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1. What is Serbia’s “Project 5000” and why Should we be concerned?

Author:
Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:
This paper examines the potential consequences and concerns surrounding Serbia’s “Project 5000,” emphasizing why it warrants attention not just from neighboring states in the Western Balkans but also from NATO. Given the geopolitical landscape, any escalation of conflict within this region directly impacts NATO’s strategic interests, considering its significant presence in the Balkans. Moreover, Russia’s overt military backing of Serbia and its advocacy for a militaristic approach towards Kosovo are of particular concern. This stance by Russia can be interpreted as an attempt to embolden Serbia to adopt a military intervention in Kosovo, serving dual purposes for Russia: shifting international focus from the brutal invasion of Ukraine and undermining NATO’s credibility and influence in the region. The unfolding situation underscores a broader strategy by Russia to exploit regional tensions, thereby challenging the Euro-Atlantic integration process. Such maneuvers not only threaten to destabilize the Western Balkans but also aim to fracture European unity and weaken NATO’s strategic coherence, particularly as it pertains to its eastern flank and broader engagement in conflict resolution and peacekeeping efforts.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Geopolitics, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Eastern Europe and Serbia

2. The big squeeze: SPI Defence budget brief 2023–2024

Author:
Jennifer Parker, David Uren, Bec Shrimpton, and Rob Bourke
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Defence has long been seen as a necessary burden on the federal budget. However, it is assuming the status of an urgent priority in the wake of the AUKUS agreement and the far-reaching reform urged by this year’s Defence Strategic Review (DSR). Both are responding to a much more challenging geopolitical environment and the realisation that Australia doesn’t have the luxury of time to achieve readiness. This year’s Defence budget reflects the urgency of the demands upon Defence to the extent that it includes the initial spending on the nuclear-powered submarines and the first response to the DSR, despite there being only very approximate estimates for how that spending is to be scheduled and for the savings that will pay for them.
Topic:
Security, Budget, and Defense Spending
Political Geography:
Australia and Australia/Pacific

3. North of 26 degrees south and the security of Australia: views from The Strategist, Volume 7

Author:
John Coyne and Henry Campbell
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
The Northern Australia Strategic Policy Centre’s latest report, North of 26 degrees south and the security of Australia: views from The Strategist, Volume 7, is a series of articles published in The Strategist over the last six months. It builds on previous volumes by identifying critical intersections of national security, nation-building, resilience and Australia’s north. This issue, like previous volumes, includes a wide range of articles sourced from a diverse pool of expert contributors writing on topics as varied as critical minerals, rare earth, equatorial space launch, agriculture, advanced manufacturing, fuel and water security, and defence force posturing. Importantly, it addresses the Defence Strategic from a northern Australian perspective. It also features a foreword by the Honourable Madeleine King MP, Minister for Northern Australia. Minister King writes, “Northern Australia is central to the prosperity, security and future of our nation and will be the engine room of Australia’s decarbonisation effort and drive towards net zero.” The 24 articles propose concrete, real-world actions for policy-makers to facilitate the development, prosperity and security of Australia’s north. The authors share a sense that those things that make the north unique – its vast space, low population density, specific geography, and harsh investment environment – are characteristics that can be leveraged, not disadvantages.
Topic:
Security, National Security, Resilience, and Nation-building
Political Geography:
Australia and Australia/Pacific

4. De-risking authoritarian AI: A balanced approach to protecting our digital ecosystems

Author:
Simeon Gilding
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Artificial intelligence (AI)–enabled systems make many invisible decisions affecting our health, safety and wealth. They shape what we see, think, feel and choose, they calculate our access to financial benefits as well as our transgressions, and now they can generate complex text, images and code just as a human can, but much faster. So it’s unsurprising that moves are afoot across democracies to regulate AI’s impact on our individual rights and economic security, notably in the European Union (EU). But, if we’re wary about AI, we should be even more circumspect about AI-enabled products and services from authoritarian countries that share neither our values nor our interests. And, for the foreseeable future, that means the People’s Republic of China (PRC)—a revisionist authoritarian power demonstrably hostile to democracy and the rules-based international order, which routinely uses AI to strengthen its own political and social stability at the expense of individual human rights. In contrast to other authoritarian countries such as Russia, Iran and North Korea, China is a technology superpower with global capacity and ambitions and is a major exporter of effective, cost-competitive AI-enabled technology into democracies.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Authoritarianism, Cybersecurity, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:
China and Asia-Pacific

5. China, climate and conflict in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Anastasia Kapetas
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
This paper surveys the current reporting and analysis on climate and security to explore the implications that climate change may have for China’s ability to prosecute its security goals in the region’s three major hotspots: the SCS, Taiwan and the India–China border conflict. Those three hotspots all involve longstanding border and territorial disputes between China and other nations and may draw in various levels of US involvement should China continue to escalate tensions.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, and Conflict
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

6. Quad Technology Business and Investment Forum outcomes report

Author:
ASPI
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
The Quad has prioritised supporting and guiding investment in critical and emerging technology projects consistent with its intent to maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific. Governments cannot do this alone. Success requires a concerted and coordinated effort between governments, industry, private capital partners and civil society. To explore opportunities and challenges to this success, the Quad Critical and Emerging Technology Working Group convened the inaugural Quad Technology Business and Investment Forum in Sydney, Australia on 2 December 2022. The forum was supported by the Australian Department of Home Affairs and delivered by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI). The forum brought together senior Quad public- and private-sector leaders, laid the foundations for enhanced private–public collaboration and canvassed a range of practical action-oriented initiatives. Sessions were designed to identify the key challenges and opportunities Quad member nations face in developing coordinated strategic, targeted investment into critical and emerging technology. Attendees of the forum overwhelmingly endorsed the sentiment that, with our governments, industry, investors and civil society working better together, collectively, our countries can lead the world in quantum technology, artificial intelligence, biotechnology and other critical and emerging technologies. This report reflects the discussions and key findings from the forum and recommends that the Quad Critical and Emerging Technology Working Group establish an Industry Engagement Sub-Group to develop and deliver a Quad Critical and Emerging Technology Forward Work Plan.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Alliance, and Quad Alliance
Political Geography:
Asia-Pacific

7. East Asia’s Worsening Security Situation

Author:
Nina C. Krickel-Choi
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
2022 was not a good year for security in the Asia Pacific Region, with multiple crucial relationships hitting a new low, and 2023 does not promise to be much better. While all-out military confrontation is not likely, it is also not off the table and care needs to be taken that contingency events and hasty decisions do not trigger a full-blown escalation. The following highlights three of the most critical flashpoints: the Korean peninsula, the Taiwan Strait, and the reemergence of Cold War blocs in East Asia.
Topic:
Security, Military, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
East Asia and Asia

8. How to rebuild Europe’s security architecture?

Author:
Loïc Simonet
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
Russia’s war on Ukraine is overturning the European security order in place since the end of the Cold War. The Helsinki Final Act (1975), the Charter of Paris for a New Europe (1990), the 1992 Helsinki Summit, as well as the fragile acquis of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), failed to build and maintain a system involving all countries of ‘Greater Europe’, including the Russian Federation. For at least two decades, Russia has expressed discomfort regarding its perceived status in a ‘concert of nations’ dominated, in its perception, by the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union. Still referring to a conception of security based on spheres of influence, it has considered NATO’s eastward expansion as a threat to its national security (Russian National Security Strategy, 2015, 15). “Only during ‘critical junctures’ – relatively rare watershed moments marked by rapid change and upheaval – are security architectures likely to be fundamentally reconfigured” (Hyde-Price, 2014, 105). The war in Ukraine is already listed as such a turning point in history. ln addition to continuing efforts to support Ukraine and stabilize the situation on the battlefield, the time seems ripe for an in-depth assessment of Europe’s security regime. Many might argue that it makes little sense to discuss architecture while the house is burning. I answer that it is our responsibility to stress our preparedness and explore all opportunities. Just increasing military expenditures cannot be the only option. We need a ‘Code of Conduct’ for the 21st Century that would allow no more – real or perceived - ‘security vacuums’. This is in no way intended to accept the Russian narrative. Even during the Cold War, European countries were able to progress in building a common security architecture through dialogue and negotiations. It was less than a month after the brutal military suppression of the Prague Spring by the Warsaw Pact States, in 1968, that the Finnish Government initiated the process that ended up in the Helsinki Final Act.
Topic:
Security, NATO, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe

9. Continuities and Ruptures in the EU’s Border and Migration Control Regime

Author:
Clemens Binder
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
After years of decrease in the public salience of the issue, border security and migration control are back on top of the agenda in the European Union. Rows around issues such as the Schengen accession of Romania and Bulgaria, the ongoing debate about refugees from Ukraine and the deteriorating humanitarian situation in the Mediterranean have once again caused intense political debates in Brussels and the member states. While numerous topics (such as cooperation with third countries) arise in this context, this report will deal with three aspects – the further implementation of the EU Pact on Migration, the general technologization of border management and the operationalization of two new databases in the field of mobility control at the borders. These issues bear both political and academic significance and are thus major developments to observe in 2023.
Topic:
Security, Migration, European Union, and Borders
Political Geography:
Europe

10. The World After Taiwan’s Fall

Author:
David Santoro, Ralph Cossa, Ian Easton, Malcolm Davis, and Matake Kamiya
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Let us start with our bottom line: a failure of the United States to come to Taiwan’s aid—politically, economically, and militarily—would devastate the Unites States’ credibility and defense commitments to its allies and partners, not just in Asia, but globally. If the United States tries but fails to prevent a Chinese takeover of Taiwan, the impact could be equally devastating unless there is a concentrated, coordinated U.S. attempt with likeminded allies and partners to halt further Chinese aggression and eventually roll back Beijing’s ill-gotten gains. This is not a hypothetical assessment. Taiwan has been increasingly under the threat of a military takeover by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and, even today, is under attack politically, economically, psychologically, and through so-called “gray zone” military actions short of actual combat. The U.S. government, U.S. allies, and others have begun to pay attention to this problem, yet to this day, they have not sufficiently appreciated the strategic implications that such a takeover would generate. To address this problem, the Pacific Forum has conducted a multi-authored study to raise awareness in Washington, key allied capitals, and beyond about the consequences of a Chinese victory in a war over Taiwan and, more importantly, to drive them to take appropriate action to prevent it. The study, which provides six national perspectives on this question (a U.S., Australian, Japanese, Korean, Indian, and European perspective) and fed its findings and recommendations into the second round of the DTRA SI-STT-sponsored (and Pacific Forum-run) Track 2 “U.S.-Taiwan Deterrence and Defense Dialogue,”[1] outlines these strategic implications in two alternative scenarios. In the first scenario, China attacks Taiwan and it falls with no outside assistance from the United States or others. In the other scenario, Taiwan falls to China despite outside assistance (i.e., “a too little, too late” scenario).
Topic:
Security, Conflict, Crisis Management, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Europe, India, Taiwan, Asia, Korea, and United States of America

11. Strategic Competition and Security Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Carl W Baker
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
There is a growing acceptance among countries in the Indo-Pacific region that strategic competition between the United States and China is changing perceptions about security and the adequacy of the existing security architecture. While some have characterized the competition between the two as a new Cold War, it is clear that what is happening in the region is far more complex than the competition that characterized the original Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. First, the economic integration that has taken place since the early 1990s makes it much more difficult to draw bright ideological lines between the two sides. Further, the Asian context of the emerging competition is one where the two competitors have grown to share power. As the dominant military power, the United States has been the primary security guarantor in Asia and beyond. China, on the other hand, has emerged over the past decades as the primary economic catalyst in Asia and beyond. Currently, each side seems increasingly unwilling to accept that arrangement.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Strategic Interests, and Competition
Political Geography:
China, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

12. A History of Shared Values, A Future of Shared Strategic Interests: US-Australia Relations in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Rob York, Craig Kafura, Rick Umback, Rose Rodgers, and Thom Dixon
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
The United States and Australia have been treaty allies for more than 70 years. This bond endured throughout the Cold War and the War on Terror, and it increasingly looks as though they will be close partners throughout the great power competition with the People’s Republic of China. The two partner countries were among the earliest critics of the PRC’s handling of the COVID-19 pandemic, have shared concerns over Chinese investment and its impact on their national security, and what growing PRC influence means for them the future of democracy in the Indo-Pacific. The two countries were early and enthusiastic members of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, which includes fellow Indo-Pacific democracies Japan and India, and which has moved to address pressing regional challenges such as pandemic response and climate change. Plus, with 2021’s announcement of the Australia-UK-US (AUKUS) pact Canberra proved its willingness to defy not only Beijing, but also other democracies—especially in Europe—to build out its capacity to defend itself and counter the PRC’s growing regional power. The contributions to this volume each address the nature, not only of the alliance, but the challenges it will face in the years to come. Craig Kafula of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs notes that public polling in both countries reveals overwhelming agreement on most subjects related to the alliance and its forthcoming challenges, but also differences of opinion that will have to be navigated. Rick Umback of Australian National University’s School of Politics and International Relations examines the growth of PRC influence over local governments and Australia, and the ramifications this has for other liberal democracies in the Indo-Pacific. Rose Rodgers at the Center for Naval Analyses says the AUKUS has not limited, but actually increased the need for scrutiny of PRC investment in critical and emerging technologies, and other means of screening technological investments. Moving away from what the alliance means for relations with the PRC, Thom Dixon examines the field of cyberbiosecurity—the intersection of cybersecurity and biosecurity—and how US-Australian cooperation in this field is essential to meet two of the great challenges of this age: climate change and pandemic response. Taken together these analyses—brought to you by the next generation of American-Australian analysts—richly detail the nature of the challenges the allies face, and offer recommendations on how to meet them over the next 70 years of their partnership.
Topic:
Security, Bilateral Relations, Cybersecurity, Alliance, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Australia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

13. Pressing Security Concerns in Southeast Asia: Next-Generation Perspectives

Author:
John Hemmings, Ariel Mota Alves, Attawat Joseph Ma Assavanadda, Fikry A. Rahman, Katrina Guanio, and Siu Tzyy Wei
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Southeast Asia is a pivotal sub-region of the Indo-Pacific. Spanning 1,700,000 square miles, its total population is 676 million – around 8.5% of the world’s population – and has a collective GDP of US$3.67 trillion (as of 2022). Over the years, it has been associated with both economic dynamism and significant security challenges. As authors in this volume note, the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, disagreements over water rights in the Mekong Delta, and the current conflict in Myanmar highlight fault lines not only between Southeast Asian states themselves, but also between great powers such as China and the United States. There are many more – the EU, India, Japan, Australia, and South Korea – that pay close attention to developments in the sub-region. Maintaining peace and stability in a region that plays host to one-third of global sea-borne trade, hosts major undersea internet cables, and is a major thoroughfare for energy supplies from the Middle East to the advanced manufacturing hubs in China, Japan, and South Korea is both challenging and complicated. The primary mechanism for engagement with the individual countries in Southeast Asia has been through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its attendant bodies, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the East Asia Summit (EAS), and the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM). Meanwhile, ASEAN member states have promoted the principle of “ASEAN centrality” as a means to prevent major power interference in the sub-region and to retain influence over security cooperation within Southeast Asia and beyond. As a result, the acknowledgement of ASEAN centrality has become a “boilerplate” for strategy and policy documents related to regional security. One example of this is the inclusion of the principle in the 2021 U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy. However, the increasingly pressing nature of challenges confronting the broader region, their speed and intensity, are beginning to outpace the evolution of institutions and processes associated with ASEAN. The ASEAN Way – an emphasis on informal consultation, non-interference, and consensus as the basis of major decisions – has been integral to creating internal cohesion and harmony within ASEAN decision-making and is an enabler of socio-political integration. On the other hand, it has also stymied efforts to develop effective collective responses to conflicts and has made ASEAN hostage to great powers able to use their influence over members to break consensus. While defenders of ASEAN point to its successes and remain confident that it will adapt to regional issues over time, others are increasingly skeptical that ASEAN can retain its status as the gatekeeper of regional security agenda. It is in this context that Pacific Forum carried out this extended study with support from the Luce Foundation to investigate Southeast Asian perspectives on the “biggest threats or most pressing security issues, now and in the foreseeable future.” We asked a group of our Southeast Asian cohort of Young Leaders (ages 21 to 35), what problems were most pressing to them, and asked them how they thought their countries should address these issues, noting which third-parties would be most important for them to leverage in doing so. We believe this publication, which cuts across a broad range of security issues, is a fair representation of the eclecticism and diversity that characterize the region itself and hope that our readers will find them as useful as we have here at Pacific Forum. The collection starts with traditional security issues and then moves to more non-traditional security issues, though this does not reflect any internal emphasis or prioritization on the part of the editors. The first essay, by Siu Tzyy Wei, is entitled “Caught in the Middle: The Measured Voice of Brunei’s Foreign Policy Amidst the South China Sea Dispute.” Beginning with the South China Sea is appropriate for any collective study on the region, but Brunei’s position as a “silent claimant” presents a perspective not often heard. The author’s assertion that it is China and external powers – AUKUS and the Quad are mentioned – that are adding pressure to the South China Sea and adding a dangerous complexity, compelling Brunei’s “neutrality,” a striking claim given the threat to Bruneian sovereignty. The second essay moves to another flashpoint, the political crisis in Myanmar; a national issue that has reverberated around ASEAN as well as further abroad in Washington and Brussels. Appropriately titled “The Coming of the Raging Fire: The Revolution in Myanmar,” Thiha Wint Aung analyzes the lead-up to the political crisis and concludes by calling for the international community to explicitly support the people’s “armed resistance” against the military. The third essay presents a bold national case for a region-wide issue: dealing with rising Chinese influence. In “Malaysia’s China Policy Amid China’s Growing Security Concerns,” Fikry A. Rahman argues that Malaysian policy elites will have to prioritize strategic concerns over economic ties vis-a-vis China if it is to adequately defend Malaysian sovereignty. The next group of essays focuses on non-traditional security issues, beginning with climate change, one of the most pressing global issues. Southeast Asia is particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change, as noted in the fourth essay, “When it Rains, it Pours: Disaster Displacement and the Future of Human Security in the Philippines Amid Changing Climate.” Katrina Guanio calls for policymakers to be aware of gradual or even sudden human migrations due to inclement weather, such as typhoons, and the impact these have on national health, economic, and security dynamics. Taking an unusual and unique perspective, the fifth essay, “Climate Maladaptation: Migration, Food Insecurity, and the Politics of Climate Change in Timor-Leste” by Ariel Mota Alves, makes the provocative argument that international organizations can sometimes promote detrimental Western development narratives that undermine local solutions to local climate change effects. The sixth essay, “Human Trafficking in Vietnam: A Top-Tier Non-Traditional Security Threat in the 21st Century” by Thu Nguyen Hoang Anh, measures the impact of the scourge of human trafficking in Vietnam and offers practical policy solutions to mitigating its impact on victims. Finally, the seventh essay, by Attawat Assavanadda, looks at “Thailand’s Brain Drain Challenge: Trends and Implications,” noting the push-pull drivers of the phenomenon and its impact on Thailand’s overall development. As one can see from this summary, the range of topics chosen by our talented Young Leader cohort from Southeast Asia is as diverse, inspiring, and multidimensional as the region itself. Ranging from security issues that are well covered by regional and international media to those that take an eclectic look at local variations of international issues, we are pleased to showcase these essays. As ever, the mission of Pacific Forum only begins with the creation of such young leader cohorts, and empowering them to present their analyses and recommendations should only be a prelude to robust regional conversations and discussions. We have been since our creation – a forum for those discussions – and hope that our readers will take that engaging approach to these essays and their authors.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Climate Change, Migration, Brain Drain, and Human Trafficking
Political Geography:
Southeast Asia

14. Protests in Iran in comparative perspective: A revolutionary state in trouble

Author:
Erwin van Veen and Hamidreza Azizi
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
Successive protests in 2009, 2019 and 2022 have poignantly laid bare the much reduced social and political legitimacy of Iran’s ruling elites. Reform-from-within is no longer viewed as credible. Even former pro-reform leaders like Mousavi have abandoned hope and call for regime change. While further protests are inevitable, it is nevertheless unlikely that they will produce a revolution that overthrows the regime in the short-term, as long as their national organisation and leadership remain weak, Iran’s ruling elites cohesive, security forces loyal, and the administration continues to function. The country has witnessed hundreds of protests every year for the past few years, in addition to those of 2009, 2019 and 2022, but calls for fundamental change continue to go unheeded. The hope of the ruling elite is that the mix of repression and Iran’s dire economic situation will prevent protests from recurring. At best, quasi-reforms will provide some band-aids. In both scenarios, the Islamic Republic of Iran is no more in the sense that it lacks legitimacy among large segments of the population. It has also shed the elements of republican governance it used to have. And yet it lives on because it remains a capable state with a fairly cohesive ruling elite and ample coercive power. Iran is on course to become a classic one-party authoritarian regime, which may shed some of its religious orientations once its Supreme Leader leaves office for reasons of age. It remains to be seen how sustainable this will be given the crescendo of protests.
Topic:
Security, Economy, Domestic Politics, Protests, and Civil Unrest
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

15. Military capabilities affected by climate change: An analysis of China, Russia and the United States

Author:
Adaja Stoetman, Dick Zandee, Ties Dams, Niels Drost, and Louise Van Schaik
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
Climate change is one of the most pressing challenges of the present and the future. Rising temperatures and sea levels, as well as extreme weather events are manifestations of climate change that also influence military capabilities. Increased attention for the climate change-security nexus is visible both at the national and the international level: nationally through the incorporation of climate change in security strategies and internationally through incorporation in important strategic documents such as the EU’s Strategic Compass and NATO’s Strategic Concept. Given its transnational nature, governments around the world have a shared responsibility to face climate change. A particular role is laid down for the global powers, China, Russia and the United States, given their position in the world. It is, however, questionable whether the global powers’ interests align. They differ in their approaches to address climate change, and even more so in their views on how it affects the armed forces. China and particularly Russia are more reluctant towards depicting climate change as a matter of international security. This is for example visible in international forums, such as the UN Security Council. In contrast, in the US, support for climate action is subject to political preferences, but climate related security risks are widely recognised within the defence establishment. This report reviews various aspects of the relationship between climate and security, with a particular focus on the military. It discusses the role of climate change in a country’s security and defence strategy and, vice versa, the changing tasks and deployment of the armed forces in response to climate change, the effects of climate change on military infrastructure, and measures to realise a greener defence sector.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, European Union, and Military
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

16. Climate and Environmental Security in the Democratic Republic of Congo

Author:
Kira Vinke, Loyle Campbell, Dana Schirwon, Katongo Seyuba, Florian Krampe, Hafsa Maalim, and Guélor Isulu Mbungwal
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
Climate change is compounding the Democratic Republic of Congo’s tangle of problems – a long-running civil war, weak governance, and deeply entrenched poverty and inequality. The country’s future is of global significance: its vast Congo-basin rainforest is a crucial carbon sink and a haven of biodiversity. DRC’s hydropower potential and its deposits of copper and cobalt could enable the energy transition, but a green resource looms over development prospects. Germany will need flexible and well-aligned national strategies to effectively support peace, human progress, and environmental protection in the DRC while putting the focus on the needs of marginalized populations.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Climate Change, Poverty, Inequality, and Hydropower
Political Geography:
Africa and Democratic Republic of Congo

17. European Defense in A New Age (#EDINA)

Author:
Christian Mölling, Sören Hellmonds, and Theresa Caroline Winter
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
Delve into the transformation of Europe's defense landscape following Russia's Ukraine invasion in 2022 with our comprehensive report. Part of the long-term project on European Defense In a New Age (EDINA), this report provides expert insights on shifts in Europe's military order, defense cooperation, and geopolitical landscape, with a focus on Europe's evolving Defense Technological and Industrial Base (DTIB). Explore key findings on political change, potential divisions, and China's role and discover the seismic shifts reshaping European defense.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe

18. US-China lessons from Ukraine: Fueling more dangerous Taiwan tensions

Author:
John K. Culver and Sarah Kirchberger
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The lessons that Washington and Beijing appear to be learning from Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, and from Ukraine’s resistance and counteroffensive, could set the stage for a crisis over Taiwan in the next few years. This grim prospect is driven by the United States and China arraying themselves for a strategic rivalry since 2017 through the continuing trade war, economic decoupling, and increasing rhetorical and military positioning for confrontation over Taiwan. In light of the Chinese military’s threatening gestures, belligerent rhetoric, and other recent actions that read like they could be preparation for war, there is a danger that the successive warnings by senior US military commanders that Chinese CCP General Secretary and President Xi Jinping has already decided to use military force in the near term could become the proverbial tail wagging the dog — and could impose a logic that makes a US-China war more likely, rather than enhancing deterrence.1 Therefore, the key question for the United States and its allies is how an increasingly truculent and belligerent Chinese leadership can be incentivized to walk back from the brink. This paper examines what lessons China, the United States, and European allies have drawn from the Ukraine conflict and how such lessons have shaped these actors’ strategic assumptions. It concludes with a discussion of policy recommendations for the transatlantic community confronting the possibility of a US-China conflict over Taiwan.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
China, Ukraine, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

19. Kazakhstan could lead Central Asia in mitigating the world’s energy and food shortages

Author:
Margarita Assenova, Ariel Cohen, and Wesley Hill
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Russia’s war against Ukraine has had significant economic and political repercussions across the globe, including energy shortages and growing food insecurity. The war has forced Central Asian states to emphasize their independence from Moscow and accelerate their economic diversification. Central Asia—comprising Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—has the potential to mitigate global shortages of energy, food, and fertilizers, caused by Russia’s war of aggression. The primary challenges for Central Asia and its Western partners remain diversifying export routes and expanding the capacity of alternative transportation corridors, especially the Trans-Caspian International Transportation Corridor, or the “Middle Corridor.” Kazakhstan is the leading producer of uranium ore in the world, grows 2 percent of the world’s wheat, and has major hydrocarbon reserves. Kazakhstan has the opportunity to lead Central Asia forward on the path to becoming an important supplier of energy, grain, fertilizers, and nuclear fuel to world markets. The energy crisis in Europe spurred renewed interest in the long-planned Trans-Caspian natural gas pipeline. A potential United States and European Union ban on uranium civilian-reactor fuel exports from Russia could ensure Kazakhstan’s importance as a nuclear fuel exporter to Europe. To do this, Kazakhstan first needs to build its own conversion and enrichment facilities. This would allow it to double its share in the European market while utilizing the Middle Corridor. By encouraging Western investment, the states of Central Asia can become an important force in global commodity markets. To this end, they should implement the recently signed far-reaching regional agreements on cooperation and integration, so that they are less susceptible to “divide and conquer” strategies from predatory foreign powers and can exercise greater leverage when negotiating as a bloc. The US and the EU should also recognize that Central Asia’s energy and agricultural potential and resources make the region an area of strategic interest with promising business opportunities. The Central Asian states need to intensify their Western-oriented diplomatic outreach to attract support from state and private actors for investment and technological partnerships. Geographic proximity to Russia and China means Central Asian countries will always have economic relationships with Moscow and Beijing. But greater Western engagement in the region can diminish the chances for Russo-Sino cooperation in Central Asia. Russia’s war against Ukraine has weakened its geopolitical position and the Western sanctions on its economy have opened up new opportunities for Central Asia to supply critical energy and food commodities to world markets. Kazakhstan, as the region’s largest economy and its largest producer of oil, uranium, and grain, is well-positioned to lead this transition.
Topic:
Security, Environment, Food Security, Geopolitics, and Energy
Political Geography:
Europe, Central Asia, Eurasia, and Kazakhstan

20. Implementing NATO’s Strategic Concept on China

Author:
Hans Binnendijk and Daniel S. Hamilton
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Set against the backdrop of Russia’s war on Ukraine, the June 2022 Madrid NATO Summit set the tone for the next decade of the Alliance’s shared future. Allies made it clear that they consider Russia their most immediate and direct threat. Yet they also made headlines by addressing challenges emanating from the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Allies laid out actions to be taken across the diplomatic, economic, and military spheres. Now the Alliance must implement those responses. Beijing will be watching closely.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Politics, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Eurasia, Canada, Asia, and United States of America

21. China and the new globalization

Author:
Franklin D. Kramer
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The unitary globalized economy no longer exists. Driven in significant part by security considerations, a new and more diverse globalization is both required and being built. The transition is ongoing, and its final form is yet to be determined. Many of the causal factors for this very significant change revolve around China and the consequent responses to its actions by the United States, other democracies of the transatlantic alliance, and the advanced democratic economies of the Indo-Pacific. There are other important factors generating this new globalization including the impact of the Russia-Ukraine war both on energy markets and on trade and investment with Russia generally, as well as the global requirements for mitigating and adapting to climate change. However, China has been a critical element in what might be described as the “maximum trade-centered globalization,” which has dominated trade and investment policy in the three decades since the end of the Cold War. This issue brief describes the still-developing new globalization focusing on the issues surrounding China. A fundamental challenge that China presents arises because its actions have generated significant security and economic challenges, yet it nonetheless is a massive trade and investment partner for the “advanced democratic economies” (ADEs),1 which for purposes of this analysis include the Group of Seven (G7) countries,2 plus Australia, Norway, the Republic of Korea, and the European Union. Adapting to a new globalization requires establishing a strategic approach that resolves the inherent contradictions between those conflicting considerations.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Environment, Politics, Science and Technology, Economy, Business, and Energy
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Eurasia, Canada, Asia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

22. Multipolarity After Ukraine: Old Wine in New Bottles?

Author:
Aldo Ferrari and Eleonora Tafuro Ambrosetti
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:
One year after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the war has exacerbated the rift between Russia and the “collective West”. While Western governments have been steadfast in punishing Russia for the invasion, other countries around the world have been more ambiguous, at times even choosing to side with Moscow politically or economically. These dynamics have revived the idea of a shift towards multipolarity along an anti-Western trajectory. Are we really heading in that direction? Are we facing increasing fragmentation due to the war or a re-consolidation of longstanding alliances? What principles underlie the formation of these blocs? What are the consequences of these dynamics for global security and the global economy? This Report aims to shed light on these questions, while also outlining the war’s possible future implications for the Russian Federation, the “West”, and the international order.
Topic:
Security, Governance, Economy, Multipolarity, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

23. The EU Indo-Pacific Bid: Sailing Through Economic and Security Competition

Author:
Filippo Fasulo
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:
Over the past five years, the Indo-Pacific region's importance for Europe has grown significantly. However, the launch of the EU Strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific in September 2021 and its subsequent implementation have been affected by growing polarisation between the US and China, and by a fast-changing scenario caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This Report examines the state and perspectives of the EU's Indo-Pacific strategy, 18 months after its launch. Are there avenues for cooperation with regional military initiatives, such as the QUAD? How is the economic landscape changing, in particular after the start of negotiations for the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF)? What are the main strategies of Indo-Pacific countries for the green transition? And how do the US, China, and ASEAN countries view and act in the Indo-Pacific region?
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Economy, Strategic Competition, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

24. What North Korea Has Been Learning From Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine

Author:
Tereza Novotná
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
A year ago, in February 2022, Russia invaded its neighbor, Ukraine. Russian aggression has upended the post-war security mechanisms in Europe and made the international multilateral system, including the UN Security Council, more fragile and ineffective than ever. Even though the war in Ukraine has implications for security in Northeast Asia, many Asian nations consider it a distant issue for Europeans to solve. However, this perspective mirrors what Europe’s Asian counterparts, especially the Koreans, have faced for decades. It serves as an apt analogy for explaining the dangers of North Korea to Europe. North Korea is also watching the war closely to discern what lessons or leverage can be extracted from the unfolding conflict. This short article reflects on two lessons and three opportunities that the War in Ukraine presents to Kim Jong Un and concludes with recommendations on what the Europeans could do in the near future.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Conflict, Russia-Ukraine War, and Invasion
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Asia, and North Korea

25. Abrogating the Visiting Forces Agreement: Its Effects on Philippines’ Security and Stability in Southeast Asia

Author:
Renato Acosta
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
During much of 2022, the defense and security alliance between the United States of America and the Philippines, anchored on and reinforced by the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT, teetered on the brink of collapse. Former Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte brought relations to the brink through attempts to scuttle the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). This move would only embolden Chinese challenges to Manila’s territorial integrity and its aspirations to dominate Southeast Asia and the South China Sea. While the Duterte administration recited parochial reasons to terminate the VFA, pundits from the security and diplomatic sectors viewed Duterte’s attempts as a pretext to steer the Philippines towards China under his own brand and definition of an independent foreign policy. During his term, Duterte reiterated that President Xi Jinping and other Chinese officials were his friends. He also publicly declared that the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), a northeastern section of the Spratly Islands, was already in physical control and possession of Beijing due to the unchallenged presence of its military and maritime militia vessels there. Given these statements, Duterte has constantly received criticism over his defeatist stance towards China.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Politics, Armed Forces, and Instability
Political Geography:
China, Philippines, Southeast Asia, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America

26. Normalizing U.S.–Pakistan Relations

Author:
Adam Weinstein
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
The U.S.–Pakistan relationship is often portrayed negatively among the lawmakers, media, and general public of both countries, with a focus on mutual resentment and dysfunction. The early relationship was burdened by mismatched expectations regarding support in conflicts with India. Different priorities from the start of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan during the 1980s further strained the relationship. The United States also sanctioned Pakistan and India for developing nuclear weapons, which had a disparate impact on Pakistan, causing ongoing tension. Many in Washington’s policy and journalistic communities hold negative views of Pakistan, viewing it as an enabler of terrorism that seeks geopolitical rents but rarely delivers. Pakistanis often resent what they view as Washington’s use of the country as a “frontline state” in both the Cold War and the War on Terror, claiming tens of thousands of lives, only to discard it later. These grievances are largely dismissed in Washington as self–inflicted. Despite the negative public debate, serving officials in both governments generally hold a more nuanced view, recognizing the broad overlapping interests shared by the United States and Pakistan in areas like climate change, trade, and counterterrorism. There is already an exhaustive literature on terrorism in Pakistan, nuclear security, and potential conflicts along the Line of Control with India. This brief will instead focus on revitalizing U.S.–Pakistan relations through innovative diplomacy in areas that have received less attention, such as trade, regional integration, people–to–people connections, and climate change. Its principal recommendation is that Washington should resist viewing Pakistan through the narrow lens of the “War on Terror” or great power competition. Instead it should pursue its interests through more normalized relations, while recognizing U.S. limitations in influencing events in Pakistan or the region.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Counter-terrorism, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Pakistan, South Asia, North America, and United States of America

27. What Works in Conflict Prevention?

Author:
David Steven and Gizem Sucoglu
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center on International Cooperation
Abstract:
This paper compares examples of collaborations that have aimed to prevent violence and conflict. The focus is primarily on ‘at risk’ and ‘acute’ settings, but with a recognition of the need to access a broader range of universal approaches to prevention where possible.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Security, Development, Diplomacy, and Collaboration
Political Geography:
Global Focus

28. Women's Security in Local Communities

Author:
Lajla Leko and Sabahudin Harčević
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Centre for Security Studies
Abstract:
With the project "Improvement of Women's Safety and Security in Local Communities - AwareBiH", CSS aims to point out the state of security from the point of view of women, therefore it is necessary that some of the biggest cities, namely Mostar, Sarajevo and Banja Luka, are bearers of positive changes in the implementation of the project's results. In addition, the project aims to show the ability of women in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) to influence changes that would make their environment safer. This topic is not discussed in BiH as much as it should be, while the security sector is still perceived as a sector dominated by men. Therefore, this project will help society and decisionmakers to better understand the needs and feelings of women in BiH about their own security.
Topic:
Security, Law Enforcement, Women, Violence, and Survey
Political Geography:
Europe, Eastern Europe, Balkans, and Bosnia and Herzegovina

29. Anti-corruption Capacities of Public Procurement in the Security Sector: Report for 2020 and 2021 - Part I

Author:
Erdin Halimić, Dajana Bašić, and Aleksandar Maletić
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Centre for Security Studies
Abstract:
Investigations into corruption in the security sector are often focused on contracting, that is, on the stages of public procurement in which civil servants prepare and sign contracts with suppliers of equipment and services and manage their implementation. However, in order to discover the functioning mechanisms of public procurement and potential critical points for the emergence of corruption, we must investigate the entire public procurement procedure and then prepare appropriate conclusions and recommendations for its suppression. In our case, this implies an indepth analysis of relevant normative acts, practices and challenges in public procurement in the security sector. The report was made on the basis of qualitative and quantitative parameters based on which the anti-corruption capacities of 13 security sector institutions from different levels of government in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) were measured and evaluated. The time period covered by the research refers to two years, 2020 and 2021.
Topic:
Security, Corruption, Government, Law Enforcement, Institutions, and Public Procurement
Political Geography:
Europe, Eastern Europe, Balkans, and Bosnia and Herzegovina

30. Anti-corruption Capacities of Public Procurement in the Security Sector: Report for 2020 and 2021 - Part II

Author:
Erdin Halimić, Ajla Popović, Haris Vejezović, Aleksandar Maletić, and Dajana Bašić
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Centre for Security Studies
Abstract:
Investigations into corruption in the security sector are often focused on contracting, that is, on the stages of public procurement in which civil servants prepare and sign contracts with suppliers of equipment and services and manage their implementation. However, in order to discover the functioning mechanisms of public procurement and potential critical points for the emergence of corruption, we must investigate the entire public procurement procedure and then prepare appropriate conclusions and recommendations for its suppression. In our case, this implies an indepth analysis of relevant normative acts, practices and challenges in public procurement in the security sector. The report was made on the basis of qualitative and quantitative parameters based on which the anti-corruption capacities of 12 security sector institutions from different levels of government in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) were measured and evaluated. The time period covered by the research refers to two years, 2020 and 2021.
Topic:
Security, Corruption, Government, Law Enforcement, Institutions, and Public Procurement
Political Geography:
Europe, Eastern Europe, Balkans, and Bosnia and Herzegovina

31. The Return of the Foreign Fighters and Their Families to Their Homeland: Existing Practices and Considerations Regarding Security and Human Rights

Author:
Katerina Christoforaki
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Centre for Security Studies
Abstract:
The creation of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has attracted an unprecedented flow of thousands of people from more than 100 countries all over the world to join their cause. After the fall of the so-called caliphate, the countries involved have to deal with the aftermath of the conflict and the future threat of the resurgence of ISIS or other terrorist groups. The people who volunteered and joined ISIS might pose a security threat in the future. This paper aims to examine the different approaches that countries have taken regarding the return of foreign fighters (FFs) and their families who joined ISIS to their homeland. This is a multidimensional and complex matter since it has legal, moral, and political implications, and therefore the decisions in this regard are never unanimous, nor do they come without criticism and opposition. On the one hand, it would be easier to just leave the FFs and their families there, prosecute them there and incarcerate them there. It would also be easier to collect evidence and to have testimonies of the witnesses and the survivors, and also it would keep the potential security threat away from their homeland. However, this would only be beneficial for the countries of origin and in the short term as it wouldn‘t solve the problem of radicalization. In fact, it might fuel it even more, and the proximity of the ISIS member in prisons or in camps could benefit them to rebuild their network and plan future attacks. Moreover, leaving them there would be against all human rights norms regarding the death penalty, fair trial, torture, rights of the child, and more. On the other hand, the return of the fighters and their families could indeed pose a danger to the security of the homeland. Not all of the returnees have committed punishable crimes and for those who have, very often there is not enough admissible evidence to the national courts. In fact, in the case of women and children, the countries are more reluctant to their return because they might have not taken part in the atrocities but that does not mean that they are innocent and bear no responsibility. Complicated is also the case of children and teenagers, some of whom have taken part in the atrocities willingly or unwillingly, some were brought by their families, some traveled alone in order to join ISIS, and some were born under ISIS control and risk statelessness.
Topic:
Security, Human Rights, Counter-terrorism, Islamic State, Foreign Fighters, and Repatriation
Political Geography:
Iraq, United Kingdom, Europe, France, Germany, Syria, United States of America, and Bosnia and Herzegovina

32. Less is More: A New Strategy for US Security Assistance to Africa

Author:
Elizabeth Shackelford, Ethan Kessler, and Emma Sanderson
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:
The US strategy toward Africa today is neither effective nor sustainable. It’s time to flip the script. US policy in Africa has for too long prioritized short-term security to the detriment of long-term stability by prioritizing the provision of military and security assistance. This is done in hopes that partner countries will use this capacity to suppress radical groups at home and reduce the likelihood that they will spread disorder in the region or create threats to US interests at home and abroad. Yet, this strategy has neither produced security in Africa nor reduced threats to the United States and its interests. Washington should rein in its use of security assistance with partners that fail to demonstrate commitment to the reforms necessary to build long-term stability. Partnerships and military assistance with illiberal, undemocratic countries have delivered little, if any, sustainable security improvements, and in many cases have prompted further instability and violence by building the capacity of abusive security forces. They have also provided harmful associations between the US government and the abuses committed by those we arm and assist. Since terrorism in Africa poses a low threat to US national security interests, there is no justification for focusing on short-term security issues at the cost of good governance, rule of law, and other factors that contribute to long-term stability. The costs of doing so are increasingly being recognized, with Congress today more likely to apply existing legal provisions to end security cooperation with abusive regimes. But these interventions typically come too late and are too inconsistent to influence behavior of illiberal regimes. A more systemic approach is needed to break the pattern of poor outcomes. The rise of great-power competition exacerbates the risk that the US national security establishment will double down on its security cooperation strategy in the region out of concern that doing otherwise would leave a vacuum that America’s competitors might fill. In reality, however, the argument for being more selective in distributing security assistance is even stronger with the return of great-power competition, as values and reputation become increasingly important in attracting support for the United States over other great powers. Security and military assistance will continue to play a role in the region. However, the United States would be better off being more deliberate and cautious, only pursuing it after completing a holistic assessment of the potential impact of such assistance on governance, human rights, and broader stability. Security assistance can and must be more closely scrutinized with enhanced US government oversight tools to ensure it does not undermine governance and stability, and Washington should be more willing to choose different tools when shaping relationships with weak partners, to condition assistance to ensure it does not facilitate bad outcomes, and to cut it off when partner countries use it to abuse civilians.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Strategic Competition, and Military Aid
Political Geography:
Africa, North America, and United States of America

33. Mexico Peace Index 2023

Author:
Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP)
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP)
Abstract:
This is the tenth edition of the Mexico Peace Index (MPI), produced by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP). It provides a comprehensive measure of peacefulness in Mexico, including trends, analysis and estimates of the economic impact of violence in the country. The MPI is based on the Global Peace Index, the world’s leading measure of global peacefulness, produced by IEP every year since 2007. The MPI consists of 12 sub-indicators aggregated into five broader indicators. Mexico’s peacefulness improved by 0.9 percent in 2022. This was the third straight year of improvement following four consecutive years of deteriorations. Seventeen states improved, while 15 deteriorated.
Topic:
Security, Economy, Violence, and Peace
Political Geography:
North America and Mexico

34. Allies Help Those Who Help Themselves: How Estonia and Japan Approach Deterrence

Author:
Yoko Iwama, Tetsuo Kotani, Sugio Takahashi, Tony Lawrence, and Henrik Praks
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Up until the blatant act of Russian aggression in Ukraine in 2022, the West had been gradually shifting its attention towards East Asia, with China seen as the primary challenge of the first half of the 21st century. The new context requires a thorough reassessment of international security architecture by all national stakeholders. This, in turn, offers Estonia and Japan the opportunity to enrich their security perspectives on common strategic threats, as well as on broader geopolitical shifts caused by Russia and China. This report introduces several aspects of these revolutionary developments, their background, and their potential implications, some of which have already been reflected in the updated strategic documents unveiled by US and Japanese defence communities. Taken together, these documents make a case for an enhanced partnership between Japan, the US, and Europe that would prepare like-minded allies to respond to any security crisis. In the eventuality of a crisis resulting in an actual military confrontation, the report compares China’s missile supremacy and Japan’s long-range standoff maritime firepower strategies by grounding this analysis in the theory of victory. Charting a more favourable course forward, the report assesses the current state of deterrence in the Baltics by detailing the key developments in regional defence posture and planning, with a clear shift towards forward defence. Centring on emerging cross-border risks posed by hybrid warfare and using Estonia as a case study for vulnerabilities, the report proposes ways to mitigate these risks by advancing the role of deterrence. The report’s recommendations are as follows: To establish a cooperative format between NATO and Indo-Pacific nations along the lines of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership and Cooperation Council and open NATO’s liaison office in Japan. To create the Baltic-Japan security and defence 1.5 Track dialogue forum. To develop ties between the defence intelligence services of Estonia and Japan in order to better understand the threats posed by Russia and China. To facilitate networking in the fields of concept development, capability planning, doctrine, and military education to address the challenges of multi-domain operations. To explore possibilities for closer defence industrial cooperation and technology sharing between Estonia and Japan in cyber security, artificial intelligence, sensorics, robotics, and electronic warfare. To engage Estonia’s knowledge and experience when adopting NATO’s standards and practices in Japan’s future capability development in pursuit of interoperability. To hold joint exercises in integrated air and missile defence, coastal defence, critical undersea infrastructure protection, etc. As Japan seeks to forge closer defence relations with Europe and European nations and enhance their defence ties with the democracies in the Indo-Pacific area, the need to understand better how cooperation between Estonia and Japan contributes to the emerging Euro-Pacific deterrence agenda will persist.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, European Union, Cybersecurity, Deterrence, and Resilience
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Europe, Ukraine, Taiwan, Asia, and Estonia

35. Europe’s Broken Order and the Prospect of a New Cold War

Author:
Kristi Raik and Eero Kristjan Sild
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The Russian and western visions of European security have profoundly different ideational roots: balance of power embedded in realist geopolitics versus liberal rules-based order. Russia is a revisionist power aiming to re-establish a European security order based on the balance of power, including a recognition of its empire and sphere of influence. Russia’s aggressive pursuit of this vision has forced the West to defend the rules-based liberal order in Europe and beyond. This report analyses the main sources and implications of Russia’s discontent with the post-Cold War European security order, which eventually led to the invasion of Ukraine. The disagreements are likely to endure beyond the war in Ukraine, leading to a new Cold War. The paper identifies three scenarios for the future of the European security order, the most likely one being a dual order, with the liberal rules-based order further strengthened and enlarged among western countries including Ukraine, while Russia will hold on to its imperialist ambitions but being forced to accept a much more limited sphere of influence than the former Soviet or tsarist empires. As long as the worldview that underlies Russia’s foreign policy does not change, any new balance of power will be temporary and under threat of renewed aggression once Russia has regained strength. In order to make it more sustainable, the West will need to eliminate grey zones, ensure credible deterrence and defence, and consistently weaken Russia’s ability to rebuild its military might.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Cold War, Authoritarianism, European Union, Democracy, Geopolitics, Deterrence, and Soviet Union
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

36. War and Energy Security: Lessons for The Future

Author:
Tomas Jermalavicius, Veli-Pekka Tynkkynen, Andrian Prokip, Christian Egenhofer, and Edoardo Righetti
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Russia’s war against Ukraine has produced multiple shifts in the geopolitical landscape of Europe. Various EU member states and EU institutions broke through entire decades of dogmatic principles and established practices in security and defence policies to respond to Russia’s aggression and protect the continent. The energy domain is at the forefront of this confrontation, as Russia used its dominant market position in European energy supply in the run-up to – as well as during – the war to weaken Europe’s responses, divide the EU, and deter it from increasing its support to Ukraine. The multifaceted and far-reaching impact of the war offers an opportunity for a deeper reflection on the lessons learned for energy security at the national, regional, and EU levels. It allows for an assessment of the prospects in the geopolitical landscape where Russia is comprehensively isolated; new energy and technology players grow in importance; a new global energy order emerges; and the effects of the climate crisis become more severe and evident. It is also a rare opportunity to assess how complex energy systems retain their resilience or degrade under the conditions of a high-intensity conventional war, which has collective defence implications to the ability of the frontline states, such as Estonia, to fulfil NATO’s baseline requirements for national resilience and thus Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The report seeks to provide analysis concerning these aspects of the war’s short-, medium-, and long-term impact on energy security in Europe, the Baltic region, and Estonia. Conclusions of the report stress the importance of regulatory, policy, and technological flexibility, as well as innovation, in responding to various forms of strategic coercion through the energy sector – especially when such coercion is applied against targets under the duress of a major war, in which economic disruption, market uncertainty, geopolitical turmoil, and societal anxieties are abundant. The conclusions caution though that the appetite for resilience-enhancing investments and transformative solutions might diminish in the cost-conscious economic environment of the future or that the EU and US will start a vicious cycle of protectionist measures in green energy development, which will undercut transatlantic cooperation in energy security.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Infrastructure, European Union, Gas, Crisis Management, Renewable Energy, Hybrid Threats, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Finland, Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, Sweden, and United States of America

37. The Future of Arms Control: Ready to (Dis)Agree?

Author:
Tõnis Idarand, Kalev Stoicescu, and Ian Anthony
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Having been crumbling already for years, international arms control architecture is now in a perilous state. Existing arrangements have either been losing their effectiveness or outright failing due to Russia’s non-compliance, whilst Russia’s aggression against Ukraine might have delivered the final blow to this system. Even after the war in Ukraine has ended, it will take years to re-establish the level of trust necessary to, again, engage with Russia on arms control. The return to the pre-war ‘business as usual’, where the dialogue will resume as if never interrupted, is unlikely. Arms control dialogue with Russia ‘at any cost’ cannot produce an acceptable result. Arms control as we have known it, with its legally binding and verifiable agreements, may have come to an end. The trends emerging from the expert discussions are more focused on a different set of instruments, such as political commitments, risk reduction, or transparency and confidence building measures. Development of new technologies, proliferation of new weapon systems, the rise of China as a global player, and increasing role of non-strategic nuclear weapons in Russian and Chinese military doctrines will all have an impact on global arms control. The fate of the New START Treaty will have a decisive effect on the future of arms control and the prospects of the nuclear non-proliferation regime already under immense pressure. This report attempts to summarise the developments in arms control architecture over the last decades and accentuate the trends that might be consequential when designing the arms control system of the future. The year 2023 has already demonstrated that arms control is less relevant in Russia’s security thinking. Moscow exploits the existing arrangements mainly as leverage to influence the US and NATO’s policy towards Ukraine or obtain concessions regarding its proposals on the new European security arrangements. The role of arms control in European security might be in decline, but the key elements of European security architecture are still in place, and most states continue to implement them. NATO allies – when discussing and designing arms control or confidence-building measures – shall consider how these instruments advance the security of allies. Under the current circumstances, the priority is to strengthen defence and deterrence of the Alliance. This is the only way to lay the groundwork for a constructive arms control dialogue with Russia.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Weapons, Nonproliferation, Trade, and Military
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

38. How Russia Went to War: The Kremlin’s Preparations for Its Aggression Against Ukraine

Author:
Kalev Stoicescu, Mykola Nazarov, Keir Giles, and Matthew Johnson
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
This report examines Russia’s preparations for its full-scale invasion of Ukraine: domestically, in Ukraine itself, in the global information domain, and in building its relationship with China. For Russia, crushing Ukraine’s quest for democracy was central to meeting its objectives of reshaping the post-Cold War order in Europe and globally, restoring its own status, and reconstituting the Russian empire and Russian world. Its preparations in the political and informational, military, and economic domains for a full-scale war in Ukraine were too extensive and overt to go unnoticed, but they were not acted upon. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the evidence went against the dominant narrative in the West and was simply brushed aside. In the political and informational domains, Russia’s domestic preparations including cementing the regime’s authority, and taking advantage of the population’s Soviet nostalgia and aspirations for the restoration of the Russian world and the empire. Limited economic preparations were intended to safeguard Russia’s economy against current and future Western sanctions, while Russia’s extensive military preparations involved large-scale defence spending and extensive military modernisation efforts. Russia’s preparations beyond its own territory included: a campaign within Ukraine to divide society and discredit the democratically elected leadership; a campaign directed at the rest of the world about Ukraine, discrediting the country and its people as an object of sympathy and support in their resistance against Russia; and a campaign of intimidation designed to instil in western leaders and populations a fear of obstructing, impeding, or offending Russia. Russia also worked to build a relationship with China. China’s support is essential to Putin’s ambitions. But equally, China’s strategy for confronting the United States – which China cannot do alone – depends on Russia remaining at least a quasi-great power.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Development, Sanctions, Military Affairs, European Union, Resilience, and Information Warfare
Political Geography:
Russia, China, United Kingdom, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

39. Campaigning to Dissuade: Applying Emerging Technologies to Engage and Succeed in the Information Age Security Competition

Author:
Bryan Clark and Dan Patt
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) presents the United States with its most comprehensive economic and security rival since Great Britain during the nineteenth century. Starting in 2018, US defense strategies have highlighted the threat that the PRC poses to US allies, and successive presidential administrations and Congresses responded by increasing defense budgets to expand US military capability and capacity. Despite these efforts, numerous assessments now show that modernization of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has eroded—and in some missions overcome—US military superiority. Absent large and politically fraught increases in defense spending, continued expansion and improvement of today’s US force are unlikely to regain broad overmatch against the PLA in the Western Pacific. Instead, the United States will need new strategies and operational concepts to deter PRC aggression. Recognizing this imperative, the 2022 US National Defense Strategy (NDS) attempted to move in a different direction from its predecessors through two new lines of effort called “campaigning” and “integrated deterrence.” However, in unclassified documents and speeches by defense officials, both the essence of integrated deterrence and the mechanism of campaigning remain unclear. 1 Emerging technologies offer the US military a way to put these new concepts into action, sustaining its ability to prevent conflict and gaining an upper hand in the strategic competition with China despite the PLA’s “home team” advantages. The United States remains the world leader in operational and technological innovation, as evidenced by decades of advancements in networking and computing—marked recently by the rapid commercialization of artificial intelligence (AI). Building on the 2022 NDS, this report proposes a strategy for campaigning that would exploit information technologies to dissuade China from pursuing acts of aggression against allies such as Taiwan. The primary objective of the proposed campaigning model is to shape PRC government decision-making, especially that of the PRC military, in ways that are conducive to long-term regional stability and prosperity. A whole-of-government effort like that implied by the 2022 NDS would be the most effective form of campaigning because it could exploit the PRC government’s numerous vulnerabilities, from its appalling record on human rights to its loss of economic momentum and its growing demographic challenges. However, this report focuses on actions the US military can take by itself or with allied militaries to dissuade future PRC aggression. In the proposed approach, campaigning is an ongoing sequence of probing, signaling, adapting, and acting by the US military and intelligence community, coupled with and informed by instrumentation of the information environment. In addition to demonstrating US resolve, campaigning should enable the US to estimate competitor habits, preferences, and fears. These estimates would guide future campaigning activities and inform US force planners regarding a competitor’s uncertainty and areas of concern. Armed with increasing insight about adversary beliefs, campaigning actions would aim to shape an opponent’s preferences and priorities away from violent paths to their goals and toward scenarios that are more aligned with US interests. In offering an approach to dissuasion, this report diverges from the strategy of deterring war primarily through threats of denial or punishment. This construct has dominated US defense strategy since the Soviet Union collapsed because conventional dominance enabled the US military to credibly stop or reverse an act of aggression and nuclear weapons provided the capability to impose existential punishment. Today, the PRC’s status as a peer competitor makes denial and punishment less credible. The US government will instead need to prevent conflict before it becomes imminent.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Economics, Science and Technology, Strategic Competition, and Emerging Technology
Political Geography:
China, North America, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America

40. Faltering Lion: Analyzing Progress and Setbacks in Somalia’s War against al-Shabaab

Author:
James Barnett
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Analysts have long understood the war against al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda’s East African affiliate, as “unwinnable” and “[with] no end in sight.” Most have considered the group one of the largest and most sophisticated jihadist insurgencies on the planet while viewing Somalia, the state in which it was born and primarily operates, as a quintessential “failed state.” Yet in mid-2022, many analysts began to change their tune. Al-Shabaab began to suffer its most significant setbacks in a decade at the hands of a clan uprising in Somalia’s central states of Hirshabelle and Galmudug. The uprising quickly received military support from the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), and some United States officials believe it constitutes Somalia’s Anbar Awakening. Meanwhile, Somali officials speak of this offensive, which they’ve now dubbed Operation Black Lion, as the long-awaited death blow against the group. Unfortunately, the pendulum started to swing back after al-Shabaab began regrouping and counterattacking in early 2023. As of September 2023, the Somali government is struggling to complete the offensive that began last year in central Somalia. All the while, the government promises to achieve ever more ambitious goals for defeating the group in its southern Somalian strongholds by the end of 2024. The question, then, is whether Somalia is really turning a page in the war against al-Shabaab, with the group’s defeat or meaningful degradation in sight for the first time in years, or if the FGS’s battlefield progress in 2022 was merely a short-lived setback for the terrorist group. In this report, I argue that the ongoing, if faltering, offensive against al-Shabaab reveals the dilemma of counterterrorism in the Horn of Africa: On the one hand, al-Shabaab is not invincible, and the group’s center of gravity—its ability to gain a modicum of acceptance or legitimacy from vulnerable Somali communities—has been exposed as fragile. On the other hand, Somalia’s perennial and myriad political disputes, as well as other issues like a lack of state capacity and rampant corruption, are preventing its federal and state governments from capitalizing on the opportunities available to them. Instead, Mogadishu, aware of its limited military capacity, is looking to the militaries of neighboring Kenya and Ethiopia to bear the brunt of its anticipated offensive into southern Somalia, even though these countries’ controversial interventions in Somalia over the years have catalyzed al-Shabaab’s formation and expansion. In any case, there appears to be little appetite from either country to engage in another offensive. Al-Shabaab, for its part, is counterattacking against government forces in central Somalia and looking to expand its operations in neighboring countries—in part to hinder those regional militaries’ potential participation in any forthcoming offensive. Consequently, the situation looks less promising than it did at the end of 2022, and al-Shabaab is unlikely to face a meaningful defeat in the coming months. Instead, the best-case scenario would see this military offensive degrade al-Shabaab over the coming months to the point that the terrorist organization partially fractures and loses some of its popular support, possibly opening up room for the FGS to negotiate with factions of the group. A more likely scenario, however, would see the conflict remain a stalemate, with the government’s current offensive bringing only temporary or superficial gains that do not meaningfully degrade al-Shabaab’s capacity. I have drawn this report from insights I gained during a four-week trip to Kenya and Somalia in June 2023. Within Somalia, I traveled around the federal capital, Mogadishu, as well as the capitals of the states of Jubbaland, Galmudug, and Puntland, in the south, center, and north of the country respectively. I also traveled to the frontline town of Bar Sanguuni, near al-Shabaab–controlled territory in Jubbaland, and separately to Las Anod, a disputed city that both Somaliland and local clans have claimed and that is at the heart of a new regional conflict. Given the sensitivity of discussing security matters in Somalia, I have anonymized the details of interview subjects in almost all references.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, Alliance, and Al-Shabaab
Political Geography:
Africa and Somalia

41. From Fueling Victory to Running on Empty: Lessons from American Energy Policy in War and Peace

Author:
Arthur Herman
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The purpose of this study is to draw important lessons from how the United States has handled its national energy policy in the past in order to guide policymakers and industry leaders in the future. In the end, this is a study in contrasts. In the case of World War II, the federal government successfully used America’s energy independence and abundance to help Great Britain survive the Nazi onslaught and then to win a two-front world war, the greatest victory in history. In the case of the 1970s, the United States became dependent on others, specifically the Middle East, for its energy prosperity. As a result, America lost control over not only its ability to conduct foreign policy but also its economy. Construction of the Big Inch oil pipelines, the most extensive government energy project ever created, epitomized America’s successful national energy strategy in World War II. This project enabled the United States to literally fuel victory over the Axis. The Arab oil embargo of 1973 and the dramatic rise in the price of oil imposed by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) severely damaged the US economy, set back global growth for nearly a generation, and symbolized the failure of America’s energy strategy in that decade. The end of this study will summarize the key lessons from these two contrasting approaches to a national energy strategy. However, two stand out: Energy independence—and having access to cheap, abundant energy—is an essential prerequisite for American national and economic security. A national energy strategy that relies on the expertise of leading energy executives and engineers in the private sector will tend to be successful; one that ignores their advice and assistance will tend to fail. Whether America will enjoy energy security as it faces the challenges of the twenty-first century will depend on many factors. But drawing the right lessons from these two contrasting historical eras can prepare the way for a new era of energy abundance and national power.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, History, and Energy
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

42. EU – Pacific Talks: EU – Security Challenges for the Pacific, EU, and Russia

Author:
Tomáš Moudrý
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Europeum Institute for European Policy
Abstract:
If you missed the debate EU - Pacific talks: EU - Security Challenges for the Pacific, EU, and Russia, here you can read the report from the debate written by Tomáš Moudrý. During the debate, it was discussed, for example, that despite the considerable geographical distance, the EU and the Indo-Pacific region are now more interconnected than ever before and both sides are seeking to strengthen their partnership in many areas, with security policy now one of the most important due to many factors.
Topic:
Security, European Union, Partnerships, Geopolitics, Dialogue, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Asia-Pacific

43. How Finnish and Swedish NATO Accession Could Shape the Future Russian Threat

Author:
Nicholas Lokker, Jim Townsend, Heli Hautala, and Andrea Kendall-Taylor
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was a major strategic blunder. Not only will Russia emerge from the war economically and militarily weakened, but its brutal invasion has undercut Moscow’s geopolitical position, including by triggering nearby countries to take new steps to provide for their security and defense. Most notably, Russia’s aggression in Ukraine compelled Finland and Sweden to apply for NATO membership— leading to an expansion of the very alliance that Russia purports to be opposing in Ukraine. While it is unclear exactly when Finland and Sweden will join NATO—this will depend on when Hungary and Turkey, the last remaining allies to ratify the accession protocols, finalize the process—it is clear that there is no going back to the status quo ante. NATO allies should expect Russia to react to Finland and Sweden joining the organization beyond the cool response that followed their announcement. Their accession into NATO will permanently reshape the European security architecture, which Moscow is likely to see as a threat to its own security and therefore use as a basis for adjusting it calculus. Even though Moscow has not explicitly retaliated against Finland and Sweden for joining NATO beyond expressing displeasure, the Kremlin is nonetheless likely to respond, including in ways that will pose challenges to the alliance in both the near and long term. This memo discusses how Finland’s and Sweden’s entry into NATO will shape Europe’s security landscape, how Russia is likely to see these changes and respond, and how the allies can address the future challenges stemming from these changing dynamics.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Regional Security, Russia-Ukraine War, and Threat Assessment
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Finland, and Sweden

44. Atomic Strait: How China’s Nuclear Buildup Shapes Security Dynamics with Taiwan and the United States

Author:
Jacob Stokes
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
This report examines the intersection of China’s nuclear modernization and cross-Strait tensions, especially how they might play out during a crisis, contingency, or conflict involving China, Taiwan, and the United States. Beijing is rapidly modernizing its nuclear arsenal to make it larger and more sophisticated. Changes include an increase in warhead numbers from more than 400 today to potentially 700 by 2027 and more beyond, consolidating a nuclear triad, developing new delivery systems, and digging at least 300 new missile silos. Some factors still could constrain the growth of China’s arsenal or the policies that shape the way Chinese leaders employ it. They range from fissile material stocks to competing military spending priorities, considerations about China’s international reputation, and upholding Beijing’s claimed No First Use policy. But nearly all those constraining factors either already have weakened or could do so in the near future. China’s expanding nuclear arsenal suggests that the force will be designed to fulfill new missions. Some part of Beijing’s buildup surely is meant to bolster its second-strike retaliatory capability in the face of what China perceives as shifts in U.S. conventional and nuclear capabilities and policies. China’s long-term goal for the expansion, however, could be more ambitious and potentially even include seeking to build an arsenal on par with Washington’s and Moscow’s. Meanwhile, China continues to ramp up pressure on Taiwan using political, economic, and military tools. Beijing’s campaign could provoke more crises in the coming years. The three major roles that nuclear weapons could play for China when dealing with cross-Strait crises or conflicts are: to shield China from U.S. nuclear coercion, to threaten Chinese nuclear use to try to forestall U.S. intervention, and to conduct a limited Chinese nuclear detonation in an attempt to force U.S. and Taiwanese capitulation. The report concludes with recommendations for U.S. policymakers. It calls for carrying out U.S. nuclear modernization plans to deter China but avoiding nuclear arms racing as a strategy in itself. It recommends incorporating nuclear elements into contingency planning and scenario exercises related to Taiwan, both unilaterally and with allies and partners. The report then calls for improving Taiwan’s conventional military capabilities while maintaining a consistent U.S. policy on cross-Strait issues and ensuring Taiwan forgoes pursuing indigenous nuclear weapons. Finally, the report argues in favor of pushing forward tough-minded bilateral engagement with Beijing on strategic stability and security issues while crafting a multilateral arms control strategy that builds coalitions to incentivize China to join and impose costs on Beijing if it opts to stay outside of key agreements.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

45. Avoiding the Brink: Escalation Management in a War to Defend Taiwan

Author:
Stacie L. Pettyjohn and Hannah Dennis
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The United States is entering an unprecedented multipolar nuclear era that is far more complex and challenging than that of the Cold War. This report examines potential triggers, thresholds, and targets for Chinese nuclear use as well as options for the United States and its allies and partners to avoid and manage escalation. It uses the results of two exploratory tabletop exercises (TTXs) focused on how China’s expanding nuclear arsenal could impact the risk of nuclear escalation in a conventional conflict over Taiwan. From these two TTXs, the authors derived tentative insights into how nuclear escalation in a war over Taiwan might unfold and identified areas where further research is needed. First, the expansions and improvements projected for China’s nuclear forces will provide it with a wider range of coercive options. With a secure second-strike capability and more diverse theater nuclear options, China may be willing to brandish its nuclear weapons to attempt to deter the United States from entering a war. There are few incentives to conduct nuclear strikes early in such a conflict, but a war over Taiwan might well lead to a protracted war between the great powers—another area where more study will be critical. The authors also found that American policymakers today might not find the PRC’s nuclear threats credible because of its smaller arsenal size and historic policy of no first use (NFU). Furthermore, the authors found that attempts to degrade key conventional capabilities might lead either side to cross the other’s red lines, setting off an escalatory spiral and transforming a regional conflict into a great-power war. Both the United States and China will have to weigh the value of eliminating certain targets with the risk of crossing an adversary red line. Last, the authors found an asymmetry between the targets available to the United States and China in a Taiwan contingency. With fewer categories of targets to strike and types of capabilities with which to strike them, the United States may have fewer options to manage escalation. All these findings merit further study. The two TTXs, conducted in summer 2022, pitted a U.S. Blue team against a Chinese Red team in a war over Taiwan. The two wargames were designed as a controlled comparison to focus on the impact of one specific variable—the size and composition of the PLA’s nuclear arsenal—on the Red team’s decision-making and its propensity to deliberately escalate and on the Blue team’s ability to defend its allies and partners while managing escalation. By holding most other factors constant but changing Red’s nuclear force structure, the authors aimed to concentrate on the role that nuclear weapons played. In TTX 1, the players had a notional 2027 order of battle with a nuclear arsenal of about 700 warheads, diverse in yield and delivery system type and range. The second TTX, set in 2030, included a similarly diverse Red arsenal of over 1,000 nuclear warheads. After analyzing the results of both exercises, the authors contextualized and expanded the findings through research on existing literature on nuclear deterrence and escalation.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Escalation
Political Geography:
Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

46. “Production Is Deterrence”: Investing in Precision-Guided Weapons to Meet Peer Challengers

Author:
Stacie L. Pettyjohn and Hannah Dennis
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
This report explores whether the fiscal year (FY) 2024 U.S. defense budget request for key conventional precision-guided munitions (PGMs) aligns with the 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) by prioritizing weapons needed for the “pacing challenge” China poses and dealing with the “acute threat” from Russia, while taking risk in lower priority areas. The FY24 presidential budget request builds on the shift that began in FY23 to support the NDS: increasing buys of key long-range and antiship missiles to prepare for a fight in the Pacific, starting to fill the cruise missile defense gap, bolstering production of the land-attack weapons needed in Europe, and test-running multiyear procurement and large lot procurement for key munitions to strengthen the defense industrial base. In the Department of Defense’s (DoD) budgeting process, ships, aircraft, and vehicles tend to be prioritized, leaving missiles and munitions with inadequate funding. Moreover, the Pentagon does not take a holistic approach to procuring key conventional PGMs, making it difficult to assess the joint portfolio. If the United States is going to effectively compete with China and Russia, that needs to change. To deter and—if deterrence fails—defeat China, the DoD needs large stockpiles of standoff missiles, maritime strike weapons, and layered air and missile defenses. The authors conclude that after years of underinvestment, the DoD is buying more long-range and medium-range missiles, which would be essential in a China war fight. While historically the Pentagon has overinvested in bombs and missiles to attack targets on the land and neglected antiship weapons, the FY24 budget saw a notable uptick in air-launched antiship weapons. For the past decade, the DoD has consistently invested in air defenses, but its purchases have focused on expensive ballistic missile defense interceptors, while neglecting cruise missile defenses. The FY24 budget reverses this trend. Additionally, the DoD is investing in PGMs to arm Ukraine and replenish American and allied stores of weapons that are needed to counter Russia. Except for surface-to-air missiles, the weapons for Ukraine are relatively short-range land-attack PGMs that U.S. forces do not need in the Indo-Pacific. A large portion of the funding for these weapons is coming from Ukraine supplemental appropriations, not the base defense budget. Supplemental appropriations are also resourcing significant investments in U.S. production lines, but the DoD has made only moderate progress rebuilding American stockpiles of the PGMs given to Ukraine.
Topic:
Security, Budget, Weapons, Deterrence, and Defense Spending
Political Geography:
China, North America, and United States of America

47. U.S.-China Competition and Military AI: How Washington Can Manage Strategic Risks amid Rivalry with Beijing

Author:
Jacob Stokes, Alexander Sullivan, and Noah Greene
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Two tectonic trends in the international security environment appear to be on a collision course. The first trend is the intensifying geopolitical rivalry between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China). The second trend is the rapid development of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies, including for military applications. This report explores how the United States can manage strategic risks—defined as increased risks of armed conflict or the threat of nuclear war—that could be created or exacerbated by military AI in its relationship with China. It begins by providing an overview of China’s views on and policies toward AI. Beijing sees AI playing roles in both its civilian economy and the modernization of its military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). At home, Chinese leaders want to leverage AI to boost growth and innovation, address economic and social challenges, and secure the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) domestic rule. AI also plays a key role in China’s military ambitions, especially its goal to become a “world-class military” by midcentury, in part through the “intelligentization” of its forces. Intelligentization relies on integrating AI and other emerging technologies into the joint force with the goal of gaining an edge on the United States. China argues that its governance model, including its military-civil fusion policy, gives Beijing a competitive advantage over Washington. Realization of that vision, however, remains uncertain and will require China to overcome external and internal obstacles.
Topic:
Security, Military Affairs, Artificial Intelligence, Rivalry, and Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

48. Campaign of Denial: Strengthening Simultaneous Deterrence in the Indo-Pacific and Europe

Author:
Becca Wasser
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The United States faces an unprecedented challenge: simultaneously deterring large-scale conventional aggression by two nuclear-armed powers. The nation will need to deter these major adversaries from overt aggression in the near term in two primary, yet distinct, regions: China in the Indo-Pacific and Russia in Europe. However, the U.S. military is unprepared to concurrently meet the challenges posed by China and Russia. These challenges have become more pronounced as Beijing continues its ambitious military modernization and Moscow continues to threaten European security despite its currently diminished military strength. Effective simultaneous deterrence requires the United States to reembrace the basic principles of deterrence to reverse unfavorable trends in military power that are eroding long-standing U.S. warfighting advantages. It necessitates U.S. forces to project power into far-flung regions that are contested by China and Russia to uphold America’s extended deterrence commitments to its allies and partners. To do so, the Pentagon must shift from previous approaches designed to deter opportunistic aggressors and respond to crises. While the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has realigned its strategy to focus on great-power deterrence, it has faced hurdles in strategy implementation that have stymied changes needed to organize more effectively for simultaneous deterrence. This is due in part to a sizable mismatch between strategy and resources. The U.S. military does not have the kinds and numbers of forces required to simultaneously deter China in the Indo-Pacific and Russia in Europe from conventional conflict. This deficit is especially telling in two priority scenarios: an invasion of Taiwan by China, and a Russian invasion of the Baltics. American forces lack the modernized capabilities, necessary posture, right levels of readiness, and familiarity with executing the types of warfighting missions needed to meet the current challenge.1 The balance between meeting global demands and responding to persistent threats while shifting to emphasize deterrence in the Indo-Pacific and Europe is precarious. Concentrating on strategic priorities requires accepting risk in other regions, as the United States, with fewer forces and resources stretched around the globe, moves capabilities and forces to priority theaters. A new approach to simultaneous deterrence is needed. The Biden administration has outlined the concept of campaigning as a key component of peacetime deterrence. This concept seeks to sequence and link military activities so they intentionally counter coercion by priority adversaries. The intent is to enable the Pentagon to respond to challenges posed by China and Russia, while still meeting global demands. But the concept is currently ill-defined and expansive, and its broad interpretation does not help the DoD meet its deterrence requirements or align strategy and resources. Instead, campaigning runs the risk of engaging U.S. forces in activities that do not contribute to or are counterproductive to deterrence. A failure to curb these activities will result in either the need to expand force size, or the hindrance of modernization efforts.
Topic:
Security, Military Affairs, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Europe, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

49. Assessing the Evolving Russian Nuclear Threat

Author:
Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Michael Kofman, Nicholas Lokker, and Heli Hautala
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, its nuclear rhetoric has become more permissive, more inconsistent, and more instrumental. Russia has also placed greater emphasis on military exercises involving nuclear-capable weapons, and it has altered policies and planning for its nuclear forces. Although it is too soon to draw definitive conclusions as the war in Ukraine is still ongoing and the lessons that Russia draws from it uncertain, the changes in Russia’s approach to nuclear weapons since its invasion suggest that Russia is likely to adopt a more assertive nuclear force posture, especially with respect to its non-strategic nuclear weapons, in order to signal that the country will no longer be a status quo power and increase the credibility of its nuclear threats. Russia is also likely to increase its efforts to test NATO cohesion—potentially through greater nuclear provocations and/or by signaling an insincere willingness to engage in forms of arms control or cooperative threat reduction—and continue to look for opportunities to leverage nuclear weapons to signal great-power status. In a future war with NATO, Russia would likely perceive the need to use nuclear weapons earlier in the conflict, either to seek victory against superior NATO conventional forces through nuclear first use on the battlefield, or to prevent defeat by those NATO forces. Moreover, since 2022, it has become increasingly difficult for U.S. and Russian policymakers to discern each other’s red lines, raising the risk of unintended escalation. Heightened Russian nuclear rhetoric at home could also alter the public’s views of acceptable nuclear use, eroding a potential constraint on Kremlin decision-making. Finally, changes since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine indicate both reduced Russian commitment to nonproliferation as its image increasingly becomes that of a rogue actor in international affairs, and diminished opportunities for nuclear arms control, for now.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, Russia-Ukraine War, and Threat Assessment
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

50. Rolling the Iron Dice: The Increasing Chance of Conflict Protraction

Author:
Andrew Metrick
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The prospect of a Sino-American war looms on the horizon. No scenario for such a conflict has garnered more interest than the potential invasion of Taiwan by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In the United States, discussions have focused on the early days of a conflict, in particular sinking the PRC’s amphibious fleet.1 Both the United States and the PRC place great emphasis on offensive military operations that heavily use the fruits of the precision strike revolution (PSR).2 This focus on early offensive action leads immediately to considerations of forces and weapons. U.S. defense planners are unsurprisingly most comfortable with the dynamics of short, sharp wars, having spent the past decade focused on deterring or defeating adversary faits accomplis, short and often opportunistic campaigns of aggression. Speed, political sophistication, and immediate military overmatch seemed to be the key ingredients for victory. Russia’s seizure of Crimea in 2014 was seen as a template for other future aggressors to follow.3 Prolonged wars of attrition, particularly those involving the United States, were thought no longer possible. Russia’s subsequent invasion of Ukraine in 2022 turned this vision on its head, demonstrating the military and political consequences of trying and failing to obtain a similar fait accompli on a larger scale. The ongoing Russian experiences in Ukraine indicate a need to reevaluate such thinking and consider the potential of protraction in the context of a hypothetical U.S.-PRC conflict. Most work on this topic has considered only the initial days and weeks of hostilities, usually over Taiwan or in the South or East China Seas.4 There has been comparably little discussion of what comes after.5 There are three key concepts that inform the following discussions: exhaustion, sanctuary, and protraction. Exhaustion is the point when large-scale offensive operations are no longer possible as offensive military capabilities have been used up. Afterward, some period of reconstitution and recovery is needed. This requires sanctuary, the relative freedom from attack sufficient for the rebuilding of military forces and capacities. Protraction occurs after at least one cycle of exhaustion and recovery. It is closely tied to pre-conflict leadership beliefs about the length of the looming war. A simplified definition of a protracted war is a conflict that lasts longer than leaders expect; it is a mismatch between political-military expectations and reality. Doctrinal developments in both the PRC and the United States, influenced by improvements in technology, place significant emphasis on the early stages of conflict and rapid, offensive operations. The emphasis by both the PRC and the United States on the early stages of the conflict can be seen in the PRC’s system destruction warfare and United States’ denial-centric concepts that aim for rapid decisive results.6 These approaches focus almost exclusively on the operational level of war, ignoring strategic factors animating the conflict and shaping its termination. Should PRC President Xi Jinping commit the PLA to seizing Taiwan by force, enter a war with the United States, and “roll the iron dice,” protraction appears increasingly likely, contrary to most contemporary military thinking and preparation.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Conflict, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

51. No Winners in This Game: Assessing the U.S. Playbook for Sanctioning China

Author:
Emily Kilcrease
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The relationship between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is marked by both geopolitical tensions and deep economic linkages. While policymakers may have once believed that economic integration would inject stability into the overall relationship and provide a deterrent to conflict, that idealistic vision has been shaken by Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine. No longer can the United States and its partners assume that the PRC’s economic interest in retaining ties to the global economy will override its nationalist impulses. The once unthinkable idea of imposing severe sanctions on China has become a strategic imperative to consider, as one of a range of measures that the United States and its partners may consider if relations with the PRC deteriorate further. Yet, sanctioning China represents a challenge more complex than any other in the modern era of sanctions. The scale and interconnected nature of China’s economy means that the damage from sanctions will not be contained in China; instead, the negative effects will rebound globally through China’s deep economic ties to nearly every country around the world, including the United States. China has substantial capacity in key economic areas, such as manufacturing, that provide it with important means to retaliate against U.S. sanctions or impose its own economic costs on the United States and its partners. This report seeks to advance policy debates on how to sanction China, if geopolitical conditions warranted doing so at scale. It builds on prior Center for a New American Security (CNAS) research, including a 2023 report that outlines how the United States currently uses a variety of sanctions tools to manage the strategic relationship with the PRC.1 A key finding of the earlier work is that the United States imposes sanctions at a relatively limited scale compared to the scope of challenges that exist in the bilateral relationship, with the notable exception of an increasing range of technology-related sanctions. A large divide separates the existing level of sanctions on China and the full range of economic measures that the United States may consider. This report attempts to envision that fuller range of economic measures and consider whether the use of sanctions would meaningfully advance U.S. interests during a potential conflict. The report begins, in chapter 1, with an assessment of the main economic and political characteristics that would determine China’s vulnerability to, and resolve to withstand, sanctions pressure. The concentration of power at the very top of the PRC’s political system, along with a willingness to subordinate economic objectives to political ones, indicate that China may have a high degree of resolve to absorb the costs of sanctions. China’s continued reliance on the U.S.-dominated global financial infrastructure is a key area of vulnerability to sanctions pressure. But, China retains significant economic leverage through its manufacturing relationships, as well as through the importance of its large domestic market to foreign multinational companies. Attempting to impose sanctions that are asymmetrically more painful to China will be a fraught exercise, given the degree to which China is embedded in global supply chains. In chapter 2, the report examines sanctions actions that the United States and its partners may impose during a conflict scenario, drawing from the sanctions playbook used against Russia and projecting adaptations that would be needed in the China context. The main objective of this analysis is to identify points of asymmetric leverage in the U.S.-China economic relationship, where imposition of a sanction would be more economically damaging to China than to the United States and its partners. The sanctions actions are examined through the lens of a ends-ways-and-means framework, loosely borrowing concepts from the defense community and mapping them into the economic domain. The value in such an exercise is to impose discipline in identifying why a particular economic measure may be taken and what the intended impact would be. It can also enhance the ability to integrate economic actions with those being considered in military or other domains. The report examines possible actions under three broad categories, based on the objective of the sanctions: technology denial, embargo of commodities and materials, and macroeconomic pressure. The research includes analysis by the CNAS Energy, Economic & Security team of economic data and research interviews with a wide range of sanctions, export controls, macroeconomics, trade and finance, and China experts in the United States, Europe, and Asia. In addition to examining potential sanctions options on a sectoral basis, the report also includes a company-by-company lens to assess the potential impact of sanctioning specific Chinese companies. The report finds that the U.S. options to impose harsh sanctions on China are severely constrained. U.S. options to deny militarily relevant technology to China are modest, at best. Certain areas, such as maritime capabilities, will be difficult to target due to the nearly entirely domestic supply chains of China’s main military shipbuilders. Other areas, such as semiconductors, cannot be targeted without running the risk of disruption to critical U.S. supply chains. Overall, efforts to deny technology to China require a longer time horizon to be effective and may have less utility in an immediate run-up period to a potential conflict. Attempts to use sanctions tools to deny commodities or materials to China will require innovation and the development of new sanctions tools. Key commodities, such as energy, are inherently substitutable and globally available, including from many countries that will likely not align with the United States in a conflict with the PRC. Building on the example of the oil price cap used in the Russia context, the United States and partners will need to consider novel policy approaches that provide positive economic inducements to align with U.S. policies, in addition to using traditional sanctions tools.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Sanctions, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

52. Resisting China’s Gray Zone Military Pressure on Taiwan

Author:
Jacob Stokes
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) has sharply escalated its pressure campaign targeting the Republic of China (ROC or Taiwan) in recent years. Beijing appears likely to use Taiwan’s upcoming presidential election in January 2024 as a pretext to apply more pressure on the self-governing island, particularly in the “gray zone” using China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), along with other tools of state power. There is no precise and commonly agreed upon definition of what gray zone activities are and are not. In general, though, the concept refers to actions that fall into the space between, on one side, peace and, on the other, full-scale kinetic war.1 Gray zone activities are coercive and aggressive but designed to stay below the threshold of triggering major conflict. China uses gray zone operations as part of a comprehensive strategy to pressure Taiwan that spans the areas of diplomacy, information, economics, and security. This policy brief examines one major component of that campaign: gray zone military and security operations. It starts by detailing the capabilities and tactics China uses to put security pressure on Taiwan. Then, it explains what Beijing seeks to achieve with those actions. The paper concludes with recommendations for how U.S. and Taiwan policymakers can resist and counter China’s gray zone operations.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, Military Affairs, and Information
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

53. Using Risk Analysis to Shape Border Management: A Review of Approaches during the COVID-19 Pandemic

Author:
Kelley Lee, Julianne Piper, and Jennifer Fang
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Migration Policy Institute (MPI)
Abstract:
The near universal adoption of travel measures by governments to control the spread of COVID-19 has proved controversial during the pandemic. National responses have been highly varied and frequently changing, and the use of travel measures—ranging from advisories and screening to quarantine, testing, immunity certification, and restrictions on entry—has been poorly coordinated across jurisdictions. Particularly in the early stages of the crisis, this created chaos for travelers and the travel sector, and caused significant economic and social harms. Many governments also failed to clearly communicate the rationale for using travel measures, the evidence underpinning them, and the measures’ role within overall pandemic response strategies. There is now substantial evidence that these measures’ early and stringent use by some governments during the initial stages of the pandemic slowed the importation of the virus and reduced its onward transmission. Yet, there is also growing recognition of weaknesses in the quality of evidence available to inform policy decisions. Evaluating the appropriateness of travel measures and applying them effectively during future public-health emergencies will depend on international consensus on methodologies that lead to a more harmonized and coordinated approach and to greater public trust in policy decisions. This report presents a comparative analysis of 11 publicly available methodologies used to assess travel-related risks during the pandemic—those of Hong Kong, New Zealand, South Korea, Taiwan, United Kingdom, United States, International Civil Aviation Organization, International Air Transport Association, World Health Organization, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and European Union. It offers a set of lessons learned and recommendations, including a proposed decision instrument that could improve the use of risk analysis for border management during future public-health emergencies.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, International Organization, Governance, Border Control, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Taiwan, South Korea, New Zealand, Hong Kong, Global Focus, and United States of America

54. Pakistan Security Report 2022

Author:
Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
Abstract:
In 2022, the number of terrorist attacks in Pakistan marked an increase of 27 percent from the previous year. The number of terrorist attacks in the country also continued to rise for the second consecutive year. A total of 262 terrorist attacks in Pakistan in the year – including 14 suicide bombings –claimed in all 419 lives and injured another 734 people. A 25 percent increase has been recorded in fatalities in the outgoing year as compared with 2021. Pak Institute for Peace Studies revealed these statistics in its annual “Pakistan Security Report 2022”. The report further noted that the proscribed Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) was becoming a major irritant in Islamabad’s relations with the Taliban government in Kabul as the militant group remained one of the major actors of violence in Pakistan in the year 2022. Other critical actors of violence in 2022 were Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K) and Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA). Over 60 percent of total terrorist attacks recorded in Pakistan in the year were perpetrated by these three militant groups. Similarly, about 95 percent of the total recorded terrorist attacks in Pakistan in 2022 concentrated in in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, Military Strategy, Governance, and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:
Pakistan and Asia

55. Advancing Equity: Mentorship in Peace and Security

Author:
Kimberly Gillies
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Women of Color Advancing Peace, Security and Conflict Transformation (WCAPS)
Abstract:
In this report, we synthesize findings from original interviews and extensive research into what makes an effective DEI strategy, the impact of mentorship —particularly on people of color—and how to elevate equity-focused mentoring within the fields of peace, security, and foreign policy. We close with a recommendation to CRAVE mentoring opportunities by founding, joining, or supporting initiatives that: create opportunity for cross-identity contact; establish responsibility structures; cultivate social accountability for involvement; are voluntary; and engage participants in their evolution.
Topic:
Security, Women, Diversity, Peace, Inclusion, Equity, People of Color (POC), and Mentorship
Political Geography:
Global Focus

56. Monitoring Progress on the Women, Peace and Security Agenda

Author:
Robert U. Nagel, David Guzman, and Carla Koppel
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security (GIWPS)
Abstract:
To advance the WPS Agenda and monitor progress, in 2019 the governments of Finland and Spain initiated Commitment 2025 (C-25). The member countries agreed to track their efforts to increase the meaningful and substantive participation of women along nine specific commitments related to conflict prevention and resolution, negotiation and mediation processes. This agreement currently has 13 signatories: Finland, Spain, Norway, Iceland, Germany, Italy, Belgium, United Kingdom, Bulgaria, Namibia, Canada, Uruguay, and Argentina. The Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security (GIWPS) has partnered with C-25 members to track progress toward the commitments. To increase transparency and accountability while also providing metrics for progress, we collected and analyzed data on women’s representation in political governance, diplomatic, and peace and security institutions. We combined data from various sources to generate analysis and insights about the status of progress on C-25 commitments. Findings indicate that concerted efforts are needed to reach targets by 2025. Despite some progress, women’s participation and meaningful inclusion in matters of peace and security is still lacking. Governments can and must do better including and empowering women in peace and security institutions and processes. The data underscore the importance of continued dedication to women’s empowerment and the importance of holding governments accountable through monitoring progress.
Topic:
Security, Women, Accountability, Peace, Transparency, and Monitoring
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Canada, Finland, Norway, Argentina, Uruguay, Germany, Belgium, Bulgaria, Spain, Italy, Iceland, and Namibia

57. Transatlantic Trends 2023: Public Opinion in a Shifting Global Order

Author:
Alexandra de Hoop Scheffer, Martin Quencez, and Gusine Weber
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Transatlantic Trends 2023 presents the results of representative surveys conducted in 14 countries on both sides of the Atlantic: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Türkiye, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Divided into five chapters, this report assesses public opinion on contemporary structural issues impacting the world order, transatlantic relations, security and defense, China, and global challenges.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, European Union, Democracy, Geopolitics, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
China, United Kingdom, Europe, Turkey, Ukraine, France, Poland, Germany, Global Focus, and United States of America

58. Defending America’s Northern Border and Its Arctic Approaches Through Cooperation With Allies and Partners

Author:
Heather A Conley, Sophie Arts, Kristine Berzina, and Mathieu Boulegue
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
This paper analyzes the evolving situation in the Arctic in the wake of Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The war has not reduced Russia’s military focus or significantly affected its posture in the Arctic: rather, the authors find, it has exacerbated a dynamic of heightened tension and rising instability that started in the mid-2000s and that most policymakers in Arctic capitals chose to ignore. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and—perhaps most importantly—changing Sino-Russian relations have increased the urgency to address existing gaps in the United States and its allies’ Arctic strategy, posture, and capabilities.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Geopolitics, Transatlantic Relations, Russia-Ukraine War, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
Arctic and United States of America

59. Next Generation Perspectives on Taiwan: Insights from the 2023 Taiwan-US Policy Program

Author:
Bonnie S. Glaser
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Taiwan faces growing threats to its security. The circumstances and factors that have deterred for decades an attack by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on Taiwan and enabled its people to remain secure and prosperous are changing. The conventional military balance in the western Pacific has tipped in China’s favor, although its military, the People’s Liberation Army, is not yet ready to seize and control Taiwan. Apart from the military threats of invasion, blockade, and seizure of one of its small outlying islands, Taiwan is the target of Chinese economic and diplomatic pressure, disinformation, united front tactics, and other forms of psychological warfare. Most of the global focus on Taiwan centers on the risk of war, leaving insufficient attention to these gray-zone threats that are designed to sow doubts about US willingness to defend Taiwan if attacked and to induce a sense of deep psychological despair about its future unless it is integrated into the PRC. Beijing’s ultimate goal is to convince the people of Taiwan to lose faith in their democracy and to surrender sovereignty. China is more likely to succeed in that endeavor if Taiwan becomes isolated from the rest of the world. Only 13 sovereign states now maintain full diplomatic relations with the Republic of China, the official name that Taiwan uses to distinguish itself from its giant neighbor. Since President Tsai Ing-wen took office in 2016, Beijing has poached nine of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies and blocked Taipei from participating in international organizations, including the World Health Organization and its decision-making body, the World Health Assembly. On the economic front, Taiwan remains an active member of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), but it has been excluded from the ASEAN-inspired Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the US-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). Beijing is lobbying members of the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) to oppose Taipei’s application for membership. Easing Taiwan’s isolation and providing reassurance that the world cares deeply about the fate and well-being of its 23.5 million people are crucial to preserving the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. The Taiwan-US Policy Program (TUPP) was launched in 2017 to encourage young professionals to include Taiwan in their research and help Taipei expand its global networks. TUPP enables future leaders to acquire a deeper understanding of Taiwan and its relations with the United States through meetings with officials and experts in Washington, followed by a visit to Taiwan to gain first-hand exposure to its politics, culture, and history. Experiencing Taiwan influences how these future leaders approach their work and their writing. It impacts their worldview by imbuing them with an appreciation for Taiwan’s history and commitment to the principles of democracy and human rights that undergird the existing international order. It also reinforces the importance of maintaining robust bilateral relations and strengthening international support for maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, East Asia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

60. Russian Lancet-3 Kamikaze Drone Filled with Foreign Parts: Western Parts Enable Russian Lancet-3 Drone to Have Advanced Targeting and Anti-jamming Capabilities.

Author:
Spencer Faragasso
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
The Institute for Science and International Security has reviewed open-source images and information found on the internet, identifying several key Western parts, commonly available on the commercial market, used in the Russian Lancet-3 kamikaze drone. - The Lancet-3 is an effective combat drone that has been successful in combat operations against Ukrainian systems, including Western supplied armor and artillery. - This report follows a series of reports published in the last year by the Institute on Russian drone systems and its acquisition of foreign technology. - Russia is increasingly relying on large quantities of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to identify, target, and attack Ukrainian positions, vehicles, and structures. - Russia has a limited capability to design and produce advanced strategic commodities. To build these UAVs, Russia depends on extensive procurement networks to acquire strategic commodities produced by foreign countries, particularly the United States. - Because of the use of civilian Western components in Russian military systems, the United States and its partners are intensifying controls on critical items used in Russian drones, but more needs to be done.
Topic:
Security, Weapons, Drones, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

61. Satellite Imagery Update on Alabuga Shahed-136 Drone Factory

Author:
David Albright, Sarah Burkhard, and Victoria Cheng
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
Iranian-designed Shahed-136 kamikaze drones continue to destroy Ukrainian lives and their civilian infrastructure. These drones, also known as Geran-2, are produced and assembled by JSC Alabuga inside the Alabuga Special Economic Zone in Russia, with critical assistance from Iran. Recent commercial satellite imagery appears to show that the buildings making the drones continue to operate, and at higher levels than other facilities located at the SEZ. The image, taken on a Wednesday morning in late November, shows a winter scene of the SEZ, with all the visible buildings covered in snow, except the two buildings making the Shahed-136 drone. The heat generated by the Shahed-136 buildings’ interior appears to have melted the snow on their roofs, implying ongoing operation.
Topic:
Security, Weapons, Drones, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

62. The Lessons We Choose to Draw

Author:
Paul J. McKinney
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Contemporary Arab Studies (CCAS)
Abstract:
In September 2003, just a few violent months after the Bush administration proclaimed major combat operations had ended, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) – the US-led civilian body charged with administering occupied Iraq – organized a two-day workshop in Baghdad to identify best practices for countries transitioning from state-led to market economies. Seeking to draw lessons that may be applicable to Iraq, the CPA invited former ministers and finance officials from Central and Eastern European countries to share their experiences. Evidently impressed by Poland’s “shock therapy,” in which Warsaw introduced a drastic neoliberal package during the country’s emergence from Soviet domination in the early 90s, the CPA appointed the former Polish finance and prime minister responsible for those reforms, Marek Belka, to head the CPA’s Office of Economic Policy. With Belka at the helm, lessons learned from Poland’s transition would be universalized and superimposed onto Iraq, with little regard to contextual factors. Iraq was, after all, seen as a blank canvas upon which the West could project its own visions. Zealously driven by a belief that markets are the most efficient way to organize a society and, by extension, to optimize individual freedom, the CPA issued what can only be described as the economic equivalent to the U.S. military’s “shock-and-awe” campaign. Within a year, the CPA issued an astoundingly high number of Orders to build the new neoliberal state. Some of the most notable included, for example, selling about 200 state-run enterprises, eliminating the right to unionize in most sectors, outlawing labor strikes, opening Iraq’s banks to foreign ownership and control, mandating a regressive flat tax on income, lowering the corporate rate to a flat 15%, eliminating taxes on profits repatriated to foreign-owned businesses, and even prohibiting Iraqi farmers from re-using “protected” varieties of genetically modified seeds.
Topic:
Security, Markets, Reform, and Iraq War
Political Geography:
Iraq and Middle East

63. Opaque and Pervasive: Microaggressions in Peace and Security

Author:
Karla Mastracchio
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Women of Color Advancing Peace, Security and Conflict Transformation (WCAPS)
Abstract:
This is the final report of a multi-year project that analyzes microaggressions in language used across peace and security communities of practice. Our intent is to understand their strategic impact in those professional settings. This project would not have been possible without the invaluable contributions across the WCAPS staff who graciously provided their time and professional expertise to further these discussions. We wish to also extend sincere thanks to each member of the WCAPS community and the wider peace and security field who participated and gave thoughtful feedback. Words matter and the linguistic and performative choices we make in our everyday lives impact not only our ability to maneuver in professional spaces but also affect the way we collectively communicate on a much larger scale.
Topic:
Security, Peace, and Microaggression
Political Geography:
Global Focus

64. Women Police Officers’ Perception of Gender Integration in the Kosovo Police

Author:
Adelina Hasani
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:
Kosovo has made significant strides in improving women’s political representation by implementing gender quotas to enhance the presence of women in its all state institutions. The enactment of Kosovo’s Law on Gender Equality in May 2015 marked a crucial milestone in strengthening the nation’s legal framework for promoting gender equality. However, despite progress, Kosovo still faces numerous gender equality challenges, particularly in the realms of women’s leadership positions, equal political participation, and ending violence against women. Traditional gender role mentalities, discrimination, and stereotyping have presented significant barriers to women’s involvement in decision-making at all levels, including within the security sector. Despite some notable improvements, the journey towards increased representation of women in the Kosovo Police remains a work in progress. Nevertheless, in many countries, likewise in Kosovo, security sector policies and programming have failed to analyze women’s security needs and priorities adequately and involve women and men equally by integrating their gender perspectives. In such cases, security institutions are often rife with equality gaps and may be unable to provide security for all community members. Efforts aimed at integrating a gender perspective into policies and practices of the security sector have predominantly focused on women’s representation rather than on their specific needs. The data conducted shows that Kosovo’s policies have demonstrated significant efforts to enhance the gender perspective within the Kosovo Police. However, challenges persist, stemming from factors such as the limited participation of women in managerial and decision-making roles, traditional male dominance, patriarchal mindsets, and the need for comprehensive integration of gender perspectives into all laws and regulations governing the Kosovo Police. This report highlights and analyzes women’s critical challenges in the Kosovo Police from the perspective of women police officers. Women’s issues are often not treated as a priority and do not receive the necessary attention. Through this report, we will examine the working environment for women in the Kosovo Police, the primary challenges they encounter, unaddressed issues that have not been taken seriously, policies that should promote gender diversity, and the impact and contribution of women within the the Kosovo Police. The report employs a qualitative methodology and relies on semi-structured interviews with experienced and high-ranking women in the Kosovo Police. These interviews have focused on gaining insights into the working environment, gender sensitivity within security institutions, and the primary challenges faced by women in the sector. Additionally, we have conducted seven focus groups with women in the Kosovo Police who do not hold high-ranking positions. The aim is to analyze and comprehend the dynamics and factors that hinder women’s advancement to higher ranks within the Kosovo Police. These focus groups were organized in Prizren, Prishtina, Mitrovica, Gjilan, Gjakova, Ferizaj, and Peje. Through these focus groups, we have collected comprehensive information about the working environment and gender integration within the Kosovo Police.
Topic:
Security, Women, Legislation, Police, Integration, and Gender
Political Geography:
Eastern Europe and Kosovo

65. Kosovo citizens’ perceptions on EU integration, Kosovo-Serbia bilateral relations, and Regional Cooperation

Author:
Dea Fetiu and Gramos Sejdiu
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:
This report of Western Balkans Security Barometer analyzes the Kosovo citizens’ perceptions on EU integration, Kosovo-Serbia bilateral relations, and Regional Cooperation. Over the course of our measurement period, the public perception of EU integration has consistently maintained a high level of support. In 2020, 92.5 percent of citizens expressed support, followed by 92.3 percent in 2021, and 94.2 percent in 2022. These findings indicate a stable and high level of support for the integration process, with no significant changes observed over the last three years. Turning to the citizens’ perceptions of the Kosovo-Serbia bilateral relations and the dialogue process, the second part of the report highlights an increase in support for the dialogue among Kosovo citizens. In 2021, 74.3 percent expressed their support to the dialogue, which rose to 83 percent in 2022. Furthermore, the chapter touches upon the shift of citizens’ perspectives on the impact of the dialogue on Kosovo – Serbia relations, with 40 percent of the respondents believing it had improved in 2022 compared to 14.6 percent in 2021. A majority of respondents (68.8 percent) expressed support for regional cooperation in the Western Balkans, indicating a positive inclination among Kosovo’s population. Additionally, respondents consistently expressed support for free movement, information exchange, and the establishment of a common market for goods and workforce in the Western Balkans. When specifically asked about the Open Balkan Initiative, responses were very divided and varied over the years, with fluctuating levels of support and opposition. Overall, the findings highlight the strong aspiration for EU integration and the continuation of the Kosovo – Serbia dialogue, with citizens understanding the complexity and challenges of both processes and the challenges ahead.
Topic:
Security, Bilateral Relations, Public Opinion, European Union, Regional Integration, Survey, and Perception
Political Geography:
Eastern Europe, Kosovo, and Serbia

66. Youth, Peace, and Security in Iraq: Operationalizing Youth Peacebuilding Priorities in Practice

Author:
Arab Reform Initiative
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
In December 2020, the Government of Iraq, under the auspices of the Ministry of Youth and Sports, together with UNFPA and the Folke Bernadotte Academy (Swedish Agency for Peace, Security and Development), formally launched the National Coalition on Youth, Peace, and Security (YPS) in Iraq. As part of the government’s commitment to fulfilling the vision of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2250 (UNSCR 2250) and its subsequent resolutions 2419 and 2535, the Coalition seeks to act as a bridge linking grassroots youth peace activists and community leaders with formal decision-making circles in Iraq. The Coalition advocates for the implementation of the YPS agenda through policies and programs, facilitates the exchange of experiences, knowledge, and information amongst Coalition members and YPS actors, and supports the empowerment of youth to meaningfully participate and take leading roles in peace-building processes. The success of this Coalition is of prime importance at this critical juncture in Iraq’s history. In the aftermath of ISIS’ defeat, the wave of popular mobilization in the central and southern provinces largely led by youth, and the recent parliamentary elections in October 2021, Iraq is in an important phase of reconstruction. The country’s challenges are numerous and include maintaining stability and securing the sovereignty of the State, reinforcing pro-democracy forces and the rule of law, improving the economy and provision of services, and ensuring that redistribution meets citizens’ demands for economic, political, and social justice. More importantly, there exist important cohorts among young women and men in Iraq that are keen to participate in these various processes of reconstruction and to leave conflicts and disputes behind. Youth peace activists, youth-led grassroots initiatives and community leaders have already been conducting myriad actions on the ground to contribute to rebuilding the Iraqi society and many are of the opinion that this is one of the main paths to sustainable peace. The YPS agenda can be used as a common framework for dialogue and partnerships between youth and decision-makers. Moreover, including youth in decision-making processes can render policies not only better adapted to the needs and aspirations of citizens, but can also help increase the legitimacy of the process itself and ensure sustainability. Fulfilling the YPS agenda and creating successful mechanisms for Iraqi youth’s inclusion and incorporation in building, sustaining, and taking ownership of peace and development processes is thus essential to the reconstruction of the Iraqi nation-State and its prosperity and stability going forward. Yet, in order to ensure that youth’s participation is meaningful, it is essential to take as the point of departure youth’s own priorities for peace and security in practice, and what youth-owned political participation looks like on the ground. In other words, operationalizing the YPS agenda should aim to operationalize into practice the priorities that young women and men themselves set, with the support of decision-makers and YPS actors. On 7 December 2021, the Arab Reform Initiative and the Folke Bernadotte Academy organized a virtual closed policy dialogue, held under Chatham House Rule, bringing together governmental actors, youth activists (members of the YPS Coalition), researchers, policy makers, and advisors to collectively reflect on what meaningful youth inclusion in peace and development in Iraq looks like. This discussion included exploring what “peace,” “security,” and “participation” actually mean to Iraqi youth in theory and practice and considering examples of youth participation in peacebuilding on the ground and what good practices can be derived from them. The discussion also drew insights from good practices in other contexts in the region, and assessed the types of policies, approaches, and programs that can support Iraqi youth’s participation on both formal and informal levels. In doing so, this policy dialogue contributed to defining the various means and methods to operationalize a youth-owned YPS agenda in Iraq.
Topic:
Security, Youth, Peace, and Peacebuilding
Political Geography:
Iraq and Middle East

67. Safeguarding Critical Infrastructure in Kosovo

Author:
Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:
Critical infrastructure is a segment which is related to several other areas of security and defense, namely some strategic and legal documents which are in force as well as some new initiatives. This analysis provided a detailed overview of the protection of critical infrastructure in the Republic of Kosovo, becoming the first document published in this field. While the MIA has done a very good job in drafting the law on critical infrastructure, putting Kosovo one step ahead of other Western Balkan countries, the law remains unimplementable for almost 2 years following the date of its entry into force. Initially, strategic documents that are in the process of being drafted such as the draft National Security Strategy, the draft Defense Strategy, the draft Counter-Terrorism Strategy and the draft Cyber Security Strategy should include the protection of critical infrastructure by ensuring coordination of actions and by avoiding duplication or overlap of actions. The Strategic Planning Office within the Office of the Prime Minister should coordinate this process in cooperation with the relevant ministries. On the other hand, the draft law on cyber security should pay attention to the drafting of legal provisions which may cause overlap with the law on infrastructure, while the initiative for drafting the law on Security Measures for Networks and Information Systems needs to be reviewed. Moreover, the draft law on private security services should be finalized as soon as possible.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Infrastructure, and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:
Eastern Europe and Kosovo

68. Citizens perceptions of integrity of public institutions in Kosovo

Author:
Shpat Balaj
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:
The Kosovo Security Forces, the Kosovo Police, the President of Kosovo and the Municipalities are the most trusted public institutions in Kosovo, with over 50 percent of respondents declaring that they trust or completely trust these institutions. This is followed by the Kosovo Customs and the Kosovo Intelligence Agency with 45 percent of respondents sharing such an opinion. On the other hand, less than 40 percent of the respondents declared that they trust or completely trust Courts, Prosecution, Kosovo Correctional Services, the Government of Kosovo and the Kosovo Assembly. The results of the report show that citizens of Kosovo find the security institutions more reliable with a higher level of trust towards them, compared to other public institutions in Kosovo, such as the justice institutions which citizens perceive less trustworthy and with weak integrity. The citizen confidence in the institutions of the Courts and the Prosecution in Kosovo has been consistently in decline, and this is concerning. Citizens have higher confidence in the public institutions from the central level, especially when compared to the previous year (2020), however, the skepticism towards these institutions generally prevails.
Topic:
Security, Public Opinion, Survey, and Public Institutions
Political Geography:
Eastern Europe and Kosovo

69. Counterterrorism Yearbook 2022

Author:
Katja Theodorakis and Gill Savage
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
The Road from 9/11 It’s been its been over two decades since the 9/11 attacks when two planes hit the World Trade Center, one hit the Pentagon and a fourth crashed in Pennsylvania. Close to 3,000 people died and many others were injured, and even more people were traumatised by the experience and the loss of loved ones. Today’s release of the Counterterrorism (CT) yearbook 2022 coincides with the anniversary of the November 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks and the deaths of 174 people. These and other acts of terror have left an indelible mark and shaped the years that followed. Australia’s overall security environment is increasingly challenging to navigate. Emerging threats such as information operation campaigns, cyberattacks and climate change are increasing the complexity of the world. In 2022, major geopolitical events including Russia’s war on Ukraine and China’s continuing coercive operations and aggression, occupied a significant space in national discourse. Foreign interference and espionage have continued to rise to the forefront of intelligence agencies priorities. Yet, terrorism prevails as a significant security concern for Australia and the wider region. These continuing challenges mean that ASPI’s 6th edition of the Counterterrorism Yearbook is as important as ever. ASPI’s Executive Director, Justin Bassi, notes in the preface of this 6th edition of the CT Yearbook, that ‘while terrorism is no longer assessed by ASIO to be our top security threat, it hasn’t disappeared and in fact continues to be one of the predominant security concerns for Australia and the region.’ The 2022 yearbook was co-edited by Katja Theodorakis, head of ASPI’s Counterterrorism, CVE and Resilience program and Gill Savage, an ASPI senior fellow, considers CT challenges through the lens of the world context, today’s challenges and explores wider policy considerations through a range of chapters from 16 expert authors. The yearbook includes chapters on trends in terrorism, precrime policing and extremism, radicalisation of teenagers, strategic competition and CT, public trust, multiculturalism and bioterrorism and resilience. Theodorakis notes in her introduction that: ‘For most of the past two decades, terrorism and extremism were largely seen as an external issue brought to Australia by foreign problems. Even when talking about ‘homegrown jihadists’, extremist ideological motivations were generally ascribed to global terrorist sources in faraway places.’ The presence of motivated violent extremist groups continues and are increasingly accompanied by issue-specific radicalised individuals. A key aspect of the changing environment is the use of social media by extremist groups to tap into public discord arising from Covid lockdowns and vaccination mandates as well as violence driven by divisive political agendas in democratic countries such as the White House riots in 2020. Today’s CT environment is an increasingly complex one, the impact of which hasn’t diminished. It represents a challenge that requires governments, community and academia to continue to work together.
Topic:
Security, Violent Extremism, Counter-terrorism, 9/11, and Threat Assessment
Political Geography:
Australia and Australia/Pacific

70. Small Modular Reactors: The Next Phase for Nuclear Power in the Indo-Pacific?

Author:
Carl Baker, Jor-Shan Choi, Ferenc Dalnoki-Veress, Sanjana Gogna, and Victor Nian
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
In an effort to understand the rising interest worldwide in so-called “small modular reactors” (SMRs) and their companion “floating nuclear power plants” (FNPPs), the Pacific Forum commissioned three papers on this topic. Written by Victor Nian, the first paper unpacks SMR/FNPP technologies and discusses their applicability in the Indo-Pacific. The second paper, authored by Jor-Shan Choi, examines the safety, security, and safeguards (i.e., the “3S”) considerations associated with SMRs/FNPPs. Finally, penned by Miles Pomper, Ferenc Dalnoki Veress, Dan Zhukov, and Sanjana Gogna, the third paper addresses the potential geopolitical implications of SMR/FNPP deployments in the Indo-Pacific. By looking at these three areas – the technology, the 3S considerations, and geopolitics – the papers seek to provide a comprehensive, albeit preliminary, analysis of the SMR/FNPP question in the Indo-Pacific.
Topic:
Security, Energy Policy, Science and Technology, Nuclear Power, Geopolitics, and Small Modular Reactors (SMRs)
Political Geography:
Indo-Pacific

71. Next steps for the US-China strategic nuclear relationship

Author:
David Santoro, David C. Logan, Vahid Brown, Heather Williams, and Duyeon Kim
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Conducted with the generous support of the Carnegie Corporation of New York, this study seeks to provide an in-depth analysis of strategic nuclear issues of significance to the bilateral relationship to pinpoint the challenges to, and opportunities for, improving the current state of affairs between Washington and Beijing. The study, in other words, aims to propose an assessment of key issues and, insofar as possible, solutions or mitigation measures to address US-China strategic nuclear problems, including those that are seemingly intractable. It is motivated by the idea that even (or perhaps especially) when stark pessimism dominates, it is essential to be clear about what is in “the realm of the possible” to improve the situation, and to act on it.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, Nonproliferation, Strategic Competition, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, Korea, and United States of America

72. An Alliance Renewed? Future-proofing U.S.-Japan Security Relations

Author:
Brittany Bardsley-Marcial, Jada Fraser, Shinichi Hirao, Yu Inagaki, and Shusuke Ioku
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Authors of this volume participated in the inaugural U.S.-Japan Next-Generation Leaders Initiative, sponsored by the U.S. Department of State, through the U.S. Embassy Tokyo. With backgrounds from academia, government, military and industry, the cohort brings rich insights on the past, present, and future of the U.S.-Japan bilateral security relations. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of their respective organizations and affiliations. Pacific Forum’s publications do not necessarily reflect the positions of its staff, donors and sponsors.
Topic:
Security, Bilateral Relations, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

73. Getting past constraints: Deepening U.S. security relations with Vietnam and Indonesia

Author:
Jeffrey Ordaniel
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Pacific Forum reconvened two Track 2 dialogues with Vietnam and Indonesia in August 2022 to help identify ways the United States and its two Southeast Asian partners can work together to enhance bilateral cooperation on security issues of shared concern. Functional cooperation between Washington and its two Southeast Asian partners has considerably advanced in the past ten years, but differing strategic considerations still handicap some aspects of these relationships. The two security dialogues emphasized these findings, among other takeaways.
Topic:
Security, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, and Dialogue
Political Geography:
Indonesia, Vietnam, Southeast Asia, and United States of America

74. Walking the tightrope towards the EU: Moldova’s vulnerabilities amid war in Ukraine

Author:
Bob Deen and Wouter Zweers
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
When the Council of the European Union decided on 23 June 2022 to grant Moldova the status of EU candidate country, it boosted the morale of a beleaguered government in Chișinău trying to circumnavigate a daunting series of crises. Since Maia Sandu ousted Socialist President Igor Dodon in the presidential election in 2020 and her reform-oriented Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) obtained a parliamentary majority in 2021, Moldova has barely had a chance to catch its breath. In the year that followed, the country experienced an energy crisis that almost deprived it of gas in the winter of 2021-2022, a budding economic crisis with rampant inflation, and a security and refugee crisis as a result of Russia’s war against Ukraine. The war in its immediate neighbourhood, with Russian troops advancing in the spring along Ukraine’s southern coast to barely over 100 kilometres of Moldova’s borders, has further complicated the already difficult geopolitical balancing act of successive Moldovan governments. It has also aggravated existing security risks. For years, Moldova has balanced its aspirations to join the EU with its constitutional neutrality and its many dependencies on the Russian Federation. While President Putin was quick to congratulate Maia Sandu on her election and has so far refrained from open hostility towards her government, there are still many vulnerabilities that Moscow already leverages and could further exploit if it chose to destabilise Moldova. Not only is Moldova’s economy highly fragile and dependent on Russian energy, there are also political forces and regions that see their interests threatened by the reforms of the PAS government in Chișinău – and over which Moscow has different degrees of influence. Two of such regions are the separatist region of Transnistria in the east and the autonomous region of Gagauzia in the south of the country. A better understanding of these key vulnerabilities could help the EU and the Netherlands to assist Moldova in reducing them and to increase the stability and resilience of the EU’s newest candidate country. The central question of this research report therefore is to what extent Russia’s influence over Moldovan domestic politics as well as the regions of Transnistria and Gagauzia poses risks to the internal and external stability of Moldova.
Topic:
Security, European Union, Geopolitics, Political stability, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, and Moldova

75. US-Chinese Competition and Transatlantic Relations: Implications for Germany and Europe

Author:
Markus Jaeger
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
Germany is at risk of sustaining collateral damage in the face of intensifying US-Chinese competition and conflict. China’s ascendance and America’s desire to preserve the status quo lock Beijing and Washington into a classic security dilemma. The United States sees China as a potential regional hegemon in Asia and as an emerging global systemic challenger. China sees the United States as impeding its rise. Security competition is already well underway. So are geo-economic and geo-technological competition and conflict. For Germany, a position of relative neutrality or equidistance is not an option, it should consider pursuing a multi-track approach.
Topic:
Security, Transatlantic Relations, Strategic Competition, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:
China, Europe, North America, and United States of America

76. Germany’s Economic Security and Technology: Optimizing Export Control, Investment Screening and Market Access Instruments

Author:
Tyson Barker and David Hagebölling
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
Technological development and increasingly fraught US-China competition have geopolitical consequences for technology access. The erosion of post-Cold War multilateral dual-use technology export control regimes, such as the Wassenaar Arrangement, and investment and other control frameworks have led to na-tional, EU, and ad hoc measures, such as the restrictions on Russian semiconductor access following the invasion of Ukraine. The German government must integrate technology access and control instruments – export controls, FDI screening, critical infrastructure access, research protection, and outbound investment– in its Digital Strategy and National Security Strategy. The former currently neglects critical technology access and control; the latter must address it comprehensively. German – and EU – dual-use export and FDI screening reforms have been updated and are now in place. Capacity building and alignment with EU and NATO partners now deserves greater attention. Measures could include more robust, institutionalized information-sharing and consultations on dual-use technology export, import, investment, and research controls in a Multilateral Technology Control Committee born out of the G7 or TTC. The commit-tee should also establish the capacity to deny end-user access to German technology through its own Foreign-Direct Product Rules and Entity List.
Topic:
Security, Economics, Science and Technology, Investment, and Exports
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

77. Japan: Defense Planning in Transition: Country Report From the Project “Risk Reduction and Arms Control in the Asia-Pacific Region”

Author:
Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
Since the 2000s, Japan has worked to strengthen and sharpen its defense strategy and readiness to better deal with the increasingly challenging In-do-Pacific security environment. The developments to date have allowed the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) to become a more effective and proactive force, but the threats posed by China, North Korea, and Russia have also increased dramatically in recent years, calling for new measures expected to be unveiled in Japan’s new National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) in late 2022.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

78. A Path to Peace

Author:
Park Institute for Peace Studies
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
Abstract:
The last few decades have seen Pakistan grapple with serious and diverse security challenges. These have been accompanied not merely by deterioration of law and order, but also substantial socio-economic impact. In recent years, particularly after 2014, Pakistan managed to achieve considerable success in containing terrorism. Militant groups no longer had large areas under their effective control and attacks and casualties declined sharply,1 affording Pakistan a degree of relative peace. In early 2021, violence against civil society, security forces, public servants and other citizens was not as frequent or vicious as it had been a few years earlier. Much has been said and written about the prevalence of violent extremism and terrorism in Pakistan and on ways to tackle them in order to restore peace to the country. Terrorism in the country is recent decades has been largely believed to be religiously motivated.2 Groups responsible for the wave of terrorism from 2009 till 2017 were largely Sunni and Deobandi in nature, who targeted state institutions and civilians, both indiscriminately and along sectarian lines. Ethnonationalist organizations, predominantly from Balochistan, also conducted high profile attacks in Pakistan’s urban areas. The State’s counter-terrorism (CT) responses have almost exclusively fallen in the category of “hard approaches”, involving kinetic force and tactical operations to physically eliminate terrorists.3 To be fair, many of the security threats that confronted Pakistan warranted some form of immediate military action. However, while successful in the short term, such approaches fail to address the wider issues or causes and factors of violent extremism. For instance, even as hard approaches eliminate terrorists already on the ground, as long as the motivation driving them survives, more would continue to take their place. In that context, until the ‘mindset’ driving terrorism and violent extremism and the networks that connect them are confronted and eradicated, claims of victory over terrorism may be premature and unsustainable.4 Therefore, “soft” approaches must be an indispensable component in any counter-terrorism framework, particularly in the case of Pakistan, where not just terrorism but violent extremism is also rampant. At the outset, it must be said unequivocally that the state has the right, and indeed the obligation, to use all lawful and reasonable options to maintain law and order and protect the rights and lives of citizens. However, perceiving hard approaches as the only option, for all intents and purposes, misses out on the sustainability and advantage of the alternatives that may be used instead of or in conjunction with the use of force, as a measure of last resort. As the counter-terrorism approaches have relied on hard options over the past two decades, Pakistan’s growing extremism challenge—including the factors, dynamics, ideologies, and actors that feed into terrorism—have not received as much attention. This is not to say that no example of non-violent approaches for tackling terrorism and extremism exists in Pakistan. Several initiatives over the years have included components of counter-violent extremism (CVE) and the so-called soft approaches with the stated aim of preventing alienation, radicalization and promoting political means including dialogue and other forms of engagement, as well as rehabilitation and reintegration. Prominent instances of the use of soft approaches in Pakistan are enumerated in Chapter II. However, without exception, these so-called soft or non-violent approaches in the country have either had too miniscule a footprint, or little effort has been exerted on implementation, even for initiatives launched with much fanfare. The post-2014 trend of improving security indicators seemed to be faltering, or even reversing in the latter half of 2021, particularly after the fall of the Afghan government in August. Even before this recent development, as the physical footprint of terrorist outfits and their attacks had seemingly receded in the face of military operations, little had been done to tackle the religious-ideological, sociocultural, political, or governance-related and other factors and drivers of extremism, which feed into violent extremism and terrorism. This report has sprouted out of an initiative conceived in mid-2020, much before the unfolding of several recent events with significant implications for peace and security in Pakistan. That is to say that the need for considering soft approaches has only grown more urgent with the Taliban regaining power in Afghanistan and a clear uptick in security-related incidents in Pakistan in recent months.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Governance, Counter-terrorism, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Pakistan and Middle East

79. Interfaith Relations in Pakistan Perspectives and Worldview of Youth in Punjab

Author:
Ahmed Ali
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
Abstract:
In the present day where concerns are gradually shifting from overpopulation to decreasing youth population in many countries, Pakistan’s youth population makes it a young nation. On a theoretical level, a large youth population with energy and capacity for work should help boost the national economy and contribute to GDP growth. However, in practice, lack of focus on youth in policymaking has drastically checked Pakistan’s ability to capitalize on its youth bulge and channelize the youth’s energies for economic growth. Still more worrisome, youth engagement is usually overlooked in policy discourse and formulation concerning peace and security, even though youth are integral to Pakistan’s security issues including violent extremism and terrorism. In recent past, the scale of religious extremism and violence witnessed in Pakistan could not have been possible without the formidable role of the youth who were indoctrinated in violent ideologies and used as weapons of war by militant groups. The Amnesty International has documented the using of youth in conflicts and hostilities around the world. In Pakistan, a Taliban commander Qari Hussain called the children “the tools to achieve God’s will”.1 The strategy of using young people in acts of violence was demonstrated by terror outfits, and children and teenagers were deployed as human bombs. However, despite Pakistan’s bitter experiences with faith-based extremism and terrorism, the youth continue to be discounted in policy. There is no effective or functional youth policy to speak of, though leaders do quite often cite the youth bulge as a source of national strength and promise uplift of youth. But rhetoric is barely followed by befitting policy measures. Resultantly, the youth are left largely rudderless and disenchanted which make them vulnerable to exploitation. There is already enough evidence to suggest that the current generation of Pakistani youth harbor anger inside which is often manifested in violent ways including in the forms of vigilantism and lynching.
Topic:
Security, Economics, Leadership, and Youth
Political Geography:
Pakistan and Middle East

80. Afghan Peace and Reconciliation: Pakistan’s Interests and Policy Options II

Author:
Arooj Mumtaz
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
Abstract:
The recognition of the Taliban government continues to be a major concern of world powers which are also closely monitoring the stance of Afghanistan’s neighbours on the matter of recognition. Since the fall of Kabul, Pakistan has demonstrated the policy of engagement, however as far as the recognition of the Taliban government is concerned, experts are of the opinion that recognition by Pakistan will be of no use until others follow the suit. Many in the U.S. and NATO countries believe that their “defeat” in Afghanistan could have been avoided had Pakistan not played the role it did. Hence, Pakistan needs to consider the great powers’ perspective on Afghanistan meanwhile ensuring that it facilitates humanitarian assistance in the war-torn neighbour. Moreover, experts assert that the Taliban are capable enough to further their agenda on the regional and world stage and Pakistan needs to avoid assuming that role. Cross-border migration remains a pronounced worry of the Pakistani government, but due to border fencing and strict security measures the phenomenon has so far been under control. However, if further humanitarian catastrophe in Afghanistan is not prevented, more refugees will certainly cross the border to enter Pakistan. To escape this situation, Pakistan has time and again urged the world community to provide humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan. The hosting of OIC summit is one such attempt by Pakistan. However, experts believe that OIC is less likely to be fruitful; firstly, because individually important OIC members (Saudi Arabia or U.A.E) have not given any statement regarding Afghanistan’s assistance, and secondly because the issue of recognition is impossible to be tackled as all the Arab states are hesitant to accept the Taliban regime.
Topic:
Security, Migration, Governance, Taliban, Leadership, and Borders
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Middle East

81. The Pillars Necessary for a Strong Domestic Semiconductor Industry

Author:
Sujai Shivakumar, Charles Wessner, and Thomas Howell
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
All major U.S. defense systems and platforms rely on semiconductors for their performance, and the erosion of U.S. capabilities in microelectronics is a direct threat to the United States’ ability to defend itself and its allies. The COMPETES and USICA legislation, currently being reconciled in Congress, represents a national strategy to secure U.S. competitiveness and national security in the twenty-first century. Both the House and Senate legislation call for $52 billion to support U.S.-based semiconductor research and production. They also authorize several programs to both expand U.S. semiconductor fabrication capacity and support the continued research and development (R&D) of advanced chips. The key question is how these intentions can best be turned into reality. There are several challenges that the domestic semiconductor industry confronts, such as international competition, capital investment requirements, workforce needs, gaps in the supply chain, and the shortfall in venture capital funding and technical support needed to enable commercialization of promising technologies.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Innovation, Industrialization, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

82. The Challenge of European Political Will

Author:
Rachel Lutz Ellehuus and Seth G. Jones
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
In this follow-on report to 2021’s Europe's High-End Military Challenges: The Future of European Capabilities and Missions, the CSIS Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program and International Security Program examine the other side of the coin of European military effectiveness: the political will of European countries to conduct military missions and operations. The report identifies the endogenous and exogenous factors constraining or increasing political will and maps them onto six country case studies. Four prototypes of political will emerged from the analysis: global partners, international activists, constrained partners, and minimalists. The report then assesses the political will of European allies and partners to conduct fifteen types of military missions and operations worldwide, from peacekeeping to large-scale combat. It concludes with a summary of key findings. First, it finds that internal and external factors—such as strategic culture and alliance dependence, respectively—will continue to constrain European political will in many cases, even after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Second, European states are more likely to have the political will to engage in military missions at the lower end of the conflict spectrum (such as maritime patrol missions) and less likely at the higher ends of the spectrum, except in cases of significant collective or national defense.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Politics, Military Strategy, Regionalism, and Intervention
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

83. U.S. Defense Posture in the Middle East

Author:
Seth G. Jones and Seamus P. Daniels
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
There are growing calls for a decrease in the U.S. military presence in the Middle East. Proponents of a major reduction of forces argue that it is necessary because of growing competition with China in the Indo-Pacific and Russia in Europe, a declining U.S. reliance on Gulf oil and gas, a reduced threat from terrorist groups, and a need to focus on diplomacy rather than military force. To inform the debate over the United States’ military presence in the Middle East, this report assesses three posture options for U.S. forces in the region. This report finds that the United States should keep a notable but tailored presence in the Middle East to contain the further expansion of Chinese and Russian military power and to check the actions of Iran and terrorist organizations that threaten the United States and its allies and partners.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Hegemony, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

84. U.S. Strategy: Rebalancing Global Energy between Europe, Russia, and Asia and U.S. Security Policy in the Middle East and the Gulf

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The war in Ukraine has already shown how dangerous it is for the U.S. to assume that it can rebalance its forces to one region and count on a lasting peace or detente in others. It now is all too clear that U.S. strategy must continue to focus on Europe as well as China. What is less clear is the extent to which the Ukraine War is an equal warning that the U.S. must have a truly global strategy – and one that continues to focus on other critical regions like the Middle East. The sudden escalation of the Ukraine crisis into a major regional conflict and the need for political and diplomatic support in the UN as well as for sanctions are warnings that much of the U.S. success in deterrence and defense lies in creating long-term global diplomatic and political support as well as true and lasting strategic partnerships.
Topic:
Security, Energy Policy, International Trade and Finance, Hegemony, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Middle East, Asia, North America, and United States of America

85. China, Europe, and the Pandemic Recession: Beijing’s Investments and Transatlantic Security

Author:
John R. Deni, Chris Alden, Erik Brattberg, Roger Cliff, Mark Duckenfield, R. Evan Ellis, Nicholas Nelson, and Laura Speranza
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
Given the depth and breadth of the pandemic-induced recession in Europe, private companies in need of capital and governments looking to shed state-owned enterprises may be tempted to sell shares, assets, or outright ownership to investors with liquidity to spare. Of greatest concern is the role that China might play in Europe, building Beijing’s soft power, weakening allied geopolitical solidarity, and potentially reprising the role it played in the 2010s, when its investments in Europe expanded dramatically. More specifically, there is concern over China’s investments in infrastructure and sensitive technologies relevant to American and allied military operations and capabilities. Whether Europe is prepared and able to parry Beijing’s economic statecraft is somewhat unclear, given varied attitudes toward China and the patchwork of investment screening mechanisms across the continent. Regardless, the outcomes will have significant implications for US security and for the Defense Department specifically. In support of US European Command (EUCOM) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) assembled an interdisciplinary team to examine these issues and offer actionable policy recommendations for military leaders and decisionmakers on both sides of the Atlantic.
Topic:
Security, Military Affairs, Economy, Investment, Transatlantic Relations, COVID-19, State-Owned Enterprises, and Recession
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

86. Food Insecurity and its Discontents in the Middle East and North Africa

Author:
Salma Al-Shami
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arab Barometer
Abstract:
Food insecurity plagues majorities of citizens in six out of 10 countries surveyed as part of Arab Barometer’s seventh wave (2021-2022). Majorities from 53 percent in Libya to 68 percent in Egypt report that they ran out of food before they had money to buy more. And in nine out of 10 countries, more than half of all citizens express concern about running out of food before being able to get more. These findings reiterate a long-standing and often observed quagmire in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA): the high proportion of food insecure citizens in middle income countries with otherwise medium or high levels of human development is staggering. Beyond affirming this quagmire, Arab Barometer’s newest data show that looking at region through the lens of food insecurity and its web of discontents emphasizes seven key challenges facing MENA: “Democracy fatigue” is highest among the food insecure, though they still prefer democracy to its alternatives. Gender gaps in reports of food insecurity reiterate the consequences of extreme gender imbalances in labor force participation. Urban-rural cleavages in food insecurity are a reminder that food scarcity can be higher in rural areas on account of decreased access to credit, reliance on import substitution strategies, shrinking agricultural lands, and climate change. Despite the documented effects of the latter on food availability, food insecure citizens are less likely to want government intervention to address climate challenges. Differences between food secure and insecure citizens on evaluations of the economy are more muted than expected, perhaps because broadly defined economic challenges loom heavily on all. Still, those suffering from food insecurity express a higher desire to emigrate. And finally, food insecurity has devastating effects on present and future outlooks, with food insecure citizens—particularly youth—less likely to say both that their lives are better than their parents’ and their children’s lives will be better than their own.
Topic:
Security, Children, Food Security, and Food Safety
Political Geography:
Africa, Middle East, North Africa, and MENA

87. Sahel: 10 Years of Instability. Local, Regional and International Dynamics

Author:
Giovanni Carbone and Camillo Casola
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:
Ten years after the start of the Malian crisis, political and security instability in the Sahel have changed in scale and nature, and spilled over across national frontiers. The border region between Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger has become the new epicentre of insecurity. The comeback of military actors on the political scene, and the support provided by large parts of the population to post-coup military juntas is evidence of poor governance and a severe deterioration in the legitimacy of elected authorities. In this complex scenario, the initiatives of external partners affect regional balances, making the Sahel a major theatre for power competition. How did the crisis evolve over the past decade? What are the main drivers behind local, regional and international dynamics? What prospects for regional stability?
Topic:
Security, Politics, Territorial Disputes, Borders, Instability, and Military
Political Geography:
Africa, Mali, Sahel, Niger, and Burkina Faso

88. Facing War: Rethinking Europe’s Security and Defence

Author:
Serena Giusti and Giovanni Grevi
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:
Russia’s attack on Ukraine has sent shockwaves across Europe and the world. While the current war is a geopolitical turning point, it remains unclear whether it will trigger a quantum leap forward for European defence policies and for the role of the European Union as a security provider. This Report investigates whether we can expect a further convergence of European strategic cultures, and on collaboration among Europeans to generate the required military capabilities and integrate their forces. Most importantly, it finds that the timely implementation of the EU’s Strategic Compass will be a decisive test to establish whether Europeans are rising to the challenge of taking more responsibility for their security and defence.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

89. Energy Politics in the MENA Region: From Hydrocarbons to Renewables?

Author:
Valeria Talbot
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:
After Russia's invasion of Ukraine and its weaponisation of natural gas supplies, energy security has become a top political priority for Europe. Given the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region's abundant oil and gas resources, the European countries inevitably turned to the region to make up for the shortfall. This Report analyses the impact of Europe's "scramble for alternatives" on key MENA exporters of fossil fuels. Specific attention is attached to their prospects as short-term suppliers of fossil fuels while they set the stage for their green transition. How is the current energy crisis affecting the role of MENA hydrocarbons producers as Europe's energy suppliers? Which impact on energy relations among MENA countries? Which new prospects for their green transition?
Topic:
Security, Energy Policy, Renewable Energy, Hydrocarbons, and Green Transition
Political Geography:
Middle East and North Africa

90. 'And Everything Became War': Warrap State since the Signing of the R-ARCSS

Author:
Joshua Craze
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Small Arms Survey
Abstract:
In Warrap state, home to South Sudanese President Salva Kiir and much of the country's political and military elite, many hoped that the signing of a peace agreement in 2018 would bring an end to the violence that had scarred their country for the previous five years. Instead, in Warrap, violence intensified, and pitted communities against each other in increasingly brutal tit-for-tat attacks that targeted women, children, homes, and the very capacities of communities to sustain life. At the war's end, everything became war. Such clashes are often dismissed as 'inter-communal violence' delinked from the politics of the peace agreement. 'And Everything Became War': Warrap State since the Signing of the R-ARCSS—a report from the Survey’s Human Security Baseline Assessment for Sudan and South Sudan (HSBA) project—demonstrates that the conflict raging in Warrap is instead deeply political, and a consequence of the way that Kiir's regime maintains power by setting feuding elites against each other. In Warrap, the South Sudanese state has suffered an almost total collapse in political legitimacy, and cattle-guards have emerged as the only actors on the ground with genuine community support that can resist the predatory state, even if they are also instrumentalized by it. 'And Everything Became War' is the first in-depth study of conflict dynamics in Warrap state since the beginning of the South Sudanese civil war. Based on extensive fieldwork, the report makes one central conclusion: as South Sudan enters its fourth year of ‘peace’, everything has become war, and the South Sudanese government is the war’s cause rather than the solution.
Topic:
Security, Politics, Treaties and Agreements, Conflict, and Elites
Political Geography:
Africa, Sudan, and South Sudan

91. Global Peace Index 2022

Author:
Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP)
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP)
Abstract:
This is the 16th edition of the Global Peace Index (GPI), which ranks 163 independent states and territories according to their level of peacefulness. Produced by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), the GPI is the world’s leading measure of global peacefulness. This report presents the most comprehensive data-driven analysis to-date on trends in peace, its economic value, and how to develop peaceful societies. The GPI covers 163 countries comprising 99.7 per cent of the world’s population, using 23 qualitative and quantitative indicators from highly respected sources, and measures the state of peace across three domains: the level of societal Safety and Security; the extent of Ongoing Domestic and International Conflict; and the degree of Militarisation. In addition to discussing the findings from the 2022 GPI, the report includes an analysis of the military conflict in Ukraine. It covers likely increases in military spending, new and emerging uses of technology in the war, its impact on food prices and global shipping routes. The report also contains a deeper analysis on violent demonstrations around the world. This year’s results found that the average level of global peacefulness deteriorated by 0.3 per cent. Although slight, this is the eleventh deterioration in peacefulness in the last fourteen years, with 90 countries improving, 71 deteriorating and two remaining stable in peacefulness, highlighting that countries tend to deteriorate much faster than they improve.
Topic:
Security, Economics, Peace, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Global Focus

92. Finland in Afghanistan 2001–2021: From stabilization to advancing foreign and security policy relations

Author:
Katariina Mustasilta, Tyyne Karjalainen, Timo R. Stewart, and Mathilda Salo
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Finland participated in the international stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan for nearly 20 years, contributing around 2,500 soldiers and 140 civilian crisis management experts. During this period, Finland’s development cooperation funds and humanitarian assistance allocated to Afghanistan amounted to around EUR 398 million. When Finland made the decision to join the operations in Afghanistan at the turn of 2001 and 2002, the country was living in uncertain yet optimistic times. The Taliban regime had collapsed quickly after the US-led military intervention, and the international community was broadly committed to supporting the interim administration in changing the country’s course. Finland sent a CIMIC unit to Afghanistan to participate in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and support the stabilization and reconstruction efforts. It also began to channel development cooperation funds to Afghanistan, notably through UN and World Bank programmes, and soon allocated most of its civilian crisis management resources to the European Union Police Mission (EUPOL) in Afghanistan. In the second half of the 2000s, however, Afghanistan slid further into a devastating civil war. A decade into the international intervention, the early optimism had given way to Afghans’ growing distrust of their government and the international actors. The Finnish troops, now comprising around 200 soldiers, repeatedly engaged in combat as part of the military operation that was now led by NATO and had become a party in the conflict. While the security arrangements for the international actors required increasing resources, their room for manoeuvre became significantly more limited. After the ISAF mission ended, Finland continued to participate in the NATO-led Resolute Support Mission (RSM), which supported the Afghan security forces until the summer of 2021. Finland also remained one of the most important actors to support EUPOL until the end of the mission and took responsibility for co-hosting the 2020 Afghanistan pledging conference to support the country. Afghanistan was the biggest recipient of Finland’s development cooperation funds throughout the second half of the 2010s. In August 2021, Finland suspended its extensive activities in Afghanistan in chaotic circumstances as the international community left the country following the US decision to withdraw its forces and the Taliban’s seize of power. This research examines Finland’s activities in Afghanistan by focusing on why Finland decided to engage in Afghanistan, on what its activities were based, and what can be learned from them for future crises and conflicts. The research is based on the analysis of a broad set of qualitative data consisting of interviews with 64 people who were involved in the intervention in Afghanistan or employed in related activities. Workshop discussions were also held to hear the views of the Afghan diaspora in Finland and experts. In addition, the researchers analysed public documents and previous research literature and held background discussions with experts. This research report broadly examines the consequences of Finland’s objectives, the logic behind its activities and the key challenges from the perspectives of military crisis management, civilian crisis management, and development cooperation and humanitarian assistance. Our research findings suggest that Finland’s activities in Afghanistan were motivated by multiple objectives that were partly unclear and at times conflicting. Based on government reports and other public documents, Finland’s primary aim was to stabilize and support Afghanistan to enhance international peace and security. The proclaimed objectives highlighted Finland’s responsibility as part of the UN-led international community and its efforts to support the development of good governance and the rule of law and promote the rights of women and girls in particular. In our research, these objectives comprise a framework we call “Finland as a benefactor”. On the other hand, our analysis suggests that alongside – and over – these proclaimed objectives, Finland’s participation was primarily guided by its desire to maintain and strengthen its foreign and security policy relations with the US and other international partners, as well as its effort to deepen its collaboration with NATO. Within the limits of this “Finland as a partner” framework, Finland sought to position itself as a reliable benefactor but also to gain advantage by improving its national capacities. Finland’s multiple objectives in Afghanistan might not necessarily have posed a problem in terms of the appropriateness of Finland’s involvement. Indeed, at the beginning they worked in harmony as the operating environment allowed Finland to show solidarity with the US and support it in the fight against terrorism while also appearing as a humanitarian actor that promoted stability and development in Afghanistan. However, tensions emerged between the different rationales when the situation in Afghanistan deteriorated, and the nature and outcomes of the intervention became more conflicted. In the absence of clearly and transparently set objectives, it was challenging to build an action plan and assess the activities. One particular factor that made the planning and monitoring of Finland’s participation difficult was the effort to disguise the fact that it was motivated by a desire to foster transatlantic relations and partnerships. From the perspective of the international partnerships, it was enough that Finland participated in the intervention. In terms of Afghanistan and its development, the objectives of the various activities remained vague, unrealistic and unclear, and they received insufficient attention. Instead of critical analysis and strategic monitoring, both international and Finnish actors attempted to meet the stated objectives by highlighting the progress made in Afghanistan and keeping silent about the combats and difficulties. It is almost impossible to assess to what extent Finland achieved its objectives in Afghanistan, because no clear and transparent objectives had been set. Based on our interviews, Finland’s involvement benefitted its transatlantic relations, Nordic cooperation and position in the international community. Besides defence cooperation, Finland developed its national capacities and raised its profile within the EU’s civilian crisis management framework. It is however difficult to assess in retrospect how the different forms of participation deepened Finland’s relations with the US, for example, and whether Finland’s activities were cost-efficient in terms of its partnership goals and national capacities, because no expectations had been explicitly stated. While temporary successes were achieved in improving security and the conditions for education in some areas, for example, issues such as a lack of understanding of the context of the conflict, challenges related to local ownership and the absence of a coherent long-term strategy became stumbling blocks in the international intervention in Afghanistan. Previous research has already called attention to the negative impacts of the intervention: the civilian victims of the military operations, the changes in local power structures, the displacement of local activities and increased corruption are only some of the examples of the impacts for which Finland has also been partly responsible. During, and partly as a result of, the intervention in Afghanistan, Finland’s policy came to be underpinned by a comprehensive crisis management strategy. In Afghanistan, this meant that Finland participated in multiple sectors and placed emphasis on the interdependence between the development and civilian crisis management efforts and military crisis management. Overall, our interviewees assessed that the activities of Finland and Finnish actors in Afghanistan were of high quality and appreciated. Our research suggests that the comprehensive strategy adopted by Finland served to justify its participation in different areas of the intervention and especially its military participation. However, Finland failed to fulfil the strategy in terms of coordinating its various activities in Afghanistan. Finland’s experiences in Afghanistan provide lessons learned that can be used to guide its activities in future crisis and conflict situations. First, it is necessary to set clearer and more transparent objectives to enable the effective planning and strategic monitoring of activities. In the context of partnership and capacity goals, clear objectives would help to develop the resourcing and targeting of activities. As regards supporting peace and stability, clearer, context-specific objectives would make it possible to monitor the appropriateness and comprehensiveness of activities. However, adopting a comprehensive approach does not mean that Finland should engage in all activities or areas of assistance in the target country; rather, its activities should be targeted to support the overall international aid effort. It is also important to develop Finland’s advocacy and impact efforts in multilateral interventions, in particular in situations in which Finland contributes significant resources. While Finland is in principle a small player, playing an active role in issues such as drawing attention to the possible negative impacts of interventions is consistent with its value-based foreign policy. By collaborating with like-minded actors, Finland has the opportunity to promote its interests through interventions (as far as these interests have been identified). However, sufficient resources are required for effective outcomes: development cooperation funds and inputs from seconded experts will be wasted if the human resources allocated to the comprehensive planning, implementation and monitoring of Finland’s participation are insufficient. The setting and implementation of realistic objectives appropriate to the context require a continuously updated conflict analysis, which in the case of small players such as Finland must also include an analysis of the context of international aid and operations. After interventions, it is also important to effectively put to use the expertise of the people who return to Finland after working in crisis areas so as not to waste the cultural and linguistic knowledge they have acquired. The lessons identified in this research are also relevant for the future of Afghanistan and Afghan people. The international community, including Finland, has been involved in shaping the structures of Afghan society, as well as its conflict dynamics, for nearly 20 years. This means that it also continues to assume its responsibility after withdrawing from the country – all the more so because the decisions to start and terminate the intervention were primarily driven by interests other than those of Afghans themselves. In terms of Finland’s credibility as a foreign policy actor, it is particularly important that it continues to abide by its long-standing commitment to promote the rights of women and girls. In the present difficult circumstances, the cooperation and assistance efforts should be based on placing the needs and priorities of Afghans at the centre. This can be achieved by conducting a careful conflict analysis, listening to and discussing with Afghans, and promoting a strategically coordinated approach to setting the objectives and framework conditions of the cooperation at the level of the international community.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, Crisis Management, and Stabilization
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, South Asia, and Finland

93. Arms-production Capabilities in the Indo-Pacific Region: Measuring Self-reliance

Author:
Lucie Béraud-Sudreau, Xiao Liang, Siemon T. Wezeman, and Ming Sun
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
Armed forces in the Indo-Pacific region remain dependent on weapon systems imported from foreign suppliers. This is despite the efforts of many governments in the Indo-Pacific to implement policies that support the development of local arms industrial capabilities with the aim of increasing self-reliance. This report develops three indicators to give a score and regional ranking of self-reliance in arms production to 12 jurisdictions in the Indo-Pacific region: Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand and Viet Nam. Overall, this report contributes to knowledge and debates on armament trends and military modernization in the Indo-Pacific. In a region where tensions among neighbours are rising, it further contributes to transparency with regard to levels of self-reliance in domestic arms production, allowing for an independent assessment of the region’s respective arms industries.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Arms Trade, and Imports
Political Geography:
China, Australia, and Indo-Pacific

94. “Don’t Abandon Us”: Preventing Mass Atrocities in Papua, Indonesia

Author:
Made Supriatma
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
Abstract:
This report assesses the risk of mass atrocities (large-scale, systematic violence against civilian populations) in Papua, Indonesia, over the next 12–18 months. Since its integration into Indonesia in 1969, Papua has seen ongoing political resistance and armed rebellion in favor of independence, and government repression in response. The region is home to Indigenous Papuans and a growing population of migrants from other parts of Indonesia, layering intercommunal tensions on top of the conflict over the region’s governance. An upward trend in the frequency of violent incidents prompted this analysis of the potential for mass atrocities. This report is based on field research in Indonesia, including in Papua, from March to August 2021, as well as on expert consultations and a literature review. The report’s conceptual framework and research questions draw from the atrocity assessment framework developed by the US government.
Topic:
Security, Armed Forces, Indigenous, Industry, Atrocity Prevention, and Risk Assessment
Political Geography:
Indonesia, Southeast Asia, and Papua

95. What Ukraine Taught NATO about Hybrid Warfare

Author:
Sarah J. Lohmann, Chuck Benson, Vytautas Butrimas, Georgios Giannoulis, and Gabriel Raicu
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 forced the United States and its NATO partners to be confronted with the impact of hybrid warfare far beyond the battlefield. Targeting Europe’s energy security, Russia’s malign influence campaigns and malicious cyber intrusions are affecting global gas prices, driving up food costs, disrupting supply chains and grids, and testing US and Allied military mobility. This study examines how hybrid warfare is being used by NATO’s adversaries, what vulnerabilities in energy security exist across the Alliance, and what mitigation strategies are available to the member states. Cyberattacks targeting the renewable energy landscape during Europe’s green transition are increasing, making it urgent that new tools are developed to protect these emerging technologies. No less significant are the cyber and information operations targeting energy security in Eastern Europe as it seeks to become independent from Russia. Economic coercion is being used against Western and Central Europe to stop gas from flowing. China’s malign investments in Southern and Mediterranean Europe are enabling Beijing to control several NATO member states’ critical energy infrastructure at a critical moment in the global balance of power. What Ukraine Taught NATO about Hybrid Warfare will be an important reference for NATO officials and US installations operating in the European theater.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Economics, Infrastructure, Cybersecurity, Renewable Energy, and Hybrid Warfare
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, Central Europe, Western Europe, and Southeast Europe

96. Enabling NATO’s Collective Defense: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resiliency (NATO COE-DAT Handbook 1)

Author:
Carl V. Evans, Chris Anderson, Malcom Baker, Ronald Bearse, and Salih Biçakci
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
In 2014 NATO’s Centre of Excellence-Defence Against Terrorism (COE-DAT) launched the inaugural course on “Critical Infrastructure Protection Against Terrorist Attacks.” As this course garnered increased attendance and interest, the core lecturer team felt the need to update the course in critical infrastructure (CI) taking into account the shift from an emphasis on “protection” of CI assets to “security and resiliency.” What was lacking in the fields of academe, emergency management, and the industry practitioner community was a handbook that leveraged the collective subject matter expertise of the core lecturer team, a handbook that could serve to educate government leaders, state and private-sector owners and operators of critical infrastructure, academicians, and policymakers in NATO and partner countries. Enabling NATO’s Collective Defense: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resiliency is the culmination of such an effort, the first major collaborative research project under a Memorandum of Understanding between the US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), and NATO COE-DAT. The research project began in October 2020 with a series of four workshops hosted by SSI. The draft chapters for the book were completed in late January 2022. Little did the research team envision the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February this year. The Russian occupation of the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant, successive missile attacks against Ukraine’s electric generation and distribution facilities, rail transport, and cyberattacks against almost every sector of the country’s critical infrastructure have been on world display. Russian use of its gas supplies as a means of economic warfare against Europe—designed to undermine NATO unity and support for Ukraine—is another timely example of why adversaries, nation-states, and terrorists alike target critical infrastructure. Hence, the need for public-private sector partnerships to secure that infrastructure and build the resiliency to sustain it when attacked. Ukraine also highlights the need for NATO allies to understand where vulnerabilities exist in host nation infrastructure that will undermine collective defense and give more urgency to redressing and mitigating those fissures.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Infrastructure, Cybersecurity, Alliance, Crisis Management, and Risk Assessment
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

97. The Coming Storm: Insights from Ukraine about Escalation in Modern War

Author:
Benjamin Jensen and Adrian Bogart
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Based on three crisis simulations held in late March 2022 with think tank fellows, military planners, and congressional staffers, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) will likely struggle to address escalation vectors almost certain to push the current war in Ukraine beyond the country’s borders. This paper captures key insights from across these simulations based on two triggering events: (1) a Russian surgical strike on a NATO logistics hub used to provide weapons to Ukraine in southeast Poland, and (2) Russian use of chemical weapons along the Polish border while simultaneously mobilizing to threaten the Baltics. As the conflict crossed a key threshold and risked becoming a regional war, most participants found a natural pull to escalate in each scenario despite limited expectations of achieving a position of competitive advantage. Analyzing how individuals and teams approached decision making provides insights on rethinking escalation models in the twenty-first century and taking advantage of new concepts and capabilities to better support signaling during a crisis.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

98. Localizing Humanitarian Action in Africa

Author:
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele, Kurtzer Jacob D., and Hareem Fatima Abdullah
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The international humanitarian community is increasingly focusing on the need for local and national actors to lead humanitarian response and recovery efforts in conflict-affected or disaster-prone regions, especially in the Global South. Local and national actors responding to crises remain severely underfunded, particularly in Africa, where civil society organizations (CSOs) receive insufficient funding from African and international actors alike. African funders reportedly directed 9 percent of large gifts to African CSOs between 2010 and 2019, while non-African philanthropists provided 14 percent of their funding to these groups. The United States is the world’s largest foreign assistance donor, having contributed $35.5 billion in overseas development assistance (ODA) in 2020. Much of this aid goes to sub-Saharan Africa, including $8.5 billion to 47 countries and 8 regional programs in 2020. Yet national and local organizations receive little of this funding directly. At the same time, Washington has repeatedly signaled a commitment to the “localization” of humanitarian aid, or the shift of decisionmaking power, program implementation, and resources to local and national actors. Yet localized humanitarian assistance in Africa has failed to materialize. Bureaucratic and regulatory hurdles, as well as geostrategic calculations, pose a challenge to localization efforts. African voices are excluded from the decisionmaking landscape—in donor discussions and localization efforts themselves—resulting in a gap in cultural competency. The conversation on localization in Africa cannot be limited to the African continent; it must occur in donor capitals, with African voices leading the dialogue. To achieve sustainable localization, the U.S. and African policy landscapes should resolve bureaucratic obstacles and shift an exclusionary aid paradigm to one that is inclusive and builds on existing successes.
Topic:
Security, Humanitarian Aid, Humanitarian Intervention, and Humanitarian Crisis
Political Geography:
Africa

99. The Lessons of the Afghan War That No One Will Want to Learn

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
At the best of times, the U.S. tends to rush out heavily politicized studies of the lessons of war that are more political ammunition than serious analyses, and while these are followed by long formal studies that are often quite good, they then are often ignored as the flow of events moves on. These are scarcely the best of times. The collapse of the Afghan government and forces has occurred during one of the most partisan periods in American politics, followed by a totally different kind of conflict in Ukraine, all while the U.S. focus on terrorism and regional conflicts that began with 9/11 has been replaced by a focus on competition with nuclear superpowers like Russia and China. The very fact that the war stretched out over two decades has meant that much of the focus on lessons has ignored the first half or more of the war, and the almost inevitable chaos following the U.S. decision to withdraw has led to the focus on the collapse of the Afghan forces and the central government rather than on the actual conduct of the war – and few within the U.S. government now want to rake over the list of past mistakes that turned an initial tactical victory into a massive grand strategic defeat.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

100. Cyber War and Ukraine

Author:
James Andrew Lewis
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
This is a preliminary review of cyber operations in the Ukraine conflict based on publicly available information. Ukraine was not the first “cyber war”—the term itself makes little sense—but it was the first major conflict involving large-scale cyber operations. The so-far inept Russian invasion, where cyber operations have provided little benefit, raises questions about the balance between defense and offense in cyberspace, the utility of offensive cyber operations, and the requirements for planning and coordination. Better-than-expected Ukrainian defenses seem to be one hallmark of this invasion and the primary reason why Russian cyber efforts have had limited effect. It is likely that Ukraine, forewarned by Russian cyber actions that began as early as 2014, was better prepared as a result. It was also assisted in its cyber defense by friendly countries and private actors with whom it had developed cooperative relationships before the conflict. This preparation allowed it to deflect many Russian offensive cyber operations, suggesting that a well-prepared and energetic defense can have the advantage over offense in cyberspace. Russia had previously used cyberattacks against Ukraine to destroy or damage infrastructure and data. It attempted to do so again in 2022. Based on publicly available information, Russia launched a broad cyber campaign shortly before the invasion (see the appendix for a list of known events). Some reporting showed a huge increase in exploits on the first day. The intent appears to have been to create disorder and overwhelm Ukrainian defenses. Russia sought to disrupt services and install destructive malware on Ukrainian networks included phishing, denial of service, and taking advantage of software vulnerabilities. One company identified eight different families of destructive software used by Russia in these attacks. The primary targets were Ukrainian government websites, energy and telecom service providers, financial institutions, and media outlets, but the cyberattacks encompassed most critical sectors. This was a wide-ranging attack using the full suite of Russian cyber capabilities to disrupt Ukraine, but it was not a success. Russia’s most significant cyber success so far was the disruption of the Viasat Inc’s KA-SAT satellite. This created significant damage that spread beyond Ukraine but ultimately did not provide military advantage to Russia. The attack may have been intended to be part of a larger, coordinated cyberattack that proved unsuccessful, or the Russians may not have expected the rapid restoration of service that was provided with outside assistance. The metric for Viasat and for other actions is not whether a cyberattack is effective in terms of network penetration or the disruption of services or data, but whether its effect helps achieve in this case, the occupation of Ukraine and the elimination of its elected government. By this metric, the Viasat attack was not a success.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Cybersecurity, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Ukraine