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2. US strategy and force posture for an era of nuclear tripolarity
- Author:
- Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press
- Publication Date:
- 05-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Atlantic Council
- Abstract:
- The term “nuclear tripolarity” describes a world in which China has joined the United States and Russia as a leading nuclear power. As China modernizes its existing nuclear forces and deploys new weapons, it is on track to roughly double its deployed nuclear arsenal in the next few years—from approximately 350 to 700 deliverable warheads. The US Department of Defense projects that China will go further, expanding its arsenal to at least 1,500 warheads by 2035.1 At those force levels, China’s arsenal would be comparable to US and Russian deployed nuclear forces, currently capped at 1,550 by the New START Treaty.2 What are the consequences of emerging tripolarity for US nuclear strategy and force posture? If the United States retains its current approach to nuclear force planning, the growth of China’s arsenal (and the ongoing modernization of Russia’s nuclear weapons) will likely compel the United States to significantly increase its own arsenal. The easiest way to do so would be to upload one to two thousand additional warheads from US reserves onto existing delivery systems when the New START treaty expires in 2026. Unfortunately, a major increase in US forces would likely mark just another step in an intensifying arms competition among the three leading nuclear powers, since China and Russia would then feel pressure to respond.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Geopolitics, Deterrence, and Multipolarity
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
3. The NewSpace market: Capital, control, and commercialization
- Author:
- Robert Murray
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Atlantic Council
- Abstract:
- Commercial opportunities in space-based technologies are expanding rapidly. From satellite communications and Earth observation to space tourism and asteroid mining, the potential for businesses to capitalize on these emerging technologies is vast and known as “NewSpace.”1 The NewSpace model is important for governments to understand because the dual-use nature of space, specifically its growing commercialization, will influence the types of space-based technologies that nations may leverage, and consequently, impact their national security paradigms. By capitalizing on the private sector’s agility and combining it with the essential research efforts and customer role played by the public sector, the NewSpace industry can play a critical function in addressing current and future national security challenges through public-private codevelopment. As the NewSpace industry expands, the role of government is evolving from being the primary developer and operator of space assets to facilitating their commercialization, while still prioritizing key advancements. US and allied governments can capitalize on this competitive landscape by strategically investing in areas that align with their national security objectives. However, it is crucial for them to first understand and adapt to their changing roles within this dynamic environment. Indeed, the benefits of the burgeoning NewSpace industry extend beyond the United States. International collaboration and competition in this area can lead to faster technological advancements and economic gains. The global NewSpace landscape is driving down costs, increasing access to space, and fostering innovation that can improve not only economic well-being, but also impact national security models. To that end, this memo will examine the broad state of the space market, discuss the industry drivers, and propose recommendations for US and allied policymakers as they consider future government investments in those enabling space-based activities that support wider national security ambitions.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, International Trade and Finance, National Security, Science and Technology, European Union, Space, and Defense Industry
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Eurasia, Canada, Asia, and United States of America
4. Implications of the Incursions into U.S. and Canadian Airspace
- Author:
- Marcin Andrzej Piotrowski
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Polish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- In the first half of February, a series of serious incidents happened in the airspace of the U.S. and Canada involving shootdowns of four objects, with at least one confirmed as a Chinese balloon, likely used for intelligence. The U.S. administration is conducting an investigation to explain the various platforms, the equipment onboard, and their mission. Because further incidents cannot be excluded, some changes in the rhetoric of the Chinese government should be expected, as well as a higher readiness of air defence networks of the powers.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Territory, and Airspace
- Political Geography:
- China, Canada, North America, and United States of America
5. Evolution, not Revolution: Japan Revises Security Policy
- Author:
- Oskar Pietrewicz
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Polish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- In December last year, the government of Kishida Fumio adopted three documents adapting Japan’s security policy to the deteriorating international situation. Its security and national defence strategies highlight challenges from China, Russia, and North Korea, as well as an increase in non-military threats. A third document specifies the need for a record increase in defence spending. Japan’s readiness to deepen cooperation with the U.S. and European countries and its criticism in its assessment of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine create the conditions for the further development of Japan’s cooperation with NATO and the Polish-Japanese dialogue on security.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Japan, China, Asia, and North Korea
6. Northeast Asia Defense Transparency Index 2021–22
- Author:
- Chi Fang and Jade Reidy
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
- Abstract:
- Military tensions are on the rise in Northeast Asia as the likes of China, North Korea, and the United States flex their combat capabilities—but this does not mean that war is imminent. This is an important insight from the latest Northeast Asia Defense Transparency Index (DTI) for the period spanning 2021 to 2022. Carried out every two years by the University of California’s Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, the DTI offers a detailed examination of how open or closed major regional states are in disclosing information on their defense postures, including defense budgets, publication of official annual defense reports, legislative oversight, and the nature of external military activities. The 2021–22 DTI found that there was only a marginal decline in the overall defense transparency level for Northeast Asia, with Japan showing a noteworthy improvement in its transparency performance. The concealment of defense activities is often an indicator that countries are quietly making preparations for military conflict and contributes to declining trust and confidence. The evidence from this DTI that defense transparency is relatively stable in Northeast Asia is cause for cautious optimism that the long peace that the region has enjoyed remains intact for now. Transparency though is just one indicator of the overall state of defense affairs, and the powerful underlying currents that are the main determinants of war and peace, such as threat perceptions and arms dynamics, all appear to be trending negatively.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, International Security, and Transparency
- Political Geography:
- China, North Korea, Northeast Asia, and United States of America
7. What would Europeans want a European defence union to look like?
- Author:
- Francesco Nicoli, Brian Burgoon, and David Van der Duin
- Publication Date:
- 06-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Bruegel
- Abstract:
- While the Russian invasion of Ukraine has created a new momentum for EU defence integration, the political feasibility of such integration remains disputed, as it may entail both additional financial costs and a loss of sovereignty. Furthermore, design of defence integration is inherently multidimensional, differing in terms of scope and level, governance and sources of financing, among other dimensions. To determine the extent of public support for European security cooperation, we conducted the first conjoint experiment ever fielded on public support for alternative defence union designs. We carried out a pre-registered, randomised conjoint experiment on a highly representative sample of the French, German, Italian, Dutch and Spanish populations in November 2022. This multidimensional conjoint experiment allows us to determine the causal link between policy features of potential defence pacts, and public support or opposition to such policy. Our results show that policy packages receiving the most support require joint EU-level governance, joint purchases of military equipment through joint procurement, and repurposing of existing national expenditure as the preferred form of financing. All in all, our results show not only that there is considerable cross-border support for defence integration in Western Europe, but also that citizens in different Western European countries have generally aligned preferences regarding the actual design of such policy, indicating that a compromise policy is feasible and publicly supported. Furthermore, our results support ongoing research on the nature of European solidarity at times of crisis, suggesting that European citizens are willing to support the creation of joint institutions and policies to face issues of common concern, and therefore indicating that major crises open important windows of opportunity to re-shape EU-level policies and institutions.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Governance, European Union, and Regional Security
- Political Geography:
- Europe
8. NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept. Analysis and implications for Austria
- Author:
- Loïc Simonet
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
- Abstract:
- Adopted at the Madrid Summit in June 2022, the long-overdue NATO’s new Strategic Concept provides a clear set of guidelines for the Atlantic Alliance in a mid-term perspective. The war in Ukraine has provided the Allies with a powerful catalyst to reconsider NATO’s identity, core missions, as well as their vision of Russia and China. NATO’s new deterrence and defence-centric approach has already entailed a major shift in our security architecture, especially on Europe’s eastern flank. Without undermining its historical neutrality, Austria might reinterpret it in light of NATO’s “reset” and use this opportunity to reinvigorate its partnership with the Alliance.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Partnerships, and Deterrence
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Asia, and Balkans
9. NATO in the North: The emerging division of labour in Northern European security
- Author:
- Matti Pesu
- Publication Date:
- 09-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- The Russian war of aggression has rendered Northern Europe an increasingly significant region for Euro-Atlantic security. A stable and secure Northern Europe is a critical precondition for a safe and stable Euro-Atlantic region. The alliance should treat Northern Europe as a strategic whole although the different subareas of Northern Europe have their distinctive security dynamics and concerns. NATO is currently improving its deterrence and defence posture. It is simultaneously shifting its military strategy from a model of deterrence by reinforcement to one of deterrence by denial. NATO’s evolving posture and strategy in Northern Europe should be underpinned by a more explicit division of labour. The regional allies and stakeholders can be divided into four categories in terms of their role in regional security: frontline nations, hubs, security providers and the ultimate security guarantor. The regional frontline nations include the Baltic states, Finland and Poland, which can also play a role as hubs and even security providers along with the United Kingdom and Germany. Denmark, Sweden and Norway are first and foremost hubs. The United States remains the ultimate security guarantor of the area.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Deterrence
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Nordic Nations, Arctic, and Baltic Sea
10. The Greek Defence Sector: Turning the Page?
- Author:
- Antonis Kamaras
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
- Abstract:
- From the 1980s to the 2000s, Greece’s defence industry was mismanaged and failed to utilize Greece’s high defence expenditures to become innovative. The impact of Greece’s fiscal crisis and the subsequent expansion of the Turkish threat mean that both economics and geopolitics now favour an invigorated Greek defence sector. The first major weapons procurement programme since the end of Greece’s fiscal crisis has not meaningfully involved the Greek defence sector. Yet the sector’s future prospects have improved, assured by the need for the sector to be financially viable and internationally competitive and by the broader awareness of the defence sector as a building block in national defence. The EU’s growing role in Europe’s collective defence, driven by continent-wide geopolitical developments and industrial imperatives, will also boost the prospects of the Greek defence sector. Mutually reinforcing obstacles still hamper the Greek defence sector’s progress: (a) a polity which privileges distribution over capital investments in its fiscal choices, and (b) an officer corps which lacks the degree of autonomy to co-create novel defence solutions together with the Greek defence sector. Despite these obstacles, the ongoing Turkish threat engenders national insecurity within Greece to such an extent that it can drive the sustainable growth of the Greek defence sector.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Geopolitics, Innovation, and Defense Industry
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Turkey, and Greece
11. Buying Time: Logistics for a New American Way of War
- Author:
- Chris Dougherty
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- Discussions about defense strategy that focus on combat units and fail to account for logistics are irrelevant when it comes to understanding how well the United States can deter or defeat aggression by China or Russia. Planes, ships, and tanks are just weapons systems; making them combat capabilities requires getting them and their crews into the fight; supplying them with fuel, food, water, medical care, and munitions; and keeping them maintained. Logistics, more than the quantity of forces or the quality of technology, will determine the potential combat power available to the United States in future conflict scenarios with China or Russia. It will influence Chinese and Russian decisions about going to war, and when, where, and how to fight. It will bound the military courses of action available to U.S. commanders and delineate the strategic options available to presidents. Despite this critical role, the Department of Defense has systemically underinvested in logistics in terms of money, mental energy, physical assets, and personnel. Neglect of logistics arguably became most severe in the post–Cold War era. Pressure to save money through efficiency and misguided attempts to run the department like a “lean” business disproportionately impacted logistics. Maximizing the ratio of combat “tooth” to logistical “tail” saved money, but at the cost of leaving U.S. armed forces with a logistical system that is stretched thin supporting peacetime operations and wholly unsuited to the demands of warfare with China or Russia. Recognizing U.S. dependence on strained logistics networks, China and Russia have developed means to attack these networks, including long-range missiles and cyberattacks. Barring changes to U.S. logistics and sustainment concepts, such attacks present a grave threat to the department’s ability to uphold U.S. security commitments in East Asia or eastern Europe.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Logistics
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
12. Charting a Transatlantic Approach to Russia: A Working Paper of the Transatlantic Forum on Russia
- Author:
- Andrea Kendall-Taylor
- Publication Date:
- 09-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- Although the United States and Europe are not directly engaged in the war with Russia in Ukraine, Moscow clearly sees itself as being at war with the West. The United States and Europe, therefore, must be prepared for a period of what is likely to be prolonged confrontation with Russia, with the war for Ukraine at the center of that confrontation. Successfully navigating this period of sustained confrontation requires continued cohesion and coordination between the United States and Europe to ensure they share a common picture of the challenge that Russia poses and the necessary response. Russia’s war in Ukraine has precipitated rapid and major changes in Europe and broader ripple effects that are altering political dynamics much farther afield. Because of the war in Ukraine, Russia itself is changing in still unknowable ways. Russian President Vladimir Putin is taking the country in a more authoritarian direction, Russian society is shifting, and the Russian military’s degradation in Ukraine means that the nature of the Russian threat is evolving. Russia’s war, therefore, requires the allies to re-examine long-held assumptions and understandings about Russia and its intentions and capacity, and it is those updated assessments that should guide the transatlantic partners’ future policy approach toward Moscow. There is no going back to the way things were with Russia prior to its invasion of Ukraine. Instead, Western allies must build on ongoing efforts to constrict and constrain the Kremlin’s ability to sustain aggression in Ukraine and more broadly beyond Russia’s borders. It also will require the development of a long-term and sustainable approach to restoring peace and stability to Europe, increasing resilience to the Kremlin’s tools and tactics, and planting the seeds for a less confrontational relationship with a future Russia. In many ways, such an approach will resemble the containment strategy first set out in the 1940s, a strategy designed to apply steady and forceful counterpressure to a regime whose paranoia and insecurities represented a clear danger to the West, just as the Putin regime does today. Each of the transatlantic allies’ preferred policy approaches will reflect their own proximity to and history with Russia, as well as current political realities within their own borders. Nonetheless, there is broad consensus within the alliance that the unprecedented cohesion and coordination among allies in the wake of Russia’s invasion must hold. To that end, this working paper provides a starting point for the development of a transatlantic approach to Russia. It articulates expectations for relations with Russia that should guide the allies’ approach, outlines the broad objectives that a transatlantic Russia policy should seek to accomplish, and in some cases more specific near-term actions the allies can take. The analysis reflects two years of dialogue that CNAS has conducted through its Transatlantic Forum on Russia (TFR). It brings together and builds on previous work facilitated by the Forum, including policy papers, op-eds, articles, a Senate Foreign Relations Committee testimony, “What Comes Next for U.S. Policy Toward Russia,” and other cited publications.1 The paper aims to provide fodder for policymakers and experts on both side of the Atlantic to debate and refine through continued dialogue, including through the future work of the TFR.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Transatlantic Relations, Dialogue, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia and Europe
13. NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept: One Year On
- Author:
- LSE Ideas
- Publication Date:
- 09-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- LSE IDEAS
- Abstract:
- This Strategic Update summarises a roundtable discussion held at LSE IDEAS in July 2023. Contributors to the discussion were: General Sir James Everard, Stuart Austin, Professor Gordon Barrass, Professor Christopher Coker, Tom McKane, Hugh Sandeman, Susan Scholefield, and Peter Watkins. None of the content of the Strategic Update is attributable to any one individual. One year on from NATO’s Madrid 2022 summit, this Strategic Update address the 2022 NATO Strategic Concept and its implications for the future, especially regarding Russia’s war on Ukraine. The paper addresses the misalignment between preparations for defence and the real state of its armed forces, the UK’s symbolic support for Ukraine versus its capability, the concepts of resilience and deterrence, and finally the future of NATO’s relationship with Russia.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, NATO, Armed Forces, Deterrence, Resilience, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America
14. Countering United Front Work: Taiwan’s Political Warfare System
- Author:
- Mariah Thornton
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- LSE IDEAS
- Abstract:
- This strategic update introduces the challenges posed by China’s united front work, which has significantly expanded due to unprecedented institutional elevation and support under Xi Jinping. Mariah argues that Taiwan—a country that has effectively resisted China’s united front activities for several decades—can serve as an instructive case for other democratic countries in institutionalising counter-interference operations. The briefing initially explores the origins of Taiwan’s political warfare system, its evolution from the martial law era to democratisation in the 1990s, and how this history informs the institution’s modern structure and operations. The information presented in this report was compiled during a period of fieldwork in Taiwan from late September to early November 2022, in which she interviewed dozens of political warfare officers as well as Taiwanese defence and security experts–a majority of whom have chosen to remain anonymous. In the conclusion, Mariah offers broad policy recommendations based on these findings that may be applicable to other countries experiencing united front work activities and or seeking to institutionalise counter-interference operations.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Politics, Public Opinion, Propaganda, and Regional Security
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, and Asia
15. The EU and the Transformed Nuclear Context since the War in Ukraine
- Author:
- Clara Portela
- Publication Date:
- 06-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Istituto Affari Internazionali
- Abstract:
- The invasion of Ukraine by Russian forces in February 2022 has entirely transformed the European security landscape, bringing war to the European Union’s doorstep. Importantly, the war features a nuclear dimension that manifests itself in consequential ways, including Moscow’s nuclear sabre-rattling and its denunciation of the last surviving nuclear arms control treaty. This unleashed intriguing reactions, like a surprisingly tough resort to sanctions by the EU, or the shrinking of neutrality on the continent. However, while support for nuclear deterrence has increased in some NATO countries, support for arms control remains strong too. Meanwhile, nuclear disarmament advocates have not shifted their stance as a result of the crisis.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, European Union, Nonproliferation, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
16. Assessing U.S. Options for the Future of the ICBM Force
- Author:
- Toby Dalton, Megan Dubois, Natalie Montoya, Ankit Panda, and George Perkovich
- Publication Date:
- 09-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Abstract:
- Our task was to consider the relative risks and benefits of options for the future U.S. intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force. Our task was not to assess whether the United States should deploy ICBMs at all or change its nuclear strategy and doctrine. In our work, we engaged former officials from Democratic and Republican administrations, nuclear policy specialists from universities and defense and arms control think tanks, and senior military officers, as well as other representatives of combatant commands and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The current policy, established following a 2014 Analysis of Alternatives (AOA), is to replace the Minuteman III system with a new Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) system, now named the LGM-35A Sentinel. Some observers, including members of Congress, have urged reassessing whether deterrence and other requirements could be met more cost-effectively by extending the life of the current Minuteman III missiles and their supporting infrastructure. Department of Defense (DOD) officials note that upgrades that otherwise would have been necessary to sustain the Minuteman III system to 2043 were not undertaken once the decision was made in 2015 to proceed with GBSD. Therefore, they insist, there is no realistic option today to pursue a life extension program for Minuteman III missiles beyond 2030, when they are due to be replaced by GBSD. Although we received considerable data from DOD officials on these topics, the iterative process through which we received information, the unclassified nature of our study, and the limited time available for investigating DOD conclusions left us unable to assess the DOD’s position regarding the technical and cost feasibility of an extended Minuteman III alternative to GBSD. To strengthen public confidence in its decisionmaking on the future ICBM, we believe the DOD should commission an independent, classified technical study (with an unclassified version) to address outstanding questions relating to the options and timelines in the 2014 Analysis of Alternatives, cost estimates, procurement decisions, and adversary threats to future silo-based ICBMs. One of the most salient issues that surfaced in our study is the projected medium-term increase in the vulnerability of silo-based ICBMs to attack by precision conventional weapons. A non-nuclear attack on U.S. nuclear-armed ICBMs would confront the president with the choice of initiating in response what could be a large-scale nuclear attack on adversary homelands (either by launching U.S. ICBMs before they were destroyed or by using other nuclear forces). This threat is likely to materialize well before the notional GBSD service life expiration in 2075. We believe this issue deserves more debate, as it may raise questions about the declining strategic value of a long-term commitment to silo-based nuclear-armed ICBMs inherent in the decision to proceed with GBSD. Our discussions and research also explored issues that senior leaders, including the president, should consider regarding any silo-based ICBM system that the United States would deploy, today and in the future. These include allocating forces to simultaneously deter Russia (possibly in the absence of nuclear arms control, if occurring after the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or New START, expires in 2026) and a more nuclear-capable China from escalating regional conflicts; confronting possible risks posed by ICBMs overflying Russia to target China; building allies’ confidence in U.S. extended nuclear deterrence; mitigating risks of launch under attack scenarios; and facilitating the negotiation of verifiable nuclear arms control agreements with Russia and China. Consideration of these challenges and issues will be especially important in fashioning the Employment Guidance that will follow from the Nuclear Posture Review.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Weapons, and ICBM
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
17. Global South Perspectives on a Global Ban on Nuclear Weapons: A Comparative Approach
- Author:
- Leonardo Bandarra, Miriam Prys-Hansen, Jo-Ansie van Wyk, Layla Dawood, Monica Herz, Nir Hassid, Harsh V. Pant, and Shounak Set
- Publication Date:
- 07-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- German Institute of Global and Area Studies
- Abstract:
- Banning nuclear weapons is an aspiration at the core of most disarmament and non-proliferation initiatives. It gained new momentum with the "Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons." The negotiation of that treaty, and its subsequent approval and entry into force, sheds light on the complexities and dissent surrounding diverse regional perspectives on the appropriate means and timing regarding the elimination of nuclear weapons and establishing a related global norm. Scholars from different academic backgrounds and epistemological standpoints jointly discuss these perspectives through lenses from Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and South Asia. We seek to discuss how regional issues may shape global non-proliferation and disarmament politics, with a focus on the nuclearweapon-ban norm. This debate also reveals the broad trends and patterns organising and driving the current shifts in the global nuclear order, such as interrelations between regional and global institutions as well as domestic politics and decision-making.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Nonproliferation
- Political Geography:
- Global South
18. Europe after Putin’s War: EU Foreign and Defence Policy in the new European security architecture
- Author:
- George Pagoulatos and Spyros Blavoukos
- Publication Date:
- 03-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
- Abstract:
- Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a game changer for Europe and the global system and a call for the EU to emerge as a coherent security actor. Any EU discussion about an autonomous EU military capacity becomes irrelevant in the face of a systemic global security challenge, such as Russia, which cannot be dealt with through the existing or envisaged EU military instruments. Faced with a security challenge on a global scale, NATO remains the only game in town. The EU ambition of developing its strategic autonomy becomes practically meaningful only within the transatlantic alliance. EU member-states should take advantage of the existing clauses that enable significant steps to be taken towards foreign and security integration. The existing Treaty framework provides legal space for significant advances in the field of foreign and security integration, even though all relevant Treaty Articles contain strong ‘brakes’ which enable member-states to retain control of the process. Enhanced cooperation in EU foreign and security policy remains an important way forward, even though there are significant safety clauses. The ‘mutual defence’ or ‘mutual assistance’ clause (Article 42(7) of TEU) and the ‘solidarity clause’ (Article 222 of TFEU) are the closest things the EU has to security guarantees. Adding teeth to 42(7) should be an EU priority. Supporting EU ‘coalitions of the willing’ (Article 44 of TEU) also provides the opportunity for swifter military action under the EU aegis. The modality of cooperation between such coalitions and the EU rapid deployment capacity, which is also envisaged in the Strategic Compass and the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), has still to be worked out. Transition to qualified majority voting (QMV) in EU foreign policy decision-making presents both advantages and disadvantages, both from the standpoint of the EU and of the dissenting member states. The EU cannot become a credible global power if it cannot reach collective decisions on EU foreign and security policy. Moving towards QMV would address structural weaknesses and serve the objective of European sovereignty. However, smaller member-states need a strong and explicit reassurance that they can always use the existing emergency brakes when they consider an issue which is to be decided on by QMV to be a matter of national security. Transition to QMV should be the result of the gradual forging of a common foreign policy understanding on the major security challenges facing the EU. Human rights issues and sanctions are a good place to start when building momentum towards QMV. In the meanwhile, the current reform effort should be focused on investing in the institutional framework of EU foreign and security policy and making good use of existing instruments.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, European Union, Vladimir Putin, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Europe
19. They melted down our tanks, we are creating the strongest power in the region – militarist narratives serving the purpose of state capturing
- Author:
- Luka Steric
- Publication Date:
- 05-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Belgrade Centre for Security Policy
- Abstract:
- In this publication, BCSP researcher Luka Šterić analyzes how are the militarist narratives used for the legitimising in public the capturing of the state. Defence system capturing is done in various ways. The authorities are using the procurement of armament from different parties to achieve foreign policy goals in order to reduce the external pressure on the authoritarian regime. Insisting on military neutrality and foreign policy balancing, Serbia is trying to keep access to both the Eastern and Western armament markets. Also, through non-transparent contracts, individuals and companies close to the government opulently profit at the expense of the military industry, as well as through exporting weapons oftentimes conducted in contravention of both domestic and international law and norms. However, the focus of this analysis shall be on the militarist narratives constructed by the authorities to legitimise in public the capturing of the state and its defence system. In this publication, we shall present three major militarist narratives used by the authorities to capture the state: the narrative of the personal power of the “commander-in-chief“, the narrative of non-transparent armament in order to defend the country from the external enemy and the narrative of discrediting criticism and political opponents on topics of defence. The narrative of efficient personal power in the defence system has got a dual function. On the one hand, building the cult of a leader as the only guarantor of the state’s success, thus the Army’s success, justifies the non-constitutional concentration of power in the hands of the President. On the other hand, it normalises the military hierarchy as the most efficient model for civilian authorities’ structure, too, whereby the institutional and other mechanisms of government control are discredited. The narrative about the external enemy and the necessity of armament serves to justify the reduced transparency and scandals related to the defence system. The narrative about the inept and non-patriotic former government is used for settling the political accounts with political opponents, as well as for suppression of any criticism against the regime regarding the topics of defence.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Military
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus
20. NATO’s Resilience: The first and last line of defence
- Author:
- Johnny Hall and Hugh Sandeman
- Publication Date:
- 05-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- LSE IDEAS
- Abstract:
- Ahead of NATO’s Madrid Summit in June 2022, Hugh Sandeman and Jonny Hall confront the political challenges posed by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to the alliance’s 2021 Strengthened Resilience Commitment, especially in creating collective standards when resilience remains the responsibility of individual member states. The authors find that resilience is a psychological mindset as well as a material factor, and NATO’s ‘whole-of-society’ approach should be framed within the concept of ‘deterrence by denial’ to potential threats. This Strategic Update is based on a discussion hosted by LSE IDEAS in January 2022 on ‘How can NATO define and develop practical objectives for enhancing the resilience of member states?’ Participants in the discussion were: General Sir James Everard, Dr Tomas Ries, Susan Scholefield, Peter Watkins, Professor Gordon Barrass, General Sir Richard Barrons, Professor Christopher Coker, and Tom McKane. This Strategic Update reflects points made during the discussion, but no participant is in any way committed to its specific content, and the views expressed here are attributable solely to the authors.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, NATO, Resilience, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine