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Begin New Search Topic Politics Content Type Working Paper Publishing Institution The Cato Institute

1. The Limits of Democracy

Author:
D. Eric Schansberg
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
There’s an old saying that democracy is the worst form of government, except for all of the others. Or putting it another way: the best form of government is a benevolent and knowledgeable dictator, except for the problem of finding a good and wise leader. Whatever democracy’s strengths, they are relative not absolute, and they are contingent on context—namely, the people being governed, the people governing, and the underlying institutions.
Topic:
Politics, Governance, Democracy, and Populism
Political Geography:
Global Focus

2. The Case against a Carbon Tax

Author:
Robert P. Murphy, Patrick J. Michaels, and Paul "Chip" Knappenberger
Publication Date:
10-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
A vigorous campaign aimed at American policymakers and the general public has tried to create the perception that a federal carbon tax (or similar type of “carbon price”) is a crucial element in the urgently needed response to climate change. Within conservative and libertarian circles, a small but vocal group of academics, analysts, and political officials are claiming that a revenue-neutral carbon tax swap could even deliver a “double dividend” — meaning that the conventional economy would be spurred in addition to any climate benefits. The present study details several serious problems with these claims. The actual economics of climate change — as summarized in the peer-reviewed literature as well as the U.N. and Obama Administration reports — reveal that the case for a U.S. carbon tax is weaker than the public has been told.
Topic:
Climate Change, Economics, Energy Policy, and Politics
Political Geography:
Global Focus

3. A Tale of Two Villages: Kinship Networks and Political Preference Change in Rural India

Author:
Neelanjan Sircar
Publication Date:
09-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
This paper develops a theory on how voters form and change political preferences in democratic developing world contexts. In the developing world, where state institutions are often weak, voters tend to be more focused on the competence and capacity of parties and candidates to deliver benefits. Such information may be difficult to ascertain, so voters must glean information from how candidates conduct themselves during the electoral campaign. Voters use kinship networks to develop more accurate preferences by collectively reasoning through newly available information on candidates. In order to demonstrate these claims, this study analyzes data collected on political preferences and kinship networks in two villages just before and after the campaign period during the 2011 Assembly election in the Indian state of West Bengal. The paper finds very strong kinship network effects on changes in issue preferences and vote choice over the course of the campaign and explains the results through qualitative work and a series of network autoregressive statistical models. In sum, this paper demonstrates how voters develop independent preferences and implement political change, even in low information contexts with weak human capital.
Topic:
Democratization, Politics, Self Determination, and Elections
Political Geography:
India

4. Whose Side Are You On? Identifying the Distributive Preferences of Local Politicians in India

Author:
Mark Schneider and Neelanjan Sircar
Publication Date:
08-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
The literature on decentralized public programs suggests that errors in the targeting of anti-poverty programs are rooted in the capture of these programs by local elites or local politicians. Consistent with the literature on moral economy in political science and experimental economics, we argue that voters in contexts of rural poverty prefer local leaders who target subsistence benefits to the poor. In a high information village context, where voters and leaders know each other, we argue that local elections lead to the selection of local leaders with pro-poor preferences over the distribution of these benefits. We show this with a novel theory of local politicians’ social preferences. We test our theory with unique data from a behavioral measure, conducted in the context of a lottery with a modest cash prize in rural India, that captures a scenario in which local leaders have full discretion and anonymity over allocation among members of their rural communities. We analyze our data using a novel estimation strategy that takes the characteristics of the pool of potential beneficiaries into account in decisions over allocation under a budget constraint. We find that local leaders have strong preferences for targeting the poor, and particularly those they believe supported them politically in the past. This article suggests that free and fair elections at the local level can powerfully encourage pro-poor targeting even in contexts of weak institutions and pervasive poverty. It also makes a fundamental contribution to research on distributive politics by challenging research in this area to demonstrate the effect of electoral strategies and other distortions on allocation relative to local leaders’ baseline distributive preferences.
Topic:
Democratization, Economics, Politics, Political Theory, and Elections
Political Geography:
India

5. The Independent Payment Advisory Board: PPACA's Anti-Constitutional and Authoritarian Super-Legislature

Author:
Michael F. Cannon and Diane Cohen
Publication Date:
06-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
When a member of Congress introduces legislation, the Constitution requires that legislative proposal to secure the approval of the House of Representatives, the Senate, and the president (unless Congress overrides a presidential veto) before it can become law. In all cases, either chamber of Congress may block it.
Topic:
Government, Politics, Governance, and Law
Political Geography:
United States

6. Libertarian Roots of the Tea Party

Author:
David Kirby and Emily McClintock Ekins
Publication Date:
08-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
Many people on the left still dismiss the tea party as the same old religious right, but the evidence says they are wrong. The tea party has strong libertarian roots and is a functionally libertarian influence on the Republican Party.
Topic:
Democratization, Economics, Politics, Insurgency, and Financial Crisis
Political Geography:
United States

7. The Case for Gridlock

Author:
Marcus E. Ethridge
Publication Date:
01-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
In the wake of the 2010 elections, President Obama declared that voters did not give a mandate to gridlock. His statement reflects over a century of Progressive hostility to the inefficient and slow system of government created by the American Framers. Convinced that the government created by the Constitution frustrates their goals, Progressives have long sought ways around its checks and balances. Perhaps the most important of their methods is delegating power to administrative agencies, an arrangement that greatly transformed U.S. government during and after the New Deal. For generations, Progressives have supported the false premise that administrative action in the hands of experts will realize the public interest more effectively than the constitutional system and its multiple vetoes over policy changes. The political effect of empowering the administrative state has been quite different: it fosters policies that reflect the interests of those with well organized power. A large and growing body of evidence makes it clear that the public interest is most secure when governmental institutions are inefficient decisionmakers. An arrangement that brings diverse interests into a complex, sluggish decisionmaking process is generally unattractive to special interests. Gridlock also neutralizes some political benefits that producer groups and other well-heeled interests inherently enjoy. By fostering gridlock, the U.S. Constitution increases the likelihood that policies will reflect broad, unorganized interests instead of the interests of narrow, organized groups.
Topic:
Democratization, Government, Politics, Power Politics, and Governance
Political Geography:
United States and America

8. The Libertarian Vote in the Age of Obama

Author:
David Kirby and David Boaz
Publication Date:
01-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
Libertarian—or fiscally conservative, socially liberal—voters are often torn between their aversions to the Republicans' social conservatism and the Democrats' fiscal irresponsibility. Yet libertarians rarely factor into pundits' and pollsters' analyses.
Topic:
Democratization and Politics
Political Geography:
United States

9. Electronic Employment Eligibility Verification: Franz Kafka's Solution to Illegal Immigration

Author:
Jim Harper
Publication Date:
03-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
In last summer's debate over immigration reform, Congress treated a national electronic employment eligibility verification (EEV) system as a matter of near consensus. Intended to strengthen internal enforcement of the immigration laws, electronic EEV is an Internet-based employee vetting system that the federal government would require every employer to use.
Topic:
Economics, Government, and Politics
Political Geography:
United States

10. A Critique of the National Popular Vote

Author:
John Samples
Publication Date:
10-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
The National Popular Vote plan (NPV), introduced in more than 40 states, and adopted by 4, proposes an interstate compact to bring about direct election of the president of the United States. The proposal eliminates states as electoral districts in presidential elections by creating a national electoral district for the presidential election, thereby advancing a national political identity for the United States. States with small populations and states that are competitive may benefit from the electoral college. Few states clearly benefit from direct election of the president. NPV brings about this change without amending the Constitution, there by undermining the legitimacy of presidential elections. It also weakens federalism by eliminating the role of the states in presidential contests. NPV nationalizes disputed outcomes and cannot offer any certainty that states will not withdraw from the compact when the results of an election become known. NPV will encourage presidential campaigns to focus their efforts in dense media markets where costs per vote are lowest; many states now ignored by candidates will continue to be ignored under NPV. For these reasons, states should not join the National Popular Vote compact.
Topic:
Politics and Political Theory
Political Geography:
United States