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Begin New Search Topic Foreign Policy Political Geography London Content Type Working Paper Publishing Institution Centre for International Peace and Security Studies

1. India in Afghanistan: A Rising Power or a Hesitant Power?

Author:
Harsh Pant
Publication Date:
04-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for International Peace and Security Studies
Abstract:
Indian diplomacy faced a major setback at the Afghanistan Conference in London in January 2010, where Indian concerns were summarily ignored. In one stroke, Pakistan rendered New Delhi irrelevant in the evolving security dynamic in Afghanistan. When Indian External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna underscored the folly of making a distinction “between good Taliban and bad Taliban,” he was completely out of sync with the larger mood at the conference. Days before this much-hyped conference, senior U.S. military commanders were suggesting that peace talks with the Taliban may be imminent and that Taliban members might even be invited to join the government in Kabul. The West had made up its mind that it was not a question of if, but when and how to exit from Afghanistan, which seemed to be becoming a quagmire for the leaders in Washington and London.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Terrorism, War, Power Politics, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, United States, Washington, India, Taliban, London, and New Delhi

2. Debunking the 1930s Analogy: Neville Chamberlain's Grand Strategy Re-Examined

Author:
Christopher Layne
Publication Date:
11-2006
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for International Peace and Security Studies
Abstract:
The key events of the 1930s Hitler's rise to power, Germany's reoccupation of the Rhineland, the Anschluss with Austria, Munich and the subsequent German occupation of Prague in March 1939, and the outbreak of World War II in September 1939 transpired some seventy years ago. The events of the 1930s or at least Churchill's depiction of them have provided the standard images that have shaped U.S. foreign policy and scholarly research alike: falling dominoes, insatiable dictators, the interdependency of strategic commitments, the importance of demonstrating resolve, and the impossibility of achieving diplomatic accommodation with nondemocratic regimes. But does the myth track with the historical record? Does the 1930s myth accurately explain British grand strategy in the 1930s? Simply stated, my argument is that the 1930s myth as commonly understood in the United States is bad history, and that its use has contributed importantly to a series of dubious policy decisions by U.S. decisionmakers and still does. As I demonstrate, the British, in fact, were not willfully blind to the German threat or indifferent to the need to rearm to meet it. Rather, during the 1930s, London formulated a quintessentially realist grand strategy that attempted to blend deterrence and diplomacy to contain Hitler's Germany (and Japan and Italy), and defend Britain's interests as a world power by avoiding what, for Britain, could only be a disastrous war.
Topic:
Foreign Policy and War
Political Geography:
Britain, United States, Japan, Europe, London, Germany, Italy, and Austria

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