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  • Author: Stephanie Sanok Kostro, Rhys McCormick
  • Publication Date: 01-2015
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: Center for Strategic and International Studies
  • Abstract: While the united states has long acknowledged the value of working with partner nations to address shared security concerns, drawdowns in defense spending have underscored the importance of bilateral and multilateral cooperation to leverage capabilities and investments. the Center for strategic and International studies' multiyear Federated Defense Project aims to inform policymakers about global and regional security architectures and defense capabilities that support the achievement of common security goals, as well as ways to improve defense cooperation among nations to address those goals together. This report on institutional foundations of federated defense recognizes that successful cooperation in a budget-constrained environment often rests on the u.s. ability and willing-ness to provide assistance and/or equipment to partner nations. CSIS project staff drew on a literature review, workshops, and a public event (“the Future of the security Cooperation Enterprise”) to identify key findings in five areas: Priorities/Strategic Guidance: Proponents of federated defense should better articulate priorities. A proactive, interagency component that includes, at a minimum, officials from the Defense Department, State Department, and White House is necessary to effect a cultural shift and combat potential backsliding into unilateral approaches. Foreign Military Sales: In a federated approach, officials should identify capabilities that could most effectively support partner nations' contributions to federated defense. Toward that end, officials should also emphasize the establishment and maintenance of high-demand capabilities over time. other key issues related to potential difficulties in foreign sales include surcharges, overhead costs, and transparency in offsets. Export Controls: study participants noted that recent export control reform efforts have not yet resulted in significant change and have inadequately addressed industry concerns. Moreover, there appears to be a lack of appetite for these reforms in Congress. Technology Security and Foreign Disclosure: Improvements are needed to coordinate and speed technology transfer and foreign disclosure decisions. transparency across stovepipes within the executive branch is critical to create a common vision and objectives for federated defense, which is especially important when working with industry and foreign government partners. Acquisition and Requirements Processes: Within the Department of Defense, there is insufficient consideration of the export value and challenges of systems in early stages of the acquisition and requirements processes. Modifications during late stages of development are often far more expensive than building in exportability earlier. Having examined these key areas, the study team identified and analyzed three over-arching institutional challenges to and opportunities for federated defense. First, study participants remarked upon the lack of sufficient advocacy for federated defense among senior U.S. government officials. A second challenge was the cultural resistance to federated defense; experts noted that significant cultural change, such as that brought about by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Pub.L. 99-433), may require top-down direction, years to implement, and decades to be accepted. A third challenge was the need for a perceived or actual budget crisis to drive change. The study team's recommendations resulting from this examination were five-fold. First, U.S. national strategies should address the grand strategy questions that could imperil implementation of a federated approach. Implementation of the u.s. National security strategy could impel a new effort to focus on partner capabilities and areas for sharing the common global security burden, as well as to prioritize interests and activities related to U.S. security cooperation, export controls, and technology security/foreign disclosure. Second, proactive U.S. leaders should articulate a vision, objectives, and priorities for a federated approach to defense. third, the Administration and Congress should work together to ensure completion of legal and regulatory reforms already under way (e.g., on export controls). Fourth, executive and legislative officials—perhaps through an interagency task force that works with committee staffs—should identify additional reforms to streamline or create authorities and to eliminate unhelpful directed spending on capabilities and systems that do not contribute to federated defense. Finally, the Department of Defense should start with incremental steps to create a culture that values federated defense; for example, the Defense Acquisition University and Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management could update coursework to institutionalize knowledge regarding federated approaches. This study made it clear that enduring changes in these five areas—from strategy to culture—are necessary to ensure the success of a federated approach to defense.
  • Topic: Security, Science and Technology, Budget
  • Political Geography: United States
  • Author: Anthony H. Cordesman, Aaron Linn
  • Publication Date: 03-2015
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: Center for Strategic and International Studies
  • Abstract: The tensions between the Koreas – and the potential involvement of the People's Republic of China (China or PRC), Japan, Russia, and the United States of America (US) in a Korean conflict – create a nearly open-ended spectrum of possible conflicts. These conflicts could range from posturing and threats – “wars of intimidation” – to a major conventional conflict on the Korean Peninsula, intervention by outside powers like the US and China, and the extreme of nuclear conflict.
  • Political Geography: Russia, United States, Japan, China, Korea, Northeast Asia
  • Publication Date: 07-2015
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: Center for Strategic and International Studies
  • Abstract: North Korea last week rejected South Korea’s invitation to attend the Seoul Defense Dialogue in September, denigrating the talks as “puerile.” In the same breath, it also rejected a proposal by National Assembly speaker Chung Ui-hwa for a meeting with his northern counterpart to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the liberation of the Korean Peninsula on Aug. 15. If you ask an Obama administration official about America’s “strategic patience” policy of non-dialogue with North Korea, he or she will tell you that the problem is not an unwillingness on the part of the United States to have dialogue. On the contrary, the Obama administration has tried every channel possible, from six-party talks to personal communications to secret trips, to jump-start a dialogue. But the regime in Pyongyang has rejected all of these.
  • Topic: Conflict Resolution, Defense Policy, International Security
  • Political Geography: United States, South Korea, North Korea
  • Author: Maren Leed, J.D. McCreary, George Flynn
  • Publication Date: 08-2015
  • Content Type: Working Paper
  • Institution: Center for Strategic and International Studies
  • Abstract: The demand for amphibious capabilities in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region reflects the operational and strategic challenges faced by the U.S. Marine Corps and Australian Defense Forces. Both nations have indicated the importance of deepening their strategic partnership, yet there has been a lack of clarity around the desired outcomes for and priority among the variety of cooperative activities. Recognizing that the demand for amphibious capabilities in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region will likely continue to exceed the current capacity of any one nation, the CSIS International Security Program sought to explore the strategic and operational utility of various models for combined amphibious forces. The study first provides an overview of existing and projected ADF and USMC amphibious capability and capacity. Using data gathered from interviews with U.S. and Australian subject matter experts, the study examines two potential force options along five dimensions: range/duration, responsiveness, scale, breadth, and force protection. These options are evaluated against three mission sets varying in complexity. As the United States continues to face shortfalls in amphibious capacity and as Australia continues to advance its capabilities, this report provides a framework and recommendations through which to align strategic interests and advance a shared vision for combined amphibious operations.
  • Political Geography: United States, Australia