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452. The Arab-Israeli Military Balance in 2002 Part Four: Trends in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Weapons
- Author:
- Anthony H. Cordesman
- Publication Date:
- 01-2002
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Abstract:
- Reasons for proliferating outweigh disincentives, and motivation is growing. Arms control regimes harass proliferators without stopping stem and fail to offer nonproliferators security. War fighting concepts are likely to lack clear structure and be highly volatile in terms of enemy, targets, and crisis behavior. Only a few leadership and military elites -- such as Egypt and Israel -- have shown a concern with highly structured strategic planning in the past. Iran - Iraq and Gulf Wars have demonstrated missiles and weapons of mass destruction will be used. Israeli actions in 1967 and attack on Osirak, Egyptian and Syrian attack on Israel in 1973, demonstrate regional focus on surprise and preemption. Iraq has already demonstrated regional concern with launch on warning, launch under attack options. Syria probably has some option of this kind. Concentration of population and leadership in single or a few urban areas makes existential attacks possible.
- Topic:
- Security, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, Israel, Arabia, and Egypt
453. If We Fight Iraq: Iraq and The Conventional Military Balance
- Author:
- Anthony H. Cordesman
- Publication Date:
- 01-2002
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Abstract:
- Despite the Gulf War, and the loss of some 40% of its army and air force order of battle, Iraq remains the most effective military power in the Gulf. It still has an army of around 375,000 men, and an inventory of some 2,200 main battle tanks, 3,700 other armored vehicles, and 2,400 major artillery weapons. It also has over 300 combat aircraft with potential operational status. At the same time, Iraq has lacked the funds, spare parts, and production capabilities to sustain the quality of its consolidated forces. Iraq has not been able to restructure its overall force structure to compensate as effectively as possible for its prior dependence on an average of $3 billion a year in arms deliveries. It has not been able to recapitalize any aspect of its force structure, and about two-thirds of its remaining inventory of armor and aircraft is obsolescent by Western standards. Iraq has not been able to fund and/or import any major new conventional warfare technology to react to the lessons of the Gulf War, or to produce any major equipment -- with the possible exception of limited numbers of Magic “dogfight” air-to-air missiles. In contrast, Saudi Arabia has taken delivery on over $66 billion worth of new arms since 1991, Kuwait has received $7.6 billion, Iran $4.3 billion, Bahrain $700 million, Oman $1.4 billion, Qatar $1.7 billion, and the UAE $7.9 billion, Equally important, the US has made major upgrades in virtually every aspect of its fighter avionics, attack munitions, cruise missile capabilities, and intelligence, reconnaissance, and targeting capabilities. Iraq's inability to recapitalize and modernize its forces means that much of its large order of battle is no obsolescent or obsolete, has uncertain combat readiness, and will be difficult to sustain in combat. It also raises serious questions about the ability of its forces to conduct long-range movements or maneuvers and then sustain coherent operations. Iraq has demonstrated that it can still carry out significant ground force exercises and fly relatively high sortie rates. It has not, however, demonstrated training patterns that show its army has consistent levels of training, can make effective use of combined arms above the level of some individual brigades, or has much capability for joint land-air operations. It has not demonstrated that it can use surface-to-air missiles in a well-organized way as a maneuvering force to cover its deployed land forces. Iran remains a major threat to Iraq. Iran lost 40-60% of its major land force equipment during the climactic battles of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988. It has, however, largely recovered from its defeat by Iraq and now has comparatively large forces. Iran now has an army of around 450,000 men – including roughly 125,000 Revolutionary Guards, and an inventory of some 1,600 main battle tanks, 1,500 other armored vehicles, and 3,200 major artillery weapons. It also has over 280 combat aircraft with potential operational status. Iran has been able to make major improvements in its ability to threaten maritime traffic through the Gulf, and to conduct unconventional warfare. Iran has also begun to acquire modern Soviet combat aircraft and has significant numbers of the export version of the T-72 and BMP. Iran has not, however, been able to offset the obsolescence and wear of its overall inventory of armor, ships, and aircraft. Iran has not been able to modernize key aspects of its military capabilities such as airborne sensors and C4I/BM, electronic warfare, land-based air defense integration, beyond-visual-range air-to-air combat, night warfare capabilities, stand-off attack capability, armored sensors and fire control systems, artillery mobility and battle management, combat ship systems integration, etc. In contrast, no Southern Gulf state has built up significant ground forces since the Gulf War, and only Saudi Arabia has built up a significant air force. Only two Southern Gulf forces – those of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait – have a significant defense capability against Iraq. Saudi Arabia has made real progress in improving its 75,000 man National Guard. Its army, however, lacks effective leadership, training, and organization. It now has an army of around 75,000 men –, and an inventory of some 1,055 main battle tanks, 4,800 other armored vehicles, and 500 major artillery weapons. It also has around 350 combat aircraft with potential operational status. The army has made little overall progress in training since the Gulf War, can probably only fight about half of its equipment holdings in the Iraqi border area (and it would take 4-6 weeks to deploy and prepare this strength), and has declined in combined arms capability since the Gulf War. It has little capability for joint land-air operations. Its individual pilots and aircraft have experienced a growing readiness crisis since the mid-1990s. It has lacked cohesive leadership as a fighting force since that time and cannot fight as a coherent force without US support and battle management.. Kuwait now has an army of only around 11,000 men, and an active inventory of some 293 main battle tanks, 466 other armored vehicles, and 17 major artillery weapons. Only its 218 M-1A2s are really operational and only a portion of these are in combat effective forces. It has only 82 combat aircraft and 20 armed helicopters with potential operational status, and only 40 are modern F-18s. It is making progress in training, but has not shown it can make effective use of combined arms above the battalion level, and has little capability for joint land-air operations. Its individual pilots and aircraft have moderate readiness, but cannot fight as a coherent force without US support and battle management. There has been little progress in standardization and interoperability; advances in some areas like ammunition have been offset by the failure to integrate increasingly advanced weapons systems. Showpiece exercises and purchases disguise an essentially static approach to force improvement which is heavily weapons oriented, and usually shows little real-world appreciation of the lessons of the Gulf War, the “revolution in military affairs,” and the need for sustainability. Current arms deliveries are making only token progress in correcting the qualitative defects in Southern Gulf forces, and no meaningful progress in being made towards integrating the Southern Gulf countries under the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).
- Topic:
- Security and Defense Policy
- Political Geography:
- United States, Iraq, Middle East, and Arabia
454. For a State of Peace: Conflict and the Future of Democracy in Sudan
- Author:
- Abdelwahab El-Affendi
- Publication Date:
- 01-2002
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Centre for the Study of Democracy, University of Westminster
- Abstract:
- Sudan – Africa's largest country (area: 2.5 million square kilometres; population: 36 million) – has been described as a microcosm of the continent, as it embodies the continent's characteristic ethnic and religious diversity. The majority of its inhabitants (70 per cent) are Muslim. The rest adhere to traditional African beliefs (25 per cent) or various Christian denominations (5 per cent). The majority of Muslims are Arabic speaking (though not all are ethnically Arab), and Arabic is both the official language and the lingua franca. However, over 500 ethnic groups live in Sudan, and some 75 languages are spoken in the country. The bulk of the Arabic-speaking Muslims live in the north, while the south is inhabited by a predominantly non-Arab and non-Muslim population.
- Topic:
- Conflict Resolution, Democratization, and Religion
- Political Geography:
- Sudan, Middle East, and Arabia
455. Islamism: Roots and Prospects
- Author:
- Bechir Chourou
- Publication Date:
- 03-2002
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Istituto Affari Internazionali
- Abstract:
- The emergence of a political ideology based on Islam is commonly attributed to Jamal Eddine al-Afghani (1838-1898) of Afghanistan, Mohammad Abduh (1849-1905) of Egypt and Abdurrahman al-Kawakibi (1849-1902) of Syria. These early Muslim intellectuals are called "reformers," because they advocated a reversal of what they perceived in their era as a slow but inexorable decline of Islam. In their views, this could be accomplished only through a purification of the faith and a return to strict observance of the word of Allah (i.e. the Koran) and imitation of His prophet's behaviour (i.e. the Sunna). But at the same time, those thinkers believed that Muslims should not shun science and knowledge even if they came from non-Muslims. Thus saved from decay and decadence, the reformed and renovated Islam could inaugurate a period of renaissance (nahdha) that would allow it to join and participate in the economic and social transformations that were under-way in the West.
- Topic:
- Religion and Terrorism
- Political Geography:
- Afghanistan, Middle East, Arabia, and Egypt
456. Islamic Extremism in Saudi Arabia and the Attack on Al Khobar
- Author:
- Anthony H. Cordesman
- Publication Date:
- 06-2001
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Abstract:
- This draft analysis is be circulated for comment as part of the CSIS “Saudi Arabia Enters the 21 st Century Project.” It will be extensively revised before final publication.
- Topic:
- Security and Defense Policy
- Political Geography:
- United States, Middle East, Arabia, and Saudi Arabia
457. Saudi-Italian Relations During the Reign of King Fahd
- Author:
- Roberto Aliboni
- Publication Date:
- 11-2001
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Istituto Affari Internazionali
- Abstract:
- In the hundred years that have elapsed since the birth of Saudi Arabia many important developments and changes have affected both this country and Italy. Still, whereas Saudi Arabia has progressed with remarkable political stability, Italy has suffered numerous shocks: the crisis and fall, after World War I, of the nationalist elites which had made Italy an independent and united country in the 19th century; the fall of the Fascist regime and the Savoy monarchy at the end of World War II; the emergence, during the Cold War, of a Western democracy run by the classes which the nationalist elite had excluded from the process of independence; today, after the end of the Cold War, the fall of the Catholic and communist parties that dominated the Cold War domestic stage and the painful attempt to establish a less ideologically-based, more market-oriented and liberal-minded democracy in the country.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Foreign Policy, and Economics
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Arabia, Saudi Arabia, and Italy
458. Water As a Factor of Conflict Challenges Around the Mediterranean Basin
- Author:
- Roberto Aliboni
- Publication Date:
- 02-2001
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Istituto Affari Internazionali
- Abstract:
- The southern shore of the Mediterranean region is an area with very high population growth. National economies haven't - but for Israel - the strength and vitality of northern-shore states. On the southern shore the state has generally a pervasive role in the society. Inefficient state-owned industries and subsidised agriculture give way to products that are scarcely competitive on the world market. Weak southern Mediterranean economies, that could somehow get along with a stable population, risk the failure in trying to keep pace with the ongoing population boom and with globalisation. For this reason, on the southern shore of the Mediterranean resource disputes have emerged, especially since the seventies, as an area of contentions between states. The latter more and more is perceived as a dangerous and hardly manageable issue.
- Topic:
- Security and Environment
- Political Geography:
- Middle East and Arabia
459. Post-Conflict Peace Operations and Governance in Afghanistan
- Author:
- Jeff Fischer
- Publication Date:
- 12-2001
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Academy of Political Science
- Abstract:
- Over the last two decades, post-conflict military and civilian interventions have occurred with increasing frequency and scope. By illustration, the first UN peacekeeping mission in 1948, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), was mandated to supervise the truce of the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, and initially deployed 93 military observers. By contrast, the current international interventions in Kosovo (UNMIK) and East Timor (UNTEAT) are de facto governments, employing thousands of international and local staff with police and military services included in the portfolio.
- Topic:
- Government, International Cooperation, and Peace Studies
- Political Geography:
- Afghanistan, South Asia, Israel, Arabia, and Kosovo
460. Youth as Social and Political Agents: Issues in Post-Settlement Peace Building
- Author:
- Siobhán McEvoy-Levy
- Publication Date:
- 12-2001
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame
- Abstract:
- There is a growing body of literature dealing with the roles of children and young people in armed conflict and the effects of such conflict on their development (Brett McCallin, 1996; Cohn Goodwin-Gill, 1994; Klare, 1999; Machel, 1996; Wessells, 1998). This literature based on extensive field case work has provided important evidence of intensive child and youth involvement in warfare, the reasons for that involvement, the processes of induction into armed groups, the activities of children in these groups - as fighters, cooks, spies, couriers, and in providing sexual services - and their immediate - term rehabilitation needs once a war has been ended. Many of these studies make recommendations about demobilization, reintegration and prevention with an emphasis on economic, social, and psychological measures and the effective implementation of relevant international law. Although much has been discovered and is actively utilized in the domain of advocacy, most studies recognize that much more needs to be done to develop research and good practice particularly in the area of healing war - torn societies across a range of social, psychological, economic and security interests and needs and using indigenous beliefs and rituals as peace building resources (Wessells 2000).
- Topic:
- Conflict Resolution
- Political Geography:
- United States, Middle East, and Arabia