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201. The Future of Civilians in National Security: Challenges and Opportunities

Author:
Katherine L. Kuzminski, Nathalie Grogan, and Celina Pouchet
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Imagine you’re a high-achieving college student, interested in serving in a national security role in the federal government. You invest years in learning a critical language—perhaps of an ally, perhaps of an adversary—a language for which the federal government has a high demand and a limited workforce. You’re selected for not one, but two prestigious overseas government-sponsored fellowships and are encouraged to participate in both. After returning to the States, you move to Washington, D.C., to pursue a graduate degree at a competitive policy school. You apply for opportunities to serve in a national security position. But because you had fellowships abroad—administered by the federal government—the hiring process takes more than two years.CNAS Focus Group, March 11, 2022.1 The national security workforce is full of stories like this one—which is the experience of someone who successfully navigated into the system. Many others decide not to pursue government service in the first place, whether because they believe the option isn’t open to them, or because the hiring process is so onerous that they lose interest or pursue more readily available options. To meet the challenge of protecting the country and its national interests, the federal government must attract, recruit, and retain experienced, educated individuals with skills specific to national security, including foreign language proficiency, regional knowledge, legal expertise, or a background in engineering, computer science, or data analytics. It also needs people who can lead, manage, and communicate. Fortunately, there are highly motivated Americans—from undergraduate college students through senior-level professionals—who are developing the education, experience, and credentials required for work in national security departments and agencies. This population has a strong interest in serving the country even as other opportunities present themselves. But challenges such as opaque hiring practices, long clearance processes, and limited access to professional networks hinder people’s chances at employment in the federal government. As a result, the government is unable to fill critical national security roles, while individuals with the necessary skill sets and desire to serve are sidelined from a federal career. To attract, recruit, and retain those with the required qualifications and interests, departments and agencies must understand the motivations of the next generation and the challenges they face when seeking government careers in national security. As part of this project, CNAS researchers organized focus groups and conducted a survey to identify the motivations, priorities, and skill sets of those interested in government service, along with the challenges, barriers, and opportunities in taking this path. The project examines the current civilian national security talent pipeline and explores the problems associated with the recruitment and retention of civil servants in national security departments and agencies. What did we find? Improvements to the federal hiring process and the clearance timeline, greater access to talent beyond Washington, D.C., and expansion of initial pathways into government service could ensure that the federal government has the employees it needs to secure the nation. These improvements require action from the executive branch and Congress.
Topic:
National Security, Employment, Public Service, and Skills
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

202. Campaign of Denial: Strengthening Simultaneous Deterrence in the Indo-Pacific and Europe

Author:
Becca Wasser
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The United States faces an unprecedented challenge: simultaneously deterring large-scale conventional aggression by two nuclear-armed powers. The nation will need to deter these major adversaries from overt aggression in the near term in two primary, yet distinct, regions: China in the Indo-Pacific and Russia in Europe. However, the U.S. military is unprepared to concurrently meet the challenges posed by China and Russia. These challenges have become more pronounced as Beijing continues its ambitious military modernization and Moscow continues to threaten European security despite its currently diminished military strength. Effective simultaneous deterrence requires the United States to reembrace the basic principles of deterrence to reverse unfavorable trends in military power that are eroding long-standing U.S. warfighting advantages. It necessitates U.S. forces to project power into far-flung regions that are contested by China and Russia to uphold America’s extended deterrence commitments to its allies and partners. To do so, the Pentagon must shift from previous approaches designed to deter opportunistic aggressors and respond to crises. While the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has realigned its strategy to focus on great-power deterrence, it has faced hurdles in strategy implementation that have stymied changes needed to organize more effectively for simultaneous deterrence. This is due in part to a sizable mismatch between strategy and resources. The U.S. military does not have the kinds and numbers of forces required to simultaneously deter China in the Indo-Pacific and Russia in Europe from conventional conflict. This deficit is especially telling in two priority scenarios: an invasion of Taiwan by China, and a Russian invasion of the Baltics. American forces lack the modernized capabilities, necessary posture, right levels of readiness, and familiarity with executing the types of warfighting missions needed to meet the current challenge.1 The balance between meeting global demands and responding to persistent threats while shifting to emphasize deterrence in the Indo-Pacific and Europe is precarious. Concentrating on strategic priorities requires accepting risk in other regions, as the United States, with fewer forces and resources stretched around the globe, moves capabilities and forces to priority theaters. A new approach to simultaneous deterrence is needed. The Biden administration has outlined the concept of campaigning as a key component of peacetime deterrence. This concept seeks to sequence and link military activities so they intentionally counter coercion by priority adversaries. The intent is to enable the Pentagon to respond to challenges posed by China and Russia, while still meeting global demands. But the concept is currently ill-defined and expansive, and its broad interpretation does not help the DoD meet its deterrence requirements or align strategy and resources. Instead, campaigning runs the risk of engaging U.S. forces in activities that do not contribute to or are counterproductive to deterrence. A failure to curb these activities will result in either the need to expand force size, or the hindrance of modernization efforts.
Topic:
Security, Military Affairs, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Europe, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

203. Strengthening the Shield: Japan’s Defense Transformation and the U.S.-Japan Alliance

Author:
Jacob Stokes, Lisa Curtis, Joshua Fitt, Joseph I. Grimm, and Rebecca Wittner
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
In December 2022, Japan’s government released three major strategic documents: the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the Defense Buildup Program. Although Japan has made incremental changes to its security policies and capabilities over the last decade, the new documents mark a notable shift in Japan’s approach to strengthening its defense. The documents reflect Tokyo’s assessment of the rising threats that could challenge Japan’s security and signal Japan’s commitment to build the military capabilities necessary to meet them. This report examines Tokyo’s defense transformation and assesses its implications for the U.S.-Japan alliance and Washington’s strategy toward the Indo-Pacific. Japan is “fundamentally reinforcing” its national security and defense policies to cope with its increasingly severe security environment. The military threats posed by China, North Korea, and Russia have been growing steadily for years but appear to be peaking simultaneously. Tensions between Japan and China have occasionally flared in the five decades since they normalized diplomatic relations. But those tensions have reached new heights since 2012, when China began to regularly contest Japan’s administration of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. By August 2022, Beijing fired five ballistic missiles into Japan’s exclusive economic zone during China’s live-fire military exercises after then-U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan. The aim of the missile launches was to signal there would be consequences for Japan if Tokyo were to intervene in a Taiwan contingency. Meanwhile, North Korea’s unprecedented rate of missile testing since 2022 and Russia’s brutal war against Ukraine have deepened Japanese concerns about the potential for the use of force in the Indo-Pacific. Japan is taking steps to improve its ability to defend itself and deter an invasion, including through changes to security funding and policy. Tokyo has announced plans to increase its defense spending by 65 percent over the next five years, acquire standoff weapons that could be used for a counterstrike mission, and adopt an “active cyber defense” posture. Japan has clarified the roles of its military, the Self-Defense Forces (SDF), and Coast Guard in the event of an attack; committed to establishing a permanent Joint Headquarters for SDF operations; and created a program for supplying partner militaries with security assistance. Effectively employing counterstrike and active cyber defense, however, will require a clearer delineation of the legal authorities for their use as well as the overall military strategies that they would support. In addition, pressure from the Japanese public over tax hikes required to pay for the defense spending increase amid other fiscal pressures could pose a barrier to implementation. Japan plans to strengthen the SDF through boosting readiness and resilience of current forces, acquiring counterstrike and other advanced capabilities, and improving force posture and mobility. The SDF has been plagued by a chronic lack of munitions and other supplies, and most of its facilities do not meet its own standards for resilience against enemy attack. Addressing these shortfalls is essential, though these types of programs often lose out to more high-profile programs. For its counterstrike mission, Japan has announced it will buy U.S.-made Tomahawk cruise missiles. This initial purchase will provide a stopgap until Japan is able to produce its own longer-range missiles later in the decade. Japan has also announced it will pursue new capabilities in uncrewed systems, space, cyber, and artificial intelligence (AI). But fulfilling these ambitions will be challenging given some short-falls in Japan’s technology base and SDF personnel. Lastly, the SDF is grappling with how to expand its forces in Japan’s southwest islands while maintaining a sufficient presence throughout the country to deter aggression from a range of possible threats. Next, Japan’s strategy emphasizes enhancing security partnerships regionally and across the globe. Japan has recently stepped up its defense cooperation with several Indo-Pacific and European countries. With Australia, Japan is building on a 10-year effort to deepen strategic cooperation, a process that culminated in January 2022 with the completion of a Reciprocal Access Agreement. New bilateral strategic cooperation includes enhancing interoperability between the SDF and the Australian military, increasing rotational SDF training deployments to Australia, and announcing a new joint security declaration that commits to a combined response to military contingencies. Similarly, Japan has long recognized the strategic importance of India and continues to build on the Japan-India relationship through maritime security cooperation, a new joint fighter exercise, and operationalization of their Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement. Japan and the Philippines are also expanding their defense ties through humanitarian assistance and disaster relief training exercises and an important emerging trilateral security relationship with the United States. Over the past year, Japan and South Korea have made significant strides to repair relations since the latest downturn that began in 2018. This will be an incremental process, but there has been progress in the form of leader-level summits and ministerial dialogues, plans to cooperate on sharing data about North Korean missiles, and new trilateral ballistic missile and anti-submarine drills with the United States. Japan also is building defense connections and relationships with European nations. It is pursuing the development of a sixth-generation fighter jet with the U.K. and Italy and, particularly since the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, has sought to deepen strategic ties with NATO. These comprehensive changes to Japan’s defense policies will necessarily reshape the military and security pillars of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Tokyo’s acquisition of counterstrike capabilities will position Japan to potentially take on some offensive tasks, even while retaining its primarily defensive orientation. This also has implications for alliance contingency planning related to defending Japan directly as well as around Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula, and the South China Sea. However, increased joint planning will require updates to alliance command and control (C2) and information-sharing mechanisms. Additionally, given resource constraints, the alliance would be well-served to find additional opportunities for military technology sharing, codevelopment, and coproduction, such as through Japanese involvement in the second pillar of the AUKUS (Australia-United Kingdom-United States) partnership focused on cooperation on advanced capabilities and defense technology innovation. And the alliance must take steps to improve force posture and readiness, including through enhancing base resiliency and increasing munitions stockpiles. Japan’s fundamental transformation of its defense posture will mean significant changes for the U.S.-Japan alliance. The United States must adapt its approach to alliance coordination to maximize new opportunities and manage any new challenges. In this context, U.S. policymakers should: Prepare to update the alliance, while recognizing that Japan’s new defense policies will require significant time, resources, and political will to implement. Stay closely aligned with Tokyo on the threat land- scape as well as engagement with geopolitical competitors, especially China. Integrate U.S.-Japan command and control structures. Create an alliance readiness, resilience, and posture implementation task force. Deepen planning for contingencies and bolster extended deterrence. Create a road map for expanding defense technology cooperation concurrently with Japan’s implementation of specific improvements to its information security practices and infrastructure. Innovate operational concepts for uncrewed systems and counterstrike capabilities. Leverage the U.S.-Japan alliance as a hub for minilateral and multilateral security engagement. Build U.S.-Japan alliance mechanisms that will expand cooperation on cyber security and defense. Stand up an alliance dialogue on military personnel issues.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Bilateral Relations, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, and United States of America

204. Assessing the Evolving Russian Nuclear Threat

Author:
Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Michael Kofman, Nicholas Lokker, and Heli Hautala
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, its nuclear rhetoric has become more permissive, more inconsistent, and more instrumental. Russia has also placed greater emphasis on military exercises involving nuclear-capable weapons, and it has altered policies and planning for its nuclear forces. Although it is too soon to draw definitive conclusions as the war in Ukraine is still ongoing and the lessons that Russia draws from it uncertain, the changes in Russia’s approach to nuclear weapons since its invasion suggest that Russia is likely to adopt a more assertive nuclear force posture, especially with respect to its non-strategic nuclear weapons, in order to signal that the country will no longer be a status quo power and increase the credibility of its nuclear threats. Russia is also likely to increase its efforts to test NATO cohesion—potentially through greater nuclear provocations and/or by signaling an insincere willingness to engage in forms of arms control or cooperative threat reduction—and continue to look for opportunities to leverage nuclear weapons to signal great-power status. In a future war with NATO, Russia would likely perceive the need to use nuclear weapons earlier in the conflict, either to seek victory against superior NATO conventional forces through nuclear first use on the battlefield, or to prevent defeat by those NATO forces. Moreover, since 2022, it has become increasingly difficult for U.S. and Russian policymakers to discern each other’s red lines, raising the risk of unintended escalation. Heightened Russian nuclear rhetoric at home could also alter the public’s views of acceptable nuclear use, eroding a potential constraint on Kremlin decision-making. Finally, changes since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine indicate both reduced Russian commitment to nonproliferation as its image increasingly becomes that of a rogue actor in international affairs, and diminished opportunities for nuclear arms control, for now.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, Russia-Ukraine War, and Threat Assessment
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

205. Rolling the Iron Dice: The Increasing Chance of Conflict Protraction

Author:
Andrew Metrick
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The prospect of a Sino-American war looms on the horizon. No scenario for such a conflict has garnered more interest than the potential invasion of Taiwan by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In the United States, discussions have focused on the early days of a conflict, in particular sinking the PRC’s amphibious fleet.1 Both the United States and the PRC place great emphasis on offensive military operations that heavily use the fruits of the precision strike revolution (PSR).2 This focus on early offensive action leads immediately to considerations of forces and weapons. U.S. defense planners are unsurprisingly most comfortable with the dynamics of short, sharp wars, having spent the past decade focused on deterring or defeating adversary faits accomplis, short and often opportunistic campaigns of aggression. Speed, political sophistication, and immediate military overmatch seemed to be the key ingredients for victory. Russia’s seizure of Crimea in 2014 was seen as a template for other future aggressors to follow.3 Prolonged wars of attrition, particularly those involving the United States, were thought no longer possible. Russia’s subsequent invasion of Ukraine in 2022 turned this vision on its head, demonstrating the military and political consequences of trying and failing to obtain a similar fait accompli on a larger scale. The ongoing Russian experiences in Ukraine indicate a need to reevaluate such thinking and consider the potential of protraction in the context of a hypothetical U.S.-PRC conflict. Most work on this topic has considered only the initial days and weeks of hostilities, usually over Taiwan or in the South or East China Seas.4 There has been comparably little discussion of what comes after.5 There are three key concepts that inform the following discussions: exhaustion, sanctuary, and protraction. Exhaustion is the point when large-scale offensive operations are no longer possible as offensive military capabilities have been used up. Afterward, some period of reconstitution and recovery is needed. This requires sanctuary, the relative freedom from attack sufficient for the rebuilding of military forces and capacities. Protraction occurs after at least one cycle of exhaustion and recovery. It is closely tied to pre-conflict leadership beliefs about the length of the looming war. A simplified definition of a protracted war is a conflict that lasts longer than leaders expect; it is a mismatch between political-military expectations and reality. Doctrinal developments in both the PRC and the United States, influenced by improvements in technology, place significant emphasis on the early stages of conflict and rapid, offensive operations. The emphasis by both the PRC and the United States on the early stages of the conflict can be seen in the PRC’s system destruction warfare and United States’ denial-centric concepts that aim for rapid decisive results.6 These approaches focus almost exclusively on the operational level of war, ignoring strategic factors animating the conflict and shaping its termination. Should PRC President Xi Jinping commit the PLA to seizing Taiwan by force, enter a war with the United States, and “roll the iron dice,” protraction appears increasingly likely, contrary to most contemporary military thinking and preparation.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Conflict, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

206. No Winners in This Game: Assessing the U.S. Playbook for Sanctioning China

Author:
Emily Kilcrease
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The relationship between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is marked by both geopolitical tensions and deep economic linkages. While policymakers may have once believed that economic integration would inject stability into the overall relationship and provide a deterrent to conflict, that idealistic vision has been shaken by Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine. No longer can the United States and its partners assume that the PRC’s economic interest in retaining ties to the global economy will override its nationalist impulses. The once unthinkable idea of imposing severe sanctions on China has become a strategic imperative to consider, as one of a range of measures that the United States and its partners may consider if relations with the PRC deteriorate further. Yet, sanctioning China represents a challenge more complex than any other in the modern era of sanctions. The scale and interconnected nature of China’s economy means that the damage from sanctions will not be contained in China; instead, the negative effects will rebound globally through China’s deep economic ties to nearly every country around the world, including the United States. China has substantial capacity in key economic areas, such as manufacturing, that provide it with important means to retaliate against U.S. sanctions or impose its own economic costs on the United States and its partners. This report seeks to advance policy debates on how to sanction China, if geopolitical conditions warranted doing so at scale. It builds on prior Center for a New American Security (CNAS) research, including a 2023 report that outlines how the United States currently uses a variety of sanctions tools to manage the strategic relationship with the PRC.1 A key finding of the earlier work is that the United States imposes sanctions at a relatively limited scale compared to the scope of challenges that exist in the bilateral relationship, with the notable exception of an increasing range of technology-related sanctions. A large divide separates the existing level of sanctions on China and the full range of economic measures that the United States may consider. This report attempts to envision that fuller range of economic measures and consider whether the use of sanctions would meaningfully advance U.S. interests during a potential conflict. The report begins, in chapter 1, with an assessment of the main economic and political characteristics that would determine China’s vulnerability to, and resolve to withstand, sanctions pressure. The concentration of power at the very top of the PRC’s political system, along with a willingness to subordinate economic objectives to political ones, indicate that China may have a high degree of resolve to absorb the costs of sanctions. China’s continued reliance on the U.S.-dominated global financial infrastructure is a key area of vulnerability to sanctions pressure. But, China retains significant economic leverage through its manufacturing relationships, as well as through the importance of its large domestic market to foreign multinational companies. Attempting to impose sanctions that are asymmetrically more painful to China will be a fraught exercise, given the degree to which China is embedded in global supply chains. In chapter 2, the report examines sanctions actions that the United States and its partners may impose during a conflict scenario, drawing from the sanctions playbook used against Russia and projecting adaptations that would be needed in the China context. The main objective of this analysis is to identify points of asymmetric leverage in the U.S.-China economic relationship, where imposition of a sanction would be more economically damaging to China than to the United States and its partners. The sanctions actions are examined through the lens of a ends-ways-and-means framework, loosely borrowing concepts from the defense community and mapping them into the economic domain. The value in such an exercise is to impose discipline in identifying why a particular economic measure may be taken and what the intended impact would be. It can also enhance the ability to integrate economic actions with those being considered in military or other domains. The report examines possible actions under three broad categories, based on the objective of the sanctions: technology denial, embargo of commodities and materials, and macroeconomic pressure. The research includes analysis by the CNAS Energy, Economic & Security team of economic data and research interviews with a wide range of sanctions, export controls, macroeconomics, trade and finance, and China experts in the United States, Europe, and Asia. In addition to examining potential sanctions options on a sectoral basis, the report also includes a company-by-company lens to assess the potential impact of sanctioning specific Chinese companies. The report finds that the U.S. options to impose harsh sanctions on China are severely constrained. U.S. options to deny militarily relevant technology to China are modest, at best. Certain areas, such as maritime capabilities, will be difficult to target due to the nearly entirely domestic supply chains of China’s main military shipbuilders. Other areas, such as semiconductors, cannot be targeted without running the risk of disruption to critical U.S. supply chains. Overall, efforts to deny technology to China require a longer time horizon to be effective and may have less utility in an immediate run-up period to a potential conflict. Attempts to use sanctions tools to deny commodities or materials to China will require innovation and the development of new sanctions tools. Key commodities, such as energy, are inherently substitutable and globally available, including from many countries that will likely not align with the United States in a conflict with the PRC. Building on the example of the oil price cap used in the Russia context, the United States and partners will need to consider novel policy approaches that provide positive economic inducements to align with U.S. policies, in addition to using traditional sanctions tools.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Sanctions, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

207. Resisting China’s Gray Zone Military Pressure on Taiwan

Author:
Jacob Stokes
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) has sharply escalated its pressure campaign targeting the Republic of China (ROC or Taiwan) in recent years. Beijing appears likely to use Taiwan’s upcoming presidential election in January 2024 as a pretext to apply more pressure on the self-governing island, particularly in the “gray zone” using China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), along with other tools of state power. There is no precise and commonly agreed upon definition of what gray zone activities are and are not. In general, though, the concept refers to actions that fall into the space between, on one side, peace and, on the other, full-scale kinetic war.1 Gray zone activities are coercive and aggressive but designed to stay below the threshold of triggering major conflict. China uses gray zone operations as part of a comprehensive strategy to pressure Taiwan that spans the areas of diplomacy, information, economics, and security. This policy brief examines one major component of that campaign: gray zone military and security operations. It starts by detailing the capabilities and tactics China uses to put security pressure on Taiwan. Then, it explains what Beijing seeks to achieve with those actions. The paper concludes with recommendations for how U.S. and Taiwan policymakers can resist and counter China’s gray zone operations.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, Military Affairs, and Information
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

208. The Compound Era of U.S. Counterterrorism

Author:
Don Rassler
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
The past several years have been a period of transition for the U.S. counterterrorism enterprise. During this time, the United States has had to navigate, and adapt U.S. CT posture and approaches to, a shift in U.S. national security priorities; a complex, diverse, and ever-evolving threat landscape; and ongoing technological change that is transforming the worlds of extremism, terrorism, and counterterrorism. In addition, the United States has simultaneously been working to define what the next chapter of U.S. counterterrorism should look like and how the U.S. CT community needs to evolve so it can anticipate, understand, and respond to the varied threats it will face in the years ahead. To help drive change, the United States should frame the counterterrorism moment it finds itself as the compound era of U.S. CT. This new era is being shaped by three primary characteristics: multiple priorities; a broad range of threats, including mixed ones; and a more diverse CT landscape. How well the United States responds to and adapts to the change and challenges that are occurring across these three areas will have an important bearing on the future effectiveness of U.S. counterterrorism. This report outlines characteristics that define the compound era of U.S. CT and the utility associated with this framing. The body of the report then explores some of the key trends and factors that have been impacting and driving change across the extremism, terrorism, and CT landscapes. The report also discusses some of the implications of these trends and outlines 11 priorities that can help guide the U.S. counterterrorism community’s evolution during this new era.
Topic:
National Security, Counter-terrorism, and Threat Assessment
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

209. Worsening Risk of Mass Atrocities in South Sudan

Author:
Sarah McIntosh and Naomi Kikoler
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
Abstract:
The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum's Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide published a report in February 2022 detailing the immediate risk of mass atrocities facing South Sudanese civilians.1 Since then, threats facing South Sudanese civilians have worsened and the government of South Sudan has failed to take action to mitigate these threats.2 Attacks against civilians have continued, leading thousands of people to be killed, injured, or displaced. Experts told Simon-Skjodt Center staff that they feared the world's youngest country would slip back into full scale war. This stems from both the highly complex conflict dynamics throughout the country with different geographic regions experiencing unique forms of violence from distinct perpetrators as well as the South Sudanese government's recent decision to delay for two years the deadline for implementing the peace agreement and for conducting national elections. Their actions suggest that those most responsible for past abuses may intend to cling to power and evade justice for their actions. The need to take decisive preventative and protective action is urgent.
Topic:
Impunity, Civilians, Atrocities, Armed Conflict, and Risk Assessment
Political Geography:
Africa and South Sudan

210. Using Targeted Sanctions to Help Prevent Mass Atrocities: Results from Interviews with Experienced Practitioners

Author:
Tallan Donine, Kyra Fox, Daniel Solomon, Alex Vandermaas-Peeler, and Lawerence Woocher
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
Abstract:
The Simon-Skjodt Center’s “lessons learned” project aims to understand better how policy makers, across all levels of government, can take effective action to prevent mass atrocity crimes and protect civilian populations in situations where they face serious threats of group-targeted, systematic violence. We have sought to identify, distill, and organize insights on a range of policy tools—ranging from “naming and shaming” to sanctions to prosecutions—which are sometimes used to help prevent or respond to mass atrocities. To complement our review of the empirical research literature on the use of targeted sanctions, we conducted interviews with people who had substantial policy or operational experience working in the US government on targeted sanctions prior to 2021. The premise for the interviews is that experienced practitioners have important insights about when and how targeted sanctions can be most effective in helping prevent mass atrocities.3 While one can find many ideas about how to use targeted sanctions most effectively, none that we are aware of are: (1) focused specifically on the use of targeted sanctions for mass atrocity prevention and (2) based on the collective perspectives of a set of experienced practitioners. This report summarizes the results of the interviews with experienced targeted sanctions practitioners. Details on the methods employed and the interview respondents are presented in appendices.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Sanctions, and Atrocity Prevention
Political Geography:
Global Focus

211. Social Media Platforms, the Risks of Mass Atrocities, and Opportunities for Atrocity Prevention: 2023 Sudikoff Interdisciplinary Seminar on Genocide Prevention

Author:
Tallan Donine
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
Abstract:
On January 19 and 24, the Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum brought together a diverse group of scholars, representatives of social media companies, practitioners, and policy makers for two 90-minute virtual convenings to discuss social media platforms, the risks of mass atrocities, and opportunities for atrocity prevention. Motivations for this seminar included (1) taking stock of knowledge about the relationship between social media, mass atrocities, and atrocity prevention; (2) generating new ideas for future research or practice on this topic; and (3) exploring how the Simon-Skjodt Center can play a constructive role in this area. This rapporteur’s report summarizes key observations raised during both discussions under the Chatham House rule of non-attribution and does not necessarily represent the views of all participants. The first session focused on exploring the interaction between social media platforms and risks of mass atrocities. Guiding questions included: • How might social media platforms contribute to risk factors associated with mass atrocities? • How might perpetrators use social media platforms to enact mass atrocities? • How might the relationship between social media platforms and mass atrocities change in the future? The second session focused on social media platforms and the prevention of mass atrocities. Guiding questions included: • How do technology firms and others understand the risks that social media platforms may inadvertently contribute to the commission of mass atrocities? • What steps have firms taken to date to address these risks? • What new or different actions can social media companies take to design and manage their platforms in ways that would help reduce risks of mass atrocities? • What type of regulation of social media platforms would most effectively balance interests in civil liberties and violence prevention?
Topic:
Genocide, Social Media, Atrocity Prevention, and Risk Assessment
Political Geography:
Global Focus

212. Using Risk Analysis to Shape Border Management: A Review of Approaches during the COVID-19 Pandemic

Author:
Kelley Lee, Julianne Piper, and Jennifer Fang
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Migration Policy Institute (MPI)
Abstract:
The near universal adoption of travel measures by governments to control the spread of COVID-19 has proved controversial during the pandemic. National responses have been highly varied and frequently changing, and the use of travel measures—ranging from advisories and screening to quarantine, testing, immunity certification, and restrictions on entry—has been poorly coordinated across jurisdictions. Particularly in the early stages of the crisis, this created chaos for travelers and the travel sector, and caused significant economic and social harms. Many governments also failed to clearly communicate the rationale for using travel measures, the evidence underpinning them, and the measures’ role within overall pandemic response strategies. There is now substantial evidence that these measures’ early and stringent use by some governments during the initial stages of the pandemic slowed the importation of the virus and reduced its onward transmission. Yet, there is also growing recognition of weaknesses in the quality of evidence available to inform policy decisions. Evaluating the appropriateness of travel measures and applying them effectively during future public-health emergencies will depend on international consensus on methodologies that lead to a more harmonized and coordinated approach and to greater public trust in policy decisions. This report presents a comparative analysis of 11 publicly available methodologies used to assess travel-related risks during the pandemic—those of Hong Kong, New Zealand, South Korea, Taiwan, United Kingdom, United States, International Civil Aviation Organization, International Air Transport Association, World Health Organization, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and European Union. It offers a set of lessons learned and recommendations, including a proposed decision instrument that could improve the use of risk analysis for border management during future public-health emergencies.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, International Organization, Governance, Border Control, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Taiwan, South Korea, New Zealand, Hong Kong, Global Focus, and United States of America

213. External Processing: A Tool to Expand Protection or Further Restrict Territorial Asylum?

Author:
Pauline de Oliveira and Nicholas Feith Tan
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Migration Policy Institute (MPI)
Abstract:
Access to territorial asylum is under significant pressure in many corners of the world. Pushbacks at borders as well as pandemic-era mobility restrictions have prevented many asylum seekers from reaching their destinations. And new and ongoing crises, including those in Afghanistan and Ukraine, have highlighted the need to offer protection closer to where vulnerable populations live, and for high-income countries to find ways to share responsibilities with the low- and middle-income countries that host the overwhelming majority of people in need of international protection. This has led to renewed interest in external processing, which involves conducting part or all of the asylum procedure outside a destination country’s territory. Notably, even as countries such as Australia and the United Kingdom have adopted policies to offshore asylum processing to countries such as Papua New Guinea and Rwanda in hopes of deterring spontaneous arrivals, there is growing interest in using external processing in ways that complement existing territorial asylum and expand, rather than restrict, protection opportunities. This report—part of the Beyond Territorial Asylum: Making Protection Work in a Bordered World initiative led by MPI and the Robert Bosch Stiftung—highlights the opportunities that external processing offers as well as the challenges to its implementation and the risks it could pose to territorial asylum. It explores three categories of external processing policies implemented or proposed to date: humanitarian visas, emergency evacuations, and external processing centers. The report also identifies key conditions that must be present for external processing to occur in a protection-sensitive manner.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Governance, Refugees, Asylum, Visa, and Immigration Policy
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Australia, Rwanda, Papua New Guinea, and Global Focus

214. Trusting AI: Integrating Artificial Intelligence into the Army’s Professional Expert Knowledge

Author:
C. Anthony Pfaff, Christopher J. Lowrance, Bre M. Washburn, and Brett A. Carey
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
Integrating artificially intelligent technologies for military purposes poses a special challenge. In previous arms races, such as the race to atomic bomb technology during World War II, expertise resided within the Department of Defense. But in the artificial intelligence (AI) arms race, expertise dwells mostly within industry and academia. Also, unlike the development of the bomb, effective employment of AI technology cannot be relegated to a few specialists; almost everyone will have to develop some level of AI and data literacy. Complicating matters is AI-driven systems can be a “black box” in that humans may not be able to explain some output, much less be held accountable for its consequences. This inability to explain coupled with the cession to a machine of some functions normally performed by humans risks the relinquishment of some jurisdiction and, consequently, autonomy to those outside the profession. Ceding jurisdiction could impact the American people’s trust in their military and, thus, its professional standing. To avoid these outcomes, creating and maintaining trust requires integrating knowledge of AI and data science into the military’s professional expertise. This knowledge covers both AI technology and how its use impacts command responsibility; talent management; governance; and the military’s relationship with the US government, the private sector, and society.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Ethics, Artificial Intelligence, Army, Civil-Military Relations, and Data Science
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

215. PLA Logistics and Sustainment: PLA Conference 2022

Author:
George R. Shatzer, Roger D. Cliff, Kenneth Allen, Joshua Arostegui, and Justin Boggess
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
The US Army War College People’s Liberation Army Conference (PLA) Conference was held March 31 to April 2, 2022, at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. The conference focused on PLA logistics and sustainment. As the PLA continues to build and modernize its combat forces, it is important to examine if the capabilities meant to support combat operations are also being developed. Specific topics included: 1) China’s national-level logistics, including how China mobilizes national resources for the military and how it provides joint logistics support to the PLA Theater Commands; 2) the logistics capabilities of the different PLA services, especially the Army, Navy, and Air Forces; 3) PLA logistics in China’s remote regions, such as airpower projection in the Western Theater Command along the Indian border; and, 4) the PLA’s ability to sustain overseas operations at its base in Djibouti. Despite notable potential shortfalls and points of friction, the PLA has successfully sustained counterpiracy maritime operations for many years and conducted noncombatant evacuation operations well-distant from China. It is increasingly able to move forces across the vast distances of China and conduct large training exercises. Far more must be known about PLA sustainment and logistics before the hard questions about PLA operational reach and endurance can be answered.
Topic:
International Relations, Defense Policy, Logistics, Mobilization, Military, People's Liberation Army (PLA), and Power Projection
Political Geography:
China and Asia

216. Pakistan Security Report 2022

Author:
Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
Abstract:
In 2022, the number of terrorist attacks in Pakistan marked an increase of 27 percent from the previous year. The number of terrorist attacks in the country also continued to rise for the second consecutive year. A total of 262 terrorist attacks in Pakistan in the year – including 14 suicide bombings –claimed in all 419 lives and injured another 734 people. A 25 percent increase has been recorded in fatalities in the outgoing year as compared with 2021. Pak Institute for Peace Studies revealed these statistics in its annual “Pakistan Security Report 2022”. The report further noted that the proscribed Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) was becoming a major irritant in Islamabad’s relations with the Taliban government in Kabul as the militant group remained one of the major actors of violence in Pakistan in the year 2022. Other critical actors of violence in 2022 were Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K) and Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA). Over 60 percent of total terrorist attacks recorded in Pakistan in the year were perpetrated by these three militant groups. Similarly, about 95 percent of the total recorded terrorist attacks in Pakistan in 2022 concentrated in in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, Military Strategy, Governance, and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:
Pakistan and Asia

217. Political Coalitions in Turkey in the Run-Up to the 2023 Elections

Author:
Aurélien Denizeau
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The year 2023, already marked by a deadly double earthquake in the south-east of the country in February, is the year of the centenary of the Republic, but above all an election year for Turkey. The general elections (parliamentary and presidential) will take place on May 14 and are unanimously considered to be crucial for the political future of the country. The electoral campaign is polarized around two major coalitions: the People’s Alliance, led by the presidential AKP and the MHP, which supports the re-election of President Erdoğan; and the Nation Alliance, formed by the main Kemalist party CHP with five other parties, and supporting Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu as a presidential candidate. Two other coalitions are also present and could tip the election one way or the other: the Labor and Freedom Alliance, centered around the progressive and pro-Kurdish HDP, and the Ancestral Alliance, which supports the nationalist Sinan Oğan. While this political configuration may seem familiar to European observers – where cross-party coalitions are common, especially in parliamentary regimes – there are indications, such as the tensions between the İYİ Party and its partners in the Nation Alliance over support for Kılıçdaroğlu, that call into question the nature of these coalitions: are they motivated by ideological proximity, or are they merely tactical tools for gaining power? In particular, these coalitions seem to derive from the nature of the Turkish political regime and its evolution over the last decade, with an ultra-presidentialization of the system under the successive presidential terms of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan which has led all political actors to position themselves in relation to his personal power. As socio-economic conditions weaken the AKP’s electoral base, the prospects for this election seem more open than ever.
Topic:
Elections, Domestic Politics, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, AKP, and Coalition
Political Geography:
Turkey and Middle East

218. The Strategic Repositioning of LNG: Implications for Key Trade Routes and Choke Points

Author:
Leslie Palti-Guzman and Marc-Antoine Eyl-Mazzega
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
2022 saw the climax so far of the weaponization of energy. Following its geopolitical demise, Russia has undertaken its own gas amputation, moving from a super energy power status to a diminished role with uncertain prospects and only hard options left. Russia has cut off almost entirely pipeline gas supplies to the European Union (EU), first inflicting huge financial pain and collecting record high revenues, but then simply losing out its largest and best market with no realistic alternative, and no prospect of any significant return. However, the Kremlin could still further reduce some of the remaining pipeline gas or liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies and thus cause some tensions in the markets. Russia also retains leverage on oil markets, where the Kremlin managed to cope with the embargo as well as the price cap and maintain the relationship with Saudi Arabia which drives OPEC+ decisions. Meanwhile, in 2022, the European energy system has managed to surprisingly adapt on the supply and demand side to the three shocks: the decoupling from Russian energy supplies, the hydropower generation crisis, and the French nuclear electricity crisis. Liquefied natural gas has made a comeback in Europe and has been a savior of industries, governments, and populations. The LNG corridor between the EU and the United States (U.S.) has become the most dominant LNG trade route in 2022. This came at a huge cost though – EU’s gas import bill soared ten times from 2020 and three times from 2021 levels. For 2023, the European gas balance is much more fragile, as the demand reduction potential has reached its limits, same for the ability to attract additional non-Russian exports to Europe, at a time when missing Russian volumes will probably reach 120 billion cubic meters (bcm), instead of about 77 bcm in 2022. More moderate price levels since November 2022 have clearly overshadowed this fundamental mismatch, especially as the weather has been mild and China was still struggling with the pandemic. With an additional 30-40 bcm of missing Russian gas to offset in 2023 compared to 2022, Europeans can be expected to benefit from an extra gas of around 20-25 bcm left in storages thanks to mild weather and available LNG. They have no choice but to continue saving energy in a hurry, that is both on gas and electricity. Gas demand in power generation had increased in the first nine months of 2022 before falling in Q4 2022, and well over 15 bcm can be saved here in 2023 as more nuclear is available altogether, alongside more renewables, and some coal. It will be critical to reduce peak loads though. The key improvement is in terms of logistics, with the massive new LNG import capacity deployed across Europe. Overall, EU’s import situation will be very tensed and fragile for the next winter. The key challenge is that EU’s gas supply security ultimately depends on the weather in Europe, China’s and Japan’s LNG demand, and weather or technical outages in the Gulf of Mexico or in other producers. Any slight disruptions in supplies can have major impacts. As a last resort, bringing back some Groningen supplies, no matter how politically sensitive this would be, must be considered and prepared. Large financial compensations and effective governmental action would notably be required to offset the hardships.
Topic:
European Union, Gas, Exports, Trade, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Europe

219. Russia’s Mining Strategy: Geopolitical Ambitions and Industrial Challenges

Author:
Florian Vidal
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
In addition to being a leading gas and oil power, Russia also possesses vast geological resources that place it among the world’s leading mining countries. Nevertheless, Russia’s largely privatized mining sector faces great and numerous restrictions relating to the obsolescence of its infrastructure, lack of investment and a shortage of qualified human resources in the industry, which may be further exacerbated by the war in Ukraine. To diversify its sources of revenue, whilst also obtaining new levers of geopolitical power, particularly in Africa, Moscow is seeking to revitalize this strategic industry. Russia may focus on several of its globally significant companies, particularly in the diamond, fertilizer and nickel sectors. It also plans to extend its mining activities by reinvesting in and modernizing historic sectors such as coal, or by developing new ones like lithium. In a context of growing global demand for critical metals and minerals in order to meet the challenge of the ecological and energy transition, what role can Russia play? Moscow intends to overcome the challenge of maintaining its economic and industrial autonomy in the face of the sanctions imposed by the West following its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The future of Russia’s mining industry may depend upon a reorientation away from its traditional Western markets and towards Asian countries, such as India, Malaysia, and Vietnam, which have decided to retain their economic ties with Russia. Will Russia’s mining policy bolster the implementation of the “pivot to Asia” that Moscow has talked of for several years?
Topic:
Natural Resources, Geopolitics, Diversification, Mining, Modernization, and Industry
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

220. China/United States: Europe off Balance

Author:
Thomas Gomart and Marc Hecker
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
As French President Emmanuel Macron (accompanied by Ursula von der Leyen) is on a state visit to China, some twenty Ifri researchers decipher the stakes of the U.S./China/Europe strategic triangle. This 16-text study follows Olaf Scholz’s visit to Beijing (November 2022) and precedes that of Emmanuel Macron (April 2023). It comes especially one year after the beginning of a geopolitical and geoeconomic shock of a rare magnitude: the invasion of Ukraine by Russia. The War in Ukraine or the Return of Bloc Geopolitics? The war in Ukraine has broken ties between the European Union (EU) and Russia for the foreseeable future, particularly in the field of energy, though not without consequences in the Middle East, Africa, and the Indo-Pacific. Furthermore, this war has become the main show of active indirect confrontation between the United States—which has provided military support to Ukrainians, with help from its European allies—and China, which has supported Russia politically and economically. In February 2022, Moscow and Beijing declared their “no limits friendship”; in March 2023, Xi Jinping offered his personal support to Vladimir Putin after the International Criminal Court issued a warrant for his arrest. In its position on the political settlement of the Ukraine crisis, presented in February 2023, China stated: “All parties should oppose the pursuit of one’s own security at the cost of others’ security, prevent bloc confrontation, and work together for peace and stability on the Eurasian Continent”. China is no more of a mediator than the United States: it would be unrealistic to believe so. We appear to be witnessing a return of bloc geopolitics, albeit in a starkly different context than that of the Cold War (1947-1991). Globalization has produced strong economic and technological interdependencies that make any prospect of decoupling very costly, if not impossible. Economic partners are no longer necessarily military allies, and vice versa. In other words, a gap is opening up between geopolitical perceptions and geoeconomic realities. The term “decoupling” is popular in the United States, though much less so elsewhere. The rejection of bloc geopolitics is particularly acute outside of the West, where a “pragmatic” approach to foreign policy is often promoted. The Saudi foreign minister summed this up during the World Policy Conference in December 2022: “Polarization is the last thing we need right now. […] We need to build bridges, strengthen connections, and find areas of cooperation”. A few months later, China pulled off an extraordinary diplomatic coup by brokering a deal to restore relations between Riyadh and Tehran. For the EU, the situation is particularly delicate: Europe is in the Western camp, but a severing of ties with Beijing would cause a crushing economic blow. In 2022, China accounted for more than 20% of the EU’s imports, while the United States accounted for around 12%. By 2030, the EU’s GDP is expected to rise to $20.5 trillion, compared to $30.5 trillion for the United States and $33.7 trillion for China. In January 2023, the President of the European Commission declared at Davos: “We still need to work and trade with China, especially when it comes to this transition. So, we need to refocus our approach on de-risking, rather than decoupling”. For its part, Beijing has encouraged European aspirations of “strategic autonomy”, understood in China as a form of detachment from the United States. At the same time, the EU is constantly strengthening its military, technological, financial and energy ties with the U.S. This collective study notes a hypothetical search for balance on the part of the Europeans, faced with a war on their territory (the Western peninsula of the heartland), who cannot escape Sino-American mechanisms, and who do not form a monolithic whole. It also analyzes the strategy of several important actors outside our continent, and shows that, from Ukraine to Taiwan, via Africa and the Middle East, Europeans have little room for maneuver. This is why the study proposes recommendations to try, at a crucial moment, to reinforce their positioning.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Climate Change, International Trade and Finance, Science and Technology, European Union, and Industry
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and United States of America

221. The Sino-Russian Partnership Assumptions, Myths and Realities

Author:
Bobo Lo
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
When Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin announced a “no limits friendship” at their February 2022 summit, the message was that Beijing and Moscow had reached a new peak in relations. Yet Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has exposed the limits of Sino-Russian partnership and highlighted their sometimes diverging interests. Far from being an authoritarian alliance, this is a classic great power relationship centered in realpolitik. China and Russia are strategically autonomous actors, with fundamentally different attitudes toward international order. The Sino-Russian partnership remains resilient. Both sides recognize that it is too important to fail, especially given there are no viable alternatives to continuing cooperation. Nevertheless, the balance of power within the relationship is changing rapidly. Russia’s geopolitical and economic dependence on China is greater than ever. Although predictions of a clientelist relationship are premature, this widening inequality represents a major long-term source of weakness. The challenges Beijing and Moscow pose to Western interests are largely separate and should be addressed individually on their merits. Equally, it is naive to imagine that reaching out to either side could help loosen their strategic partnership. Western governments should focus instead on upping their own game—from revitalizing democracy and the rule of law at home to addressing universal threats such as climate change and food insecurity. Bobo Lo is an Associate Research Fellow with the Russia/NIS Center at Ifri. He is also a Non-Resident Fellow with the Lowy Institute, Sydney, Australia; and a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) in Washington, D.C. Previously, he was Head of the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House, and Deputy Head of Mission at the Australian Embassy in Moscow. Dr. Lo has written several books, including A Wary Embrace: What the China-Russia Relationship Means for the World (Penguin Australia, 2017); Russia and the New World Disorder (Brookings and Chatham House, 2015); and Axis of Convenience: Moscow, Beijing and the New Geopolitics (Brookings and Chatham House, 2008).
Topic:
Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Asia

222. The Technology Policies of Digital Middle Powers

Author:
Alice Pannier
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Digital technology is an element of power in the international system as well as an area for competition among countries. Considering the economic weight and political voluntarism of the U.S., China, and the EU, those three poles of power have received a lot of attention when it comes to their technology policies. This study aims to shift our gaze toward countries outside of the trio. Digital middle powers are those countries that are caught in the middle of the power play in an emerging multipolar international system where digital technology is a determining factor of power. It also refers to countries with established or growing clout in digital technology, and which are regional leaders or global ones in certain sectors. The study provides a qualitative comparison of the technology policies of nine of the digital middle powers: Brazil, India, Israel, Japan, Kenya, Nigeria, Russia, South Korea, and the United Kingdom. It seeks to reflect the diversity of national technology policies, as well as to identify those countries’ convergences and divergences with Europe, the United States, and China. Each case study introduces national technology and digital innovation ecosystems, data policies, and the state of digital infrastructure. These elements serve to examine the strengths of the country’s private sector in technology, the government’s regulatory capacity, and the degree of digital development. The chapters then look at how the digital domain is embedded in the broader dynamics of their bilateral relations with the U.S., the EU, and China. A first conclusion is that digital middle powers can usefully be differentiated between rising digital powers and established ones. Established digital powers have well-developed ecosystems, regulations, and infrastructure, but they are all having to renew and re-focus their technology policies to remain relevant. By contrast, rising digital powers tend to have budding ecosystems in digital services and mobile applications, and large ongoing infrastructure development projects, albeit with limited or patchy regulatory capacity. When it comes to foreign relations, the study confirms well-identified trends whereby the EU’s influence occurs chiefly through the elaboration of norms; the U.S.’s via the strength of its digital services and private sector investment, as well as strong bilateral security ties; while China’s growing influence is underpinned by large infrastructure projects. All the countries studied are attempting to balance their relationships with U.S., China, and the EU. None, save for Russia, has outrightly “picked a side” and severed ties with one or two of the blocs.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Strategic Competition, 5G, and Middle Power
Political Geography:
Kenya, Russia, Japan, United Kingdom, India, Israel, South Korea, Brazil, and Nigeria

223. The Politics of New Cities: Diversification of Actors and Recentralization of State Power in the Case of Diamniadio

Author:
Sina Schlimmer
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The construction of new cities on the African continent is in vogue. From multifunctional urban hubs to eco-districts, the images that accompany the announcement of these projects promote an African urban future based on modernity and technology. This trend for urban planning that claims to make a clean sweep of pre-existing approaches is not unique to African countries, whose governments are inspired in particular by North African and Asian models. However, the promotion of new cities in Africa is part of the lively debate that has been going on for several years on the rapid urbanization of the continent's countries. The creation of modern cities, organized and corresponding to the urban planning standards of international metropolises, is presented as a means of avoiding haphazard, chaotic urban development. This paper offers a critical analysis of the policy of new cities based on an empirical study of the new urban pole of Diamniadio (PUD) in Senegal. Two key arguments are put forward in this paper. First, the analysis deconstructs the ex nihilo character of these urban projects and emphasizes that they are part of public policy trajectories. Due to its geo-economic and strategic position, Diamniadio has been at the heart of the Dakar region's territorial planning policies since at least the end of the 1990s. Secondly, new towns are far from being neutral and technical urban planning instruments; rather, they are political devices that convey interests and stimulate power games. By delimiting the boundaries of the PUD, which is presented as President Macky Sall's political footprint, the central government regains certain administrative powers, particularly in terms of land planning and allocation. In addition, the PUD reflects competition from foreign actors, both public and private, and the growing importance of emerging actors such as Turkey.
Topic:
Infrastructure, Governance, State, Urban, and Cities
Political Geography:
Africa and Senegal

224. Economic Priorities in Post-war Ukraine

Author:
Dmytro Boyarchuk
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Social and Economic Research - CASE
Abstract:
Ukraine has been a stellar example of a little reform going a long way. First invaded by Russia in 2014, the Ukraine of 2022 was a different country, with more resilience, more ability, and more depth. As it pushes to repel the Russian aggressor, it is never too early to think about how Ukraine can continue its reform process and become a state that is free of Russia, economically strong, and a model for policy reform. The ways in which Ukraine can attain this goal are contained in the economic roadmap, “Economic Priorities in Post-war Ukraine,” produced by Ukrainian experts and world-class policy advisors under CASE-Center for Social Research and CASE Ukraine and funded by agencies from around Europe and the United States. This report focuses on the essential reforms that will help Ukraine with the post-war reconstruction, as well as enable progress in its efforts on the way to EU membership. Over 30 years of independence, Ukraine has launched almost all of the necessary reforms to build and develop a market economy. In 2014, Ukraine signed the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, and substantial progress has been demonstrated since then. However, the country fought against a legacy of start-stop reforms and inattention to major objectives such as building the rule of law and encouraging private sector competition. Before the full-scale Russian invasion, it had been making progress in institutional reforms but still had far to go. This report addresses many of the complex tasks that Ukraine needs to complete, with the main challenge being the rule of law, a problem lasting for three decades. Our team of experts propose specific mechanisms to make the transition to a country which respects the rule of law, including ways to improve the judiciary, respect property rights, and encourage private sector competition. The report also examines the question on how the Ukrainian government can attract funding and rebuild the country after the war is over, discussing ways in which the EU and the donor community can be involved. The eventual end of the war also provides Ukraine with a unique opportunity to leap ahead in the European integration process and to finish its institutional reforms. With Ukraine now a candidate for EU membership, the prospects of the integration process, the unprecedented support for integration with the EU in Ukrainian society and the continued support of the West, present Ukraine with a way forward and overcoming the obstacles that have delayed, stalled, or even caused the abandonment of reforms in the past.
Topic:
Development, Reform, Economy, Institutions, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

225. Addressing Product Diversification in Public Housing Supply/Importance of Product Diversification in Public Housing Supply

Author:
Shubhagato Dasgupta, Anindita Mukherjee, Abhinav Kumar, and Shaurya Gupta
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Centre for Policy Research, India
Abstract:
Despite the government’s efforts on augmenting the supply of houses, recent estimates suggest that the housing shortage in urban areas have widened. It is a result of the mismatch between the housing needs of the urban poor and the typology of housing supply. The present study analyses and assesses the housing needs of the urban poor using secondary data from 76th round of NSS (2018-19) on housing and living condition vis-à-vis the typologies of housing supplied by public sector. Through this analysis, we highlight in the report the mismatch between the need and supply of public housing and suggest ways to bridge this gap through policy interventions. The choice of housing, its tenure and location for the urban poor is guided by nature of employment they are engaged in, their stage of life and household size. We find that casual wage workers and urban poor are more likely to compromise on housing conditions, amenities, and privacy to locate themselves near to their livelihood opportunities. Urban housing for urban poor is predominantly supplied by the small households that form part of the informal sector however, the quality of housing remains a concern. Housing provided by formal private sector is a miniscule proportion of total housing constructed by them and is not affordable for most urban poor. The current public housing supply is designed to cater to the urban poor remains mostly at the periphery of the cities making them less desirable to the targeted population – lacks tenure diversity and often disrupts livelihoods linages. The study recommends that public sector should focus on diversifying their housing supply based on the needs of urban poor. It should strive to create a robust housing ecosystem that is responsive to the urban growth, evolving economic structure of the city as well as local preference and aspirations. It should also establish modalities for collaboration with formal private sector to develop newer models of public-private partnerships that also involves and incentivizes, informal private sector, especially the small households that are categorized as subsistence landlords, non-profit sector and communities, to supply better quality housing for the urban poor residents.
Topic:
Poverty, Public Policy, Diversification, Urban, and Housing
Political Geography:
South Asia and India

226. Decoding Digitalization of Urban Governance in India Policy, People and Processes of the Smart Cities Mission and National Urban Digital Mission

Author:
Khaliq Parkar and Uttara Purandare
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Centre for Policy Research, India
Abstract:
The presence of digital technology within urban governance in India is not new. Computerization and the use of enterprise software was encouraged in municipalities through the 1990s, followed by varied e-governance reforms in the early 2000s. These ranged from centralized policies like the National e-Governance Plan (NeGP), to projects such as the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM), and city and state initiatives such as online billing and certification services for citizens and GIS platforms for administrators. The Smart Cities Mission (SCM) launched in 2015, gave a substantial and centralized push for digital interventions by choosing 100 cities to create “smart solutions” for urban governance, planning, and digital infrastructures. These were seen as “lighthouse” cities, expected to create technology-centric solutions that could be emulated by other cities in the mission.
Topic:
Governance, Urban, Smart Cities, and Digitalization
Political Geography:
South Asia and India

227. The Evolution of India’s Welfare System from 2008-2023: A Lookback

Author:
Centre for Policy Research
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Centre for Policy Research, India
Abstract:
In the 15 years that have gone by, India has seen a significant transition in the social sector, and lived through a pandemic. At the Accountability Initiative, Centre for Policy Research, we have tracked the provision of welfare services and entitlements since 2008, in-step with the country’s evolution over these years. The year 2023 marks a moment to pause and reflect for us as we celebrate our 15th anniversary, and the Centre for Policy Research reaches its milestone of 50 years. But, aside from our legacy of evidence-based knowledge sharing, this reflection is important in one more way. In 2024, India will choose a new government. A lookback on welfare spending and outcomes is an essential first step to understanding future priorities and pathways to development. Drawing from previous Union Budgets, this Special Brief will dive into six major aspects. Firstly, reviewing the sources of funding available with the government. Secondly, analysing trends in expenditures including social sector allocations for key ministries and schemes. Thirdly, the devolution of funds to states who are primary spenders on welfare services. Fourthly, unpacking social sector schemes over the years. Fifthly, analysing select outputs and outcomes over time. Lastly, we offer our own experience by providing a snapshot of the changes in government Management Information Systems which are critical to monitoring welfare schemes, among other aspects. For the purpose of this Special Brief, we are covering the period from 2009-2023. Actual Government of India (GoI) expenditures have been used till Financial Year (FY) 2020-21. For FY 2021-22, figures are Revised Estimates (REs) and Budget Estimates (BEs) for FY 2022-23.
Topic:
History, Governance, Budget, Welfare, and Public Spending
Political Geography:
South Asia and India

228. Are Immigrants a Threat? Most Americans Don’t Think So, but Those Receptive to the “Threat” Narrative Are Predictably More Anti-immigrant

Author:
PRRI Staff
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
PRRI: Public Religion Research Institute
Abstract:
Joe Biden campaigned on a commitment to reverse many of the Trump administration’s strictest anti-immigration policies. Though many of these policies have either been reversed or halted — including the travel ban for people from various countries, the ban on temporary work visas, and the expansion of the public charge rule, among others —some remain in place.[1] One such policy is a public health rule known as Title 42, which allows for the immediate expulsion of migrants at the border in order to control the spread of COVID-19. The rule was set to be lifted in late December, but its suspension was delayed by the Supreme Court owing to public backlash and fears that illegal border crossings would increase significantly.[2] Meanwhile, independent Sen. Kyrsten Sinema and Republican Sen. Thom Tillis have proposed legislation that would both extend Title 42 and provide a pathway to citizenship for two million people who were illegally brought to the United States as children and are now classified as “Dreamers.” The proposal also includes new resources to speed the processing of asylum seekers.[3] As politicians struggle with how to address immigration issues, Americans’ views on immigration have become increasingly polarized, with Republicans becoming significantly more anti-immigrant in their attitudes over the past few years. Republicans have continually attacked the Biden administration’s handling of immigration, claiming that his policies will increase the flow of immigrants over the southern border and calling for U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro Mayorkas to resign. These criticisms are expected to increase now that Republicans have regained control of the House of Representatives.[4] Though the Trump-era narrative still resonates among certain portions of the American public, this report reveals that majorities of Americans do not view immigrants as a threat. But people who are more likely to think of immigrants as a threat — including those who most trust conservative media sources and Fox News — they are considerably more anti-immigrant and less supportive of open immigration policies.
Topic:
Politics, Immigration, Border Control, and Nativism
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

229. Advancing Equity: Mentorship in Peace and Security

Author:
Kimberly Gillies
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Women of Color Advancing Peace, Security and Conflict Transformation (WCAPS)
Abstract:
In this report, we synthesize findings from original interviews and extensive research into what makes an effective DEI strategy, the impact of mentorship —particularly on people of color—and how to elevate equity-focused mentoring within the fields of peace, security, and foreign policy. We close with a recommendation to CRAVE mentoring opportunities by founding, joining, or supporting initiatives that: create opportunity for cross-identity contact; establish responsibility structures; cultivate social accountability for involvement; are voluntary; and engage participants in their evolution.
Topic:
Security, Women, Diversity, Peace, Inclusion, Equity, People of Color (POC), and Mentorship
Political Geography:
Global Focus

230. Citizens’ Perceptions on Public Safety and Threats to National Security in Kosovo

Author:
Dea Fetiu and Dorjeta Rukiqi
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:
The following Western Balkans Security Barometer (WBSB) report provides a thorough analysis of respondents’ perception of potential threats to their public safety and national security in Kosovo in 2022. Respondents feel generally safe in their close communities. Nevertheless, the sense of safety gradually decreases as the communities grow larger. Around 77 percent of the respondents declared that they feel safe in their houses, while they feel the least safe in their country (around 33 percent). Respondents’ perceptions between 2021 and 2022 indicate a slow decrease in their feeling of public safety; whereby in the previous 2021 WBSB, 79 percent and 40 percent of respondents stated that they feel safe in their homes and in their country, respectively. On the other hand, almost half of the respondents feel safe on the cyberspace. Brain drain is ranked as the highest threat to public safety, with 83 percent of the respondents viewing it as a threat or high threat to their respective communities. Stray animals and drug abuse are also perceived as highly threatening phenomena. Moreover, respondents are generally concerned about shortages of necessities, however, they express the biggest concerns about the shortages of electricity. On the national level, respondents see the increased prices of goods as the highest threat towards Kosovo’s national security, followed closely by the energy crisis. Pollution and climate change, violent extremism, and COVID-19 are seen as the lowest threats to national security. When asked if COVID-19 continues to endanger public health, almost half of the respondents answered negatively. Further, COVID-19 was ranked as the lowest threat to Kosovo’s national security. Opinions are somewhat divided when it comes to the efficiency of the COVID-19 vaccine on hindering the pandemic; yet 45 percent of respondents believe that the vaccine contributed to curb the pandemic. According to the survey data, the main causes of domestic violence in Kosovo are poor economic conditions and low levels of education. Respondents believe that raising the quality of education, and organizing more raising awareness campaigns are some of the measures that need to be taken by institutions to prevent and fight domestic violence.
Topic:
National Security, Public Opinion, and Public Safety
Political Geography:
Europe, Kosovo, and Balkans

231. Monitoring Progress on the Women, Peace and Security Agenda

Author:
Robert U. Nagel, David Guzman, and Carla Koppel
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security (GIWPS)
Abstract:
To advance the WPS Agenda and monitor progress, in 2019 the governments of Finland and Spain initiated Commitment 2025 (C-25). The member countries agreed to track their efforts to increase the meaningful and substantive participation of women along nine specific commitments related to conflict prevention and resolution, negotiation and mediation processes. This agreement currently has 13 signatories: Finland, Spain, Norway, Iceland, Germany, Italy, Belgium, United Kingdom, Bulgaria, Namibia, Canada, Uruguay, and Argentina. The Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security (GIWPS) has partnered with C-25 members to track progress toward the commitments. To increase transparency and accountability while also providing metrics for progress, we collected and analyzed data on women’s representation in political governance, diplomatic, and peace and security institutions. We combined data from various sources to generate analysis and insights about the status of progress on C-25 commitments. Findings indicate that concerted efforts are needed to reach targets by 2025. Despite some progress, women’s participation and meaningful inclusion in matters of peace and security is still lacking. Governments can and must do better including and empowering women in peace and security institutions and processes. The data underscore the importance of continued dedication to women’s empowerment and the importance of holding governments accountable through monitoring progress.
Topic:
Security, Women, Accountability, Peace, Transparency, and Monitoring
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Canada, Finland, Norway, Argentina, Uruguay, Germany, Belgium, Bulgaria, Spain, Italy, Iceland, and Namibia

232. Toward Inclusive Recovery in Ukraine: Engaging Women and Civil Society in Ukraine’s Relief, Recovery, and Reconstruction

Author:
Jess Keller
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security (GIWPS)
Abstract:
Women’s participation in the design and implementation of Ukraine’s recovery programs is critical to maximize the effectiveness of the reconstruction process, take into account differentiated needs, and bolster post-conflict development. Key recommendations: Promote women’s participation, leadership, and decision-making in Ukraine’s planning frameworks and recovery process. Ensure new funding enables women’s active participation in Ukraine’s recovery and advances gender equality. Establish a gender-sensitive monitoring mechanism for the Ukrainian government to report on recovery progress and collect and analyze sex-disaggregated data. Prioritize the re-establishment of critical social infrastructure and services. Integrate gender equality in Ukraine’s EU accession commitments.
Topic:
Civil Society, Reconstruction, Women, Recovery, Participation, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

233. The state of public opinion: 2023

Author:
Tim Bale, Matthew Blayney, Rosie Campbell, Leonardo Carella, and John Curtice
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
UK in a Changing Europe, King's College London
Abstract:
A lot has changed since Boris Johnson celebrated ‘smashing’ the 2019 election. Since then, we’ve faced a global pandemic, two wars, and spiralling inflation and interest rates. Britain has lived through a tumultuous period. The same period saw Labour choose a new leader, whilst the Conservatives elected two. ‘Levelling up’ became the latest buzzword. ‘Partygate’ was followed by a series of allegations about impropriety at the top of government. Nineteen by-elections took place, for reasons ranging from resignations to recall petitions. As the cost-of-living crisis worsened, voter concern about the economy rocketed, whilst interest in Brexit declined. As we approach the next general election, understanding what the public makes of these developments, and how opinion and voting behaviour has shifted since December 2019, is crucial. This new UK in a Changing Europe report brings together over 45 of the UK’s top public opinion experts. They analyse both short and long-term trends that have shaped public attitudes and voting behaviour and will continue to do so in the run up to the next general election and beyond. The 36 contributions cover political parties, the four nations, key policy issues, voting behaviour and Brexit.
Topic:
Public Opinion, Elections, Brexit, and Voting Behavior
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

234. UK-EU regulatory divergence tracker Q3 2023

Author:
Joël Reland
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
UK in a Changing Europe, King's College London
Abstract:
UK in a Changing Europe’s series of regulatory divergence trackers provide an overview of where and how the UK has used its regulatory freedoms to diverge from EU regulation. It identifies and analyses the most significant cases of divergence between the UK and EU which have taken place since Brexit. It explains what the changes are, what impact they are having, and likely further consequences. This is the ninth edition of the regulatory divergence tracker, covering developments from August to October 2023. There are six cases of active divergence (where the UK, or some part of it, changes its rules); nine of passive divergence (where the EU changes its rules and the UK, or some part of it, does not follow); two of delayed divergence (where active divergence is delayed); and five of active alignment (where the UK takes steps to align more closely with EU rules, systems or programmes). In a what is now a recurring theme under Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, the UK has opted to delay some major cases of upcoming divergence.
Topic:
European Union, Regulation, and Divergence
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

235. Exploring ‘Bregret’: public attitudes to Brexit, seven years on

Author:
Ines Wittke, James Frayne, Seb Wride, and Sophie Stowers
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
UK in a Changing Europe, King's College London
Abstract:
Brexit refuses to go away. Over seven years since the referendum, and over three and a half since the UK finally left the European Union, the issue continues to generate headlines and spark furious debate. One reason for this is a sense that public opinion is still evolving. There has been much talk of ‘Brexit regret’ among Leave voters. Given this, Public First and UK in a Changing Europe decided to talk to Leave voters to hear from them what they thought. In a survey carried out in May and June 2023 and a series of focus groups held between May and September, a series of questions were posed to them about what they think about Brexit, how it has gone, whether they have changed their minds and what they think the future holds. This report describes the findings. DOWNLOAD THE REPORT
Topic:
Politics, Public Opinion, European Union, Brexit, and Society
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

236. UK trade tracker Q3 2023

Author:
Stephen Hunsaker
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
UK in a Changing Europe, King's College London
Abstract:
The UK in a Changing Europe trade tracker is now being produced quarterly and in a new format. The new format trade tracker will focus on three key areas: UK trade and its performance relative to historical data; UK trade in a global context and how it compares to the G7; and finally, newsworthy developments which have occurred within trade in the last quarter. In this quarter’s edition, the trade tracker looks at how UK trade measures compare to 2019 as well as the proportion of total UK trade made up of trade with the EU. In addition, it looks at the UK’s trade balance and trade openness compared to the G7. Lastly, the tracker summarises the India-UK free trade agreement that has been in the works for the past few years, considering whether it is close to signing and what impact it might have on UK trade, as well as what elements are hotly debated.
Topic:
Economy, Brexit, and Trade
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

237. Reviewing the Trade and Cooperation Agreement: potential paths

Author:
Jannike Wachowiak and Joël Reland
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
UK in a Changing Europe, King's College London
Abstract:
On Christmas Eve 2020 the UK and EU finally agreed a treaty to regulate their relationship post Brexit. The Trade and Cooperation Agreement was provisionally applied from 1 January 2021 and formally ratified in April. Among its numerous provisions, the treaty contains Article 776 stating that, ‘The Parties shall jointly review the implementation of this Agreement and supplementing agreements and any matters related thereto five years after the entry into force of this Agreement and every five years thereafter.’ Within the UK at least, many are looking to this review to deliver significant changes to the relationship. This report examines those provisions within the TCA and reflects on what might or might not reasonably be achieved in the context of the review. The report proposes three models which the review could follow: a technical check, acting on unfulfilled commitments, and widening the scope of the TCA.
Topic:
Treaties and Agreements, European Union, Trade, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

238. The investment gap: the UK’s efforts to replace the European Investment Bank

Author:
Peter Jurkovic and Stephen Hunsaker
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
UK in a Changing Europe, King's College London
Abstract:
Following Brexit, the UK lost access to funding from the European Investment Bank. In this report, Stephen Hunsaker and Peter Jurkovic detail the impact this has had on the UK development finance landscape. The report outlines not only the role that development banks play in providing longer term financing for projects the private sector might be reluctant to support, but also the specific role the European Investment Bank played in infrastructure investments in the UK prior to 2020. It also explores the potential and ongoing implications of a lack of access to that investment despite the existence of a number of UK based banks intended to fill the gap.
Topic:
European Union, Finance, Economy, Brexit, Investment, Banking, and European Investment Bank
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

239. Policy landscape 2023

Author:
Ben Zaranko, Jonathan Portes, Mike Brewer, Paul Cheshire, and Carole Willis
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
UK in a Changing Europe, King's College London
Abstract:
What are the public policy challenges confronting the UK? What plans do the parties have for addressing them? To what extent are these plans fit for purpose? As Parliament returns from its summer recess, Full Fact and UK in a Changing Europe have partnered to produce a series of evidence led, research-based assessments of the key issues that politicians will confront. To do this, we brought together a group of leading experts from respected institutions including the Health Foundation, the Institute for Fiscal Studies, and the Royal United Services Institute. We asked each of them to consider, based on the findings of their own research, the challenges the country faces in their area of expertise, the immediate and longer-term issues politicians will need to address, and the potential implications of any choices they might make. We selected the issues based on the Ipsos issues index, and added security, defence and foreign affairs, which did not figure amongst the public’s priorities in July of this year. The intention of the collection is to inform and not persuade. Each article in this collection is the responsibility of its author.
Topic:
Climate Change, Education, Health, Politics, European Union, Economy, Brexit, Economic Growth, Public Policy, Fiscal Policy, Housing, and Standard of Living
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

240. UK-EU relations tracker: April – June 2023

Author:
Cleo Davies and Jannike Wachowiak
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
UK in a Changing Europe, King's College London
Abstract:
This is the second edition of the UKICE UK-EU Relations Tracker, covering developments in relations between the UK and EU and between the UK and EU member states from April to June 2023. This edition looks at key developments in the relationship since the formal adoption of the Windsor Framework on 24 March 2023 which had raised hopes for a reset in relations. Whilst some progress has been made within the framework of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA), other areas remain stalled.
Topic:
Treaties and Agreements, European Union, Brexit, and Trade
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

241. UK-EU regulatory divergence tracker: eighth edition

Author:
Joël Reland
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
UK in a Changing Europe, King's College London
Abstract:
UK in a Changing Europe’s series of regulatory divergence trackers provide an overview of where and how the UK has used its newfound regulatory freedoms to diverge from EU regulation. It identifies and analyses the most significant cases of divergence between the UK and EU which have taken place since Brexit. It explains what the changes are, what impact they are having, and likely further consequences. This is the eighth edition of the UK in a Changing Europe’s regulatory divergence tracker, covering developments from April to July 2023. There are eleven cases of active divergence (where the UK, or some part of it, changes its rules); eight of passive divergence (where the EU changes its rules and the UK, or some part of it, does not follow); two of passive convergence (where the EU takes steps which align with UK rules); three of managed divergence (where the UK and EU make joint efforts to manage the implications of divergence); and one of internal divergence (changes in rules between different parts of the UK).
Topic:
European Union, Regulation, Brexit, and Divergence
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

242. UK-EU regulatory divergence tracker: seventh edition

Author:
Joël Reland
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
UK in a Changing Europe, King's College London
Abstract:
UK in a Changing Europe’s series of regulatory divergence trackers provide an overview of where and how the UK has used its newfound regulatory freedoms to diverge from EU regulation. It identifies and analyses the most significant cases of divergence between the UK and EU which have taken place since Brexit. It explains what the changes are, what impact they are having, and likely further consequences. This is the seventh edition of UK in a Changing Europe’s regulatory divergence tracker, covering developments since January 2023. There are seven cases of active divergence (where the UK, or some part of it, changes its rules); two of active convergence (where the UK, or some part of it, aligns to EU rules); 17 of passive divergence (where the EU changes its rules and the UK, or some part of it, does not follow); and one of internal divergence (changes in rules between different parts of the UK). In addition, the Windsor Framework is significant case of ‘managed divergence’: a UK-EU agreement which alters the regulatory border between Great Britain (GB) and Northern Ireland (NI), as created by the Protocol.
Topic:
European Union, Regulation, Brexit, and Divergence
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

243. The British monarchy

Author:
Catherine Barnard, Frank Cranmer, John Curtice, Robert Hazell, and Ailsa Henderson
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
UK in a Changing Europe, King's College London
Abstract:
May 2023 will witness a landmark event: the coronation of King Charles III. Given the event’s significance, and the high levels of interest in the British monarchy that have been apparent since the death of Elizabeth II, UK in a Changing Europe and the Constitution Unit, UCL, have produced a report to explain the role of the modern monarchy and its place in the UK’s constitutional system. The report explains what the institution does and how it does it, and places the monarchy in its wider historical and comparative context. It provides a clear and accessible account of the monarchy and is intended as an indispensable guide ahead of the coronation. The report includes analysis from specialists on the monarchy and contributions from scholars who study UK politics and society and who examine the institution from their own specialist perspectives.
Topic:
Governance, Constitution, and Monarchy
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

244. UK-EU relations tracker: first edition

Author:
Cleo Davies and Sophie Stowers
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
UK in a Changing Europe, King's College London
Abstract:
This new UK in a Changing Europe tracker provides an overview of the state of relations between the United Kingdom and the European Union. The first edition, which covers January to March 2023, highlights the thawing in relations between the UK and the EU that has taken place during this period in the context of the agreement of the Windsor Framework in late February 2023. Released quarterly, the UK-EU relations tracker will assess relations between the UK and EU as well as relationships between the UK and EU member states. It will also highlight developments in British politics which may affect the UK-EU relationship, and internal dynamics within the EU that might shape its approach to the relationship with the United Kingdom.
Topic:
International Relations, Politics, European Union, and Brexit
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

245. Immigration after Brexit: where are we going?

Author:
Anand Menon
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
UK in a Changing Europe, King's College London
Abstract:
Immigration was a key, if not the key issue in the referendum of 2016. The last few years have seen the biggest shakeup in the UK migration system in at least half a century, coinciding with record levels of immigration across all the main routes – work, students and refugees. This report explores what has happened to immigration, immigration policy and public attitudes towards immigration since the Brexit vote. It examines the way in which the UK government has reacted to the ending of free movement, and explores the impact of new policies on immigration levels. It represents a state-of-the-art analysis of what has happened, where we have got to, and what might transpire in the future.
Topic:
Migration, Public Opinion, Economy, Brexit, and Immigration Policy
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

246. UK-EU regulatory divergence tracker: sixth edition

Author:
UK in a Changing Europe
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
UK in a Changing Europe, King's College London
Abstract:
UK in a Changing Europe’s series of regulatory divergence trackers provide an overview of where and how the UK has used its newfound regulatory freedoms to diverge from EU regulation. It identifies and analyses the most significant cases of divergence between the UK and EU which have taken place since Brexit. It explains what the changes are, what impact they are having, and likely further consequences. This is the sixth edition of the divergence tracker, covering developments since October 2022. There are six cases of active divergence (where the UK or some part of it changes its rules), 13 of passive divergence (where the EU changes its rules and the UK, or some part of it, does not follow), two of active alignment (where the UK and EU take the same regulatory steps in parallel), and five of delayed divergence (where either side postpones an upcoming case of divergence). This edition of the tracker finds that the UK has engaged in less active divergence over the past quarter. This is due in part to political instability, but also to Prime Minister Sunak’s emphasis on calming the markets and projecting a wider sense of political stability. The new administration has signalled its ambition to reform EU legislation, though in a more targeted manner than under the two preceding premierships.
Topic:
European Union, Regulation, Brexit, and Divergence
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

247. Where next? The future of the UK-EU relationship

Author:
UK in a Changing Europe
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
UK in a Changing Europe, King's College London
Abstract:
Six and a half years since the Brexit referendum, UK relations with the EU have still not settled into a coherent and consistent pattern. Partly, this is because the process of leaving itself took so long. Partly, too, because there is much still to resolve, not least whether the treaties signed will be fully applied. This report examines the contours of that relationship. It assesses both where we have got to and how the relationship might evolve. The reports sets out the state of play on trade, migration, public opinion, as well as the various party positions on the relationship. It also highlights the deadlines and decisions on the horizon in a number of areas, such as financial services, electric vehicles and fisheries. Finally, it examines the ways in which the TCA could be deepened, and steps that might be taken beyond the TCA – both unilaterally and through increased cooperation with the EU – concluding that changes to the relationship are likely to be slow and incremental.
Topic:
International Relations, Migration, Treaties and Agreements, Public Opinion, European Union, Economy, and Trade
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

248. The Shell and the Seed: Lessons from the Negotiation with the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia

Author:
Marta Ruiz
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ)
Abstract:
The achievement of total peace is not a new goal for Colombia. For the better part of the last 30 years, most government administrations have attempted to negotiate or subdue all existing armed groups either simultaneously or sequentially. However, the results so far have been partial and insufficient to address the structural causes and persistent factors behind a 60-year internal armed conflict. The product of a collaboration between ICTJ and the researcher, journalist, and former commissioner of the Colombian Truth Commission, Marta Ruiz, this study presents new points of view and reflections on the negotiations with the paramilitary forces in the first years of 2000. These reflections can be useful not only to inform public debate but also as input for decisionmakers and those who design strategies for negotiation and the pursuit of total peace underway today in Colombia. The first part explains the genesis of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) and describes their transition from drug traffickers to political and military actors. It presents evidence that since the 1980s the Colombian state has attempted to negotiate with drug traffickers using different narratives about their nature. The second part describes what happened at the Santafé Ralito negotiation table, the discussion’s agenda, and how the political context affected the process. It also shows how political timing, in particular President Uribe's reelection, affected the process’s outcome. The big question it asks, one with no single answer, is why, if negotiations were being held with drug traffickers, there was no real talk of dismantling drug trafficking. The third part assesses the consequences of the process, both in terms of justice and reintegration. It attempts to explain how the demobilized armed groups were reactivated in the territories.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Armed Forces, Negotiation, and Peace
Political Geography:
Colombia and South America

249. Advancing Victims’ Rights and Rebuilding Just Communities: Local Strategies for Achieving Reparation as a Part of Sustainable Development

Author:
The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ)
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ)
Abstract:
This comparative study examines strategies used by local actors to facilitate the operationalization of reparations for victims of widespread human rights violations, while highlighting the synergies between these efforts and sustainable development. The study is based on the fieldwork of ICTJ and its partners in four contexts—Colombia, The Gambia, Tunisia, and Uganda. These countries represent a range of different situations, where the progress made, challenges faced, and overall political and institutional contexts vary significantly. Nonetheless, comparison of the approaches used across the cases offers valuable insights for those working in these and other contexts. In The Gambia, the truth commission and legislation for reparations have created expectations among victims, but a program has yet to be implemented. In Uganda, the legal and policy framework for reparations exists, but there is no enabling legislation or mechanism to provide them as a result of stalled political will. In Tunisia, the truth commission recommended reparations, but the political and economic situation make operationalization unlikely. In Colombia, challenges faced by reparations have informed the design of restorative sanctions that include reparative projects but are yet to be implemented. The major insights gained from this comparative study relate to the specific ways in which reparations can contribute to individual and community well-being and development; innovative and effective approaches to ensuring victims and communities receive reparations and support, including through collective action, engagement with government, and grassroots initiatives; the integration of victims’ needs and priorities into development policies and models; and the reparative elements of complementary accountability and reform measures that are participatory, address corruption and marginalization, and contribute to gender justice and equality. The report offers practical guidance and policy recommendations for advancing reparations as an integral element of broader societal efforts to facilitate inclusion, justice, peace, and development.
Topic:
Human Rights, Sustainable Development Goals, Accountability, Reparations, and Truth and Reconciliation
Political Geography:
Uganda, Africa, Colombia, South America, Tunisia, and Gambia

250. Red Lines Around a Free and Fair Polish Election

Author:
Josh Rudolph, Anna Wójcik, and Ayleen Cameron
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
The October 15, 2023 Polish parliamentary election will not be fair. The country’s last fair election was in 2015, when the ruling Law and Justice Party (PiS) came to power and promptly set about undermining constitutional governance. Since then, the weakness of Poland’s rule-of-law system has enabled PiS to amend electoral law, reshape the media environment, exploit state-owned companies and other resources—including public funds—and engage in other autocratic subversions to tilt the playing field in Polish elections in favor of the ruling regime. However, the degree of unfairness in this election will hinge on actions taken by Polish authorities. The authorities should: Stop diverting state resources into media enterprises and political messaging campaigns meant to support PiS candidates, Commit to renewing the licenses of independent media outlets such as TVN, Stop using arbitrary fines to harass and weaken independent media outlets, Stop using the system for disciplining judges as a weapon against those who do not display loyalty to the PiS regime, Implement judgments of European tribunals, and ensure that rulings on the integrity of the election come from independent and impartial bodies. While the US government has struck the right tone in recent values-based remarks about the importance of electoral fairness, the message has not broken through a policy environment that is crowded on two levels. Most importantly, many experts and officials in Warsaw believe that the United States is reluctant to pressure its strongest ally in supporting Ukraine in its war against Russia—the Polish government—on matters of electoral fairness. But even if the United States is genuinely committed to pressing for electoral fairness in Poland, there are so many areas of democratic backsliding in the country that it is not clear which concrete threats are priorities for the United States. At every available opportunity, Poland’s allies should publicly reiterate the importance of respecting shared democratic values by holding fair elections. Privately, diplomats should warn Warsaw that crossing red lines around the four most consequential risks to the integrity of the upcoming Polish election would trigger unified public rebukes from NATO allies.
Topic:
Authoritarianism, Elections, Democracy, and Democratic Backsliding
Political Geography:
Europe and Poland