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Begin New Search Topic War Political Geography United States of America Content Type Special Report

1. Women and the Iraq War, 20 Years Later: The Consequences of War, Sanctions, and Occupation for Women and the Continuing Struggle for Women’s Rights

Author:
David Cortright, Anna Romandash, and Marcelle Al-Zoughbi
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Fourth Freedom Forum
Abstract:
This report marks 20 years since the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. It recounts the impacts of war and critiques the strategy of using military intervention to enhance women’s rights. It is presented in the spirit of UN Security Council Resolution 1325, adopted in 2000, which urges all actors to “adopt a gender perspective.” Our analysis traces the deterioration of social and economic conditions for women caused by U.S. policy and the resulting rise of extremism and sectarian warfare. We also address the role of Iraqi women in mobilizing movements to assert their rights and oppose violence. In telling this story, we rely extensively on the voices of Iraqi women who experienced and studied these events. A gender perspective means going beyond the view of women as victims to address the political agency of women as they struggle for political, economic, and social justice. We use “feminist discovery” to examine the lived experience of Iraqi women and gain a better understanding of the realities of war.1 This report draws lessons for the future of U.S. and international security policy and examines the agenda for women’s rights today as defined by Iraqi women and their international supporters.
Topic:
War, Women, Feminism, and Iraq War
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, and United States of America

2. Software-Defined Warfare: Architecting the DOD's Transition to the Digital Age

Author:
Nand Mulchandani and John Shanahan
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The U.S. Department of Defense's (DOD) massive bureaucracy struggles with the kind of periodic “tech refresh” that has been instrumental to commercial industry success. While it is insulated from market competition within the U.S. economy, the DOD is not immune from the kind of revolutionary, secular, and wide-ranging technological changes happening outside the government. Nor is it immune from the threat of competition with other militaries around the world. In the future, warfighting will only become more complex, even more chaotic, and even faster. The only way for the DOD to stay competitive in a new warfighting environment is to ensure that it uses the most potent weapon available: technology, and more specifically, software. For the United States to retain its dominant position in the future— which is not a guaranteed outcome—the DOD needs a new design and architecture that will allow it to be far more flexible, scale on demand, and adapt dynamically to changing conditions. And it must do so at a dramatically lower cost as it delivers its critical services. This paper provides a blueprint for the way forward.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, War, Military Strategy, Digitalization, and Software
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

3. Improving Joint Operational Concept Development within the U.S. Department of Defense

Author:
Paul Benfield and Greg Grant
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
For the first time in nearly four decades, the DoD is developing joint warfighting concepts designed to counter advanced military rivals—specifically China and Russia. The last such effort took place at the height of the Cold War in the late 1970s and early 1980s to address the strategic and operational challenges posed by the Soviet Union’s conventional advantage on Europe’s Central Front. Now, as the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) emphasizes, the joint force must “prioritize preparedness for war” which includes developing “innovative operational concepts” for military advantage.1 As operational concepts are fundamentally visions of future war that guide future force design and development, the joint force first must answer the question of how it intends to fight future wars before it tries to answer questions of what it needs to fight with. Yet, if the DoD is going to move to “joint concept driven, threat informed capability development,” it faces a considerable challenge in that its joint concept development and experimentation process is fundamentally broken.2 While the post–Cold War era has witnessed repeated efforts to develop joint operational concepts, the process fails to yield innovative warfighting approaches to guide future force and capability development. Instead, the process produces concepts that seem almost intentionally designed not to drive significant change. These concepts are not truly “joint,” but rather lowest-common-denominator assemblages of existing service concepts that privilege service priorities. Any innovative joint ideas that make it through the development process are so watered-down and vague that they fail to provoke change (and thus threaten the interests of key stakeholders). In this environment, individual service concepts win out over joint concepts and drive investment priorities. However, warfighting concepts and critical investments must be joint because the services have become increasingly interdependent at the operational level.3 Moreover, current wargaming and analysis suggest that this operational interdependence will be a critical aspect of future conflict with a highly-capable peer adversary such as China or Russia—whether as a strength or a weakness remains to be seen. One can expect an advanced, adaptive adversary to seek out any gaps and seams presented by the U.S. military and exploit those to its advantage. In this regard, the current joint force is not “joint” enough for a high-end war against a peer adversary that has developed counters to critical, long-standing U.S. operational advantages such as air, maritime, and information dominance. As this paper discusses, successfully waging war at the scale and intensity that a conflict with a peer rival would entail will demand entirely new ways of warfighting that in turn will require a forcing function that integrates individual service capabilities into an actual “joint” fighting force. Recent efforts to develop threat-focused joint warfighting concepts—if successful—represents the best chance for that result actually to occur. This paper briefly discusses three past attempts by the DoD to develop joint concepts, including AirLand Battle, Air-Sea Battle, and a more recent effort, the Advanced Capabilities and Deterrence Panel (ACDP). It uses these examples to showcase the challenges of overcoming stovepiped and parochial service-led efforts and to illustrate the drawbacks of building service-centric concepts and covering them with a patina of jointness. These cases highlight how the persistent pathologies of the joint concept development process have rendered post–Cold War joint concepts useless for encouraging operational innovation or driving change in service investment priorities. Ongoing work to develop new joint warfighting concepts provides the DoD with a long-overdue opportunity to focus its concept development on tangible threats and consequent operational objectives. The current effort is the first time in decades that the DoD is organizing concept development around countering a specific threat instead of supporting idealized notions of how the joint force preferred to operate against vague or undefined groups of adversaries. However, without major changes to what is widely viewed as a consensus process that does not foster a competition of ideas, the DoD risks repeating the same concept development mistakes it has made in the past. Additionally, new joint concepts must be rigorously tested and refined through a campaign of experimentation to validate their viability for future force design. That experimentation piece is currently missing.4 The Joint Staff is trying to rebuild its joint concept development capability after years of neither prioritizing nor adequately resourcing that work. Generating truly new ways of warfighting with the potential to transform future force design will require the sustained attention of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS and VCJCS) to push new joint concepts through the system. The DoD’s senior leadership must overcome the tendency of each service to drive toward consensus products that are aimed more at protecting existing priorities and longstanding prerogatives than generating creative ideas.
Topic:
Defense Policy, War, Military Strategy, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
Russia, China, North America, and United States of America

4. Afghanistan: The Fog at the End of the Tunnel

Author:
Carl Conetta
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
What is causing the uncertainty about when US ground forces will exit Afghanistan. The Biden administration insists that logistical factors explain its breach of the 2020 US-Taliban agreement, which reset the exit date from May to September. Logistical factors are also supposed to explain why the date may now be walked back to July. Actually, logistical issues explain neither. Using current data and historical precedent, this short analysis shows why. An alternative explanation for the delay is that it gave Washington more time to pursue some of its unfinished goals regarding Afghanistan. In this, the lingering troop presence serves as leverage. What goals? Improve Kabul’s military posture, polish plans and preparations for US forces to “fight from afar,” and pursue dramatic new international initiatives aiming to lock the Taliban into a cease-fire, peace settlement, and government reform plan substantially defined by the USA. This high risk-gambit won’t succeed, but it might prolong the conflict and America’s involvement in it.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Treaties and Agreements, War, Military Strategy, Armed Forces, Taliban, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, South Asia, North America, and United States of America

5. Numbers and Per Capita Distribution of Troops Serving in the U.S. Post-9/11 Wars in 2019, By State

Author:
Heidi Peltier
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs at Brown University
Abstract:
This infographic displays an estimate of the raw number of service members from each state operating in the United States post-9/11 wars in 2019 and the relative burden borne by each state in making this contribution. The ‘post-9/11 wars’ refers to U.S. military operations around the world, including in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere, that have grown out of President George W. Bush’s “Global War on Terror” and the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. The color coding on the map shows the broader context of each state’s contribution of service members in relation to its population size. The darkest color, for instance, shows that South Carolina, Hawaii, Alaska, Florida, and Georgia send the highest numbers of troops, per capita, to war. Since there is no publicly available government data that lists service members involved in the U.S. post-9/11 wars by their state of origin, the research team estimated the figures using a combination of various government data sources. The Methodological Appendix, below, lists sources and methods.
Topic:
Demographics, War, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, 9/11, War on Terror, and Statistics
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

6. The Cost of Debt-financed War: Public Debt and Rising Interest for Post-9/11 War Spending

Author:
Heidi Peltier
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs at Brown University
Abstract:
Throughout the 18 years the U.S. has been engaged in the “Global War on Terror,” mainly in Iraq and Afghanistan, the government has financed this war by borrowing funds rather than through alternative means such as raising taxes or issuing war bonds. Thus, the costs of the post-9/11 wars include not only the expenses incurred for operations, equipment, and personnel, but also the interest costs on this debt. Since 2001 these interest payments have been growing, resulting in more and more taxpayer dollars being wasted on interest payments rather than being channeled to more productive uses. This paper calculates that the debt incurred for $2 trillion in direct war-related spending by the Department of Defense and State Department has already resulted in cumulative interest payments of $925 billion. Even if military interventions ceased immediately, interest payments would continue to rise, and will grow further as the U.S. continues its current military operations.
Topic:
Debt, War, Military Spending, and 9/11
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Iraq, Middle East, Yemen, Syria, North America, and United States of America

7. Hitting Home: Cyber-Hybrid Warfare in Ukraine and Its Impact on the United States

Author:
Yuriy Danyk, Chad Michael Briggs, and Tamara Maliarchuk
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
Abstract:
The conflict in Ukraine has received renewed attention in Washington D.C., and it is worth considering the relevance of this conflict to US national security interests. The open conflict in eastern Ukraine since 2014 has been part of a larger hybrid war, including political and information warfare, cyber warfare, assassinations, promotion of corruption, and traditional (kinetic) warfare carried out by destructive geopolitical actors (DGAs) [1]. The conventional conflict cannot be taken out of context, and it is the less visible and “dark” aspects of hybrid warfare that should particularly worry the United States. Hybrid warfare consists of a wide spectrum of attacks, from conventional to covert, carried out to destabilize one’s opponent. Rather than being isolated incidents, cyber attacks often represent part of a wide spectrum of coordinated, offensive strategies against countries like Ukraine and the United States.
Topic:
National Security, War, Cybersecurity, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

8. The Future of US-Kazakhstan Relations

Author:
Wilder Alejandro Sanchez
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
Abstract:
Since achieving its independence after the fall of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan has maintained warm relations with the United States. The country regards the United States both as a potential source for trade and investment and as a partner to balance the influence of Russia and China in Central Asia, a perspective which underlines the importance of US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s February visit to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. During the visit, Pompeo was generous in his praise for Kazakhstan and highlighted the importance of bilateral ties, while criticizing China’s detention of hundreds of thousands of Uyghurs, Kyrgyz, and ethnic Kazakhs in so-called “re-education” camps.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, War, Bilateral Relations, Conflict, and Trade
Political Geography:
Russia, Central Asia, Kazakhstan, North America, and United States of America

9. A Plan to End the War in Syria: Competing with Russia in the Levant

Author:
Aaron Stein
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
The United States has an interest in allowing the Russian Federation to “win” an outright victory in Syria, so long as it secures from Moscow an agreement that is favorable to the Syrian Kurds, builds in negative consequences for an external actor targeting the Syrian Democratic Forces, and establishes a “deconflict plus”-type mechanism to continue to target Islamic State- and Al Qaeda-linked individuals in Syria. A forward-looking policy that the incoming Biden administration could consider is to deprioritize the nascent threat of the Islamic State as a key factor in driving U.S. national security strategy, and instead focus more intently on long-term competition with great powers. This approach would seek to shape how Moscow spends finite defense dollars—at a time of expected global defense cuts stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic—in ways that are advantageous to the United States. It also would seek to limit the cost of the U.S. presence in Syria—to include secondary and opportunity costs not accounted for in a basic cost breakdown of the U.S. war against the Islamic State. This approach is not without risk, particularly from a nascent Islamic State insurgency in Russian-controlled territory, but seeks to match U.S. strategic priorities with action and to impose upon a long-term competitor the costs of victory for its intervention in Syria.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Foreign Policy, War, Syrian War, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Russia, Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

10. Mission Command of Multi-Domain Operations

Author:
Mark Balboni, John A. Bonin, Robert Mundell, and Doug Orsi
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
This research monograph explores the Army’s emerging concept of multi-domain operations and its implications on the mission command approach. The transition to multi-domain operations changes the traditional view of how Army commanders and staffs conduct operations in the physical environment to include simultaneously operations in the information environment within the competition continuum. This monograph will utilize the introduction of the aircraft during World War I as a historical case study for the integration of new domains. The Army has integrated new domains in the past and this example provides the historical context for the challenges involving integration of new domains. An overview and analysis of what multi-domain operations are will provide a baseline understanding of how multi-domain operations are changing not only how we fight but also how the Army must change roles and responsibilities to allow the Joint force to compete across the competition continuum, especially below armed conflict. The transition to multi-domain operations will require new processes. Changes will be required not only to the physical systems employed but also to Joint professional military education, Joint and Army doctrine, and headquarters staff structures as leaders and their staffs will require different skills to operate in this new environment.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, War, Military Strategy, World War I, and Peace
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America