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202. Café Evropa: European commemoration of the Shoah and the fight against anti-Semitism
- Author:
- Barbora Jehličková
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Europeum Institute for European Policy
- Abstract:
- A debate on the European commemoration of the victims of the Shoah and the fight against anti-Semitism took place as part of the Café Evropa debate series. What is the path to a Czech national strategy to fight anti-Semitism and is a European culture of Shoah remembrance possible? You can read a summary of the outcomes of the individual guests in the report written by our intern Barbora Jehličková.
- Topic:
- History, Culture, Holocaust, Memory, and Anti-Semitism
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Czech Republic
203. EU-Pacific Talks: Be small and beautiful - future of nuclear energy?
- Author:
- Petra Pospíšilová
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Europeum Institute for European Policy
- Abstract:
- This year's third debate in a series of expert discussions on the EU's relations with the Pacific occurred online on Tuesday, 28 March 2023. The guests offered their views on nuclear energy trends, outlook, and small modular reactors' role in energy and industry sectors. Read more about this debate in the report by Petra Pospíšilová.
- Topic:
- Nuclear Power, European Union, Industry, and Energy
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Asia-Pacific
204. EU-China relations - Will the current crisis change the relationship between the two great powers?
- Author:
- Eliška Prostřední
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Europeum Institute for European Policy
- Abstract:
- As part of the Café Evropa debate cycle, one of the discussions took place on the relationship and approach between the European Union and China. Among those invited were Magdaléna Slezáková, Ondřej Wagner, David Gardáš and Zdeněk Beránek. You can read a summary of the outputs of individual guests in the report written by our intern Eliška Prostřední.
- Topic:
- Bilateral Relations, European Union, Crisis Management, and Debates
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, and Asia
205. Roundtable report | Monitoring of the EU’s Green Policies: Perceptions and Narratives in the Czech and Slovak Information Space
- Author:
- Tatiana Mindeková
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Europeum Institute for European Policy
- Abstract:
- On 17th of January 2023, the EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy organised a closed roundtable discussion titled Monitoring of the EU’s Green Policies: Perceptions and Narratives in the Czech and Slovak Information Space. The discussion was held under the Chatham House Rule and attended by experts on the EU’s green policies and disinformation from think-tank communities and academia as well as by journalists who regularly comment on these topics. The event was moderated by Žiga Faktor, EUROPEUM’s Head of the Brussels Office. A short report from the discussion was prepared by our junior researcher and project manager Tatiana Mindeková.
- Topic:
- Climate Change, European Union, Energy, and Green Transition
- Political Geography:
- Europe
206. Monitoring of the EU's Green Policies: Perceptions and Narratives in the Czech and Slovak Information Space
- Author:
- Tatiana Mindeková
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Europeum Institute for European Policy
- Abstract:
- The European Green Deal is the core of the current climate strategy of the European Union, which has set the goal of making Europe a carbon-neutral continent by 2050. In an effort to monitor and counter disinformation narratives about the deal, IRI's Beacon project launched an initiative called the “European Green Deal: Mapping perceptions in Central and Eastern Europe,” in which six partner organizations studied how the deal is perceived in Bulgaria, Czechia, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. Our project manager and juniour researcher, Tatiana Mindeková, analyzed narratives spread about the Green Deal and the EU’s green policies through Czech chain emails as well as through selected mainstream media and websites known for spreading disinformation.
- Topic:
- Climate Change, European Union, Disinformation, Energy, and Green Transition
- Political Geography:
- Czech Republic and Slovakia
207. EU-Pacific talks: Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Bold vision for bold players
- Author:
- Zsanett Gréta Papp
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Europeum Institute for European Policy
- Abstract:
- If you missed the EU-Pacific talks: Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Bold vision for bold players, here you can read the report from the debate written by Zsanett Gréta Papp. During the debate it was discussed, for example, that although each country has its own interests concerning the region, there are several global problems that countries should face together, because one country cannot solve them. On the other hand, it is really difficult to establish dialogue with the Indo-Pacific countries.
- Topic:
- European Union, Geopolitics, Dialogue, and Debates
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Indo-Pacific
208. EU – Pacific Talks: EU – Security Challenges for the Pacific, EU, and Russia
- Author:
- Tomáš Moudrý
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Europeum Institute for European Policy
- Abstract:
- If you missed the debate EU - Pacific talks: EU - Security Challenges for the Pacific, EU, and Russia, here you can read the report from the debate written by Tomáš Moudrý. During the debate, it was discussed, for example, that despite the considerable geographical distance, the EU and the Indo-Pacific region are now more interconnected than ever before and both sides are seeking to strengthen their partnership in many areas, with security policy now one of the most important due to many factors.
- Topic:
- Security, European Union, Partnerships, Geopolitics, Dialogue, and Regional Security
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Asia-Pacific
209. Fragile States Index 2023 – Annual Report
- Author:
- Nate Haken, Daniel Woodburn, Emily Sample, Wendy Wilson, and John Madden
- Publication Date:
- 06-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- The Fund for Peace
- Abstract:
- The Fragile States Index, produced by The Fund for Peace, is a critical tool in highlighting not only the normal pressures that all states experience, but also in identifying when those pressures are pushing a state towards the brink of failure. By highlighting pertinent issues in weak and failing states, The Fragile States Index—and the social science framework and software application upon which it is built—makes political risk assessment and early warning of conflict accessible to policy-makers and the public at large.
- Topic:
- War, Territorial Disputes, Fragile States, Political stability, Peace, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Africa, Europe, Sudan, Turkey, Ukraine, France, Armenia, Peru, Guyana, Global Focus, Burkina Faso, and Nagorno-Karabakh
210. Towards an Intersectional Feminist Development Policy for Germany
- Author:
- Aïssa Boodhoo and Damjan Denkovski
- Publication Date:
- 06-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Centre for Feminist Foreign Policy
- Abstract:
- In the development of Germany’s Feminist Development Policy Strategy, the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) conducted a consultative process which included online consultations, a high-level conference, and civil society dialogues. While the broadest consultative process by the German government to date, the BMZ process had limitations in terms of Global South participation and language accessibility. To complement the official BMZ-led process, the Centre for Feminist Foreign Policy (CFFP) initiated a comprehensive co-creation process involving diverse feminist civil society organisations from the Global South, Germany, and other Global North countries. Guided by position papers from various perspectives, desk research, and interviews, the CFFP feminist convenings process involved over 100 feminists from diverse backgrounds, spanned over 25 countries, provided compensation to small and Global South organisations, and incorporated intersectional perspectives. The process consisted of in-person and online convenings held in multiple languages, ensuring broad accessibility. This report is a summary of the rich discussions and recommendations of feminists. It aims to influence policymakers and initiate action in shaping Germany's Feminist Development Policy. This report opens by discussing five action areas in chapter 1, which serve as comprehensive guidelines for immediate transformative action across policy areas. The second chapter discusses feminist reflections in six thematic areas: economic justice, climate justice, food sovereignty and agriculture, sexual and reproductive health and rights, protecting minority rights, and education.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Agriculture, Climate Change, Development, Economics, Education, Minorities, Partnerships, Feminism, Reproductive Rights, Digitalization, Funding, and Food Sovereignty
- Political Geography:
- Germany and Global Focus
211. EU lessons from the evacuation of Kabul: Part 1 – What went wrong? The decision-making moments
- Author:
- Mihai Sebastian Chihaia and Georg Riekeles
- Publication Date:
- 08-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- European Policy Centre (EPC)
- Abstract:
- What went wrong in Kabul and what were the critical junctures in the West’s decision-making? This Paper explores these two questions in detail. Two moments stand out in the chaotic evacuation from Kabul: the establishment of the military withdrawal schedule in mid-April and when all the countries involved scrambled to get their civilians out too. What is clear is that EU institutions were not prepared and were equally blindsided by the speed of events and decisions. This Paper shows that the dereliction of prudence, planning and duty also extends to the EU. This is the first paper of a three-part Report examining the evacuation of Kabul, and the combined failures of NATO and the EU, amid the war in Ukraine. The Report is structured in three parts: A description of the central decision moments leading up to and during the evacuation from Afghanistan. An assessment of the main factors contributing to failure in anticipation, planning and execution. Recommendations regarding the EU’s crisis management architecture and capacity in the context of the implementation of the Strategic Compass.
- Topic:
- NATO, Military Affairs, European Union, and Crisis Management
- Political Geography:
- Afghanistan and South Asia
212. EU lessons from the evacuation of Kabul: Part 2 – Critical factors in the failure to prepare for evacuation
- Author:
- Mihai Sebastian Chihaia and Georg Riekeles
- Publication Date:
- 08-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- European Policy Centre (EPC)
- Abstract:
- The EU has yet to engage in a comprehensive ex-post evaluation of the factors of failure ahead of and during the critical summer months in 2021. By failing to deal with the past, one also does not learn about the future. Building on the preceding chapter’s analysis of the events leading up to and during the evacuation of Kabul, this paper identifies three main factors in the West’s Kabul fiasco: a collective failure of anticipation, NATO groupthink and dependence on the US, and the absence of European will and capabilities. This is the second Paper of a three-part Report examining the evacuation of Kabul, and the combined failures of NATO and the EU, amid the war in Ukraine. The Report is structured in three parts: A description of the central decision moments leading up to and during the evacuation from Afghanistan. An assessment of the main factors contributing to failure in anticipation, planning and execution. Recommendations regarding the EU’s crisis management architecture and capacity in the context of the implementation of the Strategic Compass.
- Topic:
- NATO, Military Affairs, European Union, Crisis Management, and Strategic Planning
- Political Geography:
- Afghanistan and Europe
213. Assessing the European Citizens' Panels: Greater ambition needed
- Author:
- Johannas Greubel, Perle Petit, and Andrey Demidov
- Publication Date:
- 09-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- European Policy Centre (EPC)
- Abstract:
- More than a year has passed since the Conference on the Future of Europe (CoFoE) concluded its unprecedented, deliberative exercise that put citizens front and centre in the discussions on the future of the EU. An inter-institutional effort by the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the Council, the CoFoE brought citizens together in four transnational citizens’ panels to discuss several topics in view of developing a series of recommendations on the future of Europe. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen reassured participants at the closing event that this interactive experiment would not be a one-off. It was the first time in EU history that the Brussels’ executive agreed to create space for input from transnational Citizens’ Panels to formulate new legislation. Following the conclusion of the first pilot ECPs and with the upcoming European Parliament elections, this EU Democracy Reform Observatory Report looks at this significant point in time and asks: can these efforts live beyond the political commitment of the von der Leyen Commission and become an established institutional process? Having observed the Panels and interviewed their organisers, the authors analyse the ECPs across three areas: Institutional design: what are the institution’s objectives when conducting these Panels, and how do they fit into the Commission’s current policymaking cycle? Methodological design: did the Panels lead to tangible outcomes, which can be useful for decision-makers, and how can the process be improved? Political effects: what is the Panels’ political value and how do they fit into the Union’s broader institutional landscape and existing participatory infrastructure?
- Topic:
- Public Opinion, European Union, Citizenship, Institutions, European Parliament, and European Commission
- Political Geography:
- Europe
214. How Finnish and Swedish NATO Accession Could Shape the Future Russian Threat
- Author:
- Nicholas Lokker, Jim Townsend, Heli Hautala, and Andrea Kendall-Taylor
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was a major strategic blunder. Not only will Russia emerge from the war economically and militarily weakened, but its brutal invasion has undercut Moscow’s geopolitical position, including by triggering nearby countries to take new steps to provide for their security and defense. Most notably, Russia’s aggression in Ukraine compelled Finland and Sweden to apply for NATO membership— leading to an expansion of the very alliance that Russia purports to be opposing in Ukraine. While it is unclear exactly when Finland and Sweden will join NATO—this will depend on when Hungary and Turkey, the last remaining allies to ratify the accession protocols, finalize the process—it is clear that there is no going back to the status quo ante. NATO allies should expect Russia to react to Finland and Sweden joining the organization beyond the cool response that followed their announcement. Their accession into NATO will permanently reshape the European security architecture, which Moscow is likely to see as a threat to its own security and therefore use as a basis for adjusting it calculus. Even though Moscow has not explicitly retaliated against Finland and Sweden for joining NATO beyond expressing displeasure, the Kremlin is nonetheless likely to respond, including in ways that will pose challenges to the alliance in both the near and long term. This memo discusses how Finland’s and Sweden’s entry into NATO will shape Europe’s security landscape, how Russia is likely to see these changes and respond, and how the allies can address the future challenges stemming from these changing dynamics.
- Topic:
- Security, NATO, Regional Security, Russia-Ukraine War, and Threat Assessment
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Finland, and Sweden
215. Atomic Strait: How China’s Nuclear Buildup Shapes Security Dynamics with Taiwan and the United States
- Author:
- Jacob Stokes
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- This report examines the intersection of China’s nuclear modernization and cross-Strait tensions, especially how they might play out during a crisis, contingency, or conflict involving China, Taiwan, and the United States. Beijing is rapidly modernizing its nuclear arsenal to make it larger and more sophisticated. Changes include an increase in warhead numbers from more than 400 today to potentially 700 by 2027 and more beyond, consolidating a nuclear triad, developing new delivery systems, and digging at least 300 new missile silos. Some factors still could constrain the growth of China’s arsenal or the policies that shape the way Chinese leaders employ it. They range from fissile material stocks to competing military spending priorities, considerations about China’s international reputation, and upholding Beijing’s claimed No First Use policy. But nearly all those constraining factors either already have weakened or could do so in the near future. China’s expanding nuclear arsenal suggests that the force will be designed to fulfill new missions. Some part of Beijing’s buildup surely is meant to bolster its second-strike retaliatory capability in the face of what China perceives as shifts in U.S. conventional and nuclear capabilities and policies. China’s long-term goal for the expansion, however, could be more ambitious and potentially even include seeking to build an arsenal on par with Washington’s and Moscow’s. Meanwhile, China continues to ramp up pressure on Taiwan using political, economic, and military tools. Beijing’s campaign could provoke more crises in the coming years. The three major roles that nuclear weapons could play for China when dealing with cross-Strait crises or conflicts are: to shield China from U.S. nuclear coercion, to threaten Chinese nuclear use to try to forestall U.S. intervention, and to conduct a limited Chinese nuclear detonation in an attempt to force U.S. and Taiwanese capitulation. The report concludes with recommendations for U.S. policymakers. It calls for carrying out U.S. nuclear modernization plans to deter China but avoiding nuclear arms racing as a strategy in itself. It recommends incorporating nuclear elements into contingency planning and scenario exercises related to Taiwan, both unilaterally and with allies and partners. The report then calls for improving Taiwan’s conventional military capabilities while maintaining a consistent U.S. policy on cross-Strait issues and ensuring Taiwan forgoes pursuing indigenous nuclear weapons. Finally, the report argues in favor of pushing forward tough-minded bilateral engagement with Beijing on strategic stability and security issues while crafting a multilateral arms control strategy that builds coalitions to incentivize China to join and impose costs on Beijing if it opts to stay outside of key agreements.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Regional Security
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America
216. Avoiding the Brink: Escalation Management in a War to Defend Taiwan
- Author:
- Stacie L. Pettyjohn and Hannah Dennis
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- The United States is entering an unprecedented multipolar nuclear era that is far more complex and challenging than that of the Cold War. This report examines potential triggers, thresholds, and targets for Chinese nuclear use as well as options for the United States and its allies and partners to avoid and manage escalation. It uses the results of two exploratory tabletop exercises (TTXs) focused on how China’s expanding nuclear arsenal could impact the risk of nuclear escalation in a conventional conflict over Taiwan. From these two TTXs, the authors derived tentative insights into how nuclear escalation in a war over Taiwan might unfold and identified areas where further research is needed. First, the expansions and improvements projected for China’s nuclear forces will provide it with a wider range of coercive options. With a secure second-strike capability and more diverse theater nuclear options, China may be willing to brandish its nuclear weapons to attempt to deter the United States from entering a war. There are few incentives to conduct nuclear strikes early in such a conflict, but a war over Taiwan might well lead to a protracted war between the great powers—another area where more study will be critical. The authors also found that American policymakers today might not find the PRC’s nuclear threats credible because of its smaller arsenal size and historic policy of no first use (NFU). Furthermore, the authors found that attempts to degrade key conventional capabilities might lead either side to cross the other’s red lines, setting off an escalatory spiral and transforming a regional conflict into a great-power war. Both the United States and China will have to weigh the value of eliminating certain targets with the risk of crossing an adversary red line. Last, the authors found an asymmetry between the targets available to the United States and China in a Taiwan contingency. With fewer categories of targets to strike and types of capabilities with which to strike them, the United States may have fewer options to manage escalation. All these findings merit further study. The two TTXs, conducted in summer 2022, pitted a U.S. Blue team against a Chinese Red team in a war over Taiwan. The two wargames were designed as a controlled comparison to focus on the impact of one specific variable—the size and composition of the PLA’s nuclear arsenal—on the Red team’s decision-making and its propensity to deliberately escalate and on the Blue team’s ability to defend its allies and partners while managing escalation. By holding most other factors constant but changing Red’s nuclear force structure, the authors aimed to concentrate on the role that nuclear weapons played. In TTX 1, the players had a notional 2027 order of battle with a nuclear arsenal of about 700 warheads, diverse in yield and delivery system type and range. The second TTX, set in 2030, included a similarly diverse Red arsenal of over 1,000 nuclear warheads. After analyzing the results of both exercises, the authors contextualized and expanded the findings through research on existing literature on nuclear deterrence and escalation.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Escalation
- Political Geography:
- Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America
217. Democracy under Threat: How the Personalization of Political Parties Undermines Democracy
- Author:
- Erica Frantz, Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Joseph Wright, Jia Li, Carisa Nietsche, Nicholas Lokker, and Nicolas Rice
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- In 1998, Viktor Orbán was elected the prime minister of Hungary in free and fair elections. He was supported by the Fidesz party—a movement he founded in 1988 that became a political party in 1990. After losing reelection in 2002, Orbán returned to the prime ministership in 2010 having internalized the lesson that surviving in Hungarian politics “requires strong leadership and absolute control over the party.”1 From 2002 to 2010, Orbán increased his influence within Fidesz, including by changing the party constitution to give himself control of the selection of local party leaders, all parliamentary candidates, and the leader of the party’s parliamentary group. Orbán’s increasing influence within the party paved the way for his efforts over the next decade to remove checks on his power. His control over the party, along with Fidesz’s constitutional majority, enabled Orbán to change Hungary’s constitution in ways that weakened executive constraints, including from the Constitutional Court, the election commission, independent media, and civil society. Orbán’s disproportionate power within the political system allowed him to dismantle democracy in the years that followed, pushing Hungary into authoritarianism. This pattern of democratic decay is not unique to Hungary. Freedom House reports that democracy has been in decline for the last 16 consecutive years, with much of the deterioration occurring in countries classified as democracies.2 In some instances these declines left democracy compromised but intact (as in Poland). In other cases, the declines gave way to the onset of authoritarianism (as in Serbia). Importantly, along with the decline in democracy, there has been a clear change in the way that democracies are breaking down.3 Before 2000, coups were the primary way that democracies failed. Since 2000, however, incumbent takeovers—or the ability of democratically elected leaders to dismantle democracy from within—have grown more prevalent. In the 2010s, 64 percent of the democracies that broke down did so due to incumbent power grabs, while only 36 percent of those that collapsed did so because of a coup.4 Simply put, the greatest threat to democracy now comes from democratically elected leaders.
- Topic:
- Democracy, Political Parties, and Democratic Backsliding
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
218. Against All Odds: Supporting Civil Society and Human Rights in Taliban-Controlled Afghanistan
- Author:
- Lisa Curtis, Annie Pforzheimer, and Jan Muhammad Jahid
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- Eighteen months after taking power, the Taliban is intensifying its repression of Afghan civil society and cracking down on the rights and freedoms of all Afghans, especially those of women and girls. The Taliban’s harsh approach to governing the country is repressing millions of people and fueling civil unrest, promoting extremism, and laying the foundation for the reemergence of a terrorist hotbed that will almost undoubtedly become a threat to global peace and security in the years to come. Humanitarian needs in Afghanistan remain immense, and the country will require large amounts of international aid for the foreseeable future to avoid famine and other health challenges. Twenty-three million Afghans (or nearly 60 percent of the population) currently require food assistance, and unusually cold winter temperatures this year have caused further hardship and death. The Taliban’s December 2022 order barring Afghan women from working for nongovernmental organizations led some international humanitarian organizations to suspend operations, complicating aid distribution, especially to women-headed families. The abolition of democratic institutions—the Parliament, judiciary, free press—and key government ministries and departments charged with protecting human rights demonstrates that the Taliban is adhering to the same extremist policies that marked their first stint in power from 1996 to 2001. The Taliban rules by fear and intimidation; torture, kidnapping, illegal detention, and extra-judicial killings are part of daily life in Afghanistan. The Taliban’s rollback of women’s rights has been swift and comprehensive. Among the most devastating anti-female policies, which will have far-reaching negative impacts on Afghanistan’s social and economic development and relations with the world, are the edicts forbidding girls from attending secondary school or university. Women and girls in today’s Afghanistan also are prohibited from accessing parks or gyms, leaving home without a male companion, and working outside the home—except in the health sector—and have been publicly flogged for not adhering to the strict behavioral edicts. Women demonstrators have been arbitrarily jailed and subject to torture and death.
- Topic:
- Civil Society, Human Rights, and Taliban
- Political Geography:
- Afghanistan and South Asia
219. Disarming the Bomb: Distilling the Drivers and Disincentives for Iran's Nuclear Program
- Author:
- Jonathan Lord, Arona Baigal, Hunter Streling, and Stewart Latwin
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- Negotiations to return to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), known commonly as the Iran nuclear deal, reached an impasse this past year. Further, Iran made parallel decisions to brutally crack down on a nationwide protest movement and to inject itself into the conflict in Ukraine by furnishing Russia with weapons. These decisions may have rendered the impasse insurmountable. U.S. President Joe Biden has not retreated from the U.S. policy that it will never allow Iran to obtain a nuclear weapon. However, Iran’s maximalist demands at the negotiating table, along with its domestic and foreign activities, have made it politically impossible for the United States and Europe to pursue further negotiation. Further complicating the situation and perhaps rendering the JCPOA increasingly obsolete, critical provisions of the original deal will expire in 2025 and 2030.1 The United States and the international community must consider how to constrain Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear deterrent in a post-JCPOA world, in which Iran has never been closer to achieving a bomb. The CNAS Middle East Security Program designed and ran a scenario exercise in October 2022 to identify key factors that might accelerate or decelerate Iran’s nuclear program in 2024. Additionally, the exercise explored how Iran, the United States, Israel, and the Gulf nations could prioritize their own national security objectives with respect to Iran’s nuclear program, along with the potential actions each might take to accomplish those objectives. The exercise examined two scenarios. Scenario 1 explored key countries’ policy actions and perspectives if the United States and Iran failed to reenter the JCPOA. Scenario 2 explored key countries’ policy actions and perspectives if the United States and Iran successfully renegotiated a return to compliance with the JCPOA and faced the imminent expiration of elements of the deal. Overall observations from the exercise suggest that Iran’s leadership’s primary concern is self-preservation. Pursuing a nuclear program is secondary and ultimately serves to advance the primary objective (self-preservation). U.S. policymakers face many challenges in rallying partners against Iran while prioritizing a negotiated approach to curtail Iran’s nuclear program.
- Topic:
- Nuclear Weapons, Negotiation, Deterrence, and JCPOA
- Political Geography:
- Iran and Middle East
220. India-China Border Tensions and U.S. Strategy in the Indo-Pacific
- Author:
- Lisa Curtis and Derek Grossman
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- India-China border intrusions and clashes have become more frequent and threaten to lead to all-out conflict between the two Asian giants. In recent years, China has upped the ante in its border disputes with India through infrastructure development, military deployments, capability enhancements, and periodic efforts to encroach into territory controlled by India. The first deadly border clash between the two countries in 45 years occurred on June 15, 2020, in the Galwan River Valley, where 20 Indian troops and at least four Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops were killed. More recently, on December 9, 2022, Chinese and Indian forces clashed along the disputed border in the mountains near Tawang in the northeastern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh after an estimated 300 Chinese PLA soldiers tried to cross the border. While the Chinese and Indian militaries have since pulled back forces from the most contentious standoff sites where the 2020 buildup occurred and established temporary buffer zones, both sides retain high numbers of troops forward deployed along the disputed frontier, and there are several flashpoints that could erupt into another border crisis at any time. The most recent clash that took place near Tawang is a reminder that, even though recent attention has been focused on the Ladakh region, there are multiple trigger points along the 2,100-mile-long Line of Actual Control (LAC) that bear monitoring.1 With both China and India enhancing infrastructure and introducing new and advanced weapons systems on their sides of the disputed border, combined with forward deployments and heightened lack of trust, the chances for continued standoffs that could erupt into local or even full-blown conflict remain high.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Territorial Disputes, and Borders
- Political Geography:
- China, India, Asia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific
221. Russia-China Defense Cooperation
- Author:
- Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Nicholas Lokker
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- Russia’s war in Ukraine has been a critical test of the depth of Sino-Russian relations. Since Russia’s invasion, China has remained an essential partner for Moscow. Although there have been limits to what Beijing has been willing to do for Russia, China has served as a vital lifeline for the Kremlin including by parroting Russian talking points about the war, increasing purchases of Russian oil and gas, and continuing to export microchips and other component parts to Moscow cut off by the West. Warnings by senior U.S. officials that China is contemplating providing Russia with lethal military aid in support of its war against Ukraine underscore the depth of their partnership.1 Emerging reports that Chinese companies have provided rifles and dual-use equipment such as drone parts and body armor only add credibility to these warnings.2 Although it remains unclear at the time of writing whether China will ultimately decide to send lethal aid to Russia, the last year has provided further evidence that Russia and China are deeply aligned and that the persistence and evolution of their partnership will continue to pose challenges that the United States and its allies must navigate. This working paper will focus on the challenges that Russia-China military cooperation poses to the United States and its allies and partners. This aspect of their relationship has been one of the most consequential dimensions of their deepening partnership. Already, China has obtained key capabilities from Moscow such as Su-27 and Su-35 fighter aircrafts, S-300 and S-400 air defense systems, and anti-ship missiles, which bolster China’s military posture in the Indo-Pacific.3 Russia too has benefited from a large market for its arms sales and access to technological components it can no longer access following the imposition of Western sanctions in 2014—a need that has grown exponentially since Russia’s reinvasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Meanwhile, more frequent and elaborate joint exercises have signaled to onlooking countries the two partners’ mutual support for each other’s security priorities and willingness to push back against the United States. In the context of Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine and increasing U.S.-China tensions in the Indo-Pacific, it has become even more urgent to understand how future military cooperation between Russia and China could evolve and what it would mean for the United States and its partners. This memo examines this aspect of the partnership, including what is driving it, how it has evolved following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, and the implications for the United States and its allies and partners.
- Topic:
- Bilateral Relations, Military Affairs, Russia-Ukraine War, and Defense Cooperation
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, and Asia
222. Instead of Politicizing Afghanistan, Stand Up for Women and Girls
- Author:
- Lisa Curtis
- Publication Date:
- 06-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- Ahuman rights calamity is unfolding in Afghanistan. In its latest move to repress half of the country’s population, the Taliban mandated that Afghan women can no longer work for the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). The United Nations (U.N.) condemned the Taliban for forcing the international organization to make an “appalling choice” between continuing its operations without employing Afghan women, which would violate the U.N. charter, or withdrawing from the country, which would deepen the humanitarian crisis.1 Following a U.N.-led international meeting in Doha in early May, U.N. Secretary General António Guterres signaled that the U.N. would likely continue operating in Afghanistan despite the harsh Taliban edict.2 This follows several other outrageous Taliban edicts, including keeping girls out of secondary school and young women from attending university; preventing women from leaving their homes without a male companion; and prohibiting women from going to parks or gyms or holding jobs, except in the health sector.3 Yet rather than stand up for Afghan women and girls in the face of such repressive policies, American leaders—Republicans and Democrats alike—are busy in a blame game about which political party is responsible for the U.S. failure in Afghanistan. Republican congressional leaders have held hearings on Afghanistan that focus on the Biden administration’s poor handling of the August 2021 withdrawal but largely ignore what is happening to women and girls in the country. One exception to Republican leaders’ inaction on the plight of Afghan women was Congressman Mike McCaul’s chairing of a roundtable on the issue that featured remarks by former Afghan Ambassador Roya Rahmani.4 For its part, the Biden administration recently published a review of the Afghan withdrawal that laid blame on the Trump administration for the Biden administration’s own failures.5 For instance, the Biden administration chose to bind itself to the Trump-era Doha deal made between the United States and the Taliban that called for U.S. troop withdrawal by May 2021. The Biden administration could have delayed a troop withdrawal and negotiated a harder bargain with the Taliban. The administration would better serve American interests by focusing on implementing policies that support women and girls, like conditioning engagement with the Taliban on the reopening of schools and universities to women.
- Topic:
- Human Rights, Taliban, and Women
- Political Geography:
- Afghanistan and South Asia
223. “Production Is Deterrence”: Investing in Precision-Guided Weapons to Meet Peer Challengers
- Author:
- Stacie L. Pettyjohn and Hannah Dennis
- Publication Date:
- 06-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- This report explores whether the fiscal year (FY) 2024 U.S. defense budget request for key conventional precision-guided munitions (PGMs) aligns with the 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) by prioritizing weapons needed for the “pacing challenge” China poses and dealing with the “acute threat” from Russia, while taking risk in lower priority areas. The FY24 presidential budget request builds on the shift that began in FY23 to support the NDS: increasing buys of key long-range and antiship missiles to prepare for a fight in the Pacific, starting to fill the cruise missile defense gap, bolstering production of the land-attack weapons needed in Europe, and test-running multiyear procurement and large lot procurement for key munitions to strengthen the defense industrial base. In the Department of Defense’s (DoD) budgeting process, ships, aircraft, and vehicles tend to be prioritized, leaving missiles and munitions with inadequate funding. Moreover, the Pentagon does not take a holistic approach to procuring key conventional PGMs, making it difficult to assess the joint portfolio. If the United States is going to effectively compete with China and Russia, that needs to change. To deter and—if deterrence fails—defeat China, the DoD needs large stockpiles of standoff missiles, maritime strike weapons, and layered air and missile defenses. The authors conclude that after years of underinvestment, the DoD is buying more long-range and medium-range missiles, which would be essential in a China war fight. While historically the Pentagon has overinvested in bombs and missiles to attack targets on the land and neglected antiship weapons, the FY24 budget saw a notable uptick in air-launched antiship weapons. For the past decade, the DoD has consistently invested in air defenses, but its purchases have focused on expensive ballistic missile defense interceptors, while neglecting cruise missile defenses. The FY24 budget reverses this trend. Additionally, the DoD is investing in PGMs to arm Ukraine and replenish American and allied stores of weapons that are needed to counter Russia. Except for surface-to-air missiles, the weapons for Ukraine are relatively short-range land-attack PGMs that U.S. forces do not need in the Indo-Pacific. A large portion of the funding for these weapons is coming from Ukraine supplemental appropriations, not the base defense budget. Supplemental appropriations are also resourcing significant investments in U.S. production lines, but the DoD has made only moderate progress rebuilding American stockpiles of the PGMs given to Ukraine.
- Topic:
- Security, Budget, Weapons, Deterrence, and Defense Spending
- Political Geography:
- China, North America, and United States of America
224. U.S.-China Competition and Military AI: How Washington Can Manage Strategic Risks amid Rivalry with Beijing
- Author:
- Jacob Stokes, Alexander Sullivan, and Noah Greene
- Publication Date:
- 07-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- Two tectonic trends in the international security environment appear to be on a collision course. The first trend is the intensifying geopolitical rivalry between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China). The second trend is the rapid development of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies, including for military applications. This report explores how the United States can manage strategic risks—defined as increased risks of armed conflict or the threat of nuclear war—that could be created or exacerbated by military AI in its relationship with China. It begins by providing an overview of China’s views on and policies toward AI. Beijing sees AI playing roles in both its civilian economy and the modernization of its military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). At home, Chinese leaders want to leverage AI to boost growth and innovation, address economic and social challenges, and secure the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) domestic rule. AI also plays a key role in China’s military ambitions, especially its goal to become a “world-class military” by midcentury, in part through the “intelligentization” of its forces. Intelligentization relies on integrating AI and other emerging technologies into the joint force with the goal of gaining an edge on the United States. China argues that its governance model, including its military-civil fusion policy, gives Beijing a competitive advantage over Washington. Realization of that vision, however, remains uncertain and will require China to overcome external and internal obstacles.
- Topic:
- Security, Military Affairs, Artificial Intelligence, Rivalry, and Competition
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
225. The Future of Civilians in National Security: Challenges and Opportunities
- Author:
- Katherine L. Kuzminski, Nathalie Grogan, and Celina Pouchet
- Publication Date:
- 08-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- Imagine you’re a high-achieving college student, interested in serving in a national security role in the federal government. You invest years in learning a critical language—perhaps of an ally, perhaps of an adversary—a language for which the federal government has a high demand and a limited workforce. You’re selected for not one, but two prestigious overseas government-sponsored fellowships and are encouraged to participate in both. After returning to the States, you move to Washington, D.C., to pursue a graduate degree at a competitive policy school. You apply for opportunities to serve in a national security position. But because you had fellowships abroad—administered by the federal government—the hiring process takes more than two years.CNAS Focus Group, March 11, 2022.1 The national security workforce is full of stories like this one—which is the experience of someone who successfully navigated into the system. Many others decide not to pursue government service in the first place, whether because they believe the option isn’t open to them, or because the hiring process is so onerous that they lose interest or pursue more readily available options. To meet the challenge of protecting the country and its national interests, the federal government must attract, recruit, and retain experienced, educated individuals with skills specific to national security, including foreign language proficiency, regional knowledge, legal expertise, or a background in engineering, computer science, or data analytics. It also needs people who can lead, manage, and communicate. Fortunately, there are highly motivated Americans—from undergraduate college students through senior-level professionals—who are developing the education, experience, and credentials required for work in national security departments and agencies. This population has a strong interest in serving the country even as other opportunities present themselves. But challenges such as opaque hiring practices, long clearance processes, and limited access to professional networks hinder people’s chances at employment in the federal government. As a result, the government is unable to fill critical national security roles, while individuals with the necessary skill sets and desire to serve are sidelined from a federal career. To attract, recruit, and retain those with the required qualifications and interests, departments and agencies must understand the motivations of the next generation and the challenges they face when seeking government careers in national security. As part of this project, CNAS researchers organized focus groups and conducted a survey to identify the motivations, priorities, and skill sets of those interested in government service, along with the challenges, barriers, and opportunities in taking this path. The project examines the current civilian national security talent pipeline and explores the problems associated with the recruitment and retention of civil servants in national security departments and agencies. What did we find? Improvements to the federal hiring process and the clearance timeline, greater access to talent beyond Washington, D.C., and expansion of initial pathways into government service could ensure that the federal government has the employees it needs to secure the nation. These improvements require action from the executive branch and Congress.
- Topic:
- National Security, Employment, Public Service, and Skills
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
226. Campaign of Denial: Strengthening Simultaneous Deterrence in the Indo-Pacific and Europe
- Author:
- Becca Wasser
- Publication Date:
- 08-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- The United States faces an unprecedented challenge: simultaneously deterring large-scale conventional aggression by two nuclear-armed powers. The nation will need to deter these major adversaries from overt aggression in the near term in two primary, yet distinct, regions: China in the Indo-Pacific and Russia in Europe. However, the U.S. military is unprepared to concurrently meet the challenges posed by China and Russia. These challenges have become more pronounced as Beijing continues its ambitious military modernization and Moscow continues to threaten European security despite its currently diminished military strength. Effective simultaneous deterrence requires the United States to reembrace the basic principles of deterrence to reverse unfavorable trends in military power that are eroding long-standing U.S. warfighting advantages. It necessitates U.S. forces to project power into far-flung regions that are contested by China and Russia to uphold America’s extended deterrence commitments to its allies and partners. To do so, the Pentagon must shift from previous approaches designed to deter opportunistic aggressors and respond to crises. While the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has realigned its strategy to focus on great-power deterrence, it has faced hurdles in strategy implementation that have stymied changes needed to organize more effectively for simultaneous deterrence. This is due in part to a sizable mismatch between strategy and resources. The U.S. military does not have the kinds and numbers of forces required to simultaneously deter China in the Indo-Pacific and Russia in Europe from conventional conflict. This deficit is especially telling in two priority scenarios: an invasion of Taiwan by China, and a Russian invasion of the Baltics. American forces lack the modernized capabilities, necessary posture, right levels of readiness, and familiarity with executing the types of warfighting missions needed to meet the current challenge.1 The balance between meeting global demands and responding to persistent threats while shifting to emphasize deterrence in the Indo-Pacific and Europe is precarious. Concentrating on strategic priorities requires accepting risk in other regions, as the United States, with fewer forces and resources stretched around the globe, moves capabilities and forces to priority theaters. A new approach to simultaneous deterrence is needed. The Biden administration has outlined the concept of campaigning as a key component of peacetime deterrence. This concept seeks to sequence and link military activities so they intentionally counter coercion by priority adversaries. The intent is to enable the Pentagon to respond to challenges posed by China and Russia, while still meeting global demands. But the concept is currently ill-defined and expansive, and its broad interpretation does not help the DoD meet its deterrence requirements or align strategy and resources. Instead, campaigning runs the risk of engaging U.S. forces in activities that do not contribute to or are counterproductive to deterrence. A failure to curb these activities will result in either the need to expand force size, or the hindrance of modernization efforts.
- Topic:
- Security, Military Affairs, and Deterrence
- Political Geography:
- Europe, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific
227. Strengthening the Shield: Japan’s Defense Transformation and the U.S.-Japan Alliance
- Author:
- Jacob Stokes, Lisa Curtis, Joshua Fitt, Joseph I. Grimm, and Rebecca Wittner
- Publication Date:
- 09-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- In December 2022, Japan’s government released three major strategic documents: the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the Defense Buildup Program. Although Japan has made incremental changes to its security policies and capabilities over the last decade, the new documents mark a notable shift in Japan’s approach to strengthening its defense. The documents reflect Tokyo’s assessment of the rising threats that could challenge Japan’s security and signal Japan’s commitment to build the military capabilities necessary to meet them. This report examines Tokyo’s defense transformation and assesses its implications for the U.S.-Japan alliance and Washington’s strategy toward the Indo-Pacific. Japan is “fundamentally reinforcing” its national security and defense policies to cope with its increasingly severe security environment. The military threats posed by China, North Korea, and Russia have been growing steadily for years but appear to be peaking simultaneously. Tensions between Japan and China have occasionally flared in the five decades since they normalized diplomatic relations. But those tensions have reached new heights since 2012, when China began to regularly contest Japan’s administration of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. By August 2022, Beijing fired five ballistic missiles into Japan’s exclusive economic zone during China’s live-fire military exercises after then-U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan. The aim of the missile launches was to signal there would be consequences for Japan if Tokyo were to intervene in a Taiwan contingency. Meanwhile, North Korea’s unprecedented rate of missile testing since 2022 and Russia’s brutal war against Ukraine have deepened Japanese concerns about the potential for the use of force in the Indo-Pacific. Japan is taking steps to improve its ability to defend itself and deter an invasion, including through changes to security funding and policy. Tokyo has announced plans to increase its defense spending by 65 percent over the next five years, acquire standoff weapons that could be used for a counterstrike mission, and adopt an “active cyber defense” posture. Japan has clarified the roles of its military, the Self-Defense Forces (SDF), and Coast Guard in the event of an attack; committed to establishing a permanent Joint Headquarters for SDF operations; and created a program for supplying partner militaries with security assistance. Effectively employing counterstrike and active cyber defense, however, will require a clearer delineation of the legal authorities for their use as well as the overall military strategies that they would support. In addition, pressure from the Japanese public over tax hikes required to pay for the defense spending increase amid other fiscal pressures could pose a barrier to implementation. Japan plans to strengthen the SDF through boosting readiness and resilience of current forces, acquiring counterstrike and other advanced capabilities, and improving force posture and mobility. The SDF has been plagued by a chronic lack of munitions and other supplies, and most of its facilities do not meet its own standards for resilience against enemy attack. Addressing these shortfalls is essential, though these types of programs often lose out to more high-profile programs. For its counterstrike mission, Japan has announced it will buy U.S.-made Tomahawk cruise missiles. This initial purchase will provide a stopgap until Japan is able to produce its own longer-range missiles later in the decade. Japan has also announced it will pursue new capabilities in uncrewed systems, space, cyber, and artificial intelligence (AI). But fulfilling these ambitions will be challenging given some short-falls in Japan’s technology base and SDF personnel. Lastly, the SDF is grappling with how to expand its forces in Japan’s southwest islands while maintaining a sufficient presence throughout the country to deter aggression from a range of possible threats. Next, Japan’s strategy emphasizes enhancing security partnerships regionally and across the globe. Japan has recently stepped up its defense cooperation with several Indo-Pacific and European countries. With Australia, Japan is building on a 10-year effort to deepen strategic cooperation, a process that culminated in January 2022 with the completion of a Reciprocal Access Agreement. New bilateral strategic cooperation includes enhancing interoperability between the SDF and the Australian military, increasing rotational SDF training deployments to Australia, and announcing a new joint security declaration that commits to a combined response to military contingencies. Similarly, Japan has long recognized the strategic importance of India and continues to build on the Japan-India relationship through maritime security cooperation, a new joint fighter exercise, and operationalization of their Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement. Japan and the Philippines are also expanding their defense ties through humanitarian assistance and disaster relief training exercises and an important emerging trilateral security relationship with the United States. Over the past year, Japan and South Korea have made significant strides to repair relations since the latest downturn that began in 2018. This will be an incremental process, but there has been progress in the form of leader-level summits and ministerial dialogues, plans to cooperate on sharing data about North Korean missiles, and new trilateral ballistic missile and anti-submarine drills with the United States. Japan also is building defense connections and relationships with European nations. It is pursuing the development of a sixth-generation fighter jet with the U.K. and Italy and, particularly since the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, has sought to deepen strategic ties with NATO. These comprehensive changes to Japan’s defense policies will necessarily reshape the military and security pillars of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Tokyo’s acquisition of counterstrike capabilities will position Japan to potentially take on some offensive tasks, even while retaining its primarily defensive orientation. This also has implications for alliance contingency planning related to defending Japan directly as well as around Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula, and the South China Sea. However, increased joint planning will require updates to alliance command and control (C2) and information-sharing mechanisms. Additionally, given resource constraints, the alliance would be well-served to find additional opportunities for military technology sharing, codevelopment, and coproduction, such as through Japanese involvement in the second pillar of the AUKUS (Australia-United Kingdom-United States) partnership focused on cooperation on advanced capabilities and defense technology innovation. And the alliance must take steps to improve force posture and readiness, including through enhancing base resiliency and increasing munitions stockpiles. Japan’s fundamental transformation of its defense posture will mean significant changes for the U.S.-Japan alliance. The United States must adapt its approach to alliance coordination to maximize new opportunities and manage any new challenges. In this context, U.S. policymakers should: Prepare to update the alliance, while recognizing that Japan’s new defense policies will require significant time, resources, and political will to implement. Stay closely aligned with Tokyo on the threat land- scape as well as engagement with geopolitical competitors, especially China. Integrate U.S.-Japan command and control structures. Create an alliance readiness, resilience, and posture implementation task force. Deepen planning for contingencies and bolster extended deterrence. Create a road map for expanding defense technology cooperation concurrently with Japan’s implementation of specific improvements to its information security practices and infrastructure. Innovate operational concepts for uncrewed systems and counterstrike capabilities. Leverage the U.S.-Japan alliance as a hub for minilateral and multilateral security engagement. Build U.S.-Japan alliance mechanisms that will expand cooperation on cyber security and defense. Stand up an alliance dialogue on military personnel issues.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, National Security, Bilateral Relations, and Alliance
- Political Geography:
- Japan, Asia, and United States of America
228. Assessing the Evolving Russian Nuclear Threat
- Author:
- Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Michael Kofman, Nicholas Lokker, and Heli Hautala
- Publication Date:
- 10-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, its nuclear rhetoric has become more permissive, more inconsistent, and more instrumental. Russia has also placed greater emphasis on military exercises involving nuclear-capable weapons, and it has altered policies and planning for its nuclear forces. Although it is too soon to draw definitive conclusions as the war in Ukraine is still ongoing and the lessons that Russia draws from it uncertain, the changes in Russia’s approach to nuclear weapons since its invasion suggest that Russia is likely to adopt a more assertive nuclear force posture, especially with respect to its non-strategic nuclear weapons, in order to signal that the country will no longer be a status quo power and increase the credibility of its nuclear threats. Russia is also likely to increase its efforts to test NATO cohesion—potentially through greater nuclear provocations and/or by signaling an insincere willingness to engage in forms of arms control or cooperative threat reduction—and continue to look for opportunities to leverage nuclear weapons to signal great-power status. In a future war with NATO, Russia would likely perceive the need to use nuclear weapons earlier in the conflict, either to seek victory against superior NATO conventional forces through nuclear first use on the battlefield, or to prevent defeat by those NATO forces. Moreover, since 2022, it has become increasingly difficult for U.S. and Russian policymakers to discern each other’s red lines, raising the risk of unintended escalation. Heightened Russian nuclear rhetoric at home could also alter the public’s views of acceptable nuclear use, eroding a potential constraint on Kremlin decision-making. Finally, changes since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine indicate both reduced Russian commitment to nonproliferation as its image increasingly becomes that of a rogue actor in international affairs, and diminished opportunities for nuclear arms control, for now.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, Russia-Ukraine War, and Threat Assessment
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
229. Rolling the Iron Dice: The Increasing Chance of Conflict Protraction
- Author:
- Andrew Metrick
- Publication Date:
- 11-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- The prospect of a Sino-American war looms on the horizon. No scenario for such a conflict has garnered more interest than the potential invasion of Taiwan by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In the United States, discussions have focused on the early days of a conflict, in particular sinking the PRC’s amphibious fleet.1 Both the United States and the PRC place great emphasis on offensive military operations that heavily use the fruits of the precision strike revolution (PSR).2 This focus on early offensive action leads immediately to considerations of forces and weapons. U.S. defense planners are unsurprisingly most comfortable with the dynamics of short, sharp wars, having spent the past decade focused on deterring or defeating adversary faits accomplis, short and often opportunistic campaigns of aggression. Speed, political sophistication, and immediate military overmatch seemed to be the key ingredients for victory. Russia’s seizure of Crimea in 2014 was seen as a template for other future aggressors to follow.3 Prolonged wars of attrition, particularly those involving the United States, were thought no longer possible. Russia’s subsequent invasion of Ukraine in 2022 turned this vision on its head, demonstrating the military and political consequences of trying and failing to obtain a similar fait accompli on a larger scale. The ongoing Russian experiences in Ukraine indicate a need to reevaluate such thinking and consider the potential of protraction in the context of a hypothetical U.S.-PRC conflict. Most work on this topic has considered only the initial days and weeks of hostilities, usually over Taiwan or in the South or East China Seas.4 There has been comparably little discussion of what comes after.5 There are three key concepts that inform the following discussions: exhaustion, sanctuary, and protraction. Exhaustion is the point when large-scale offensive operations are no longer possible as offensive military capabilities have been used up. Afterward, some period of reconstitution and recovery is needed. This requires sanctuary, the relative freedom from attack sufficient for the rebuilding of military forces and capacities. Protraction occurs after at least one cycle of exhaustion and recovery. It is closely tied to pre-conflict leadership beliefs about the length of the looming war. A simplified definition of a protracted war is a conflict that lasts longer than leaders expect; it is a mismatch between political-military expectations and reality. Doctrinal developments in both the PRC and the United States, influenced by improvements in technology, place significant emphasis on the early stages of conflict and rapid, offensive operations. The emphasis by both the PRC and the United States on the early stages of the conflict can be seen in the PRC’s system destruction warfare and United States’ denial-centric concepts that aim for rapid decisive results.6 These approaches focus almost exclusively on the operational level of war, ignoring strategic factors animating the conflict and shaping its termination. Should PRC President Xi Jinping commit the PLA to seizing Taiwan by force, enter a war with the United States, and “roll the iron dice,” protraction appears increasingly likely, contrary to most contemporary military thinking and preparation.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Conflict, and Deterrence
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America
230. No Winners in This Game: Assessing the U.S. Playbook for Sanctioning China
- Author:
- Emily Kilcrease
- Publication Date:
- 12-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- The relationship between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is marked by both geopolitical tensions and deep economic linkages. While policymakers may have once believed that economic integration would inject stability into the overall relationship and provide a deterrent to conflict, that idealistic vision has been shaken by Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine. No longer can the United States and its partners assume that the PRC’s economic interest in retaining ties to the global economy will override its nationalist impulses. The once unthinkable idea of imposing severe sanctions on China has become a strategic imperative to consider, as one of a range of measures that the United States and its partners may consider if relations with the PRC deteriorate further. Yet, sanctioning China represents a challenge more complex than any other in the modern era of sanctions. The scale and interconnected nature of China’s economy means that the damage from sanctions will not be contained in China; instead, the negative effects will rebound globally through China’s deep economic ties to nearly every country around the world, including the United States. China has substantial capacity in key economic areas, such as manufacturing, that provide it with important means to retaliate against U.S. sanctions or impose its own economic costs on the United States and its partners. This report seeks to advance policy debates on how to sanction China, if geopolitical conditions warranted doing so at scale. It builds on prior Center for a New American Security (CNAS) research, including a 2023 report that outlines how the United States currently uses a variety of sanctions tools to manage the strategic relationship with the PRC.1 A key finding of the earlier work is that the United States imposes sanctions at a relatively limited scale compared to the scope of challenges that exist in the bilateral relationship, with the notable exception of an increasing range of technology-related sanctions. A large divide separates the existing level of sanctions on China and the full range of economic measures that the United States may consider. This report attempts to envision that fuller range of economic measures and consider whether the use of sanctions would meaningfully advance U.S. interests during a potential conflict. The report begins, in chapter 1, with an assessment of the main economic and political characteristics that would determine China’s vulnerability to, and resolve to withstand, sanctions pressure. The concentration of power at the very top of the PRC’s political system, along with a willingness to subordinate economic objectives to political ones, indicate that China may have a high degree of resolve to absorb the costs of sanctions. China’s continued reliance on the U.S.-dominated global financial infrastructure is a key area of vulnerability to sanctions pressure. But, China retains significant economic leverage through its manufacturing relationships, as well as through the importance of its large domestic market to foreign multinational companies. Attempting to impose sanctions that are asymmetrically more painful to China will be a fraught exercise, given the degree to which China is embedded in global supply chains. In chapter 2, the report examines sanctions actions that the United States and its partners may impose during a conflict scenario, drawing from the sanctions playbook used against Russia and projecting adaptations that would be needed in the China context. The main objective of this analysis is to identify points of asymmetric leverage in the U.S.-China economic relationship, where imposition of a sanction would be more economically damaging to China than to the United States and its partners. The sanctions actions are examined through the lens of a ends-ways-and-means framework, loosely borrowing concepts from the defense community and mapping them into the economic domain. The value in such an exercise is to impose discipline in identifying why a particular economic measure may be taken and what the intended impact would be. It can also enhance the ability to integrate economic actions with those being considered in military or other domains. The report examines possible actions under three broad categories, based on the objective of the sanctions: technology denial, embargo of commodities and materials, and macroeconomic pressure. The research includes analysis by the CNAS Energy, Economic & Security team of economic data and research interviews with a wide range of sanctions, export controls, macroeconomics, trade and finance, and China experts in the United States, Europe, and Asia. In addition to examining potential sanctions options on a sectoral basis, the report also includes a company-by-company lens to assess the potential impact of sanctioning specific Chinese companies. The report finds that the U.S. options to impose harsh sanctions on China are severely constrained. U.S. options to deny militarily relevant technology to China are modest, at best. Certain areas, such as maritime capabilities, will be difficult to target due to the nearly entirely domestic supply chains of China’s main military shipbuilders. Other areas, such as semiconductors, cannot be targeted without running the risk of disruption to critical U.S. supply chains. Overall, efforts to deny technology to China require a longer time horizon to be effective and may have less utility in an immediate run-up period to a potential conflict. Attempts to use sanctions tools to deny commodities or materials to China will require innovation and the development of new sanctions tools. Key commodities, such as energy, are inherently substitutable and globally available, including from many countries that will likely not align with the United States in a conflict with the PRC. Building on the example of the oil price cap used in the Russia context, the United States and partners will need to consider novel policy approaches that provide positive economic inducements to align with U.S. policies, in addition to using traditional sanctions tools.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Sanctions, and Geopolitics
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
231. Resisting China’s Gray Zone Military Pressure on Taiwan
- Author:
- Jacob Stokes
- Publication Date:
- 12-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- The People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) has sharply escalated its pressure campaign targeting the Republic of China (ROC or Taiwan) in recent years. Beijing appears likely to use Taiwan’s upcoming presidential election in January 2024 as a pretext to apply more pressure on the self-governing island, particularly in the “gray zone” using China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), along with other tools of state power. There is no precise and commonly agreed upon definition of what gray zone activities are and are not. In general, though, the concept refers to actions that fall into the space between, on one side, peace and, on the other, full-scale kinetic war.1 Gray zone activities are coercive and aggressive but designed to stay below the threshold of triggering major conflict. China uses gray zone operations as part of a comprehensive strategy to pressure Taiwan that spans the areas of diplomacy, information, economics, and security. This policy brief examines one major component of that campaign: gray zone military and security operations. It starts by detailing the capabilities and tactics China uses to put security pressure on Taiwan. Then, it explains what Beijing seeks to achieve with those actions. The paper concludes with recommendations for how U.S. and Taiwan policymakers can resist and counter China’s gray zone operations.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, Military Affairs, and Information
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, and Asia
232. The Compound Era of U.S. Counterterrorism
- Author:
- Don Rassler
- Publication Date:
- 08-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
- Abstract:
- The past several years have been a period of transition for the U.S. counterterrorism enterprise. During this time, the United States has had to navigate, and adapt U.S. CT posture and approaches to, a shift in U.S. national security priorities; a complex, diverse, and ever-evolving threat landscape; and ongoing technological change that is transforming the worlds of extremism, terrorism, and counterterrorism. In addition, the United States has simultaneously been working to define what the next chapter of U.S. counterterrorism should look like and how the U.S. CT community needs to evolve so it can anticipate, understand, and respond to the varied threats it will face in the years ahead. To help drive change, the United States should frame the counterterrorism moment it finds itself as the compound era of U.S. CT. This new era is being shaped by three primary characteristics: multiple priorities; a broad range of threats, including mixed ones; and a more diverse CT landscape. How well the United States responds to and adapts to the change and challenges that are occurring across these three areas will have an important bearing on the future effectiveness of U.S. counterterrorism. This report outlines characteristics that define the compound era of U.S. CT and the utility associated with this framing. The body of the report then explores some of the key trends and factors that have been impacting and driving change across the extremism, terrorism, and CT landscapes. The report also discusses some of the implications of these trends and outlines 11 priorities that can help guide the U.S. counterterrorism community’s evolution during this new era.
- Topic:
- National Security, Counter-terrorism, and Threat Assessment
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
233. The state of public opinion: 2023
- Author:
- Tim Bale, Matthew Blayney, Rosie Campbell, Leonardo Carella, and John Curtice
- Publication Date:
- 12-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- UK in a Changing Europe, King's College London
- Abstract:
- A lot has changed since Boris Johnson celebrated ‘smashing’ the 2019 election. Since then, we’ve faced a global pandemic, two wars, and spiralling inflation and interest rates. Britain has lived through a tumultuous period. The same period saw Labour choose a new leader, whilst the Conservatives elected two. ‘Levelling up’ became the latest buzzword. ‘Partygate’ was followed by a series of allegations about impropriety at the top of government. Nineteen by-elections took place, for reasons ranging from resignations to recall petitions. As the cost-of-living crisis worsened, voter concern about the economy rocketed, whilst interest in Brexit declined. As we approach the next general election, understanding what the public makes of these developments, and how opinion and voting behaviour has shifted since December 2019, is crucial. This new UK in a Changing Europe report brings together over 45 of the UK’s top public opinion experts. They analyse both short and long-term trends that have shaped public attitudes and voting behaviour and will continue to do so in the run up to the next general election and beyond. The 36 contributions cover political parties, the four nations, key policy issues, voting behaviour and Brexit.
- Topic:
- Public Opinion, Elections, Brexit, and Voting Behavior
- Political Geography:
- United Kingdom and Europe
234. UK-EU regulatory divergence tracker Q3 2023
- Author:
- Joël Reland
- Publication Date:
- 10-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- UK in a Changing Europe, King's College London
- Abstract:
- UK in a Changing Europe’s series of regulatory divergence trackers provide an overview of where and how the UK has used its regulatory freedoms to diverge from EU regulation. It identifies and analyses the most significant cases of divergence between the UK and EU which have taken place since Brexit. It explains what the changes are, what impact they are having, and likely further consequences. This is the ninth edition of the regulatory divergence tracker, covering developments from August to October 2023. There are six cases of active divergence (where the UK, or some part of it, changes its rules); nine of passive divergence (where the EU changes its rules and the UK, or some part of it, does not follow); two of delayed divergence (where active divergence is delayed); and five of active alignment (where the UK takes steps to align more closely with EU rules, systems or programmes). In a what is now a recurring theme under Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, the UK has opted to delay some major cases of upcoming divergence.
- Topic:
- European Union, Regulation, and Divergence
- Political Geography:
- United Kingdom and Europe
235. Exploring ‘Bregret’: public attitudes to Brexit, seven years on
- Author:
- Ines Wittke, James Frayne, Seb Wride, and Sophie Stowers
- Publication Date:
- 10-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- UK in a Changing Europe, King's College London
- Abstract:
- Brexit refuses to go away. Over seven years since the referendum, and over three and a half since the UK finally left the European Union, the issue continues to generate headlines and spark furious debate. One reason for this is a sense that public opinion is still evolving. There has been much talk of ‘Brexit regret’ among Leave voters. Given this, Public First and UK in a Changing Europe decided to talk to Leave voters to hear from them what they thought. In a survey carried out in May and June 2023 and a series of focus groups held between May and September, a series of questions were posed to them about what they think about Brexit, how it has gone, whether they have changed their minds and what they think the future holds. This report describes the findings. DOWNLOAD THE REPORT
- Topic:
- Politics, Public Opinion, European Union, Brexit, and Society
- Political Geography:
- United Kingdom and Europe
236. UK trade tracker Q3 2023
- Author:
- Stephen Hunsaker
- Publication Date:
- 09-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- UK in a Changing Europe, King's College London
- Abstract:
- The UK in a Changing Europe trade tracker is now being produced quarterly and in a new format. The new format trade tracker will focus on three key areas: UK trade and its performance relative to historical data; UK trade in a global context and how it compares to the G7; and finally, newsworthy developments which have occurred within trade in the last quarter. In this quarter’s edition, the trade tracker looks at how UK trade measures compare to 2019 as well as the proportion of total UK trade made up of trade with the EU. In addition, it looks at the UK’s trade balance and trade openness compared to the G7. Lastly, the tracker summarises the India-UK free trade agreement that has been in the works for the past few years, considering whether it is close to signing and what impact it might have on UK trade, as well as what elements are hotly debated.
- Topic:
- Economy, Brexit, and Trade
- Political Geography:
- United Kingdom and Europe
237. Reviewing the Trade and Cooperation Agreement: potential paths
- Author:
- Jannike Wachowiak and Joël Reland
- Publication Date:
- 09-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- UK in a Changing Europe, King's College London
- Abstract:
- On Christmas Eve 2020 the UK and EU finally agreed a treaty to regulate their relationship post Brexit. The Trade and Cooperation Agreement was provisionally applied from 1 January 2021 and formally ratified in April. Among its numerous provisions, the treaty contains Article 776 stating that, ‘The Parties shall jointly review the implementation of this Agreement and supplementing agreements and any matters related thereto five years after the entry into force of this Agreement and every five years thereafter.’ Within the UK at least, many are looking to this review to deliver significant changes to the relationship. This report examines those provisions within the TCA and reflects on what might or might not reasonably be achieved in the context of the review. The report proposes three models which the review could follow: a technical check, acting on unfulfilled commitments, and widening the scope of the TCA.
- Topic:
- Treaties and Agreements, European Union, Trade, and Economic Cooperation
- Political Geography:
- United Kingdom and Europe
238. The investment gap: the UK’s efforts to replace the European Investment Bank
- Author:
- Peter Jurkovic and Stephen Hunsaker
- Publication Date:
- 09-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- UK in a Changing Europe, King's College London
- Abstract:
- Following Brexit, the UK lost access to funding from the European Investment Bank. In this report, Stephen Hunsaker and Peter Jurkovic detail the impact this has had on the UK development finance landscape. The report outlines not only the role that development banks play in providing longer term financing for projects the private sector might be reluctant to support, but also the specific role the European Investment Bank played in infrastructure investments in the UK prior to 2020. It also explores the potential and ongoing implications of a lack of access to that investment despite the existence of a number of UK based banks intended to fill the gap.
- Topic:
- European Union, Finance, Economy, Brexit, Investment, Banking, and European Investment Bank
- Political Geography:
- United Kingdom and Europe
239. Policy landscape 2023
- Author:
- Ben Zaranko, Jonathan Portes, Mike Brewer, Paul Cheshire, and Carole Willis
- Publication Date:
- 09-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- UK in a Changing Europe, King's College London
- Abstract:
- What are the public policy challenges confronting the UK? What plans do the parties have for addressing them? To what extent are these plans fit for purpose? As Parliament returns from its summer recess, Full Fact and UK in a Changing Europe have partnered to produce a series of evidence led, research-based assessments of the key issues that politicians will confront. To do this, we brought together a group of leading experts from respected institutions including the Health Foundation, the Institute for Fiscal Studies, and the Royal United Services Institute. We asked each of them to consider, based on the findings of their own research, the challenges the country faces in their area of expertise, the immediate and longer-term issues politicians will need to address, and the potential implications of any choices they might make. We selected the issues based on the Ipsos issues index, and added security, defence and foreign affairs, which did not figure amongst the public’s priorities in July of this year. The intention of the collection is to inform and not persuade. Each article in this collection is the responsibility of its author.
- Topic:
- Climate Change, Education, Health, Politics, European Union, Economy, Brexit, Economic Growth, Public Policy, Fiscal Policy, Housing, and Standard of Living
- Political Geography:
- United Kingdom and Europe
240. UK-EU relations tracker: April – June 2023
- Author:
- Cleo Davies and Jannike Wachowiak
- Publication Date:
- 07-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- UK in a Changing Europe, King's College London
- Abstract:
- This is the second edition of the UKICE UK-EU Relations Tracker, covering developments in relations between the UK and EU and between the UK and EU member states from April to June 2023. This edition looks at key developments in the relationship since the formal adoption of the Windsor Framework on 24 March 2023 which had raised hopes for a reset in relations. Whilst some progress has been made within the framework of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA), other areas remain stalled.
- Topic:
- Treaties and Agreements, European Union, Brexit, and Trade
- Political Geography:
- United Kingdom and Europe
241. UK-EU regulatory divergence tracker: eighth edition
- Author:
- Joël Reland
- Publication Date:
- 07-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- UK in a Changing Europe, King's College London
- Abstract:
- UK in a Changing Europe’s series of regulatory divergence trackers provide an overview of where and how the UK has used its newfound regulatory freedoms to diverge from EU regulation. It identifies and analyses the most significant cases of divergence between the UK and EU which have taken place since Brexit. It explains what the changes are, what impact they are having, and likely further consequences. This is the eighth edition of the UK in a Changing Europe’s regulatory divergence tracker, covering developments from April to July 2023. There are eleven cases of active divergence (where the UK, or some part of it, changes its rules); eight of passive divergence (where the EU changes its rules and the UK, or some part of it, does not follow); two of passive convergence (where the EU takes steps which align with UK rules); three of managed divergence (where the UK and EU make joint efforts to manage the implications of divergence); and one of internal divergence (changes in rules between different parts of the UK).
- Topic:
- European Union, Regulation, Brexit, and Divergence
- Political Geography:
- United Kingdom and Europe
242. UK-EU regulatory divergence tracker: seventh edition
- Author:
- Joël Reland
- Publication Date:
- 05-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- UK in a Changing Europe, King's College London
- Abstract:
- UK in a Changing Europe’s series of regulatory divergence trackers provide an overview of where and how the UK has used its newfound regulatory freedoms to diverge from EU regulation. It identifies and analyses the most significant cases of divergence between the UK and EU which have taken place since Brexit. It explains what the changes are, what impact they are having, and likely further consequences. This is the seventh edition of UK in a Changing Europe’s regulatory divergence tracker, covering developments since January 2023. There are seven cases of active divergence (where the UK, or some part of it, changes its rules); two of active convergence (where the UK, or some part of it, aligns to EU rules); 17 of passive divergence (where the EU changes its rules and the UK, or some part of it, does not follow); and one of internal divergence (changes in rules between different parts of the UK). In addition, the Windsor Framework is significant case of ‘managed divergence’: a UK-EU agreement which alters the regulatory border between Great Britain (GB) and Northern Ireland (NI), as created by the Protocol.
- Topic:
- European Union, Regulation, Brexit, and Divergence
- Political Geography:
- United Kingdom and Europe
243. The British monarchy
- Author:
- Catherine Barnard, Frank Cranmer, John Curtice, Robert Hazell, and Ailsa Henderson
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- UK in a Changing Europe, King's College London
- Abstract:
- May 2023 will witness a landmark event: the coronation of King Charles III. Given the event’s significance, and the high levels of interest in the British monarchy that have been apparent since the death of Elizabeth II, UK in a Changing Europe and the Constitution Unit, UCL, have produced a report to explain the role of the modern monarchy and its place in the UK’s constitutional system. The report explains what the institution does and how it does it, and places the monarchy in its wider historical and comparative context. It provides a clear and accessible account of the monarchy and is intended as an indispensable guide ahead of the coronation. The report includes analysis from specialists on the monarchy and contributions from scholars who study UK politics and society and who examine the institution from their own specialist perspectives.
- Topic:
- Governance, Constitution, and Monarchy
- Political Geography:
- United Kingdom and Europe
244. UK-EU relations tracker: first edition
- Author:
- Cleo Davies and Sophie Stowers
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- UK in a Changing Europe, King's College London
- Abstract:
- This new UK in a Changing Europe tracker provides an overview of the state of relations between the United Kingdom and the European Union. The first edition, which covers January to March 2023, highlights the thawing in relations between the UK and the EU that has taken place during this period in the context of the agreement of the Windsor Framework in late February 2023. Released quarterly, the UK-EU relations tracker will assess relations between the UK and EU as well as relationships between the UK and EU member states. It will also highlight developments in British politics which may affect the UK-EU relationship, and internal dynamics within the EU that might shape its approach to the relationship with the United Kingdom.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Politics, European Union, and Brexit
- Political Geography:
- United Kingdom and Europe
245. Immigration after Brexit: where are we going?
- Author:
- Anand Menon
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- UK in a Changing Europe, King's College London
- Abstract:
- Immigration was a key, if not the key issue in the referendum of 2016. The last few years have seen the biggest shakeup in the UK migration system in at least half a century, coinciding with record levels of immigration across all the main routes – work, students and refugees. This report explores what has happened to immigration, immigration policy and public attitudes towards immigration since the Brexit vote. It examines the way in which the UK government has reacted to the ending of free movement, and explores the impact of new policies on immigration levels. It represents a state-of-the-art analysis of what has happened, where we have got to, and what might transpire in the future.
- Topic:
- Migration, Public Opinion, Economy, Brexit, and Immigration Policy
- Political Geography:
- United Kingdom and Europe
246. UK-EU regulatory divergence tracker: sixth edition
- Author:
- UK in a Changing Europe
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- UK in a Changing Europe, King's College London
- Abstract:
- UK in a Changing Europe’s series of regulatory divergence trackers provide an overview of where and how the UK has used its newfound regulatory freedoms to diverge from EU regulation. It identifies and analyses the most significant cases of divergence between the UK and EU which have taken place since Brexit. It explains what the changes are, what impact they are having, and likely further consequences. This is the sixth edition of the divergence tracker, covering developments since October 2022. There are six cases of active divergence (where the UK or some part of it changes its rules), 13 of passive divergence (where the EU changes its rules and the UK, or some part of it, does not follow), two of active alignment (where the UK and EU take the same regulatory steps in parallel), and five of delayed divergence (where either side postpones an upcoming case of divergence). This edition of the tracker finds that the UK has engaged in less active divergence over the past quarter. This is due in part to political instability, but also to Prime Minister Sunak’s emphasis on calming the markets and projecting a wider sense of political stability. The new administration has signalled its ambition to reform EU legislation, though in a more targeted manner than under the two preceding premierships.
- Topic:
- European Union, Regulation, Brexit, and Divergence
- Political Geography:
- United Kingdom and Europe
247. Where next? The future of the UK-EU relationship
- Author:
- UK in a Changing Europe
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- UK in a Changing Europe, King's College London
- Abstract:
- Six and a half years since the Brexit referendum, UK relations with the EU have still not settled into a coherent and consistent pattern. Partly, this is because the process of leaving itself took so long. Partly, too, because there is much still to resolve, not least whether the treaties signed will be fully applied. This report examines the contours of that relationship. It assesses both where we have got to and how the relationship might evolve. The reports sets out the state of play on trade, migration, public opinion, as well as the various party positions on the relationship. It also highlights the deadlines and decisions on the horizon in a number of areas, such as financial services, electric vehicles and fisheries. Finally, it examines the ways in which the TCA could be deepened, and steps that might be taken beyond the TCA – both unilaterally and through increased cooperation with the EU – concluding that changes to the relationship are likely to be slow and incremental.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Migration, Treaties and Agreements, Public Opinion, European Union, Economy, and Trade
- Political Geography:
- United Kingdom and Europe
248. The Shell and the Seed: Lessons from the Negotiation with the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia
- Author:
- Marta Ruiz
- Publication Date:
- 10-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ)
- Abstract:
- The achievement of total peace is not a new goal for Colombia. For the better part of the last 30 years, most government administrations have attempted to negotiate or subdue all existing armed groups either simultaneously or sequentially. However, the results so far have been partial and insufficient to address the structural causes and persistent factors behind a 60-year internal armed conflict. The product of a collaboration between ICTJ and the researcher, journalist, and former commissioner of the Colombian Truth Commission, Marta Ruiz, this study presents new points of view and reflections on the negotiations with the paramilitary forces in the first years of 2000. These reflections can be useful not only to inform public debate but also as input for decisionmakers and those who design strategies for negotiation and the pursuit of total peace underway today in Colombia. The first part explains the genesis of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) and describes their transition from drug traffickers to political and military actors. It presents evidence that since the 1980s the Colombian state has attempted to negotiate with drug traffickers using different narratives about their nature. The second part describes what happened at the Santafé Ralito negotiation table, the discussion’s agenda, and how the political context affected the process. It also shows how political timing, in particular President Uribe's reelection, affected the process’s outcome. The big question it asks, one with no single answer, is why, if negotiations were being held with drug traffickers, there was no real talk of dismantling drug trafficking. The third part assesses the consequences of the process, both in terms of justice and reintegration. It attempts to explain how the demobilized armed groups were reactivated in the territories.
- Topic:
- Conflict Prevention, Armed Forces, Negotiation, and Peace
- Political Geography:
- Colombia and South America
249. Advancing Victims’ Rights and Rebuilding Just Communities: Local Strategies for Achieving Reparation as a Part of Sustainable Development
- Author:
- The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ)
- Publication Date:
- 11-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ)
- Abstract:
- This comparative study examines strategies used by local actors to facilitate the operationalization of reparations for victims of widespread human rights violations, while highlighting the synergies between these efforts and sustainable development. The study is based on the fieldwork of ICTJ and its partners in four contexts—Colombia, The Gambia, Tunisia, and Uganda. These countries represent a range of different situations, where the progress made, challenges faced, and overall political and institutional contexts vary significantly. Nonetheless, comparison of the approaches used across the cases offers valuable insights for those working in these and other contexts. In The Gambia, the truth commission and legislation for reparations have created expectations among victims, but a program has yet to be implemented. In Uganda, the legal and policy framework for reparations exists, but there is no enabling legislation or mechanism to provide them as a result of stalled political will. In Tunisia, the truth commission recommended reparations, but the political and economic situation make operationalization unlikely. In Colombia, challenges faced by reparations have informed the design of restorative sanctions that include reparative projects but are yet to be implemented. The major insights gained from this comparative study relate to the specific ways in which reparations can contribute to individual and community well-being and development; innovative and effective approaches to ensuring victims and communities receive reparations and support, including through collective action, engagement with government, and grassroots initiatives; the integration of victims’ needs and priorities into development policies and models; and the reparative elements of complementary accountability and reform measures that are participatory, address corruption and marginalization, and contribute to gender justice and equality. The report offers practical guidance and policy recommendations for advancing reparations as an integral element of broader societal efforts to facilitate inclusion, justice, peace, and development.
- Topic:
- Human Rights, Sustainable Development Goals, Accountability, Reparations, and Truth and Reconciliation
- Political Geography:
- Uganda, Africa, Colombia, South America, Tunisia, and Gambia
250. Red Lines Around a Free and Fair Polish Election
- Author:
- Josh Rudolph, Anna Wójcik, and Ayleen Cameron
- Publication Date:
- 09-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
- Abstract:
- The October 15, 2023 Polish parliamentary election will not be fair. The country’s last fair election was in 2015, when the ruling Law and Justice Party (PiS) came to power and promptly set about undermining constitutional governance. Since then, the weakness of Poland’s rule-of-law system has enabled PiS to amend electoral law, reshape the media environment, exploit state-owned companies and other resources—including public funds—and engage in other autocratic subversions to tilt the playing field in Polish elections in favor of the ruling regime. However, the degree of unfairness in this election will hinge on actions taken by Polish authorities. The authorities should: Stop diverting state resources into media enterprises and political messaging campaigns meant to support PiS candidates, Commit to renewing the licenses of independent media outlets such as TVN, Stop using arbitrary fines to harass and weaken independent media outlets, Stop using the system for disciplining judges as a weapon against those who do not display loyalty to the PiS regime, Implement judgments of European tribunals, and ensure that rulings on the integrity of the election come from independent and impartial bodies. While the US government has struck the right tone in recent values-based remarks about the importance of electoral fairness, the message has not broken through a policy environment that is crowded on two levels. Most importantly, many experts and officials in Warsaw believe that the United States is reluctant to pressure its strongest ally in supporting Ukraine in its war against Russia—the Polish government—on matters of electoral fairness. But even if the United States is genuinely committed to pressing for electoral fairness in Poland, there are so many areas of democratic backsliding in the country that it is not clear which concrete threats are priorities for the United States. At every available opportunity, Poland’s allies should publicly reiterate the importance of respecting shared democratic values by holding fair elections. Privately, diplomats should warn Warsaw that crossing red lines around the four most consequential risks to the integrity of the upcoming Polish election would trigger unified public rebukes from NATO allies.
- Topic:
- Authoritarianism, Elections, Democracy, and Democratic Backsliding
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Poland