Search

Begin New Search Political Geography Asia Content Type Working Paper Publication Year within 3 Years

1. The Future of the Belt and Road in Europe: How China’s Connectivity Project is Being Reconfigured across the Old Continent – and What It Means for the Euro-Atlantic Alliance

Author:
Nicola Casarini
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has entered the twilight zone in the old continent, following a deterioration of bilateral relations between the EU member states and China over the last years. Italy’s official exit from the BRI at the end of 2023 was a further blow to Chinese President Xi Jinping’s signature foreign policy. Yet, the BRI in Europe is being reconfigured rather than being terminated. In Western Europe, the BRI is moving away from physical infrastructure projects and investment in industrial assets – the latter being increasingly protected from Chinese takeovers by both national and EU legislation – to financial and monetary connectivity. This shift is welcomed by various European actors, including some policymakers at the national level, eurozone institutions and major banks. Concurrently, most of Eastern European countries continue to promote BRI projects and seek to attract Chinese investments, suggesting that there is a two-speed Europe when it comes to China, both in terms of geography and sectors.
Topic:
Infrastructure, Foreign Direct Investment, European Union, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Currency
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and Italy

2. China's Political-Economy, Foreign and Security Policy: 2023

Author:
Center for China Analysis
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
It has now been three months since the 20th Party Congress convened in Beijing on October 15. While the Congress set Xi Jinping’s ideological, strategic, and economic direction for the next five years, much has happened since then that the Chinese leadership did not anticipate. Principal among these surprises was the spontaneous eruption in late November of public protests across multiple Chinese cities against the economic and social impact of the Chinese Communist Party’s “dynamic zero-COVID” policy. These protests resulted in an unprecedented U-turn on December 8 from China’s relentless pursuit of its three-year-long national pandemic containment strategy to the Party now seeking desperately to restore economic growth and social calm. This shift has in turn generated major public pressures on the Chinese health system as hospitals struggle to cope with surging caseloads and mortalities. All of these developments stand in stark contrast to the political, ideological, and nationalist self-confidence on display at the 20th Party Congress. In October, Xi Jinping swept the board by removing any would-be opponents from the Politburo and replacing them with long-standing personal loyalists. Xi also proclaimed China’s total victory over COVID-19, contrasting the Party’s success with the disarray its propaganda apparatus had depicted across the United States and the collective West. Despite faltering economic growth, Xi had doubled down in his embrace of a new, more Marxist approach to economic policy which prioritized planning over the market, national self-sufficiency over global economic integration, the centrality of the public sector over private enterprise, and a new approach to wealth distribution under the rubric of the Common Prosperity doctrine. At the same time, Xi’s 2022 Work Report, delivered at the Congress, abandoned Deng Xiaoping’s long-standing foreign policy framework that “peace and development are the principal themes of the time” and instead warned of growing strategic threats and the need for the military to be prepared for war. As part of a continuing series on China’s evolving political economy and foreign policy, this paper’s purpose is threefold: to examine the political and economic implications of this dramatic change in China’s COVID-19 strategy; to analyze what, if any, impact it may have on China’s current international posture; and to assess whether this represents a significant departure from the Party’s strategic direction set at the 20th Party Congress last October. The paper concludes that the Party changed course on COVID-19 for two reasons: (1) it feared that not doing so would threaten its unofficial social contract with the Chinese people based on long-term improvements in jobs and living standards; and (2) that a structural slowdown in growth could also undermine China’s long-term strategic competition against the United States. This paper also concludes that the stark nature of the December 8 policy backflip, together with the Chinese health system’s lack of preparedness for it, has dented Xi Jinping’s political armor for the medium term. This setback comes on top of internal criticism of Xi’s broader ideological assault on the Deng-Jiang-Hu historical economic growth formula that Xi has prosecuted since 2017, as well as Xi’s departure from Deng’s less confrontational foreign policy posture that characterized previous decades. Nonetheless, these policy errors remain manageable within Chinese elite politics, where Xi still controls the hard levers of power. Furthermore, many of these changes on both the economy and external policy are more likely to be short-to-medium term and therefore tactical in nature, rather than representing a strategic departure from the deep ideological direction laid out for the long-term in Xi’s October 2022 Work Report. While these changes to current economic and foreign policy settings are significant in their own right, there is no evidence to date that Xi Jinping’s ideological fundamentals have changed.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Political Economy, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China and Asia

3. The Pathway to an Effective ETS and Power Market Interaction: The Case of the Korean ETS

Author:
Alistair Ritchie
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
The power sector is one of the most important areas to cover in any emissions trading system (ETS), due to the scale and abatement potential of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in that sector. However, some critical challenges need to be overcome before an ETS can fulfil its emissions-reduction potential by driving fuel switching away from coal and toward renewables and low-carbon fuels. This is one of the most important topics for ETS development in Asia given the tight controls on power markets. The case of the Korean ETS (K-ETS) provides valuable insights for the pathway to an effective interaction between an ETS and the power market to support power sector decarbonization, based on recent developments and potential next steps. The Pathway to an Effective ETS and Power Market Interaction: The Case of the Korean ETS describes the details of recent developments in Korea's power market and the emission trading system to address insufficient emission reductions in the power sector, key future developments required, and learning points for ETSs in other Asian jurisdictions.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Markets, Carbon Emissions, and Decarbonization
Political Geography:
Asia and South Korea

4. Taiwan Strait Crises: Island Seizure Contingencies

Author:
Andrew Chubb
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
Conflict across the Taiwan Strait could disrupt East Asia’s extensive trade links, sever global production chains, generate serious shocks to regional economies, upend Asia’s security architecture, and, potentially, escalate into a catastrophic superpower war. Many regional states — including U.S. allies — are beginning to seriously consider how they would respond to a potential use of force by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). But analytic attention has focused overwhelmingly on the worst-case scenario of a PRC invasion, largely ignoring more likely contingencies calculated to stay below the threshold of lethal force. It is in this “gray zone” that the PRC has made strategic advances in the East and South China Seas in recent years. This paper argues that, compared with an invasion or blockade of Taiwan’s main island, an operation to capture one or more offshore islands currently controlled by the Republic of China (ROC or Taiwan) would offer Beijing considerable advantages. In an immediate tactical sense, it would offer Beijing greater flexibility and escalation control, lower risk of civilian casualties, and less likelihood of sparking a strong Taiwanese response or U.S. intervention. Strategically, such an operation could open up an array of options for further probes, faits accomplis, information gathering, and coercive pressure on ROC forces—and, in the case of the Penghu (Pescadores) Islands, substantial opportunities for enhanced surveillance, reconnaissance, and logistical support for a future invasion of the main island. Domestically, in contrast with a bloody and potentially catastrophic all-out invasion or a blockade that would risk conflict with the United States, outlying island seizure could offer Beijing a low-risk yet highly symbolic rallying point in a period of likely economic struggles and rising social dissatisfaction. Policymakers and strategists on all sides of politics in Taiwan, the United States and elsewhere need to carefully consider how they would respond to such contingencies, in order to enable an effective international response.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Territorial Disputes, Geopolitics, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

5. The Transition From an Intensity to an Absolute Emissions Cap in China’s National Emissions Trading System

Author:
Duan Maosheng
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
The unique characteristics of China's economic development and electricity marketization have resulted in the implementation of a bottom-up intensity-based emissions cap in China’s national emissions trading system (ETS) in its early stages. However, the efficacy of the bottom-up cap-setting approach remains controversial, particularly with regard to achieving emission reduction goals and cost-effectiveness. In response to China's "dual carbon" targets and updated Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC), China’s national ETS shall gradually shift towards a real cap-and-trade system, with a transition period when a hybrid system, which has an absolute control cap beside the intensity cap, is implemented. The Transition from an Intensity to an Absolute Emissions Cap in China’s National Emissions Trading System examines the cap-setting approaches used in ETSs in China, the underlying reasons for choosing intensity caps in China, and major issues related to the transition from an intensity cap to an absolute cap in China’s national ETS.
Topic:
Climate Change, Economy, Trade, and Carbon Emissions
Political Geography:
China and Asia

6. Economic and Environmental Impacts of China’s New Nationwide CO2 Emissions Trading System

Author:
Lawrence Goulder, Xianling Long, Chenfei Qu, and Da Zhang
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
China’s National Emissions Trading System (ETS) has already become the world’s largest ETS and is expected to contribute substantially toward meeting China’s pledge to peak its carbon emissions before 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality before 2060. The new system is based on a tradable performance standard (TPS), a rate-based system under which each covered facility receives from the government in each compliance period a certain number of emissions allowances based on its output and the government’s assigned “benchmark” ratio of emissions per unit of output. Economic and Environmental Impacts of China’s New Nationwide CO2 Emissions Trading System describes the results from a multi-sector multi-period general equilibrium model designed to assess the potential economic, energy mix, and emissions impacts of different future policy options under China’s National ETS over the period 2020–2035, by sector and province and in the aggregate
Topic:
Environment, Economy, Trade, and Carbon Emissions
Political Geography:
China and Asia

7. China, climate change and the energy transition

Author:
Professor Xu Yi-Chong
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
This report surveys China’s enormous energy transition to renewables. It begins by sketching the energy challenges China faces and its climate-change-related energy policies, in the context of the global geopolitics of the energy transformation. Next the report focuses on conventional energy sources (oil and natural gas), followed by electricity, and energy technologies. Although the report is intended primarily to survey developments to date, it concludes with some brief observations about the considerable energy challenges China faces in the years ahead.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, Development, Energy Policy, and Energy Transition
Political Geography:
China and Asia

8. NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept. Analysis and implications for Austria

Author:
Loïc Simonet
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
Adopted at the Madrid Summit in June 2022, the long-overdue NATO’s new Strategic Concept provides a clear set of guidelines for the Atlantic Alliance in a mid-term perspective. The war in Ukraine has provided the Allies with a powerful catalyst to reconsider NATO’s identity, core missions, as well as their vision of Russia and China. NATO’s new deterrence and defence-centric approach has already entailed a major shift in our security architecture, especially on Europe’s eastern flank. Without undermining its historical neutrality, Austria might reinterpret it in light of NATO’s “reset” and use this opportunity to reinvigorate its partnership with the Alliance.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Partnerships, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, and Balkans

9. Digital China: The Strategy and Its Geopolitical Implications

Author:
David Dorman and John Hemmings
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Over the past few years, there has been growing concern inside the United States, Europe, and in the Indo-Pacific on the strategic direction behind China’s technology policies. Beginning with the debate over 5G and Huawei, this debate has covered Artificial Intelligence (AI), quantum teachnology, and semi-conductors – a foundational technology. And despite a large number of policies in place – Made in China: 2025, Cyber Super Power, and the New Generation AI Development Plan – few in the West have known China’s overall digital grand strategy. In the first installment of a three-part research project, Dr. Dorman and Dr. Hemmings lay out the rise of China’s overall digital grand strategy, Xi’s role in it, and how it has been organized to fulfil Party objectives. The report tracks the rise of the strategy over the past 10 years, the acceleration of that rise during the Covid-19 pandemic, and the current state of the strategy. In particular, it finds Digital China has been supported and designed by General Secretary Xi Jinping himself, and is a bid to make China more competitive vis a vis the West through the digital transformation of rules, institutions, and infrastructure at the national level. Over the past few years, the strategy has risen to become the “overall” strategy for digital development in the eyes of the Chinese Communist Party leadership, bigger than the Digital Silk Road, deeper than the Belt and Road Initiative, more far reaching than 5G or AI, more important than Made in China: 2025, and wider than Cyber Great Power. A renewed Digital China seeks to challenge a hegemonic global system anchored to a previous age. A successful Digital China has profound implications for China’s developmental path, great power competition, and for the norms that will undergird the international system for decades to come. The Party leadership has re-written Marxist economic theory in its bid to incorporate “data” as the basis of its digital economy and in order to foster a Chinese “Digital Marxism”. Digital China seeks to whet the “sharp weapon” of innovation to facilitate its great power rise and challenge to the West. Beijing is testing whether innovative thinking can be created through the digital transformation of tools, talent, and learning. The US and its allies have begun to effect strategic counter-effect to the myriad of PRC technology policies, there is almost zero understanding or public discussion of this digital grand strategy. Whether inattention, mistranslation, or obfuscation, Digital China has been mostly missed by the West over the past decade.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Innovation, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

10. South China Sea, East China Sea, and the Emerging US-Japan-Philippines Trilateral

Author:
Jeffrey Ordaniel
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
The U.S.-Japan-Philippines Trilateral Maritime Security Dialogue conducted in December 2022 confirmed that there is very little difference in threat perceptions regarding the East and South China Seas. The three countries view China’s increasingly assertive claims to the territories and maritime zones in the two bodies of water as antithetical to their shared vision of a free, open, and rules-based Indo-Pacific. China’s rapid military expansion, including unprecedented nuclear weapons and missile buildup, reinforces the urgency of the threat. Japanese and Philippine interlocutors worry that as China approaches nuclear parity with the United States, the region’s strategic environment will worsen. American participants emphasized greater and tangible demonstration of alliance commitments and agreed that some risk-taking is required to push back against Chinese coercion. There was a consensus about the challenge of addressing Beijing’s gray zone activities that have so far succeeded in seizing territories and maritime areas in the South China Sea and establishing regular intrusions into Japanese waters in the East China Sea. Participants struggled to find a strategy to blunt China’s salami-slicing tactics while avoiding escalation and armed conflict.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Multilateral Relations, Maritime, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, Philippines, East China, United States of America, and South China Sea

11. The United States & Japan: Allied Against Disinformation

Author:
Akira Igata, Morihiro Ogasahara, and Christopher Paul
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
In our 21st century information age security does not start with weapons or with the armed forces who wield them. A range of non-traditional security issues has arisen to test even the oldest and closest of alliances—including that of the United States and Japan. Disinformation is among these issues, and this paper series, carried out with the generous support of the US Embassy Tokyo, highlights the specific challenges that disinformation presents. The good news is that Japan, at least so far, is not demonstrating exceptionally high difficulties with disinformation so far. However, as the paper by Prof. Morihiro Ogasahara demonstrates, there are specific demographics and specific types of news consumers in the country who are vulnerable, and Dr. Christopher Paul’s findings indicate that Japan could very well find itself under a more sustained attack by adversaries wishing to weaken its relationship with the US in the future. We at Pacific Forum hope that these papers serve as a wakeup call for policymakers, and lead to proactive solutions not only for this alliance, but which may be modeled for US relationships throughout the region.
Topic:
Security, Alliance, Disinformation, and Information Warfare
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

12. Understanding Alignment Decisions in Southeast Asia: A Review of U.S.-China Competition in the Philippines

Author:
William Piekos
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
The United States and China are engaged in an ongoing struggle for the alignment commitments of Southeast Asian governments, employing a variety of measures to entice, cajole, and threaten states to alter their policy behavior. Caught between this competition, countries in Southeast Asia weigh their alignment options in search of the strategy viewed by the ruling regime as most likely to ameliorate risk and increase its prospects for survival. While nonalignment through hedging is a sought-after option, most often smaller states align with the major power that offers inducements (over coercion), as the material and diplomatic benefits bolster regimes’ claim to performance-based legitimacy and its domestic stability and security. A review of the Philippines’ geopolitical positioning during the Benigno Aquino III (2010–2016) and Rodrigo Duterte (2016–2022) administrations reveals that inducements and coercion have played a significant role in the country’s alignment decisions. During the Aquino administration, coercive measures taken by China in the South China Sea and continued security and diplomatic inducements from the United States underscore the respective approaches of Beijing and Washington. The candidacy and election of Duterte, however, switched this dynamic, and the new president courted and received promises of Chinese economic assistance to support his domestic growth strategy and downplayed U.S. ties in pursuit of a more independent foreign policy. In the end, continued Chinese provocations in the South China Sea and domestic security challenges led Duterte to call upon U.S. assistance once again, and Duterte was unable to initiate a full reconsideration of Manila’s position. Still, his strategic flirtation with China underscores the importance of performance-based legitimacy and the impact of inducements and coercion in shaping the foreign policy choices of smaller states. The findings of this study suggest that Washington’s focus on great power competition and sanctions handicaps U.S. foreign policy in Southeast Asia and beyond. The Philippines’ leaders focused on securing their domestic political prospects and legitimacy; criticism and coercive measures were largely ineffective for the United States or China in gaining influence over policy decisions. Washington should more often consider the promise and provision of inducements—while remaining sensitive to human rights concerns, governance issues, and liberal norms—to support the needs of Southeast Asian states, incentivize more transparent behavior, and increase the likelihood that these states will support U.S. interests in the future.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Philippines, North America, Southeast Asia, and United States of America

13. US strategy and force posture for an era of nuclear tripolarity

Author:
Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The term “nuclear tripolarity” describes a world in which China has joined the United States and Russia as a leading nuclear power. As China modernizes its existing nuclear forces and deploys new weapons, it is on track to roughly double its deployed nuclear arsenal in the next few years—from approximately 350 to 700 deliverable warheads. The US Department of Defense projects that China will go further, expanding its arsenal to at least 1,500 warheads by 2035.1 At those force levels, China’s arsenal would be comparable to US and Russian deployed nuclear forces, currently capped at 1,550 by the New START Treaty.2 What are the consequences of emerging tripolarity for US nuclear strategy and force posture? If the United States retains its current approach to nuclear force planning, the growth of China’s arsenal (and the ongoing modernization of Russia’s nuclear weapons) will likely compel the United States to significantly increase its own arsenal. The easiest way to do so would be to upload one to two thousand additional warheads from US reserves onto existing delivery systems when the New START treaty expires in 2026. Unfortunately, a major increase in US forces would likely mark just another step in an intensifying arms competition among the three leading nuclear powers, since China and Russia would then feel pressure to respond.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Geopolitics, Deterrence, and Multipolarity
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

14. The NewSpace market: Capital, control, and commercialization

Author:
Robert Murray
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Commercial opportunities in space-based technologies are expanding rapidly. From satellite communications and Earth observation to space tourism and asteroid mining, the potential for businesses to capitalize on these emerging technologies is vast and known as “NewSpace.”1 The NewSpace model is important for governments to understand because the dual-use nature of space, specifically its growing commercialization, will influence the types of space-based technologies that nations may leverage, and consequently, impact their national security paradigms. By capitalizing on the private sector’s agility and combining it with the essential research efforts and customer role played by the public sector, the NewSpace industry can play a critical function in addressing current and future national security challenges through public-private codevelopment. As the NewSpace industry expands, the role of government is evolving from being the primary developer and operator of space assets to facilitating their commercialization, while still prioritizing key advancements. US and allied governments can capitalize on this competitive landscape by strategically investing in areas that align with their national security objectives. However, it is crucial for them to first understand and adapt to their changing roles within this dynamic environment. Indeed, the benefits of the burgeoning NewSpace industry extend beyond the United States. International collaboration and competition in this area can lead to faster technological advancements and economic gains. The global NewSpace landscape is driving down costs, increasing access to space, and fostering innovation that can improve not only economic well-being, but also impact national security models. To that end, this memo will examine the broad state of the space market, discuss the industry drivers, and propose recommendations for US and allied policymakers as they consider future government investments in those enabling space-based activities that support wider national security ambitions.
Topic:
Defense Policy, International Trade and Finance, National Security, Science and Technology, European Union, Space, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, Canada, Asia, and United States of America

15. United States–China semiconductor standoff: A supply chain under stress

Author:
Jeremy Mark and Dexter Tiff Roberts
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
In August 2022, the US Congress passed the CHIPS and Science Act, a law that approves subsidies and tax breaks to help jump-start the renewed production on American soil of advanced semiconductors.1 Just two months later, the Joe Biden administration issued wide-ranging restrictions on the export to China of chips and chip-making technology to undercut that country’s ability to manufacture the same class of integrated circuits.2 Taken together with a steady stream of Biden administration prohibitions on technology sales to key Chinese companies, the US initiatives represent a profound turn toward competition with China in the high-tech realm.3 They also highlight an effort to restructure the complex, multinational supply chains centered on East Asia that manufacture hundreds of billions of dollars of semiconductors a year. As such, the Biden administration has set in motion a process that could alter the business strategies—and fortunes—of homegrown and foreign-invested semiconductor companies based in China, world-leading chipmakers in Taiwan and South Korea, and suppliers around the world that provide the industry with the machinery and myriad inputs that fuel chip production. The Biden administration insists that its restrictions on sales to China are intended only to limit China’s ability to produce the cutting-edge chips that can feed into the development of weapons and other strategically important technologies—and not to cripple its semiconductor industry. But the current state of play of sanctions and support for US-based semiconductor production, including by Taiwanese and Korean chipmakers, is not the endpoint in this process. Rather, the momentum to constrain Beijing’s semiconductor program is likely to continue in the coming months, at the very least with additional restrictions on Chinese companies and government-linked entities, and unprecedented bureaucratic scrutiny of American venture-capital and equity-financing flows to China. That amounts to more bad news for corporate leaders in Asia, North America, and Europe who have spent the past generation building a globe-spanning semiconductor industry that has faced few barriers to expansion. As US restrictions mount, and sales of certain technologies to China flag, the once-unimaginable process of reorienting semiconductor supply chains will become an ever-present reality. The CHIPS and Science Act already is becoming an important factor in corporate strategy, providing incentives for Taiwanese, Korean, and American companies to make big bets on new factories in places like New York, Ohio, Texas, and Arizona—witness Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company’s (TSMC’s) recent decision to build a second factory in Phoenix.4 This paper explores the potential implications of US semiconductor policy for the global semiconductor supply chains and the competition for primacy in an industry that is constantly changing the face of the global economy and one that has implications for global security in all its dimensions. It begins by examining the policies put in place by the Biden administration, and then discusses the changes taking place across the industry, with a focus on Asia.
Topic:
Economy, Business, Supply Chains, Semiconductors, and Economic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

16. China Becoming Globally More Active in the Security Sphere

Author:
Marcin Przychodniak
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
China is expanding its potential to project power abroad. It includes legal changes, expansion of military infrastructure in other countries, and cooperation with partners in the Pacific. An example of their activity in the field of security is the operations of Chinese security companies, mainly in the Middle East and Africa. This should encourage NATO to further deepen cooperation with its members and partners, including with Pacific countries, as well as to strengthen the coordination of EU and U.S. policy towards developing countries.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Infrastructure, and Partnerships
Political Geography:
Africa, China, Middle East, Asia, and Asia-Pacific

17. Building a Coalition - the U.S. Faces Down Competition with China in the Chip Sector

Author:
Damian Wnukowski
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
In recent months, the U.S. has intensified its international efforts to limit China’s ability to produce the most advanced chips. The result includes the introduction by Japan and the Netherlands of restrictions on the export of modern machines for chip production. In response, China is trying to attract foreign investment and develop its own potential in this sector. The U.S. actions may significantly slow the pace of China’s technological development and economic growth and limit its potential to further strengthen its military capabilities. This may make it difficult for China to support Russia with dual-use products and render possible offensive actions against Taiwan harder.
Topic:
Economy, Production, Semiconductors, and Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

18. China Adapts Policy in Response to Russia's Aggression Against Ukraine

Author:
Marcin Przychodniak
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
China perceives the Russian aggression against Ukraine as an expression of resistance to the U.S. and NATO hegemony and an important element of building a new international order that marginalises the West. Based on this, China is strengthening strategic cooperation with Russia, striving to weaken the international position of the U.S., the EU, and their partners, while testing reactions to a possible escalation of Chinese actions towards Taiwan, for example. President Xi Jinping expressed this policy course during his March visit to Russia. At the same time, China is trying to gain support from the countries of the Global South. This approach means a continuation of China’s assertive policy towards the European Union, among others.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia

19. Evolution, not Revolution: Japan Revises Security Policy

Author:
Oskar Pietrewicz
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
In December last year, the government of Kishida Fumio adopted three documents adapting Japan’s security policy to the deteriorating international situation. Its security and national defence strategies highlight challenges from China, Russia, and North Korea, as well as an increase in non-military threats. A third document specifies the need for a record increase in defence spending. Japan’s readiness to deepen cooperation with the U.S. and European countries and its criticism in its assessment of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine create the conditions for the further development of Japan’s cooperation with NATO and the Polish-Japanese dialogue on security.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Japan, China, Asia, and North Korea

20. China’s quest for innovation: progress and bottlenecks

Author:
Alicia Garcia-Herrero and Robin Schindowski
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
As the Chinese economy continues to decelerate, the central government is investing heavily in innovation, doubling down on research and development (R&D) spending and STEM-oriented human capital. In this paper, we assess China’s progress so far, looking at the inputs to innovation (R&D and human capital) as well as intermediate targets, such as scientific research and patents. We then evaluate how China has fared with respect to the ultimate goal of commercialising this progress, by looking at the value-added of Chinese exports and the overall productivity of the economy. We identify three potential bottlenecks that might be hindering the translation of China’s innovation efforts into productivity growth.
Topic:
Industrial Policy, European Union, Economic Growth, Innovation, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

21. Global trends in countries‘ perceptions of the Belt and Road Initiative

Author:
Alicia Garcia-Herrero and Robin Schindowski
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Drawing on global media reports, we conduct a sentiment analysis of the image of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the evolution of its image over time. Our main finding is that perceptions of the initiative deteriorated significantly in many geographies from 2017 to 2022. The notable exception is in sub-Saharan Africa where the BRI’s image remains positive, even if slightly less so than in the past. This is notwithstanding increases in debt levels with China, much of which now face potential restructuring. Furthermore, we find significant inter- and intra-regional differences in the average sentiment towards China’s landmark project, as well as a much worse image of the initiative in countries which, until today, are not part of the BRI. Finally, we focus on the European Union, Africa and China’s immediate neighbourhood to better understand the complexities behind the perceived benefits and challenges associated with China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, European Union, Geopolitics, Economy, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

22. Time to say goodbye? The impact of environmental regulation on foreign divestment

Author:
Haiou Mao, Holger Görg, and Guopei Fang
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
We look at divestments by foreign firms – a topic that has received comparatively little attention in the literature – and investigate how changes in the regulatory environment in the host country may impact on such divestment decisions. We use the implementation of China’s Two Control Zone (TCZ) policy as a “quasi-natural experiment”, using detailed firm level combined with city level data for the empirical analysis. Our results show that the implementation of TCZ policy has led to higher probabilities of divestments by foreign firms in targeted TCZ cities and industries. The mechanism behind this seems to be a TCZ-induced increase in discharge fees and efforts to reduce SO2 emissions. Allowing for heterogeneity of effects, we find that the effect is particularly strong for firms from source countries with less stringent environmental regulation, and those using less advanced technology. We furthermore show that firms using intermediates from polluting industries also experience a higher probability of divestment.
Topic:
Climate Change, Environment, Foreign Direct Investment, Regulation, Business, and Divestment
Political Geography:
China and Asia

23. China as an International Lender of Last Resort

Author:
Sebastian Horn, Bradley C. Parks, Carmen M. Reinhart, and Christoph Trebesch
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
This paper shows that China has launched a new global system for cross-border rescue lending to countries in debt distress. We build the first comprehensive dataset on China’s overseas bailouts between 2000 and 2021 and provide new insights into China’s growing role in the global financial system. A key finding is that the global swap line network put in place by the People’s Bank of China is increasingly used as a financial rescue mechanism, with more than USD 170 billion in liquidity support extended to crisis countries, including repeated rollovers of swaps coming due. The swaps bolster gross reserves and are mostly drawn by distressed countries with low liquidity ratios. In addition, we show that Chinese state-owned banks and enterprises have given out an additional USD 70 billion in rescue loans for balance of payments support. Taken together, China’s overseas bailouts correspond to more than 20 percent of total IMF lending over the past decade and bailout amounts are growing fast. However, China’s rescue loans differ from those of established international lenders of last resort in that they (i) are opaque, (ii) carry relatively high interest rates, and (iii) are almost exclusively targeted to debtors of China's Belt and Road Initiative. These findings have implications for the international financial and monetary architecture, which is becoming more multipolar, less institutionalized, and less transparent.
Topic:
Debt, Emerging Markets, International Trade and Finance, Financial Crisis, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Sovereign Debt
Political Geography:
Africa, China, and Asia

24. Enhancing small state preparedness: Risks of foreign ownership, supply disruptions and technological dependencies

Author:
Mikael Mattlin, Shaun Breslin, Elina Sinkkonen, Liisa Kauppila, and Annika Björkdahl
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The post-Cold War liberalist view, according to which interdependences supported a virtuous cycle of mutual gains, has given way to a realist-tinged view that regards economic interdependence as a cause of insecurity and an element in conflicts. In this new environment of increasing great power competition and technological decoupling, all states are not created equal. Major states such as the United States and China can be system shapers, whereas small states tend to be system takers. Unlike smaller states, they have a greater ability to use their investment leverage, supply chain dominance and control of core technologies. For smaller states with open economies, such as Finland and Sweden, these capabilities of major powers create vulnerabilities in the form of security risks of foreign ownership, supply disruptions and critical technological dependencies. The report explores how small states can mitigate such risks. A series of innovative Delphi backcasting exercises in Finland and Sweden brought together 113 sectoral experts and generalists to ponder ways to prevent dystopian scenarios from unfolding. The target years of the scenarios extended from 2027 to 2035, encouraging ideas on both short- and longer-term solutions. Instead of aiming for a consensus of expert views, the process sought to produce a variety of effective means and measures that a small state could choose to adopt. The exercise consisted of nine scenarios, presented as comic art. The narratives on the risks of foreign ownership focused on 1) acquisitions of gaming companies gathering personal data, 2) transfers of real estate ownership in Lapland and 3) venture capital investments in emerging technology start-ups. The scenarios on supply disruptions dealt with 4) discriminatory practices limiting access to antibiotics, 5) political retaliation limiting access to water treatment components and 6) sanctions on wind power materials, components and minerals. As for high technology dependencies, the cases included 7) the maintenance of military technology, 8) the cybersecurity of health technology and 9) the supply of chemicals for research and development activities. According to the report, small states have the least leeway in navigating the risk environments created by technological dependencies, whereas the toolkits to tackle the potential dangers of foreign ownership and supply disruptions are more extensive. Although different issues and insecurities require different bespoke solutions, all the risk categories call for active mitigation efforts. Most of the suggested Finnish and Swedish expert solutions can be clustered into three alternative approaches: protectionist/interventionist, liberal and technologically oriented. Protectionist/interventionist solutions would expand the state’s powers in controlling, guiding and limiting economic activities. Key suggestions included: covering acquisitions and greenfield investments in national foreign direct investment screening screening real estate acquisitions with a wide range of countries of origin imposing country-specific limitations to real estate acquisitions screening venture capital investments in emerging technologies initiating a national security act to limit foreign control rapidly imposing country- and company-specific limitations to bids in critical industries increasing tariffs supporting domestic or EU-level production through subsidies and industrial policy friendshoring the production of critical goods expanding the scope of supply stockpiling in pharmaceuticals and water treatment components The more liberal approach towards national preparedness would focus on solving the challenges primarily through carrots instead of sticks – to avoid limiting entrepreneurial freedoms and interfering with the dynamics of the capitalist market economy. The proposed solutions included: initiating value debates to guide individuals’ choices when accepting investments formulating a national innovation strategy to boost domestic companies’ operating conditions in emerging technology fields teaching “technology literacy” to guide the use of foreign-owned products engaging all stakeholders in making decisions on foreign ownership diversifying the sources of critical goods such as antibiotics enhancing awareness of risks and making “plan Bs” in supply chain management deepening the EU’s single market to offer genuine scalability opportunities for start-ups The third, more technologically oriented approach would rely on new innovations or technical solutions to enhance small state preparedness. Key ideas included: innovating new medicines to replace antibiotics prioritising non-conventional technologies such as small modular reactors (SMRs) enhancing domestic capacity to produce key components with 3D printing researching alternative materials to replace critical chemicals developing the recycling, recovery and transportation of critical chemicals adopting geofencing and coding solutions to enhance cybersecurity designating emerging technologies as focus areas in higher education increasing the adaptability of technical solutions through standardisation These three approaches prioritise different key solutions for enhancing small state preparedness. However, they represent generic policy preferences rather than ready-made policy recommendations. Ideally, states can formulate their own pick-and-mix toolkit by combining elements from the different approaches. The complementary nature of some of the expert views was also suggested by the fact that many – even most – respondents argued for diversification as a solution to various challenges. For example, and regardless of the chosen strategy, tendering rules could be improved by placing quality over price, taking geopolitical risks into account and allowing multiple winners in contrast to the currently dominant winner-takes-it-all logic, which leads to overly concentrated supply chains. Moreover, at least minor legislative tightenings were widely proposed to be made on foreign ownership – especially with regard to that of nationals of authoritarian states. These changes were, however, typically proposed to be complemented with such balancing acts as long-term leases and incentives to develop and acquire domestic products and companies. Ultimately, by highlighting alternative approaches to small state preparedness, this report seeks to encourage democratic discussion on a broader political choice: what type of state and economy do we want in the future? It is not only their identity that guides what states do; adopted policies and means also shape state identities over time.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Supply, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:
China, Finland, Asia, Sweden, and United States of America

25. Peninsula Plus: Enhancing U.S.–South Korea Alliance Cooperation on China, Multilateralism, and Military and Security Technologies

Author:
Jacob Stokes and Joshua Fitt
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The United States–Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) alliance has entered a critical phase. In 2023, the two countries will commemorate the 70th anniversary of signing their bilateral mutual defense treaty. This year also marks the first full year under national leaders President Joe Biden and President Yoon Suk Yeol. After several challenging years in the two countries’ relationship, ties are improving. Better alliance relations have, unfortunately, coincided with a deterioration in the regional and global security environment, specifically due to threats from North Korea, China, and Russia. This report examines the U.S.-ROK alliance as it adapts to the new regional context by exploring how the United States and South Korea can sustain and deepen their relationship in three vital policy areas: coordination on China, alignment in minilateral and multilateral settings, and defense technology collaboration. Perhaps the biggest shift in alliance priorities in recent years has been the growing importance of the China challenge. During Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping’s decade in power, Beijing has adopted a more muscular foreign policy. Both the United States and South Korea have reshaped their approaches toward China in response. ROK concerns about China have grown as Beijing shields Pyongyang and acts aggressively elsewhere in the region, including toward Taiwan. But South Korea’s approach to China will continue to differ from that of the United States. The allies have divergent preferences regarding the speed, manner, and degree of partial decoupling with China. Moreover, South Korea’s deep trade ties with China will continue to make it vulnerable to Chinese political and economic coercion.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Alliance, Multilateralism, Cooperation, and Military
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

26. India's G20 Presidency: Opportunity to Resume Engagement in the Arctic

Author:
Anurag Bisen
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The Arctic lies at the intersection of several issues with global consequences such as climate change, increased accessibility to and availability of resources, and global strategic contestation that have made the region increasingly relevant to the world. Temperatures in the Arctic continue to rise at four times the global annual average, driving many of the changes under way there, most prominently sea-level rise and the thawing of permafrost, which impact both local ecosystems and the global climate system. International scientific cooperation and data monitoring and sharing are crucial to understanding the impact of climate change, counteracting its negative effects, and enhancing living conditions and economic activity. Apart from a few limited pockets of cooperation that still exist, cooperation between Russia and the West with regard to the Arctic has largely been put on hold since the start of the conflict in Ukraine. The current absence of research and data sharing among scientists is threatening to jeopardise scientists’ understanding of the warming trends in the Arctic, exacerbating the environmental emergency the region in particular is facing. One of the few channels that still exists for constructive dialogue on a range of Arctic-related issues is the GCSP’s “‘High North Talks”’, through which discreet exchanges on various important issues continue. Among other things, the G20 agenda includes climate change, sustainable development and the environment, all of which are under threat due to the cessation of Artic-related scientific engagement. The G20 also represents a rare platform where engagement between Russia and the West has not yet ceased. The suspension of dialogue and scientific exchange vis-à-vis the Arctic is driven by a deep distrust that needs to be overcome by an interlocutor that is acceptable to all stakeholders. India's theme for its G20 presidency resonates strongly with the Arctic and its impact on the world. The resumption of Arctic-related scientific exchange is an easy deliverable with global benefits that India, which has the necessary legitimacy, credibility and relevance, should use its G20 presidency to strive for.
Topic:
Climate Change, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Science and Technology, G20, and Sustainability
Political Geography:
India, Asia, and Arctic

27. Strengthening Regional Value Chain between India and South Korea: Emerging Opportunities for Trade and Investment Cooperation

Author:
Durairaj Kumarasamy
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
The changing dynamics of supply chains and their impact on shaping international relations in East Asia have become crucial issues for scholars and policymakers. Asia’s two major economies, India and South Korea, are reassessing their strategy on the changing dynamics of the supply chain. India is to redesign its developmental strategy to establish India-centric supply chains in key industries. India has stressed its endeavour to become a self-reliant economy by introducing a highly ambitious Production-Linked Incentive (PLI) scheme to attract FDI in strengthening and establishing the supply chain linkages in India, whereas South Korea has adopted a strategy to mitigate supply chain-related risk through greater emphasis on developing strong self-reliance and promoting economic diversification by enhancing its economic ties with India. In addition, the pandemic-induced supply chain disruptions further reinforced South Korea toward diversification and resilience of its supply chain. South Korea’s development experience and deep investment relations with India can explore the untapped potential of bilateral trade and investment linkages. To ensure supply chain resilience both India and South Korea focus on critical sectors such as semi-conductors, steels, secondary batteries and chemicals, along with new technology areas like AI, 6G, Digital Infrastructure and renewable energy for cooperation. In this regard, the study explores the trade and investment relationship between India and South Korea and identifies the potential sectors to engage in the sustainable value chain between them.
Topic:
Investment, Trade, Economic Cooperation, Supply Chains, and Value Chains
Political Geography:
South Asia, India, Asia, and South Korea

28. Digital Sovereignty: European Policies, American Dilemmas

Author:
Mathilde Velliet
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
European digital sovereignty has been made a priority by Ursula von der Leyen’s European Commission. Due to the privileged position of American companies in the European market, Brussels’ efforts towards digital sovereignty (on privacy, antitrust, data sovereignty, etc.) are closely scrutinized by American policymakers. They often view European initiatives as “protectionist” and unfairly targeting U.S. companies. However, the American vision of European digital sovereignty has evolved in recent years under the influence of two main factors. On the one hand, awareness of the problematic effects and practices of platforms has led to a consensus on the need for reform in the digital sector. On the other hand, technological competition with China has been elevated to a priority. This vision remains fraught with contradictions, along inter-party, intra-party, inter-agency, state-federal, and issue-based fault lines. Washington’s position on anti-monopolistic practices is an illuminating example, characterized by a double discourse between a desire to reform the U.S. digital sector domestically and active diplomacy to dilute these efforts at the European level. Nonetheless, several American actors – particularly in the legislative branch – are seeking to learn from the successes and flaws of European regulations for American reform projects, such as on platform regulation or privacy. The China factor reinforces the ambiguity of the U.S.’ position. It creates new opportunities for cooperation in the face of perceived common vulnerabilities (infrastructure security, inbound investments, etc.) and autocratic definitions of digital sovereignty. However, it also raises tension and misunderstanding on the American side towards European reforms that often target American companies more than Chinese ones. Lastly, while American and European companies have adapted to the need for digital sovereignty through a range of technical and commercial solutions, the temptation of a maximalist definition of European sovereignty continues to create major stumbling blocks, particularly on the cloud.
Topic:
European Union, Regulation, Cloud Computing, Digital Sovereignty, and Data Governance
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

29. South Korea and IPEF: Rationale, Objectives and the Implications for Partners and Neighbors

Author:
Jaewoo Choo
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
As a key manufacturer of high-end technology components critical to the sustainability of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, South Korea is essential in any effort to rebuild a resilient global supply chain but also to the promotion of a clean economy. South Korea can thus contribute to two of the pillars of IPEF (Indo-Pacific Economic Framework), specially to pillars II and III (supply-chain resilience and a clean economy). However, as the US executive and legislative branches intensify their hawkish approaches to China, they have not given much consideration to the possible damage they will inflict on the strategic interests of some of their allies. In particular, they have not fully considered Korean factors when legislating on bills such as the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA). This paper argues that allies such as South Korea and France must make the White House and US legislature aware of the external consequences of their decisions and behavior, and that they must cooperate within the confines of US-led strategic initiatives.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Economy, Supply Chains, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

30. How the War in Ukraine is Changing the Space Game

Author:
Guilhem Penent and Guillaume Schlumberger
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The war in Ukraine has become a showcase for the new commercial paradigm emerging in the space sector (New Space). As such, it seems to confirm the relevance of adaptation efforts led by the United States – more specifically the Pentagon – since the mid-2010s. Thus, it highlights ongoing transformations and announces potential disruptions in the exploitation of orbits, particularly in the fields of satellite connectivity and remote sensing. It also shapes future tensions, while the structuring of international relations around the two poles constituted by the United States and China raises questions about the consequences on the safe, sustainable, secure, and stable use of space. With these developments, Europe is faced with the challenge of remaining relevant.
Topic:
International Relations, European Union, Space, Satellite, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

31. Japan and the Pacific Islands Countries. Longstanding Strategic Interests, Recent Strategic Engagement

Author:
Celine Pajon
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Japan has recently stepped up its engagement with the Pacific Island Countries (PICs), building on its historical ties and strategic interests in the region. The wealth of these territories in fishery resources and raw materials, the crucial importance of the maritime routes, and the strategic geographical location of PICs in the context of Sino-American rivalry have been key factors behind Tokyo's expanding engagement. Despite these strategic interests, the cooperation with the PICs in the postwar era up until the emergence of the Indo-Pacific narrative has been quite fragmented, reflecting the rather low priority given to the region, the multiplicity of the objectives pursued, and the diversity of engaged actors. Nevertheless, the Japan-Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting (PALM) process initiated in 1997 provided an innovative multilateral framework to coordinate with the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) over economic cooperation, improve Japan’s communications and iron out tensions, starting with nuclear. The incorporation of the PICs into Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision cements their position in Tokyo’s efforts to preserve a rules-based international order and counterbalance China’s growing influence. Security issues of Asia have thus started to appear on the agenda of the PALM Summits. In addition, Japan has stepped up its cooperation with its closest allies and partners – the US and Australia – as part of the operationalization of a FOIP in Oceania. Finally, a major provider of development aid, Tokyo has also become a diplomatic and security partner for the Pacific Islands. Japan has stepped up naval diplomacy and defense dialogues in the region, in addition to being very active in maritime capacity-building, as well as humanitarian aid and disaster relief assistance. Despite the rise of Japanese cooperation, which is now truly multidimensional and strategic, Tokyo's ability to influence the Pacific islands and in particular to counterbalance China remains to be seen. Indeed, the PICs feel little concerned by major geopolitical projects and are careful not to create enemies. With the US and its other partners increasing their presence in the area, there is a strong impetus for Japan to reinvest in the Pacific. However, Tokyo has yet to develop a formal strategy or vision for the region. This could be announced at the next PALM summit in 2024, which will mark the 10th iteration of this meeting and could be a significant milestone.
Topic:
Development, Cooperation, and Strategic Engagement
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, Indo-Pacific, and Pacific Islands

32. China in the Race to Low Earth Orbit: Perspectives on the future internet constellation Guowang

Author:
Marc Julienne
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
In April 2021, the Chinese government officially, but rather quietly, established a new state-owned enterprise (SOE) named China SatNet. Its mission: build out China’s “mega-constellation” program for low Earth orbiting internet satellites, known as Guowang (“national network”). Several scattered programs had already been launched in China since 2018, and the establishment of this new SOE appears aimed at streamlining and accelerating the development and deployment of the future national constellation. China's goal is to position itself in the highly strategic sector that is space-based broadband mobile telecommunication networks, so far dominated by the American SpaceX and its Starlink constellation. These constellations promise significant commercial and military outcomes that have aroused the interest of states. In this field, Beijing lags behind SpaceX, but demonstrates a fierce determination to catch up and compete with its rivals. China has already registered a request with the International Telecommunications Union to put 12,992 satellites into orbit, or roughly 1,000 more than what has so far been authorized for Starlink. To achieve its goals, China relies on traditional aerospace and telecommunications SOEs, and now on the newcomer China SatNet. It also relies on an emerging ecosystem of companies and start-ups (GalaxySpace in particular), and encourages local governments to build production parks for the space industry and new launch centers across the country. China is thus gearing up to achieve its ambitions, but will nevertheless have to face multiple challenges, including the financing of its industry in a constrained economic context, the development of a viable business model which has not yet been proven elsewhere, and above all, the growing strategic and technological rivalry with the United States.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Internet, Space, and Satellite
Political Geography:
China and Asia

33. The People Powering Japan’s Startup Ecosystem

Author:
Kenji Kushida
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Japan’s startup ecosystem is now able to attract human capital in ways that were not possible fifteen years ago. Employment flexibility is critical to a maturing startup ecosystem, and Japan’s startup ecosystem is now enjoying positive feedback loops. Japan’s startup ecosystem now draws from top universities; large, prestigious companies; government ministries; global, foreign multinational corporations; and the startup ecosystem itself. While Japan’s lifetime employment system in large companies is alive and well, the rise of new employment logics has grown in parallel with corporate Japan’s traditional employment system. The rise of foreign firms and the IT industry, along with the declining attractiveness of large companies, has created a new logic of opportunities for top talent. Global linkages are still a challenge, and the government should focus on efforts to remove barriers to all global collaborations, especially given the disruption caused by Japan’s abrupt border closures in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Topic:
Employment, Business, Human Capital, and Startup
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

34. How Indonesia Used Chinese Industrial Investments to Turn Nickel into the New Gold

Author:
Angela Tritto
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
China has become a global power, but there is too little debate about how this has happened and what it means. Many argue that China exports its developmental model and imposes it on other countries. But Chinese players also extend their influence by working through local actors and institutions while adapting and assimilating local and traditional forms, norms, and practices. With a generous multiyear grant from the Ford Foundation, Carnegie has launched an innovative body of research on Chinese engagement strategies in seven regions of the world—Africa, Central Asia, Latin America, the Middle East and North Africa, the Pacific, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. Through a mix of research and strategic convening, this project explores these complex dynamics, including the ways Chinese firms are adapting to local labor laws in Latin America, Chinese banks and funds are exploring traditional Islamic financial and credit products in Southeast Asia and the Middle East, and Chinese actors are helping local workers upgrade their skills in Central Asia. These adaptive Chinese strategies that accommodate and work within local realities are mostly ignored by Western policymakers in particular. Ultimately, the project aims to significantly broaden understanding and debate about China’s role in the world and to generate innovative policy ideas. These could enable local players to better channel Chinese energies to support their societies and economies; provide lessons for Western engagement around the world, especially in developing countries; help China’s own policy community learn from the diversity of Chinese experience; and potentially reduce frictions.
Topic:
Development, Industrial Policy, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Investment, and Innovation
Political Geography:
China, Indonesia, and Asia

35. What Should India Do Before the Next Taiwan Strait Crisis?

Author:
Vijay Gokhale
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
In the next two decades, the Taiwan question is likely to assume increasing importance for the Indo-Pacific region. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is becoming more assertive about unifying Taiwan with the mainland, and it is also making progress toward establishing the military capability toward this end. For a rising PRC seeking to establish itself as the dominant global power, it is untenable that a part of its territory remains outside its control. Possible endeavors toward establishing this control could lead to a response by the United States, which would have broader ramifications for the region and the world. For the United States, any endeavors by the PRC to this end would undermine the very core of the idea that the United States is the defender of freedom and democracy across the world, thus undermining its credibility. It might also deal a devastating blow to the United States’ global power. In this context, and given the significance of Taiwan to both countries, it is an issue that can rapidly escalate, making it a matter of concern in the Indo-Pacific. Further, a conflict over Taiwan would dwarf the global economic fallout that began when Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022. Short of conflict, Chinese coercion of Taiwan could disrupt the freedom of navigation and sea lanes of communication through the Taiwan Strait and will have severe consequences for Asian geopolitics and geoeconomics. Given India’s substantial geopolitical and geoeconomic interests in the region and its long history of exchanges with East and Southeast Asia, India should pay constant and careful attention to this issue. Further, a policy to respond to various contingencies must be thought through and put into place. This paper tries to look at the possible policy that India might adopt ahead of a major crisis in the Taiwan Strait. The paper proceeds in three parts. The first part analyzes the geopolitical and geoeconomic consequences of another Taiwan Strait crisis for India. While it is difficult to estimate the actual damage that would be dealt to the Indian economy, it is clear that all segments of the economy would be affected, with the impact possibly substantial enough to set India back several years. A crisis would also impact India’s geopolitical interests and national security, given that China is increasing its assertiveness both along the Line of Actual Control as well as in the Indian Ocean. The second part argues against a commonplace view that India played no role in crisis management during earlier periods of high tension in the Taiwan Strait—the 1954–55 and 1958 Taiwan Strait Crises, also known as the First and Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, respectively. By using archival material in the United States, the United Kingdom, and India, it seeks to dispel the above notion and that Taiwan ceased to be a matter of interest for India after it had recognized PRC’s claim over Taiwan in 1950. Further, it looks at the lessons for policymaking from India’s handling of the crises. The third part of the paper briefly traces the history of India-Taiwan relations following India’s transfer of its diplomatic recognition to the PRC till the present day. It provides an overview of India’s Taiwan policy. Given that a war in the Taiwan Strait is not beyond reasonable doubt, it then discusses the scenarios India might find itself in and the possible policies to respond to these scenarios. It recommends a close following of the U.S.-ChinaTaiwan strategic triangle, a whole-of-government assessment around impacts of a Taiwan Strait contingency, and an assessment of policy options. It also recommends mapping the expectations that China and the United States would have of India, along with undertaking consultations with key partners on the Taiwan question.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Crisis Management, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:
South Asia, India, Taiwan, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

36. China’s Response to Türkiye’s Volatile Authoritarianism

Author:
Ceren Ergenç and Kenan Göçer
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
This paper investigates Türkiye’s evolving relations with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a large-scale program of infrastructure investment and project financing proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013. The paper digs deeply into cases from two sectors—transportation and energy—focusing on how heightened and changing local expectations among Turks for these prospective BRI projects have shaped choices and outcomes, including China’s. In so doing, it explores how these shifting Turkish perceptions affect the implementation of BRI projects in Türkiye. This paper has several goals: it seeks to understand the reasons behind these local changes, the role of the state and private sector in Türkiye in these changes, and the way China has responded so far. Of course, domestic factors are not the only ones that shape the implementation of BRI projects in Türkiye or elsewhere; regional and global trends have had an impact too.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Infrastructure, Authoritarianism, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Investment
Political Geography:
China, Turkey, Middle East, and Asia

37. Fighting Against Internal and External Threats Simultaneously: China’s Police and Satellite Cooperation with Autocratic Countries

Author:
Chisako T. Masuo
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
What direction will the Xi Jinping administration’s foreign policy take over the coming years, and how will that affect the existing international order? The Chinese Communist Party harbours a strong sense of crisis about the internal and external threats colliding to supposedly destabilise its regime, and thus aims to strengthen cooperation with developing countries in order to prevent such danger. The Xi administration is consequently strengthening police and law-enforcement cooperation inside the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, which includes Russia. Besides, China has launched a new initiative of collaborating with Moscow on satellite systems to monitor the entire Earth, in order to accumulate big data on various issues. The current Chinese foreign policy, which pursues a cultivation of deeper relations with autocratic countries by providing them with surveillance technologies, is likely to deepen the global divide with liberal democracies.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, International Order, and Satellite
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

38. Moving on Up: Multilevel Monitoring and Advocacy for Health Rights

Author:
Abrehet Gebremedhin
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Accountability Research Center (ARC), American University
Abstract:
Multilevel approaches to monitoring and advocacy are often used by international development practitioners, particularly in civil society, in efforts to hold governments—from the national to the local—to account for policy implementation. However, such approaches are not yet well understood or identified by many scholars in the social accountability field. This evidence review addresses this gap through a cross-case comparison of multilevel approaches in ten health rights programs across Africa, Asia, and Latin America. It draws on published evaluations, working papers, and peer-reviewed journal articles, as well as insights shared by implementers and researchers. Cases were selected to illustrate health rights initiatives that included monitoring or advocacy activity at a minimum of two different levels: local health facility, district, regional, provincial or national. Four significant findings emerge from this review of evidence: Vertical integration is a relatively common feature of multilevel monitoring and advocacy in these ten cases and is most likely to take place at the lower ends of the health system. However, it is largely implicit, and often not articulated in project design or theories of change. Horizontal organizing—the coordination of civil society action across districts or geographies—is a less visible feature of multilevel approaches to health rights programming than vertical integration. Despite the multilevel nature of health monitoring and advocacy in these ten cases, less than half reported working at the regional or provincial level, indicating a ‘missing middle’ between local and national activity. Escalation—the process by which citizens’ unaddressed claims move upwards to those with greater decision- making powers—is an important mechanism for accountability and one way in which vertical integration can happen. However, escalation is not clearly articulated in much of the gray literature, and therefore merits further research. The findings from this evidence review have implications for strategy, including: the importance of explicitly identifying multilevel tactics for monitoring and advocacy; theorizing the process by which unaddressed claims can be addressed, particularly moving up beyond the local level; emphasizing the importance of the ‘middle’ and ensuring regional and provincial decision-making is leveraged; and looking to link vertical integration with opportunities for horizontal organizing.
Topic:
Civil Society, Health, Accountability, Advocacy, and Monitoring
Political Geography:
Africa, Asia, and Latin America

39. The Cross-Border Interbank Payment System: A Case Study in Chinese Economic Leadership

Author:
Aidan Campbell
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Political Economy Research Institute (PERI), University of Massachusetts Amherst
Abstract:
Investigations seeking to explain the rise of China rarely investigate the many new institutions founded to increase China’s economic success and influence over global affairs. In the economic sector, some better-known projects include the Belt and Road Initiative, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and the New Development Bank. One of the newest and least understood institutions founded to promote international use of the RMB is the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS). The purpose of this research is to examine the development, policies, and goals of CIPS in order to better understand the phenomenon of Chinese-lead international economic institutions. Novel evidence for CIPS’s intention to adopt blockchain technology and provide services for currencies other than the RMB is presented. The conclusion to this research is that CIPS is presently too small to pose a threat to the existing SWIFT network or predominance of US dollar transactions in international trade. At the same time, CIPS evidences a patient and rational strategy designed to reform international norms and patterns of trade to China’s advantage in the long term.
Topic:
Political Economy, Leadership, Economy, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Banking
Political Geography:
China and Asia

40. State Capitalism, Imperialism, and China: Bringing History Back In

Author:
Isabella Weber
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Political Economy Research Institute (PERI), University of Massachusetts Amherst
Abstract:
State capitalism is experiencing a great revival as a term to capture the current capitalist constellations, increasingly replacing neoliberalism. Unlike neoliberalism, however, the term state capitalism has a long history reaching back to the age of imperialism in the late 19th century. While state capitalism has been used as a pejorative term by Marxists, liberals and neoliberals alike, it has served as a programmatic label for developmentalist and neomercantilist projects in reaction to imperialism in the periphery. This paper argues that we need to bring the intellectual history of state capitalism into the ‘new state capitalism’ debate. China has played a major role in the revival of state capitalism in the social sciences, but the long history of China’s engagement with state capitalism as a concept and program dating back to the late Qing reformers has been overlooked for the most part. State capitalism is by no means new to China, from Liang Qichao, Sun Yatsen and Mao Zedong to Deng Xiaoping, the idea that China had to create a modern nation state and industrial capitalism in the name of economic progress and to get ahead in the global competition is a recurring theme. What is new is that for the first time the ambition to use state capitalism as a means to catch up with the West is bearing fruits in ways that could undermine the predominance of Western economies.
Topic:
Imperialism, Political Economy, History, Capitalism, and State Capitalism
Political Geography:
China and Asia

41. Technological Innovation and the Development of the Fuel Cell Electric Vehicle Industry Based on Patent Value Analysis

Author:
Yanfei Li, Jia Zhao, and Jianjun Yan
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
Currently, major economies are competing on the technological and industrial development of fuel cell electric vehicles (FCEVs). This paper discusses the relationship between the patent value of FCEVs and the commercialisation of this technology. First, the patent data of FCEVs are analysed, focusing on data of China, Germany, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the United States. Then, the paper constructs the FCEV patent value index framework based on the technological value and economic value of patents. Finally, this paper conducts an empirical study to analyse the influence of patent value on the development of the FCEV industry. It is found that, under the current situation, individual patent value can significantly promote the development of the FCEV industry, whilst the gross patent value of a certain country even has a negative impact. In addition, the increase of hydrogen infrastructure, research and development expenditure, and market demand will significantly promote the development of the FCEV industry. The development level of related industries such as the battery electric vehicle industry and the reduction of environmental pollution are also significant drivers of the development of FCEVs.
Topic:
Development, Science and Technology, Innovation, Industry, and Electric Vehicles
Political Geography:
Asia

42. What Japanese Tourism Amenities are Influenced in Terms of Affecting Inbound Tourist Demand?

Author:
Yoko Konishi and Takashi Saito
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
Since 2012, the number of inbound tourists to Japan has increased every year, and new records of tourism-related economic indicators are being updated. On the other hand, the sudden inbound boom has led to a concentration of travel destinations, and over-tourism has become a problem. In this paper, we first statistically observe the concentration of tourists by accommodation type for each country of origin. Second, by identifying tourism amenities that contribute to inbound demand, we gain the knowledge necessary to shift demand from facilities with a high concentration of inbound tourists to facilities with lower occupancy. For the analysis, we utilised establishment data from the Online Travel Agency ‘Accommodation Travel Statistics Survey’ and data on tourism resources by region. The results show that the number of rooms, average price, membership of the hotel in a chain, internet availability, room type, number of World Heritage sites, and number of direct flights positively affect inbound demand. In particular, for ryokan (Japanese-style inns) with low occupancy rates and inbound guest ratios, their independence, internet availability, Western-style room availability, number of World Heritage sites, and hot spring facilities are effective in capturing demand.
Topic:
Economics, Tourism, Hospitality, and Travel
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

43. The COVID-19 Pandemic and World Machinery Trade Network

Author:
Kozo Kiyota
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
In light of the importance of the machinery trade in global trade, this study examines whether the patterns of machinery exports changed significantly after the COVID-19 pandemic. Frameworks of network analysis and structural break analysis are applied to monthly level bilateral export data from January 2016 to March 2022. The main findings are threefold. First, positive structural change is found in exports in major machinery-exporting countries. Second, negative structural change in centrality is found in Japan and some ASEAN Member States (AMS), which implies a decline in the relative importance of these countries in the global machinery network. Third, the decline in Japanese centrality was not caused by the decline in export values or number of destination countries. Rather, it is attributable to the decline in the centrality of Japan’s export destination countries such as AMS. Noting that Japan has a relatively strong trade relationship with AMS, these results together suggest that the negative shock of the pandemic spread throughout the supply chain, which led to the decline in the relative importance of some countries – such as Japan – in the global machinery trade network.
Topic:
Exports, Trade, ASEAN, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, and Southeast Asia

44. The Effects of the United States-China Trade War During the COVID-19 Pandemic on Global Supply Chains: Evidence from Viet Nam

Author:
Duc Anh Dang and Ngoc Anh Tran
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
The trade war between the United States (US) and China has affected their bilateral trade as well as that with other countries. This study investigates how Vietnamese firms performed during the COVID-19 pandemic under the shadow of this trade war. The change in the log of Vietnamese exports to the US from 2017 to 2020 is used to measure the impact of the trade war, and the change in the log of Chinese exports to the US is then used as an instrument for the Vietnamese export change during the same period. It is found that firms that faced more trade war exposure increased their investment, profit, and value added, which may be due to the market exit of unproductive firms. Moreover, the trade war impact is more pronounced for large firms. Foreign-invested firms gained less from trade war exposure. The pandemic weakened the trade war effect on firm performances; however, it exacerbated the trade tension effect on foreign-trade firms.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Investment, Trade, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

45. ASEAN Digital Community 2045

Author:
Lili Yan Ing, Yessi Vadila, Ivana Markus, and Livia Feliciani Nazara
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
Over the last decade, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has undergone significant development in digitalisation. The rapid digital transformation in ASEAN, however, has brought forth risks and challenges encompassing data security, cybersecurity, competition, and the digital divide. To effectively address these challenges and leverage the potential of the digital realm, ASEAN developed nine frameworks during 2016–2023. Yet, the focus is primarily on digital trade. We suggest that ASEAN embrace digital transformation by establishing the ASEAN Digital Community (ADC) 2045. This vision could provide guidance to Member States, enabling them to overcome regional challenges and unlock their digital potential. It is crucial for ASEAN to nurture digital development across the three key pillars: political-security, economic, and socio-cultural dimensions. The three pillars should be built on four fundamental elements: data governance, value-added enhancement, improved digital connectivity, and digital inclusivity. Through the establishment of ADC 2045, ASEAN could position itself as a significant player in the global digital economy while ensuring that digital transformation aligns with its sustainable and inclusive development agenda.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Investment, Innovation, Trade, ASEAN, Connectivity, and Competition
Political Geography:
East Asia, Asia, and Southeast Asia

46. Restoring Competitive Politics: Electoral Contestation and the Future in Turkey and India, and Iran and Russia

Author:
Hugh Sandeman
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
The institutions and practices necessary for open and fair competition for political power are eroding across the world. In some countries, such as Turkey and India, the democratic dividend of electoral competition has been steadily undermined by majoritarian autocrats who have proved adept in campaigning for office and winning elections. In others, such as Russia and Iran, political leaders have marginalised or suppressed electoral processes, reducing them to closely managed performances that seek to demonstrate public consent. At least some traces of the mechanisms of electoral competition often remain in place, however, even where genuine public consent has been almost extinguished. This leaves open the possibility that the trend away from competitive electoral politics could be at least partially reversed in future, in the context of political succession or the electoral defeat of incumbents. In June 2023, LSE IDEAS brought together experts from the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) and other institutions to examine the potential for restoring the democratic dividend of competitive politics in four major countries. Turkey and India were selected for their timeliness—national parliamentary and presidential elections were held in Turkey in May 2023, and national parliamentary elections are due in India in April 2024—and for their similarities: both political systems are characterised by powerful elected leaders with a strong record of performance in national elections, each backed by large political parties based on an appeal to national and religious identity. Iran and Russia were chosen as examples of two states where competitive electoral politics had been temporarily enabled by significant political change—respectively, an impasse in Iran’s theocracy in the 1990s, and the end of the Soviet Union—only to be undermined by the reassertion of autocratic power. Two assumptions underlay the planning of this discussion on ‘Restoring Competitive Politics: Electoral Contestation and the Future’. The first is that the characterisation of political systems as either democratic or autocratic provides an insufficient basis for explaining many differences in the workings of political institutions, or for guiding policy. The second assumption is that while certain institutions and practices appear to be essential to maintaining open competition for political power—including for example, freedom and diversity of comment in major channels of communication like broadcast television, radio, newspapers, and social media—there is no useful empirical example or theoretical formulation of an ideal or perfect democratic political system. The exclusion from the discussion of countries with longer established forms of competitive politics, such as the United States or the United Kingdom, was not intended to suggest an implicit comparison with ideal types of functioning democracies. On the contrary, there are grounds for concern about the maintenance of open competition for political power in every country professing to be a democracy. As David Runciman has said of the future of democratic practices: ‘The question for the twenty-first century is how long we can persist with institutional arrangements we have grown so used to trusting, that we no longer notice when they have ceased to work.’ He warns that ‘democracy could fail while remaining intact’.
Topic:
Elections, Political stability, Autocracy, and Competition
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Eurasia, Turkey, Middle East, India, and Asia

47. China’s Semiconductors Reflections on Sources and Solutions to an Expensive Problem

Author:
Jonathan Liebenau
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
The semiconductor industry has been a renewed topic of political debate for over three years. Due to recent US sanctions on the most advanced semiconductors, the industry has quickly become another flashpoint in the competition between the US and China to dominate the 21st century’s strategic technologies. In this Strategic Update, Dr Jonathan Liebenau explains the development of the semiconductor industry in the context of China’s rise to become an increasingly capable technology power. China’s sustained efforts in industrial policy to cultivate a domestic innovation system coincided with Western firms’ offshoring strategies since the 1990s, transforming China into a large producer and consumer of semiconductors. While Taiwan and the West retained cutting edge chip design capabilities, Chinese firms such as Huawei and Hikvision have become competitive providers of mobile phones, surveillance equipment and related infrastructure services. Despite Washington and its partners’ conviction to constrain in China’s technological prowess, industrial policy initiatives such as the CHIPS Act will face an uphill battle when it comes to bringing manufacturing capacity back to Western economies. In this context, the UK must combine short term incentives with a longer-term strategic vision to remain competitive in one of the 21st century’s key strategic arenas.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Sanctions, Strategic Competition, Production, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

48. China’s smart cities and the future of geopolitics

Author:
Valentin Weber
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
In this latest Strategic Update, Valentin Weber explores Chinese scientific research and industry application of smart cities, with ‘city brains’. The geostrategic implications for these complex Chinese smart city construction projects outside of China – particularly surrounding surveillance and artificial intelligence – and a potential future ‘world digital brain’ must be considered by policymakers, even if we are far away from an eventual bifurcation of the global internet.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Geopolitics, Surveillance, Artificial Intelligence, and Smart Cities
Political Geography:
China and Asia

49. Countering United Front Work: Taiwan’s Political Warfare System

Author:
Mariah Thornton
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
This strategic update introduces the challenges posed by China’s united front work, which has significantly expanded due to unprecedented institutional elevation and support under Xi Jinping. Mariah argues that Taiwan—a country that has effectively resisted China’s united front activities for several decades—can serve as an instructive case for other democratic countries in institutionalising counter-interference operations. The briefing initially explores the origins of Taiwan’s political warfare system, its evolution from the martial law era to democratisation in the 1990s, and how this history informs the institution’s modern structure and operations. The information presented in this report was compiled during a period of fieldwork in Taiwan from late September to early November 2022, in which she interviewed dozens of political warfare officers as well as Taiwanese defence and security experts–a majority of whom have chosen to remain anonymous. In the conclusion, Mariah offers broad policy recommendations based on these findings that may be applicable to other countries experiencing united front work activities and or seeking to institutionalise counter-interference operations.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Politics, Public Opinion, Propaganda, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

50. China’s Global Strategy as Science Fiction

Author:
William A. Callahan
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
Xi Jinping is leading China in a new direction, but how are we to understand his global strategy? For most countries, to understand domestic and international politics we would analyse authoritative sources – leaders’ speeches, official documents and statistics, elite interviews and essays, and public opinion surveys. In the 2000s these methods worked well to probe Chinese politics. But since civil society and independent thought have been severely restricted under Xi, it’s necessary to go beyond such “factual” sources. To understand China’s global strategy, it’s best to read fiction, especially Chinese science fiction. This essay critically analyses Liu Cixin’s novels, The Wandering Earth and the Three Body Problem trilogy, to probe how Chinese sci-fi pushes us to think creatively about key topics: the relation of humans and technology, the relation of science and politics, and the relations between political communities, i.e. are we doomed to existential struggle, or can we engage with difference in creative and productive ways?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Science and Technology, Grand Strategy, Novels, and Science Fiction
Political Geography:
China and Asia