-undisclosed location. The two radars will cost approximately $2.5 billion over the course of the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). The inadequacy of the request lies not with the top line, but rather with the capabilities and strategy that the top line fails to prioritize. Although these radars would be useful to close the near-term Pacific midcourse gap against limited ballistic missile threats to the homeland, such funds must be weighed against the opportunity cost for larger improvements in capability provided by a space-based sensor layer that could provide substantially more capable birth-to-death tracking and discrimination on a more global scale and against a wider diversity of threats. The choice for capacity over capability reflects a near-term time horizon, but further delay in more advanced technologies will carry costs at a later time. In sum, the administration’s budget request for FY 2019 prioritizes near-term readiness against limited but growing ballistic missile threats from sources such as North Korea. This choice, however, falls short of connecting missile defense efforts to the reality of renewed great power competition as articulated in the National Defense Strategy. The inadequacy of the request lies not with the top line, but rather with the capabilities and strategy that the top line fails to prioritize. The 2019 request’s modesty of ambition is manifested by low funding for more advanced programs, such as boost-phase intercept, space-based sensors, and volume kill. Should the forthcoming Missile Defense Review address some of these issues and recommend programmatic changes, their implementation may have to wait until the 2020 budget, unless a budget amendment of some kind prioritizes them for the coming fiscal year.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Budget, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, Asia, and North America

30. Russia's New Nuclear Weapons: Whoever Dies with the Most Toys Wins?

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
03-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Whatever his other limitations, Vladimir Putin has shown he is a master in exploiting Russian nationalism and American and European sensitivities. His latest gambit—publicizing new Russian nuclear systems—several of which are still developmental, may have key components that are untested, or do not yet exist—give him political credibility in asserting Russian national strength in a Russian election year, and emphasize the one key area where Russia remains a leading global super power: its possession of nuclear weapons. The key question is whether they represent any real change in the nuclear balance, Russian and U.S. ability to pose an existential threat to the other state, and mutual assured destruction. If they do not, they are more technological status symbols or “toys” than real threats, although the proliferation of such weapons might allow smaller nuclear powers like Iran and North Korea to defeat today’s missile and air defense systems and technologies. An analysis of the actual content of his speech, the changing nuclear and conventional balance between the superpowers—the U.S., Russia, and China, the global balance of deployed nuclear weapons, the shifts taking in US and Russian balance since the Cold War, and as a result of START, the full range of new U.S. and Russian nuclear programs, and of what Putin did and did not say about Russia's new programs, provides a very different picture from the one Putin portrayed in his speech. It shows that Putin focused on the "toy factor" in emphasize technology over any real world aspects of the balance, arms control, and war fighting.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nationalism, Military Strategy, Authoritarianism, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, Europe, and Asia

31. Shield of the Pacific: Japan as a Giant Aegis Destroyer

Author:
Tom Karako
Publication Date:
05-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Several decades ago, former Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone once described his country as a “big aircraft carrier” from which to defend against Soviet aircraft.1 Although such an analogy fails to capture the richness and depth of the U.S-Japan alliance, it did say something important about Japan’s unique geographic and strategic position. Today’s air and missile threats in the Asia-Pacific region are different, as is the joint U.S.-Japanese defense posture to meet them. Given a handful of changes underway, however, one might instead say that Japan is shaping up to be a giant Aegis destroyer group of sorts. A vision of much more robust air and missile defense capability in the Asia-Pacific region hinges upon the forthcoming acquisition of Aegis Ashore sites in Japan. Japan’s intent to acquire two such sites was announced in December 2017, a decision supported by 66 percent of the Japanese population, according to one recent poll.2 But the potential significance of Japanese Aegis Ashore deployments has not yet been widely understood. Combined with military forces in other domains, these sites will be the foundation of more robust air and missile defenses against North Korea and form a base upon which to adapt to more sophisticated future threats, including China. Assuming the approval process for the foreign military sales comes along well, this development has broad implications for the United States and America’s allies.3 The road to more layered missile defense goes in part through Aegis Ashore, and the road to innovative Aegis Ashore deployments probably goes through Tokyo. The U.S. Navy’s Aegis Combat System has evolved considerably since the first Aegis ship deployed in 1984. Some 90 Aegis ships are currently operated by the United States, and five other countries have Aegis ships as well: Australia, Norway, South Korea, Spain, and Japan. The word “Aegis” refers to the shield of the ancient god Zeus, and Aegis ships have long provided fleet air defense, strike, and antisubmarine warfare. Over the past decade, 35 American and 4 Japanese Aegis ships have also acquired a ballistic missile defense mission. The most recent configurations are capable of executing the integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) mission, with simultaneous air defense and ballistic missile defense operations.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Asia-Pacific

32. China’s pursuit of advanced dual-use technologies

Author:
Helena Legarda and Meia Nouwens
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
In its quest to become a global ‘science and tech superpower’ and to build a strong military that can fight and win wars, China has embarked on a major process to achieve civil–military integration (CMI) and develop advanced dual-use technologies. Using various methods both to promote indigenous innovation and to access foreign technology and know-how, China’s goal is to leapfrog the United States and Europe and achieve dominance in these technologies, which will have major civilian and military implications in the future. The EU does not have strong, coordinated strategies to promote the development of indigenous dual-use technologies or to protect Europe’s indigenous innovation. As a result of this patchwork regime, China is either catching up to, or surpassing, European capabilities regarding most of these technologies through a ‘whole-of-government’ regulatory framework and financial investment, as well as by accessing European innovation and technology through a variety of means. For Europe, the incentive to keep up with China’s progress in these technologies, and to protect its own innovation in this field, is one with military, but also commercial and economic, imperatives. At a time when China is increasing its commitment to this process of developing advanced, dual-use technologies, it is high time for Europe to think strategically and take action to leverage its own competitive advantages.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Science and Technology, Military Strategy, and European Union
Political Geography:
United States, China, Europe, and Asia

33. Turkey’s Turbulent Journey with the EPAA and Quest for a National System

Author:
Nilsu Gören
Publication Date:
01-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
This paper provides an overview of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) missile defense debate from a Turkish perspective. While Turkey participates in the EPAA by hosting a U.S. early-warning radar in Kurecik, Malatya, its political and military concerns with NATO guarantees have led to the AKP government's quest for a national long-range air and missile defense system. However, Turkish decision makers' insistence on technology transfer shows that the Turkish debate is not adequately informed by the lessons learned from the EPAA, particularly the technical and financial challenges of missile defense.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, Turkey, and Asia

34. Indonesia’s Defence Diplomacy: Harnessing the Hedging Strategy against Regional Uncertainties

Author:
Iis Gindarsah
Publication Date:
06-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
Indonesia has been increasingly susceptible to recent geopolitical developments. Along with the rapid pace of regional arms modernisation and unresolved territorial disputes, it begins to ponder the impact of emerging great power rivalry to the country’s strategic interests. However, rather than pursuing a robust military build-up, Indonesian policymakers asserts that diplomacy is the country’s first line of defence. This paper argues that Indonesia’s defence diplomacy serves two agenda of hedging strategy — strategic engagement and military modernisation. This way, Indonesian defence and security officials seek to moderate the impact of geopolitical changes whilst maintaining the country’s defensive ability against regional uncertainties.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Indonesia and Asia

35. Rebuilding Deterrence: Post-2015 Defense Guidelines Challenges Facing the U.S.-Japan Alliance

Author:
Sugio Takahashi
Publication Date:
05-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Project 2049 Institute
Abstract:
On 27 April 2015, Japan and the U.S. concluded the new Guidelines for the Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation. This paper will explore the challenges facing the alliance after the revision of the Defense Guidelines. It will examine the evolution of Japanese thought on deterrence as outlined in the 2010 and 2013 National Defense Program Guidelines. It will also assess the strategic implications of China’s military modernization. This paper will conclude by offering possible policy solutions to the challenges facing the U.S.-Japan alliance in maintaining deterrence.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Bilateral Relations, Alliance, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

36. The India-Australia Strategic Relationship: Defining Realistic Expectations

Author:
Frédéric Grare
Publication Date:
03-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Mutual indifference has long characterized relations between India and Australia, but the two countries' interests are increasingly converging. In particular, New Delhi and Canberra are both wary of China's growing assertiveness in the Asia-Pacific region. Yet there are several constraints hindering the development of a strong India-Australia partnership, and both countries need to be realistic about the prospects for a closer strategic relationship.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
China, Asia, New Delhi, Australia, and Canberra

37. Chinese Military Modernization and Force Development: Chinese and Outside Perspectives

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
09-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC) face a critical need to improve their understanding of how each is developing its military power and how to avoid forms of military competition that could lead to rising tension or conflict between the two states. This report focuses on China's military developments and modernization and how they are perceived in the US, the West, and Asia.
Topic:
Defense Policy and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
United States, China, and Asia

38. NATO Enlargement and Russia: Die-Hard Myths and Real Dilemmas

Author:
Michael Ruhle
Publication Date:
05-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
The crisis in Ukraine, which culminated in Russia's annexation of the Crimea, marks a new low in NATO-Russia relations. While this relationship had been deteriorating for quite some time, Moscow's role in the Ukraine crisis revealed a geopolitical agenda that caught many observers by surprise. In the course of just a few weeks Russia clearly emerged as a revisionist power, behaving in a manner reminiscent of the "predatory nation-states from the 19th century" and changing borders by force in order to deny a neighbouring country the choice to determine its own alignments.
Topic:
Security, Political Violence, and Defense Policy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Asia, and Moscow

39. Cold War Déjà Vu? NATO, Russia and the Ukraine Crisis

Author:
Roger McDermott, Brooke Smith-Windsor, and Heidi Reisinger
Publication Date:
03-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Russia's behaviour in the Ukrainian crisis has been described by some as giving rise to “the most dangerous situation in East-West relations since the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.” For one, NATO's recently retired Supreme Allied Commander has called for immediate action in response. This could include, for example, bringing the NATO Response Force – a sea, air, land, special forces capability – to a higher state of alert, and sailing NATO maritime forces into the Black Sea.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and NATO
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia

40. Does Russia Matter? Purely Political Relations Are Not Enough in Operational Times

Author:
Heidi Reisinger
Publication Date:
02-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
On 27 January 2014, the NATO Defense College Research Division hosted its Russia Roundtable, where international experts from various research institutions meet senior practitioners from the International Staff and International Military Staff from NATO HQ.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Politics
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Asia

41. The Future of American Landpower: Does Forward Presence Still Matter? The Case of the Army in the Pacific

Author:
John R. Deni
Publication Date:
05-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
The time has come for a reappraisal of the U.S. Army's forward presence in East Asia, given the significantly changed strategic context and the extraordinarily high, recurring costs of deploying U.S. Army forces from the 50 states for increasingly important security cooperation activities across the Indo-Asia-Pacific theater. For economic, political, diplomatic, and military reasons, the Indo-Asia-Pacific theater continues to grow in importance to the United States. As part of a broad, interagency, multifaceted approach, the U.S. military plays a critical role in the rebalancing effort now underway. The U.S. Army in particular has a special role to play in bolstering the defense of allies and the deterrence of aggression, promoting regional security and stability, and ameliorating the growing U.S.-China security dilemma.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and Arms Control and Proliferation
Political Geography:
United States, East Asia, Asia, and Australia

42. Federated Defense in Asia

Author:
Michael J. Green, Kathleen H. Hicks, and Zack Cooper
Publication Date:
12-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The United States has long emphasized the desirability of working with allies and partners to meet pressing security challenges. Indeed, many of our most vexing security concerns—from terrorism to cyber attacks—are best met with concerted multilateral responses. At a time when the United States and many of its allies and partners are reluctant to increase defense and security spending, working together is paramount. This is perhaps most evident in Asia, where present and potential future threats to security and prosperity are high and shared interests are substantial.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Disaster Relief, Humanitarian Aid, and Intelligence
Political Geography:
United States and Asia

43. Risks of Intelligence Pathologies in South Korea

Publication Date:
08-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
A failure of intelligence on the Korean peninsula-the site of the world's highest concentration of military personnel with a history of fraught, sometimes violent, sabre-rattling-could have catastrophic consequences. Yet the South Korean intelligence community has revealed its susceptibility to three types of pathologies-intelligence failure, the politicisation of intelligence, and intervention in domestic politics by intelligence agencies-which bring into stark relief the potential for grievous miscalculation and policy distortions when addressing the threat from North Korea. Moves by intelligence agencies to recover or bolster their reputations by compromising sensitive information have compounded the problem. Efforts are needed to reform the South's intelligence capacities, principally by depoliticising its agencies and ensuring adequate legislative and judicial oversight. Lawmakers and bureaucrats also need to fulfil their responsibilities to protect classified information and refrain from leaking sensitive intelligence for short-term personal political gains.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Intelligence, and Science and Technology
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and Sinai Peninsula

44. Global Cybercrime: The Interplay of Politics and Law

Author:
Aaron Shull
Publication Date:
06-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for International Governance Innovation
Abstract:
Examining global cybercrime as solely a legal issue misses an important facet of the problem. Understanding the applicable legal rules, both domestically and internationally, is important. However, major state actors are using concerted efforts to engage in nefarious cyber activities with the intention of advancing their economic and geostrategic interests. This attempt to advance a narrow set of economic interests through cybercrime and economic cyber espionage holds to the potential to erode the trust in the digital economy that has been a necessary condition for the success of the Internet as an economic engine for innovation and growth. By pursuing these efforts, states are prioritizing short-term interests over long-term stability and a responsibly governed, safe and secure Internet platform. This paper explores the recent unsealing of a 31-count indictment against five Chinese government officials and a significant cyber breach, perpetrated by Chinese actors against Western oil, energy and petrochemical companies. The paper concludes by noting that increased cooperation among governments is necessary, but unlikely to occur as long as the discourse surrounding cybercrime remains so heavily politicized and securitized. If governments coalesced around the notion of trying to prevent the long-term degradation of trust in the online economy, they may profitably advance the dialogue away from mutual suspicion and toward mutual cooperation.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Crime, International Trade and Finance, Terrorism, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
United States, China, and Asia

45. Before "DarkSeoul" Becomes "DestroySeoul"

Author:
Ye Ra Kim
Publication Date:
02-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies
Abstract:
Growing dependence on ever evolving information technology and continuous occurrence of cyber- attacks against nations demonstrate the need for solid security strategy in cyberspace. South Korea, a country keen to explore benefits brought by the Internet, has suffered a heavy blow from a series of North Korea's cyber-attacks in the past. This paper analyzes the 2013 March 20 cyber-attack against South Korea in detail and sheds light on the fast developing cyber capabilities of North Korea. The severity of the March 20 attack which simultaneously targeted major banks and broadcasters in the country spread panic through South Korea. The malware used in the attack was later nicknamed "DarkSeoul" because of the repetitive use of the term in the malware programming source. The attack illustrates the changing nature of the conflict on the Korean Peninsula, reflecting the need for a new concept of national security in which cyberforce plays a critical role.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Science and Technology, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

46. Crisis Stability and Nuclear Exchange Risks on the Subcontinent: Major Trends and the Iran Factor

Author:
Thomas F. Lynch III
Publication Date:
11-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Abstract:
Crisis stability—the probability that political tensions and low-level conflict will not erupt into a major war between India and Pakistan—is less certain in 2013 than at any time since their sequential nuclear weapons tests of 1998. India's vast and growing spending on large conventional military forces, at least in part as a means to dissuade Pakistan's tolerance of (or support for) insurgent and terrorist activity against India, coupled with Pakistan's post-2006 accelerated pursuit of tactical nuclear weapons as a means to offset this Indian initiative, have greatly increased the risk of a future Indo-Pakistani military clash or terrorist incident escalating to nuclear exchange. America's limited abilities to prevent the escalation of an Indo-Pakistani crisis toward major war are best served by continuing a significant military and political presence in Afghanistan and diplomatic and military-to-military dialogue with Pakistan well beyond 2014.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, America, Iran, India, and Asia

47. Opportunities Unbound: Sustaining the Transformation in U.S.-Indian Relations

Author:
Ashley J. Tellis
Publication Date:
01-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The evolving U.S.-Indian strategic partnership holds great potential for both countries. India's economic growth and its ties to the United States can assist its global rise, which contributes to keeping the peace in Asia, provided New Delhi and Washington sustain concerted cooperation. And India's emerging markets promise to be the key instrument for enlarging India's power while remaining a rich opportunity for U.S. businesses.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
United States, Washington, India, Asia, and New Delhi

48. Closer Australia-Canada Defence Cooperation?

Author:
John Blaxland
Publication Date:
09-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for International Governance Innovation
Abstract:
This paper examines the prospect and utility of closer defence cooperation for both Canada and Australia. It reflects on commonalities and like-mindedness, particularly as they concern regional security and stability in the Indo-Pacific. Forward-looking measures are presented for Canadian and Australian defence policy makers to capitalize on each other\'s strengths and similarities. Cooperation could enhance both countries\' ability to engage in the region, their mutual defence capabilities and their engagement with the great powers. With this in mind, closer bilateral engagement should be considered in three areas: bolstering regional engagement, cost-saving measures and enhancing engagement with great powers.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
Canada, Asia, and Australia/Pacific

49. The Tenth Korea-U.S. West Coast Strategic Forum

Author:
Walter H. Shorenstein
Publication Date:
06-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
Abstract:
Meeting after North Korea had raised tensions on the Korean Peninsula in the spring, participants in the Tenth Korea-U.S. West Coast Strategic Forum focused on the implications for the Korean Peninsula of leadership changes in North and South Korea and especially China. Participants also focused on regional dynamics, including increased confrontation between China and Japan and various, sometimes conflicting, efforts to increase regional economic integration in Northeast Asia.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Bilateral Relations, and Sanctions
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, China, Israel, and Asia

50. Sailing Against the Current – China-U.S. Relations in the Next Stage

Author:
Yu Bianjiang
Publication Date:
06-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University
Abstract:
In recent years, “rebalancing” has been a buzzword in the U.S.'s Asia-Pacific policy and naturally also in U.S.-China relations. Some believe this rebalancing has been quite successful and refer to this as the hallmark of President Barack Obama's first-term foreign policy.  At the same time, others, both within and outside of America, have expressed different opinions. The most critical point is that while the U.S. administration has argued that rebalancing is an integrated strategy with military, diplomatic, and economic initiatives intended to strengthen U.S. involvement in the Asia-Pacific area, in practice, rebalancing has been depicted and implemented in more military terms, with the United States shifting its troops and resources from wars in Iraq and Afghanistan to the Asia- Pacific region. “The military soundtrack has the volume turned up too loud.”.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Emerging Markets, Bilateral Relations, and Armed Forces
Political Geography:
United States, China, Israel, Asia, and Australia/Pacific

51. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Project: Organizational Capacities and Operational Capabilities

Author:
Ian Easton and L. C. Russell Hsiao
Publication Date:
03-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Project 2049 Institute
Abstract:
Revolutionary advances in unmanned technologies and the prospects offered by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in surveillance, targeting and attack appear to have captured the attention of senior civilian and defense officials in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Given the PRC’s expanding strategic interests, and the associated requirement for an improved command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) infrastructure, UAVs represent a transformational capability for the Chinese military.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Military Affairs, Surveillance, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

52. Offshore Control: A Proposed Strategy for an Unlikely Conflict

Author:
T.X. Hammes
Publication Date:
06-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Abstract:
As America ends its military commitment to Iraq and continues its drawdown in Afghanistan, a lively discussion has emerged on what future challenges the Nation faces. High on every list is the requirement to deal with a rising China. In his remarks to the Australian Parliament on November 17, 2011, President Barack Obama stated, “As we end today's wars, I have directed my national security team to make our presence and mission in the Asia Pacific a top priority.” As part of this re-balancing to Asia, the administration has stated that it seeks “to identify and expand areas of common interest, to work with China to build mutual trust, and to encourage China's active efforts in global problem-solving.” Clearly, the United States seeks prudent and coordinated political, economic, and military actions to further integrate China into the international system.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Arms Control and Proliferation
Political Geography:
United States, China, and Asia

53. A Policy Mismatch: Canada and the United States in the Asia-Pacific Region

Author:
James Manicom
Publication Date:
11-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for International Governance Innovation
Abstract:
The United States and Canada have simultaneously re- invigorated their diplomatic and military postures toward the Asia-Pacific region. As two of the world's closest allies, it is worth exploring the possible synergies and tensions between their efforts to identify areas of possible policy coordination. Canada has considerable assets that could support US diplomacy in the region, including the legacy of its good offices and its close ties with the US military; however, these assets are outweighed by three liabilities. First, Canada's diplomacy to the Asia-Pacific is driven by its desire to diversify away from the US market. Although relatively innocuous in isolation, the politics of this shift, driven by growing concern in Canada about whether the United States remains a reliable market for energy exports, adds a layer of complexity. Second, Canada's closer economic ties with China could undermine its willingness to support the United States on tough regional security issues in the Asia-Pacific. Third, and related, Canadian silence about navigational freedoms, the primary security issue between the United States and China in East Asia, has not gone unnoticed. This paper argues that, on balance, Canada may not be an ideal Pacific partner for the United States.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, International Trade and Finance, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
United States, China, Canada, East Asia, Asia, Australia/Pacific, and Asia-Pacific

54. Asian Defense Spending, 2000–2011

Author:
David J. Berteau, Guy Ben-Ari, Joachim Hofbauer, Priscilla Hermann, and Sneha Raghavan
Publication Date:
10-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Asia is growing in geostrategic importance. Despite the financial crisis that began in 2008, many Asian countries experienced relatively less fiscal distress and increased their level of involvement in global affairs. Indicative of the region's elevated global role is the United States' pivot toward the Asia-Pacific region as outlined in the Strategic Guidance recently released by the Department of Defense. With Asian defense spending projected to overtake that of Europe by the end of 2012, the United States' posture rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific region is likely to continue.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and International Political Economy
Political Geography:
Israel and Asia

55. Russia, China and Global Governance

Author:
Charles Grant
Publication Date:
02-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The need for international co-operation has never been greater, yet global governance is inadequate. Whether one looks at the Doha round of trade liberalisation, the climate change talks led by the United Nations, the G20's efforts to co-ordinate economic and financial policies, or efforts to reform the UN Security Council (UNSC), not much is being achieved. 'Multilateralism'–the system of international institutions and rules intended to promote the common good–appears to be weakening. At the same time, the growing influence of China, Russia and other non-Western powers is pushing the international order towards 'multipolarity'.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Governance, and Reform
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Asia

56. The FY2013 Defense Budget, Deficits, Cost-Escalation, and Sequestration

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman and Robert Shelala II
Publication Date:
09-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The US may not face peer threats in the near to mid term, but it faces a wide variety of lesser threats that make maintaining effective military forces, foreign aid, and other national security programs a vital national security interest. The US does need to reshape its national security planning and strategy to do a far better job of allocating resources to meet these threats. It needs to abandon theoretical and conceptual exercises in strategy that do not focus on detailed force plans, manpower plans, procurement plans, and budgets; and use its resources more wisely. The US still dominates world military spending, but it must recognize that maintaining the US economy is a vital national security interest in a world where the growth and development of other nations and regions means that the relative share the US has in the global economy will decline steadily over time, even under the best circumstances. At the same time, US dependence on the security and stability of the global economy will continue to grow indefinitely in the future. Talk of any form of “independence,” including freedom from energy imports, is a dangerous myth. The US cannot maintain and grow its economy without strong military forces and effective diplomatic and aid efforts. US military and national security spending already places a far lower burden on the US economy than during the peaceful periods of the Cold War, and existing spending plans will lower that burden in the future. National security spending is now averaging between 4% and 5% of the GDP – in spite of the fact the US has been fighting two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan – versus 6-7% during the Cold War.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Economics
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, Iraq, and Asia

57. Developments in and Obstacles to the US Pivot to Asia: What Alternatives for Europe?

Author:
Alessandro Riccardo Ungaro
Publication Date:
09-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The new US strategic guidance released in January 2012 represents a hallmark of US President Barack Obama's foreign policy and forms integral part of the so-called “Pivot to Asia”. However, rather than a radical departure from the past, the strategic guidance represents an evolution and extension of US foreign policy towards the region, envisaging the reallocation of American military assets from Europe to the Asia-Pacific. The implementation of the guidance strategy is a long-term and complex process: several challenges, tensions and frictions between the US and regional actors may hamper the implementation of the policy and will require a delicate balancing act in which China will play a key role. On the European side, the US shift should be seen as an opportunity to review the European Security Strategy and elaborate its own strategy towards Asia.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and International Security
Political Geography:
United States, China, America, Europe, Israel, and Asia

58. The New U.S. Defense Strategic Guidance and Its Implications for South Korean Security

Author:
Young Ho Kim
Publication Date:
02-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
On January 5, 2012, U.S. President Barack Obama paid a rare visit to the Pentagon and unveiled his guidelines for the Department of Defense to set the goals and priorities of its defense strategy for the next ten years. The resulting eight-page-long guidelines, entitled Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense (hereafter DSG), contain the administration’s assessment of changing global security conditions and propose the roles and shape of the U.S. armed forces for the coming decade. Prepared through “unprecedentedly” close consultations between the President himself and senior leaders in the U.S. defense department and military including both service chiefs and combatant commanders, the DSG defines the present as a historic “inflection point” and envisions the future U.S. military as “smaller and leaner, but agile, flexible, ready and technologically advanced.” Moreover, in accordance with the DSG the U.S. defense budget will be cut by $487 billion and the sizes of the Army and Marine Corps will shrink by 80,000 and 14,000 respectively over the next ten years. While a more detailed picture will be revealed next month with the administration’s FY2013 budget request to Congress, the DSG reflects the Obama administration’s arduous effort to rebalance and redirect its defense priorities and spending under severe fiscal austerity. Because of the unusual timing of its publication and the magnitude of the reduction in defense spending, the DSG has generated controversy and concern domestically in the United States as well as internationally. In the United States, particularly people in the conservative wing of the Republican Party have been prompted to criticize the guidelines for putting the nation’s security in danger, whereas some people on the liberal side have advocated seeking deeper and bolder cuts in defense spending. Internationally, China was understandably the first to respond negatively to the DSG. For example, rebutting the DSG’s portrayal of Beijing’s military policy as lacking transparency as “groundless and untrustworthy,” Liu Weimin, a spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, stressed that Beijing was committed to peaceful development and “defensive” policy. What then are the implications of the DSG for South Korean security? Will there be any changes in U.S. defense policy or posture in the region under the DSG that may affect security conditions in South Korea significantly and, if so, require new measures or scrutiny by the South Korean government or the military? In fact, there have been largely four issues raised by the news media in South Korea. I will examine these four issues, and then discuss more challenging concerns that will require closer attention by South Korean foreign and security policy-makers.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

59. China's Positions and Interests in the South China Sea: A Rational Choices in its Cooperative Policies

Author:
Su Hao
Publication Date:
09-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
After the Cold War, although the danger of conflict and war between the east and west has been removed, some latent hot issues have emerged in the East Asia area, among which the South China Sea issue became a prominent regional security problem. Because this issue is related to China-the fast developing big power in this region, it then turned into an important foundation for the so-called "China threat" theory which has been prevalent since the 1990s. The western countries have always been taking advantage of the South China Sea issue to damage China's image, and at the same time some claimant states in the South China Sea also made use of the complicated Asia-Pacific security situation to extend their own interests in the South China Sea. Due to the interweaving historical factors, differences in current security interests, disagreements in sea boundaries, and the ambiguousness in international law, the South China Sea issue, therefore, is exceptionally complex and complicated. However, thanks to the only big power of the South China Sea-China's responsible attitude and rational position, the South China Sea conflict has been well managed, the occasional friction has never upgraded to military clash, and the tensions caused by some countries' irresponsible acts have been effectively controlled. All those constructive functions exerted by China are possible to be realized only on condition that China abides by its explicit standpoint and principles, takes a rational and responsible attitude, and acts through coordination and cooperation.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Australia/Pacific

60. Detained and Denied in Afghanistan

Publication Date:
05-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Human Rights First
Abstract:
In August 2010, General David Petraeus, Commander of the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, announced a shift in U.S. strategy. The United States “cannot kill or capture our way to victory,” he warned. Rather, we must earn the trust of the Afghan people.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, War, and Prisons/Penal Systems
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and Asia

61. China’s Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) Satellite Developments: Implications for U.S. Air and Naval Operations

Author:
Ian Easton and Mark Stokes
Publication Date:
02-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Project 2049 Institute
Abstract:
A review of authoritative Chinese writings indicate that the People’s Republic of China is researching, developing, testing, and deploying a number of electronic intelligence (ELINT) satellites for the tracking and targeting of mobile air defense systems and ships at sea. This program has potentially serious and immediate implications U.S. and allied air and naval operations in the Asia-Pacific region.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Intelligence, Armed Forces, and Satellite
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America

62. Japan’s National Defense Program Guidelines 2010 and Its Implication to South Korean Security Policies

Author:
Young-June Park
Publication Date:
01-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
On December 17, 2010, the government of Japan updated its most strategically important document entitled “National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), FY 2011-” following confirmation from both the Security Council and the Cabinet. The new defense plan released along with the “Mid-Term Defense Program for FY2011-2015” addresses the objectives and the methods of the Japanese Self Defense Forces. Moreover, the plan also outlines Japan’s future military strategies as well as the fundamental tenets of its defense policy. Whereas in the United States, the White House, Pentagon, and Joint Chiefs all release new guidelines each time a new administration comes to power, Japan does not have such a regular format for its defense plan. This makes the National Defense Program Guidelines a comprehensive strategic document that covers every aspect of Japan’s military defense. First introduced in 1976, the Guidelines has only been updated twice in 1995 and 2004. The NDPG in 1976 reflected Japan’s security and military strategy during the Cold War, while the 1995 and the 2004 guidelines reflected strategies for the post-Cold War era and the beginning of 21st century after 9/11, respectively. What then do these updated guidelines in 2010 signify? And in what context should this defense plan be seen? Firstly, the structural changes that have occurred in the security environment of East Asia should be taken into consideration. North Korea conducted nuclear tests twice in 2006 and 2009. In 2010, it displayed new levels of provocation by sinking the South Korean naval vessel Cheonan and shelling Yeonpyeong Island. These actions not only threaten the Korean Peninsula but also the entire region. Added to that, China surpassed Japan as the second largest economy after the United States and has become more assertive over maritime disputes with Japan. How all these military and economic changes are projected in the document deserves close analysis. Secondly, unlike previous NDPGs that were written during the long years under the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the 2010 Guidelines are part of the first strategic document that reflects the strategic outlook and security approach of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). Since the DPJ assumed power, it has long tried to differentiate itself from LDP in its decision making procedures and actual policies. Such tendencies are naturally reflected in its security policies as well. How do these guidelines differ from the NDPGs issued under the LDP? In short, the National Defense Program Guidelines 2010 is the best resource with which to understand how Japan perceives the changed security environment, and what strategic concepts and military capability it is preparing for in face of future security challenges.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

63. Ambivalence toward North Korea: South Korean Public Perceptions Following the Attack on Yeonpyeong Island

Author:
Nae-Young Lee and Han-Wool Jeong
Publication Date:
01-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
In 2010 there were two major North Korean provocations against South Korea as tensions mounted on the Korean Peninsula and in the broader region. Following both the sinking of the ROK Navy corvette Cheonan and the artillery attack on Yeonpyeong Island, there has been a process within South Korean society to clarify where the responsibility lies and to find an appropriate direction for coping with a more aggressive North Korea. The way that politicians and the media have analyzed the situation has mostly been based upon a dichotomy of ‘war vs. peace.’ Public opinion on the other hand has displayed ambivalent attitudes toward war or peace, preferring to allow for both concepts to exist rather than choosing one over the other. The South Korean public does not support either appeasement policies that hold back from retaliation or hard line policies that could lead to a full-scale war. In the short term, the public shows mixed views toward improving inter-Korean relations. For the long term, however, the majority of the public favors that the government redirects its tough stance against North Korea toward more dialogue and cooperation. However, it should be noted that there is a growing opinion for maintaining hard-line policies against North Korea even for the long term. The EAI and Hankook Research, as part of its monthly Public Opinion Barometer, surveyed eight hundred people from around South Korea on November 27, 2010, four days after the attack on Yeonpyeong Island. The results of the November Public Opinion Barometer survey formed the basis of the EAI Issue Briefing on Public Opinion entitled “The Impact of North Korea’s Artillery Strike on Public Opinion in South Korea” which summed up the characteristics of public opinion after the incident . This Issue Briefing will use the results from that survey to provide analysis of the shifting public perceptions on policies toward North Korea.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Public Opinion, Conflict, and Survey
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

64. North Korea’s Hedging Strategy and South Korea’s Proactive Strategy

Author:
Kyung-Young Chung
Publication Date:
06-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
The year 2010 saw heightened tensions on the Korean Peninsula triggered by North Korea, as shown by the sinking of the Cheonan warship and the artillery attack against Yeonpyeong Island. Some experts, even some within the intelligence community, estimated that through these efforts Kim Jong-eun was attempting to strengthen his power in the succession struggle. North Korea’s provocative actions, however, while internally motivated, repeatedly force South Korea to pay a ransom to support three generations of succession within the royal Kim family, and create an almost insurmountable problem for the South. Defining the Yeonpyeong Island incident is critical to the national security posture of the Republic of Korea (ROK). Conducting an exercise of artillery fire against a specific target is one thing, but attacking South Korean territory is a different thing altogether. The latter implies an invasive action, a deliberate attack to secure a series of strategic objectives waged by limited warfare. In the context of North Korea’s provocation, the conflicting, competitive, yet also cooperative relationship between the United States and China had both a direct and an indirect impact on the Korean Peninsula. The ROK's weak, vacillating reaction against the North Korean provocation clearly revealed the ROK military's limitations in countering the North Korean threat. Since dealing with a provocative scenario has a tremendous impact on how the ROK responds, a comprehensive reassessment of the North Korean threat is imperative. Taking account of the complexity of power politics as well as North Korea's provocations, this briefing will explore a potential provocative scenario, which will be developed on the basis of Pyongyang’s intent, its capability to inflict threat using asymmetric war-fighting assets, and the North Korean perception of South Korea's political, social, economic, and military vulnerability. Finally, the briefing will make policy recommendations in terms of security and defense posture, international cooperation to deter North Korean provocation, and examine how to promptly and effectively deal with future crises in the event of any further military action from the North against the ROK.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

65. Blame Game under Fire: Parsing South Korean Debate on North Korea Policy

Author:
Dong Sun Lee
Publication Date:
07-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
In late 2009, a North Korean warship attacked South Korean naval vessels near Daecheong Island. The following year witnessed a further elevation of North Korean aggression expressed in attacks on the South Korean corvette Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island. These shocking developments have sparked a heated debate in the South, inter alia, on whether and how Seoul’s North Korea policy has increased Pyongyang’s belligerence. This paper aims to critically evaluate key arguments pervading the debate and offer an alternative perspective. (I limit my scope to examining how Seoul’s policy has affected Pyongyang’s recent aggressiveness, instead of offering a more comprehensive account of the provocations or a theory of North Korean behavior.) I argue that all conventional wisdom (which either denies the significance of North Korea policy or views the level of engagement as mainly shaping Pyongyang’s behavior) has only weak empirical support, but remains salient because it serves parochial political interests in the partisan blame game. In reality, Seoul’s policy toward Pyongyang has significantly amplified North Korean belligerence primarily because it has been partisan in nature—not because inter-Korean engagement has been excessive or insufficient. Resolving this problem requires promoting post-partisanship, to which independent scholars and institutions can contribute significantly.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

66. Japan’s National Defense Program Guidelines 2010 and Its Implication to South Korean Security Policies

Author:
Young-June Park
Publication Date:
01-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
On December 17, 2010, the government of Japan updated its most strategically important document entitled “National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), FY 2011-” following confirmation from both the Security Council and the Cabinet. The new defense plan released along with the “Mid-Term Defense Program for FY2011-2015” addresses the objectives and the methods of the Japanese Self Defense Forces. Moreover, the plan also outlines Japan’s future military strategies as well as the fundamental tenets of its defense policy. Whereas in the United States, the White House, Pentagon, and Joint Chiefs all release new guidelines each time a new administration comes to power, Japan does not have such a regular format for its defense plan. This makes the National Defense Program Guidelines a comprehensive strategic document that covers every aspect of Japan’s military defense. First introduced in 1976, the Guidelines has only been updated twice in 1995 and 2004. The NDPG in 1976 reflected Japan’s security and military strategy during the Cold War, while the 1995 and the 2004 guidelines reflected strategies for the post-Cold War era and the beginning of 21st century after 9/11, respectively. What then do these updated guidelines in 2010 signify? And in what context should this defense plan be seen? Firstly, the structural changes that have occurred in the security environment of East Asia should be taken into consideration. North Korea conducted nuclear tests twice in 2006 and 2009. In 2010, it displayed new levels of provocation by sinking the South Korean naval vessel Cheonan and shelling Yeonpyeong Island. These actions not only threaten the Korean Peninsula but also the entire region. Added to that, China surpassed Japan as the second largest economy after the United States and has become more assertive over maritime disputes with Japan. How all these military and economic changes are projected in the document deserves close analysis. Secondly, unlike previous NDPGs that were written during the long years under the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the 2010 Guidelines are part of the first strategic document that reflects the strategic outlook and security approach of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). Since the DPJ assumed power, it has long tried to differentiate itself from LDP in its decision making procedures and actual policies. Such tendencies are naturally reflected in its security policies as well. How do these guidelines differ from the NDPGs issued under the LDP? In short, the National Defense Program Guidelines 2010 is the best resource with which to understand how Japan perceives the changed security environment, and what strategic concepts and military capability it is preparing for in face of future security challenges.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, Military Spending, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

67. New Foreign Policy Actors in China

Author:
Linda Jakobson and Dean Knox
Publication Date:
09-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
In contemporary China a cacophony of voices urges decision makers to pursue a variety of foreign policies. The continuing pluralization of Chinese society and China's growing interdependence with the international order have made decision-making processes more complex. These changes, taking place at a time when China's cooperation is increasingly vital to the resolution of key global issues, present a challenge to foreign policy makers. Effective engagement of China in the international arena requires an understanding of the interplay within and between not only the Communist Party of China (CPC), the Chinese Government and the People's Liberation Army (PLA) but also new foreign policy actors on the margins of the traditional power structure. These new actors include resource companies, financial institutions, local governments, research organizations, the media and netizens.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, and International Trade and Finance
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Australia/Pacific

68. SSR in the Republic of Moldova: Strengthening Oversight of the Security Sector

Author:
Erik Sportel(ed.) and Sami Faltas(ed.)
Publication Date:
01-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for European Security Studies
Abstract:
Although a small country, Moldova is of great geostrategic importance. Sandwiched between Romania and Ukraine, it borders both the former Soviet Union and the Euro-Atlantic Bloc. In the years after independence, Moldova was ambivalent about its foreign policy orientation. Situated on a geopolitical crossroads, Chisinau could not decide whether to deepen its relations with Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) or to follow a policy of Euro-Atlantic integration. In recent years, the country has clearly chosen the latter option, albeit with the reservation that integration into NATO is incompatible with Moldova's neutral status. First, Moldova pushed for the involvement of the European Union (EU) and the North-Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in negotiations to find a settlement for the Transnistrian conflict. Second, Moldova intensified its co-operation with NATO within the PfP programme by agreeing upon an Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) in 2006. By signing the IPAP, Moldova expressed its intention to move closer to Euro-Atlantic standards and institutions. Third, the EU-Moldova Action Plan was adopted in February 2005 in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Its aim is 'to encourage and support Moldova's objective of further integration into European economic and social structures'. Closer EU-Moldova relations are also evident in the EU's higher visibility in Moldova and in the Transnistrian conflict settlement process. In March 2005, the EU appointed a Special Representative to Moldova, and in October 2005, the EU established a border control mission on the frontier between Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM). At the same time, the European Commission opened a delegation office in Chisinau.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, and Defense Policy
Political Geography:
Ukraine, Asia, and Soviet Union

69. On the Rocks: Korea and Japan Divided over the Dokdo Issue

Author:
D. Bong Youngshik
Publication Date:
08-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
No serious observer of postwar relations between South Korea and Japan doubts that there is a bilateral issue between the two nations that is more persistent and volatile than their feud over the sovereign status of the two minuscule islets of Dokdo. This commentary examines the history of disputes over Dokdo, and attempts to argue that the starting point for a solution lies in the pragmatic and prudent approach, not in assertive diplomacy based on nationalistic sentiments. Since the end of World War II, Dokdo has been under the effective administrative control of the South Korean government. The Japanese government has protested at various official levels since then, arguing that the islets, which it calls Takeshima, belong to Japan in accordance with historical evidence and international law. The diplomatic feud over the territory did not flare up during the Cold War, because both countries involved in the controversy made security cooperation against the communist threat in Northeast Asia their top priority. It was only after concerns over the external regional security environment were lifted with the end of the Cold War that Japan began to fortify its claims to Dokdo in a far more assertive and diversified manner. South Korea responded to this change by making periodic departures from its traditional line of defense of “quiet diplomacy”—that is, taking the view that because its sovereignty over the islets is indisputable and its control over them remains complete, South Korea has no strategic interests in aggressively and emotionally reacting to Japan’s escalatory territorial policy. To do so would only reinforce Japan’s claim that there does exist an unresolved territorial issue between the two countries and the sovereign status of Dokdo is undetermined, when in fact South Korea’s position is the opposite.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, and South Korea

70. North Korea's Yongbyon Nuclear Complex

Author:
Siegfried S. Hecker
Publication Date:
11-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), Stanford University
Abstract:
On November 12, during my most recent visit to the Yongbyon Nuclear Complex with Stanford University colleagues John W. Lewis and Robert Carlin, we were shown a 25 to 30 megawatt-electric (MWe) experimental light-water reactor (LWR) in the early stages of construction. It is North Korea's first attempt at LWR technology and we were told it is proceeding with strictly indigenous resources and talent. The target date for operation was said to be 2012, which appears much too optimistic.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Energy Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

71. Revolutionizing Taiwan’s Security: Leveraging C4ISR for traditional and non-traditional challenges

Author:
Mark Stokes
Publication Date:
02-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Project 2049 Institute
Abstract:
As a global leader in technology, Taiwan is yet to leverage the information revolution for its C4ISR needs. Faced with an array of security challenges, from China’s conventional and electronic attack to the risk of natural disasters, Taiwan’s defense and disaster management capabilities can be fortified with advanced sensor, communications and satellite technology. In doing so, Taiwan can significantly improve its security outlook.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Science and Technology, and Non-Traditional Threats
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

72. The Next Steps in Japan-NATO Cooperation

Author:
Randall Schriver and Tiffany Ma
Publication Date:
11-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Project 2049 Institute
Abstract:
The Japan-NATO relationship holds greater potential than has been realized to date. A more ambitious, more formal, and more active program for Japan’s involvement with NATO could include enhanced intelligence and information sharing, planning and exercising, defense technical cooperation programs, consultations on strategic deterrence, and a joint Arctic security initiative. While obstacles to closer cooperation are foreseeable, a stronger and closer Japan-NATO relationship will have strategic benefits that resonate beyond the trans-Atlantic region.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Intelligence Sharing
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, and Arctic

73. A Complex Strategy to Overcome the Yeonpyeong Incident

Author:
Young-Sun Ha
Publication Date:
12-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Since North Korea’s deadly artillery barrage on Yeonpyeong Island, South Korea has been stepping up efforts in its defense posture and international cooperation. In preparing against any further provocation from the North, Seoul has been reinforcing forces on the island, strengthening defense and deterrence capabilities, and drastically increasing its defense budget. Somewhat belatedly, it has also been taking up actions to reexamine the strategies of the ROK-U.S. military alliance, demanding cooperation from China and Russia while maintaining the traditional trilateral cooperation with the United States and Japan. Of course, analyzing the causes of the weak response to the shelling and preparing to prevent further provocations are undoubtedly important. However, reading the bigger picture and formulating key strategies for the future is a far more critical task. The Kim Jong-il/Kim Jong-un leadership in November 2010 conducted two consecutive moves—revealing its uranium enrichment facilities and launching an artillery strike on Yeonpyeong Island. Understanding the situation of the whole East Asian region, while at the same time anticipating Pyongyang’s strategies and taking preemptive actions will be the main challenges ahead for Seoul. Firstly, it is important to understand the range of North Korea’s strategic options from aggressive diplomacy to peaceful diplomacy. The Korean Peninsula went through the Korean War in 1950 and following of the ceasefire, both Koreas were stuck between ‘hot war’ and ‘cold war.’ Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the world has passed the stage of ‘cold peace’ and moved towards a ‘hot peace.’ In spite of this global shift, North Korea has been frequently using combinations of ‘cold war,’ ‘hot war,’ ‘cold peace,’ and ‘hot peace’ on the international strategic chessboard. For example, during the Cold War period North Korea provoked the South in a number of cases: Rangoon bombing (1983), bombing of Korean Air Flight 858 (1987), attempted Blue House raid (1968), North Korean infiltration in the Uljin and Samcheok areas (1968). Even in the post-Cold War period, nuclear tests, naval battles in the Yellow Sea, the sinking of Cheonan naval ship and the shelling on Yeonpyeong Island ensued. At the same time, Pyongyang has been aggressively demanding for a peace agreement to this day. The possibility for limited warfare on the Korean Peninsula came dangerously close with the recent Yeonpyeong shelling, more so than the last North Korean provocation, the sinking of the Cheonan. As the pendulum of war and peace on the Korean Peninsula swung from the ‘cold war’ to ‘hot war,’ greater chaos arise. It is expected that the Kim Jong-il/Kim Jong-un regime will try to maximize the use of this pendulum of peace and war in order to strengthen Kim Jong-un’s weak power base. In spite of the dangers, merely worrying about the possibility of war is not going to help. Rather, we have to understand precisely why the North has raised the bar of aggression from acts of terrorism to that of a direct artillery attack on South Korean territory. It is likely that the North would pursue a ‘cold peace’ offensive to utilize the amplitude of the pendulum. A complex picture emerges when looking back on the recent comments made by top officials from North Korea, the United States, and China. Seoul and Washington have called for Pyongyang to engage in measures for active denuclearization and reengagement in inter-Korean relations as preconditions for resuming the Six-Party Talks. North Korea on the other hand has taken precisely the opposite measures. To read what the North Korean regime has in mind we have to think of the situation not as a motionless snapshot but as a moving footage. Furthermore, South Korea must do more than just respond to North Korea’s actions. Instead it should focus on making strategically preemptive moves. For this, it is necessary to examine why the North Korean regime expanded the pendulum’s amplitude and find measures to make the leadership pursue a survival strategy that does not include huddling around nuclear weapons.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Alliance, and Conflict
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

74. Security Sector Reform: Post-conflict Integration

Author:
Mark Knight
Publication Date:
08-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform
Abstract:
This research paper was commissioned by GFN-SSR as part of a help-desk support to inform HMG to report on its engagement in the context of Nepal. The query asked for illustrative examples and lessons of integration; in particular, examples of integration into armies, integration into non-military forces (police, armed police, intelligence, etc), and creation of new security structures (industrial security forces, border police, etc) into which ex-combatants are then integrated.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and Communism
Political Geography:
Asia and Nepal

75. Japan under the DPJ: Changes in Foreign and Defense Policies

Author:
Sook-Jong Lee and Young-June Park
Publication Date:
09-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
On August 31, 2009 the Democratic Party of Japan’s (DPJ) landslide victory in the country’s national election brought fifty-four years of Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) political dominance to an end. The DPJ won 308 of the 480 seats in the Lower House. Combined with 118 of the 237 seats in the Upper House that it won in July 2007, for the first time, the DPJ now controls both houses. By contrast, the LDP performed miserably. It managed to hold onto only 119 of the original 304 seats that it had held in the Lower House. Since its founding in 1955, the LDP had only lost power very briefly for a ten-month period between 1993 and 1994 when a non-LDP coalition came to power. The DPJ’s rise to power has been remarkable. The party was formed in 1996 during the run-up to the Lower House election of that year. The formation of the DPJ was in opposition to the LDP’s long dominance of Japanese politics and the policies of the reformist parties such as the Social Democratic Party and the Japanese Communist Party. The DPJ emerged as the third largest party behind the LDP and the now defunct New Frontier Party. By merging with members who had seceded from other opposition parties, such as the New Frontier Party, it would soon come to be a major challenger as it became the second largest party with the 1998 Upper House elections. However, its political influence waned and was only strengthened again through its merger with the Liberal Party, then led by the powerful Ichiro Ozawa in September 2003. This merger would also considerably boost its low public approval rating. However, it still trailed behind the LDP with a comparatively lower approval rating and a smaller number of parliamentary seats. In spite of these initial disadvantages, the DPJ’s victory was mainly due to a public backlash against the neoliberal reforms initiated during the 2001-2006 Koizumi administration and the inefficiencies of the short-lived cabinets of Shinzo Abe, Yasuo Fukuda, and Taro Aso. With this election victory, analysts widely expect that there will be considerable changes in Japan’s domestic and foreign policies under the DPJ. On its domestic agenda, the DPJ is likely to increase its political control over the bureaucracy and to strengthen the social safety net by providing farming subsidies and cash allowances for child-rearing families. In its foreign policy, the DPJ is expected to maintain the U.S.-Japan alliance but pursue a more independent stance than that of the LDP. At the same time, the DPJ will place greater emphasis on improving its relations with other Asian countries. This will also mean that South Korea-Japan relations will be improved as the DPJ addresses from a different perspective the controversial historical issues that have strained relations between the two countries. In general, there will not be significant changes to Japan’s foreign policy while substantial reforms will be focused on domestic political issues. Based on an analysis of the DPJ’s foreign and security policy, this commentary examines the prospects for South Korea-Japan relations as well as changes to Japan’s foreign policy.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Elections, and Domestic Politics
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

76. China's National Defense in 2008 Panel Discussion Report

Author:
Dr.Alison A. Kaufma
Publication Date:
02-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Academy of Political Science
Abstract:
On February 6, 2009, CNA China Studies and the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University convened a panel discussion on China's sixth defense white paper, which had been released by Beijing on January 20, 2009. The following are the main observations that emerged from that roundtable.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and War
Political Geography:
China, Beijing, and Asia

77. China, Space Weapons, and U.S. Security

Author:
Bruce W. MacDonald
Publication Date:
09-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
On January 11, 2007, China launched a missile into space, releasing a homing vehicle that destroyed an old Chinese weather satellite. The strategic reverberations of that collision have shaken up security thinking in the United States and around the world. This test demonstrated that, if it so chose, China could build a substantial number of these anti- satellite weapons (ASAT) and thus might soon be able to destroy substantial numbers of U.S. satellites in low earth orbit (LEO), upon which the U.S. military heavily depends. On February 21, 2008, the United States launched a modified missile-defense interceptor, destroying a U.S. satellite carrying one thousand pounds of toxic fuel about to make an uncontrolled atmospheric reentry. Thus, within fourteen months, China and the United States both demonstrated the capability to destroy LEO satellites, heralding the arrival of an era where space is a potentially far more contested domain than in the past, with few rules.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Diplomacy
Political Geography:
United States, China, and Asia

78. Business as Usual: An Assessment of Donald Rumsfeld's Transformation Vision and Transformation's Prospects for the Future

Author:
Mark G. Czelusta
Publication Date:
06-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies
Abstract:
Donald Rumsfeld's vision of a transformed United States military has been discussed by many and understood by few. It is no surprise that this lack of understanding has resulted in both significant simplifications and sweeping generalizations, to include the Reuters headline noted above. Even the term, “Rumsfeld's Transformation,” accounts for neither the historical influences that led to his vision, nor the multiple components of this transformational effort.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and War
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, Iraq, Middle East, and Asia

79. The Pentagon and Global Development: Making Sense of the DoD's Expanding Role

Author:
Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown
Publication Date:
11-2007
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Global Development
Abstract:
One of the most striking trends in U.S. foreign aid policy is the surging role of the Department of Defense (DoD). The Pentagon now accounts for over 20 percent of U.S. official development assistance (ODA). DoD has also expanded its provision of non-ODA assistance, including training and equipping of foreign military forces in fragile states. These trends raise concerns that U.S. foreign and development policies may become subordinated to a narrow, short-term security agenda at the expense of broader, longer-term diploma tic goals and institution-building efforts in the developing world. We find that the overwhelming bulk of ODA provided directly by DoD goes to Iraq and Afghanistan, which are violent environments that require the military to take a lead role through instruments like Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and the use of Commanders' Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds. This funding surge is in principle temporary and likely to disappear when the U.S. involvement in both wars ends. But beyond these two conflicts, DoD has expanded (or proposes to expand) its operations in the developing world to include a number of activities that might be more appropriately undertaken by the State Department, USAID and other civilian actors. These initiatives include: the use of “Section 1206” authorities to train and equip foreign security forces; the establishment of the new Combatant Command for Africa (AFRICOM); and the administration's proposed Building Global Partnerships (BGP) Act, which would expand DoD's assistance authorities.
Topic:
Defense Policy
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Africa, United States, Iraq, Middle East, and Asia

80. Human Security on Foreign Policy Agendas. Changes, Concepts and Cases, INEF-Report 80

Author:
Tobias Debiel and Sascha Werthes
Publication Date:
01-2006
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for Development and Peace
Abstract:
When the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) published its 1994 report, nobody expected that the human security concept outlined within it would attract so much attention from politicians and academics alike. This is all the more astonishing as the concept has provoked a lot of criticism ever since its first appearance due to its excoriated analytical ambiguity and its disputed political appropriateness.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Human Rights, International Political Economy, and United Nations
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, Europe, and Asia

81. Counterinsurgency and Political Control. US Military Strategies Regarding Regional Conflict, INEF-Report 81

Author:
Jochen Hippler
Publication Date:
01-2006
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for Development and Peace
Abstract:
With US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan fighting rather ruthless counter- insurgency campaigns, the topic of in surgency and counterinsurgency is of pressing relevance. At the same time, questions of internal violence in developing countries have generally been high on the political and academic agenda in the context of “failed” and “failing states”.
Topic:
Defense Policy and War
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, Iraq, Middle East, and Asia

82. A Realist Case for Conditioning the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal

Author:
George Perkovich
Publication Date:
05-2006
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The debate over the nuclear deal negotiated by the Bush Administration and the government of India is too narrow. This is ironic in as much as the best argument for the deal is that it advances big strategic goals. Some administration officials admit privately that the purported nonproliferation benefits of the deal are thinner than the paper it's not yet written on, and they hope to convince Congress that even if there are no nonproliferation gains, the grand strategic benefits still make the deal worth supporting. Strangely, nevertheless, the debate focuses on the nonproliferation aspects of the deal and leaves larger strategic questions relatively unexamined.
Topic:
International Relations, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Government
Political Geography:
India and Asia

83. Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1998-2005

Author:
Richard F. Grimmett
Publication Date:
11-2006
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Defense Information
Abstract:
This report is prepared annually to provide Congress with official, unclassified, quantitative data on conventional arms transfers to developing nations by the United States and foreign countries for the preceding eight calendar years for use in its various policy oversight functions. All agreement and delivery data in this report for the United States are government-to-government (FMS) transactions. Some general data are provided on worldwide conventional arms transfers by all suppliers, but the principal focus is the level of arms transfers by major weapons suppliers to nations in the developing world.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and Arms Control and Proliferation
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and Asia

84. The Paths Ahead: Missile Defense in Asia

Author:
Jeremiah Gertler
Publication Date:
03-2006
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
In early 2005, Kurt M. Campbell, Director of CSIS' International Security Program, accompanied Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld on a trip to Asia. Enroute, the Secretary and several of his close aides expressed an interest in learning more about the future of missile defenses in East Asia and the Subcontinent. Although familiar with the missile defense policies of countries in the region, they were concerned about how those policies were being implemented, whether the various national efforts were complementary or counterproductive, and how those efforts might affect the US approach to missile defense architecture.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, and Defense Policy
Political Geography:
United States and Asia

85. The Security Of Regional Sea Lanes

Author:
Joshua Ho
Publication Date:
05-2005
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
The emergence of China and India as major global players will not only transform the regional geopolitical landscape but will also mean an increased dependence on the sea as an avenue for trade and transportation of energy and raw materials. Within the region, the Malacca Straits, Sunda Straits, and the Lombok Straits are the main sea lanes through which trade, energy, and raw material resources flow. Indeed, the strategic importance of the regional lanes was recognised by the late Michael Leifer but the threats indetified at that time were primarily those that concerned the safety of navigation, the control of the freedom of passage by the coastal state as well as the interruption of passage in the sea lanes by an external naval power like the Soviet Union. The threats that Michael Leifer had identified has faded into insignificance and new threats to safety of shipping have arisen in their place, and these include piracy and the spectre of maritime terrorism.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
China, India, and Asia

86. Deducing India's Grand Strategy Of Regional Hegemony From Historical And Conceptual Perspectives

Author:
Manjeet Singh Pardesi
Publication Date:
04-2005
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
This paper seeks to answer if a rising India will repeat the pattern of all rising great powers since the Napoleonic times by attempting regional hegemony. This research deduces India's grand strategy of regional hegemony from historical and conceptual perspectives. The underlying assumption is that even though India has never consciously and deliberately pursues a grand strategy, its historical experience and geo-strategic environment have substantially conditioned its security behaviour and desired goals. To this extent, this research develops a theoretical framework to analyse grand strategy. This framework is then applied to five pan-Indian powers–the Mauryas, the Guptas, the Mughals, British India and the Republic of India–to understand their security behavior.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, and Defense Policy
Political Geography:
India and Asia

87. Australians speak 2005: public opinion and foreign policy

Author:
Ivan Cook
Publication Date:
03-2005
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
Australians feel positive and self-confident about Australia's place in the world, but we also have a realistic sense of our limitations and vulnerabilities. A vast majority believe Australia is 'a good international citizen' (82%), 'important in Asia' (82%), and 'well-placed to succeed in a competitive world' (79%), while few agree with the notion that we are 'unimportant in global politics' (37%). But three quarters of respondents also think we are 'vulnerable to external threats' (76%), and while the population is evenly split on whether we are 'independent minded', 65% think we are 'a follower not a leader'.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, and Defense Policy
Political Geography:
Asia, Australia, and Australia/Pacific

88. Unsheathing the Samurai Sword: Japan's Changing Security Policy

Author:
Alan Dupont
Publication Date:
11-2004
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
This Lowy Institute Paper sheds analytical light on Japan's changing security policy and seeks answers to several important questions that are of major consequence for Australia and the wider region. What are Japan's strategic aspirations and what does Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi really mean when he talks about Japan becoming a 'normal country'? How signifi cant are the mooted revisions to the peace constitution and how different will the Japanese Self Defense Force (SDF) be in capability and structure a decade hence? As domestic anxieties increase will Japan move closer to the US or seek greater autonomy within the framework of the US alliance? Is it conceivable that the alliance itself could fracture or dissolve entirely? Will cooperation with the US on missile defence weaken the prohibition on collective self defence and under what circumstances might Japan acquire nuclear weapons?
Topic:
Foreign Policy and Defense Policy
Political Geography:
Japan, Israel, Asia, and Australia

89. Chinese Military Power

Author:
Harold Brown, Adam Segal, and Joseph W. Prueher
Publication Date:
05-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
The People's Republic of China (PRC) is currently engaged in comprehensive military modernization. This report addresses the state of China's military capability, assesses the current capabilities of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), and establishes milestones for judging the future evolution of Chinese military power over the next twenty years. These assessments and milestones will provide policymakers and the public with a pragmatic and nonpartisan approach to measuring the development of Chinese military power. They will allow observers of Chinese military modernization to determine the degree to which changes in the quantity and quality of China's military power may threaten the interests of the United States, its allies, and its friends; and how the United States should adjust and respond politically, diplomatically, economically, and militarily to China's military development.
Topic:
Defense Policy
Political Geography:
United States, China, and Asia

90. Stand-off with North Korea: War Scenarios and Consequences

Author:
Colin Robinson and Stephen H. Baker
Publication Date:
05-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Defense Information
Abstract:
North Korea's military threat and somewhat peculiar approaches to international relations have been a central difficulty in dealing with the isolated regime during the past decade. In the early 1990s, North Korea, formally known as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), was expected by many observers to collapse, just as communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union did.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Science and Technology
Political Geography:
Eastern Europe, Asia, North Korea, and Soviet Union

91. China's Rise and the U.S. Army: Leaning Forward

Author:
Russell D. Howard and Albert Willner
Publication Date:
08-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Department of Social Sciences at West Point, United States Military Academy
Abstract:
The United States led war on terrorism has already had a major impact on developing state relationships in Asia. The coalition of convenience that emerged in the aftermath of the September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon has engendered a change in strategic thinking, perceptions, and influence. A significant shift in any of these three areas could have dramatic implications. For the United States, what is required is not only a reassessment of the new realities but also a strategy to take advantage of new opportunities and cope with potential threats. Perhaps nowhere is this need more apparent, or possible responses more fraught with risk, than in determining the impact of such strategic shifts on the U.S.-China relationship, particularly in the security realm.
Topic:
Security and Defense Policy
Political Geography:
United States, China, and Asia

92. Democratic America in Northeast Asia: U.S. Strategy, Theater Missile Defense, and Allied Defense Relationships

Author:
Sonya L. Finley
Publication Date:
08-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Department of Social Sciences at West Point, United States Military Academy
Abstract:
With the proliferation of ballistic and cruise missiles and weapons of mass destruction (WMD), American political leaders have embarked on a long-term plan for deploying Theater Missile Defense (TMD) as a means to protect the United States, US forces abroad, and allies. Effective on 13 June 2002, the United States is no longer party to the 1972 ABM Treaty and missile defense is a priority with "prominence in policy, funding, and organization." TMD essentially is a family of military weapon systems whose purpose is to intercept hostile missiles that have been launched, whether intentionally or unintentionally. However, the question remains whether Theater Missile Defense is, and will be, an integrated and effective tool in achieving overall US national security goals in Northeast Asia, namely enhancing regional security and reducing the threat of weapons of mass destruction.
Topic:
Security and Defense Policy
Political Geography:
United States, China, America, and Asia

93. Terrorism and Asymmetric Conflict in Southwest Asia

Author:
Shahram Chubin and Jerold D. Green
Publication Date:
06-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
At previous RAND-GCSP workshops in 1999 and 2001, participants examined, respectively, possible roles for NATO in the Middle East and the challenges to Turkey as both a European and Middle Eastern actor. The 2002 workshop, scheduled for June 23-25, 2002, was originally intended to take a broad look at issues relating to Southwest Asia, where Europe and the United States have long grappled with a range of strategic and political differences. However, in light of the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 and the subsequent U.S.-led military campaign in Afghanistan, the organisers decided to refocus the workshop around the specific theme of terrorism and asymmetric conflict in Southwest Asia. The workshop focused on both the global and regional aspects of the terrorist threat.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, Middle East, and Asia

94. Soft security problems in Northwest Russia and their implications for the outside world. A framework for analysis and action

Author:
Christer Pursiainen, Pekka Haavisto, and Nikita Lomagin
Publication Date:
01-2001
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Ten years after the end of the Cold War, the traditional security dilemma based on the perception of a military threat between Russia and the West has largely given way to a variety of new challenges related to non-military security, so-called soft security threats. These threats are not merely problems internal to Russia, but constitute existing or potential problems for other countries as well.
Topic:
Defense Policy and International Cooperation
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Asia

95. The United States and Europe: Smooth Sailing or Storm Clouds Ahead?

Author:
William Hitchcock
Publication Date:
08-2000
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Two years ago, when many of us gathered together in the dramatic Alpine setting of Leukerbad to consider the recent past and the likely future of US-European relations, our group was full of dire prognostications. Russia was headed toward collapse, the EU looked weak after the Yugoslav war, NATO expansion appeared to be dividing Europe; the introduction of the euro looked liked a risky gamble that might worsen trans-Atlantic relations; and most disturbing for me as an American, my government was preoccupied with the Lewinsky scandal and the future of the Clinton presidency seemed at risk. Indeed, one of our colleagues, discussing the crisis over after-dinner drinks, declared that Clinton would resign from the presidency within matter of weeks.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and NATO
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and Asia

96. Through the Glass Ceiling: Towards a New Security Regime for Europe?

Author:
Anne Deighton
Publication Date:
08-2000
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The 'St Malo process' which has being taking shape since December 1998, will bring a qualitative change in the EU's role as an international institution. Many of the big initiatives that the Union undertakes are not fully understood early on - unexpected, and sometimes unintended consequences can result from the changes that the EU agrees to. It takes time for the institutional implications of major changes to emerge: the Single Act was, in the mid 80s, often seen as the 'elephant that gave birth to a mouse'; and the Maastricht Treaty as at once called too federalist, and too timid. Likewise, the exact configuration of the changes that St Malo may bring will also take time to become clear. 'Militarising' the EU, however, ends one of the last policy taboos of a 'civilian-power' European Union and breaks through the 'glass ceiling' of the EU's self-denying ordinance against the adoption of the instruments of military force which has existed since its inception. This paper assesses how far these changes got by the summer of 2000 and asks whether the last eighteen months are one stage in the messy birth of a post-Cold War pan-European defence and security regime with institutions based around NATO and the EU. Europe's institutional configuration tends to matter more to Europeans than to our transatlantic partners; but institutions are the reality of contemporary European international politics. 'Multilateral institutionalism' too, is inescapable, and how institutions relate to each other has become an increasingly significant question. To accept this does not meant that states do not matter, for states also use institutions, as well as being shaped by institutions.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and NATO
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, Asia, and Switzerland

97. NATO's Past, NATO's Future

Author:
John Lewis Gaddis
Publication Date:
08-2000
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization stands at a crossroads. Critical choices lie ahead that will determine its future. I begin my paper this way because it is customary to begin pronouncements on NATO with this kind of statement. Indeed papers and speeches on NATO have been beginning this way through the half-century of the alliance's existence - and yet NATO never quite reaches whatever crisis the speaker or writer has in mind. NATO seems to have a life of its own, which is remarkably detached from the shocks and surprises that dominate most of history, certainly Cold War history. And NATO's members, both actual and aspiring, seem bent on keeping it that way. So what is a crossroad anyway in historical terms? Most of my colleagues, I think, would say that it's a turning point: a moment at which it becomes clear that the status quo can no longer sustain itself, at which decisions have to be made about new courses of action, at which the results of those decisions shape what happens for years to come. The Cold War was full of such moments: the Korean War, Khrushchev's de-Stalinization speech, the Hungarian and Suez crises, the Berlin Wall, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Six Day War, the Tet offensive, Nixon's trip to China, the invasion of Afghanistan, the reunification of Germany, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War itself. What strikes me as a historian, though, is how little impact these turning points had on NATO's history - even General deGaulle, who tried to turn himself personally into a turning point. The structure and purposes of the alliance today are not greatly different from what they were when NATO was founded. Which is to say that NATO's history, compared to that of most other Cold War institutions, is uneventful, bland, and even (let us be frank) a little dull. That very uneventfulness, though, is turning out to be one of the more significant aspects of Cold War history. It surprised the historians, who have been able to cite no other example of a multi-national alliance that has had the robustness, the durability, the continuity, some might say the apparent immortality, of this one. It has also surprised the international relations theorists, for it is a fundamental principle of their discipline that alliances form when nations balance against threats. It follows, then, that as threats dissipate, alliances should also - and yet this one shows no signs of doing so. An instrument of statecraft, which is what an alliance normally is, has in this instance come to be regarded as a fundamental interest of statecraft. That requires explanation, which is what I should like to attempt here.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and NATO
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Russia, United States, China, Europe, Asia, Soviet Union, Germany, and Berlin

98. U.S.-EU Relations after the Introduction of the Euro and the Reinvention of European Security and Defence

Author:
Pal Dunay
Publication Date:
08-2000
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The current phase and the prospects of U.S. - EU relations can be analysed from different vantage points. The most logical is to deal with the position of the main actors, the United States or the European Union. This paper makes an attempt to analyse the prospects of U.S. - EU relations in light of two major developments: the beginning of the third phase of the economic and monetary union, symbolised by the introduction of the Euro and the verbal (re-)establishment of European defence. The paper makes an attempt to pay attention to the arguments of the United States, though the emphasis is on the European perception of the possible complications of the new phase of evolution that European integration may generate in the relations between the two entities.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and NATO
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and Asia

99. Beyond Enlargement: NATO's Role in Russia's Relations with the West

Author:
S. Neil MacFarlane
Publication Date:
08-2000
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
In 1996, ex-NATO Defence College fellow Dmitrii Trenin wrote that "in spite of the numerous public declarations of intention by Russia and the United States, Russia and NATO, and Russia and the European Union, so far no reliable foundation for partnership has been laid." Although the remark is four years old, there is little to argue with here. The proposition remains equally valid today. Four years ago, one might have asked: so what? Given the state of affairs in Russia, it didn't matter much anyway. However, things are changing. For the first time in ten years, secessionist wars, submarine disasters and fires in television towers notwithstanding, NATO and the West face a pivotal moment in the effort to normalize the relationship with Russia. The executive has secured reasonable control over the legislature. It is moving towards the reestablishment of central authority vis-à-vis the regions. The government is restoring a disciplined and reasonably orderly approach to foreign and security policy. There is increasingly strong evidence of sustained Russian economic recovery. This is a moment, consequently, of both opportunity and risk in the West's relations with Russia. It is an appropriate time to review where we have been, where we are, where we want to be, and what the role of NATO is in getting us there.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and NATO
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and Asia

100. Kosovo's Evolving Contest: Security, Policy and Sovereignty

Author:
Charles H. Norchi
Publication Date:
08-2000
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
It will be recalled that Yugoslavia was created in 1918 in the wake of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The new state was peopled by religiously distinct ethnic groups of Serbs, Croats, Slovenians and Muslims. After World War II and German occupation, Josip Broz Tito, the Croat leader of the Yugoslav resistance, reunited the country as the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). Member Republics of the SFRY were Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and the autonomous provinces of Voyvodina and Kosovo. Kosovo had been incorporated into Yugoslavia in 1945, but unlike the five federal units of Yugoslavia, it did not have the constitutional right to secede from the federation. With its majority Albanian population, it held the same status of Vojvadina with its majority Hungarian population. Tito's rule was harsh. His aim was to establish a public order straddling capitalism and communism in a multi-ethnic society. His foreign policy direction was non-aligned. Tito died in 1980 and SFRY leadership was assumed by a Presidential Council intended to represent the republics and autonomous territories with council chairmanship rotating among members.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and NATO
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, Asia, and Kosovo