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81. Iraq: Building a New Security Structure

Publication Date:
12-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
For the foreseeable future, Iraq's security will be in the hands of Coalition forces. As a result, how the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) chose to deal with the country's former military and how it is now going about starting up a new army may not have immediate security implications. But both courses have decisive political implications, and both appear, at a minimum, to have been poorly thought out and recklessly implemented. They heighten the risk that the Sunni population will be further alienated, that the military will be perceived as a prolongation of, rather than a substitute for, the occupation and that, far from helping to forge a new collective national identity, it will become an arena for renewed internal political, sectarian and ethnic conflict. A significant course correction is required in order to lay the foundations for a stable, and stabilising, indigenous security structure.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Foreign Policy, Politics, Sovereignty, and Population
Political Geography:
Iraq and Arabia

82. Iran: Discontent and Disarray

Publication Date:
10-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
The decision to award the Nobel Peace Prize to Shirin Ebadi, a courageous human rights lawyer, has focused renewed attention on the deep divisions and tensions within Iran. How these work out, and how Iran defines its role in the world, will have a critical impact on a range of wider security issues, from Iraq and Afghanistan to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the future of nuclear non-proliferation.
Topic:
Security, Demographics, Development, Economics, Politics, and Poverty
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Iran, Israel, and Arabia

83. Red Alert In Jordan: Recurrent Unrest In Maan

Publication Date:
02-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
In successive incidents over eight days in November 2002, the city of Maan in the south of Jordan was the scene of intense armed clashes between security forces and elements of the Maani population. What began as a routine police operation rapidly escalated into incidents in which thousands of police, soldiers, and special forces fought militants in and around the town before subduing them. The clashes left six dead, many more wounded, over 150 arrested for questioning or prosecution, and property destroyed. As of early February 2003, over 45 people remained in custody and several others were still being sought.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Security, and Government
Political Geography:
Arabia and Jordan

84. Yemen: Coping with Terrorism and Violence in a Fragile State

Publication Date:
01-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
On 3 November 2002, an unmanned U.S. “Predator” aircraft hovering in the skies of Yemen fired a Hellfire missile at a car carrying a suspected al- Qaeda leader, four Yemenis said to be members of the Aden-Abyan Islamic Army, and a Yemeni- American who, according to U.S. authorities, had recruited volunteers to attend al-Qaeda training camps. All six occupants were killed. Almost two months later, three American missionaries were shot and killed in the Yemeni city of Jibla. These incidents, only the latest in a series involving Yemen, reinforced its image as a weak and lawless state with porous borders, a sanctuary for al-Qaeda operatives, a country with tenuous government control over vast parts of its territory and dominated by a culture of kidnappings and endemic violence. The October 2000 attack on the USS Cole, the arrest earlier in 2002 of several Yemenis in the United States and Pakistan suspected of membership in the al-Qaeda network, the capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibah, a Yemeni citizen accused of being a key plotter of the 11 September 2001 attacks in the U.S., and the attack on the French oil tanker Limburg in October 2002 have all contributed to this perception. Indeed, during the past year, the U.S. has sent special forces to Yemen and neighbouring countries, with the purpose of pursuing presumed members of the al-Qaeda network and associated organisations in Yemen.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
Pakistan, United States, Yemen, and Arabia

85. Why the United States Should Not Attack Iraq

Author:
Ivan Eland and Bernard Gourley
Publication Date:
12-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
For months the Bush administration has been preparing the country for war with Iraq. The administration has argued that only a forcible regime change can neutralize the threat that Saddam Hussein is said to pose. But the assumptions that underlie the administration's policy range from cautiously pessimistic to outright fallacious. First, there is a prevalent belief that if Iraq is able to obtain nuclear weapons it will inevitably use them. Second, there is a notion that Hussein is totally irrational and cannot be trusted to act in a predictable manner; and, because of that, his leadership creates a substantial risk of instability in the Middle East. Finally, many people in the United States have come to believe that war in Iraq may be the only means of nullifying the threat posed by Iraq's nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons programs.
Topic:
Security and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Middle East, and Arabia

86. Guiding Principles for U.S. Post-Conflict Policy in Iraq

Author:
Frank G. Wisner and Edward P. Djerejian
Publication Date:
12-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
Today's Iraq debate is understandably focused on the run-up to possible military action. However, the question of how the United States and the international community should manage post-conflict Iraq is even more consequential, as it will determine the long-term condition of Iraq and the entire Middle East. If Washington does not clearly define its goals for Iraq and build support for them domestically and with its allies and partners, future difficulties are bound to quickly overshadow any initial military success. Put simply, the United States may lose the peace, even if it wins the war.
Topic:
International Relations and Security
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Middle East, Arabia, and Arab Countries

87. The Arab-Israeli Military Balance in 2002 Part Four: Trends in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Weapons

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
01-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Reasons for proliferating outweigh disincentives, and motivation is growing. Arms control regimes harass proliferators without stopping stem and fail to offer nonproliferators security. War fighting concepts are likely to lack clear structure and be highly volatile in terms of enemy, targets, and crisis behavior. Only a few leadership and military elites -- such as Egypt and Israel -- have shown a concern with highly structured strategic planning in the past. Iran - Iraq and Gulf Wars have demonstrated missiles and weapons of mass destruction will be used. Israeli actions in 1967 and attack on Osirak, Egyptian and Syrian attack on Israel in 1973, demonstrate regional focus on surprise and preemption. Iraq has already demonstrated regional concern with launch on warning, launch under attack options. Syria probably has some option of this kind. Concentration of population and leadership in single or a few urban areas makes existential attacks possible.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, Arabia, and Egypt

88. If We Fight Iraq: Iraq and The Conventional Military Balance

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
01-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Despite the Gulf War, and the loss of some 40% of its army and air force order of battle, Iraq remains the most effective military power in the Gulf. It still has an army of around 375,000 men, and an inventory of some 2,200 main battle tanks, 3,700 other armored vehicles, and 2,400 major artillery weapons. It also has over 300 combat aircraft with potential operational status. At the same time, Iraq has lacked the funds, spare parts, and production capabilities to sustain the quality of its consolidated forces. Iraq has not been able to restructure its overall force structure to compensate as effectively as possible for its prior dependence on an average of $3 billion a year in arms deliveries. It has not been able to recapitalize any aspect of its force structure, and about two-thirds of its remaining inventory of armor and aircraft is obsolescent by Western standards. Iraq has not been able to fund and/or import any major new conventional warfare technology to react to the lessons of the Gulf War, or to produce any major equipment -- with the possible exception of limited numbers of Magic “dogfight” air-to-air missiles. In contrast, Saudi Arabia has taken delivery on over $66 billion worth of new arms since 1991, Kuwait has received $7.6 billion, Iran $4.3 billion, Bahrain $700 million, Oman $1.4 billion, Qatar $1.7 billion, and the UAE $7.9 billion, Equally important, the US has made major upgrades in virtually every aspect of its fighter avionics, attack munitions, cruise missile capabilities, and intelligence, reconnaissance, and targeting capabilities. Iraq's inability to recapitalize and modernize its forces means that much of its large order of battle is no obsolescent or obsolete, has uncertain combat readiness, and will be difficult to sustain in combat. It also raises serious questions about the ability of its forces to conduct long-range movements or maneuvers and then sustain coherent operations. Iraq has demonstrated that it can still carry out significant ground force exercises and fly relatively high sortie rates. It has not, however, demonstrated training patterns that show its army has consistent levels of training, can make effective use of combined arms above the level of some individual brigades, or has much capability for joint land-air operations. It has not demonstrated that it can use surface-to-air missiles in a well-organized way as a maneuvering force to cover its deployed land forces. Iran remains a major threat to Iraq. Iran lost 40-60% of its major land force equipment during the climactic battles of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988. It has, however, largely recovered from its defeat by Iraq and now has comparatively large forces. Iran now has an army of around 450,000 men – including roughly 125,000 Revolutionary Guards, and an inventory of some 1,600 main battle tanks, 1,500 other armored vehicles, and 3,200 major artillery weapons. It also has over 280 combat aircraft with potential operational status. Iran has been able to make major improvements in its ability to threaten maritime traffic through the Gulf, and to conduct unconventional warfare. Iran has also begun to acquire modern Soviet combat aircraft and has significant numbers of the export version of the T-72 and BMP. Iran has not, however, been able to offset the obsolescence and wear of its overall inventory of armor, ships, and aircraft. Iran has not been able to modernize key aspects of its military capabilities such as airborne sensors and C4I/BM, electronic warfare, land-based air defense integration, beyond-visual-range air-to-air combat, night warfare capabilities, stand-off attack capability, armored sensors and fire control systems, artillery mobility and battle management, combat ship systems integration, etc. In contrast, no Southern Gulf state has built up significant ground forces since the Gulf War, and only Saudi Arabia has built up a significant air force. Only two Southern Gulf forces – those of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait – have a significant defense capability against Iraq. Saudi Arabia has made real progress in improving its 75,000 man National Guard. Its army, however, lacks effective leadership, training, and organization. It now has an army of around 75,000 men –, and an inventory of some 1,055 main battle tanks, 4,800 other armored vehicles, and 500 major artillery weapons. It also has around 350 combat aircraft with potential operational status. The army has made little overall progress in training since the Gulf War, can probably only fight about half of its equipment holdings in the Iraqi border area (and it would take 4-6 weeks to deploy and prepare this strength), and has declined in combined arms capability since the Gulf War. It has little capability for joint land-air operations. Its individual pilots and aircraft have experienced a growing readiness crisis since the mid-1990s. It has lacked cohesive leadership as a fighting force since that time and cannot fight as a coherent force without US support and battle management.. Kuwait now has an army of only around 11,000 men, and an active inventory of some 293 main battle tanks, 466 other armored vehicles, and 17 major artillery weapons. Only its 218 M-1A2s are really operational and only a portion of these are in combat effective forces. It has only 82 combat aircraft and 20 armed helicopters with potential operational status, and only 40 are modern F-18s. It is making progress in training, but has not shown it can make effective use of combined arms above the battalion level, and has little capability for joint land-air operations. Its individual pilots and aircraft have moderate readiness, but cannot fight as a coherent force without US support and battle management. There has been little progress in standardization and interoperability; advances in some areas like ammunition have been offset by the failure to integrate increasingly advanced weapons systems. Showpiece exercises and purchases disguise an essentially static approach to force improvement which is heavily weapons oriented, and usually shows little real-world appreciation of the lessons of the Gulf War, the “revolution in military affairs,” and the need for sustainability. Current arms deliveries are making only token progress in correcting the qualitative defects in Southern Gulf forces, and no meaningful progress in being made towards integrating the Southern Gulf countries under the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).
Topic:
Security and Defense Policy
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Middle East, and Arabia

89. Voices From The Iraqi Street

Publication Date:
12-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
As this briefing paper went to press, all eyes were on the United States and United Nations, the weapons inspectors, war preparations and the Iraqi regime's posture toward them. Yet, as has been true throughout this crisis, the unknown variable in the equation is the view of the Iraqi population. Living under a highly repressive and closed regime and bereft of genuine means of expression, the Iraqi people have largely appeared to the outside world as passive bystanders in a crisis that is bound to affect them more than anyone else. Speculation about how Iraqis view the current crisis has varied widely, with assessments often tailored to buttress political arguments regarding the wisdom of a U.S.-led war.
Topic:
Security and War
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Arabia, and United Nations

90. Old Games, New Rules: Conflict on the Israel-Lebanon Border

Publication Date:
11-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
The Israel-Lebanon border is the only Arab-Israeli front to have witnessed continuous violence since the late 1960s and it could become the trigger for a broader Arab-Israeli conflict. Yet, in recent times it has been the object of very little international focus. Amidst raging warfare between Israelis and Palestinians and mounting war-talk surrounding Iraq, there is scant energy to devote to a conflict that, since Israel's May 2000 withdrawal from Lebanon, appears devoid of justification and which neither of its principal protagonists seems interested in escalating. But ignoring it could be costly. Neither its roots nor its implications have ever been purely local. Israel's withdrawal has lessened the immediate costs but in some ways rendered the problem more unpredictable. Stripped of its cover as an Israeli-Lebanese border dispute, it has laid bare both the underlying Israeli-Syrian confrontation and Iran's involvement in the conflict.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, and Ethnic Conflict
Political Geography:
Iran, Israel, Palestine, Arabia, Lebanon, and Syria