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Begin New Search Content Type Working Paper Publishing Institution Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM) Publication Year within 25 Years Publication Year within 5 Years

21. Can Non-State Actors Help to Overcome Barriers to State Cooperation? The Case of Global Climate Governance

Author:
Poorti Sapatnekar
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
While nation-states remain primary protagonists in global governance processes, it is increasingly recognized that non-state actors (NSAs) are key players in areas ranging from human rights and civil conflict to infectious disease and nuclear non-proliferation. The area of climate change is an illustrative example. NSAs have been active participants in the margins of the Conference of Parties (COP), the annual meeting of Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), since its inception in 1995 by holding side-events and protests, raising awareness, lobbying, etc. NSAs have also contributed to the development of a “regime complex” in climate governance at the same time. Yet, the determinants and effects of that participation are not well understood. The COP offers a unique opportunity to examine one piece of this puzzle; namely, the factors that enable and motivate NSAs to participate in the design and implementation of international agreements. We use an original dataset of NSA participants at the COP from 1995 to 2016, to examine whether NSAs are well positioned to help states overcome key barriers to cooperation. As NSAs ramp up their participation in climate governance and elsewhere, this study offers insight into their motivations and potential impact on governance outcomes.
Topic:
Climate Change, United Nations, Non State Actors, and Governance
Political Geography:
Global Focus

22. North Korea’s Shift to Diplomacy in 2018: A Result of U.S. Pressure or North Korean Security Calculus?

Author:
Naoko Aoki
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
After conducting a record number of missile and nuclear tests in 2016 and 2017, North Korea dramatically changed its policy approach and embarked on a diplomatic initiative in 2018. It announced a self-imposed halt on missile and nuclear tests and held summit meetings with the United States, China, and South Korea from spring of that year. Why did North Korea shift its policy approach? This paper evaluates four alternative explanations. The first is that the change was driven by North Korea’s security calculus. In other words, North Korea planned to achieve its security goals first before turning to diplomacy and successfully followed through with this plan. The second is that U.S. military threats forced North Korea to change its course. The third is that U.S.-led sanctions caused North Korea to shift its policy by increasing economic pain on the country. The fourth is that diplomatic initiatives by South Korea and others prompted North Korea to change its position. This paper examines the actions and statements of the United States, North Korea, China, South Korea, and Russia leading up to and during this period to assess these four explanations. It concludes that military threats and economic pain did not dissuade North Korea from obtaining what it considered an adequate level of nuclear deterrence against the United States and that North Korea turned to diplomacy only after achieving its security goals. External pressure may have encouraged North Korea to speed up its efforts to develop the capacity to strike the United States with a nuclear-armed missile, the opposite of its intended effect. Diplomatic and economic pressure may have compelled Kim Jong Un to declare that North Korea had achieved its “state nuclear force” before conducting all the nuclear and ballistic missile tests needed to be fully confident that it could hit targets in the continental United States. These findings suggest that if a pressure campaign against North Korea is to achieve its intended impact, the United States has to more carefully consider how pressure would interact with North Korean policy priorities. Pressure should be applied only to pursue specific achievable goals and should be frequently assessed for its impact.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Nonproliferation, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

23. China on Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Strategic Stability

Author:
Nancy Gallagher
Publication Date:
08-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
China and the United States view each other as potential adversaries with mixed motives and divergent value systems, yet both can benefit from cooperation to reduce the risk of war, avert arms races, and prevent proliferation or terrorist access to weapons of mass destruction. The two countries have more common interests, fewer ideological differences, and greater economic interdependence than the United States and the Soviet Union had during the Cold War. In principle, arms control broadly defined, i.e., cooperation to reduce the likelihood of war, the level of destruction should war occur, the cost of military preparations, and the role of threats and use of force in international relations, could be at least as important in this century as it was in the last. In practice, though, China’s rise as a strategic power has not been matched by a corresponding increase in the kinds of cooperative agreements that helped keep the costs and risks of superpower competition from spiraling out of control. Why not? This paper argues that because China’s strategy rests on different assumptions about security and nuclear deterrence than U.S. strategy does, its ideas about arms control are different, too. China has historically put more value on broad declarations of intent, behavioral rules, and self-control, while the United States has prioritized specific quantitative limits on capabilities, detailed verification and compliance mechanisms, and operational transparency. When progress has occurred, it has not been because China finally matched the United States in some military capability, or because Chinese officials and experts “learned” to think about arms control like their American counterparts do. Rather, it has happened when Chinese leaders believed that the United States and other countries with nuclear weapons were moving toward its ideas about security cooperation--hopes that have repeatedly been disappointed. Understanding Chinese attitudes toward security cooperation has gained added importance under the Trump administration for two reasons. Trump’s national security strategy depicts China and Russia as equally capable antagonists facing the United States in a “new era of great power competition,” so the feasibility and desirability of mutually beneficial cooperation with China have become more urgent questions. The costs and risks of coercive competition will keep growing until both sides accept that they outweigh whatever benefits might accrue from trying to maximize power and freedom of action in a tightly interconnected world.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
United States, China, Taiwan, and Asia

24. China’s evolving nuclear 
export control regime

Author:
Xu Chunyang
Publication Date:
08-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
The Chinese nuclear industry is actively pursuing international trade under China’s new “Go Global” policy. This development could strain Chinese nuclear export control systems in the coming decades. This paper investigates the evolution of the Chinese nuclear export control regime from the late 1970s to the present, describes the current state of the Chinese export control system, and investigates recent Chinese efforts to build a more robust system. It finds that although the Chinese strategic export control systems have grown tremendously since they first took shape and the capacity of the government to implement these controls has grown as well, significant improvements in both the legal basis for the controls and the capacity of institutions involved are still needed, including in how current laws define exports, in how government bodies are equipped to investigate violations, and in how violations are prosecuted. The Ministry of the Commerce is preparing a new “Export Control Law” that is expected to come into effect soon and to provide the basis for more robust controls that address many of the deficiencies identified above. The Chinese government’s growing commitment to undertaking its international obligations and safeguarding the peaceful use of nuclear energy provides reason for optimism, but in the near term, the effectiveness of these corrective efforts will depend on the completion, implementation, and enforcement of the new law.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Trade and Finance, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
China, Beijing, and Asia

25. Do as I Say, and as I Do: 
Chinese Leadership in Nuclear Security

Author:
Sara Z. Kutchesfahani
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
This paper analyzes China’s words and actions regarding the Nuclear Security Summits to better understand what Chinese leadership on nuclear security could look like in the future. It finds that China accomplished the many things it said it would do during the summit process. The paper also explores how China’s policy and actions in other nuclear arenas could be paired with Chinese nuclear security policy to form a coherent agenda for nuclear risk reduction writ large. Consequently, the paper addresses how China doing as it says and does – per nuclear security – may be used as a way in which to inform its future nuclear security roles and responsibilities. In particular, it assesses China’s opportunities to assume a leadership role within this crucial international security issue area, especially at a time where U.S. leadership has waned.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
United States, China, Beijing, and Asia

26. Iranian Public Opinion under “Maximum Pressure”

Author:
Nancy Gallagher, Ebrahim Mohseni, and Clay Ramsay
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
The Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM) has been conducting in- depth surveys of Iranian public opinion on nuclear policy, regional security, economics, domestic politics, and other topics since the summer of 2014. Each survey includes a combination of trend-line questions, some going as far back as 2006, and new questions written to assess and inform current policy debates. This report covers findings from three surveys fielded in May, August, and early October 2019 to evaluate how the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” campaign is affecting public opinion in Iran. The United States withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in May 2018, and began re-imposing sanctions on Iran that the Obama administration had lifted under the terms of the 2015 agreement it had negotiated with Iran, Britain, France, Germany, Russia and China. In the fall of 2018, it blacklisted hundreds of Iranian entities and threatened to impose secondary sanctions on anyone who did business with them. In spring of 2019, it tried to prevent Iran from getting any revenue from oil sales, its main export, by ending exemptions for key customers. In the summer of 2019, it tightened constraints on Iran’s access to the international financial system, including channels that had been used to pay for medicines and other humanitarian goods that were officially exempted from earlier sanctions. It also sanctioned Iran’s foreign minister, complicating his ability to interact with U.S. officials, experts, and media figures. The Trump administration’s stated objective is to keep imposing more sanctions until Iran acquiesces to a long list of U.S. demands articulated by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. The original twelve points include the types of restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program that the government rejected during previous negotiations and that the Iranian public has consistently opposed. It also includes stopping development of nuclear-capable missiles, ending support for various groups throughout the Middle East, halting cyberattacks and other threatening activities, and releasing all U.S. and allied detainees. Pompeo subsequently added other demands related to civil liberties in Iran. The Iranian public enthusiastically supported the JCPOA when it was first signed, partly due to unrealistic expectations about how much and how quickly economic benefits would materialize. After the International Atomic Energy Agency certified in January 2016 that Iran had met all of its nuclear obligations and implementation of sanctions relief began, foreign companies were slow to ramp up permissible trade with Iran or to make major investments there before they knew how the next U.S. president would view the JCPOA. By the end of the Obama administration few Iranians said that they had seen any economic benefits from the deal and most lacked confidence that the other signatories would uphold their obligations. But a solid majority of Iranians (55%) still approved of the agreement.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

27. Fissile Materials Security in Civilian Facilities

Author:
Robert D. Lamb and Arpitha Peteru
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
This report presents the results of a preliminary study focused on the following question: What will it take at this point to encourage civilian facilities to adopt safer alternatives to fissile materials and, more broadly, to develop a culture of security enabling facilities to be more proactive in mitigating and adapting to risk as it emerges and evolves. Its purpose is not to provide a definitive answer but to map the factors affecting nuclear security so the next phase of research can prioritize attention to the dynamics most likely to influence the quality of nuclear security governance in the future. Perhaps more importantly, this report seeks to draw attention to underemphasized opportunities to experiment with different pathways to nuclear security. For this scoping study, the general problem of nuclear security governance needed to be bounded, so this report’s primary focus is on the security of fissile materials. But a number of our observations are likely to be applicable to radiological materials as well. Given the preliminary nature of this study, these observations should be taken as hypotheses that are worth testing, rather than as robust findings. Our recommendations are therefore geared toward future research rather than policy and governance. Our primary audience is the nuclear security NGO community and their funders rather than government or industry. Throughout this report we use the terms “advocates” or “experts” as a convenient shorthand for this audience, even though we recognize that different NGOs have different missions and take different approaches: some as scholars, some as conveners, some as advocates. Most, however, seem to focus their efforts on what it will take to improve nuclear security, however they individually define it. And most seem to recognize that their collective efforts and progress toward their collective goal have both stalled. The focus of this study, therefore, was on the factors that stand between their efforts and their goals, asking: Why isn’t nuclear security improving at the rate or scale advocates believe is necessary? What are the factors and dynamics preventing progress? And where are the most promising opportunities for kickstarting progress? The approach we took to answer these questions is a system mapping exercise. System mapping involves a set of well-developed methods and visualizations for making sense of situations involving many factors, many actors, and perplexing outcomes. By displaying how different factors affect each other, we are able to show the causal structure of the problem in a way that clearly identifies the likely dynamics preventing progress, plus potential paths to self-sustaining solutions. A system map also makes it easier for anyone working on any aspect of nuclear security see how their work fits in to the collective effort. (It can also serve, in future research, as a basis for simulating different strategies to aid in decision making.)
Topic:
National Security, NGOs, and Civil-Military Relations
Political Geography:
Global Focus