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1. Can Russia live with an ongoing conflict in Syria? Mapping out Trends Among Russian Foreign Policy Elites

Author:
Andrey Baklanov and Leonid Isaev
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
September 30, 2020 marked five years since the start of the Russian Aerospace Forces operation in Syria. This was the first military operation Moscow launched far from its own borders since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Today Russia is not only militarily involved but is deeply invested in the conflict as it seeks to shape the course of the negotiation process and the post-conflict socio-political development of Syria. Russia’s grand strategy in Syria continues to evolve as it assesses its actions and goals in the light of current realities. In this paper we look at how the Russian academic community and diplomatic circles see the outlook of the Syrian negotiation process. We conducted in-depth interviews with representatives of these groups in order to understand their perspective on the Geneva process, the prospects of the Astana format, and the impacts on Russia of an ongoing conflict scenario in Syria.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Hegemony, Conflict, and Intervention
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Middle East, and Syria

2. Reconciliation Initiatives in Daraa: A Testimony for Histor

Author:
Haytham Manna
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The southern city of Daraa was the birthplace of the peaceful Syrian uprising that started in March 2012. This genuine Syrian movement was met with accusations of conspiracy and vandalism by the Government of Syria (GoS), whose aggressive responses provoked similar reactions from local population. The Houranian people (Daraa city residents), who are known for their peacefulness and sensitivity towards strangers, detested the militarization of the uprising, and they resisted the increasing presence of foreign armed elements (Hezbollah, Nusra Front, ISIS). The feeling of loss of their identity and space to outsiders was acute. The reconciliation with the GoS came about through negotiations with the Russians in mid-2018. Houran people took it as an opportunity to avoid a costly military confrontation with the GoS, restore peacefulness, and expel the foreign militias. This author was part of the negotiations and involved in deliberations at many junctures, and this testimony was prepared in consultation with the principal members of the reconciliation negotiations with the Russians and the GoS.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Conflict, Peace, and Reconciliation
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Middle East, and Syria

3. Understanding Russia’s Endgame in Syria: A View from the United States

Author:
Mona Yacoubian
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Inherently unstable, Russia’s “spheres of influence” endgame strategy will result in a fractured and volatile Syria. Neither Russia nor Turkey appears likely to withdraw from Syria in the near term. Iran will remain an important player, albeit without holding a territorial sphere of influence. Balancing against Moscow, Tehran will exploit opportunities where possible, deepening its influence through informal and covert efforts. In this endgame, Russia’s prickly partnership with Turkey in Syria likely will endure. As a Russian analyst noted, “Turkey and Russia need each other strategically.” While Moscow may acknowledge that Turkey’s presence in Syria is a long-term problem, Russia’s “spheres of influence” endgame strategy nonetheless accommodates the reality of a lasting Turkish presence.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Hegemony, Rivalry, and Intervention
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Middle East, and Syria

4. US-Russia interactions in Syria and the future of the conflict in 2021

Author:
Nikolay Surkov
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The future for Syria in 2021 looks bleak from the Russian perspective. Though the conflict entered a low-intensity phase of armed confrontations that characterised 2020 will likely continue in 2021. The temporary negotiated solution for north-western Syria reached in March 2020 is likely to hold but there exists a high probability of renewed fighting between the SAA and various Islamist groups. There will also be bickering between Russia, Turkey, Syria, and Iran due to their different visions for Idlib’s future. Tensions will likely also continue to grow in northern and north-eastern Syria, where US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces sporadically clash with pro-Turkish groups. Occasional US-Russian encounters on the ground are also highly likely in the region. Additionally, confrontations between Israel and Iran/Hezbollah forces stationed in Syria will likely continue and might escalate.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Hegemony, Conflict, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Syria, North America, and United States of America

5. Supporting Syrian Refugees amidst Lebanon’s Crises

Author:
Will Todman
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Lebanon is in freefall amid numerous crises. The currency has collapsed, food prices have quadrupled in a year, and Covid-19 cases continue to rise after one of the strictest lockdowns in the world. More than half of Lebanese households now live below the poverty line and the government will soon be forced to end subsidies on basic goods. The country is approaching a national humanitarian emergency and widespread food insecurity. Syrian refugees are especially vulnerable because the Lebanese government has curtailed their rights and restricted international support for them. More than 90 percent of Syrians in Lebanon now live in extreme poverty. However, the prospect of any imminent, voluntary return of large numbers of refugees to Syria remains distant. Numerous surveys with refugees confirm that they do not feel able to return to Syria, despite worsening conditions in Lebanon. Lebanese are increasingly in need of economic support and feel ignored by the government and aid organisations. In this context, Lebanese leaders’ attempts to scapegoat refugees are gaining traction. Scapegoating refugees not only allows the political class to delay critical reforms but has also resulted in increasing inter-communal violence. As Lebanon’s freefall continues, the risk of more widespread violence increases. Donors face a dilemma in how best to respond to the crises. The Lebanese political elite have steadfastly refused to implement necessary economic reforms to avoid collapse and have proved to be unsuitable partners for aid operations. To circumvent the government, donors have increased their support to local leaders in the hope that it can help create a more permissive environment for refugees with channelled support through local NGOs. Humanitarians are now trying to meet the needs of vulnerable Lebanese, Syrian refugees, Palestinian refugees, and migrant workers in different humanitarian responses. Aid coordination is becoming a gargantuan task. Shifting to a country-wide or “Whole of Lebanon” response would better streamline the humanitarian response and ensure refugees and vulnerable Lebanese are treated equitably. Donors have little appetite for such an approach, but it could soon be the only viable option. Interviews with international donors revealed a viewpoint that the United States is not capitalising on its potential influence on the refugee file in Lebanon. To maximise the United States’ potential to improve conditions for vulnerable Lebanese and Syrians, it must increase its participation in donor discussions in Beirut and devote more political capital to the issue. The United States and other donors should use this political capital to take advantage of new openings to build the foundations of sustainable development for all. The changing context has created a few, though limited, opportunities to push for programs that are primarily framed as aiding Lebanese yet include refugees.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Refugees, NGOs, and Humanitarian Crisis
Political Geography:
Middle East, Lebanon, and Syria

6. Post-Election Iran and Syria: Continuity or Change?

Author:
Hamidreza Azizi
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
On June 18, conservative cleric Ebrahim Raisi won Iran’s presidential election to succeed moderate President Hassan Rouhani. For many, his victory came amid public dissatisfaction with the dire economic and political situation, along with widespread disqualification of reformist and moderate candidates, which significantly reduced voter turnout. Traditionally, lower turnout in Iranian elections means the victory of conservative or so-called ‘hardline’ figures and so Raisi’s victory was in many ways following a theme. However, even though the election and its outcome indicate a significant shift in Iran’s domestic politics toward more authoritarianism, its impacts on foreign policy, including Iran’s strategy in Syria, will be less tangible. Over the past several years, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has almost completely dominated Iran’s regional policy. At the same time, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei openly seeks to limit the role of the president in foreign policy. Consequently, this means that Iran’s policy in Syria in the post-election period will be more about continuity than about change.
Topic:
Governance, Elections, Leadership, and Transition
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and Syria

7. Security Scenarios for Syria in 2021-2022

Author:
Serhat Erkmen, Nicholas Heras, and Kirill Semenov
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Syria is a geographic entity divided into three main zones of control, each ruled by local actors with the strong and seemingly indefinite support of powerful foreign actors. These three zones are one zone in western, central, and eastern Syria controlled by the Syrian government, a second zone in northwest and northern Syria along the Syrian-Turkish border controlled by the Syrian opposition and supported by Turkey and a third zone in northeast Syria controlled by the Autonomous Administration of Northeast Syria (AANES) and its military the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) - which is supported by the United States and several of its allies that are part of the global coalition to defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). The common perception by observers of the Syrian conflict is that it is frozen; that Syria will be indefinitely divided into these different territorial zones of control. This assumption obscures the fact though that a significant amount of fluidity on the ground within Syria's three main zones of control is possible. Each of these zones has its own unique characteristics and local customs that must be understood to draw broader assessments on how the wider Syrian conflict might be resolved one day.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Governance, and Local
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

8. The Political Economy of Syria’s Physical Fragmentation and Dependence

Author:
Samir Aita
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
It is difficult to imagine how the Syrian conflict could be resolved through a political process alone that does not directly involve the combating forces in Syria – namely the Syrian army and its associated militias linked to the power system in Damascus, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and their Democratic Union Party (PYD) power system, as well as the “opposition” factions and their respective backers, i.e. Iran and Russia, the USA and Turkey. Similarly, it is difficult to imagine such a solution without addressing the political economy that has emerged and that now underpins these forces’ power, the warlords’ chaos-inducing advantages gained from the country’s physical fragmentation, the hidden or open bargains between these warlords and other powers, and the deterioration of Syrians’ living conditions to unbearable levels. The current situation, where the country’s physical fragmentation has reached relative stability, could persist for a long time at the people’s expense. However, several factors could reignite the conflict: growing competition over resources and rent-seeking activities, even within each area of influence; the ongoing decline in much-needed international aid; and the further deterioration of the situation expected in Lebanon and its consequences for Syria.
Topic:
Economics, Political Economy, Politics, Conflict, Peace, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

9. Perspectives on the future of Idlib

Author:
Kirill Semenov
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The situation in Idlib poses a challenge to the Assad government. Damascus has neither the forces nor the means to resolve the problem. Moreover, any operation conducted against the Syrian moderate opposition and the radical alliance “Hayat Tahrir al-Sham” (HTS) concentrated in this region could be significantly problematic for the government. Turkey seeks to establish a protectorate or security zone in Idlib to accommodate those fleeing regime-held areas and prevent a new refugees flow into Turkey. The gains achieved by the Turkish operation in Idlib by the establishment of the security zone has potentially been lost as a result of the subsequent Russian backed Syrian government offensive, which has created a problem for Turkey with hundreds of thousands heading toward the Turkish border and threatening to exasperate what is already a costly refugee problem for Ankara. In order for Turkey to address issues in Idlib, including IDPs and economic problems, it first needs to deal with the HTS, ideally finding a way to dissolve the group. This could potentially be an area of cooperation for Moscow and Ankara. This may be necessary to prevent a deterioration in the security situation and long-term destabilisation of the area.
Topic:
Security, Refugees, Economy, Political stability, Displacement, Syrian War, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), and Transition
Political Geography:
Russia, Turkey, Middle East, Syria, and Idlib

10. Operation Peace Spring: Objectives, Current Situation and its Future

Author:
Serhat Erkmen
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The Peace Spring Operation (PSO), launched on 9 October 2019, was Turkey’s military/diplomatic/political offensive against the People's Defence Units (YPG) in Syria and beyond and was triggered by key dynamics in the country. The first was the redeployment of US troops in the northeast of Syria; second was the expansion of Russia’s area of influence towards the east of the Euphrates; third was the launch of a new phase of the Assad government’s operation in Idlib; forth was a re-evaluation of YPG’s patron-client relationship with the United States and the European Union. Turkey sought to prevent the formation of a Kurdish state and to address the Syrian refugee issue. While Turkey was able to achieve some strategic gains via the PSO, many challenges remain which prevent Ankara from achieving all its objectives. This paper argues that PSO should be analysed in the context of Turkey’s two former operations in Syria, Euphrates Shield Operation (ESO) and Olive Branch Operation (OBO).
Topic:
Military Intervention, Conflict, Syrian War, Transition, and YPG
Political Geography:
Russia, Turkey, Middle East, Syria, and United States of America