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11. Civil Society and the Global Pandemic: Building Back Different?

Author:
Carnegie Civic Research Network
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Since the coronavirus pandemic began, civic activists around the world have shifted into a higher gear. As Carnegie’s Civic Research Network analyzed last year, the gravity of the health emergency has pushed many civil society organizations (CSOs) to engage in new ways to help alleviate the pandemic’s impact.1 Sometimes they have done this in cooperation with governments, but other times they have acted on their own out of frustration at governments’ sluggish and inadequate responses to the emergency. At the same time, many activists have had to defend themselves as governments have used the pandemic as a pretext for further clamping down on independent civil society voices, under the cover of emergency laws passed to help manage the crisis. As civic activists grapple with the challenges of the pandemic, they are also turning their attention to the long term. It is clear that the pandemic will reshape economics, politics, and international relations, but it is not yet clear how. Many countries are undergoing major economic upheaval and are searching for new economic templates to overcome the damage they have experienced. On the political side, the pandemic has fueled authoritarian actions and damaged the credibility of many democratic governments. Post-pandemic political life will likely entail heightened struggles for democracy and a search for new democratic practices that more effectively meet citizens’ needs. With regard to geopolitics, the pandemic is contributing to still greater tensions between the world’s major powers. Because of these factors, the pandemic is likely to have a long-term impact on the nature of civil society worldwide. Civil society has already adapted to the coronavirus pandemic through the growth of self-help activism. Looking further ahead, civic actors are helping to spark a rethink of economic models. In the political sphere, at least some civic actors are engaging in efforts to revitalize democratic politics, including through new ideas on technology’s role in post-pandemic politics. Finally, civil society is being reshaped by geopolitical competition: some civil society actors are being pulled into the Chinese and Russian orbits, while others are more firmly resisting political encroachment by these powers. In an overarching sense, civic activists are juggling uneasily at present as they focus on the immediate challenges of the pandemic while also trying to fashion new economic, political, and geostrategic agendas for the period after the pandemic.2
Topic:
Civil Society, Politics, Economy, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Activism
Political Geography:
Global Focus

12. Financial Markets and Social Media: Lessons From Information Security

Author:
Claudia Biancotti and Paolo Ciocca
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
On January 28, 2021, stocks in U.S.-based video game retailer GameStop Corp. reached an all-time high of $483. Two weeks earlier, they had been trading at $20. Two weeks later, they were down again, and a congressional hearing on the matter was underway in Washington. Wild swings are hardly uncommon in financial markets. This episode, however, had novel characteristics. In a recent report, the U. S. Securities and Exchange Commission states that “GameStop Corp and multiple other stocks experienced a dramatic increase in their share price in January 2021 as bullish sentiments of individual investors filled social media.” 1 Retail traders congregating on the Reddit platform were key in both price formation and the emergence of a “Main Street versus Wall Street” narrative around the stock.2 The influence of social media on financial markets is here to stay, as younger generations start saving and investing. This carries both opportunities and risks. Information sharing and discussion on internet platforms can improve market transparency and efficiency. On the other hand, social media platforms are known vehicles of disinformation and manipulation of human behavior. They could be weaponized by malicious actors, ranging from state-sponsored groups to crime syndicates, looking to compromise market integrity and financial stability. For liberal democracies with independent financial watchdogs, a complex policy challenge follows. In order to fight information operations, financial authorities will need to cooperate with intelligence communities and other relevant parts of executive branches. This requires rules that clearly define each party’s role and encourage reciprocal trust. In many jurisdictions, cybersecurity statutes provide a starting point. They are, however, limited in scope, only covering cooperation vis-& agrave;-vis traditional cyber attacks. In this paper, we argue that the model must evolve to help prevent or defend against malicious information operations.3 We highlight, as a first step, the importance of organizational modules that allow entities with different levels of access to classified information to work together to assess and inform responses to hostile operations.
Topic:
Security, Markets, Finance, and Social Media
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America

13. Multipolarity in Practice: Understanding Russia’s Engagement With Regional Institutions

Author:
Paul Stronski and Richard Sokolsky
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Over the past two decades, and especially since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014, the Kremlin has intensified its engagement with international institutions. This paper evaluates the drivers of this involvement, Russian views of three of these organizations, and Moscow’s success in achieving its objectives.
Topic:
International Relations, Regional Cooperation, Multilateralism, and Institutions
Political Geography:
Russia and Global Focus

14. Toward Accountable Nuclear Deterrents: How Much is Too Much?

Author:
George Perkovich
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
For decades, policy debates in nuclear-armed states and alliances have centered on the question, “How much is enough?” What size and type of arsenal, and what doctrine, are enough to credibly deter given adversaries? This paper argues that the more urgent question today is, “How much is too much?” What size and type of arsenal, and what doctrine, are too likely to produce humanitarian and environmental catastrophe that would be strategically and legally indefensible? Two international initiatives could help answer this question. One would involve nuclear-armed states, perhaps with others, commissioning suitable scientific experts to conduct new studies on the probable climatic and environmental consequences of nuclear war. Such studies would benefit from recent advances in modeling, data, and computing power. They should explore what changes in numbers, yields, and targets of nuclear weapons would significantly reduce the probability of nuclear winter. If some nuclear arsenals and operational plans are especially likely to threaten the global environment and food supply, nuclear-armed states as well as non-nuclear-weapon states would benefit from actions to physically reduce such risks. The paper suggests possible modalities for international debate on these issues. The second initiative would query all nuclear-armed states whether they plan to adhere to international humanitarian law in deciding if and when to detonate nuclear weapons, and if so, how their arsenals and operational plans affirm their intentions (or not). The United Kingdom and the United States have committed, in the words of the 2018 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, to “adhere to the law of armed conflict” in any “initiation and conduct of nuclear operations.” But other nuclear-armed states have been more reticent, and the practical meaning of such declarations needs to be clarified through international discussion. The two proposed initiatives would help states and civil society experts to better reconcile the (perceived) need for nuclear deterrence with the strategic, legal, and physical imperatives of reducing the probability that a war escalates to catastrophic proportions. The concern is not only for the well-being of belligerent populations, but also for those in nations not involved in the posited conflict. Traditional security studies and the policies of some nuclear-armed states have ignored these imperatives. Accountable deterrents—in terms of international law and human survival—would be those that met the security and moral needs of all nations, not just one or two. These purposes may be too modest for states and activists that prefer the immediate prohibition and abolition of nuclear weapons. Conversely, advocates of escalation dominance in the United States and Russia—and perhaps in Pakistan and India—will find the force reductions and doctrinal changes implied by them too demanding. Yet, the positions of both of these polarized groups are unrealistic and/or unacceptable to a plurality of attentive states and experts. To blunt efforts to stifle further analysis and debate of these issues, the appendix of this paper heuristically rebuts leading arguments against accountable deterrents. Middle powers and civil society have successfully put new issues on the global agenda and created political pressure on major powers to change policies. Yet, cooperation from at least one major nuclear power is necessary to achieve the changes in nuclear deterrent postures and policies explored here. In today’s circumstances, China may be the pivotal player. The conclusion suggests ways in which China could extend the traditional restraint in its nuclear force posture and doctrine into a new approach to nuclear arms control and disarmament with the United States and Russia that could win the support of middle powers and international civil society. If the looming breakdown in the global nuclear order is to be averted, and the dangers of nuclear war to be lessened, new ideas and political coalitions need to gain ascendance. The initiatives proposed here intended to stimulate the sort of analysis and debate from which such ideas and coalitions can emerge.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Environment, Nuclear Power, Weapons, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Russia, China, India, Global Focus, and United States of America

15. Cyberspace and Geopolitics: Assessing Global Cybersecurity Norm Processes at a Crossroads

Author:
Christian Ruhl, Duncan Hollis, Wyatt Hoffman, and Tim Maurer
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
As cyber insecurity has become a growing problem worldwide, states and other stakeholders have sought to increase stability for cyberspace. As a result, a new ecosystem of “cyber norm” processes has emerged in diverse fora and formats. Today, United Nations (UN) groups (for example, the Group of Governmental Experts [GGE] and the Open-Ended Working Group [OEWG]), expert commissions (for example, the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace), industry coalitions (for example, the Tech Accord, the Charter of Trust), and multistakeholder collectives (for example, the Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace) all purport to identify or operationalize various normative standards of behavior for states and/or other stakeholders in cyberspace. As some of these processes wind down (for example, the Global Commission) and others wind up (for example, the OEWG), cyber norms are at a crossroads where each process’s potential (and problems) looms large.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Geopolitics, and Norms
Political Geography:
Global Focus

16. Cyber Mapping the Financial System

Author:
Jan-Philipp Brauchle, Matthias Göbel, Jens Seiler, and Christoph Von Busekist
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Cyber risks present a growing threat for individual agents in the financial system: banks, insurers, central counterparties, and the like. However, cyber events may also have the potential to destabilize the financial system as a whole. While dedicated microprudential regulatory and supervisory regimes are in place or are being developed to manage cyber risks especially at credit institutions, what is lacking is a systemic view of cyber risks that particularly sheds light on concentrations and contagion channels that are material to the financial system.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Finance, Networks, Risk, and Financial Institutions
Political Geography:
Global Focus

17. War, Terrorism, and Catastrophe in Cyber Insurance: Understanding and Reforming Exclusions

Author:
Jon Bateman
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Cyber insurance is a promising way to contain the havoc cyber attacks wreak, but endless lawsuits hamper its effectiveness. Reforms and new solutions are sorely needed. Insurance is one of the most promising tools for addressing pervasive cyber insecurity. A robust market for insuring cyber incidents could, among other things, financially incentivize organizations to adopt better cyber hygiene—thereby reducing cyber risk for society as a whole. But cyber insurance is not yet mature enough to fulfill its potential, partly due to uncertainty about what kinds of cyber risks are, or can be, insured. Uncertainties in cyber insurance came to a head in 2017, when the Russian government conducted a cyber attack of unprecedented scale. Data-destroying malware called NotPetya infected hundreds of organizations in dozens of countries, including major multinational companies, causing an estimated $10 billion in losses.1 NotPetya showed that cyber risk was greater than previously recognized, with higher potential for “aggregation”—the accumulation of losses across many insurance policies from a single incident or several correlated events. NotPetya also exposed a serious ambiguity in how insurance policies treat state-sponsored cyber incidents. Some property and casualty insurers declined to pay NotPetya-related claims, instead invoking their war exclusions—long-standing clauses that deny coverage for “hostile or warlike action in time of peace and war” perpetrated by states or their agents.2 War exclusions date back to the 1700s, but they had never before been applied to cyber incidents. This novel use of the war exclusion, still being litigated, has raised doubts about whether adequate or reliable coverage exists for state-sponsored cyber incidents. Some observers have asked whether such incidents are insurable at all, given the potential for aggregated cyber losses even more catastrophic than those of NotPetya.3 And while the war exclusion has attracted the most attention, another exclusion—for terrorism—presents similar challenges to cyber claims.
Topic:
Terrorism, War, Cybersecurity, and Non-Traditional Threats
Political Geography:
Global Focus

18. Enduring Cyber Threats and Emerging Challenges to the Financial Sector

Author:
Adrian Nish, Saher Naumaan, and James Muir
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Cybersecurity is a unique challenge for the financial sector. To prevent massive financial losses, banks and other financial institutions should understand how cyber threat groups could launch complex new cyber attacks. At the time of writing, several financial services firms are working to restore their networks following disruptive cyber attacks. Banks in Chile and Seychelles, as well as financial technology companies like Silverlake Axis, a supplier of core banking systems throughout the Asia-Pacific, are all reportedly victims of separate ransom and extortion attempts. Elsewhere, the threat from cyber criminals triggered a suspension of automatic teller machine (ATM) transactions overnight, and hackers recently knocked websites associated with a stock exchange offline using distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks. Such disruptions not only impact customers of these services, but also undermine the confidence of peers in the financial services community. Regulators have been taking increasing notice of these cyber threats, and operational resilience has shot to the top of agendas around the world. A few years ago, targeted attacks on financial services sector firms were still relatively rare. However, cases have increased in recent years as capabilities and specialisms such as network intrusion have advanced. BAE Systems in partnership with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has documented public examples via the Timeline of Cyber Incidents Involving Financial Institutions. This timeline serves as a useful resource in tracking trends, even though public cases are just the tip of the iceberg and the true volume of incidents and near misses is much greater.
Topic:
Security, Finance, Non-Traditional Threats, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
Global Focus

19. Is the Coronavirus Catalyzing New Civic Collaborations for Open Government?

Author:
Abigail Bellows and Nada Zohdy
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The pandemic is spurring elite and grassroots civic actors to cooperate more, but the gulf between them remains wide. Civic actors must seize the opportunity for reform on open government issues. From Africa to Latin America to Europe, the coronavirus pandemic has generated a surge in public demand for government transparency and accountability. To seize this window for reform, elite and grassroots civic actors concerned with open governance must overcome the cleavage that has long existed between them. Thus far, the pandemic has catalyzed some new civic collaborations, but not at the scale or depth needed to seize that window. In general, civil society groups report feeling more isolated during the pandemic. In some places, the urgency of tackling open government issues during the pandemic has helped overcome that isolation by deepening partnerships among existing networks. But in other places, those partnerships have yet to take shape, and new alliances are less likely to form without the benefit of face-to-face interactions. Even the partnerships that have crystallized or deepened do not appear to be changing the fundamental roles of elite and grassroots civic actors. It is possible that this shift may happen over time. Or it may be that the pandemic alone is not enough to dislodge structural barriers to deeper cooperation. The pandemic has dramatically changed the operations of elite and grassroots actors alike. The impact of those changes on collaboration between the two depends on preexisting levels of technological capacity. In places with limited connectivity, the pandemic has exacerbated the digital divide, adversely affecting grassroots actors. Meanwhile, in places with good connectivity, technology is enabling broader (though shallower) participation, laying the groundwork for more elite-grassroots collaboration. Although many civil society groups are struggling financially during the pandemic, those effects are mitigated to some degree by continuing donor interest in the open government sector. This is encouraging, as coalition building requires dedicated, flexible resources. Finally, it is a more dangerous time to be working on open government issues in general, and grassroots actors bear disproportionate risks in doing so. This underscores the need for more vertical alliances to mitigate civic space threats.
Topic:
Civil Society, Government, Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Global Focus

20. Research Collaboration on Influence Operations Between Industry and Academia: A Way Forward

Author:
Jacob N. Shapiro, Natalie Thompson, and Alicia Wanless
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Research on influence operations requires effective collaboration across industry and academia. Federally funded research and development centers provide a compelling model for multi-stakeholder collaboration among those working to counter influence operations. Research on influence operations requires effective collaboration across industry and academia. Social media platforms are on the front lines of combating influence operations and possess a wealth of unique data and insights. Academics have rigorous training in research methods and relevant theories, and their independence lends credibility to their findings. The skills and knowledge of both groups are critical to answering important questions about influence operations and ultimately finding more effective ways to counter them. Despite shared interest in studying and addressing influence operations, existing institutions do not provide the proper structures and incentives for cross-sector collaboration. Friction between industry and academia has stymied collaboration on a range of important questions such as how influence operations spread, what effects they have, and what impact potential interventions could have. Present arrangements for research collaboration remain ad hoc, small-scale, and nonstandard across platforms and academic institutions. Federally funded research and development centers (FFRDCs) provide a compelling model for multi-stakeholder collaboration among those working to counter influence operations. Federally funded research institutions—such as the RAND Corporation, the Institute for Defense Analyses, or the MITRE Corporation—have hosted successful cross-sector collaboration between the federal government and academic institutions for more than seventy years. Academic and industry researchers should seek funding and create an analogous institution so the influence operations research community can further collaborative research on shared interests that cannot be addressed with existing models. Drawing from such models, industry would be a primary funder, but governments and philanthropic donors could also contribute to encourage independence and balance.
Topic:
Development, Academia, and Influence
Political Geography:
Global Focus