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1. Protests in Iran in comparative perspective: A revolutionary state in trouble

Author:
Erwin van Veen and Hamidreza Azizi
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
Successive protests in 2009, 2019 and 2022 have poignantly laid bare the much reduced social and political legitimacy of Iran’s ruling elites. Reform-from-within is no longer viewed as credible. Even former pro-reform leaders like Mousavi have abandoned hope and call for regime change. While further protests are inevitable, it is nevertheless unlikely that they will produce a revolution that overthrows the regime in the short-term, as long as their national organisation and leadership remain weak, Iran’s ruling elites cohesive, security forces loyal, and the administration continues to function. The country has witnessed hundreds of protests every year for the past few years, in addition to those of 2009, 2019 and 2022, but calls for fundamental change continue to go unheeded. The hope of the ruling elite is that the mix of repression and Iran’s dire economic situation will prevent protests from recurring. At best, quasi-reforms will provide some band-aids. In both scenarios, the Islamic Republic of Iran is no more in the sense that it lacks legitimacy among large segments of the population. It has also shed the elements of republican governance it used to have. And yet it lives on because it remains a capable state with a fairly cohesive ruling elite and ample coercive power. Iran is on course to become a classic one-party authoritarian regime, which may shed some of its religious orientations once its Supreme Leader leaves office for reasons of age. It remains to be seen how sustainable this will be given the crescendo of protests.
Topic:
Security, Economy, Domestic Politics, Protests, and Civil Unrest
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

2. The Lessons We Choose to Draw

Author:
Paul J. McKinney
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Contemporary Arab Studies (CCAS)
Abstract:
In September 2003, just a few violent months after the Bush administration proclaimed major combat operations had ended, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) – the US-led civilian body charged with administering occupied Iraq – organized a two-day workshop in Baghdad to identify best practices for countries transitioning from state-led to market economies. Seeking to draw lessons that may be applicable to Iraq, the CPA invited former ministers and finance officials from Central and Eastern European countries to share their experiences. Evidently impressed by Poland’s “shock therapy,” in which Warsaw introduced a drastic neoliberal package during the country’s emergence from Soviet domination in the early 90s, the CPA appointed the former Polish finance and prime minister responsible for those reforms, Marek Belka, to head the CPA’s Office of Economic Policy. With Belka at the helm, lessons learned from Poland’s transition would be universalized and superimposed onto Iraq, with little regard to contextual factors. Iraq was, after all, seen as a blank canvas upon which the West could project its own visions. Zealously driven by a belief that markets are the most efficient way to organize a society and, by extension, to optimize individual freedom, the CPA issued what can only be described as the economic equivalent to the U.S. military’s “shock-and-awe” campaign. Within a year, the CPA issued an astoundingly high number of Orders to build the new neoliberal state. Some of the most notable included, for example, selling about 200 state-run enterprises, eliminating the right to unionize in most sectors, outlawing labor strikes, opening Iraq’s banks to foreign ownership and control, mandating a regressive flat tax on income, lowering the corporate rate to a flat 15%, eliminating taxes on profits repatriated to foreign-owned businesses, and even prohibiting Iraqi farmers from re-using “protected” varieties of genetically modified seeds.
Topic:
Security, Markets, Reform, and Iraq War
Political Geography:
Iraq and Middle East

3. The Lessons of the Afghan War That No One Will Want to Learn

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
At the best of times, the U.S. tends to rush out heavily politicized studies of the lessons of war that are more political ammunition than serious analyses, and while these are followed by long formal studies that are often quite good, they then are often ignored as the flow of events moves on. These are scarcely the best of times. The collapse of the Afghan government and forces has occurred during one of the most partisan periods in American politics, followed by a totally different kind of conflict in Ukraine, all while the U.S. focus on terrorism and regional conflicts that began with 9/11 has been replaced by a focus on competition with nuclear superpowers like Russia and China. The very fact that the war stretched out over two decades has meant that much of the focus on lessons has ignored the first half or more of the war, and the almost inevitable chaos following the U.S. decision to withdraw has led to the focus on the collapse of the Afghan forces and the central government rather than on the actual conduct of the war – and few within the U.S. government now want to rake over the list of past mistakes that turned an initial tactical victory into a massive grand strategic defeat.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

4. Looking beyond the Biden Visit to the Middle East and the “Fist Bump”

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
If one looks back on media coverage of Biden’s visit to Saudi Arabia – and far too many of the analyses of the visit that have followed – it is amazing to see how much of that coverage focused on the assassination of Jamal Khashoggi, the President’s “fist bump,” and on short term issues and trends. The key strategic challenges the U.S. faces in the Middle East are longer term and they go far beyond most of the reporting and discussion of the Biden visit.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Middle East, North America, and United States of America

5. What Strategic Posture Should France Adopt in the Middle East?

Author:
Héloïse Fayet
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
France has a historical presence in the Middle East, where it has many interests to defend: the fight against terrorism, the promotion of the arms industry, the dissemination of humanitarian values, etc. To this end, it has a number of resources at its disposal, notably military: French forces are deployed in Iraq, Syria and Jordan as part of Operation Chammal, in Lebanon for the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), and in the United Arab Emirates. This strategic posture, inherited from the history and "Arab policy" of the 20th century, is now being called into question by the geopolitical upheavals in the region. The resizing of the American presence in the Middle East, initiated by the withdrawal from Afghanistan, is accompanied by a growing assumption of responsibility for their own security by local actors. This evolution is embodied, for example, in the signing of the Abraham Accords, which redefine the place of Israel. The American pulling out also allows extra-regional powers such as China and Russia to become progressively involved in the area. These transformations require an adaptation of the French posture in order to position itself as a credible actor in the strategic competition. It is therefore necessary to move away from the sole focus on counterterrorism, which no longer gathers partners, and more broadly to redefine the partnership strategy and the mechanism deployed on the ground. A strengthened interministerial, or even European, dynamic also seems essential in order to mobilize all the levers available to France.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Armed Forces, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, France, and Syria

6. Geopolitics of Europe’s Hydrogen Aspirations: Creating Sustainable Equilibrium or a Combustible Mix?

Author:
Tomas Jermalavicius, Tomas Janeliūnas, Andrian Prokip, Iliya Kusa, Alan Riley, Andrei V. Belyi, Pier Paolo Raimondi, and Miguel Sainz de Vicuña
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Discussions about hydrogen’s role in the transition to carbon-neutral economies and the EU’s Green Deal seldom include consideration of geopolitical aspects and/or national security imperatives. However, given the importance of energy as a factor in global and regional geopolitical trends and national security, hydrogen development will reshape not only energy relations between countries but will also alter the broader geopolitical picture. While elevating new aspects of geopolitical interplays, such as the importance of technology and regional clusters, hydrogen development might also unwittingly transplant present-day challenges—such as excessive dependence on the energy supply from hostile powers—into the carbon-neutral future. Since Europe’s energy sovereignty and geopolitical role in its neighbourhood could be at stake, the nexus of geopolitics, energy security and hydrogen development should be given serious attention. At the same time, the transformative socioeconomic impact of energy transition will create winners and losers within and between nations, which in some cases will have national security implications; hydrogen development could offer ways to mitigate this. This report focuses on exploring the impact that the European Union’s ambitions and plans for hydrogen development—including an expansion of its infrastructure in the form of the European Hydrogen Backbone—on its geopolitical position up to 2040. It first looks into the greater detail of the EU Hydrogen Strategy and how it links with the Energy Union, as well as with European strategic autonomy and energy sovereignty issues. It finds that hydrogen development—alongside the growth of the renewable energy sector—offers a great opportunity to reduce the current exposure to hostile actors through the energy sector that often hampers Europe’s ability to act as a geopolitical force in its neighbourhood. However, it also warns that the lack of unity and coherence currently afflicting the Energy Union, and manifest in such recent controversies as the Nord Stream 2 undersea gas pipeline from Russia to Germany before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, could potentially weaken such a positive geopolitical impact of hydrogen. Although hydrogen development requires Europe to draw upon external suppliers, the fact that this supply can come from many countries provides a significant opportunity for diversification and reducing the potency of energy supply as a geopolitical weapon. In this regard, two directions stand out in the EU’s neighbourhood—Ukraine in the east, and the Mediterranean along with the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) to the south. Both have huge potential for playing major roles in the European hydrogen supply chains, and their cultivation by the EU would provide many opportunities both to strengthen the EU’s influence in its neighbourhood and to build new partnerships. Certainly, neither of those directions comes without risks and downsides: political instability and armed conflicts, poor governance, unstable investment environment, water scarcity, and in some cases dependence on the hydrocarbons industry for income will be significant factors hampering the efforts to unlock their potential. Ukraine in particular will require sustained reconstruction efforts to tackle the massive devastation caused by Russia’s war. This will divert resources and attention, but transforming its energy sector and developing its hydrogen production base could still be important strands of these efforts. Europe’s own potential for domestic hydrogen production is another direction that this report looks into as a way to disentangle from the present-day geopolitically toxic dependencies and enhance its energy sovereignty. The Baltic states and Finland represent an interesting case study on how hydrogen could underpin a regional cooperation cluster with a high degree of integration—one of the new characteristics of the hydrogen era that will have geopolitical implications. The report, however, finds that different national perspectives on hydrogen, lack of coordination, and certain issues of trust arising from recent failures of solidarity and unity when tackling the regional nexus of energy security and geopolitics might hamper future regional cooperation in hydrogen. The hydrogen economy also offers some important benefits in managing national security challenges at the national level. In Estonia, the loss of the fossil fuel-based industry in the highly sensitive north-eastern region of Ida-Virumaa will be a socioeconomic blow to the local population. This report highlights how the vulnerability of the region, dominated by the Russian-speaking ethnic minorities who are already highly exposed to Russia’s malignant influence activities, could imperil Estonia’s energy transition and its national security. Creating a national hydrogen cluster in this region, drawing upon its industrial infrastructure and human capital, could mitigate the consequences of decarbonisation and energy transition. However, these considerations do not seem to receive sufficient attention from the government and energy businesses when drawing Estonia’s hydrogen map of the future. The report recommends that various stakeholders in the EU—including those behind the European Hydrogen Backbone—continuously monitor and assess the geopolitical risks, especially in terms of their impact on European energy sovereignty, when creating and managing new hydrogen-related interdependencies with the regions and countries outside the EU. The report urges the EU to support energy transition and necessary market and governance reforms in post-war Ukraine and the MENA countries to facilitate their emergence as crucial and reliable partners in hydrogen value chains. The report also recommends closer coordination and common planning between hydrogen stakeholders of the Baltic states and Finland when forming a regional cluster of hydrogen supply that would contribute to European energy sovereignty. Last but not least, it suggests that, for national security and resilience reasons, Estonia should focus more attention on the Ida-Virumaa region when developing its national hydrogen roadmap.
Topic:
Security, European Union, Geopolitics, Hydrogen, and Energy
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Middle East, North Africa, and Baltic States

7. Turkey's Response to the Russia-Ukraine Crisis

Author:
Aaron Stein
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
On October 26, 2021, Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense released video of a TB2 unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) striking a separatist D-30 howitzer in Russian-occupied Donbas. The strike was Ukraine’s first confirmed use of the now ubiquitous TB2, the Bayraktar-manufactured drone that the Turkish military has used to great tactical effect in Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh. The Turkish-Ukrainian defense relationship is understudied, but it could become an important factor in how Russian elites view North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) support for non-member Ukraine, and be used to justify an invasion to assuage Moscow’s concerns about a US-allied military presence along its borders. The Turkish support for Ukraine is not the main driver of Russian discomfort about the future of Ukraine. The TB2 is also not a decisive game changer, and the use of UCAVs is almost certain to have little impact on how Russian leadership weighs risk during debates about the efficacy of armed conflict in a neighboring state. Nevertheless, Turkish-Ukrainian defense ties are worthy of deeper study, precisely because Ankara’s relationships with Kyiv and Moscow have a secondary impact on American interests in Eastern Europe. The Turkish-Russian relationship is marred by bureaucratic distrust, which is papered over by a very functional leader-to-leader dynamic that enables the two Black Sea neighbors to cooperate and manage numerous regional conflicts. The Turkish-Ukrainian dynamic, in turn, is part of a broader Turkish effort to establish itself as an independent actor, committed to pursuing a foreign policy that often clashes with much of the NATO alliance. This paper will explore Turkish-Russian and Turkish-Ukrainian relations; the reasons for Turkey’s efforts to “fence sit” and establish itself as a neutral political actor in the Black Sea; and what these efforts portend for US interests in the region.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Turkey, Ukraine, and Middle East

8. Risk and Responsibility: Managing Future Iranian Weapons of Mass Destruction Threats

Author:
Becca Wasser and Jennie Matuschak
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Washington is reimagining its global role, leading the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) to make difficult choices about priorities, resources, and risk to better address the long-term “pacing challenge” posed by China. To do so, the United States plans to accept risks in the Middle East and against future Iran threats. Iran’s possession and potential use of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs)—specifically, its nuclear program, chemical weapons, and biological agents—pose the greatest threat to U.S. interests and Washington’s ability to accept risk in the region. But how Iran might leverage WMDs to threaten U.S. interests and upend Washington’s plans to make trade-offs in global responsibilities is unclear, while the risks of failing to address these challenges remain high. As a result, the DoD and its component organizations, such as the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), must enhance their understanding of the threat posed by Iran’s nuclear, chemical, and biological capabilities and the escalation dynamics surrounding Iranian WMDs during crisis and conflict. By doing so, the United States can better accept risk in the Middle East and revise its global priorities while still protecting core U.S. interests. To improve the DoD’s understanding of future Iranian WMD-related threats and escalation dynamics, the Gaming Lab at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) conducted a series of three virtual strategic-operational tabletop exercises (TTXs) exploring future Iranian nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons use. The TTXs indicated that even if Iran acquires a nuclear weapon, the likelihood the regime will use it is low. Instead, the regime may be more likely to use chemical and biological weapons to escalate conflict. Moreover, there are significant asymmetries between American and Iranian views of conflict timelines, escalation redlines, and risk tolerance, all of which make it difficult to offer and signal credible ways to de-escalate a crisis. Differences between Washington’s risk acceptance and that of its regional partners—Israel, in particular—further complicate U.S.-Iran interactions. The TTXs aimed to enable the United States to identify where and how it might mitigate the risk it must accept to better marshal resources in support of the department’s strategic guidance. Accepting greater risk against Iran and in the Middle East more broadly means shifting U.S. strategic priorities in the region. This shift has the potential to unsettle allies and partners, and may possibly embolden Iran in the near term, but such tough choices must be made if the United States wishes to prioritize other long-term threats that may be of greater impact to U.S. security, such as China.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Weapons, and Risk
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

9. Afghanistan’s Security Challenges under the Taliban

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
One year after the Taliban seized power in Afghanistan, fighting has decreased considerably. Yet serious security problems remain, not least the foreign militants still in the country. External actors should press the new authorities to fulfil their commitments and avoid any steps that could reignite large-scale violence.
Topic:
Security, Governance, Taliban, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and Middle East

10. Syria: Ruling over Aleppo’s Ruins

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Aleppo was devastated by bombing and shelling during the Syrian war. It remains unsafe, with residents subject to shakedowns by the regime’s security forces and various militias. Damascus and its outside backers should curb this predation as a crucial first step toward the city’s recovery.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Recovery
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

11. The Iran Nuclear Deal at Six: Now or Never

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
After all is said and done, the Iran nuclear deal struck in 2015 remains the best way to achieve the West’s non-proliferation goals and the sanctions relief that Tehran seeks. The parties must not squander what is likely their last chance to save the accord.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Nuclear Power, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

12. The Russian-Iran Partnership in a Multipolar World

Author:
Clément Therme
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The strengthening of the partnership between Russia and Iran depends on overlapping security interests; bilaterally, regionally and on the world stage. Tehran has pursued a regional policy program that is largely in line with Russia’s interests, whether these relate to Syria (from 2011), the Caucasus, Central Asia, or Afghanistan (since 1991). This security dimension was already one of the foundations of the bilateral relationship in the post-Cold War-period. It has now appeared in regional dealings between Tehran and Moscow. In addition, the decline of US international predominance, which has been apparent since the 2000s, has allowed Russia and Iran to develop a shared ideological discourse in opposition to “Western values”. Beyond this shared ideological basis, Tehran has developed a true “Realpolitik” whereby it relies on Russian foreign policy to relieve US pressure on Iran that is aimed at regime change or, at the very least, a change in the behavior of the Islamic Republic. In other words, in seeking to preserve intact the main ideological tenets of its regime, Tehran has added a new dimension to its relationship with Moscow. Since 1991, this relationship has become a matter of survival for a regime that faces both popular opposition at home and external pressure from Washington: pressure that increased during the Trump administration of 2017-2021.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, and Multipolarity
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, and Middle East

13. Pakistan Security Report 2021

Author:
Safdar Sial, Muhammad Amir Rana, and Najam U Din
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
Abstract:
While the political and security situation in neighboring Afghanistan is still fluid, concerns are growing inside Pakistan about the possible fallout including in terms of increased insecurity, border tensions, and militant violence. For one, the developments in Afghanistan had already started influencing Pakistan’s militant landscape in 2021 as the year witnessed not only an increase in terrorist attacks by the Pakistani Taliban in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa but also an intensified terrorist violence by Baloch insurgent groups mainly in Balochistan. Meanwhile, Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K) province also emerged as one of the key actors of violence and instability in Afghanistan and Pakistan during the year. While the Afghan Taliban find it difficult to convince the world to recognize their government and activate/unfreeze financial channels, they are also finding it increasingly hard to address the domestic challenges mainly those linked to governance, security, and intra-Afghan reconciliation. Despite their repeated promises to not allow anyone to use the Afghan soil against Pakistan, the Afghan Taliban have yet not seriously considered to act against the TTP; except having facilitated the talks between Pakistani government and the TTP which have also not shown any successes so far. Nonetheless, there have been critical statements about Pakistan from some Taliban officials on multiple occasions about Pakistan’s democratic political system as well as fencing of the border by Pakistani security forces. Pakistan has eventually conveyed its concerns to the Afghan interim government about Afghan officials’ repeated efforts to damage the border fencing saying it was observing maximum restraint.
Topic:
Security, National Security, and International Security
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Middle East, and Asia

14. Beyond the Blocs: Jewish Settlement East of Israel's Security Barrier and How to Avert the Slide to a One-State Outcome

Author:
David Makovsky
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Communities outside the West Bank security barrier constitute an obstacle to a future two-state solution and a potential source of friction between Washington and Jerusalem. Springtime in Israel has been marked by instability, from a spate of deadly terrorist attacks to the resignation of Idit Silman from the coalition government and violent clashes in Jerusalem. Yet these developments do not change the fundamental challenges in U.S.-Israel relations: first, the shape of a new Iran nuclear deal, and second, Israel’s West Bank policy, which has largely allowed the hardcore among Jewish settlers to pursue their ideological goals through the construction of settlements, outposts, and neighborhoods outside major blocs. In this finely detailed Policy Focus—released in tandem with an update to his landmark “Settlements and Solutions” interactive map—Israel expert David Makovsky explains why communities outside the West Bank security barrier constitute a central obstacle to a future two-state solution. In making his case—aided by an assortment of charts and graphics—he explores settlers’ voting patterns, discusses trends in violent activity on both sides, and explains why a quiet U.S.-Israel understanding could help preserve an outcome that advances both American interests and Israeli democracy.
Topic:
Security, Territorial Disputes, Violence, and Settlements
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

15. Countering Iran's Regional Strategy: A Long-Term, Comprehensive Approach

Author:
Eyal Zamir
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
A coordinated response to Iran’s aggression can preserve U.S. and Western interests, reinforce Israel and America’s Arab allies, and promote regional stability. For decades, the Islamic Republic of Iran has sought to extend its influence throughout the Middle East, and the threat has only grown more serious amid the regime’s enhanced conventional military capabilities and proximity to a nuclear breakout. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has spearheaded Tehran’s expansionist “four capitals” strategy, focused on Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut, and Sanaa. In Iraq, the IRGC works through elements of the government-funded Popular Mobilization Forces; in Syria, through the regime of Bashar al-Assad; in Lebanon, through Hezbollah—which can be regarded as Iran’s “model” proxy; and in Yemen, through the Houthis, who hold territory and oppose the internationally recognized government. In all these places, the IRGC has exploited civil wars and interstate conflicts to spread its political, economic, and military influence. In this Policy Focus, Maj. Gen. Eyal Zamir, IDF, draws on his deep experience in the Israeli military establishment to propose a detailed plan for undermining Iran’s influence in the region—an approach that will preserve U.S. and Western interests, reinforce Israel and America’s Arab allies, and promote regional stability.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Instability, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and Israel

16. China's Security Presence in the Middle East: Redlines and Guidelines for the United States

Author:
Grant Rumley
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
A more assertive Beijing means that Washington must work harder to protect its traditional partnerships and secure sensitive information. The U.S. competition with China has reached the Middle East, where the longstanding American security infrastructure faces an increasing array of Chinese arms sales, military deployments, and investments in critical infrastructure. Beijing is keen to strengthen its own relationships in the region and views any reliance on the U.S. security umbrella as a “profound strategic vulnerability.” Yet Washington rightly regards these activities with skepticism, since an expanded Chinese security presence threatens to erode traditional partnerships and compromise sensitive information. For instance, discussions to sell F-35 aircraft to the UAE broke down over American concerns about Chinese-Emirati cooperation, including in the security realm. In this timely Policy Note—illustrated with informative graphics—security expert Grant Rumley traces the contours of China’s Middle East ambitions and where the perils lie for the United States. An effective U.S. response, he contends, will require assessing risk in each specific theater and acting appropriately, thereby ensuring a productive, sustainable American presence in this pivotal region.
Topic:
Security, Infrastructure, Partnerships, and Weapons
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, Asia, and United States of America

17. Fighting Jihadists By, With, and Through U.S. Partners: Lessons Learned and Future Prospects

Author:
Ido Levy
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Special forces have succeeded especially in such missions, but any BWT effort requires some U.S. ground presence to achieve its goals. As part of its bid to end Middle East “forever wars,” the United States has employed a “by, with, and through” (BWT) doctrine for fighting jihadist adversaries. Such operations rely on local partner forces to assume the bulk of the hard ground combat, sometimes with U.S. accompaniment, while American advisors provide support through training, intelligence, heavy air and artillery assets, equipment, funding, and logistics. BWT missions have seen success over the past two decades in theaters such as Iraq (with the Counter Terrorism Service), Syria (with the Syrian Democratic Forces), and Somalia (with the Danab Brigade). But they do not succeed on their own and must be guided by several principles, including a serious U.S. commitment, alignment of American and partner interests, and strong interpersonal relations between advisors and local actors. In this tightly argued Policy Note, military analyst Ido Levy emphasizes the particular success of U.S.-created special forces in missions against jihadist forces. But he cautions that BWT efforts cannot thrive without some U.S. ground presence and, as occurred in Afghanistan, would likely fail amid an outright American withdrawal.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Terrorism, Military Affairs, and Jihad
Political Geography:
Middle East and United States of America

18. Iran's Nuclear Hedging Strategy: Shaping the Islamic Republic's Proliferation Calculus

Author:
Michael Eisenstadt
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Tehran’s willingness to pause aspects of its nuclear program may offer opportunities to stoke regime concerns about the potential costs of moving forward. Since halting its crash nuclear weapons program in 2003, the Islamic Republic has pursued a cautious hedging strategy that has enabled it to become an advanced nuclear threshold state, while also avoiding a military confrontation with the United States and Israel. Yet Iran’s willingness to pause aspects of its nuclear program in order to ease pressure—and in turn to pursue more urgent objectives—may help Washington constrain Tehran’s nuclear ambitions by amplifying its concerns about the potential risks and costs of proliferating. In this Policy Focus, military analyst Michael Eisenstadt surveys the evolution of Iran’s nuclear hedging strategy and suggests ways for the United States, along with its allies and partners, to shape the regime’s proliferation calculus with the goal of preventing an Iranian breakout and a nuclearized Middle East.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Affairs, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

19. Youth, Peace, and Security in Iraq: Operationalizing Youth Peacebuilding Priorities in Practice

Author:
Arab Reform Initiative
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
In December 2020, the Government of Iraq, under the auspices of the Ministry of Youth and Sports, together with UNFPA and the Folke Bernadotte Academy (Swedish Agency for Peace, Security and Development), formally launched the National Coalition on Youth, Peace, and Security (YPS) in Iraq. As part of the government’s commitment to fulfilling the vision of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2250 (UNSCR 2250) and its subsequent resolutions 2419 and 2535, the Coalition seeks to act as a bridge linking grassroots youth peace activists and community leaders with formal decision-making circles in Iraq. The Coalition advocates for the implementation of the YPS agenda through policies and programs, facilitates the exchange of experiences, knowledge, and information amongst Coalition members and YPS actors, and supports the empowerment of youth to meaningfully participate and take leading roles in peace-building processes. The success of this Coalition is of prime importance at this critical juncture in Iraq’s history. In the aftermath of ISIS’ defeat, the wave of popular mobilization in the central and southern provinces largely led by youth, and the recent parliamentary elections in October 2021, Iraq is in an important phase of reconstruction. The country’s challenges are numerous and include maintaining stability and securing the sovereignty of the State, reinforcing pro-democracy forces and the rule of law, improving the economy and provision of services, and ensuring that redistribution meets citizens’ demands for economic, political, and social justice. More importantly, there exist important cohorts among young women and men in Iraq that are keen to participate in these various processes of reconstruction and to leave conflicts and disputes behind. Youth peace activists, youth-led grassroots initiatives and community leaders have already been conducting myriad actions on the ground to contribute to rebuilding the Iraqi society and many are of the opinion that this is one of the main paths to sustainable peace. The YPS agenda can be used as a common framework for dialogue and partnerships between youth and decision-makers. Moreover, including youth in decision-making processes can render policies not only better adapted to the needs and aspirations of citizens, but can also help increase the legitimacy of the process itself and ensure sustainability. Fulfilling the YPS agenda and creating successful mechanisms for Iraqi youth’s inclusion and incorporation in building, sustaining, and taking ownership of peace and development processes is thus essential to the reconstruction of the Iraqi nation-State and its prosperity and stability going forward. Yet, in order to ensure that youth’s participation is meaningful, it is essential to take as the point of departure youth’s own priorities for peace and security in practice, and what youth-owned political participation looks like on the ground. In other words, operationalizing the YPS agenda should aim to operationalize into practice the priorities that young women and men themselves set, with the support of decision-makers and YPS actors. On 7 December 2021, the Arab Reform Initiative and the Folke Bernadotte Academy organized a virtual closed policy dialogue, held under Chatham House Rule, bringing together governmental actors, youth activists (members of the YPS Coalition), researchers, policy makers, and advisors to collectively reflect on what meaningful youth inclusion in peace and development in Iraq looks like. This discussion included exploring what “peace,” “security,” and “participation” actually mean to Iraqi youth in theory and practice and considering examples of youth participation in peacebuilding on the ground and what good practices can be derived from them. The discussion also drew insights from good practices in other contexts in the region, and assessed the types of policies, approaches, and programs that can support Iraqi youth’s participation on both formal and informal levels. In doing so, this policy dialogue contributed to defining the various means and methods to operationalize a youth-owned YPS agenda in Iraq.
Topic:
Security, Youth, Peace, and Peacebuilding
Political Geography:
Iraq and Middle East

20. A Path to Peace

Author:
Park Institute for Peace Studies
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
Abstract:
The last few decades have seen Pakistan grapple with serious and diverse security challenges. These have been accompanied not merely by deterioration of law and order, but also substantial socio-economic impact. In recent years, particularly after 2014, Pakistan managed to achieve considerable success in containing terrorism. Militant groups no longer had large areas under their effective control and attacks and casualties declined sharply,1 affording Pakistan a degree of relative peace. In early 2021, violence against civil society, security forces, public servants and other citizens was not as frequent or vicious as it had been a few years earlier. Much has been said and written about the prevalence of violent extremism and terrorism in Pakistan and on ways to tackle them in order to restore peace to the country. Terrorism in the country is recent decades has been largely believed to be religiously motivated.2 Groups responsible for the wave of terrorism from 2009 till 2017 were largely Sunni and Deobandi in nature, who targeted state institutions and civilians, both indiscriminately and along sectarian lines. Ethnonationalist organizations, predominantly from Balochistan, also conducted high profile attacks in Pakistan’s urban areas. The State’s counter-terrorism (CT) responses have almost exclusively fallen in the category of “hard approaches”, involving kinetic force and tactical operations to physically eliminate terrorists.3 To be fair, many of the security threats that confronted Pakistan warranted some form of immediate military action. However, while successful in the short term, such approaches fail to address the wider issues or causes and factors of violent extremism. For instance, even as hard approaches eliminate terrorists already on the ground, as long as the motivation driving them survives, more would continue to take their place. In that context, until the ‘mindset’ driving terrorism and violent extremism and the networks that connect them are confronted and eradicated, claims of victory over terrorism may be premature and unsustainable.4 Therefore, “soft” approaches must be an indispensable component in any counter-terrorism framework, particularly in the case of Pakistan, where not just terrorism but violent extremism is also rampant. At the outset, it must be said unequivocally that the state has the right, and indeed the obligation, to use all lawful and reasonable options to maintain law and order and protect the rights and lives of citizens. However, perceiving hard approaches as the only option, for all intents and purposes, misses out on the sustainability and advantage of the alternatives that may be used instead of or in conjunction with the use of force, as a measure of last resort. As the counter-terrorism approaches have relied on hard options over the past two decades, Pakistan’s growing extremism challenge—including the factors, dynamics, ideologies, and actors that feed into terrorism—have not received as much attention. This is not to say that no example of non-violent approaches for tackling terrorism and extremism exists in Pakistan. Several initiatives over the years have included components of counter-violent extremism (CVE) and the so-called soft approaches with the stated aim of preventing alienation, radicalization and promoting political means including dialogue and other forms of engagement, as well as rehabilitation and reintegration. Prominent instances of the use of soft approaches in Pakistan are enumerated in Chapter II. However, without exception, these so-called soft or non-violent approaches in the country have either had too miniscule a footprint, or little effort has been exerted on implementation, even for initiatives launched with much fanfare. The post-2014 trend of improving security indicators seemed to be faltering, or even reversing in the latter half of 2021, particularly after the fall of the Afghan government in August. Even before this recent development, as the physical footprint of terrorist outfits and their attacks had seemingly receded in the face of military operations, little had been done to tackle the religious-ideological, sociocultural, political, or governance-related and other factors and drivers of extremism, which feed into violent extremism and terrorism. This report has sprouted out of an initiative conceived in mid-2020, much before the unfolding of several recent events with significant implications for peace and security in Pakistan. That is to say that the need for considering soft approaches has only grown more urgent with the Taliban regaining power in Afghanistan and a clear uptick in security-related incidents in Pakistan in recent months.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Governance, Counter-terrorism, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Pakistan and Middle East