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1. Time to change track Assessing the UN’s conflict mediation strategy for Syria from 2019 to 2023

Author:
Malik al-Abdeh and Lars Hauch
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
The United Nations (UN) has become largely irrelevant to diplomatic efforts to resolve the Syria conflict. This report shows that the primary reason has been the fact that the main conflict parties never wanted to resolve the Syrian conflict by other than military means. Yet, the report also highlights secondary reasons within this unfavourable context, namely: the frames, methods and choices of the UN Special Envoy and his team at times misjudged or poorly corresponded with the realities of the conflict. Moreover, the capacity of the Office of the Special Envoy (OSE) remained too limited. The report suggests that the time is ripe for the OSE to reinvent itself as a principled thought leader and to develop an operational framework that brings a safe, calm and neutral environment (SCNE) closer as a practical conflict management modality.
Topic:
Diplomacy, United Nations, Syrian War, and Mediation
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

2. Iran Entangled: Iran and Hezbollah’s Support to Proxies Operating in Syria

Author:
Nakissa Jahanbani and Suzanne Weedon Levy
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
At a time when power dynamics in the Middle East region are in flux due to the shifting circumstances of the Islamic State, the drawdown of U.S. troops in the region, and the intensification of Iranian-backed attacks on U.S. and Saudi Arabian targets in the region, an historical look at the support Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) provided to proxies during the Syrian civil war may yield insights into Iran’s past and present playbook not only in Syria but potentially other contexts. The civil war in Syria was a unique catalyst that intensified Iranian economic, political, and religious activity in the country, which was ongoing since the 1980s. During the conflict, Iran demonstrated the ability to exert influence tactically while also building a religious and social support base in Syrian society. Iran achieved these goals, in part, through raising and supporting various non-state militant groups in Syria. Drawing on open sources and interviews with subject matter experts, this report investigates the nature of Iranian and LH support to proxies operating in Syria from 2011 to 2019. While the nature of Iran’s proxy network is dynamic, it is useful to investigate the network at its peak years to understand existing and potential future structures and capabilities for Iranian external operations. This report investigates support from Iranian actors—inclusive of the IRGC and its various components, notably the Quds Force (IRGC-QF), as well as the Iranian government more generally—and LH through the lens of kinetic (e.g., joint attacks between the militias and Iranian actors and/or LH, personnel placed with militias, and training and weapons provided to militias) and non-kinetic assistance (e.g., funding, logistical support, recruitment and social service assistance, and meetings between Iranian actors and/or LH and militias). Looking at these two categories of support provides a more holistic snapshot of Iranian influence and capacity-building with proxies in Syria. The report’s findings indicate a pattern of support on the part of Iran and LH that potentially indicates a phased rollout of battlefield-related supports to be replaced with longer-term societal entrenchment efforts. Furthermore, Iran and LH share a division of labor between Iranian actors and LH for kinetic supports, but not non-kinetic ones. Specifically, this report found training, weapons provisions, funding, and joint attacks among the most common supports provided by Iran and LH. Finally, of all Iranian actors, this report found the IRGC to be the most prolific supporter to proxies operating in Syria.
Topic:
Terrorism, Weapons, Syrian War, Hezbollah, Proxy War, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC), Strategy, and Military Tactics
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and Syria

3. A new conflict management strategy for Syria: Creating a Safe, Calm and Neutral Environment

Author:
Malik al-Abdeh and Lars Hauch
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
The search for peace in Syria faces a deep crisis. The battlefield has reached a stalemate, the Constitutional Committee never emerged from its cul-de-sac, and the UN’s ‘step-for-step’ approach suffers from flawed conceptual underpinnings as well as a lukewarm reception. Meanwhile, Syria remains divided into three areas that risk drifting further apart amid deteriorating humanitarian conditions. This reality on the ground should serve as a marker for recalibrating Western policy on Syria beyond the current focus on sanctions, accountability, and humanitarian aid. Western policy makers – mostly those from the US, European Union and Turkey – must base a much-needed new conflict management strategy on three ‘ground truths’: 1) the conflict is largely frozen and Syria is likely to remain divided into competing areas of control that are supported, or overseen, by external powers for the foreseeable future; 2) questions of national legitimacy and power sharing are not currently solvable and must be temporarily put on the back burner; c) diplomatic efforts to stabilise Syria and prevent partition are likely to be more effective when they focus on restoring practical connectivity between the different areas of control in terms of flows of people, goods and trade/aid/investment, as well as education. Such a strategy can take shape by operationalising the UN-sanctioned concept of a ‘safe, calm and neutral environment’ (SCNE) via a clear set of principles for engagement, a detailed stakeholder/interest mapping of the various conflict parties, and a focus on pragmatic measures to improve daily conditions. The objective of such a strategy is to enable a durable return to relatively normal life for Syrians still living in the country, and to create linkages between the country’s war-torn parts that can open windows of opportunity in the longer term for a political process reflecting the intention of UNSCR 2254.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Diplomacy, Syrian War, Peace, and Conflict Management
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

4. Putin Prioritizes Syria. Biden Should Too.

Author:
Anna Borshchevskaya
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
Abstract:
Moscow is in Syria for the long haul and will continue to undermine American efforts there. In recent months, Moscow intensified its activities in Syria against the backdrop of a changing US administration. The Kremlin sent additional military policy units to eastern Syria, and continued diplomatic engagement through the Astana format, a process that superficially has international backing but in practice excludes the United States and boosts Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad. Moreover, Moscow also unveiled at its airbase in Syria a statue to the patron saint of the Russian army, Prince Alexander Nevsky. A growing Russian presence in Syria will further hurt Western interests.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Conflict, and Syrian War
Political Geography:
Russia, Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

5. Henchman, Rebel, Democrat, Terrorist: The YPG/PYD during the Syrian conflict

Author:
Erwin van Veen
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
This report analyses the role of the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) and the associated Democratic Union Party (PYD) during the Syrian civil war. The purpose of our research is to obtain a better understanding of the nature, objectives and methods of the YPG/ PYD as a combined paramilitary and rebel force that is involved in a quasi-statebuilding project during an internationalised civil war. We start by examining the critical factors that enabled the swift rise of the YPG: informal arrangements with the Assad regime, support from the Kurdistan Workers’ Party and a pragmatic partnership with the US against Islamic State. This sets the scene for an inquiry into how core YPG strategies to maintain its dominance once it was established – coercive, deal-making, identity and basic service strategies – both shape the group’s behavior and result from its current organization. Finally, we dissect a number of major challenges to future YPG rule, such as its relation with the PKK, intra-Kurdish reconciliation, the US presence in northeast Syria and its interaction with the Arab populations over which it rules. Based on our analysis, we anticipate a scenario of ‘muddling through’ in which unconditional support from the US will continue at current levels, combined with an abiding US military presence. This will provide the YPG/ PYD with a security umbrella against both regime forces and Turkey, continue the status quo of the YPG/ PYD ruling northeast Syria in authoritarian fashion, make the civil war more ethno-sectarian in nature and prolong the conflict. While such a scenario is arguably more attractive for northeast Syria than a return of the regime, it is also unlikely to improve the area’s current underdevelopment. It will keep other external actors, like the EU, away and allow the PKK to continue to take its share of the area’s revenues. The primary audience of the report are Western opinion-, policy- and decision-makers engaged with the Syrian civil war and we hope it will help them to craft policies and initiate interventions that are feasible and appropriate to the situation in northeast Syria.
Topic:
Conflict, Syrian War, and YPG
Political Geography:
Middle East, Syria, United States of America, and European Union

6. Lessons of the Syrian Conflict: Toward a Better Intervention Debate

Author:
Nick Danforth
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
In October 2019, The New York Times published a feature story describing how “Russia, Turkey and Bashar al-Assad carved up northern Syria as the Americans retreated.”1 It is hard to think of a more telling, and damning, one-sentence encapsulation of both the failure of American policy in Syria and the skewed political discourse compounding it. Somehow the United States was retreating from a place it never wanted to occupy—and the Syrian regime’s success in partially clawing back control of a country it once ruled with an iron fist was prime evidence of American decline. This paper begins from the premise that Washington will increasingly be confronted with conflicts where it can neither determine the outcome nor stay out entirely, and the country needs better strategies for charting a middle course. Given the scale of the tragedy that has befallen Syria, and the damaging repercussions it continues to have for U.S. interests in the region, few would argue that Washington’s handling of the Syrian civil war represents a success. Yet there remains no consensus on the nature of Washington’s failure. In a highly charged debate, many critics are adamant that faster and more forceful military intervention could have secured a more favorable outcome. Others, by contrast, are equally insistent that Washington should have done even less. It is possible that the ideal form of intervention advocated by interventionists or the ideal form of nonintervention advocated by noninterventionists would have created a better outcome in Syria. Instead, Washington pursued a sometimes-inconsistent intermediate approach that achieved the worst of both worlds. The United States engaged in the conflict in a way that put its credibility at stake without positively affecting the outcome. By examining how this happened, this paper seeks to ensure that Washington can avoid similar failures in the future.
Topic:
Military Intervention, Conflict, and Syrian War
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

7. Turkey’s Interests in Idlib

Author:
Karol Wasilewski
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The agreement signed on 5 March between Russia and Turkey has halted the offensive by the Syrian army on Idlib and led to a new division of influence in the province. Both Turkey and Russia are using the truce to strengthen their military presence in this territory. The coronavirus pandemic may delay the resumption of fighting in Idlib, giving the EU time to prepare for a renewed escalation and attempts by Turkey to instrumentally use an exodus of Syrian refugees to exert pressure on the Union.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Syrian War, and Coronavirus
Political Geography:
Russia, Turkey, Middle East, Syria, and Idlib

8. Unpacking Kosovo's response to returnees from the war zones in Syria and Iraq

Author:
Skender Perteshi and Ramadan Ilazi
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:
This report finds that the government of Kosovo as well as civil society have, overall, positively responded to the needs of the returnees and supported their reintegration, albeit shortcomings with the extent of implementation of proclaimed commitments towards the returnees. Upon arrival in Kosovo institutions provide medical care, temporary housing, mental health sessions, while preparing them for reintegration in the society. Kosovo has two overall approaches to the returnees: punitive-restorative approaches and societal reintegration programs. Following a period of 72 hours returnees are interrogated by authorities to determine their roles in the war zones in Syria and Iraq, while confirmed foreign fighters are arrested. The first set of measures deals with those Kosovars who are found to have committed a criminal offense for participating in a foreign conflict in accordance with the national legislation. While in the correctional service, foreign fighters are offered access to programs that aim to help them with skills development to increase their employability, completion of education, as well as, training and lectures that target radical religious beliefs.
Topic:
Security, Civil Society, Conflict, Syrian War, Foreign Fighters, and Reintegration
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, Kosovo, and Syria

9. Turkey’s Refugee Resilience: Expanding and Improving Solutions for the Economic Inclusion of Syrians in Turkey

Author:
Bastien Revel
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Since 2014, Turkey has not only hosted the world’s largest refugee population but has also modeled a best practice for the global refugee policy discussion. Turkey’s experience on the key issues such as jobs and employment should be examined as lessons for both refugee hosting countries and donor countries alike. The country has provided Syrians under Temporary Protection the right to access work permits and formal employment. Facilitating self-reliance for such a large number of refugees’ households remains a challenging task, even in the medium to long-term. This is especially the case in a context where increasing levels of unemployment in Turkey compounded by the socio-economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic have posed a serious challenge to job creation and increased competition for available opportunities. Many Syrians living in Turkey experiencing partial or complete loss of income while incurring higher expenses, which is compounded for most households by a lack of savings. Addressing these challenges requires to draw lessons learnt at both policy and operational level to effectively support access to livelihoods opportunities. This notably involves fostering greater engagement and partnership with the private sector, on the one hand, and exploring innovative solutions such as e-work and online livelihoods opportunities on the other. The COVID-19 pandemic is proving to be an important test on the government’s and their international partners’ relevance and flexibility and their ability to quickly step up efforts in that direction. In this context, UNDP Turkey—a longstanding development partner and the co-lead of the Refugee and Resilience Response Plan (3RP)—joined hands with the Atlantic Council’s program on Turkey—”Atlantic Council IN TURKEY”—to explore policy options to foster socioeconomic inclusion among Syrians under Temporary Protection. Building on the experience and expertise of both organizations, our joint policy report : “Turkey’s Refugee Resilience: Expanding and Improving Solutions for the Economic Inclusion of Syrians in Turkey” aims at outlining pragmatic and innovative options to facilitate refugees’ access to decent employment so as to contribute to our common objective to #leavenoonebehind.
Topic:
Migration, Science and Technology, United Nations, Women, Refugees, Economic Growth, Youth, Conflict, Syrian War, Crisis Management, and Resilience
Political Geography:
Europe, Eurasia, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

10. Silencing the Guns in Syria’s Idlib

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
With the Syrian regime’s offensive in Idlib paused, the time is now for a deal sparing the rebellion’s last stronghold the full wrath of reconquest. The parties should pursue an improved ceasefire including the regime, Russia, Turkey and the Islamist militants entrenched in the province. What’s new? A Russian-backed Syrian regime offensive against rebel-held Idlib halted when Russia and Turkey negotiated a ceasefire in March. Turkey is sending reinforcements, signalling a military response to what it deems a national security threat. For now, this step may dissuade Russia from resuming the offensive, but the standoff appears untenable. Why does it matter? Successive Russian-Turkish ceasefires in Idlib have collapsed over incompatible objectives, diverging interpretations and exclusion of the dominant rebel group, Hei’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which is UN-sanctioned and considered by Russia and others a terrorist organisation. A Russian-backed regime offensive to retake Idlib likely would result in humanitarian catastrophe. What should be done? All actors should seek a more sustainable ceasefire – optimally including HTS, notwithstanding legitimate concerns about the group – that avoids the high military, political and humanitarian price of another offensive. Turkey should push HTS to continue distancing itself from transnational militancy and display greater tolerance for political and religious pluralism.
Topic:
Non State Actors, Conflict, Syrian War, Islamism, and Proxy War
Political Geography:
Russia, Turkey, Middle East, Syria, and Idlib

11. Easing Syrian Refugees’ Plight in Lebanon

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Most Syrian refugees in Lebanon have thought many times about going home but in the end deemed the risks too great. Donors should increase aid allowing the Lebanese government to continue hosting the Syrians, so that any decision they make to leave is truly voluntary. What’s new? Pressure on Syrian refugees in Lebanon to return home is rising. Although Syria remains unsafe for most, refugees are trickling back, escaping increasingly harsh conditions in Lebanon and hoping that the situation will improve back home. Procedures that clarify refugees’ legal status are making return more plausible for some. Why does it matter? While even a small number of successful repatriations represents positive news, conditions are too dangerous for mass organised returns. Yet the Syrian government and some Lebanese political factions increasingly insist that it is time for large-scale returns to begin. What should be done? Donors should plan for many refugees to stay for many years, and provide support to help Lebanon meet Syrians’ needs, ease the burden on Lebanon’s economy, and reduce friction between refugees and their Lebanese hosts. The Lebanese government can take additional administrative steps to ease voluntary returns.
Topic:
Government, Refugees, Syrian War, and Humanitarian Crisis
Political Geography:
Middle East, Lebanon, and Syria

12. Pandora’s Box in Syria: Anticipating negative externalities of a re-entrenching regime

Author:
Samar Batrawi
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
During 2019, the original Syrian conflict entered its closing phases, except for the battlefields of Idlib and in the north east. As a result, conflict dynamics have become somewhat easier to read, as the regime and its key allies have shifted towards a triumphalist ‘post-war’ narrative and corresponding governance styles, deal-making and decision-making. These developments can be witnessed in three interlinked spheres: security, civil, and political economic practices. Together, they largely form the Assad regime’s political economy, which – although poorly understood due to limited access – is crucial to understand to assess the negative externalities likely to result from its wartime survival and re-entrenchment. The paper analyses six such externalities: 1. risk of conflict relapse due to economic pressures 2. the politics of refugees 3. risks and instrumentalisation of terrorism 4. regional instability 5. humanitarian culpability 6. deterioration of the international legal order. These externalities are interconnected and emerge from the political economy of the regime – the accumulation of its security, civil and political economic practices. Their nature and volume suggest that the Syrian civil war will plague its neighbors, as well as Europe, for a long time to come. These externalities also focus our attention on the fact that adequate containment strategies should be designed as a matter of urgency, to limit their negative impact.
Topic:
Security, International Law, Political Economy, Terrorism, Refugees, Conflict, Syrian War, and Bashar al-Assad
Political Geography:
Middle East, Syria, and Idlib

13. Mixing politics and force: Syria’s Constitutional Committee in review

Author:
Lars Hauch
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
This report examines Syria’s Constitutional Committee process and parallel military developments during the Syrian civil war to reveal that the two have so far been interconnected. It arrives at the conclusion that the Government of Syria and Russia created and subsequently manipulated various linkages between conference room and battlefield to increase their own advantage. This has included the use of the Constitutional Committee as a placeholder to avoid greater Western diplomatic, or even military, efforts to resolve the conflict; the deliberate targeting of civilians and civilian infrastructure to force opposition bodies out of Syria; and polarization of the Committee by engaging in continuous human rights abuses among the Syrian population during negotiations. The Constitutional Committee can still help build bridges, but this requires redressing the balance of forces on the battlefield first. A joint Turkish-European military humanitarian intervention in northwestern Syria can serve this purpose and revitalize efforts to negotiate a (late) solution to the war.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Constitution, Humanitarian Intervention, Syrian War, and Negotiation
Political Geography:
Russia, Middle East, and Syria

14. Gone Without a Trace: Syria's Detained, Abducted, and Forcibly Disappeared

Author:
Hanny Megally and Elena Naughton
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center on International Cooperation
Abstract:
Tens of thousands of people have been unlawfully detained by the Syrian government and other parties to the conflict in Syria. In most cases, their fate—and if they are alive, their whereabouts—remains unknown. Many families have been waiting for word of their spouses, children, and other relatives since mass protests first began in 2011. This situation is adversely affecting not only Syrians inside the country—including over 6.5 million who are internally displaced—but also many of the 5.6 million refugees who are likewise desperately seeking answers about family members from abroad. This joint report from the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) and the Center on International Cooperation (CIC) recommends a set of urgent steps that should be taken to assist families in obtaining information about the whereabouts of their loved ones, gaining access to them, and achieving their prompt release. Authored by CIC's Hanny Megally and ICTJ's Elena Naughton, the report details the scope of the detention crisis and argues that answers and coordinated action are needed now. Time is of the essence, as the COVID-19 pandemic appears to be accelerating in Syria, putting those detained in overcrowded and unsanitary prisons at further risk. Any meaningful progress toward a political agreement in Syria will be dependent on more than a negotiated ceasefire or reduction in violence and urgent access to humanitarian assistance. There will be little or no possibility of lasting peace without addressing critical issues, like the question of the missing, detained, abducted, and forcibly disappeared.
Topic:
Prisons/Penal Systems, Syrian War, Crimes Against Humanity, Humanitarian Crisis, and State Abuse
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

15. Russian Naval Forces in the Syrian War

Author:
Igor Delanoe
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
Since the late 2000s, the Russian Federation has expanded its naval footprint in the Eastern Mediterranean, and even resurrected its Mediterranean Squadron in 2013. The backbone of this operational squadron is provided by units coming from the Black Sea Fleet, complemented by vessels from other Russian naval formations (namely, the Northern, Baltic, and Pacific Fleets, as well as the Caspian Sea Flotilla) on a rotational basis. As the Russian State Armament Program for the period 2011-2020 was implemented, the Black Sea Fleet received new warships and new diesel-powered submarines. Consequently, by the outbreak of the Syrian crisis, Moscow’s naval footprint in the Mediterranean had already been reconstituted. Yet, since the mid-2010s, a structural change occurred in the Mediterranean Squadron’s order of battle. The Squadron has morphed qualitatively and quantitatively, and has become more capable. Featuring fewer ex-Soviet large platforms and more modern green water units, this naval task force has been assigned mainly a defensive objective: locally counterbalance navies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and protect Russia’s southern flank from perceived instability emanating from the Mediterranean’s southern shore, in the context of the Arab Spring. Moreover, Moscow’s direct military involvement in the war in Syria has provided the Mediterranean Squadron with a new purpose while highlighting a conventional deterrence mission.
Topic:
NATO, Armed Forces, Navy, and Syrian War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Middle East, and Syria

16. Russian Aerial Operations

Author:
Anton Lavrov
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
Before the start of the military intervention in Syria in 2015, even top Russian generals were uncertain what the result would be. Shortly before the start of the intervention, the Russian Aerospace Forces (RuAF) received hundreds of new airplanes and helicopters and new “smart” precision weapons. Almost all of them had never been tested in real combat. The pilots and commanders also did not have combat experience and were trained by textbooks filled with outdated concepts and tactics. The five years of war in Syria have been the most intense period of transformation for the RuAF since the war in Afghanistan in the 1980s. The Russian military not only gained an unprecedented amount of experience, but also made substantial improvements in tactics and strategy.
Topic:
Military Affairs, Military Intervention, Conflict, Syrian War, and Air Force
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Middle East, and Syria

17. The Russian Ground-Based Contingent in Syria

Author:
Charles Bartles and Lester Grau
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
The Syrian Civil War produces a new set of problems involving extended urban combat, intense fights for key resources (oil fields, water, and lines of communication and supply), conventional combat among irregular units, ethnic and religious cleansing, a large number of foreign combatants with varying motivations, and contending outside powers fighting a proxy engagement. The Russian Federation is not an expeditionary power, and its entry into Syria on the side of the regime has strained its logistical resources. From the beginning of the Syrian campaign, it was clear that Russian involvement was initially envisaged to be through the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS). Although the Syrian government was on the verge of collapse, and the Syrian military was on its hind legs and a shell of its former self, there was a sufficient number of Syrian ground units that were mission capable. With this understanding, the VKS was to be the principal supplier of Russian combat power aimed at disruption of the command and control and leadership of the groups fighting the Bashar al-Assad regime through the provision of reconnaissance and target destruction. In particular, Russia’s priority was the destruction of the Western-backed, moderate opposition groups, since it saw these as the greatest immediate threat to Assad. The Islamic State (ISIS) and other Sunni extremist groups were targeted, but sat lower on Russia’s priority list. As with other such operations, «mission creep” soon resulted in Russia’s involvement quickly expanding past the provision of aerospace support to planning, and, in some cases, conducting ground operations. General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia, confirmed this expansion of Russian involvement in a December 2017 interview. Russia’s ground-based contingent in the Syrian campaign involves a diverse set of forces and capabilities. Some of the key features of this expanded ground force mission included a Russian model of military advisors, integrated and modernized fires, mobility and countermobility operations, a featured role for military police, use of coastal defense, spetznaz, and private military company (PMC) forces. Russian ground forces have benefitted from the opportunity to provide combat experience to a large number of professional soldiers, conduct battlefield testing of new systems and observe the impact of different terrain on tactics. The forces opposing the Syrian government provide a different opponent than the “enemy” encountered in normal Russian peacetime training and much of the “Syrian experience” is discussed and dissected in Russian professional military journals.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Military Intervention, and Syrian War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Middle East, and Syria

18. A Plan to End the War in Syria: Competing with Russia in the Levant

Author:
Aaron Stein
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
The United States has an interest in allowing the Russian Federation to “win” an outright victory in Syria, so long as it secures from Moscow an agreement that is favorable to the Syrian Kurds, builds in negative consequences for an external actor targeting the Syrian Democratic Forces, and establishes a “deconflict plus”-type mechanism to continue to target Islamic State- and Al Qaeda-linked individuals in Syria. A forward-looking policy that the incoming Biden administration could consider is to deprioritize the nascent threat of the Islamic State as a key factor in driving U.S. national security strategy, and instead focus more intently on long-term competition with great powers. This approach would seek to shape how Moscow spends finite defense dollars—at a time of expected global defense cuts stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic—in ways that are advantageous to the United States. It also would seek to limit the cost of the U.S. presence in Syria—to include secondary and opportunity costs not accounted for in a basic cost breakdown of the U.S. war against the Islamic State. This approach is not without risk, particularly from a nascent Islamic State insurgency in Russian-controlled territory, but seeks to match U.S. strategic priorities with action and to impose upon a long-term competitor the costs of victory for its intervention in Syria.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Foreign Policy, War, Syrian War, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Russia, Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

19. Countering Iran in the Gray Zone: What the United States Should Learn from Israel’s Operations in Syria

Author:
Ilan Goldenberg, Nicholas Heras, Kaleigh Thomas, and Jennie Matuschak
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Since the Islamic Revolution in 1979 and especially since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, Iran has become highly proficient in using its surrogates and proxies across the Middle East as a tool to achieve its interests while avoiding direct conflict with the United States. Successive U.S. presidents have sought options for pushing back against this Iranian strategy but have struggled to find approaches that could deter Iran’s actions or degrade its capabilities. In most cases U.S. administrations have been hesitant to respond at all, for fear of starting a larger conflict. The recent killing of Qassim Soleimani represents the opposite problem, in which the United States and Iran came unnecessarily close to a much larger war. In contrast, Israel’s “campaign between the wars” (the Hebrew acronym is mabam) against Iran and Iranian-backed groups in Syria has been one of the most successful military efforts to push back against Iran in the “gray zone.” Since the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011, and especially since early 2017, Israel has conducted more than 200 airstrikes inside Syria against more than 1,000 targets linked to Iran and it’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force (IRGCQF), and against IRGC-QF backed groups such as the Lebanese Hezbollah. This campaign has slowed Iran’s military buildup in Syria while avoiding a broader regional conflagration that would have been damaging to Israel’s interests.1 This study examines Israel’s mabam campaign and asks what lessons the United States can draw and how they may be applied to future U.S. actions in gray zone conflicts, both against Iran and more broadly.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Military Affairs, Conflict, and Syrian War
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Syria

20. The Russian Way of War in Syria: Implications for the West

Author:
Robert E. Hamilton
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
The Russian Federation’s intervention in Syria is a watershed event. However the war there ends, its impact on Russia is likely to be profound. For the first time in its post-Soviet history, Russia’s military is fighting outside the borders of the former Soviet Union. In doing so, it is exercising military capabilities that had atrophied from long lack of use. Moscow is also rebuilding its diplomatic muscle through its role in Syria by managing a diverse coalition, leading a parallel peace process, and forcing the United States to take the Kremlin’s preferences into account when making decisions in the Middle East. Through Syria, Russia has reemerged on the geopolitical stage. The war is not over, and there are many ways in which things could still go badly for Russia. Moscow may find that a return to geopolitical prominence entails costs and risks at least as great as the rewards that status brings. Nevertheless, the West will be dealing with a Russia that has changed fundamentally through its experience in the war. Understanding these changes and their implications for Western governments is the focus of this conclusion chapter. It is structured around two questions. First, what does Syria tell us about how Russia fights its wars? Second, how has Russia’s experience in Syria affected the capabilities of its armed forces? Answering these questions should increase our understanding of Russia as a geopolitical actor and allow Western governments to make more effective policy on issues where Russia is a factor.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, War, Armed Forces, Military Intervention, and Syrian War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Middle East, and Syria