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511. A 'Bright Path' Forward or a Grim Dead End? The Political Impact of the Belt and Road Initiative in Kazakhstan

Author:
Anton Louthan
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
This report assesses the political impact of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Kazakhstan. Specifically, it examines whether and how the People’s Republic of China can pursue a strategy of economic statecraft to further its foreign policy and political interests in Kazakhstan. Despite Kazakhstan’s importance for the success of the BRI’s overland trade corridors, the report argues that important financial, foreign policy, and political constraints limit Beijing’s potential to influence Nur-Sultan. Beijing’s concerns over upsetting its relationship with the Russian Federation and the fact that the value of bilateral trade, investment, and Kazakhstani indebtedness to China have decreased in recent years suggest that Beijing is less willing to, capable of, or interested in using the BRI to influence Kazakhstan. The perceived closeness in this bilateral relationship has less to do with the influence of the BRI and more to do with the alignment of both countries’ geopolitical interests before the initiative’s creation. The report does not suggest that Chinese influence has decreased, but rather shows how Kazakhstan has been able to maintain a degree of political autonomy. Nur-Sultan has played a proactive role in forming its relationship with Beijing through its pursuit of former President Nursultan Nazarbayev’s “multi-vector” foreign policy strategy. In diversifying Kazakhstan’s diplomatic, economic, and political ties with Russia, China, the European Union, and the United States, Nur-Sultan has been able to avoid complete dependence on one country. Furthermore, Kazakhstan has been able to shape the size and scope of Chinese economic activity by guiding the initiative’s investments and projects to further the government’s domestic development agenda, Nurly Zhol (translated as “Bright Path”). However, issues related to corruption and deepening ties between Chinese and Kazakhstani elites through the BRI have likely strengthened Kazakhstan’s authoritarian political structure.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, Bilateral Relations, Infrastructure, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Autonomy, and Influence
Political Geography:
China, Kazakhstan, and Asia

512. Turkey's Response to the Russia-Ukraine Crisis

Author:
Aaron Stein
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
On October 26, 2021, Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense released video of a TB2 unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) striking a separatist D-30 howitzer in Russian-occupied Donbas. The strike was Ukraine’s first confirmed use of the now ubiquitous TB2, the Bayraktar-manufactured drone that the Turkish military has used to great tactical effect in Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh. The Turkish-Ukrainian defense relationship is understudied, but it could become an important factor in how Russian elites view North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) support for non-member Ukraine, and be used to justify an invasion to assuage Moscow’s concerns about a US-allied military presence along its borders. The Turkish support for Ukraine is not the main driver of Russian discomfort about the future of Ukraine. The TB2 is also not a decisive game changer, and the use of UCAVs is almost certain to have little impact on how Russian leadership weighs risk during debates about the efficacy of armed conflict in a neighboring state. Nevertheless, Turkish-Ukrainian defense ties are worthy of deeper study, precisely because Ankara’s relationships with Kyiv and Moscow have a secondary impact on American interests in Eastern Europe. The Turkish-Russian relationship is marred by bureaucratic distrust, which is papered over by a very functional leader-to-leader dynamic that enables the two Black Sea neighbors to cooperate and manage numerous regional conflicts. The Turkish-Ukrainian dynamic, in turn, is part of a broader Turkish effort to establish itself as an independent actor, committed to pursuing a foreign policy that often clashes with much of the NATO alliance. This paper will explore Turkish-Russian and Turkish-Ukrainian relations; the reasons for Turkey’s efforts to “fence sit” and establish itself as a neutral political actor in the Black Sea; and what these efforts portend for US interests in the region.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Turkey, Ukraine, and Middle East

513. How Will China Respond to the Russia-Ukraine Crisis?

Author:
Chris Miller
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
How will China respond to a potential Russian military escalation against Ukraine? Relations between Russia and China have intensified in recent years, with Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping holding regular summits and the two countries’ militaries participating in joint exercises and cooperating in some defense industrial efforts. Ties between Moscow and Beijing are now closer than any time since the days of Stalin and Mao, driven by a shared perception that the United States is each country’s primary foreign policy challenge. One top Russian official told media in December 2021 that the relationship now “exceeds an alliance.”[1] Chinese state media, meanwhile, have vocally backed Russia in arguing that the current crisis stems from the US “using NATO as a tool to cannibalize and squeeze Russia’s strategic space.”[2] The 2014 war in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea was an important factor driving Russia and China closer to each other, as Russia sought to reduce post-Crimea international isolation and as Beijing realized it could drive a hard bargain in its bilateral relationship with Russia on issues like energy. China’s response to the 2014 war, however, was generally to avoid taking sides. China accepted a narrative that placed blame on the West for causing the crisis, with top diplomats citing Western “foreign interference for causing the crisis,” but didn’t approve of Russia’s seizure of Crimea or its military actions in the Donbas.[3] China abstained from voting on the key United Nations resolutions regarding Crimea, for example, and it still declines to recognize Crimea as Russian territory. Similarly, it verbally rejected US and European sanctions on Russia though it let Chinese firms, including the country’s big state-owned banks, abide by these sanctions to avoid being cut off from US financial markets and the international banking system. Compared to 2014, however, China may find it more difficult to avoid involvement in an escalating crisis. Leaders in Beijing and around the world will see the US response to any military escalation against Ukraine as sending signals about whether the US could effectively respond to future crises in the Taiwan Strait or East or South China Seas. The success or failure of US efforts to impose meaningful costs on Russia if it escalates will be seen as a test of whether the US could do something similar in Asia. Moreover, after repeated summits between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin, including Xi’s description of Putin as his “best friend,” China’s approach to Russia amid a crisis will also be interpreted as sending signals about China’s own capabilities and influence. Because of this, China will not see a new phase of war between Russia and Ukraine as a peripheral issue in its foreign policy, even though China has no core issues at stake in Ukraine itself. China is most likely to be implicated in the crisis by potential Western sanctions on Russia, which in contrast to 2014 will impose substantially more pressure on Beijing to take sides. China’s decision either to adhere to new Western sanctions or to help Russia avoid them will shape escalation pathways and determine the magnitude of economic and political isolation that sanctions impose.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Sanctions, Military Affairs, Economy, Crisis Management, and Escalation
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, and Asia

514. Russian Perceptions of Military AI, Automation, and Autonomy

Author:
Anna Nadibaidze
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
President Vladimir Putin declared 2021 to be the Year of Science and Technology in Russia, with November named as the month of artificial intelligence (AI), signaling Russian leadership’s strong interest in this umbrella term. The Russian defense sector is particularly captivated by the opportunities associated with AI-based technologies. In recent years, AI, robotics, as well as the further integration of automation and autonomy into weapons systems and military decision-making have all been highlighted as priorities for modernizing the Russian armed forces. In 2017, Putin famously said that “artificial intelligence is the future, not only for Russia, but for all humankind … Whoever becomes the leader in this sphere will become the ruler of the world.” Quoting these words, analysts often attribute Russia’s development, testing, and use of weaponized AI to the necessity of competing in the so-called global AI race or the global tech race with the current leading AI developers: the United States and China. While the perceived need to compete and catch up is part of Russia’s motivations, its interest in military AI should not only be attributed to a quest for relative power. Understanding the depth and complexity of the debates surrounding AI, autonomy, and automation in Russia requires an examination of discussions about its strategic implications for the Russian army, the perceived benefits and risks of autonomy, and, more broadly, the importance of technological modernization and innovation for Russia’s place in the world. This report aims to provide an overview of the different conceptions and motivations, both oriented towards domestic and international audiences, that have been and are guiding Russian political and military leaderships in their ambitions to pursue weaponized AI. First, it outlines the various factors, both external and internal, behind the quest for pursuing AI, autonomy, and automation in the Russian military. Second, it presents some of the Russian plans in this area, what is known about their capabilities, and the challenges to strengthening them. Third, it dives into Russian debates on autonomy, and especially autonomous weapons systems, as well as discussions on the ethics of developing so-called “killer robots,” or autonomous combat robots (боевые роботы, or военные роботы), a term often used in the Russian-language literature. The analysis is based on a survey of open-source materials, including media reports, press releases, official statements and speeches, peer-reviewed articles and think tank reports, as well as publications in Russian military journals. The author would like to present it as the first step in an ongoing doctoral research project, as well as a contribution to the emerging English-language literature on how weaponized AI is perceived in Russia.
Topic:
Cybersecurity, Artificial Intelligence, Autonomy, Automation, and Military
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

515. Electronic Warfare: Russia's Approach

Author:
Pavel Luzin
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
Russia considers electronic warfare (EW) one of the key military capabilities in its ongoing confrontation with the West. EW provides a non-nuclear deterrence capability and helps Russia keep its great power status and strategic autonomy while also taking into account its long-term economic and demographic weakness. Russia has made significant advances in EW during the 2010s. However, at the beginning of 2020s, Russia still faces technological, technical, industrial, organizational, and political challenges that prevent Moscow from getting the EW capabilities it wants. Technological challenges are related to delays in developing air- and space-based EW capabilities, and to the need to unify EW systems. Technical challenges stem from the number of different types of EW systems that must be maintained, the relatively short lifespans of various EW systems, and issues integrating them with other combat systems and units. The last point also indicates why Russia has struggled to transform its quantity of the EW systems into a higher quality of combat capabilities. Industrial challenges are caused by the volatile dynamic of Russia’s arms procurements and R&D programs and the capacity of defense corporations to develop and produce advanced EW systems with acceptable costs. The main organizational challenge is that the number of EW troops that has already achieved its objective limit. Now EW troops need to be transformed from combat support into a combat branch. Finally, a political challenge appears in the confrontation between Russia and the West, which is the main driver for efforts related to EW. Russia is unable to compete with the United States and Europe in a symmetric way, and Russia’s political system does not allow Moscow to realize a “revolution in military affairs” because the centralized system struggles to implement a net-centric approach to the armed forces in effective way. For that reason, Russia has chosen a classic approach of asymmetric warfare with the goal of disrupting the command and control systems of a superior adversary. The coming decade promises to be challenging for Russia in terms of electronic warfare. Moscow will need to fix its previous EW efforts, pay more attention to the overall quality of electronic warfare rather than on the quantity of deployed EW systems, and bridge the evident gaps in EW on tactical, theater, and strategic levels. Moreover, after defense spending stabilized and even declined during the late 2010s, Russia has been forced to increase its defense budget again. This means spending for EW will also increase. Russia will try to fill gaps in air- and space-based EW capabilities, with the sea-based component continuing to play a secondary role in Russia’s military planning. It is also possible that Russia will chose to extend its ground-based EW infrastructure in Belarus with creation of an EW “chain” from Crimea to Kaliningrad.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Deterrence, Military, and Electronic Warfare
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

516. How the Intervention in Kazakhstan Revitalized the Russian-led CSTO

Author:
Bruce Pannier
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
The Russian Federation-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) has existed for nearly 30 years, and, during all that time, it had never sent troops into a conflict zone in one of its members states. CSTO members Armenia and Kyrgyzstan had requested assistance in the past, but the organization did not send help as those situations were not part of the CSTO mandate. Faced with unrest that broke out in early January 2022, Kazakhstan’s government requested CSTO assistance to fend off what Kazakhstan’s president said was a threat to the country’s sovereignty from tens of thousands of terrorists. For the first time, the CSTO answered a call for aid and deployed some 2,500 troops to guard key facilities in Kazakhstan—but only in a few cities, and for less than two weeks. It looks now like there were no terrorists, and Kazakh President Kassym-Zhomart Tokayev’s call for help was not to save his country, but to save himself from elements in the government that were trying to oust him. That makes the CSTO decision to deploy forces more intriguing, as it appears the organization did not send the force to Kazakhstan to defend that country’s sovereignty, but to defend Tokayev and preserve a government that was friendly towards Russia.
Topic:
Security, Sovereignty, Regional Integration, and Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)
Political Geography:
Russia, Central Asia, Eurasia, and Kazakhstan

517. Correlates of Politics and Economics: How Chinese Investment in Africa Changes Political Influence

Author:
Carla D. Jones, Mengge Li, and Hermann A. Ndofor
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
This study investigates the impact of Chinese economic engagement in Africa (FDI and loans from China to African countries) on African countries’ international political alignment as evidenced by voting patterns in the UN General Assembly. We find three seasons of Chinese policy in Africa. Pre 2008, Chinese economic engagement in Africa was driven primarily by economic considerations, market seeking for FDI and likely resource seeking for loans. During the Great Recession, China came to terms with its rise as an economic power and thus started leveraging its economic power in international relationships. During this season, both Chinese FDI and loans were no longer driven by economic considerations but rather by international relations which led to increased political alignment with recipient African countries. The final season captured the Xi Jinping era beginning 2013. During this season, Chinese FDI had no effect on African countries’ foreign policy alignment with China, but Chinese loans still had a significant positive effect. This likely reflects a movement away from FDI to less transparent bilateral loans as a means of utilizing Chinese economic power to influence foreign policy. During the entire period of the study, Chinese FDI to Africa resulted in reduced political alignment between African countries and the United States.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Politics, Investment, and Influence
Political Geography:
Africa, China, and Asia

518. The Wagner Group's Playbook in Africa: Mali

Author:
Raphael Parens
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
What is the Wagner Group doing in Mali? Since it rose to prominence after its involvement in the Syrian Civil War alongside the Assad regime, Wagner Group, a Russian-owned Private Military Contractor (PMC), has expanded its footprint into Africa. [1] Wagner has immersed itself in Libya, Madagascar, Mozambique, Central African Republic (CAR), and Sudan, leading training exercises, fighting anti-government forces, and brutally quelling protests. Wagner Group often overlaps with Russian state foreign policy aims, but its position as an independent contractor lends it unpredictability, while giving Russia plausible deniability. The group offers the Russian state a valuable tool: the ability to test new environments for military cooperation without appearing heavy-handed or overtly involved. Wagner has established a pattern of political, military, and economic involvement in Sudan and CAR since 2015. Wagner Group and its founder, Yevgeny Prigozhin, have followed this strategy successfully in Mali, contributing to France’s recent decision to withdraw its military forces from the country. Although Wagner group still needs to adapt its strategy to succeed in a new environment in Mali, the Kremlin has strong-armed a key competitor out of the country. This creates potential contagion effects for the rest of the Sahel, particularly those countries facing long-term insurgencies, such as Burkina Faso.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Non State Actors, Wagner Group, and Military
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, and Mali

519. Control, Development, Legitimacy, and the 2024 Problem: Russia Two Years Before the End of Putin's 4th Term

Author:
András Tóth-Czifra
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
In 2020, the Russian Federation’s legislature adopted constitutional reforms initiated by President Vladimir Putin. The reforms allowed Putin to “zero out” his presidential term count, and thus maintain ambiguity about his plans in 2024. They also set the stage for a radical revamp of governance in the country, with hope to kick-start Russia’s economic growth before 2024 and to ensure that the system could withstand instability stemming from a potential succession crisis. The reforms did bring substantial changes. However, as it is evident from major policies regarding capital investments, public administration, and the COVID-19 pandemic, the reforms left political decision-making top-heavy, poorly informed, short-sighted, and constrained, making it highly questionable whether they could achieve the goal of stimulating growth and stabilizing the regime’s domestic position before 2024. It was amid this set of contradictions and ambiguities that Putin decided to start a war of submission against Ukraine in February 2022. As of March 2022, it is too early to conclusively evaluate the consequences of the war on Russia’s future, and having been finalized in early February, this report cannot attempt to do it. However, by undoing the foundations of economic and social development, the war seems to have set Russia on a course where the regime aims to resolve the contradictions and ambiguities detailed in this report by previously unseen levels of domestic repression and external aggression.
Topic:
Development, Reform, Constitution, Legitimacy, and Vladimir Putin
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

520. Serbia on Edge

Author:
Richard Kraemer
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
The time has come to openly regard the Republic of Serbia for what it is: A stalwart Russian and Chinese ally run by a semi-authoritarian government that proactively pursues ideologically irredentist territorial expansion in the Western Balkans. Today’s Serbia poses a threat to regional and transatlantic security. Under President Aleksandar Vučić’s Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), the Serbian government is rapidly building its military, overtly backing ultranationalist provocateurs in neighboring states, cementing Belgrade’s ties to Moscow, and consolidating partnerships with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Integral to its efforts to actualize the “Greater Serbia” ideology, Serbia’s and Russia’s Orthodox Church leadership cooperate closely and in concert with their political counterparts. Without a significant Westward shift in its orientation, Serbia will continue on an authoritarian trajectory aligned with U.S. adversaries. Contemporary Serbia presents a quandary for U.S. and European strategists and policymakers. A genuinely democratic and Euro-Atlantic-oriented Serbia has been sought by Brussels and Washington alike. Yet, decades after Yugoslavia’s violent dissolution and related North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) interventions in the 1990s, most Serbians reject NATO cooperation and are lukewarm towards the European Union (EU). Consequently, the U.S. and its democratic allies in Europe are less able to leverage prospective memberships as a means of transatlantic integration. Further complicating relations with Serbia is Aleksandar Vučić’s overt embrace of Beijing and Moscow. The depth of Serbia’s growing dependence on those powers jeopardizes U.S and European security on multiple fronts. The Vučić government’s enduring endorsement of ultranationalist narratives and their subversive purveyors continues to intensify discord in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and North Macedonia. Its military build-up is gravely disconcerting; Belgrade responds only with specious explanations. The country’s ever-greater reliance on Russian oil and gas as a client and transit state for Gazprom, Russia’s state-owned energy giant, puts it at odds with Brussels, Washington, and several Central-Eastern European capitals. Belgrade and Beijing’s economic, technological, and increasingly military cooperation accelerates as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) further entrenches itself in southeast Europe. In sum: Serbia’s expanding alignment with authoritarian powers and regional anti-democratic forces reflects its illiberal worldview and disabling narrative of national victimhood. Western policymakers persistently view Belgrade’s government with the misunderstanding that, given the right incentives, Serbia will moderate, democratize, and gradually integrate into transatlantic institutions. This assumption is misguided. It diminishes, if not excludes, the need for a national reckoning among the Serbian people. As with post-war Germany’s Willy Brandt, Serbia needs courageous and sincere leadership to acknowledge past sins and move the nation forward. For example: A genuine Kniefall von Warschau event could spur an honest discussion among Serbian peoples about the atrocities committed during Yugoslavia’s dissolution. Whatever the catalyst, a broad acknowledgment of past crimes against humanity is categorical if Serbia is ever to become a democratic and open society. Without it, Serbs will remain disproportionately susceptible to domestic irredentist forces fed by malign foreign powers set on keeping the Western Balkans removed from the transatlantic community. Until such a national reckoning, Western decision-makers should adopt a more pragmatic approach to relations with a Belgrade government dismissive of genuine transatlantic partnerships. For as long as Pan-Serb ultranationalism is considered by Serbia’s leaders to be acceptable in political discourse, the kind of genuine democratic values and institutions shared within the transatlantic community will remain unrealized. Accordingly, the U.S. and its European allies should encourage Serbia to focus on itself, not its neighbors. In that vein, Western policymakers would be wise to stop expecting a breakthrough in Kosovo-Serbia status negotiations. It has become an empty dialogue that only keeps Kosovo locked outside of international institutions and other benefits of recognized statehood. A revised approach should also discontinue pushing an ineffective EU integration process as the primary means of democratically transforming Serbia.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Ideology, and Expansion
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eastern Europe, Serbia, and Balkans