Search

Begin New Search Topic Treaties and Agreements Political Geography Europe Content Type Working Paper Publishing Institution EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations

1. The Aachen Mutual Defence Clause: A Closer Look at the Franco-German Treaty

Author:
Elie Perot
Publication Date:
02-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
On 22 January 2019, Emmanuel Macron and Angela Merkel signed a new treaty on “Franco-German cooperation and integration” in Aachen. Complementing the 1963 Elysée Treaty which symbolized the reconciliation between Germany and France in the post-war period, the Aachen Treaty aims to further strengthen the ties between the two countries in the domains of economy, culture, administration, environment, diplomacy and defence. Although the Treaty has been criticised for its lack of ambition, a closer reading of its text reveals some hidden gems, including its mutual defence clause. What does this new clause mean for the Franco-German tandem and for collective defence in Europe?
Topic:
Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Treaties and Agreements, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Europe, France, and Germany

2. Europe in a multipolar missile world – Why the EU and NATO should not try to salvage the INF Treaty

Author:
Bruno Hellendorff
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
On 1 February 2019, the US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced that his country had suspended its compliance with the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty, or INF Treaty, and would withdraw from it within six months. The INF Treaty, little known outside of arms control and disarmament circles, was a landmark Cold War agreement between the United States of America and the USSR – the first to ban an entire category of weapons (ground-based medium- and intermediate-range missiles). The US withdrawal, announced in dramatic terms by President Donald Trump in October 2018, followed the claim that Russia had recently developed and fielded a missile with performances forbidden by the INF Treaty. The end of this little-known treaty is not anecdotal. Not only will it further strain the US-Russia relationship and antagonise allies, it will also contribute to the erosion of what is left of the global arms-control architecture and incentivise arms-race behav- iours among great powers. In a world where security is increasingly less a question of multilateral deliberation and rules-based interactions, the end of the INF Treaty is a further signal that missile technologies are again becoming a venue for competition between great powers: only this time, at least three are playing the game (United States, China and Russia) rather than two (United States and USSR). Additionally, missile technology proliferation has turned into a major dimension of contemporary battlefield realities, and missile programmes of countries such as Iran and North Korea continue to pose important diplomatic and non-proliferation challenges. Meanwhile, Europe is, by and large, left watching as its regional security architecture erodes. Welcome to what US National Security Advisor John Bolton recently termed ‘a multipolar missile world’. The EU should not try to salvage the INF Treaty. Its diplomatic capital might be better spent in areas where it could potentially make a difference, rather than in a treaty to which it is not even party. Existing multilateral regimes and agreements with the EU or its Member States as parties are already in dire need of reinforcement in the face of technological progress, a volatile diplomatic environment and self-centred, competitive political narratives. These include, inter alia, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) framework (including its Structured Dialogue), multilateral export control regimes (MECR) like the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), transparency and trust-building mechanisms like the Hague Code of Conduct against missile proliferation (HCoC), and nuclear-related frame- works like the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or ‘Iran deal’) or the Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Process. These, however, may simply fail to meet the challenge of a multipolar missile world. Renewed efforts, both conceptual and in the realm of capabilities, are needed in a NATO framework to reinforce the linkage between deterrence and diplomacy. NATO-EU dialogue and cooperation on defence issues could be further enhanced, and European countries should work more with like-minded partners at both bilat- eral or multilateral levels on the challenges of non-proliferation and disarmament in the twenty-first century. The demise of the INF Treaty should therefore re-energise the debate on European strategic autonomy, help support collective capability building – not least in NATO – and prompt new discussions on stronger multilateral rules on missile development, use and proliferation.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, Treaties and Agreements, Military Strategy, and European Union
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

3. Spitzenkandidaten: A debate about power and about the future development of the EU

Author:
Jim Cloos
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
In 2014, the European Parliament staged a small 'coup' when it imposed the EPP "Spitzenkandidat" Jean-Claude Juncker as the new Commission President, on the basis of a rather innovative reading of the Treaty. In 2019, the attempt at renewing this operation failed, because of some of the inherent flaws in the concept, and because the conditions were no longer the same. The European Council was quick to reclaim its prerogatives as set out in the Treaty. This may however not be the last word and a revised version of the Spitzenkandidaten could possibly emerge from the upcoming conference on the future of the EU. But any such move towards a more federal Europe requires an informed and transparent debate and cannot be introduced via the back-door.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Treaties and Agreements, European Union, and Centralization
Political Geography:
Europe

4. The European Citizens'Initiative: Next Big Thing or New False Good Idea ?

Author:
Franklin Dehousse
Publication Date:
07-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
One innovative element of the Lisbon Treaty was the creation of a European Citizens' Initiative (ECI). At the time, this was sometimes hailed as a fundamental change in the European institutional system. A few years after the entry into force of the Treaty, however, much less is heard about this “first truly transnational instrument of modern direct democracy”, this “revolution in disguise”, this “very innovative and symbolic” provision5. This could seem surprising at first sight. Since the entry into force of the Treaty, the implementation of this provision has been remarkably rapid. Meanwhile, new arguments have risen concerning the lack of democratic legitimacy of the European Union, and the lack of connection between the European institutions and the citizens.
Topic:
Civil Society, Democratization, Regional Cooperation, Treaties and Agreements, and Governance
Political Geography:
Europe

5. Setting a Standard for stakeholdership. Industry Contribution to a strengthened Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

Author:
Jean Pascal Zanders (Ed.)
Publication Date:
12-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, more commonly known as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), was opened for signature on 10 April 1972. Upon entering into force on 26 March 1975, it was the first treaty ever to ban completely a whole category of weapons. Together with the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the BTWC forms one of the pillars through which the international community deals with weapons of mass destruction.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Arms Control and Proliferation, Peace Studies, Treaties and Agreements, War, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Europe

6. Death of an Institution. The end for Western European Union, a future for European defence?

Author:
Graham Messervy-Whiting and Alyson J. K. Bailes
Publication Date:
05-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
On 31 March 2010 the ten Member States of Western European Union (WEU) announced that the last organs, staffs and activities of that institution would be laid to rest by 30 June 2011. Having resiled from the Modified Brussels Treaty (MBT) of 1954 which created WEU as a successor to the Western Union of 1948, these nations are now working to dispose of the staff, premises and archives at WEU's Brussels offices and its Parliamentary Assembly in Paris. Little public interest has been shown in these moves, perhaps because WEU's operational and political work had already been taken over by the European Union (EU), in the frame of its new European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), at the end of 1999.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
Europe