Search

Begin New Search Political Geography Kurdistan Content Type Special Report

1. Nationalist Underpinnings of Turkey’s Damaging “Kurdish” Policy

Author:
Max Erdemandi
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
Abstract:
Recent discussions on the Turkish state’s actions, which have devastated Kurdish people within and outside of its borders, suffer from a familiar deficiency: they neglect the historical and cultural foundations of the dynamics that placed the Kurdish people at the center of Turkey’s national security policy. Serious human rights violations and voter suppression in southeast Turkey, the massacre of Kurdish people in various parts of northern Syria, and purging of Kurdish politicians on false accusations are all extensions of Turkey’s decades-long, repeated policy mistakes, deeply rooted in its nationalist history. Unless there is a seismic shift in the drivers of Turkish security policy, especially as it pertains to the Kurdish people, Turkey is bound to repeat these mistakes. Furthermore, threat externalization with linkage to legitimacy of rule will further erode the democratic institutions of the state and other authentic aspects of Turkish identity.
Topic:
Security, Nationalism, Ethnicity, Syrian War, Borders, Violence, and Kurds
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, Syria, and Kurdistan

2. The Future of the Kurdistan Region after the Defeat of ISIS and the Failure of the 2017 Independence Referendum

Author:
Pishko Shamsi
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
In 2017, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq held an independence referendum, which triggered severe backlash, including the loss of control over the oil-rich city of Kirkuk. The backlash from the independence referendum prompted the regional government (Kurdistan Regional Government) to urgently shift policy and re-engage with Baghdad. Since then, the region has recovered politically and has implemented a pragmatic strategy to revitalize the economy and internal affairs. The KRG also launched diplomatic initiatives to restore relations with Iran and Turkey, and has pursued a policy of neutrality to manage the Region’s myriad of crises. Moreover, the KRG has pursued tactical alliances with Iraqi political parties to secure short-term gains, including the resumption of budget transfers from Baghdad. The KRG’s deal-making with Baghdad, however, has fallen short of translating into a sustainable policy, and many of the gains are fragile and dependent on Baghdad’s changing political scene. Without a long-term strategy, the KRG’s new leadership is unlikely to be able to deliver much needed institutional reforms to help curb corruption, improve governance, and enhance transparency in public affairs. And while the KRG has committed to reform politically, it remains unclear if it will bring about meaningful change and address structural challenges, such as entrenched crony networks, rentier economics, and partisan control over the public sector and security forces.The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, a non-partisan organization that seeks to publish well-argued, policy-oriented articles on American foreign policy and national security priorities.
Topic:
Islamic State, Autonomy, and Referendum
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, and Kurdistan

3. Iraq in Transition: Competing Actors and Complicated Politics

Author:
Aaron Stein
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
The Republic of Iraq has faced considerable challenges after the American-led invasion in 2003 to oust Saddam Hussein, ranging from insurgency to endemic corruption and poor government services. Baghdad has emerged as the epicenter of a broader geopolitical struggle between the United States and Islamic Republic of Iran, two hostile adversaries at odds since the Islamic Revolution toppled the American-friendly Shah in 1979. Amidst these broader challenges, Iraq faced an existential security threat in 2014, after the Islamic State gained strength in Syria, augmented its ranks with foreign fighters, and took control over eastern Syria and parts of western Iraq, including the Iraqi city of Mosul, the country’s second largest city. The war to defeat this group was brutal and fraught, with the Iraqi military bearing the brunt of the casualties fighting for control over densely populated urban areas and vast expanses of desert terrain. The fighting consumed Iraqi affairs for years, blunted the sharp tensions that underpin U.S.-Iran relations, and focused military efforts on the defeat of a common enemy. In the year since the defeat of the Islamic State, the American role in Iraq has become less clear. The United States has undertaken an aggressive policy, dubbed “Maximum Pressure,” to economically coerce the Iranian government to make a series of concessions, including limits on the development of ballistic missiles and foreign policy changes. This effort included the American withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the multi-national agreement that placed considerable limits on Iran’s nuclear program and instituted an expansive inspection regime to verify the terms of the deal in exchange for Iran receiving American and European sanctions relief. The Trump administration’s decision to reimpose sanctions severely complicated the arrangement, depriving Iran of the reward for its compliance and setting in motion a series of Iranian steps to try to coerce Europe to continue to uphold trade with the Islamic Republic. The United States, however, has threatened to sanction European entities should they not comply with American policy. The tensions over sanctions have had a deleterious effect on stability in Iraq and the Middle East, more broadly. The Iranian government has gradually increased its efforts to impose a cost on the United States for using sanctions to end its export of oil, beginning with a series of attacks on oil tankers near the Strait of Hormuz, escalating to include missile strikes on important oil centers in Saudi Arabia’s Abqaiq and Khurais, and then a shooting down an American surveillance drone. In response to rocket attacks inside Iraq, the United States has struck Iraqi militia’s linked to Iran and, in January 2020, assassinated Major General Qasem Soleimani, the now-deceased leader of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp. (IRGC), and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, an Iranian-linked actor that oversaw Iraqi militias sympathetic to the Islamic Republic. In retaliation, the Iranian military fired a salvo of ballistic missiles at bases in Iraq, striking targets with precision, but luckily resulting in no American deaths. The strikes still resulted in over one hundred cases of traumatic brain injury in the soldiers at the targeted bases. The tit-for-tat underscores Iran’s appetite for risk, particularly at time when its economy is under siege from U.S. actions.
Topic:
Politics, Insurgency, Sectarianism, Islamic State, Sunni, Transition, Muqtada al-Sadr, and Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF)
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, and Kurdistan

4. Gender Issues in Kurdistan

Author:
Michael M. Gunter
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
Abstract:
In the Kurdistan National Congress (KNK) headquarters in Brussels, one may be surprised to find that the co-chair rule governing the activities of the congress requires joint male and female leaders to share the office. As inefficient as such a dual head might seem, it sets the stage for gender equality. Overall, the duties of both men and women in the Kurdish movement leave no time for marriage or other traditional gender roles. This is particularly true of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and its related organizations, such as the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party/Peoples Defense Units (PYD/YPG).
Topic:
Gender Issues, Government, Politics, and Women
Political Geography:
Iraq, Turkey, Syria, Kurdistan, and Brussels

5. Turkey, Erdogan, and the Kurds: War as a State-Building Strategy

Author:
Joost Jongerden
Publication Date:
11-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
Abstract:
While Trump always advocated disengagement from Syria, Turkish mainstream opinion and political leadership have never accepted Kurdish self-rule of territory on its Syrian border, which Turkey treats as an existential threat and dismisses with the trope of “terrorism.” Thus, Turkey’s military intervention should hardly be surprising. Indeed, not only is the assault an upscaled version of last year’s intervention and occupation of Afrin—a pocket in the western part of northern Syria—but it also fits a wider pattern of Turkish military aggression. Looking back over the past four years, we see Turkey repeatedly waging war for a “strong” state construction and regional power development.
Topic:
War, Conflict, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and State Building
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, Syria, and Kurdistan

6. In the eye of the storm? (In)stability in Western Iraqi Kurdistan

Author:
Erwin van Veen and Hamzeh al-Shadeedi
Publication Date:
07-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
Iraqi Kurdistan has done well for itself in recent decades by carving out a largely autonomous region free of most governance and security interference from Baghdad. The alliance of convenience between the two pre-eminent Kurdish parties (PUK and KDP) effectively seized a number of opportunities to consolidate and expand Iraqi Kurdistan, such as the international no-fly zone (1991), the US intervention (2003), the crafting of a new constitution for Iraq (2005) and, arguably, even the rise of the Islamic State (IS) (2014). Yet, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) also faces a triple crisis. Politically, this includes the exclusive and increasingly repressive rule of the KDP and PUK in a context of mediocre governance, as well as strained relations between Erbil and Baghdad over the disputed territories. Economically, it includes a general downturn combined with serious financial disputes with Baghdad. Socially, it includes deteriorating popular satisfaction with the quality of rule and life in Kurdistan. In this report Erwin van Veen and al-Hamzeh al-Shadeedi analyse four factors that could drive future (in)stability in western Iraqi Kurdistan: 1) geopolitical tensions; 2) further clashes over the disputed territories; 3) growing dissatisfaction with the KDP and 4) protracted displacement. On balance, it does not consider the risk of immediate crisis or violence as being very high, but the report does note that many elements are in place that could easily trigger violent incidents with the potential of escalation. For each factor, the report proposes restraining factors, developments to monitor and trigger events. While international influence on the domestic politics of Iraqi Kurdistan is limited, coupling an offer of international (UN) mediation to facilitate resolution of the disputed territories with the development, or strengthening, of a dedicated fund that can rapidly initiate the reconstruction of the Greater Mosul area (including some of the disputed territories) would be a valuable intervention to further the peaceful development of Iraqi Kurdistan.
Topic:
Governance, Political stability, and Autonomy
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, and Kurdistan

7. Kurdistan’s New Moment

Author:
Daniel Benaim
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
One year after military victory over the Islamic State (IS) and a bitter Kurdish defeat in Kirkuk, Iraq, Iraqi Kurdistan is settling into a new moment of hard-won calm. Its two largest parties are poised to form a new regional government, and a newly formed central government in Baghdad presents opportunities for cooperation. Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) leaders have sought to turn the page on bitter disputes with Baghdad and Washington over the Kurds’ referendum on independence.
Topic:
Civil Society, Development, Transition, and Political Crisis
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, and Kurdistan

8. Partnering for Solutions

Author:
Vicki Valosik
Publication Date:
09-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Contemporary Arab Studies (CCAS)
Abstract:
CCAS, in partnership with the University of Kurdistan, brought together 40+ researchers this spring to discuss durable solutions to forced displacement in Iraq. Iraq has suffered from massive internal displacement for several decades, but with the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) the numbers of those displaced have grown drastically. More than three million Iraqis—or ten percent of the country’s population—currently live as internally displaced persons (IDPs). In an effort to address this crisis, the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies (CCAS) and the Institute for the Study of International Migration (ISIM) at Georgetown recently joined efforts with the University of Kurdistan, Hawler (UKH) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to host the conference “Migration and Displacement in Iraq: Working Towards Durable Solutions.”
Topic:
Migration, Islamic State, Displacement, Kurds, and Higher Education
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, North America, and Kurdistan

9. Weekly Conflict Summary

Author:
The Carter Center
Publication Date:
06-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Carter Center
Abstract:
Over the course of this reporting period, intra-opposition strife continued to harm groups in opposition-held territory, namely in Idleb and northern Aleppo. The Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Afrin initiated an offensive against opposition groups in northern Syria while advancing into Raqqa city to the east. Pro-government forces also advanced against ISIS in eastern Aleppo/western Raqqa and Homs. The situation around the US garrison at the al-Tanf border crossing continues to grow more complex as pro- government forces outflanked opposition groups advancing against ISIS in the area, reaching the Iraqi border to the north of opposition and US special forces positions.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution and International Security
Political Geography:
Syria and Kurdistan

10. Weekly Conflict Summary

Author:
The Carter Center
Publication Date:
06-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Carter Center
Abstract:
Over the course of this reporting period, ISIS continued to lose large portions of territory, particularly to the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and pro-government Tiger Forces in northern Syria. New clashes erupted in rural Aleppo, Daraa, and Syria’s southern desert as the Syrian government began new offensives against opposition forces on those fronts. Intra-opposition strife continues to plague groups in the opposition-held Idleb pocket.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution and International Security
Political Geography:
Syria and Kurdistan

11. The Kurds Have Opened Pandora’s Box

Author:
Bessma Momani
Publication Date:
09-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Centre for International Governance Innovation
Abstract:
The Kurds of Iraq have been patiently waiting for the right time to secede from the troubled state. Monday's referendum turnout was high and the result was clear: 92 per cent are overwhelmingly in favour of independence. While many Kurds felt the time was right to have a referendum on the question of independence, it is the worst time for all regional stakeholders and the Kurds may have made it more difficult for themselves to realize their national dream.
Topic:
International Security and International Affairs
Political Geography:
Iraq and Kurdistan

12. Kurdistan: An Invisible Nation

Author:
Stefano Maria Torelli
Publication Date:
06-2016
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:
Spread across Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran, Kurdistan is one of the hottest geopolitical areas in the Middle East. It is a land inhabited by over 30 million people, representing one of the largest stateless "nations" worldwide. The Kurds play a crucial role in the region, and the so-called "Kurdish factor" has constantly been a key ingredient of recent Middle East crises: from the wars in Iraq under Saddam Hussein to the fight against the so-called Islamic State. Not to mention the strategic relevance that Kurdistan assumes as one of the oil-richest areas in the region. What new balances would an eventual victory of Kurds over IS create? What are the long-term goals of the Kurdish community? How to reach a solution to the Kurdish question able to satisfy all the actors involved? Can we envisage a common future for the Kurds or will they remain tied to the political destinies of the countries they live in? These are just some of the questions that this report tries to answer collecting contributions from leading international experts.
Topic:
Minorities, Geopolitics, Islamic State, and Stateless Population
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Syria, and Kurdistan

13. Kürt ve Beluci Ulusçuluklarının Benzeşen ve Ayrışan Yönleri | Resembling And Diverging Aspects Of Kurdish Nationalism And Baloch Nationalism

Author:
Göktürk Tüysüzoğlu
Publication Date:
12-2013
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Sakarya University (SAU)
Abstract:
Kendi kimliklerine eklemlenmiş birer ulus devlete sahip olmayan Kürtler ve Beluciler, konumlandıkları coğrafyalar itibarıyla bölgesel dengeleri derinden etkileme kapasitesine sahip iki halk olarak görülmelidir. Toplumsal yapıları, bağlı bulundukları ülkelerin ulusal kimlik vurgularını reddetmeleri, siyasal/yönetimsel vurgularının sınır aşan bir nitelik taşıması ve ulusçuluk girişimini yönlendiren iki ayrı çizginin bulunması gibi hususlar, bu iki halkın ulusçuluk girişimlerini benzer kalıplar içerisinde değerlendirmeyi kolaylaştıran en önemli unsurlardır. Diaspora etkinliği, medya unsuru, uluslararası farkındalık ve konjonktürel vurgu ise iki ulusçuluk girişimi arasındaki farklılıklar olarak betimlenebilir. Toplumsal altyapıya vurgu yapan geleneksel aktörler ile seküler eksende ele alınması gereken örgütler arasında süregelen rekabet ise, ulusçuluk girişimlerinin yekvücut ve daha etkin bir şekilde ortaya konmasını zorlaştırmaktadır. Kürt ulusçuluğunun son dönemde elde ettiği kazanımlar ve bu halkın geleceğine dair gelecek öngörüleri, oldukça benzer bir toplumsal/siyasal/tarihsel altyapıya sahip olan Beluciler için de bir emsal teşkil edebilecektir. | Kurds and Balochis do not have a state that could be articulated into their own identities. Also they would be seen as nations that have the capacity to affect the regional outlook which they are located. Factors like societal structure, denial of the national identity formation of the states that they live, transboundary character of their societal/ administrative demands are the most important elements that ease to evaluate the nationalist motives of Kurds and Balochis within similar pattern. Efficiency of diaspora, use of media, international awareness and conjuncture could be portrayed as the differences between these nationalist initiatives. Rivalry that continues between the traditional actors that stresses the societal base and the organizations which must be dealt as secular nationalist obstructs the effectiveness and concreteness of the nationalist demands of Kurds and Balochis. Acquisitions that the Kurdish nationalist movement achieves recently and the foresights that oriented towards the future of Kurds could constitute a precedent for the Balochis, who own a similar societal/ historical/political substructure.
Topic:
Nationalism, Political Parties, and PKK
Political Geography:
Pakistan, South Asia, Turkey, Middle East, and Kurdistan

14. ‘Leaving the mountain’: How may the PKK lay down arms? Freeing the Kurdish Question from violence

Author:
Cengiz Çandar
Publication Date:
03-2012
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV)
Abstract:
The democratic norms, introduced with globalization and embodied in the EU membership criteria, served as a leverage for Turkey like in many other countries. They enabled the society to gain a new insight in its own history and state and as a result the problems that had often been overlooked and swept under the carpet were inevitably included in the domain of politics. The issue, which is often referred to as the ‘Kurdish Question’ yet essentially expresses the refusal by the state to meet the existential and cultural demands of Turkish citizens with Kurdish identity, constitutes the biggest obstacle to democratization in terms of its scope and historical background. Accordingly, today, there is a widespread belief that democracy cannot become entrenched in society unless the ‘Kurdish Question’ is resolved. The TESEV Democratization Program has systematically addressed the ‘Kurdish Question’ in the recent years and brought it to the public attention. Three reports were prepared as a result of an extensive field work, where we attempted to clarify the demands of the politically diverse Kurdish people, the possible constitutional and legal responses to these demands and how these demands are perceived by other segments of the society. The collision of this process with the widening of the domain of politics in Turkey has led to the idea of seeking for ‘the resolution’ within the framework of a new constitution. On the other hand, there is a growing understanding that ‘the resolution’ has some aspects that go beyond the legal context. For establishing a future based on trust requires conclusively burying the past in the pages of history while also ensuring its visibility, which in turn implies a confrontation among different identities. Therefore, the resolution of the ‘Kurdish Question’ needs a democratic method and approach, whereby parties are able to develop an attitude that addresses the whole society and show consent to a policy that does not encumber the future. Yet, the reciprocal past and present violence between the state and the PKK makes it necessary to create a transparent medium for dialogue to realize potential solutions, and therefore to embark upon a journey towards a solution with no way back. This means ensuring that all members of the PKK, including Öcalan, gradually perceive themselves as a part of the political process. This period, in which we are on the verge of creating the new constitution and concurrently solving the ‘Kurdish Question’, is a vital one. This TESEV report analyses what type of a political infrastructure is needed to build a favorable environment for such a dialogue. The study conducted by Cengiz Çandar, one of the most competent observers of the issue, reveals how the building blocks for resolution can be placed in a realistic way and in consideration of the plurality within both sides. Our expectation is that this groundwork presented here will offer a meaningful contribution and roadmap both for the settlement of the ‘Kurdish Question’ and for the democratization process of Turkey …
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Non State Actors, Negotiation, Violence, and Kurds
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, and Kurdistan

15. Toward a Solution to the Kurdish Question: Constitutional and Legal Recommendations

Author:
Dilek Kurban and Yılmaz Ensaroğlu
Publication Date:
06-2010
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV)
Abstract:
There is more to the dominance of “rule of law” or “supremacy of law” in a state than the mere availability of a constitution or laws, or the presence of judicial institutions. Indeed, it is a fact of history that even the bloodiest dictatorships had their idiosyncratic laws and courts. In addition, there are countless historical examples of tyrannical and oppressive policies being implemented through courts. Thus, in paying special attention to the matter, international human rights law emphasizes in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that “…it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law.” Article 3 of the Statute of the Council of Europe follows suit: “Every member of the Council of Europe must accept the principles of the rule of law and of the enjoyment by all persons within its jurisdiction of human rights and fundamental freedoms…” Article 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights, in addition, states: “The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention.” These and other instruments of law confer on the states substantial responsibilities for the protection of human rights. Of a state’s obligations in that regard, the most important include constitutional and legal recognition of citizens’ human rights, non-interference in individuals’ exercise of those rights as long as such exercise does not violate the freedoms of others, and protection of those rights against interventions by others. These obligations have also become sources and criteria for a state’s claim to legitimacy. In other words, states are now considered to be legitimate to the extent they recognize and protect human rights. As a matter of fact, the protection of states’ rights to sovereignty cannot hold its ground against human rights, thus no state can have recourse to the ‘non-intervention in domestic affairs’ discourse in the face of violations within that state’s borders. The judiciary is the most important mechanism that will check the compliance of government policies and practices with the law and protect citizens’ rights and freedoms. This is why all acts and transactions of the administration need to be subject to judicial review in a state where rule of law prevails. In short, the judiciary is the one and only power that will put the principle of the rule of law into practice. In order for the judiciary to serve that function, that is, to protect human rights, it is indispensable that constitutional and legal arrangements be compatible with human rights law. Put differently, implementing the principle of rule of law necessitates that the law should, instead of siding with the state, have an autonomous standing vis-à-vis the state. The law must maintain equal distance to the state and the citizen. Otherwise, it will not be able to serve its arbitral function between the two sides, and as a result, its legitimacy becomes contested. Considering Turkey in this light, one sees that the legal framework has adopted the ideology of creating a homogenous society and a modern nation, instead of securing all individuals’ rights. Founded as a modern state upon the remnants of the multi-religious, multilingual, and multiethnic Ottoman Empire, the Turkish Republic decided that it would not be possible for it to realize the plans to construct the new nation without denying room to the distinct identities. In line with the secularist and nationalist policies pursued as an outgrowth of this approach, the legal framework underwent a complete overhaul. It has become widely accepted today that Kurds were one of the primary targets of these policies. As a matter of fact, in addition to general legal and constitutional amendments necessary for a Turkey committed to human rights and the rule of law, a number of particular arrangements are also required for a lasting and democratic solution to the Kurdish Question. Constituting the main focus of this report, these arrangements can be broken down into two groups: constitutional and legal. Although the constitutional articles and legal provisions examined in detail and the regulations and statutes which occupy lesser space in the report might appear to have a general character and do not include the words “Kurd” or “Kurdish”, they are essentially instruments aiming to restrict Kurds’ fundamental rights and freedoms and practically causing indirect discrimination against the Kurds. It goes without saying that several administrative measures that do not necessitate any particular legal arrangements must also be taken to solve the Kurdish Question. Discussed as part of the debates on the ‘democratic initiative’, some of these measures include the restitution of names in Kurdish and other languages to places plastered with Turkish names, removal of nationalist slogans etched by the state onto mountain slopes in Turkey’s eastern and southeastern region, changing the militarist names given to schools in the same region, and appointment of Kurdish-speaking public servants in the region to facilitate the use of Kurdish language in accessing public services. Though they are outside the scope of this report, these administrative steps and similar others need to be negotiated upon with Kurdish political representatives and opinion leaders and put in practice soon.
Topic:
Human Rights, Law, Constitution, Legislation, and Kurds
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, and Kurdistan