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501. Artists killed in Latin America for exercising their freedom of artistic expression

Author:
Cecilia Noce and Diana Arévalo
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for the Opening and Development of Latin America (CADAL)
Abstract:
This is an executive summary of the original report produced in Spanish that focuses only on violence against artists, like targeted killings related to the exercise of their right to freedom of expression and artistic creativity in Latin America. In 2021, CADAL recorded 378 attacks on freedom of artistic expression, of which 23 were murders. Artists and cultural workers who participated in protests in Colombia and Cuba were harassed, detained, and repressed. Musicians and cultural leaders were also involved in the violence between organized crime groups in countries such as Mexico and Brazil.
Topic:
Arts, Culture, Freedom of Expression, Protests, Targeted Killing, and Organized Crime
Political Geography:
Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, Latin America, and Mexico

502. Anticorruption Guidance for Partners of State-Owned Enterprises

Author:
Alexandra Gillies and Tom Shipley
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Natural Resource Governance Institute
Abstract:
Drawing on broad stakeholder consultations, corruption case analysis and reviews of existing best practices, this guidance proposes concrete measures that international oil, gas a mining companies should adopt to reduce corruption risks in their work with state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the oil, gas and mining industries. It also recommends measures SOEs can take to strengthen their anticorruption safeguards. The guidance for private-sector companies has five parts: Conducting due diligence on SOEs; Avoiding high-risk agents; Responding to political exposure; Safeguarding payments; Protecting joint ventures from corruption. The final section identifies corresponding recommendations for SOEs in each of these five areas.
Topic:
Corruption, Natural Resources, Business, Risk, and State-Owned Enterprises
Political Geography:
Global Focus

503. New Producer Contract Terms and Uncertainty: Lessons From the Recent Past

Author:
Patrick Heller, Perrine Toledano, David Mihalyi, and Tehtena Mebratu-Tsegaye
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Natural Resource Governance Institute
Abstract:
The petroleum industry is volatile, and governments in “new producer” countries have operated at a significant information disadvantage when negotiating with international oil companies. This challenge is growing today; new producer countries face intensifying questions around whether to offer fiscal incentives to maintain investment in the face of 1) the pandemic-induced volatility in oil prices and 2) long-term questions about the future of the industry in the face of the climate crisis and the global energy transition. This confluence of short-term and long-term uncertainty is prompting a reexamination of the narrative that once took hold in many new producer countries. The traditional story was one of linear progression from being non-producers to small levels of production to ultimately having oil and gas become a major economic contributor over the long term. This notion of progression was associated with a commonly held theory: After a country’s first major discovery, the geological risk that wells will be dry was expected to decrease. Countries could therefore shift from a position of having to grant tax breaks (and other concessions) to international investors, to taking a tougher stance in laws and negotiations for new projects going forward. In this paper we examine whether this theory has been borne out in practice and make recommendations to support new producers in their navigation of the uncertainty associated with the energy transition. Among the eight “new producer” countries, for which we analyzed a total of 26 contracts signed before and 25 contracts signed after discovery events (all occurring between 2001 and 2014), the evidence is mixed.
Topic:
Gas, Transparency, Contracts, Monitoring, Energy, and Green Transition
Political Geography:
Global Focus

504. No Time to Waste: Governing Cobalt Amid the Energy Transition

Author:
David Manley, Patrick Heller, and William Davis
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Natural Resource Governance Institute
Abstract:
Cobalt is critical. Along with other critical minerals, cobalt has important economic uses and currently few viable substitutes, yet its supply faces a high risk of disruption. Manufacturers of batteries for electric vehicles (EVs) want the metal. EV sales—and likewise, cobalt demand— could grow a lot more. Yet, cobalt may not remain critical for decades to come. EV buyers, battery manufacturers and miners fear the high prices and disrupted supply, as well as human right abuses, environmental destruction, corruption, and political risk. As with other critical minerals, industries are seeking to use less of the metal. The time available for the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and other countries to benefit from mining the metal may be short-lived. Good governance is therefore important both for people in mining countries and for humanity to meet the Paris Climate Agreement. This report aims to help governments and their advisors in mining countries, such as the DRC, derive value from mining cobalt, develop industry along the battery-supply chains and address a host of problems from human rights abuses to corruption. The report is also for policy-makers working to ensure that the world delivers enough cobalt in time for the global energy transition.
Topic:
Natural Resources, Energy, Green Transition, and Cobalt
Political Geography:
Africa and Democratic Republic of Congo

505. Debt Policy of State-Owned Mining Enterprises in Mongolia

Author:
Andrew Bauer and Batpurev Ayushsuren
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Natural Resource Governance Institute
Abstract:
Mongolia relies heavily on state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to manage several key mining assets. Baganuur, Shivee Ovoo, Erdenet, Mongolrostsvetmet and Erdenes Tavan Tolgoi are the most important majority state-owned companies operating large-scale mines. From 2019 to 2021, debt held by mining SOEs increased 4.3 times. The total liabilities of these companies reached USD 2.3 billion, representing 15 percent of GDP. The new debt was largely issued to cover social spending and an economically questionable railway project. It is unclear how the government intends to service this debt, particularly since profitability at most mining SOEs has been weak and most face liquidity challenges. Mining SOEs’ poor financial health is due to the combination of quasi-fiscal activity financing, poor project selection and management, and inadequate legislation and control mechanisms for new debt issuance. Legal reforms to new debt issuance and stronger Ministry of Finance oversight of SOEs are needed, in addition to stricter implementation of existing legal requirements such as collecting and disclosing complete data on SOE debt. Mongolia’s government should also review mining SOE quasi-fiscal expenditures, such as price controls on coal, and other reasons for low profitability of mines.
Topic:
Debt, Natural Resources, Mining, and State-Owned Enterprises
Political Geography:
Mongolia and Asia

506. Triple Win: How Mining Can Benefit Africa’s Citizens, Their Environment and the Energy Transition

Author:
Papa Daouda Diene, David Manley, Silas Olan'g, and Thomas Scurfield
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Natural Resource Governance Institute
Abstract:
Africa’s mineral wealth is essential for the energy transition and for the hundreds of millions of people currently living in poverty in African mining countries. Whether and how governments and companies move to further extract this mineral wealth is not only economically and environmentally important for Africa, but also for the vital importance of protecting the world’s rapidly diminishing forests. The world therefore needs a mining triple win: policies that can benefit Africa’s citizens, their environment, and the energy transition. These policies need to work for all if they are to work for any of them. But mining in Africa has been riddled with injustice. Humanity cannot afford to repeat the mistakes that have beset Africa’s mining in the past. To achieve a triple win, this time must be different. There are a whole host of policies available, and many ideas from experts. NRGI has brought these together and considered how they may work to truly achieve a triple win.
Topic:
Environment, Poverty, Natural Resources, Mining, Minerals, Energy, and Green Transition
Political Geography:
Africa

507. Developing Nuclear Energy in Estonia: An Amplifier of Strategic Partnership with the United States?

Author:
Tomas Jermalavicius, Max Bergmann, Peter Crall, Thomas O'Donnell, Tomas Janeliūnas, and Tõnis Idarand
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Estonia’s climate neutrality commitments and its simultaneous pursuit of national security mean that it will need to develop and cultivate new zero- or low-carbon, affordable, secure and safe domestic sources of energy. Nuclear energy is increasingly regarded as one of the critical ingredients of successful transition to climate-neutral energy system and as a viable part of the future decarbonised mix of energy supply. Therefore, Estonia is officially considering the possibility to adopt nuclear energy generated by new-design Small Modular Reactors (SMR). This choice, however, is not purely environmental, economic or technical, but also has geopolitical implications. It would create new long-term inter-dependencies with foreign partners which could represent fresh opportunities for closer cooperation in security and foreign policy domain, but also could create some new political, reputational, and national security risks. This geopolitical dimension is of particular importance to countries such as Estonia that seek greater involvement of key allies such as the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Germany in the Nordic-Baltic area to counter the geopolitical pressure from Russia and, increasingly, China. The report assumes that Estonia might eventually opt for nuclear energy and would then choose the US as its SMR technology supplier. It explores how Estonia’s foreign and security policy interests would benefit from a potential adoption of nuclear energy and development of technological and commercial relations in this field with the US. The report also maps various potential risks in relations with several key fellow member states of the European Union that may arise from Estonia turning to nuclear power as a major source of energy and to the US for a technological solution. It considers how certain structural issues in national energy policies and divergent geopolitical perspectives of Germany, France, and Poland – as well as some persistent characteristics of intra-European relations manifest through the EU’s common policies – may impair or facilitate Estonian nuclear aspirations. The study also highlights that Estonia’s affirmative decision concerning nuclear energy is likely to draw the attention and actions of malignant actors such as Russia aiming to discredit nuclear energy in general, as a viable pathway to energy security and climate neutrality, and US SMR technology in particular; undermine trust – domestically and internationally – in the ability of the Estonian government and enterprises to ensure competent and responsible stewardship of nuclear energy, and pit Estonia against some key regional and European allies. The report articulates some recommendations on how to better exploit the opportunities related to the US involvement in the development of Estonia’s nuclear energy programme and mitigate the identified risks.
Topic:
Climate Change, National Security, Partnerships, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:
Eastern Europe, Estonia, North America, and United States of America

508. Resilience Against Disinformation: A New Baltic Way to Follow?

Author:
Dmitri Teperik, Solvita Denisa-Liepniece, Dalia Bankauskaitė, and Kaarel Kullamaa
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The Baltic states, although not immune to disinformation, have accumulated unique experience and developed effective methods to resist and combat this malice. This report is based on in-depth semi-structured interviews and supplementary surveys conducted with the representatives of several clusters – media, civil society organisations, state institutions, think-tanks/academia and business communities. It aims to assess risks and vulnerabilities, as well as the three nations’ preparedness to counteract foreign-led disinformation. This report also reviews the existing indices that lead to a greater understanding of the intricate nature and interdependences of resilience-shaping factors at various levels, while contributing the unique Baltic perspective to the evolving, global study of disinformation. Multiple overlapping crises of 2020-21 – ripple effects from the political upheaval in Belarus, surge in illegal migration engineered by the regime in Minsk, the COVID-19 pandemic and accompanying socio-political perturbations, as well as China’s economic and diplomatic coercion against Lithuania – served as a reminder that no country could afford neglecting national resilience. The start of a major inter-state conventional war in Europe in 2022 has triggered a multitude of changes in the information environment of the Baltic states and prompted some radical adjustments and responses. Although the report does not cover the developments since 24 February, when Russia launched a full-scale invasion against Ukraine, neither foreign exploitation of vulnerabilities nor the responses of the Baltic governments that have been on display since then come in a vacuum. This report provides useful background and context that will help to understand what conceptual, legal, policy, institutional, political and societal precursors shape the current situation and determine successes or failures of disinformation and counter-disinformation efforts. The general strength of the Baltic states arises from their historical memory of totalitarianism and occupation, as well as their unique regional context. However, Western-focused internationalisation in all spheres of life has proven beneficial to combatting foreign-led disinformation, which strengthens electoral integrity and ensures continued democratic traditions. That said, efforts to improve civic education and strengthen cognitive security of the societies must be redoubled. National resilience to disinformation must be maintained and further increased by investing in national and especially local high-quality media. Resilience – as a whole-of government and whole-of society effort – requires all stakeholders to continuously cooperate, creating a multi-layered cross-sectoral network, or a team-of-teams approach, able to identify and counter malignant influence campaigns. These and other insights and experiences of the Baltic states highlighted in the report remain as relevant in the post-24/02 world as during the global and regional crises of 2020-21.
Topic:
Resilience, COVID-19, Disinformation, and Civil Unrest
Political Geography:
Baltic States

509. Germany’s Position on CSDP: Is There Anything for the Baltics?

Author:
Margarita Šešelgytė and Emilė Indrašiūtė
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
In the third brief in our Germany and Baltic Security series, Margarita Šešelgytė and Emilė Indrašiūtė examine Germany’s approach to the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy and the broader question of Europe’s strategic autonomy and consider whether Germany’s policies align with Baltic views. Following Russia’s 2014 illegal annexation of Crimea and intervention in eastern Ukraine, Germany not only strengthened its contribution to NATO’s collective defence and deterrence, but also took a greater role in shaping EU security and defence policies, a field it had previously shied away from. Germany’s involvement was instrumental in ensuring that the EU’s Permanent Structured Cooperation was implemented in a form that is more palatable to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and that the debate on European strategic autonomy was broadened and blunted to be more in tune with Baltic positions. Germany’s policy positions on European defence are unlikely to shift dramatically under Chancellor Scholz. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania will continue to look to Germany to balance France’s ambitions during its Presidency of the European Council and beyond.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, European Union, Strategic Autonomy, and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)
Political Geography:
Germany, Estonia, and Baltic States

510. Geopolitics of Europe’s Hydrogen Aspirations: Creating Sustainable Equilibrium or a Combustible Mix?

Author:
Tomas Jermalavicius, Tomas Janeliūnas, Andrian Prokip, Iliya Kusa, Alan Riley, Andrei V. Belyi, Pier Paolo Raimondi, and Miguel Sainz de Vicuña
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Discussions about hydrogen’s role in the transition to carbon-neutral economies and the EU’s Green Deal seldom include consideration of geopolitical aspects and/or national security imperatives. However, given the importance of energy as a factor in global and regional geopolitical trends and national security, hydrogen development will reshape not only energy relations between countries but will also alter the broader geopolitical picture. While elevating new aspects of geopolitical interplays, such as the importance of technology and regional clusters, hydrogen development might also unwittingly transplant present-day challenges—such as excessive dependence on the energy supply from hostile powers—into the carbon-neutral future. Since Europe’s energy sovereignty and geopolitical role in its neighbourhood could be at stake, the nexus of geopolitics, energy security and hydrogen development should be given serious attention. At the same time, the transformative socioeconomic impact of energy transition will create winners and losers within and between nations, which in some cases will have national security implications; hydrogen development could offer ways to mitigate this. This report focuses on exploring the impact that the European Union’s ambitions and plans for hydrogen development—including an expansion of its infrastructure in the form of the European Hydrogen Backbone—on its geopolitical position up to 2040. It first looks into the greater detail of the EU Hydrogen Strategy and how it links with the Energy Union, as well as with European strategic autonomy and energy sovereignty issues. It finds that hydrogen development—alongside the growth of the renewable energy sector—offers a great opportunity to reduce the current exposure to hostile actors through the energy sector that often hampers Europe’s ability to act as a geopolitical force in its neighbourhood. However, it also warns that the lack of unity and coherence currently afflicting the Energy Union, and manifest in such recent controversies as the Nord Stream 2 undersea gas pipeline from Russia to Germany before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, could potentially weaken such a positive geopolitical impact of hydrogen. Although hydrogen development requires Europe to draw upon external suppliers, the fact that this supply can come from many countries provides a significant opportunity for diversification and reducing the potency of energy supply as a geopolitical weapon. In this regard, two directions stand out in the EU’s neighbourhood—Ukraine in the east, and the Mediterranean along with the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) to the south. Both have huge potential for playing major roles in the European hydrogen supply chains, and their cultivation by the EU would provide many opportunities both to strengthen the EU’s influence in its neighbourhood and to build new partnerships. Certainly, neither of those directions comes without risks and downsides: political instability and armed conflicts, poor governance, unstable investment environment, water scarcity, and in some cases dependence on the hydrocarbons industry for income will be significant factors hampering the efforts to unlock their potential. Ukraine in particular will require sustained reconstruction efforts to tackle the massive devastation caused by Russia’s war. This will divert resources and attention, but transforming its energy sector and developing its hydrogen production base could still be important strands of these efforts. Europe’s own potential for domestic hydrogen production is another direction that this report looks into as a way to disentangle from the present-day geopolitically toxic dependencies and enhance its energy sovereignty. The Baltic states and Finland represent an interesting case study on how hydrogen could underpin a regional cooperation cluster with a high degree of integration—one of the new characteristics of the hydrogen era that will have geopolitical implications. The report, however, finds that different national perspectives on hydrogen, lack of coordination, and certain issues of trust arising from recent failures of solidarity and unity when tackling the regional nexus of energy security and geopolitics might hamper future regional cooperation in hydrogen. The hydrogen economy also offers some important benefits in managing national security challenges at the national level. In Estonia, the loss of the fossil fuel-based industry in the highly sensitive north-eastern region of Ida-Virumaa will be a socioeconomic blow to the local population. This report highlights how the vulnerability of the region, dominated by the Russian-speaking ethnic minorities who are already highly exposed to Russia’s malignant influence activities, could imperil Estonia’s energy transition and its national security. Creating a national hydrogen cluster in this region, drawing upon its industrial infrastructure and human capital, could mitigate the consequences of decarbonisation and energy transition. However, these considerations do not seem to receive sufficient attention from the government and energy businesses when drawing Estonia’s hydrogen map of the future. The report recommends that various stakeholders in the EU—including those behind the European Hydrogen Backbone—continuously monitor and assess the geopolitical risks, especially in terms of their impact on European energy sovereignty, when creating and managing new hydrogen-related interdependencies with the regions and countries outside the EU. The report urges the EU to support energy transition and necessary market and governance reforms in post-war Ukraine and the MENA countries to facilitate their emergence as crucial and reliable partners in hydrogen value chains. The report also recommends closer coordination and common planning between hydrogen stakeholders of the Baltic states and Finland when forming a regional cluster of hydrogen supply that would contribute to European energy sovereignty. Last but not least, it suggests that, for national security and resilience reasons, Estonia should focus more attention on the Ida-Virumaa region when developing its national hydrogen roadmap.
Topic:
Security, European Union, Geopolitics, Hydrogen, and Energy
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Middle East, North Africa, and Baltic States

511. A 'Bright Path' Forward or a Grim Dead End? The Political Impact of the Belt and Road Initiative in Kazakhstan

Author:
Anton Louthan
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
This report assesses the political impact of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Kazakhstan. Specifically, it examines whether and how the People’s Republic of China can pursue a strategy of economic statecraft to further its foreign policy and political interests in Kazakhstan. Despite Kazakhstan’s importance for the success of the BRI’s overland trade corridors, the report argues that important financial, foreign policy, and political constraints limit Beijing’s potential to influence Nur-Sultan. Beijing’s concerns over upsetting its relationship with the Russian Federation and the fact that the value of bilateral trade, investment, and Kazakhstani indebtedness to China have decreased in recent years suggest that Beijing is less willing to, capable of, or interested in using the BRI to influence Kazakhstan. The perceived closeness in this bilateral relationship has less to do with the influence of the BRI and more to do with the alignment of both countries’ geopolitical interests before the initiative’s creation. The report does not suggest that Chinese influence has decreased, but rather shows how Kazakhstan has been able to maintain a degree of political autonomy. Nur-Sultan has played a proactive role in forming its relationship with Beijing through its pursuit of former President Nursultan Nazarbayev’s “multi-vector” foreign policy strategy. In diversifying Kazakhstan’s diplomatic, economic, and political ties with Russia, China, the European Union, and the United States, Nur-Sultan has been able to avoid complete dependence on one country. Furthermore, Kazakhstan has been able to shape the size and scope of Chinese economic activity by guiding the initiative’s investments and projects to further the government’s domestic development agenda, Nurly Zhol (translated as “Bright Path”). However, issues related to corruption and deepening ties between Chinese and Kazakhstani elites through the BRI have likely strengthened Kazakhstan’s authoritarian political structure.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, Bilateral Relations, Infrastructure, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Autonomy, and Influence
Political Geography:
China, Kazakhstan, and Asia

512. Turkey's Response to the Russia-Ukraine Crisis

Author:
Aaron Stein
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
On October 26, 2021, Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense released video of a TB2 unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) striking a separatist D-30 howitzer in Russian-occupied Donbas. The strike was Ukraine’s first confirmed use of the now ubiquitous TB2, the Bayraktar-manufactured drone that the Turkish military has used to great tactical effect in Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh. The Turkish-Ukrainian defense relationship is understudied, but it could become an important factor in how Russian elites view North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) support for non-member Ukraine, and be used to justify an invasion to assuage Moscow’s concerns about a US-allied military presence along its borders. The Turkish support for Ukraine is not the main driver of Russian discomfort about the future of Ukraine. The TB2 is also not a decisive game changer, and the use of UCAVs is almost certain to have little impact on how Russian leadership weighs risk during debates about the efficacy of armed conflict in a neighboring state. Nevertheless, Turkish-Ukrainian defense ties are worthy of deeper study, precisely because Ankara’s relationships with Kyiv and Moscow have a secondary impact on American interests in Eastern Europe. The Turkish-Russian relationship is marred by bureaucratic distrust, which is papered over by a very functional leader-to-leader dynamic that enables the two Black Sea neighbors to cooperate and manage numerous regional conflicts. The Turkish-Ukrainian dynamic, in turn, is part of a broader Turkish effort to establish itself as an independent actor, committed to pursuing a foreign policy that often clashes with much of the NATO alliance. This paper will explore Turkish-Russian and Turkish-Ukrainian relations; the reasons for Turkey’s efforts to “fence sit” and establish itself as a neutral political actor in the Black Sea; and what these efforts portend for US interests in the region.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Turkey, Ukraine, and Middle East

513. How Will China Respond to the Russia-Ukraine Crisis?

Author:
Chris Miller
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
How will China respond to a potential Russian military escalation against Ukraine? Relations between Russia and China have intensified in recent years, with Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping holding regular summits and the two countries’ militaries participating in joint exercises and cooperating in some defense industrial efforts. Ties between Moscow and Beijing are now closer than any time since the days of Stalin and Mao, driven by a shared perception that the United States is each country’s primary foreign policy challenge. One top Russian official told media in December 2021 that the relationship now “exceeds an alliance.”[1] Chinese state media, meanwhile, have vocally backed Russia in arguing that the current crisis stems from the US “using NATO as a tool to cannibalize and squeeze Russia’s strategic space.”[2] The 2014 war in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea was an important factor driving Russia and China closer to each other, as Russia sought to reduce post-Crimea international isolation and as Beijing realized it could drive a hard bargain in its bilateral relationship with Russia on issues like energy. China’s response to the 2014 war, however, was generally to avoid taking sides. China accepted a narrative that placed blame on the West for causing the crisis, with top diplomats citing Western “foreign interference for causing the crisis,” but didn’t approve of Russia’s seizure of Crimea or its military actions in the Donbas.[3] China abstained from voting on the key United Nations resolutions regarding Crimea, for example, and it still declines to recognize Crimea as Russian territory. Similarly, it verbally rejected US and European sanctions on Russia though it let Chinese firms, including the country’s big state-owned banks, abide by these sanctions to avoid being cut off from US financial markets and the international banking system. Compared to 2014, however, China may find it more difficult to avoid involvement in an escalating crisis. Leaders in Beijing and around the world will see the US response to any military escalation against Ukraine as sending signals about whether the US could effectively respond to future crises in the Taiwan Strait or East or South China Seas. The success or failure of US efforts to impose meaningful costs on Russia if it escalates will be seen as a test of whether the US could do something similar in Asia. Moreover, after repeated summits between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin, including Xi’s description of Putin as his “best friend,” China’s approach to Russia amid a crisis will also be interpreted as sending signals about China’s own capabilities and influence. Because of this, China will not see a new phase of war between Russia and Ukraine as a peripheral issue in its foreign policy, even though China has no core issues at stake in Ukraine itself. China is most likely to be implicated in the crisis by potential Western sanctions on Russia, which in contrast to 2014 will impose substantially more pressure on Beijing to take sides. China’s decision either to adhere to new Western sanctions or to help Russia avoid them will shape escalation pathways and determine the magnitude of economic and political isolation that sanctions impose.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Sanctions, Military Affairs, Economy, Crisis Management, and Escalation
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, and Asia

514. Russian Perceptions of Military AI, Automation, and Autonomy

Author:
Anna Nadibaidze
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
President Vladimir Putin declared 2021 to be the Year of Science and Technology in Russia, with November named as the month of artificial intelligence (AI), signaling Russian leadership’s strong interest in this umbrella term. The Russian defense sector is particularly captivated by the opportunities associated with AI-based technologies. In recent years, AI, robotics, as well as the further integration of automation and autonomy into weapons systems and military decision-making have all been highlighted as priorities for modernizing the Russian armed forces. In 2017, Putin famously said that “artificial intelligence is the future, not only for Russia, but for all humankind … Whoever becomes the leader in this sphere will become the ruler of the world.” Quoting these words, analysts often attribute Russia’s development, testing, and use of weaponized AI to the necessity of competing in the so-called global AI race or the global tech race with the current leading AI developers: the United States and China. While the perceived need to compete and catch up is part of Russia’s motivations, its interest in military AI should not only be attributed to a quest for relative power. Understanding the depth and complexity of the debates surrounding AI, autonomy, and automation in Russia requires an examination of discussions about its strategic implications for the Russian army, the perceived benefits and risks of autonomy, and, more broadly, the importance of technological modernization and innovation for Russia’s place in the world. This report aims to provide an overview of the different conceptions and motivations, both oriented towards domestic and international audiences, that have been and are guiding Russian political and military leaderships in their ambitions to pursue weaponized AI. First, it outlines the various factors, both external and internal, behind the quest for pursuing AI, autonomy, and automation in the Russian military. Second, it presents some of the Russian plans in this area, what is known about their capabilities, and the challenges to strengthening them. Third, it dives into Russian debates on autonomy, and especially autonomous weapons systems, as well as discussions on the ethics of developing so-called “killer robots,” or autonomous combat robots (боевые роботы, or военные роботы), a term often used in the Russian-language literature. The analysis is based on a survey of open-source materials, including media reports, press releases, official statements and speeches, peer-reviewed articles and think tank reports, as well as publications in Russian military journals. The author would like to present it as the first step in an ongoing doctoral research project, as well as a contribution to the emerging English-language literature on how weaponized AI is perceived in Russia.
Topic:
Cybersecurity, Artificial Intelligence, Autonomy, Automation, and Military
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

515. Electronic Warfare: Russia's Approach

Author:
Pavel Luzin
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
Russia considers electronic warfare (EW) one of the key military capabilities in its ongoing confrontation with the West. EW provides a non-nuclear deterrence capability and helps Russia keep its great power status and strategic autonomy while also taking into account its long-term economic and demographic weakness. Russia has made significant advances in EW during the 2010s. However, at the beginning of 2020s, Russia still faces technological, technical, industrial, organizational, and political challenges that prevent Moscow from getting the EW capabilities it wants. Technological challenges are related to delays in developing air- and space-based EW capabilities, and to the need to unify EW systems. Technical challenges stem from the number of different types of EW systems that must be maintained, the relatively short lifespans of various EW systems, and issues integrating them with other combat systems and units. The last point also indicates why Russia has struggled to transform its quantity of the EW systems into a higher quality of combat capabilities. Industrial challenges are caused by the volatile dynamic of Russia’s arms procurements and R&D programs and the capacity of defense corporations to develop and produce advanced EW systems with acceptable costs. The main organizational challenge is that the number of EW troops that has already achieved its objective limit. Now EW troops need to be transformed from combat support into a combat branch. Finally, a political challenge appears in the confrontation between Russia and the West, which is the main driver for efforts related to EW. Russia is unable to compete with the United States and Europe in a symmetric way, and Russia’s political system does not allow Moscow to realize a “revolution in military affairs” because the centralized system struggles to implement a net-centric approach to the armed forces in effective way. For that reason, Russia has chosen a classic approach of asymmetric warfare with the goal of disrupting the command and control systems of a superior adversary. The coming decade promises to be challenging for Russia in terms of electronic warfare. Moscow will need to fix its previous EW efforts, pay more attention to the overall quality of electronic warfare rather than on the quantity of deployed EW systems, and bridge the evident gaps in EW on tactical, theater, and strategic levels. Moreover, after defense spending stabilized and even declined during the late 2010s, Russia has been forced to increase its defense budget again. This means spending for EW will also increase. Russia will try to fill gaps in air- and space-based EW capabilities, with the sea-based component continuing to play a secondary role in Russia’s military planning. It is also possible that Russia will chose to extend its ground-based EW infrastructure in Belarus with creation of an EW “chain” from Crimea to Kaliningrad.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Deterrence, Military, and Electronic Warfare
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

516. How the Intervention in Kazakhstan Revitalized the Russian-led CSTO

Author:
Bruce Pannier
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
The Russian Federation-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) has existed for nearly 30 years, and, during all that time, it had never sent troops into a conflict zone in one of its members states. CSTO members Armenia and Kyrgyzstan had requested assistance in the past, but the organization did not send help as those situations were not part of the CSTO mandate. Faced with unrest that broke out in early January 2022, Kazakhstan’s government requested CSTO assistance to fend off what Kazakhstan’s president said was a threat to the country’s sovereignty from tens of thousands of terrorists. For the first time, the CSTO answered a call for aid and deployed some 2,500 troops to guard key facilities in Kazakhstan—but only in a few cities, and for less than two weeks. It looks now like there were no terrorists, and Kazakh President Kassym-Zhomart Tokayev’s call for help was not to save his country, but to save himself from elements in the government that were trying to oust him. That makes the CSTO decision to deploy forces more intriguing, as it appears the organization did not send the force to Kazakhstan to defend that country’s sovereignty, but to defend Tokayev and preserve a government that was friendly towards Russia.
Topic:
Security, Sovereignty, Regional Integration, and Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)
Political Geography:
Russia, Central Asia, Eurasia, and Kazakhstan

517. Correlates of Politics and Economics: How Chinese Investment in Africa Changes Political Influence

Author:
Carla D. Jones, Mengge Li, and Hermann A. Ndofor
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
This study investigates the impact of Chinese economic engagement in Africa (FDI and loans from China to African countries) on African countries’ international political alignment as evidenced by voting patterns in the UN General Assembly. We find three seasons of Chinese policy in Africa. Pre 2008, Chinese economic engagement in Africa was driven primarily by economic considerations, market seeking for FDI and likely resource seeking for loans. During the Great Recession, China came to terms with its rise as an economic power and thus started leveraging its economic power in international relationships. During this season, both Chinese FDI and loans were no longer driven by economic considerations but rather by international relations which led to increased political alignment with recipient African countries. The final season captured the Xi Jinping era beginning 2013. During this season, Chinese FDI had no effect on African countries’ foreign policy alignment with China, but Chinese loans still had a significant positive effect. This likely reflects a movement away from FDI to less transparent bilateral loans as a means of utilizing Chinese economic power to influence foreign policy. During the entire period of the study, Chinese FDI to Africa resulted in reduced political alignment between African countries and the United States.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Politics, Investment, and Influence
Political Geography:
Africa, China, and Asia

518. The Wagner Group's Playbook in Africa: Mali

Author:
Raphael Parens
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
What is the Wagner Group doing in Mali? Since it rose to prominence after its involvement in the Syrian Civil War alongside the Assad regime, Wagner Group, a Russian-owned Private Military Contractor (PMC), has expanded its footprint into Africa. [1] Wagner has immersed itself in Libya, Madagascar, Mozambique, Central African Republic (CAR), and Sudan, leading training exercises, fighting anti-government forces, and brutally quelling protests. Wagner Group often overlaps with Russian state foreign policy aims, but its position as an independent contractor lends it unpredictability, while giving Russia plausible deniability. The group offers the Russian state a valuable tool: the ability to test new environments for military cooperation without appearing heavy-handed or overtly involved. Wagner has established a pattern of political, military, and economic involvement in Sudan and CAR since 2015. Wagner Group and its founder, Yevgeny Prigozhin, have followed this strategy successfully in Mali, contributing to France’s recent decision to withdraw its military forces from the country. Although Wagner group still needs to adapt its strategy to succeed in a new environment in Mali, the Kremlin has strong-armed a key competitor out of the country. This creates potential contagion effects for the rest of the Sahel, particularly those countries facing long-term insurgencies, such as Burkina Faso.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Non State Actors, Wagner Group, and Military
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, and Mali

519. Control, Development, Legitimacy, and the 2024 Problem: Russia Two Years Before the End of Putin's 4th Term

Author:
András Tóth-Czifra
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
In 2020, the Russian Federation’s legislature adopted constitutional reforms initiated by President Vladimir Putin. The reforms allowed Putin to “zero out” his presidential term count, and thus maintain ambiguity about his plans in 2024. They also set the stage for a radical revamp of governance in the country, with hope to kick-start Russia’s economic growth before 2024 and to ensure that the system could withstand instability stemming from a potential succession crisis. The reforms did bring substantial changes. However, as it is evident from major policies regarding capital investments, public administration, and the COVID-19 pandemic, the reforms left political decision-making top-heavy, poorly informed, short-sighted, and constrained, making it highly questionable whether they could achieve the goal of stimulating growth and stabilizing the regime’s domestic position before 2024. It was amid this set of contradictions and ambiguities that Putin decided to start a war of submission against Ukraine in February 2022. As of March 2022, it is too early to conclusively evaluate the consequences of the war on Russia’s future, and having been finalized in early February, this report cannot attempt to do it. However, by undoing the foundations of economic and social development, the war seems to have set Russia on a course where the regime aims to resolve the contradictions and ambiguities detailed in this report by previously unseen levels of domestic repression and external aggression.
Topic:
Development, Reform, Constitution, Legitimacy, and Vladimir Putin
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

520. Serbia on Edge

Author:
Richard Kraemer
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
The time has come to openly regard the Republic of Serbia for what it is: A stalwart Russian and Chinese ally run by a semi-authoritarian government that proactively pursues ideologically irredentist territorial expansion in the Western Balkans. Today’s Serbia poses a threat to regional and transatlantic security. Under President Aleksandar Vučić’s Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), the Serbian government is rapidly building its military, overtly backing ultranationalist provocateurs in neighboring states, cementing Belgrade’s ties to Moscow, and consolidating partnerships with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Integral to its efforts to actualize the “Greater Serbia” ideology, Serbia’s and Russia’s Orthodox Church leadership cooperate closely and in concert with their political counterparts. Without a significant Westward shift in its orientation, Serbia will continue on an authoritarian trajectory aligned with U.S. adversaries. Contemporary Serbia presents a quandary for U.S. and European strategists and policymakers. A genuinely democratic and Euro-Atlantic-oriented Serbia has been sought by Brussels and Washington alike. Yet, decades after Yugoslavia’s violent dissolution and related North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) interventions in the 1990s, most Serbians reject NATO cooperation and are lukewarm towards the European Union (EU). Consequently, the U.S. and its democratic allies in Europe are less able to leverage prospective memberships as a means of transatlantic integration. Further complicating relations with Serbia is Aleksandar Vučić’s overt embrace of Beijing and Moscow. The depth of Serbia’s growing dependence on those powers jeopardizes U.S and European security on multiple fronts. The Vučić government’s enduring endorsement of ultranationalist narratives and their subversive purveyors continues to intensify discord in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and North Macedonia. Its military build-up is gravely disconcerting; Belgrade responds only with specious explanations. The country’s ever-greater reliance on Russian oil and gas as a client and transit state for Gazprom, Russia’s state-owned energy giant, puts it at odds with Brussels, Washington, and several Central-Eastern European capitals. Belgrade and Beijing’s economic, technological, and increasingly military cooperation accelerates as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) further entrenches itself in southeast Europe. In sum: Serbia’s expanding alignment with authoritarian powers and regional anti-democratic forces reflects its illiberal worldview and disabling narrative of national victimhood. Western policymakers persistently view Belgrade’s government with the misunderstanding that, given the right incentives, Serbia will moderate, democratize, and gradually integrate into transatlantic institutions. This assumption is misguided. It diminishes, if not excludes, the need for a national reckoning among the Serbian people. As with post-war Germany’s Willy Brandt, Serbia needs courageous and sincere leadership to acknowledge past sins and move the nation forward. For example: A genuine Kniefall von Warschau event could spur an honest discussion among Serbian peoples about the atrocities committed during Yugoslavia’s dissolution. Whatever the catalyst, a broad acknowledgment of past crimes against humanity is categorical if Serbia is ever to become a democratic and open society. Without it, Serbs will remain disproportionately susceptible to domestic irredentist forces fed by malign foreign powers set on keeping the Western Balkans removed from the transatlantic community. Until such a national reckoning, Western decision-makers should adopt a more pragmatic approach to relations with a Belgrade government dismissive of genuine transatlantic partnerships. For as long as Pan-Serb ultranationalism is considered by Serbia’s leaders to be acceptable in political discourse, the kind of genuine democratic values and institutions shared within the transatlantic community will remain unrealized. Accordingly, the U.S. and its European allies should encourage Serbia to focus on itself, not its neighbors. In that vein, Western policymakers would be wise to stop expecting a breakthrough in Kosovo-Serbia status negotiations. It has become an empty dialogue that only keeps Kosovo locked outside of international institutions and other benefits of recognized statehood. A revised approach should also discontinue pushing an ineffective EU integration process as the primary means of democratically transforming Serbia.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Ideology, and Expansion
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eastern Europe, Serbia, and Balkans

521. China's Security Management Towards Central Asia

Author:
Niva Yau Tsz Yan
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
In the early years of diplomatic relations between the People’s Republic of China and Central Asian countries (roughly 1992-1999), bilateral security discussions strictly focused on the then-looming influence of a Uyghur-led independence movement in Xinjiang. Chinese officials directly asked Central Asian states to not support the East Turkestan Movement, orienting the issue as a regional mutual security interest. While concerns for stability in Xinjiang continue as the foundational drive towards deepening security relations with Central Asian states, new security interests have entered discussions since the late 2010s as expanded bilateral trade brought new issues, such as investment security and corruption-fuelled anti-China sentiment. Also, domestic issues in Central Asia, concerning leadership transition, economic decline, and nationalism, expanded the Chinese discussion of the role of Islam in politics and implications on Xinjiang’s stability. To address these interests, Chinese security engagement in Central Asia has steadily expanded. Within and beyond the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), multilateral dialogue on security issues have been regularized among all ranks of Central Asian security officers. The SCO has conducted annual security exercises since 2010, though the size of deployment, focus, and scope have changed. Between 2010 and 2019, the SCO created five expert groups to coordinate regional law enforcement agencies in order to address specific security issues. However, in comparison, bilateral security engagement remains more diverse. The number of meetings is increasing, and their formats are becoming more efficient. There are joint patrols and operation, regular military exercises pre-pandemic, short-term training and long-term military degree programs in China, transfer of security equipment, construction of security infrastructure, and the presence of Chinese private security companies. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are the two most responsive countries towards welcoming these initiatives. In addition to multilateral and bilateral security engagement, the PRC has increased its military capacity in its western region. More emphasis has been placed on increased combat readiness, as well on the condition and human capacity on the border. While some areas of existing security cooperation are productive in meeting security goals, such as consensus over non-tolerance of Uyghur independence supporters and tightening illegal cross-border activities, two problems persist. First, while the PRC to an extend desires a regional approach to security, deliverables are more visible as the outcome of bilateral cooperation in Central Asia. These regional efforts are meant to deter any Central Asian governments from making independent assessments and forming their own foreign policy on Xinjiang without PRC participation. Second, language remains the most difficult operational obstacle to overcome. The dominance of the Russian language cements a substantial cultural and operational gap between the armies. So far, Central Asia-PRC cooperation has been a pragmatic, opportunistic choice—a choice that Central Asian leaders made due to the absence of comparable committed engagement from other major powers. Moving forward, in order to balance PRC security engagement, Central Asia’s strategic significance must be independently considered outside of its role in securing Xinjiang for the PRC.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Engagement
Political Geography:
China, Central Asia, and Asia

522. Appraising the War in Ukraine and Likely Outcomes

Author:
Philip Wasielewski
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
After six weeks of combat, where is the Russo-Ukrainian War going? Modern technology both facilitates and hampers the answer to that question. Every day, this war is evaluated from every angle and perspective, but modern technology provides only a soda-straw view of the war’s entire canvas. This article will try to discern that larger canvas of the war, including a focus on casualties, information operations and morale, and logistics to see how they and the tactical correlation of forces may influence several possible strategic outcomes.
Topic:
Conflict, Military Tactics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

523. The Rise of Sino-Russian Biotech Cooperation

Author:
Svitlana Lebedenko
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
The People’s Republic of China’s rise as a global innovation power is rooted in the development of a sovereign innovation infrastructure, one that allows China to compete in high-technology races with the United States. This process is complemented by an intensifying science and technology partnership with the Russian Federation. By decoupling from China and Russia, the United States and its allies are pushing China and Russia closer to each other. The paper discusses recent examples of Sino-Russian biotechnology cooperation projects, offering an early account of the emerging integration of two distinct but complementary innovation infrastructures.
Topic:
Development, Science and Technology, Infrastructure, Innovation, and Biotechnology
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

524. Northern Afghanistan and the New Threat to Central Asia

Author:
Bruce Pannier
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
The contest for control of northern Afghanistan between the Taliban, the Islamic State, and other terrorist groups is a major security concern for the states of Central Asia. Since the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan have relied on the Taliban to prevent non-state actors from operating in northern Afghanistan and launching cross-border attacks. In recent months, however, the Islamic State has bombed mosques near the border with Central Asia, and claimed to have launched a rocket attack into Uzbekistan. The deteriorating situation in the region demonstrates the limits of Central Asian states’ security strategies, and highlights that they have few options in dealing with a new threat on their border.
Topic:
Security, Non State Actors, Taliban, Borders, and Threat Perception
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, South Asia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and United States of America

525. Reviving the Prospects for Coercive Diplomacy in Ukraine

Author:
Sean Monaghan
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
The United States and its allies in the West have been unable to use the threat of military force to coerce Russia into stopping its war in Ukraine. In part, this is because the West is more concerned about escalation than Russia. Further analysis using Alexander L. George’s framework of coercive diplomacy, however, suggests the problem is more complex and deep-rooted: Few of the historical conditions or factors that favor coercive diplomacy are present in Ukraine. This analysis reveals three things the United States and its allies should do to revive the prospects of ending the war in Ukraine through coercive diplomacy. First, they should take smaller, more achievable steps which are less likely to inspire Russia to double-down. Second, they should exploit Russia’s deteriorating position through a mixture of carrots and sticks. Finally, the West should seek to minimize the intensity of its wider confrontation with Russia and focus on strategic stability as an end in itself. This will be challenging because of the gravity of Russian atrocities in Ukraine. But it may help end the war through coercive diplomacy, and avoid a serious miscalculation with Russia.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Conflict, Coercion, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

526. The Evolving Political-Military Aims in the War in Ukraine After 100 Days

Author:
Philip Wasielewski
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
Russian war aims have contracted from conquering Ukraine to simply expanding the territory of the statelets it supposedly went to war to protect. By contrast, Ukraine’s war aims have grown from survival to the recovery of all territory lost to Russia since 2014. These uncompromising objectives lock Russia and Ukraine into a war of attrition with little hope of a negotiated settlement. The ongoing battle in Donbas could provide Russia with some tactical successes and a propaganda victory but probably not a strategic one. In fact, further losses could weaken the Russian army to the point that it enables later Ukrainian counterattacks or even causes the Russian army to fracture. Leaders in Moscow may find that a depleted army leaves them few options for victory and that even their superiority in nuclear weapons may not be as useful as supposed.
Topic:
Politics, Armed Forces, Conflict, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

527. Security Challenges in the Eastern Mediterranean

Author:
Leah Pedro and Aaron Stein
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
On May 2–3 2022, the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Syria/Iraq Office and the Foreign Policy Research Institute convened a panel of foreign policy experts for a dialogue on security challenges present in the Eastern Mediterranean. The first day addressed state fragility in the region and how this phenomenon intersects with systemic security issues, including climate change, maritime issues, and migration. The second day of dialogue addressed military issues, including Russian naval modernization, US-Russian regional retrenchment, and how each country views the other’s long-term regional ambitions. Additionally, the conversations in the second day covered European regional security views and how the broader US-Russia rivalry impacts thinking on the continent amidst the current crisis landscape. In each panel, two guest speakers shared their subject matter expertise on the focus topic and a dialogue followed brief presentations. The entirety of the event was conducted under Chatham House Rule, wherein the participants could share views and opinions freely. As a result, findings from these conversations can be more transparent than traditional formal dialogues in traditional diplomatic channels. In this report, we share the consensus highlights and points of contention which came from the discussions. As the nature of Chatham House Rule protects the identity of our participants, below are a few areas of expertise found among those involved in the dialogue.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Climate Change, Diplomacy, Migration, National Security, Economy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Mediterranean

528. Afghanistan After Zawahiri: America's Counterterrorism Options in the New South Asia

Author:
Philip Wasielewski
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
Despite the attention in Washington currently paid to developments in Ukraine and the Taiwan Strait, terrorism remains a threat to US national security. The recent counterterrorism strike against Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul highlights that the fight against al-Qaeda, among other groups, is not over, and that Afghanistan remains a safe harbor for many of the world’s terrorist organizations or their affiliates. Going forward, the United States will need to continue to dedicate resources to detect and disrupt terrorist threats emanating from Afghanistan. To do so, Washington needs to rebuild a coalition of allies opposed to violent Islamist extremism—both around Afghanistan and inside the country—who can provide intelligence and logistics support as needed, to help in that task.
Topic:
National Security, Violent Extremism, Counter-terrorism, Alliance, and Coalition
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, South Asia, and United States of America

529. The Art of the Possible: Minimizing Risks as a New European Order Takes Shape

Author:
Gabriela Iveliz Rosa-Hernandez
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
Russia’s war on Ukraine is poised to bring into being a new European security order. Although the last eight months have been full of surprises, that new order may very well be marked by unstable standoffs, buildups, and dangerous activities and incidents between both Ukraine and Russia and Russia and Ukraine’s Western backers. These will risk ever more dangerous crises, all with the threat of nuclear war looming. The last eight years of military deployments, near-simultaneous exercises, and other proximate activities by Russia and NATO offer some hints as to what this future may look like. These, notably, were undertaken not to prevent an escalation in Ukraine but to deter NATO from attacking Russia and vice versa. During this time, discussions about a return to conventional arms control in Europe to mitigate the dangers of military activities gained little traction with policymakers, and the agreements and arrangements that had been in place continued to deteriorate and dwindle. In late 2021, as Russian forces massed on Ukraine’s borders, the West offered Russia a return to conventional arms control solutions. Russia countered with demands that NATO return to its 1990s-era force posture and eschew any further enlargement, and then proceeded to roll its tanks into Ukraine. During the tense months prior to Russia’s invasion, the conventional arms control mechanisms that remained, such as the Vienna Document, made it possible to call out Russia’s buildup, but not reverse it or prevent attack. Although there is little logic and less appetite for new arms control deals now, an end to fighting in Ukraine will create new imperatives to make Europe safer than it is today. While sanctions can limit Russian capacity to some extent, they may well be inadequate to prevent substantial buildups. For this reason, NATO members and their partners should be thinking in advance about how they could limit Russian capabilities via negotiated arrangements with robust verification measures and repercussions for violations. Once the shooting stops in Ukraine, deals such as these could make a more secure Europe, bolstered by more reliable deterrence, attainable.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, Conflict, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

530. American Interests in the Ukraine War

Author:
Joshua Shifrinson
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Policymakers have poorly defined U.S. strategic interests in the Russia-Ukraine War. Those interests that have been defined—deterring future aggression and protecting the “liberal order”—do not stand up to scrutiny. Actual U.S. interests in Ukraine are essentially negative: preventing further escalation or spillover of the conflict and limiting a wholesale collapse in U.S.-Russian relations. The limited interests that the U.S. does have in Ukraine suggest that Washington should try to convince Ukraine and Russia to accept a negotiated settlement.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Liberal Order, Conflict, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and United States of America

531. The Western Mediterranean Transport and Logistics Sector in the Post-Covid-19 Era: Seizing New Opportunities, Accelerating Transitions

Author:
IEMed/EuroMeSCo
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
IEMed/EuroMeSCo
Abstract:
The COVID-19 and its socioeconomic consequences have been affecting trade and supply chains worldwide for the last two years. Although global connectivity has been reduced, the transport and logistics sector has played a key role to ensure the continuous provision of food and goods in all regions of the world. This crisis has been somewhat perceived as an accelerator of the processes that were and will continue to affect the sector in the upcoming years: the digital transformation, the sustainability transition, and the growing awareness of the vulnerabilities of global value chains. This emerging context poses significant challenges to the sector together with great opportunities in a region such as the Western Mediterranean. Understanding them to design the adequate policies that will allow the transport and logistics sector to play its crucial role as a driver for regional integration and prosperity is essential.
Topic:
Economics, Transportation, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Mediterranean

532. Fragile States Index 2022 – Annual Report

Author:
Nate Haken, Daniel Woodburn, Juliette Gallo-Carelli, Asa Cooper, and Dylan Souquet
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Fund for Peace
Abstract:
The Fragile States Index, produced by The Fund for Peace, is a critical tool in highlighting not only the normal pressures that all states experience, but also in identifying when those pressures are pushing a state towards the brink of failure. By highlighting pertinent issues in weak and failing states, The Fragile States Index—and the social science framework and software application upon which it is built—makes political risk assessment and early warning of conflict accessible to policy-makers and the public at large.
Topic:
Territorial Disputes, Elections, Fragile States, Political stability, Violence, Crisis Management, Innovation, and Reconciliation
Political Geography:
Sudan, Libya, Brazil, South America, North Africa, Haiti, Somalia, Mali, Guinea, Sahel, Global Focus, and Lake Chad Basin

533. Immaterial Competition: Rethinking the Roles of Economics and Technology in the US-China Rivalry

Author:
Arthur Tellis
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The US-China rivalry is likely to be the fulcrum around which international affairs are structured in the twenty-first century, akin to the Cold War from 1947 to 1991. This rivalry, like its predecessor, emerges from divergent geopolitical interests and imperatives. While the Chinese Communist Party’s aims are many, various, and subject to change, they include its continued control of the Chinese State; economic and technological modernization and leadership; internal order; complete union with Taiwan on Beijing’s terms; certain territorial concessions from its neighbors; and the disestablishment of security arrangements across the Indo-Pacific that it views as threatening and trammeling. The latter three are in direct conflict with US interests and imperatives in the Indo-Pacific: prohibiting China’s unilateral modification of the status quo vis-à-vis Taiwan; preserving the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its allies and partners; and maintaining its military partnerships and presence in the region. These antithetical interests animate a larger struggle for hegemony in the Indo-Pacific and serve as the terms on which this contest will be decided. Explanations of the rivalry as an ideological contest or a competition born from competing economic interests are less compelling by comparison. The United States and China are motivated to an extent by ideological imperatives, but these do not appear to propel or serve as the central stakes for the rivalry as much as they affect each’s disposition toward the other. Long-standing trade, investment, and commercial disputes and competition, meanwhile, are not so substantial that they motivate the rivalry. While these issues are impactful to niche communities and conspicuous to national policymakers, they are not particularly consequential for national prosperity. The logic of competition, trade, and globalization, in fact, suggests that the US-China commercial relationship is mutually beneficial, notwithstanding each’s concerns with the other’s economic statecraft and market-leading firms. In their geopolitical rivalry, there are a few key forces or contests of interest: path dependence, regime continuity, prudent strategy, third-party alignments, and the balance of military forces in the Indo-Pacific. Each affects the United States’ and China’s ability to achieve their ends and shapes their rivalry. Economic and technological statecraft, by contrast, is largely peripheral to these ends as it does not effectively advance political objectives relevant to territory, borders, security architectures, and national defense. That is not to suggest that economic and technological factors are irrelevant, however; they shape, constrain, and advantage the United States and China across their rivalry’s key forces and contests of interests. Particularly noteworthy are economic and technological factors’ impact on the military balance. Tradition and intuition hold that nations with bigger and more advanced economies are better postured to resource, procure, and manufacture military equipment and can therefore generate greater military power. In the case of the US-China military competition, however, total military power is less relevant than the specific military balance in the Indo-Pacific, in which the distribution and strength of forces in the theater, the capability and reliability of key materiel inputs of outsized importance, and the operational concepts and tactics with which each’s military fights are more important. Total military power—and in particular greater military equipment—matters on the margin, of course, if only because the party with the greater mass and quality of materiel will be able to retain more forces in the Indo-Pacific, maintain more of these key materiel inputs, and develop novel operational concepts and tactics tailored to their superior materiel. Neither the United States’ nor China’s total economic production, public balance sheet, high-technology commercial firms, and scientific production are likely to provide a decisive or lasting advantage on this count. Each country’s economy can support substantially greater military spending, limiting the extent to which one can derive an advantage from the other’s more binding constraints. The capacity and maturity of each country’s defense industrial base is of greater relevance, but these are flexible quotients that investment can improve. This elasticity of defense production suggests that microeconomic endowments may be binding in the short run but variable in the longer run, meaning that policy choices—rather than existing economic endowments—constrain military production. Technological endowments, informing each country’s capacity for broad innovation, are of similarly bounded importance because military technology is somewhat narrow and other factors, such as military procurement processes and inflexibility in concepts of operation, limit the extent to which superior technology translates into military advantage. The fundamental result of this argument is that the concerns that propel the emerging US-China economic and technological competition are ultimately not all that relevant to the matters at the core to their rivalry and to the instruments of national power most relevant to these issues. The US should therefore be wary of policies ostensibly demanded by economic and technological competition and may find its interests better served by limiting its rivalry with China to military competition driven by its core geopolitical interests.
Topic:
Economics, Science and Technology, Strategic Competition, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

534. 'Win Without Fighting': The Chinese Communist Party's Political and Institutional Warfare Against the West

Author:
John Lee and Lavina Lee
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
When compared to Western forms of diplomatic conversation and strategic discussion, phrases emanating from Beijing and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) can appear peculiar, platitudinous, and so ambiguous as to be devoid of practical content. China’s paramount leader Xi Jinping speaks frequently about a ‘community of shared future,’ a ‘common destiny for mankind’ as part of his ‘China dream,’ or of his country’s ‘rejuvenation.’ He promises to pursue and achieve a ‘new type of great-power relations’ with the United States that will ‘expand the converging interests of all and build a big global family of harmony and cooperation.’ Yielding to the temptation to dismiss these phrases as glib and meaningless or as empty promises to the world would be a serious mistake. Emerging as the victorious side after the world was reshaped in the aftermath of the Second World War, and, more recently, the formal end of the Cold War, the United States and its allies have generally enjoyed dominance in all forms of power. The challenge and threat of China is largely understood in the context of its increase in material power, which is relatively easy to understand and quantify. In contrast, far less attention is being paid to non-material power, which is, admittedly, more nebulous and difficult to assess. However, China’s focus has been on relentlessly building its ‘comprehensive national power’ (CNP), that is, the sum-total of its powers and strengths—economic, military affair, science and technology, education, and resource—and influence. Thus, CNP encompasses both material and non-material power, and China’s buildup of both of these forms of power best explains its strategic and diplomatic successes. Chinese ‘rejuvenation’ is also not just about building GDP or having the world’s largest naval fleet. Rather, the CCP’s vision of a ‘community of shared future for mankind’ is very much about displacing the dominance enjoyed by the US and other advanced democracies in shaping global discourse and conversations, norms and standards, and influence within and through institutions. The advanced democracies have taken these less obvious forms of power for granted, a complacency that Beijing has exploited. As the CCP recognizes, “In the final analysis, the rise of a great power is a cultural phenomenon. It (that power) must be accepted by the international community. Be accommodated by the international system, rely on the international system, and be recognised by international norms.” To be sure, there is a rich and growing literature on the CCP’s various information, influence, and institutional resources and activities, and this report does not seek to reproduce the excellent work already in the public domain. Rather, it begins from the uncomfortable but growing realization that the CCP believes it has long been at war with the US and its allies, even though kinetic force has been used in only a few instances. It looks at why this war is being waged, what the hallmarks of success for Beijing look like, and how the use of non-material strategies in the form of political and institutional warfare complements and augments China’s better known material approaches in the CCP’s determined attempts to win this ongoing war or struggle. The report seeks to emphasize that, in understanding the challenge and threat of China, political and institutional warfare should not be treated as optional or interesting adjuncts to traditional notions of warfare or that their effects are peripheral to core strategic and even military objectives. On the contrary, non-material approaches are essential to the Chinese strategy and have real-world outcomes that are often the same ones that the use of force or economic coercion is intended to achieve. Just as the CCP views comprehensive power as encompassing material and non-material elements, its notion of waging and winning a war may or may not include a military element. We need to do the same when countering, deterring, and, if necessary, defeating Chinese strategies and actions. Moreover, the CCP’s approach is not just about putting its views forward in overt or veiled ways in the hope that it will change our minds about various issues. Instead, Beijing’s strategy is much more proactive and profound than that. The CCP’s political and institutional approaches are about fundamentally changing and shaping even the way we begin to think about or analyze an issue or what we perceive to be its ‘first principles.’ It is designed to shape the way we talk (or do not talk) about an issue, the presumptive and analytical frameworks we employ to do so, and the discourse regarding it that is accepted and deemed acceptable. At first glance, such a deeply cognitive approach might seem fanciful and impossible to implement. However, this report offers two recent case studies of instances where the CCP enjoyed considerable success in melding the material and the cognitive—with tangible and real-world results. This report then offers a summary of the real-world strategic effects and their impacts on the tactical decision-making of countries and their elites that should concern those in charge of our political, economic, military, and diplomatic policies and activities. In conclusion, it suggests some general responses to the CCP’s strategy, approach, and actions in these contexts.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Economy, Institutions, Strategic Competition, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

535. Regaining the High Ground Against China: A Plan to Achieve US Naval Aviation Superiority This Decade

Author:
Bryan Clark and Timothy A. Walton
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps face growing challenges ranging from China and Russia to regional threats such as Iran and North Korea, all of whom seek to undermine their neighbors’ stability and revise geopolitical relationships in their favor. Despite the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and resulting economic downturn, each of these potential adversaries continued to improve its military capabilities, especially the number and reach of precision missiles able to strike U.S. allies and slow or prevent intervention by U.S. naval forces. Supported by commercial and military surveillance networks in every domain, weapons located on adversary territory are capable of threatening U.S. and allied ships, troop formations, and aircraft hundreds of miles away. U.S. naval aviation risks sliding into irrelevance unless Navy and Marine Corps leaders embrace organizational and investment changes that would enable more effective operational concepts against peer adversaries. To support the approaches, naval air forces will need greater reach, adaptability, and capacity, which this study proposes to address by changing the composition of carrier air wings and repurposing aircraft based ashore or on surface combatants and amphibious ships. Rebalancing naval aviation primarily involves force management, supported by additional procurement or modification of existing aircraft and payloads. This contrasts with prevailing Navy and Marine Corps plans, which sustain the existing force with minimal improvements while prioritizing development of next-generation capabilities. Not only does this approach fail to address the urgent nature of Russian and Chinese threats, but it also perpetuates the Navy’s expectation that revolutionary new capabilities will fix problems that demand tactical, organizational, or adaptive technical solutions. That strategy failed to deliver in the cases of the Littoral Combat Ship, Zumwalt-class destroyer, and Ford-class carrier. The F/A-XX program for a sixth-generation air superiority fighter-even if successful-is unlikely to transform naval aviation but could consume resources needed to address peer adversaries during the next decade. The shortfalls facing naval airpower against the People’s Republic of China are significant, but not insurmountable. Analysts have pronounced the death of the aircraft carrier several times since the end of World War II, but by exploiting its adaptability and mobility U.S. naval forces could remain relevant against peer opponents despite the emergence of long-range sensor and precision weapon networks. However, achieving the reach and capacity necessary to counter Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific will depend on carriers focusing on the mission only they can do sustainably and at scalelong-range counter-air and strike warfare. Navy and Marine Corps leaders have an opportunity to substantially improve the ability of maritime airpower to influence events in the Indo-Pacific. However, rebalancing naval aviation will require overcoming cultural, organizational, and programmatic hurdles. As described in this report, the necessary changes are possible and affordable, but only if naval leaders embrace the urgency of their challenges and do not continue to hope they can continue to push their problems-and solutions-out into the future.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Navy, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

536. Decrypting Crypto: Cryptocurrencies and the Quantum Computer Threat

Author:
Arthur Herman and Daley Pagano
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Cryptocurrencies are increasingly embedded in the global financial and economic mainstream. One reason is that its security encryption, distributed ledger technology, or blockchain, is largely impervious to conventional cyber-attack or theft. However, thanks to Shor’s algorithm, cryptocurrencies will be exceptionally vulnerable to a future quantum computing attack. What makes crypto vulnerable to Shor’s algorithm is elliptic-curve cryptography, which applies to all distributed ledger technology. Based on our research, the overall cost of a major hack and devaluation of Bitcoin alone would equal $3 trillion plus. Fortunately, solutions already exist: post-quantum cryptography and quantum computing. Cryptocurrencies are here to stay. However, supporting crypto security with post-quantum cryptography or quantum cryptography will enable cryptocurrencies to remain a mainstay of the global financial system for many decades to come.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Innovation, Cryptocurrencies, Information Technology, and Quantum Computers
Political Geography:
Global Focus

537. One-Size-Fits-None: Overhauling JADC2 to Prioritize the Warfighter and Exploit Adversaries’ Weaknesses

Author:
Bryan Clark and Dan Patt
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Amazon founder Jeff Bezos famously attributes his company’s success to its customer obsession, which drove initiatives ranging from the creation of a cloud infrastructure and processing orders at unprecedented scale to establishing an entirely new logistics network that rapidly moves purchases to destinations. Amazon’s focus on shoppers is understandable, as it only makes about 1 percent of the merchandise it sells. Unlike a product-aligned business model like Apple’s, which seeks to anticipate or shape customer demand, Amazon’s bottom line depends on it being able to understand and respond to consumers better and faster than competitors. Given the urgent challenges China and Russia pose to US allies, the US Department of Defense (DoD) should adopt a fulfillment model like that of Amazon. Although analysts often treat the DoD as a single customer in a monopsonistic relationship with its thousands of suppliers across the defense industrial base, the DoD more closely resembles a market where military services, combat support agencies, and defense contractors collaborate to deliver capabilities to their ultimate customers—combatant commands such as US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), US Strategic Command (STRATCOM), and US European Command (EUCOM). Viewing the DoD as a market rather than a customer suggests that services and agencies should focus their efforts on understanding and meeting combatant commanders’ needs. This would reverse the Pentagon’s longstanding practice, codified in the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), in which services and agencies predict future operational requirements and task government labs or contractors with developing solutions that will fill anticipated capability gaps. JCIDS harkens back to the 20th century’s industrial model of product development exemplified by Henry Ford, who famously said that purchasers of his Model-T could have it in any color they wanted, as long as it was black. The DoD’s customers are similarly disenfranchised. The US Joint Staff, which administers JCIDS and acts as the combatant commanders’ representative in Pentagon decision fora, lacks acquisition authorities and funding and thus can impact defense programs only by defining requirements for future systems. Because requirements are predictive, they attempt to capture the full range of use cases for a new product, leading JCIDS to produce comprehensive, generalized solutions rather than customized capabilities designed to meet combatant commanders’ operational challenges. The argument for military services “pushing” new systems to customers instead of letting end-users “pull” what they need centers on the perception that combatant commanders are focused on near-term capacity rather than next-generation capability. This assessment may have been valid in 2003 when JCIDS was first implemented. Emerging systems like the F-35 strike-fighter and DDG-1000 each took nearly two decades to reach fruition, and combatant commanders lacked the analytic processes and far-term perspective to determine what would be useful or feasible 10 to 20 years in the future. Moreover, the US military in 2003 was by far the world’s most capable force, and threats requiring substantially different US capabilities would take a decade or more to materialize. However, the assumptions underlying the DoD’s industrial model of capability development are no longer valid. INDOPACOM assesses that China could mount a successful invasion of Taiwan during the 2020s, and Russia continues to threaten imminent action against Ukraine and NATO’s eastern members. Combatant commanders’ perspectives on capability requirements should therefore be a top priority for services, agencies, and the defense industry. At the same time, in the commercial sector, computing, manufacturing, and materials technologies are delivering new products within months or several years rather than decades. New defense industrial base entrants that leverage commercial advancements and software-centric innovation could quickly provide relevant capabilities by responding directly to combatant commander’s current and emerging operational challenges. Unfortunately, the DoD’s pursuit of efficiency and centralized decision-making hinder the direct connections between combatant commander customers and commercial or government suppliers that foster innovation. The results will therefore continue to be one-size-fits-all solutions that take longer and are more expensive than concepts and capabilities tailored to meet specific needs. In addition to furthering the Pentagon’s well-documented problems delivering new systems and concepts on cost and schedule, universal solutions will be less likely to target the specific threats posed by such peer adversaries as China or Russia. Without restoring combatant commander customers to the center of the DoD’s capability development efforts, US forces will not be able to keep up with the challenges posed by peer adversaries like China or Russia and may even find themselves behind regional powers with geographic advantages and little to lose. The US military cannot afford another failed and ponderous attempt to “boil the ocean” with universal solutions and should take a page from Amazon by focusing on customer needs first.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Armed Forces, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and United States of America

538. Unreliable Data Have Infected the Policy Debates Over Drug Patents

Author:
Adam Mossoff
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The COVID-19 pandemic has vividly brought to the public’s attention the key role of medical innovation in saving lives and increasing the quality of daily life. The pandemic has also precipitated an international debate over the role of patents and other intellectual property rights in the discovery, manufacture, and distribution of drugs and vaccines to patients. Even before COVID-19, there has been an ongoing policy debate in Washington, D.C., over drug prices and patents with congressional hearings, proposed legislation, and antitrust enforcement actions. The pandemic has thus made apparent what reliable data have already shown: poorly crafted legislation or antitrust enforcement actions could have a tremendous negative impact on the innovation economy in general and on healthcare specifically by undermining the incentives that drive the billions invested annually in the research and development of life-saving drugs and other medical treatments. Congress and regulators should engage in evidence-based policymaking on these important issues, which have far-reaching implications for economic growth and quality of life. This policy memo identifies a serious concern about the data in these discussions.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Intellectual Property/Copyright, Innovation, Data, and Pharmaceuticals
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

539. Can the U.S. Regain Battlefield Superiority against China? Applying New Metrics to Build an Adaptable and Resilient Military

Author:
Bryan Clark, Dan Patt, and Timothy A. Walton
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Organizational behavior is driven by metrics and measurements, which can compel change more effectively than a flurry of management directives from the C-suite. With Pentagon leaders calling for new ways of building and fighting the force, the time has come to re-examine some of the US military’s fundamental metrics and assess how they could better incentivize the characteristics needed for future combat.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Armed Forces, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

540. Regaining Decision Advantage: Revising JADC2 to Buttress Deterrence in Our Window of Greatest Need

Author:
Herbert "Hawk" Carlisle, Scott Swift, and Eric Wesley
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
We believe that Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) is a critical priority for the Department of Defense (DoD) as it represents the best path towards deterring potential People’s Republic of China (PRC) aggression and addressing the other military challenges of our time. To the DoD, JADC2 represents the capability to sense and make sense of information at all levels, in all phases of war, across all domains, and with all partners, thereby ensuring information advantage at the speed of relevance.1 JADC2 is therefore the US military’s essential technical enabler to leverage joint and coalition capabilities in complex military operations. Practically speaking, this means choosing important operational problems and wiring together the right sensors and decision aids to deliver the right effects to solve them. The result will create operational dilemmas for our adversaries, and new options for US commanders.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Armed Forces, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
China, North America, and United States of America

541. Building a Team for Next Generation Air Dominance

Author:
Bryan Clark and Dan Patt
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
US air and naval forces face contested environments over wider areas than ever before. Opponents fighting near their home territory can use long-range surface-to-surface missiles and air defense systems—enabled by a combination of commercial or military satellites and airborne sensors—to threaten US or allied airfields, ships, and aircraft thousands of miles away, as depicted in Figure 1.1 By showing they can slow or prevent US intervention in their regions, aggressors like the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Russia, and Iran hope they can convince neighbors to accept their demands for access, influence, or territory. And if coercion proves unsuccessful, these revisionist powers could employ long-range precision weapons as part of a military offensive to achieve their objectives. Although formidable, long-range weapon and sensor complexes like that of the PRC would not be impenetrable. For example, countermeasures and stealth capabilities could degrade the ability of enemy sensors to target and communicate the location of US ships or aircraft, and self-defense systems could prevent small attacks from being successful. As Figure 1 suggests, against the larger strikes likely to be mounted during war, US ships, aircraft, and bases could also be positioned farther from enemy missile batteries to shrink weapon salvos to within US units’ defensive capacities.3 However, reducing their detectability and attacking from longer ranges would reduce the number and intensity of effects US ships or aircraft could generate. Consequently, adversary leaders may have greater confidence in their ability to win a war on acceptable terms.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, and Air Force
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

542. Chinese Political Warfare: The PLA’s Information and Influence Operations

Author:
John Lee
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Material power is relatively easy to understand and quantify. Much less attention is given to nonmaterial power, which is admittedly more nebulous and difficult to assess. Even so, if power is broadly defined as the capacity to exercise or impose one’s will over another, then nonmaterial forms of power need to be taken seriously. This means understanding them, increasing one’s capacity to operationalize and exercise them, and institutionalizing their use to achieve national and security interests. The issue of nonmaterial power (especially information and influence operations, which will fall under the term political warfare) is arising because these forms of power have been taken for granted or have been largely ignored by the advanced democracies. Beijing is exploiting our complacency. There is already a rich and growing body of literature on the various information, influence, and institutional resources and activities of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This brief does not seek to reproduce the excellent work already out there
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Armed Forces, and Information Warfare
Political Geography:
China and Asia

543. Defending Guam

Author:
Rebeccah L. Heinrichs, Bryan Clark, and Matthew Costlow
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Guam, “where America’s day begins,” constitutes an indispensable strategic hub for the United States. The largest of the Mariana Islands in the western Pacific, it allows the United States to successfully project power within the Indo-Pacific region and so makes credible US security commitments to key US allies located there. Guam is home to Andersen Air Force Base (AFB), from which F-22 Raptors and strategic bomber rotations project US power from the skies, and to the deep-water port Apra Harbor, which plays a critical role in US Navy missions aimed at keeping trade routes open. Thus, this US territory is essential to the security of the American citizenry. Guam’s great strategic value to the United States and its proximity to North Korea and the People's Republic of China (PRC) make it a prime target of missile attack by these US adversaries. Of particular concern, however, is the threat posed by possible Chinese long-range missile strikes, and so, to enable the successful projection of US power within the region and provide credible assurance to key allies, Guam’s defenses must be strengthened. Due to its significance to US security and its status as a US territory, military officials have increased their emphases on the need to speed up the construction of an adequate defense. Then-Commander of US Pacific Command Admiral Davidson regularly connected Guam to the US homeland, stating to Congress, “Hawaii, Guam, and our Pacific territories are part of our homeland and must be defended.”
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Geopolitics, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:
Pacific Ocean and Guam

544. Learning to Win: Using Operational Innovation to Regain the Advantage at Sea against China

Author:
Bryan Clark, Timothy A. Walton, and Trent Hone
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The US Navy has spent the last decade attempting to pivot from efficiently maintaining the post–Cold War peace to effectively preventing and fighting a war against China or Russia. The circa-2000 Navy faced pervasive low-end threats from terrorists, insurgents, and regional opponents; today it is up against great power adversaries who used the past twenty years of relative stability to modernize and expand their fleets. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy is now larger than its American counterpart and is narrowing the US Navy’s capability advantages.1 Russia’s Navy, while smaller than that of the United States or China, boasts some of the most capable submarines in the world and hypersonic missile-equipped frigates.2 Proliferation of computing, sensing, material, and countermeasure technologies has leveled the playing field for military capability development. Building faster, more precise, stealthier, or smarter ships, aircraft, and weapons than opponents⎯the US Navy’s playbook since the Cold War⎯will no longer yield substantial or persistent advantages. The Navy will need to continue pursuing improved capabilities, but regaining and maintaining an edge against Chinese and Russian forces will depend as much or more on the US fleet establishing new operational concepts and tactics that exploit its strengths and its enemies’ vulnerabilities.3
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Navy, Maritime, and Innovation
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

545. Restarting the Post-Pandemic Indian Economy

Author:
Aparna Pande, Eric B. Brown, and Thomas J. Duesterberg
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
This report is a result of a Takshashila-Hudson Roundtable Series that brought together experts, policymakers, and academics from India and the United States in November and December 2021 to discuss opportunities for the two nation-states to collaborate in a fast-changing global order. This section summarizes key recommendations for policymakers based on deliberations at the Takshashila-Hudson roundtable series Restarting the Post-Pandemic Indian Economy. The recommendations are divided into four themes for India-US Collaboration: Trade, Investments, Technology, and Human Capital Movement.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Immigration, Economy, Investment, Human Capital, Trade, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:
South Asia, India, North America, and United States of America

546. Prepare Ukraine for Victory in a Long War

Author:
Luke Coffey
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
On February 24, Russia invaded Ukraine for the second time in eight years. While many assumed that the war would be short, a stiff Ukrainian defense halted and then successfully counter-attacked against the Russian advances on Kyiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv. After capturing Kherson, Russia’s main advance from occupied Crimea in the south toward Mykolaiv also stalled. At the time of writing, Ukrainian forces are beginning a counterattack in that region and are located approximately 12 miles outside Kherson city center. Mariupol, on the Sea of Azov coastline, fell to the Russians on May 22 after Ukrainian forces made a heroic last stand in the Azovstal iron and steel works. This capture allowed Russia to create a land bridge from the Russian Federation to occupied Crimea. Mariupol’s capture also turned the Sea of Azov into a Russian lake.”1 In the Donbas, which is arguably Russia’s main effort at this stage of the war, Russian troops have made limited advances at a very high cost in equipment and manpower. In late June, Russian forces captured Sievierodonetsk after weeks of heavy fighting, leaving Russia in control of Ukraine’s Luhansk Oblast. Ukrainians are currently defending a front line that is approximately 1,250 miles long—this is equal to the straight- line distance from Washington, DC, to Houston, Texas. Russian public opinion still supports the war.”2 While Russia’s advancements in the Donbas have been slow and costly, there is no indication that Moscow will stop its offensive anytime soon. President Vladimir Putin knows that his legacy rides on Russia’s victory or defeat in Ukraine.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

547. Russia Can Still Be Defeated, But Time Is Short

Author:
Can Kasapoglu
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
At Davos last May, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger sparked a controversy when he argued that Kyiv must cede territory to Moscow to achieve peace. Kissinger may well be correct to assert that a stable balance between Russia and Ukraine will require some trade-offs based on the principles of Realpolitik. But we should not delude ourselves into thinking that Putin—a former KGB officer who considers the collapse of the Soviet Union to have been the greatest catastrophe of the twentieth century—launched this war simply to secure a border readjustment. Putin’s essay, published in April 2021, expresses his view with admirable clarity: Ukraine, in the eyes of the Kremlin, is Russia. In sum, he launched this invasion to subordinate Ukraine to Moscow—totally and permanently. We should also not conclude that Russia’s battlefield setbacks have been so severe as to deflect Putin from his original goal. After he failed to subordinate Ukraine swiftly with a quick knockout blow directed at the capital, Kyiv, he moved to Plan B: a strategy of exhaustion. He is now determined to grind Ukraine down slowly and deliberately with the expectation that eventually it will have no choice but to bow to his iron fist. For its part, the West should thwart Putin’s strategy by safeguarding Ukraine’s political and economic independence. Kissinger’s comments did not bring us closer to achieving that goal. If members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) follow his lead and attempt to cajole Kyiv into ceding territory now, while Russia still believes it has the upper hand on the battlefield, their efforts will only whet Putin’s appetite for expansion. Putin will begin to entertain compromises acceptable to the West only when he comes to believe that failure to do so will lead inevitably to catastrophic losses for Russia. The bad news is that the military balance on the ground right now will not lead him to such a conclusion. If NATO members act quickly, however, there is still time to shift the dynamic in Ukraine’s favor—but it will not be easy.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, International Organization, National Security, Alliance, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

548. Understanding and Countering China's Approach to Economic Decoupling from the United States

Author:
John Lee
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Many experts have highlighted American efforts to partially decouple from China. Yet China began pursuing a far more ambitious and comprehensive decoupling strategy vis-à-vis the United States long before Donald Trump entered the White House. This monograph examines China’s evolving approach to economic decoupling from the US. It makes the following arguments and conclusions. First, on the back of a preexisting mercantilist political economic structure, China has been explicitly pursuing economic decoupling from US and allied economies on Chinese terms for at least a decade. Second, while the US seeks to decouple some aspects of its economic activity from China, the latter seeks to dominate vast segments of the Asian economy and to decouple these segments from the US. This is the Chinese strategy and threat that the US vastly underappreciates. Third, the most important segments are the high-tech and high-value sectors. These sectors are where competition is the most consequential and where decoupling on US terms needs to occur. Fourth, China faces increasingly serious problems and obstacles regarding its decoupling strategy. Many of these arise out of structural weaknesses inherent in its political economy. The monograph is written to assist the Biden administration and those who follow it to possess a deeper understanding of: China’s actions and the motives behind them; China’s strengths, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities; and How the US and its allies can craft an evolving approach that better plays to their individual and collective strengths and advantages. China hopes the US and its allies will adopt a cautious, gradualist, and ineffective approach to countering Beijing’s strategy and objectives. The Chinese Communist Party knows the US and other advanced economies still have immense advantages despite clever Chinese messaging to the contrary. The US and its allies continue to enjoy considerable leverage and remain well placed to partially decouple from China on their preferred terms, but they need to act quickly, collectively, and decisively.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Economics, and National Security
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

549. Six Months after the Russian Invasion, the West Needs Better Clock Management

Author:
Peter Rough, Luke Coffey, and Rebeccah L. Heinrichs
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Ukraine’s status as a borderland between Europe and Russia has often confined it to the periphery of Western strategic thought. For many, Ukraine constitutes the southeastern edge of the European continent, but not its heartland. For Russian President Vladimir Putin, however, Ukraine sits at the center of his strategic vision for Eurasia. Far from a backwater, the country is the key to his imperial aims—a prize for which he has risked his army and bet his rule. In Putin’s mind, if Russia were to control Ukraine, Moscow would dominate the Black Sea—and so would be in a stronger position in every connected region, from Eastern Europe to the South Caucasus and from the Balkans to the Caspian Basin. Russia would also complete its breakout into the Eastern Mediterranean, long a priority of Moscow, by securing the connection between its warm water ports in the Black Sea to its new bases on the Syrian coast.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

550. State Right-to-Repair Laws Need to Respect Federal Copyright Laws: A Constitutional, Legal, and Policy Assessment

Author:
Devlin Hartline and Adam Mossoff
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Various states are considering laws that would mandate that producers of electronic devices provide consumers and repair shops with all the tools and know-how necessary to repair these devices. Proponents of these “right-to-repair laws” argue that consumers should be able to do whatever they want with their devices, whether a smartphone, a smart TV, or a gaming console. Right-to-repair advocates, however, ignore inconvenient facts. These state laws conflict with federal copyright law and are unconstitutional, and they are bad policy as well. First, as a simple legal matter, the proposed right-to-repair laws are unconstitutional. These laws mandate the disclosure and distribution of the code in the computer programs that make our devices work, such as operating systems, apps, and the “digital locks” that protect these computer programs from unauthorized access and copying. Federal copyright law protects all these computer programs and “preempts” any conflicting state laws under the Constitution. Second, state right-to-repair laws are wrong as a matter of policy. These laws upset the long-standing balance of rights implemented by federal copyright law. For over 200 years, Congress has enacted copyright laws to secure to authors and innovators the fruits of their creative labors. These laws have properly balanced the rights of creators, the rights of companies that produce and distribute their copyrighted works, and the rights of consumers and the public. As a result, federal copyright law has been a launching pad for the economic and cultural revolutions in books, movies, music, and now digital games and the internet of things. Everyone values their electronic devices because copyright law provides the legal foundation for today’s thriving digital marketplace. Consumers have access to an incredible selection of movies, music, games, and many other previously unimagined digital goods and services. The same is true for products that consumers have long used and that have become “smart” today, such as phones, TVs, automobiles, and other devices. Overbroad right-to-repair laws fail to acknowledge the legal rights and the underlying policies in federal copyright law that have made all this possible.
Topic:
Economics, Science and Technology, Intellectual Property/Copyright, and Innovation
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

551. Seven Myths about the Iran Nuclear Deal

Author:
Center for Peace and Security in the Middle East
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
In 2015, President Barack Obama worked with three European powers, the European Union, Iran, China, and Russia to conclude the Iran nuclear deal, officially known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). In 2018, President Donald Trump formally withdrew the United States from the deal. Instituting his policy of “maximum pressure,” Trump imposed crippling economic sanctions that punished Iran not just for its ongoing nuclear weapons program but also for, among other things, its regional aggression and support for terrorism worldwide. Earlier in 2018, Israeli agents conducted a dramatic operation in Tehran, breaking into a secret warehouse and capturing a trove of Iranian nuclear files. These documents revealed a more advanced and comprehensive nuclear weapons program than had been previously known. The nuclear archive also showed Iranian officials’ plan for concealing nuclear weapons efforts under the guise of civilian research and development, and how Iranian officials systematically deceived the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). As a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran is required to cooperate with IAEA inspectors to verify the peaceful nature of its program. After the Israelis shared the nuclear archive with the IAEA, its inspectors found traces of uranium at several undeclared sites. Despite being obligated to do so, Tehran has refused to explain the presence of the uranium or reveal its current location. Iran’s requirements under the NPT are wholly separate from the JCPOA, but Tehran is using the Biden administration’s profound desire to return to the nuclear deal to bring political pressure on the IAEA to close the book on Iran’s violations. A fair-minded observer of Iran’s relations with the IAEA cannot but conclude that Tehran has never wavered from its intention to build a nuclear weapons capability and that its publicly declared “civilian” nuclear activities are an effort to hide its nuclear bomb program in plain sight. From the very inception of the JCPOA, however, the deal’s supporters have spun myths that disguise these self-evident truths. After Trump left the deal, those same supporters continued to recite the old myths while adding some new ones about the purported comparative advantage of the JCPOA over maximum pressure. As President Biden prepares to bring the United States back into the JCPOA, and as the public, the press, and Congress consider the deal's terms, we identify the seven most pernicious myths and explain the reality that they seek to conceal.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

552. Chinese Information and Influence Warfare in Asia and the Pacific

Author:
John Lee
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The People’s Liberation Army’s increasingly provocative and reckless activities in and around disputed zones such as Taiwan, the Senkaku Islands, and the South China Sea constitute only one means through which Beijing seeks to change key aspects of the regional order and compel others to “accept its interests.” However, the Chinese Communist Party and PLA are already decades into China’s information and influence war, which is designed to either weaken the will and capabilities of the United States and its allies should military conflict break out or, even better, eliminate the need for China to use military force to achieve its primary objectives (i.e., to “win without fighting”). In this context, the PLA is several steps ahead of the West; whereas Western analysts observe that the PLA is operating in the “grey zone,” the PLA is instead redefining and expanding this grey zone by manipulating how other countries think about it. With respect to this so-called grey zone, a cost-benefit analysis encompassing both objective and subjective elements typically determines an entity’s decision to respond with military force. For example, crafting narratives about the PLA’s military superiority, elite capture, ability to foment disunity within a target country, or normalization of coercion raises the West’s threshold of what provocations demand a military response—thereby expanding the grey zone within which the PLA and CCP are allowed to operate. Thus, Beijing is well ahead of the US and its allies in conceptualizing and operationalizing the use of military actions other than (kinetic) war to achieve political or strategic objectives. Finally, Asia and the Pacific constitute both the primary and most suitable region within which the Chinese can conduct information and influence warfare. These sub-regions’ unique material, geographical, ideational, and cultural characteristics render them especially suitable for Beijing to successfully wage political warfare. This policy memo describes the key objectives, strategies, and tactics of Chinese information and influence warfare developed and refined for use in the Asia-Pacific region. It focuses on maritime Southeast Asia and the Pacific, the areas of highest interest for the US, Australia, and their allies. Offering Singapore, Thailand, and the Solomon Islands as three pertinent case studies, the memo also lays the groundwork for an examination of effective US and allied counters to Beijing’s activities in these contexts, which follow-up reports in this series will present.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, National Security, Territorial Disputes, and Information Warfare
Political Geography:
China and Asia

553. France Should Embrace the Transatlantic Relationship—and Help Lead It

Author:
Angélique Talmor
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
French President Emmanuel Macron’s assertion three years ago that the transatlantic alliance was “braindead” rings as utterly misguided today.1 The resurgence of war in Europe has reinforced NATO’s raison d’être and forced Europeans to face the fact that there is no realistic alternative to transatlantic cooperation. Further, more European policy leaders recognize China’s increasing threat,2 which bolsters the case for Western “friend shoring” on defense and other issues. This process will require leadership on both sides of the Atlantic. France, the largest military power in the European Union and the second-largest EU economy, is more reluctant to embrace Atlanticism than most of its NATO counterparts. This hesitance risks limiting the success and scope of efforts to reinforce transatlantic cooperation. Nonetheless, in the evolving geopolitical context, France’s best shot at preserving its interests and influence would be through embracing Atlanticism and helping lead the reinforcement of transatlantic cooperation in the realm of defense and beyond. American policymakers should encourage and extend a hand to their oldest ally to embrace such a shift.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, European Union, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Europe, France, North America, and United States of America

554. US Has an Opportunity to Support the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan

Author:
Luke Coffey
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Just over one year ago, the Taliban swept back into power in Afghanistan. Leading up to this takeover, in February 2020 President Donald Trump agreed to a deal with the Taliban that would have seen the phased withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan by May 2021. This agreement served as the starting point that eventually led to the Afghan government’s collapse and the Taliban’s return to power. In January 2021, President Joe Biden entered office. Instead of canceling the flawed agreement with the Taliban—something that was in his power to do—he merely delayed America’s withdrawal date from May to September. By July, almost all US and international forces had left. On August 15, the Taliban took Kabul. By the twentieth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks on September 11, 2021, the Taliban controlled more of Afghanistan than it did on September 11, 2001. Since the Taliban’s return to power, one credible and non-extremist group has been willing to take up arms in opposition: the National Resistance Front (NRF) of Afghanistan. Based in the Panjshir Province and operating in a dozen other provinces, the NRF has continued the fight against the Taliban against all odds and without any international support. While the US does not have many good policy options in Afghanistan because of the Biden administration’s actions, the US and international community need to consider how to support the NRF at this perilous time. This assistance can include establishing formal contact with the NRF leadership and inviting Ahmad Massoud to Washington, DC; refusing to recognize the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan; providing the NRF with winter gear; allocating a certain percentage of all frozen Afghan central bank funds to the NRF’s political wing, and consulting and coordinating privately with Tajikistan, which harbors sympathies for the ethnic Tajik minority that comprises much of the NRF.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Non State Actors, Armed Forces, and Taliban
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, South Asia, North America, and United States of America

555. How to Strengthen US Deterrence and Weaken the Attempts of Rival Nuclear Coercion

Author:
Rebeccah L. Heinrichs
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
On February 24, 2022, Russia started the largest European war since 1945 as it intensified its invasion of Ukraine to a new level and threatened escalation to nuclear war. Though Vladimir Putin has not detonated a nuclear weapon, he used, and continues to use,1 his nuclear arsenal to threaten the United States and other NATO nations against continuing to support Ukraine’s defense. Through pre-invasion nuclear saber-rattling, verbally threatening to employ nuclear weapons on the battlefield,3 and putting such weapons on alert,4 Russia caused President Joe Biden and his administration to declare repeatedly their fears of “World War III”5 and to adopt a gradual, highly cautious approach to helping Ukraine. The White House has chosen to provide only weapons suitable for operations to allow Ukraine to achieve some tactical victories and prevent Russia from a quick and final victory,6 but this aid does not allow Ukraine to achieve and sustain the military victories necessary to win the war.7 Thus, Russia appears to have successfully used nuclear threats to deter the United States from certain actions that are on lower levels on the spectrum of escalation, enabling itself to control escalation8 to serve its aims. Russia’s explicit and implicit nuclear threats deterred US officials from providing Ukraine with real-time targeting data and heavy artillery early in the war9 and electronic warfare capabilities later in the war.10 The nuclear threats also caused US officials to press Ukraine not to hit Russian targets deep behind Russian lines.11Russian officials have ample grounds to conclude that their nuclear coercion has affected the course of the war in their favor.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, National Security, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

556. Upholding a Rules-Based Order: Reinforcing a Free and Open Indo-Pacific

Author:
James J Przystup
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
This study is focused on regional order in the Indo-Pacific, as set out in the concept of a free and open Indo-Pacific, and on the policies that the United States, Japan, Australia, India, and European allies have adopted to support this rules-based order in the face of multifaceted challenges posed by the rise of a powerful and assertive China. This study considers the evolution of the foundational elements of a free and open Indo-Pacific, the conceptual origins as set out in Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s first government by Foreign Minister Taro Aso, the increasing alliance-based cooperation between and among alliance partners, the development of alliance-based strategic partnerships across the region, the evolving multilateralism as reflected in the emergence of the Quad (the United States, Japan, Australia, and India), and the increasing engagement of European allies. The free and open Indo-Pacific—as advanced by Foreign Minister Aso and Prime Minister Abe, and later adopted by the US—set out a framework for regional governance and order based on democracy, freedom, human rights, the rule of law, the market economy, the peaceful resolution of disputes, and opposition to force or coercion to change the status quo. To support this vision, alliance ties have strengthened across the Indo-Pacific. Today, the US-Japan alliance is at a historic high point, having moved toward the strategic alignment of its respective policy documents. Meanwhile, the US and Australia have made the Indo-Pacific the focal point of the alliance, and Japan-Australia security ties have deepened, as underscored by the 2022 Reciprocal Access Agreement. At the same time, the Quad has engaged on wide-ranging economic and security issues relating to the region in support of a rules-based free and open Indo-Pacific. And European engagement in the Indo-Pacific has continued to grow, as underscored by the United Kingdom’s “tilt” toward the region and participation in the AUKUS arrangement. Europe’s expanding engagement is well outlined in the Indo-Pacific strategy documents of France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the European Union—all reflecting the recognition of Europe’s growing economic, political, and security interests in the Indo-Pacific. This study also considers the implication of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the response of Western powers for international order in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. Against a background of contemporary doubts about the staying power of the international order, the response of Western democracies, in both Europe and Asia, has been striking in their support of the rules-based international order. In Europe, NATO’s support for Ukraine has been constant. At the same time, Indo-Pacific allies, concerned about the implications of Ukraine for regional security, have joined in sanctions against Russia. Quad leaders meeting to discuss Ukraine also reaffirmed their support for a free and open Indo-Pacific, with Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida asserting that challenges to the international order, such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, “should not be allowed in the Indo-Pacific.” The pursuit of a free and open Indo-Pacific order and reaffirmation of a rules-based order in both Asia and Europe now increasingly overlap. Then Foreign Secretary Liz Truss underscored to the Atlantic Council the importance of sustaining Western unity in the face of challenges to the international order—in Europe and in Asia. In her words, “Conflict anywhere threatens security everywhere. The Euro-Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific are indivisible.” The challenges going forward will be to sustain Western unity to support an international rules-based order—in Asia, this means reinforcing the free and open Indo-Pacific.
Topic:
Defense Policy, International Order, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:
Europe, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

557. NATO Needs a New Strategy for the Baltic Sea

Author:
Luke Coffey
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
With Sweden and Finland soon joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the alliance needs to act quickly to develop plans that acknowledge the new geopolitical reality in the Baltic Sea region. When Sweden and Finland become members, the alliance will need a comprehensive approach to security that considers the region as a whole—instead of dividing it into the traditional “Baltic” and “Nordic” camps. Since Peter the Great (1682–1725), Russia has had imperial designs on the region, and this is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. Russia’s tactical-level defeats in eastern Ukraine should not inspire strategic complacency in NATO policymakers. They should view the entry of Sweden and Finland into NATO as the starting point, and not the finish line, for bolstering Baltic Sea security.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Imperialism, International Organization, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Russia, Finland, Sweden, and Baltic States

558. An Assessment of US and Allied Information and Influence Warfare

Author:
John Lee
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The first two policy memos in this series on Chinese information and influence warfare pointed out that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) believes it is engaged in a perpetual “struggle” against the West and makes no fundamental distinction between wartime and peacetime. These reports also explained that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) plays a central and often dominant role in leading doctrine and operations when it comes to informational and influence warfare. Additionally, the previous memos argued that Asia and the Pacific are both the primary and most suitable subregions for the conduct of such Chinese activities. For the CCP and PLA, the region has unique material, geographical, ideational, and cultural characteristics that render it especially suitable for Beijing to successfully wage political warfare. Previous memos focused on the PLA’s Three Warfares framework, which consists of public opinion, psychological, and legal warfare. The Chinese intent is not merely to disrupt, confuse, or create mischief but to craft and control grand narratives. Doing so is extremely effective because these narratives determine how we reflexively interpret information and situations, what seems possible or not, what seems prudent rather than reckless, and what appears to be rational and in one’s long-term interest. Grand narratives determine how we think about a problem, issue, or development. In doing so, they predetermine the range of “reasonable” options and solutions that we believe are available. The previous memos also offered analysis and examples of how the CCP and PLA are using political warfare to achieve strategic objectives and to undermine the interests of the United States and its allies. Ominously, and in important respects, Beijing is not just “winning without fighting” but taking the more insidious approach of achieving strategic goals without victory.1 This third memo in the series examines US and allied information and influence doctrine and operations, especially by the defense establishments. In these democracies, the government has largely allowed the defense establishments to lead doctrine and capability for the information and influence elements of political warfare. The paper looks at the strengths and shortcomings of how the US and others conceive of information and influence warfare as it relates to responding to Chinese efforts in the region, as detailed in the first two memos. In doing so, it prepares the way for the fourth and final memo, which will look at specific policies and activities that the US and its allies could engage in to advance its interests and values and to counter some of the more damaging and insidious elements of Chinese political warfare in the region. The memo focuses on the US and, to a lesser extent, Australia because these Five Eyes countries are the most active and invested in understanding and countering Chinese information and influencing warfare efforts in the region. It is important to remember that such warfare is different in nature, purpose, and implementation from the usual diplomatic and soft-power efforts undertaken by democracies. The first memo argues as follows: Engaging in information and influence operations (or countering those by other countries) is a whole-of-government enterprise. [But it is] very different from the usual public messaging and soft power efforts led by diplomats and embassies. Engagement in this kind of political warfare is far more akin to missions undertaken by defense forces in that there must be specific objectives, tactics designed based on the objectives and resources available, and quick implementation by ready and well-resourced teams formed specifically for these tasks—even if this type of warfare is relentless and a protracted struggle.2
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, and Information Warfare
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

559. How to Target Iran’s Kleptocracy

Author:
Nate Sibley
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The death of Mahsa Amini in the custody of Iran’s so-called morality police sparked protests that continue to spread across the country, posing the most serious challenge to Tehran’s theocratic dictatorship in years. The demonstrations have focused on opposing the compulsory wearing of the hijab, but Iranians are also venting anger at a regime that has lost legitimacy after decades of political repression, economic mismanagement, and systemic corruption. Policymakers in the United States are rightly focused on constraining Iran’s nuclear program and state sponsorship of terrorism. Sanctions and other measures targeting the regime’s illicit financial networks tend to reflect these urgent priorities. But Iran’s theocratic regime is also a sprawling, deeply entrenched kleptocracy against which the US should apply more pressure. This brief examines the prevailing forms of corruption within Iran, the implications for US policy, and how the US can intensify efforts to expose and target the regime’s kleptocracy.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Corruption, Human Rights, and Kleptocracy
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

560. Rocket’s Red Glare: Modernizing America’s Energetics Enterprise

Author:
Nadia Schadlow, Brayden Helwig, Bryan Clark, and Timothy A. Walton
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Energetic materials are critical chemicals that release huge amounts of energy in a very short amount of time. Energetics come in three main forms: explosives, which create the lethal effects in warheads; propellants, which produce thrust for missiles and rockets; and pyrotechnics, such as fireworks, which illuminate or mark targets for military and civilian applications. Nearly every weapon on the modern battlefield, from small arms to missiles to munitions, relies on some form of energetic materials. Improvements in energetics can offer significant benefits on the battlefield. In some cases, better compounds can boost the range of missiles by 40 percent or more—allowing the targeting of an adversary from a safer distance—while also improving lethality and decreasing munition size. These advantages can help the US military realize many of its operational concepts, such as those developed to counter the People’s Republic of China (PRC). China’s armed forces, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), aims to prevent the US military from operating near its shores by fielding thousands of anti-ship missiles. This concept is often referred to as an anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy. If China’s leaders act on their stated intention to invade the island of Taiwan, denying the PLA this objective would require large numbers of long-range, precision-guided munitions fired from outside the A2/AD “bubble,” coupled with other platforms that could penetrate the PLA’s defenses with powerful munitions. These types of US responses depend on energetics and the munitions that use these compounds. Since the end of the Cold War, however, the industrial base for munitions has grown increasingly brittle as innovation and investments in energetics have stagnated. Although the United States developed key compounds like CL-20—one of the world’s most powerful non-nuclear explosives—in the late 1980s, the US military still overwhelmingly uses the same energetic materials it deployed during World War II.1 Moreover, recent assessments of the industrial base have found that the DoD imports roughly a third of its energetic materials from foreign sources, with a significant portion of these sourced from China or other countries.2 For instance, one expert we spoke with stated that most trinitrotoluene (TNT) in the explosive fill of common US bombs comes from foreign sources. Other challenges include an aging network of twentieth-century production facilities, a broken business model that discourages innovation and investment, a shrinking workforce, and stifling regulations.
Topic:
National Security, Weapons, Supply Chains, and Military
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

561. Seven Myths about the “Historic” Israel-Lebanon Maritime Border Agreement

Author:
Michael Doran
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Commentators in the United States and Israel have hailed the agreement on the maritime border between Israel and Lebanon, which the Biden administration recently brokered, as a great success. They liken it to the Abraham Accords and claim that it is a major step toward normalizing relations between the Jewish State and a historic Arab foe. But a close examination of the agreement simply does not support this view. Amos Hochstein, the US State Department senior advisor for energy security, led the mediation effort to resolve this dispute. He built on the initiatives of Presidents Barack Obama and Donald Trump to reconcile the conflicting claims of Israel, which claimed Line 1 (see map) as the northern border of its exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and Lebanon, which claimed Line 23 as its southern border. In the final months of the Trump administration, Lebanese negotiators revised their claim, moving it further south to Line 29. Beirut, however, never registered this new claim with the United Nations. In other words, Line 23 always remained the official Lebanese position. When Hochstein arrived in Beirut last February, the Lebanese government abruptly dropped its insistence on Line 29 and presented its retreat as a sign of its flexibility, a compromise proposal that it could withdraw if the negotiations failed to produce satisfactory results.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Terrorism, Treaties and Agreements, Territorial Disputes, and Borders
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, and Lebanon

562. Ten Myths about US Aid to Ukraine

Author:
Luke Coffey
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Ukraine is in a national struggle that will determine its geopolitical future: the country will either be a firm member of the Euro-Atlantic community or become a Russian colony. The outcome of this struggle will have long-term implications for America’s global interests, the future of the transatlantic community, and the notion of national sovereignty in the twenty-first century. Russia is a top geopolitical adversary for the United States. For Americans who believe in strong and secure national borders, the primacy of national sovereignty, and the right to self-defense, support for Ukraine in the face of Russian aggression is natural. Considering America’s other geopolitical concerns, such as a rising China and a healthy economic relationship with Europe that benefits the American worker, US support for Ukraine is an imperative. Ukrainians are not asking for, nor do they want, US troops to help them fight Russia. All they ask for is the equipment, weapons, munitions, and financial resources required to give them a fighting chance. Providing Ukraine what it needs to fight Russia effectively will not be cheap. So far this year, the US Congress has voted on three different supplementals for Ukraine: $13.6 billion in March, $40.1 billion in May, and $12.4 billion in September. The cost that American taxpayers incur to help Ukraine is money well spent and will pale in comparison to the cost of deterring a victorious Russia or an emboldened China on the global stage. As the war continues, Congress will likely pass additional spending. It is in America’s interest that Ukraine wins the war, and that Russia is decisively defeated. Even though polling overwhelmingly shows broad and bipartisan support for Ukraine, some in Congress are against further US aid for Ukraine.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Spending, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, North America, and United States of America

563. A Rotten Money Regime is Responsible for Pandemic and War Inflation

Author:
Brendan Brown
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Who is responsible for the Great Pandemic and War Inflation of 2021–22? Is it Federal Reserve Chair Jay Powell, former President Donald Trump, President Joe Biden, or President Vladimir Putin? The answer is that the buck stops at a rotten monetary regime—the so-called “2-percent-inflation standard.” Trying to blame particular individuals may help those who gain from the present monetary status quo. Yet blaming them absolves the monetary regime, which is trampling upon the green shoots whose growth is essential for the renaissance of competitive free-market capitalism. If the United States had a good money regime when first the pandemic and then the Russian war struck the economy, the great monetary inflation that these shocks spawned would not have occurred. The current money regime might well have done better with more capable leadership and good luck—but the regime’s deep flaws prevented the possibility of an overall good outcome. Furthermore, even if the pandemic and war had not struck, the bad money regime was producing bad outcomes—including economic sclerosis with sluggish growth rates for productivity and living standards while advancing monopoly capitalism. These outcomes could well have gotten a lot worse.. This policy memo focuses on the shocks of the pandemic and war rather than what could have happened without them. However, it does venture into the counterfactual of how a good money regime would have responded to those shocks, while helping demonstrate what has gone wrong. Demonstrating the links between the rottenness of the monetary system and the high inflation during the pandemic and Russian war requires sharing with the reader a preview of the differences between good and bad money regimes. A broader analysis of these should follow in subsequent policy memos
Topic:
Economics, Inflation, Fiscal Policy, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

564. The Mixed Record of China’s Belt and Road Initiative

Author:
Thomas J. Duesterberg
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a signature program of Xi Jinping, has had undoubted success in supporting Xi’s ambitions to reestablish China as a global leader while strengthening its mercantilist economy. Nonetheless, developed and developing countries are reconsidering the program because of its success—largely for China itself—and because of the global economic and political crises since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. BRI also has increasingly visible problems caused by its operating structure, prompting participants and developed countries whose geoeconomic and geopolitical interests are undermined by the program’s expansion to reassess it. Continued BRI growth is at best questionable and probably unlikely in the wake of growing pushback to the program as well as growing problems inside China itself.`
Topic:
Economics, Infrastructure, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Xi Jinping
Political Geography:
China and Asia

565. Democratic Backsliding in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Hudson Institute
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
A negative trend of democratic recession has steadily unfolded across the Indo-Pacific region since the 2010s. Subregionally, Southeast Asia has suffered from the most severe drop in democracy scores, while East Asia and South Asia have experienced a moderate decrease. Oceania remains the most democratic subregion and has achieved a slight increase in its democracy scores. There has been a remarkable shift of balance from democratic advancement to democratic backsliding in the Indo-Pacific. In the three years from 2019 to 2021, the percentage of political regimes experiencing democratic backsliding surpassed those making democratic advancement. Evidence also shows that democratic recession is much more pronounced in populous societies than in sparsely populated societies. Overall, both the number and percentage of people living under autocratic-leaning regimes and autocratic regimes have reached record high levels. Democratic recession in the Indo-Pacific is caused by the coupling of domestic and geopolitical forces. Domestically, democratic recession has principally been driven by deep-rooted cleavages inherent within the countries and territories where illiberal strongmen, including populist leaders, army generals, and nationalist state leaders, exploit such cleavages to reinforce their repression of democracy. Geopolitically, under a multipolar Indo-Pacific, illiberal powers including China and Russia are expanding their spheres of influence by providing support to illiberal strongmen across the region. Traditionally, “democracy” and “security” are seen as two separate fields in the policy world. The major findings of this report, which documents the coupling of domestic and geopolitical forces in causing democratic recession across the Indo-Pacific, raises questions on the validity of the conventional thought pertaining to democracy promotion and security competition. Today, the Indo-Pacific region presents the free world with a double-challenge of democratic recession and security competition, indicating that it’s the time to tear down the longstanding artificial wall between democracy and security. There is an urgent need to invest in new knowledge infrastructures that can provide integrated strategic analysis to policymakers and practitioners.  
Topic:
Authoritarianism, Democracy, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Indo-Pacific

566. Eleven Myths and Realities about Biden’s Missile Defense Review

Author:
Rebeccah L. Heinrichs
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
On October 27, 2022, the Biden administration released the public version of the Missile Defense Review (MDR). The document is commendable in some respects and is concerning in others. Below are some myths and realities about the Biden MDR.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Weapons, Missile Defense, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

567. US Needs to Play Larger Role as Swing Producer of Oil and Gas in the Current Crisis

Author:
Thomas J. Duesterberg
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
In response to Russian aggression in Ukraine, European nations have drastically reduced imports of crude oil, refined petroleum products, and natural gas from Russia. The 2021 levels of these energy imports were around 2.2 million barrels per day (mbd) of crude oil, 1.2 mbd of refined products, and 155 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas on an annual basis.In addition to extreme difficulties in obtaining new sources of natural gas and to a lesser extent oil, the price increases throughout Europe since the onset of the war have been of historic proportions. In the days following the invasion, natural gas prices shot up by 62 percent, and UK energy prices were up by 150 percent. The full impact of the war, along with the related need to rein in the highest inflation numbers in over 40 years, has pushed Europe into a recession that threatens households and small businesses as well as European manufacturers’ ability to remain competitive. As a result, if the region cannot quickly assemble alternative supplies, the European commitment to assist in containing Russian aggression may weaken.
Topic:
Economics, Oil, Gas, Crisis Management, Supply Chains, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

568. US Reengagement with Pakistan: Ideas for Reviving an Important Relationship

Author:
Husain Haqqani
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The US-Pakistan relationship has gone through many changes. The relationship had a high point when President Dwight Eisenhower described Pakistan as the ‘‘most allied ally of the United States,” and another high point occurred when President Ronald Reagan said that “the American people support close ties with Pakistan and look forward to expanding them.” The relationship has also had low points, such as when in January 2018 President Donald Trump said, “The United States has foolishly given Pakistan more than $33 billion in aid over the last 15 years, and they have given us nothing but lies and deceit, thinking of our leaders as fools. They give safe haven to the terrorists we hunt in Afghanistan, with little help. No more!” US administrations going back to President Eisenhower have pinned great hopes on their alliance with Pakistan only to be disappointed and frustrated. For policymakers in both countries, some of the most important recent issues have been Pakistan’s poorly veiled support for the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan, its backing for jihadi groups targeting Kashmir, its close embrace of China, and its expanding nuclear arsenal. Successive American administrations have assumed that with the right kind of incentives—economic and military—Pakistan would finally change how its policy diverges from US interests. However, neither the award of military and civilian aid nor the cutoff of aid has been able to change Pakistan’s existing national security paradigm and the policies framed by its security establishment. Pakistan, for its part, has been upset as it believes it has offered a fair exchange to the US for its aid by abetting US strategic plans: containment of communism in the 1950s and 1960s, military assistance against the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s, and post-2001 logistical and political support for the American military mission. Pakistan complains that Washington does not respect its contribution or fully appreciate its security threats, regional concerns, and aspirations.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Bilateral Relations, and Strategic Engagement
Political Geography:
Pakistan, South Asia, North America, and United States of America

569. Advancing the Quantum Advantage: Hybrid Quantum Systems and the Future of American High-Tech Leadership

Author:
Arthur Herman
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Quantum computers mark a transformational revolution in information technology. Whereas most computers process data using bits that consist of either a zero or one, quantum computers can use those digits simultaneously through superposition.1 The many resulting benefits will include the discovery of new drugs, new processes for carbon capture and advanced battery research, and a new exactitude in weather prediction, including in dealing with climate change.2 All in all, experts expect the global quantum computing industry to grow to $450–850 billion in value in the next 15 to 30 years.3 Yet because of the challenges of engineering qubits—the physical basis of quantum computing—most authorities push the timeline for full-scale quantum computer commercialization beyond 2040 and as far as 2050. Even some quantum experts do not expect any big breakthroughs until the 2030s at the earliest. The true path to the quantum future is the combination of quantum and classical digital technology, especially in computing, which will powerfully accelerate access to the potential benefits of quantum information science. While key players in the industry, including IBM and Microsoft, have recognized the potential synergy of hybrid architectures and applications, the federal government needs to expand its attention and resources devoted to this aspect of securing America’s quantum future and its leadership in the twenty-first century.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Science and Technology, Leadership, Innovation, and Quantum Computers
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

570. Schumpeter’s Creative Destruction as a Radical Departure: New Paradigm for Analyzing Capitalism

Author:
Leonardo Burlamaqui
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)
Abstract:
The paper’s core contribution is a reinterpretation of Schumpeter’s development theory, through the "creative destruction paradigm" provided in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (CSD). By linking the core propositions of the latter with the brilliant, but underdeveloped, innovations from The Theory of Economic Development (TED) and some largely ignored historical and institutional insights provided in Business Cycles (BC), the seeds of a new analytical framework emerge. One which is completely out of balance, centered on finance, entrepreneurial action, uncertainty, institutions, and competition by means of innovation.
Topic:
Development, Political Economy, Capitalism, Finance, Entrepreneurship, and Innovation
Political Geography:
Global Focus

571. Polanyi, Market Fundamentalism, and the Institutional Structure of Capitalism

Author:
Leonardo Burlamaqui
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)
Abstract:
The basic proposition of this paper is that the so-called "new economic sociology", which is rooted in key ideas of Karl Polanyi, is an indispensable "tool" for two tasks: a) it provides us with a powerful critique of market fundamentalism, and b) it allows us to analyze the economic performance of contemporary capitalism by accessing the working of its institutional structure. From an analytical perspective, the paper suggests that Polanyian Economic Sociology is an essential complement to both the Schumpeterian and the Post-Keynesian perspectives in economics. This is especially so when it comes to the discussion of "socioeconomic stability" and, more precisely, as Keynes himself stated in the General Theory: to explain why capitalist economies manifest themselves in different ways and degrees, in spite of encompassing inherent elements of instability and unpredictability.
Topic:
Economics, Markets, Political Economy, Sociology, and Capitalism
Political Geography:
Global Focus

572. Hydrogen and Energy Transition: Opportunities for Brazil

Author:
Rafaela Guedes, Gregório Cruz Araújo Maciel, and André Bello
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)
Abstract:
Hydrogen has an important versatility in the context of energy transition. It can be used directly as a low or zero-carbon energy source in sectors that are difficult to decarbonize or in energy storage, enabling a larger share of intermittent renewables, such as wind and solar power. In 2021, the Royal General Consulate of Norway in Rio de Janeiro and CEBRI promoted a discussion on the perspectives, technical challenges and economic feasibility of hydrogen production projects, as well as alternative national development strategies for this technology and its potential advantages for Brazil. Panelists from several companies involved in the sector (DNV, NEL Hydrogen, Air Products, Hyrton), as well as Giovani Machado, Director for Energy Economics and Environmental Studies at EPE, Mariane Fosland,General Consul of Norway, and CEBRI Trustee, Winston Fritsch, participated in the panel.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Hydrogen, Energy, and Green Transition
Political Geography:
Norway, Brazil, and South America

573. Energy in a World in Transition: Challenges, Opportunities and Perspectives

Author:
Jorge Camargo, Pedro Malan, Winston Fritsch, Clarissa Lins, and Alessandra Amaral
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)
Abstract:
The Energy Transition process is complex and multifaceted, with substantial impacts on the energy industries’ business models. In order to contribute with a greater understanding of this trend, CEBRI, in partnership with BMA, organized a collection of articles that analyzes the main implications of this process, which is well positioned to be one of the major drivers of economic transformation in this historic period. Published in English and Portuguese, the collection is structured around the theme “Energy in a World in Transition”, and assesses a global process from a Brazilian perspective. The first edition, published in June, included important reflections on the future of Brazilian energy.
Topic:
Economy, Business, Industry, Energy, and Green Transition
Political Geography:
Brazil, South America, and Global Focus

574. Brazilian Perspectives for BRICS

Author:
Marcos Caramuru, José Mário Antunes, and Tatiana Rosito
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)
Abstract:
The project “Brazilian Perspectives for BRICS - 2022”, developed by CEBRI at the invitation of the Chinese Embassy in Brazil, aimed at mapping trends and defining concrete strategies and proposals to, from a Brazilian perspective, inform the agenda and improve the joint action and international projection of the group, whose rotating presidency is held by China in 2022. The development, coordination, and results of the project were the responsibility of CEBRI and, beyond the original objective, constitute a contribution to the debate on BRICS in Brazil. The project brought together about 30 high-level Brazilian specialists from various areas (academia, civil society, private sector, and public sector) in three closed meetings. This Executive Summary presents a synthesis of the discussions.
Topic:
Development, Geopolitics, Trade, and BRICS
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Brazil, and South America

575. Reboot: Framework for a New American Industrial Policy

Author:
Martijn Rasser, Megan Lamberth, Hannah Kelley, and Ryan Johnson
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
This paper presents an initial framework for a new American industrial policy, a blueprint for what is needed to ensure the United States has the vision, goals, plans, and resources for an era of sustained strategic competition. The concept, informed by an overarching national technology strategy and a supply chain resilience strategy, is the initial contribution in a larger effort to provide policymakers with a comprehensive toolkit to navigate competition with China and engage with countries around the world, friend and foe alike.4 To provide tangible real-world examples of a new sensible American industrial policy and to illustrate how policies would vary by sector and over time, subsequent reports will detail what a new American industrial policy would look like in action for three key sectors: biotechnology, semiconductors, and green technologies.
Topic:
Economy, Green Technology, Strategic Competition, Industry, Biotechnology, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:
China, North America, and United States of America

576. Revitalizing the U.S.-Philippines Alliance to Address Strategic Competition in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Lisa Curtis, Joshua Fitt, and Zachary Durkee
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The purpose of this report is to assess the current state of the relationship and provide recommendations for revitalizing and expanding bilateral ties following a six-year period marked by turbulence and volatility. While Duterte has tested the flexibility of the alliance with his controversial counternarcotics campaign and attempted realignment toward China, his actions have also highlighted a broader need for the United States to reprioritize its oldest ally in Asia. To reinvigorate U.S.-Philippines relations, the report makes a series of policy recommendations regarding security and defense ties, foreign assistance, energy cooperation, and diplomatic ties. It further proposes ways to improve the narrative regarding U.S.-Philippines legacy issues and the two countries’ complicated colonial history.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Alliance, Strategic Competition, and Rodrigo Duterte
Political Geography:
Philippines, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

577. Dangerous Straits: Wargaming a Future Conflict over Taiwan

Author:
Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Becca Wasser, and Chris Dougherty
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Until recently, U.S. policymakers and subject matter experts have viewed the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC’s) forcible unification with Taiwan as a distant threat. But the mix of rapid Chinese military modernization, a narrow window for localized near-parity with the U.S. military, and growing pessimism about the prospects for peaceful unification may lead the PRC to perceive that it has the ability to pursue a successful operation against Taiwan. Beijing’s lessons learned from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine could prompt the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to adjust its war plans for Taiwan to become more effective and deadly. Coupled together, these developments may suggest an accelerated timeline for seizing Taiwan. It is therefore urgent that the United States, in conjunction with its regional allies and partners, identify ways to deter the PRC from invading Taiwan and prevent a future conflict. To do so, the Gaming Lab at CNAS, in partnership with NBC’s Meet the Press, conducted a high-level strategic-operational wargame exploring a fictional war over Taiwan, set in 2027. The wargame sought to illuminate the dilemmas that U.S. and Chinese policymakers might face in such a conflict, along with the strategies they might adopt to achieve their overarching objectives. The game was intended to produce insights as to how the United States and its allies and partners could deter the PRC from invading Taiwan and could better position themselves to defend Taiwan and defeat such aggression should deterrence fail.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Conflict, and War Games
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America

578. Operationalizing the Quad

Author:
Lisa Curtis, Jacob Stokes, Joshua Fitt, and Andrew J. Adams
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
This paper assesses Quad activities and the progress the group has made toward its stated objective of promoting a free and open Indo-Pacific. It also provides policy recommendations for strengthening Quad cooperation across the six identified priority areas (vaccines, critical and emerging technologies, climate change, infrastructure, space, and cybersecurity) as well as on trade and economics and security and defense.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Science and Technology, Economy, Trade, and Quad Alliance
Political Geography:
Japan, India, Australia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

579. Regenerate: Biotechnology and U.S. Industrial Policy

Author:
Ryan Fedasiuk
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Arevolution in biotechnology is dawning at the precise moment the world needs it most. Amid an ongoing climate crisis, fast-paced technological maturation, and a global pandemic, humans must find new ways to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, improve food security, develop new vaccines and therapeutics, recycle waste, synthesize new materials, and adapt to a changing world. But incentive structures in the U.S. private sector are generally biased against risk, and therefore constrain development in ways that do not have the same effect on firms in China and other U.S. competitors. This puts the United States at a relative disadvantage and risks ceding American leadership over one of the most powerful and transformative fields of technology in recent memory. The United States needs some form of industrial policy to promote its bioeconomy—one that is enshrined in democratic values and focused on improving access to four key drivers of bioeconomic growth: equipment, personnel, information, and capital. This report attempts to measure the health and outlook of the U.S. synthetic biology industry and broader bioeconomy by examining U.S. access to each of these four resources. It concludes that the United States still possesses an advantage in each of these fields—but that, absent a proactive strategy to ensure resource access, and without a significant infusion of capital, the U.S. bioeconomy risks languishing behind competitors such as China in the decades ahead.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Industry, Capital, Biotechnology, Personnel, and Information
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

580. Lighting the Path: Framing a Transatlantic Technology Strategy

Author:
Carisa Nietsche, Emily Jin, Hannah Kelley, Emily Kilcrease, and Megan Lamberth
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The world’s leading powers are engaged in an unprecedented technology competition. Autocratic regimes are advancing a vision for technology use—a techno-totalitarianism that entrenches authoritarian rule—that directly opposes the interests of democratic states. This vision, which includes control over key economic inputs, the domination of supply chains, breakthrough capabilities in emerging technologies, and unfettered surveillance, threatens to upend a decades-old rules-based system that promotes economic competitiveness and freedoms, supports democratic values, and protects fundamental rights. How this technology competition unfolds will shape the global economic, political, and military balance for decades. Collaboration among the world’s tech-leading democracies will be essential to maximize the odds of a favorable outcome. Perhaps the most important factor in this dynamic is reimagining the long-standing transatlantic partnership to meet this challenge. To succeed, the United States and Europe must compete or risk ceding the competition to autocracies. They must be guided by a strategy that matches the moment. Yet no such strategy currently exists. This report aims to light that path by developing the contours of a transatlantic technology strategy. This framework has a two-part approach. First, it identifies persistent friction in technology policy between the United States and Europe. The transatlantic partners must align approaches, when possible, and manage disagreement in the relationship to pave the way for a cooperative agenda. Second, this report advances a promote and protect agenda to ensure U.S. and EU economic security and long-term technological competitiveness. The report covers seven areas in which transatlantic cooperation will be key: artificial intelligence (AI), biotechnology, clean energy technology, information and communications technology and services (ICTS), quantum information science and technology (QIST), semiconductors, and standard-setting. This report offers concrete, actionable recommendations to maintain the transatlantic partners’ technological edge, ensure economic competitiveness, and protect democratic values. Ultimately, the report charts a blueprint for transatlantic success in a wide-ranging and consequential technology competition.
Topic:
Science and Technology, European Union, Partnerships, Transatlantic Relations, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

581. Reimagine: Clean Energy Technology and U.S. Industrial Policy

Author:
Jonas Nahm
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Historically, the United States has been the largest public investor in clean energy research and development (R&D). U.S. research institutions and private firms continue to hold a technological lead in many next-generation technologies that could make the transition away from fossil fuels cheaper and more efficient. Such technologies include next-generation solar photovoltaic technologies, advanced battery chemistries, and software to manage complex energy systems, including those with high penetrations of wind energy. Although the United States was an early leader in clean energy R&D and continues to make major technological advances, it has, over time, fallen behind in the commercialization and manufacturing of the technologies developed domestically. This study reviews U.S. industrial policy for clean energy sectors and argues that other economies have more frequently used proactive industrial policies to support the development of domestic clean energy technology industries. Too often, the United States has not mounted an equivalent industrial policy response. The U.S. government has instead focused more narrowly on funding the invention of new technologies and, intermittently, supported domestic markets for clean energy technologies through federal and state programs. Such policies have included, for instance, federal R&D grants for universities, research institutes, and the private sector, as well as subsidies and regulations to support the growth of clean energy markets at the federal and state level. This U.S. approach to encouraging the growth of domestic clean energy industries has assumed that market failures primarily exist in innovation. Since firms cannot in all cases reap all the gains from investments in the development of new technologies, they are likely to underinvest in innovation, creating a need for governments to supplement private-sector investments in R&D. The U.S. approach to clean energy industrial policy also assumes that investments in R&D will eventually spur the growth of domestic industries if combined with sufficient market demand. Yet U.S. industrial policy has not addressed key institutional shortcomings in segments of clean energy supply chains that are not well supported domestically, particularly in scaling new technologies to mass manufacturing. As a consequence, many technologies developed with public R&D funding failed to reach domestic mass production, as firms were unable to make the investments required to bring the technologies to market domestically. The report develops four recommendations to improve the competitiveness of domestic clean energy industries. First, the United States should establish a state development bank that could fund domestic manufacturing projects in sectors, such as clean energy, that have struggled to raise financing from U.S. financial institutions. The scarcity of capital for clean energy manufacturing has prevented domestic startups from raising the financing required to commercialize and produce their technologies domestically. Second, the U.S. government should ramp up investments in vocational training programs that would meet the workforce needs of growing clean energy manufacturing sectors. Third, the federal government should set stable regulatory requirements and binding targets for clean energy markets as part of a national strategy for competitiveness in clean energy sectors. This would reduce uncertainty injected by the intermittent and fragmented nature of current government support for clean energy sectors and create incentives for the private sector to invest in domestic supply chains for clean energy technologies. Fourth, the United States should limit the use of trade restrictions as industrial policy tools and instead focus on improving the competitiveness of domestic clean energy firms through proactive industrial policies. Trade restrictions can limit the ability of domestic clean energy firms to source materials, parts, and components through global supply chains; may lead to increased prices in ways that can harm domestic clean energy service industries; and obstruct the climate diplomacy needed to meet the goals of the Paris Agreement. At the moment, geopolitical shifts, strategic competition with China, and the ripple effects of the war in Ukraine provide a political opening for the consistent deployment of more ambitious industrial policies. The United States should use this opportunity or risk falling behind other economies, including those in Europe, that have made the development of domestic clean energy supply chains central elements of their response to climate change.
Topic:
Green Technology, Industry, Research and Development, and Energy
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

582. Rebuild: Toolkit for a New American Industrial Policy

Author:
Emily Kilcrease and Emily Jin
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
As economic security comes to the forefront of U.S. foreign policy, the U.S. strategy has been largely reactive and focused on playing defense rather than offense. Actions have centered on slowing down competitors—namely China—rather than defining an affirmative vision for growing American strength in the economic domain. A uniquely American industrial policy is the missing piece of the U.S. economic security strategy. Pursuit of industrial policy must recognize the immense benefits of free markets while also grappling with their limitations. Policymakers must promote the efficiency and productivity gains of a competitive open market while also seeking resilient and secure supply chains, fair and reciprocal trading relations, and uninterrupted access to those goods and services critical to the national defense, critical infrastructure, and smooth functioning of the society writ large. Industrial policy advocates must also get comfortable with a new way of thinking about global competition. They must be clear-eyed about the fact that the security of the United States and its allies may be threatened by China’s technological and economic advances. Simply leveling the playing field with China is no longer enough. The United States needs to play to win. The first report in this Center for a New American Security (CNAS) project outlined the intellectual framework for a uniquely American industrial policy, one that can “secure the United States’ standing as the world’s premier technology power, so that it can empower its citizens, compete economically, and secure its geostrategic interests without compromising its values or sovereignty."
Topic:
Defense Policy, Strategic Competition, Industry, and Economic Security
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

583. Competitive Connectivity: Crafting Transatlantic Responses to China’s Belt and Road Initiative

Author:
Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Lisa Curtis, Jacob Stokes, Carisa Nietsche, Joshua Fitt, and Nicholas Lokker
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Given the uncertain future of BRI, researchers at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) identified the major drivers likely to influence the direction of the program and examined their numerous permutations. The authors selected three scenarios and focused on how conditions of each scenario would play out in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. For each scenario, the report identifies the risks and implications for the United States and its allies. The scenarios are designed to prepare policymakers and planners for the possible futures they could face, including key challenges and opportunities that may arise in the years to come. Lastly, this paper identifies additional policy steps that will prepare the transatlantic allies to both compete with China’s investments and increase their own resilience.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Infrastructure, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Transatlantic Relations, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and United States of America

584. Russia in the Arctic: Gauging How Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine Will Alter Regional Dynamics

Author:
Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Jim Townsend, Nicholas Lokker, Heli Hautala, and James Frey
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Russia’s reinvasion of Ukraine in February 2022 is producing ripple effects that will reverberate far beyond Ukraine for years to come, affecting issue areas and regions where the United States and Europe must manage relations with Moscow. Such effects will certainly be felt in the Arctic (which for this study will be limited to the European Arctic or the “High North”). Already, Russia’s aggression in Ukraine has compelled Finland and Sweden to apply for NATO membership, altering the region’s security architecture. Amid the changes that are unfolding, it is critical that analysts and policymakers reexamine long-standing assessments and assumptions about Russia. To that end, this paper reexamines Russia’s approach to the Arctic in light of events in Ukraine. Given the high degree of uncertainty about the trajectory of the war in Ukraine and its effect on Russia, it is impossible to confidently project a single future for Russia’s Arctic policy. CNAS researchers, therefore, identified four drivers that are most likely to shape Russia’s approach to the Arctic: Russia’s perception of the Western threat, the impact of Western sanctions, China’s role in the Arctic, and whether Putin remains in power. Using different permutations of those drivers, the authors developed three scenarios for how the future Russian approach to the Arctic could evolve looking out to 2025.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Arctic, and United States of America

585. Rewire: Semiconductors and U.S. Industrial Policy

Author:
Chris Miller
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
As the United States considers industrial policy for the first time in decades, it should learn lessons from prior government efforts to shape the semiconductor industry, in the United States and abroad. The U.S. government has played a major role in the semiconductor industry since the invention of the first integrated circuit, via funding scientific research and via military procurement, which has driven the commercialization of new technology. However, though government—and specifically, the Defense Department—has had deep connections with the chip industry, it has played only a supportive role in building America’s semiconductor industry, with the key innovations and firms emerging from private-sector expertise. Other countries have experimented with industrial policy toward semiconductors too. Success stories in industrial policy generally have involved investing in skilled workforces and ensuring competitiveness by pushing domestic firms to sell to international markets. Simply pouring capital into a country’s chip industry rarely has been a winning strategy. Today, the U.S. government should focus policy toward the semiconductor industry around four main objectives: promoting technological advances, guaranteeing security of semiconductor supply, retaining control of choke points, and slowing China’s technological advances.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Strategic Competition, Industry, Semiconductors, and Policymaking
Political Geography:
China, North America, and United States of America

586. Artificial Intelligence and Arms Control

Author:
Paul Scharre and Megan Lamberth
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Advances in artificial intelligence (AI) pose immense opportunity for militaries around the world. With this rising potential for AI-enabled military systems, some activists are sounding the alarm, calling for restrictions or outright bans on some AI-enabled weapon systems.1 Conversely, skeptics of AI arms control argue that as a general-purpose technology developed in the civilian context, AI will be exceptionally hard to control.2 AI is an enabling technology with countless nonmilitary applications; this factor differentiates it from many other military technologies, such as landmines or missiles.3 Because of its widespread availability, an absolute ban on all military applications of AI is likely infeasible. There is, however, a potential for prohibiting or regulating specific use cases. The international community has, at times, banned or regulated weapons with varying degrees of success. In some cases, such as the ban on permanently blinding lasers, arms control has worked remarkably well to date. In other cases, however, such as attempted limits on unrestricted submarine warfare or aerial bombardment of cities, states failed to achieve lasting restraint in war. States’ motivations for controlling or regulating weapons vary. States may seek to limit the diffusion of a weapon that is particularly disruptive to political or social stability, contributes to excessive civilian casualties, or causes inhumane injury to combatants. This paper examines the potential for arms control for military applications of AI by exploring historical cases of attempted arms control, analyzing both successes and failures. The first part of the paper explores existing academic literature related to why some arms control measures succeed while others fail. The paper then proposes several criteria that influence the success of arms control.4 Finally, it analyzes the potential for AI arms control and suggests next steps for policymakers. Detailed historical cases of attempted arms control—from ancient prohibitions to modern agreements—can be found in appendix A in the pdf available for download. For a summary table of historical attempts at arms control, see appendix B. History teaches us that policymakers, scholars, and members of civil society can take concrete steps today to improve the chances of successful AI arms control in the future. These include taking policy actions to shape the way the technology evolves and increasing dialogue at all levels to better understand how AI applications may be used in warfare. Any AI arms control will be challenging. There may be cases, however, where arms control is possible under the right conditions, and small steps today could help lay the groundwork for future successes.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Artificial Intelligence, and Military
Political Geography:
Global Focus

587. Assessing Russian State Capacity to Develop and Deploy Advanced Military Technology

Author:
Samuel Bendett, Richard Connolly, Jeffrey Edmonds, Andrea Kendall-Taylor, and Michael Kofman
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Even before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, many analysts and policymakers viewed Russia as a declining power. This mindset, formed by the sharp juxtaposition between the seeming strength of the Soviet Union and the chaos and weakness of Russia in the 1990s, has been an enduring heuristic for how Russia today is understood. The country’s stagnant and resource-dependent economy, declining population, and substantial brain drain have fed a sense that Russia’s days as a global power are numbered. The war in Ukraine has only accelerated some of these trends, further reinforcing such views. The Russian military’s poor performance, the degradation of its forces, and the imposition of sanctions and export controls that will restrict Russia’s ability to regenerate its forces have already led some to dismiss the country as a Potemkin power and pronounce the end of its great power status.1 Russia undoubtedly will emerge from its war on Ukraine as a weaker power. But even during the post-Soviet period of sustained economic stagnation, brain drain, and demographic decline, the Russian state developed a new generation of hypersonic missiles, air and missile defenses, and nuclear weapons with novel means of propulsion. Russia has demonstrated that it is able not only to bring to fruition late-Soviet designs, but also to develop a follow-on generation of capabilities. Likewise, the Kremlin has continued to modernize and expand its nuclear capabilities. Despite economic constraints, the Kremlin prioritized the development of its strategic nuclear forces by investing significant resources into developing and deploying new nuclear warheads and launchers, upgrading all legs of the nuclear triad, completing work on a hypersonic glide vehicle, and building a new intercontinental, nuclear-armed, nuclear-powered undersea autonomous torpedo. Of course, Russia’s past performance was under a different set of conditions. Moving forward, as a result of its invasion of Ukraine, Russia will face new and more significant constraints on its ability to modernize its military. But it is too soon to count Russia out. Policymakers need a more nuanced assessment of the nature of the future Russian threat. This report provides such an assessment, focusing on Russia’s ability to develop and deploy its nuclear capabilities through 2030. To that end, this report first identifies Russia’s own stated goals and objectives for the development of its nuclear forces looking out to 2030. Because Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the resulting military degradation and economic sanctions and export controls introduce critical uncertainties about the Kremlin’s ability to execute these objectives, this report adopts a scenarios approach to forecasting Russia’s future nuclear capabilities. The report identifies two drivers that the authors view as most critical in shaping Russia’s ability to fulfill its stated objectives: the impact of Western sanctions on Russia’s government revenue and ability to access critical technology, and the extent of the degradation of the Russian military in Ukraine, which will force choices on the Kremlin about how to prioritize military expenditures. This report uses these two drivers to describe two scenarios that define the upper and lower boundaries of expectations for Russia’s nuclear capabilities, along with the implications of each of these scenarios for the United States and its allies. The scenarios, in other words, describe both a worst- and best-case state of affairs for Russia, and thus they help frame the problem for U.S. policymakers and planners. The report concludes with an assessment of key findings that emerge from the analysis and associated recommendations for the United States and Europe.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Sanctions, Military, Russia-Ukraine War, and Policymaking
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

588. U.S.-ROK Strategy for Enhancing Cooperation on Combating and Deterring Cyber-Enabled Financial Crime

Author:
Jason Bartlett
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The May 2022 U.S.-ROK Summit between President Joe Biden and President Yoon Suk-yeol revitalized previous bilateral commitments to establish a joint cyber working group to address the growing issue of cyber-enabled financial crime with specific emphasis on cryptocurrency, blockchain technology, and illicit North Korean cyber activity.1 This report provides specific policy recommendations for Washington and Seoul to incorporate within the cyber working group to enhance cooperation on combating and deterring cyber-enabled financial crime, especially from state-sponsored actors. North Korea has become the greatest state-sponsored threat to the global financial services sector. From 2021 to June 2022 alone, North Korean cyber operatives and their facilitators stole more than $1 billion (in U.S. currency, as throughout this report unless otherwise indicated) in digital assets through hacking cryptocurrency exchanges and laundering the stolen funds using various financial technologies and obfuscation techniques, including cryptocurrency mixers and foreign over-the-counter brokers. Pyongyang will likely maintain this position as long as the potential gains of cyber operations against financial services are greater than the potential risks and resources needed to conduct these operations. Washington and Seoul must work together to change this reality. This report compiles the findings of a year-long research project to generate actionable policy recommendations for Washington and Seoul to incorporate within their joint cyber working group to strengthen joint deterrence against state-sponsored cyber-enabled financial crime that continues to target both U.S. and South Korean social, financial, and cyber infrastructure. Based on intensive field research and interviews with U.S. and ROK stakeholders, this report outlines current challenges to enhancing U.S.-ROK cyber coordination, details the evolution of North Korea’s cyber program and modern-day threats, provides policy recommendations for the joint cyber working group, and includes an appendix with all relevant U.S. and ROK agencies that can contribute valuable expertise to the group.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, Cybersecurity, and Financial Crimes
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

589. Precision and Posture: Defense Spending Trends and the FY23 Budget Request

Author:
Stacie L. Pettyjohn and Hannah Dennis
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
This report examines the fiscal year (FY) 2023 defense budget request and assesses whether it sufficiently resources what was known of the Biden administration’s national defense strategy when the budget was released. Because of the delay of the full, unclassified version of the strategy, the analysis focuses on two factors—high-end munitions stockpiles and overseas posture—that past studies have indicated are critical for strengthening deterrence against China and Russia in the near term. This report concludes that while the FY23 request makes some strides on both issues, more must be done today to improve the United States’ chances of deterring and, if necessary, defeating the adversary tomorrow. The ongoing war in Ukraine has elevated the issue of munitions stockpiles to front-page news as both Ukrainian and Russian forces continue to consume high volumes of key weapons. We examine the sufficiency of existing critical conventional munitions stockpiles and the future procurement plans to meet the threats posed by China and Russia. We find that while the services have shifted to investing in longer-range weapons, they are still underinvesting in the specific capabilities, in particular anti-ship and area-effects weapons, that would be needed to counter China in a variety of scenarios. Moreover, the Department of Defense (DoD) is not buying enough of these weapons to blunt and defeat an initial invasion, and it certainly is not stockpiling enough precision-guided munitions (PGMs) for a protracted war.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Budget, Defense Spending, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and United States of America

590. Supporting Russian Civil Society: A Report of the Transatlantic Forum on Russia

Author:
Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Maria Snegovaya
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Since Russia re-invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022, repression inside Russia has worsened. The trend toward greater repression predates Moscow’s unprovoked invasion. The Kremlin had already increased its crackdown on all facets of Russian civil society, including targeting journalists and political opposition and tightening the country’s information environment ahead of its parliamentary election in September 2021. Since the invasion, the Kremlin has intensified its repressive efforts to shut down the possibility of dissent and insulate its hold on power from any blowback from the war. Experience from authoritarian regimes like Putin’s Russia suggests that high levels of repression are here to stay as long as Putin remains in power—authoritarian regimes are unlikely to walk back repression for fear that doing so would indicate regime weakness and embolden activists who advocate for political change. Rising repression inside Russia created immediate risks to journalists, activists, and other Russians who support a freer and more democratic Russia (as well as to their families). In the longer term, it also creates a potential barrier to a less confrontational relationship with a post-Putin Russia. As repression has risen, the Kremlin has doubled down on anti–United States and anti-Western rhetoric and shut down opportunities for exchanges between Russian scientists and academics and their Western counterparts. The Kremlin’s propagation of anti-Western messages and the lack of exchange between Russians and the West—exacerbated by a loss of economic ties amid Western sanctions—engender mistrust and misunderstanding, creating a long-term barrier to a less confrontational relationship. Steps to deny Russian tourists visas and other forms of collective punishment, while understandable, have the potential to sour Russian attitudes toward the West, hurting the prospects for any future improvement in relations with a post-Putin Russia. This policy brief identifies how the United States and Europe together can continue to support Russian civil society despite the dismal state of relations with Russia. It outlines the state of play of the Kremlin’s crackdown on Russian civil society, U.S. and European responses to date, shared interests in coordinated support, and recommendations for what the transatlantic community can do to support Russian civil society in this new era of relations with Russia. Given the barriers to supporting activists inside Russia, this memo’s recommendations focus on assistance to those Russians who have left the country.
Topic:
Civil Society, Authoritarianism, Transatlantic Relations, Exile, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and United States of America

591. Long Shadows: Deterrence in a Multipolar Nuclear Age

Author:
Stacie L. Pettyjohn and Jennie Matuschak
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
This report examines the nuclear policies and postures of the United States and its three primary nuclear adversaries: China, Russia, and North Korea. It concludes that the world is entering a multipolar nuclear era, which is unprecedented, and far more complex and challenging than the Cold War. The current nuclear order has been gradually shifting over the past decade. Russia remains the United States’ only nuclear peer, but the arms control regime that constrained the superpowers’ nuclear arsenals is disintegrating. Relations between Washington and Moscow have worsened since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling. China’s nuclear arsenal is growing in size and sophistication, potentially enabling Beijing to launch conventional attacks behind its nuclear shield. This development will shape both competition among Beijing, Washington, and Moscow and potential future military confrontations. Similarly, North Korea has a small but expanding number of deployed nuclear weapons and is improving its missile technology. In this new nuclear environment, the United States must deter two nuclear-armed great powers as well as a regional nuclear power from launching conventional and nuclear attacks on itself and its allies. As the number of nuclear-armed states grow, interactions become more complex and the risks of miscalculation and misperception increase. The ramifications of this new reality are not well understood, aside from the implication that there is a growing risk that nuclear weapons might be used. The study’s findings have five primary implications for American policy and nuclear posture. To improve strategic stability and enhance deterrence, the United States should take several courses of action.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:
Russia, China, North Korea, and United States of America

592. Risk and Responsibility: Managing Future Iranian Weapons of Mass Destruction Threats

Author:
Becca Wasser and Jennie Matuschak
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Washington is reimagining its global role, leading the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) to make difficult choices about priorities, resources, and risk to better address the long-term “pacing challenge” posed by China. To do so, the United States plans to accept risks in the Middle East and against future Iran threats. Iran’s possession and potential use of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs)—specifically, its nuclear program, chemical weapons, and biological agents—pose the greatest threat to U.S. interests and Washington’s ability to accept risk in the region. But how Iran might leverage WMDs to threaten U.S. interests and upend Washington’s plans to make trade-offs in global responsibilities is unclear, while the risks of failing to address these challenges remain high. As a result, the DoD and its component organizations, such as the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), must enhance their understanding of the threat posed by Iran’s nuclear, chemical, and biological capabilities and the escalation dynamics surrounding Iranian WMDs during crisis and conflict. By doing so, the United States can better accept risk in the Middle East and revise its global priorities while still protecting core U.S. interests. To improve the DoD’s understanding of future Iranian WMD-related threats and escalation dynamics, the Gaming Lab at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) conducted a series of three virtual strategic-operational tabletop exercises (TTXs) exploring future Iranian nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons use. The TTXs indicated that even if Iran acquires a nuclear weapon, the likelihood the regime will use it is low. Instead, the regime may be more likely to use chemical and biological weapons to escalate conflict. Moreover, there are significant asymmetries between American and Iranian views of conflict timelines, escalation redlines, and risk tolerance, all of which make it difficult to offer and signal credible ways to de-escalate a crisis. Differences between Washington’s risk acceptance and that of its regional partners—Israel, in particular—further complicate U.S.-Iran interactions. The TTXs aimed to enable the United States to identify where and how it might mitigate the risk it must accept to better marshal resources in support of the department’s strategic guidance. Accepting greater risk against Iran and in the Middle East more broadly means shifting U.S. strategic priorities in the region. This shift has the potential to unsettle allies and partners, and may possibly embolden Iran in the near term, but such tough choices must be made if the United States wishes to prioritize other long-term threats that may be of greater impact to U.S. security, such as China.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Weapons, and Risk
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

593. Global Island: Sustaining Taiwan’s International Participation Amid Mounting Pressure from China

Author:
Jacob Stokes, Alexander Sullivan, and Zachary Durkee
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
China under Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping has ramped up political, economic, and military pressure on Taiwan. The roots of Beijing’s pressure campaign, including Xi’s personal interactions with Taiwan policy, go back decades. But recent events have deepened and intensified China’s efforts, which include seeking to block Taiwan from engaging the rest of the world as part of a comprehensive strategy to force Taipei to move toward unification with the mainland on Beijing’s terms. China’s comprehensive isolation campaign against Taiwan has three main lines of effort. First, since the election of the Tsai Ing-wen government in 2016, Beijing has revived a campaign to break the few official diplomatic relationships Taiwan enjoys by inducing or coercing the states that recognize Taiwan to shift their recognition to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Second, China seeks to cajole and bully states that have unofficial relations with Taiwan—including advanced liberal democracies—into curtailing those ties. Third, China uses its growing heft in international institutions to prevent Taiwan from playing any role whatsoever in global governance of transnational issues. Taken together, these prongs make up a multi-layered strategy to sever Taiwan’s links with global society. Washington, Taipei, and like-minded partners will have to develop sophisticated strategies to counter China’s moves in order to effectively maintain and advance Taiwan’s international participation while also aligning with the larger objective of sustaining cross-Strait peace and stability. Resources and political will are limited, so choices to focus on particular initiatives should be based on the substantive value they provide more than the symbolism they might hold. In general, Washington and Taipei should roughly prioritize deepening unofficial relations with major and like-minded countries first, expanding multilateral participation second, and protecting Taiwan’s group of official diplomatic relations last. Finally, the authors make three general recommendations for policymakers from the United States, Taiwan, and like-minded partners for sustaining Taiwan’s international participation and detail specific steps to advance them: First, keep U.S. and Taiwan policies aligned on common strategies that maximize substance over symbolism and foster deep, politically sustainable ties across their governments, legislatures, and societies. Second, facilitate the expansion of unofficial links between Taiwan and like-minded allies and partners that can help sustain the political status quo and blunt China’s isolation campaign. Third, defend and advance Taiwan’s ability to contribute to multilateral international organizations in ways that are consistent with long-standing U.S. policy.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, and Participation
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

594. Digital Allies: Deepening U.S.–South Korea Cooperation on Technology and Innovation

Author:
Jacob Stokes, Alexander Sullivan, and Joshua Fitt
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Rapid advances in digital and other emerging technologies have become a defining feature of international geopolitics and geoeconomics in the 21st century. This report explores how the United States and South Korea can broaden and deepen their alliance through expanded cooperation on issues related to technology and innovation. Despite the continued centrality of traditional security threats—especially those emanating from North Korea—both the United States and South Korea are seeking to deepen and broaden alliance cooperation to address a larger set of shared challenges and opportunities. To that end, both capitals have noted the increasing importance of key technologies for economic growth as well as for security and governance. The two countries are at the very beginning of defining how an augmented alliance will approach technology coordination, but they have decades of economic and trade ties on which to build. Technology issues are central to the policy platforms of both U.S. President Joe Biden’s and South Korean President Moon Jae-in’s administrations and will continue to be important under future administrations in both countries. In addition to examining general consultative frameworks, enhancing U.S.-South Korea technology cooperation requires assessing the state of bilateral interactions sector by sector and issue by issue. The two countries occupy leading roles in many foundational technology ecosystems within the evolving global economy, such as semiconductors, telecommunications, and advanced batteries. In emerging fields such as artificial intelligence and quantum computing, U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK) collaboration harbors the potential not only to raise living standards through technological breakthroughs but also to promote governance norms in accordance with liberal democratic principles. Potential opportunities for Washington and Seoul to deepen cooperation extend beyond the bilateral context to regional and global affairs, through coordination of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy and South Korea’s New Southern Policy or its successor under the new president-elect, Yoon Suk-yeol. Rapid technological growth and digitization in Indo-Pacific countries, particularly those of Southeast Asia, present both immense economic opportunity and a range of governance challenges. The United States and South Korea have an important opportunity to ensure that technological development promotes a free, open, secure, and prosperous region. Taken together, the strategic rationales for enhancing U.S.-South Korea cooperation on technology issues are strong. Meaningful efforts to that end are already underway, but more can and should be done to deepen alliance coordination. Policymakers in Washington and Seoul should consider recommendations spanning the areas of foreign policy and international organizations, coordination on key technologies, trade and investment, and digital governance and domestic policy. Doing so will enable the alliance to meet the challenges and seize the opportunities presented by the current regional and global landscape.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Science and Technology, Bilateral Relations, Alliance, and Innovation
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

595. The Tangled Web We Wove: Rebalancing America’s Supply Chains

Author:
Megan Lamberth, Martijn Rasser, Ryan Johnson, and Henry Wu
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The pendulum of globalization has swung too far. What the fallout of the ongoing pandemic makes clear is that decades of offshoring and cost-cutting in the pursuit of efficiency and a better bottom line have left the supply chains of the United States and its allies and partners unacceptably brittle. Restoring balance to the system—with greater resilience through reducing dependence on potential adversaries, greater geographic diversity, and a pragmatic approach to building a mix of domestic capabilities and sourcing from reliable partners—will be a complex, expensive, and far-reaching undertaking. It could well reshape the global economy and strengthen ties between the world’s democracies, and is likely to be a key factor in determining the course of the global strategic competition. Tackling America’s supply chain problems will require a new conceptual framework that is fit for the current geopolitical context. The United States and China are engaged in a complex economic, political, and military competition marked by sharp ideological and normative differences and economic dependencies. Global trade and supply chain dynamics reflect much of the spectrum of this competition, the overreliance on China for key inputs and manufacturing capacity most prominently. Correcting this imbalance and assuring the resilience and security required is needed to ensure long-term American competitiveness. The framework with which to address that imbalance has three core elements: adjusting the role of government, checking the key assumptions that shaped current global supply chains, and balancing the tension between self-reliance and interdependencies. Policymakers and business leaders alike must rethink how government and industry engage each other on supply chain matters as part of a new form of industrial policy. For example, government officials need to better understand global supply chains to identify vulnerabilities and pursue opportunities. At the same time, company officers must strive for greater transparency and continuous supply chain assessments.
Topic:
Globalization, Geopolitics, Supply Chains, and Economic Security
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

596. Aligning U.S.-Israeli Cooperation on Technology Issues and China

Author:
Jonathan Schanzer, Shira Efron, Martijn Rasser, and Alice Hickson
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The United States and Israel have a long history of working together as close allies. Theirs is a relationship based on common values and security interests. In recent years, the alliance’s highlights have included close cooperation on counterterrorism and intelligence, as well as deepening economic ties, technological cooperation, and mutual knowledge transfer. The United States continues to provide Israel with significant security assistance based on a memorandum of understanding signed by both countries in 2016, which commits the United States to provide Israel with at least $3.8 billion per year in aid. The relationship is further strengthened by deep personal connections at the government and business levels as well as through collaboration between the two countries’ technology sectors. In recent years, however, the United States and Israel have differed regarding their threat perceptions and approaches to China. Whereas Israel sees China primarily as an economic partner and is increasing its ties with the country, the consensus view in Washington increasingly sees China as a global strategic rival—militarily, economically, and technologically—even while the Joe Biden administration preserves space for cooperation with Beijing in areas of common interest. In recent years, U.S. and Israeli officials have had public and private disagreements over several Chinese investments in Israeli infrastructure and technology. Although Chinese investments in Israel have declined since their peak in 2018, and even though these disagreements have yet to be aired publicly by the Biden administration and the Naftali Bennett–Yair Lapid government, this issue is likely to remain high on the agenda. The most critical challenges in the bilateral relationship are technology protection and collaborative innovation. Chinese investment in Israeli technology companies, including those that develop dual-use technologies, remains largely unregulated. Although Israel does not export defense technology to China and has placed stringent regulation on the export of dual-use technologies, the line between civilian and dual use is increasingly blurred, and Israel has yet to fully adapt to this reality. Washington, for its part, has not been entirely clear about how it expects American companies and allies to limit their roles. The United States has been slow to offer alternatives to allies such as Israel for forgoing cooperation with China and has yet to develop a collaborative technological innovation framework that builds on the cumulative strengths of the United States and its allies, benefits all, and helps to tip the balance in the technological competition with Beijing. To address the multidimensional challenge presented by China, the United States must enhance collaboration with its allies, including Israel, its closest partner in the Middle East. Fortunately, when the United States and Israel have had differing perspectives in the past, they have successfully engaged in deep bilateral consultations to work through these differences. These efforts have not always resulted in complete alignment, but they have significantly reduced disagreements and allowed for greater cooperation. This paper represents the most comprehensive public analysis to date of the challenges facing U.S.-Israeli cooperation on issues related to technology and China. It proposes an approach for the United States and Israel to align their policies and bridge differences by focusing on three central areas.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Science and Technology, Bilateral Relations, and Alliance
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, Israel, North America, and United States of America

597. Building a Flywheel: The Biden Administration's Opportunity to Forge a New Path with North Korea

Author:
John Park
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
As the United States seeks to maintain a level of stability in its increasingly competitive relationship with China, North Korea has the potential to complicate their intensifying rivalry. Dealing with North Korea is a complex endeavor that requires deft handling by both nations because the stakes are high and instability can spread rapidly. For decades, China has been seeking to bolster the stability of the Kim family regime and increase China’s economic engagement with North Korea, to the point where North Korea Inc.—the Kim regime’s network of elite state trading companies—has embedded itself in major commercial hubs throughout China. By prioritizing the stability of the North Korean regime over denuclearization in its policy actions, China created a loophole in which the North Korean regime could enjoy economic benefits without having to do denuclearization work. Beijing thus impeded the development of a connection to a larger process in which major denuclearization activity would be paired with major economic and diplomatic concessions. In contrast to China’s sustained engagement with North Korea, U.S. policy toward North Korea over the last decade has focused substantially on sanctions implementation. There was a brief period of summit diplomacy during the Trump administration, but those efforts failed to bring about progress toward denuclearization. The North Korean nuclear issue has mutated into a much more complex challenge that no longer fits into past policy molds that rely heavily on sanctions implementation. President Joe Biden’s administration will need to recognize that North Korea under Kim Jong Un has become highly resilient to U.S. policy tools such as sanctions, largely due to far-reaching advancements in the relationship between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) as well as the migration and embedding of North Korea Inc. deep inside the Chinese national economy.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Strategic Competition, Strategic Stability, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:
China, North Korea, and United States of America

598. Toward a New Transatlantic Approach to Russia Sanctions

Author:
Edward Fishman, Andrea Kendall-Taylor, and Angela Stent
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
This policy brief is a product of the Center for a New American Security Transatlantic Forum on Russia, an initiative designed to spur coordination between the United States and Europe on Russia-related policy across multiple issue areas. The policy briefs are informed by a series of dialogues with leading experts from both sides of the Atlantic. The analysis and recommendations in the memo reflect areas of agreement between U.S. and European experts. Where there are notable differences in perspective, we highlight those to better enable policymakers to navigate fissures that can hinder coordination. We thank all the experts who contributed to such fruitful dialogue, especially Nigel Gould-Davies, Brian O’Toole, and Maria Shagina. Introduction As Russia continues to build its forces on Ukraine’s border, the United States and its allies have laid out the economic costs that Russian President Vladimir Putin would face for any further aggression against Ukraine. The Biden administration has stated it is willing to pursue “economic measures that we've refrained from using in the past.”1 In addition, the United States has indicated it is prepared to use export controls on U.S.-origin technologies that are key to Russia’s industrial sectors and potentially enact a Russia-focused Foreign Direct Product Rule—a tool that, to date, has only been used against Huawei. It is unclear if such a package is enough to deter Putin, especially if he is intent on pursuing his maximalist objectives—autonomy for parts of eastern Ukraine that would give Russia a veto over Ukrainian foreign policy and closing NATO’s door to Ukraine. Nonetheless, implementing such sanctions if Putin further escalates in Ukraine is critical for raising the costs to Putin and for restricting Russia’s ability to sustain its aggressive foreign policy over the long term. Regardless of what happens in Ukraine, however, U.S.-Russia relations are on a new course. The era of working toward a stable and predictable relationship with Russia is over for now. The United States will need a new, more proactive approach—one in which sanctions will be a tool (among many) that Washington should use to deter future Russian attacks on liberal democracies and disrupt Russia’s destabilizing actions, especially the corrupt networks that Moscow uses to spread its influence and sustain its hold on power. This policy brief outlines the current state of play of U.S. and European sanctions policies on Russia and how the United States and Europe can update its sanctions approach in this new era of relations with Russia.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Sanctions, Crisis Management, Deterrence, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and United States of America

599. Following the Crypto: Using Blockchain Analysis to Assess the Strengths and Vulnerabilities of North Korean Hackers

Author:
Jason Bartlett
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Under heavy and sustained pressure from decades of economic sanctions, North Korea has rapidly expanded its illicit activity within the cyber domain. In particular, Pyongyang has demonstrated an increasing interest in using evolving financial platforms, such as cryptocurrency and blockchain technology, to compensate for the fiscal losses related to economic sanctions on more traditional forms of commercial activity. Since 2014, the Pyongyang-led cybercrime organization known as the Lazarus Group has transformed from a rogue team of hackers to a masterful army of cybercriminals and foreign affiliates, capable of compromising major national financial networks and stealing hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of virtual assets. The international community and national governments often incorrectly correlate North Korea’s lack of access to modern computer hardware within its borders to its ability to successfully execute software-reliant cyberattacks. While Beijing and Moscow captivate the attention of most democratic governments concerned about pending cyber intrusions, Pyongyang continues to defy miscalculated expectations by successfully employing myriad sophisticated cyberattacks that target new and developing financial technology. North Korea will likely continue to adapt its cybercrime tactics targeting cryptocurrency to circumvent obstacles presented by economic sanctions on more traditional forms of financial activity and commerce. This report provides in-depth analysis of North Korea’s demonstrated ability to exploit financial technologies, in particular cryptocurrencies and blockchain technology, to procure funds for its illicit nuclear and ballistic weapons development programs. This research was supported through blockchain analysis conducted in partnership with TRM Labs, a leading blockchain intelligence firm that seeks to monitor, investigate, and mitigate crypto fraud and financial crime. Through analyzing three case studies of major North Korean hacks, this report outlines key strengths and vulnerabilities in the Lazarus Group’s campaigns to infiltrate cryptocurrency exchanges and steal, launder, and liquidate funds. The report also provides a snapshot of key policy oversights within the regulatory environment in the crypto space of central stakeholders and countries, such as China, the United States, and South Korea. Lastly, this study offers a prospective look into the future of North Korea–led crypto hacks and provides a series of policy recommendations to strengthen cyber resilience against these efforts.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Sanctions, Cybersecurity, and Blockchain
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

600. When the Chips Are Down: Gaming the Global Semiconductor Competition

Author:
Becca Wasser, Martijn Rasser, and Hannah Kelley
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The United States is in a strategic competition with a well-resourced and capable opponent. China seeks a global role that is broadly at odds with the strategic interests and values of America and fellow democracies. Technology, a key enabler of political, economic, and military power, is at the center of this competition. Within this competition, semiconductors loom large. Chips are a driving force for breakthroughs in a range of critical technology areas, from AI to synthetic biology to quantum computing. Semiconductors are essential to the military systems used by the United States and its allies and partners to defend themselves and their interests. At a fundamental level, the day-to-day functioning of modern society hinges on dependable access to chips; critical infrastructure, transportation networks, and digital communication cannot function without them. Semiconductor supply chains form an intricate global web, with several countries and companies serving as important nodes. Some of these nodes have such outsized importance that any disruption would have significant and detrimental cascading effects for U.S. national and economic security. Taiwan is the central node in the semiconductor supply chain. Home to the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), the world’s largest contract chip foundry, more than half of the world’s outsourced semiconductor manufacturing and nearly all leading-edge manufacturing capacity is in Taiwan. Secure access to the output of Taiwan’s semiconductor industry is therefore a strategic necessity. Yet, while policymakers understand the critical importance of Taiwan’s semiconductor industry, the myriad of factors and nuances essential to developing policies and plans that protect its integrity, mitigate risk, and reduce second-order consequences are insufficiently studied.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Strategic Competition, Industry, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America