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Begin New Search Topic Military Strategy Political Geography China Content Type Special Report

1. India-China Border Tensions and U.S. Strategy in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Lisa Curtis and Derek Grossman
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
India-China border intrusions and clashes have become more frequent and threaten to lead to all-out conflict between the two Asian giants. In recent years, China has upped the ante in its border disputes with India through infrastructure development, military deployments, capability enhancements, and periodic efforts to encroach into territory controlled by India. The first deadly border clash between the two countries in 45 years occurred on June 15, 2020, in the Galwan River Valley, where 20 Indian troops and at least four Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops were killed. More recently, on December 9, 2022, Chinese and Indian forces clashed along the disputed border in the mountains near Tawang in the northeastern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh after an estimated 300 Chinese PLA soldiers tried to cross the border. While the Chinese and Indian militaries have since pulled back forces from the most contentious standoff sites where the 2020 buildup occurred and established temporary buffer zones, both sides retain high numbers of troops forward deployed along the disputed frontier, and there are several flashpoints that could erupt into another border crisis at any time. The most recent clash that took place near Tawang is a reminder that, even though recent attention has been focused on the Ladakh region, there are multiple trigger points along the 2,100-mile-long Line of Actual Control (LAC) that bear monitoring.1 With both China and India enhancing infrastructure and introducing new and advanced weapons systems on their sides of the disputed border, combined with forward deployments and heightened lack of trust, the chances for continued standoffs that could erupt into local or even full-blown conflict remain high.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Territorial Disputes, and Borders
Political Geography:
China, India, Asia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

2. China’s Antarctic Ambitions – and Their Implications for Australia

Author:
Yun Jiang
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
In a new special report AIIA China Matters Fellow Yun Jiang argues that popular Australian concerns around the Antarctic ambitions of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), including possible territorial claims, militarisation, and mining, are overstated.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Territorial Disputes, Hegemony, Conflict, Mining, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Australia

3. Rising Anti-China Sentiment in South Korea Offers Opportunities To Strengthen US-ROK Relations

Author:
Haneul Lee, Alan Yu, and Tobias Harris
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
The Yoon administration’s posture toward China has important implications for the U.S.-ROK alliance and America’s strategic approach in the region
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Bilateral Relations, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

4. Coercing Fluently: The Grammar of Coercion in the Twenty-first Century

Author:
C. Anthony Pfaff
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
To illustrate the logic and grammar of coercion, this analysis relies on decision-theory methods, such as game theory, that examine the strategic decision-making process in interactions with adversaries and partners. The intent here is not to offer predictive models of rational-actor behavior. Rather, the intent is to use game-theory and similar approaches to understand how coercion works better. This analysis considers competitive interactions between actors that have discrete and qualifiable, if not quantifiable, preferences and who behave rationally, though this analysis acknowledges the behavior that is considered rational is frequently informed by nonrational social, cultural, and psychological factors. Considering these competitive interactions allows one to identify “rules of thumb” that can orient and guide actors as they compete. This analysis emphasizes coercion does not depend simply on imposing costs; rather, it depends on placing adversaries in positions in which they must act and their most rational option is the one most beneficial to one’s own cause. To achieve this result, actors must carefully calibrate their demands to ensure their adversary’s cost of concession is as low as possible. To prevent challenges in the first place, actors should convince the adversary acting on a threat is one’s most rational response. If convincing the adversary is not possible, then one must find ways to decrease the value of the adversary’s challenge. When none of those options are possible, preparing for conflict is likely one’s rational option. This analysis then applies the rules of thumb to US relations with China, Russia, and Iran.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Game Theory, Coercion, and International Competition
Political Geography:
China, Iran, Middle East, and Asia

5. What If . . . Alternatives to a Chinese Military Invasion of Taiwan Image

Author:
Benjamin Jensen, Riley McCabe, and Adrian Bogart
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
With the 20th Party Congress approaching and Xi Jinping seeking an unprecedented third term, it is important to explore the full range of actions Beijing could take to coerce Taiwan over the next 10 years. History provides a range of historical cases that suggest alternatives to a full-scale invasion. As part of its On Future War series, the CSIS International Security Program adapted six historical cases of coercion China could use to target Taiwan short of a costly amphibious invasion. The report looks back to look ahead, using the logic of historical cases ranging from the 1948 Berlin Airlift to the 1980s Tanker War in the Arabian Gulf to identify ways and means Beijing could use to compel Taiwan. The resulting range of scenarios point toward an urgent need to develop new escalation management frameworks supporting the new integrated deterrence strategy.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

6. A World in Crisis: The “Winter Wars” of 2022–2023

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman and Paul Cormarie
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
t is obvious that the world now faces a wide range of potential wars and crises. What is far less obvious is the level of confrontation between the U.S. and its strategic partners with both Russia and China, the rising levels of other types of violence that are emerging on a global level, how serious these wars and crises can become, and what kind of future could eventually emerge out of so many different crises, confrontations and conflicts, and trends. These issues are addressed in depth in a new analysis by the Emeritus Chair in Strategy at the CSIS entitled A World in Crisis: The “Winter Wars” of 2022–2023. This analysis explores the risk on the basis that war does not have to mean actual military conflict. Here, it is important to note that avoiding or minimizing combat is scarcely peace. As Sun Tzu pointed out in the Art of War well over 2,000 years ago, “war” does not have to involve the use of military force or any form of actual combat. His statement that “the supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting” applies to every form of major military confrontation and gray area warfare between opposing powers. It recognizes that it is all too easy to predict dire outcomes from the War in Ukraine, the current arms races with Russia and China, and growing levels of violence and confrontation between other states. There is still a case, however, for examining the broader impact of the war, the growing intensity of the arms races with Russia and China, and the current overall patterns of global conflict as the world enters the winter of 2022-2023. It is already clear that this will be a deeply troubled winter in many areas of the globe, that the level of confrontation between major powers has risen sharply, that they do seek to subdue the enemy without fighting, and their rivalry has become the equivalent of political and economic warfare. It is equally clear that the wide range of lower-level conflicts between other powers, their civil wars, and the abuses many governments commit against their own citizens are also intensifying, although many of these conflicts have been going on in some form for years or even decades. In far too many cases, the world is not moving toward peace. It is moving towards repression and war. Accordingly, this analysis argues that the world already faces a series of possible and ongoing “Winter Wars” in 2022-2023 that may not escalate to open military conflict but that are wars at the political and economic level and in competition to build-up more lethal military forces both for deterrence and to exert political leverage. It also shows that these “Wars” already pose serious risks and could escalate sharply and in unpredictable ways for at least the next five to ten years.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Rivalry, and Competition
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

7. Taiwan, Cross-Strait Tension, and Security in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Bryce Wakefield
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Tensions across the Taiwan Strait are rising and are potentially more serious than crises in the 1990s and even the 1950s. Military activity around Taiwan has increased, with China’s largest daily incursion into Taiwan’s Air Defence Identification Zone occurring in October 2021. Nevertheless, experts disagree as to whether such activity signals China’s intent to go to war over Taiwan or whether Beijing is posturing to a nervous international community. What is the likelihood of conflict over Taiwan? Could accidents around the island spark all-out hostilities? How should states in the region, like Australia and Japan, react to the current situation? How is the increased tension perceived in Taipei?
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Territorial Disputes, Conflict, and Borders
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

8. Missile developments in Southern Asia: a perspective from India

Author:
Manpreet Sethi
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Credible nuclear deterrence presupposes the availability and integration of certain essential components that collectively constitute a nuclear arsenal. Delivery systems, deployable across a variety of platforms and of requisite range and reliability, are one such critical element. Accordingly, in the last decade the three nuclear-armed states in Southern Asia − China, India and Pakistan − have been engaged in developing missiles that they consider necessary to support their respective deterrent needs. This paper identifies recent trends in missile development in the region, focusing on the above-mentioned states. It captures capability trends, considers the differing capability emphasis among the three countries depending on their approach to nuclear deterrence and assesses the impact of missile developments on strategic stability.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Deterrence, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:
Pakistan, China, India, and Asia

9. NATO on the Road to a New Strategy

Author:
Wojciech Lorenz
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
During the meeting of NATO foreign ministers on 2–3 December 2020, a group of experts presented the report “NATO 2030. United for a New Era” about strengthening the political dimension and consultation mechanisms of the Alliance. The report indicates a possible consensus on the expansion of the Alliance’s tasks, including on a common policy towards China. The document increases the chances that the allies will decide to start work on a new NATO strategy.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Military Strategy, Alliance, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and United States of America

10. Improving Joint Operational Concept Development within the U.S. Department of Defense

Author:
Paul Benfield and Greg Grant
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
For the first time in nearly four decades, the DoD is developing joint warfighting concepts designed to counter advanced military rivals—specifically China and Russia. The last such effort took place at the height of the Cold War in the late 1970s and early 1980s to address the strategic and operational challenges posed by the Soviet Union’s conventional advantage on Europe’s Central Front. Now, as the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) emphasizes, the joint force must “prioritize preparedness for war” which includes developing “innovative operational concepts” for military advantage.1 As operational concepts are fundamentally visions of future war that guide future force design and development, the joint force first must answer the question of how it intends to fight future wars before it tries to answer questions of what it needs to fight with. Yet, if the DoD is going to move to “joint concept driven, threat informed capability development,” it faces a considerable challenge in that its joint concept development and experimentation process is fundamentally broken.2 While the post–Cold War era has witnessed repeated efforts to develop joint operational concepts, the process fails to yield innovative warfighting approaches to guide future force and capability development. Instead, the process produces concepts that seem almost intentionally designed not to drive significant change. These concepts are not truly “joint,” but rather lowest-common-denominator assemblages of existing service concepts that privilege service priorities. Any innovative joint ideas that make it through the development process are so watered-down and vague that they fail to provoke change (and thus threaten the interests of key stakeholders). In this environment, individual service concepts win out over joint concepts and drive investment priorities. However, warfighting concepts and critical investments must be joint because the services have become increasingly interdependent at the operational level.3 Moreover, current wargaming and analysis suggest that this operational interdependence will be a critical aspect of future conflict with a highly-capable peer adversary such as China or Russia—whether as a strength or a weakness remains to be seen. One can expect an advanced, adaptive adversary to seek out any gaps and seams presented by the U.S. military and exploit those to its advantage. In this regard, the current joint force is not “joint” enough for a high-end war against a peer adversary that has developed counters to critical, long-standing U.S. operational advantages such as air, maritime, and information dominance. As this paper discusses, successfully waging war at the scale and intensity that a conflict with a peer rival would entail will demand entirely new ways of warfighting that in turn will require a forcing function that integrates individual service capabilities into an actual “joint” fighting force. Recent efforts to develop threat-focused joint warfighting concepts—if successful—represents the best chance for that result actually to occur. This paper briefly discusses three past attempts by the DoD to develop joint concepts, including AirLand Battle, Air-Sea Battle, and a more recent effort, the Advanced Capabilities and Deterrence Panel (ACDP). It uses these examples to showcase the challenges of overcoming stovepiped and parochial service-led efforts and to illustrate the drawbacks of building service-centric concepts and covering them with a patina of jointness. These cases highlight how the persistent pathologies of the joint concept development process have rendered post–Cold War joint concepts useless for encouraging operational innovation or driving change in service investment priorities. Ongoing work to develop new joint warfighting concepts provides the DoD with a long-overdue opportunity to focus its concept development on tangible threats and consequent operational objectives. The current effort is the first time in decades that the DoD is organizing concept development around countering a specific threat instead of supporting idealized notions of how the joint force preferred to operate against vague or undefined groups of adversaries. However, without major changes to what is widely viewed as a consensus process that does not foster a competition of ideas, the DoD risks repeating the same concept development mistakes it has made in the past. Additionally, new joint concepts must be rigorously tested and refined through a campaign of experimentation to validate their viability for future force design. That experimentation piece is currently missing.4 The Joint Staff is trying to rebuild its joint concept development capability after years of neither prioritizing nor adequately resourcing that work. Generating truly new ways of warfighting with the potential to transform future force design will require the sustained attention of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS and VCJCS) to push new joint concepts through the system. The DoD’s senior leadership must overcome the tendency of each service to drive toward consensus products that are aimed more at protecting existing priorities and longstanding prerogatives than generating creative ideas.
Topic:
Defense Policy, War, Military Strategy, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
Russia, China, North America, and United States of America

11. The Poison Frog Strategy: Preventing a Chinese Fait Accompli Against Taiwanese Islands

Author:
Chris Dougherty, Jennie Matuschak, and Ripley Hunter
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
How could Taiwan and the United States respond if China seized one of Taiwan’s outlying islands, such as Pratas/Dongsha (hereafter Dongsha) in the South China Sea? Whereas the U.S. national security community has focused on defending Taiwan against Chinese invasion, China’s recent military activities suggest that this kind of coercion and limited aggression might be an equally urgent question. More worryingly, such a scenario could be a prelude or pathway to war involving China, Taiwan, and the United States. To explore potential policy and strategy options to prevent such a calamity, the Gaming Lab at CNAS wargamed this scenario with Taiwanese, American, and regional experts. Worryingly, the game found few credible options for pushing China to abandon Dongsha and return to the status quo. However, the game found numerous areas where preparation and multilateral coordination—particularly in concert with Japan—could deter limited Chinese aggression against Taiwan. During the game, the teams representing the United States and Taiwan struggled to compel a Chinese withdrawal from Dongsha without escalating the crisis. The team representing China avoided further escalation given its first-mover advantage, constrained territorial gains, and geographic proximity. In contrast, the U.S. team had to push its forces far forward in ways that were risky and would be difficult to sustain.1 Punitive non-military options, such as economic sanctions or information campaigns, took too long to produce effects and appeared too weak to compel China to abandon its gains.2 More aggressive military responses risked escalation to war, which both the U.S. and Taiwan teams wished to avoid. With few viable coercive options and the onus of escalation falling on the U.S. and Taiwan teams, the game reaffirmed the difficulty of rolling back territorial aggression of this kind. Indeed, discouraging China from seizing Taiwanese territory before it happens is the most salient lesson of the game. The United States and Taiwan must begin coordinating today to build a credible deterrent against limited Chinese aggression or coercion toward Taiwan.3 Doing so will help identify ways to make a territorial fait accompli by China—such as the seizure of Dongsha—too unpalatable to consider, while also communicating the U.S. commitment to defending Taiwan. This strategy will require advance planning and communication of joint responses and defenses against coercion and territorial aggression. Rather than scrambling to respond to a fait accompli, as occurred in this game, the United States and Taiwan should prepare to implement coordinated, whole-of-government deterrent measures quickly and ensure immediate consequences for Chinese coercion or aggression short of war. Japan’s cooperation is essential in this type of scenario because it could change China’s calculations of the military and diplomatic risks of coercion or aggression. A joint statement from Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga and U.S. President Joseph R. Biden in April 2021 referenced “peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait” and encouraged “the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues.”4 The United States would rely heavily on Japan for basing infrastructure to conduct military operations to support Taiwan.5 And, although the statement did not elaborate further, unambiguous Japanese support will be necessary to create a regional, as opposed to bilateral U.S.-Taiwan, response to Chinese coercion or aggression. Specifically, Japan’s involvement could enable coordination with India and Australia via the Quad relationships.6 It could also create opportunities to work with other states facing Chinese coercion and territorial aggression, such as Vietnam and the Philippines. Wargames are not predictive, but they are useful tools for exploring decision-making and identifying vulnerabilities. As China’s assertiveness rises, failure to prepare for the threat of an incursion against Taiwanese territory presents grave risks to Indo-Pacific security. The United States, Taiwan, and regional allies and partners can better understand how to build an effective deterrence strategy to discourage Chinese aggression or coercion through multilateral gaming, to include crisis simulations and exercises.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Military Strategy, and War Games
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and United States of America

12. The Future of U.S.-Russia Strategic Arms Control

Author:
Artur Kacprzyk
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The Trump administration is sceptical about extending the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START, NST), which is to expire in 2021. It wants to sign a new deal with Russia and China covering all kinds of nuclear weapons. It will not be possible, however, to negotiate such a complex agreement before NST expires. In effect, there is a growing risk of a collapse of U.S.-Russia strategic arms control, which would negatively affect NATO as well: it would deepen both the divisions over the future of deterrence policy within the Alliance and the differences in the U.S. Congress on the modernisation of America’s nuclear forces.
Topic:
NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, United States of America, and North America

13. Watching Over the Taiwan Strait: The Role of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in Taiwan’s Defense Strategy

Author:
Ian Easton, Mark Stokes, Yang Kuang-shun, Eric Lee, and Colby Ferland
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Project 2049 Institute
Abstract:
Unmanned systems are likely to transform the Taiwan Strait battle space in the coming years. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has fielded a large and increasingly sophisticated force of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) opposite Taiwan. This underscores the importance of exploiting advanced unmanned systems to deter opportunistic acts of aggression, and to defeat the PLA’s potential use of force in the event that deterrence should fail. This report examines the current state and trajectory of Taiwan’s indigenous UAV capabilities, and illuminates the role UAVs play within both Taiwan’s defense strategy and the American-led Indo-Pacific security network more broadly. In addition, this report evaluates the PLA’s organizational infrastructure designed for a Taiwan campaign, discusses cross-Strait political-military challenges, and highlights future opportunities to expand U.S.-Taiwan military and security cooperation as part of long-term strategic competition with the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
Topic:
Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Military Strategy, and Infrastructure
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and United States of America

14. China Maritime Report No. 6: Djibouti: China's First Overseas Strategic Strongpoint

Author:
Peter A. Dutton, Isaac B. Kardon, and Conor M. Kennedy
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
This China Maritime Report on Djibouti is the first in a series of case studies on China’s “overseas strategic strongpoints” (海外战略支点). The strategic strongpoint concept has no formal definition, but is used by People’s Republic of China (PRC) officials and analysts to describe foreign ports with special strategic and economic value that host terminals and commercial zones operated by Chinese firms.
Topic:
Economics, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, Geopolitics, Navy, Oceans and Seas, Seapower, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Port, and People's Republic of China (PRC)
Political Geography:
Africa, China, Asia, Djibouti, and East Africa

15. China Maritime Report No. 5: China's Dreadnought? The PLA Navy's Type 055 Cruiser and Its Implications for the Future Maritime Security Environment

Author:
Daniel Caldwell, Joseph Freda, and Lyle J. Goldstein
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
China’s naval modernization, a process that has been underway in earnest for three decades, is now hitting its stride. The advent of the Type 055 cruiser firmly places the PLAN among the world’s very top naval services. This study, which draws upon a unique set of Chinese-language writings, offers the first comprehensive look at this new, large surface combatant. It reveals a ship that has a stealthy design, along with a potent and seemingly well-integrated sensor suite. With 112 VLS cells, moreover, China’s new cruiser represents a large magazine capacity increase over legacy surface combatants. Its lethality might also be augmented as new, cutting edge weaponry could later be added to the accommodating design. This vessel, therefore, provides very substantial naval capability to escort Chinese carrier groups, protect Beijing’s long sea lanes, and take Chinese naval diplomacy to an entirely new and daunting level. Even more significant perhaps, the Type 055 will markedly expand the range and firepower of the PLAN and this could substantially impact myriad potential conflict scenarios, from the Indian Ocean to the Korean Peninsula and many in between. This study of Type 055 development, moreover, does yield evidence that Chinese naval strategists are acutely aware of major dilemmas confronting the U.S. Navy surface fleet.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Military Affairs, Geopolitics, Navy, Oceans and Seas, Seapower, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and People's Republic of China (PRC)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

16. China Maritime Report No. 4: Civil Transport in PLA Power Projection

Author:
Conor M. Kennedy
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has ambitious goals for its power projection capabilities. Aside from preparing for the possibility of using force to resolve Beijing’s territorial claims in East Asia, it is also charged with protecting China’s expanding “overseas interests.” These national objectives require the PLA to be able to project significant combat power beyond China’s borders. To meet these needs, the PLA is building organic logistics support capabilities such as large naval auxiliaries and transport aircraft. But it is also turning to civilian enterprises to supply its transportation needs.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Military Affairs, Geopolitics, Navy, Seapower, Transportation, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and People's Republic of China (PRC)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

17. IFPA National Security Update 10: The Military Applications and Use of Artificial Intelligence

Author:
Jack Kelly
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA)
Abstract:
This IFPA National Security Update examines artificial intelligence (AI),with a focus on its status, military applications, benefits, and shortcomings; competition with China and Russia to develop AI technologies; the Trump Administration’s AI Executive Order; and the need for the United States government to develop strategies and acquisition approaches to harness/leverage more effectively the AI innovations and applications being developed primarily in the U.S. commercial sector. In early 2017, the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis initiated an online series entitled National Security Update. Its purpose is to examine key foreign policy/defense issues and to set forth policy options. These updates are made available to the broad policy community within and outside government, including key policy makers in Washington, D.C.; members of Congress and their staffs; academic specialists; and other members of the private-sector security community. Future National Security Updates will address a range of topics in an effort to provide timely analyses and policy options.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Science and Technology, Military Strategy, Artificial Intelligence, and Private Sector
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

18. White Warships and Little Blue Men: The Looming “Short, Sharp War” in the East China Sea over the Senkakus

Author:
James E. Fanell and Kerry K. Gershaneck
Publication Date:
03-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Project 2049 Institute
Abstract:
China claims Japan’s Senkaku Islands and vows to seize them in a “short, sharp war,” if necessary. China’s successful seizure of the islands would shatter the Japan-America security alliance and severely undermine U.S. credibility. This study examines China’s attack campaign by tracing its territorial claims to the East China Sea and by addressing its Senkakus campaign doctrine, the military and paramilitary forces it will employ, how the campaign will unfold, the timing of the attack, how China might counter U.S. intervention, and steps the United States and Japan should take to deter it.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Territorial Disputes, Military Intervention, Alliance, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, and United States of America

19. China Maritime Report No. 3: China’s Distant-Ocean Survey Activities: Implications for U.S. National Security

Author:
Ryan D. Martinson and Peter A. Dutton
Publication Date:
11-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
Today, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is investing in marine scientific research on a massive scale. This investment supports an oceanographic research agenda that is increasingly global in scope. One key indicator of this trend is the expanding operations of China’s oceanographic research fleet. On any given day, 5-10 Chinese “scientific research vessels” (科学考查船) may be found operating beyond Chinese jurisdictional waters, in strategically-important areas of the Indo-Pacific. Overshadowed by the dramatic growth in China’s naval footprint, their presence largely goes unnoticed. Yet the activities of these ships and the scientists and engineers they embark have major implications for U.S. national security. This report explores some of these implications. It seeks to answer basic questions about the out-of-area—or “distant-ocean” (远洋)—operations of China’s oceanographic research fleet. Who is organizing and conducting these operations? Where are they taking place? What do they entail? What are the national drivers animating investment in these activities?
Topic:
Military Strategy, Military Affairs, Geopolitics, Navy, Oceans and Seas, Seapower, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and People's Republic of China (PRC)
Political Geography:
United States, China, and Asia

20. Echelon Defense: The Role of Sea Power in Chinese Maritime Dispute Strategy

Author:
Ryan D. Martinson
Publication Date:
02-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
On April 10, 2012, two Chinese law-enforcement cutters on joint patrol in the South China Sea received orders to proceed immediately to Scarborough Shoal, a disputed cluster of rocks 140 nautical miles west of Subic Bay, the Philippines. Earlier that day, a Chinese fisherman aboard one of several boats moored in the lagoon had transmitted an alarming message to authorities in his home port in Hainan: “Philippine Navy ship number 15 heading this way.” Ship number 15 was BRP Gregorio del Pilar, an elderly former U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) cutter now serving as a frigate in the Philippine navy. Not long after the first message arrived in Hainan, sailors operating from the ship entered the lagoon and approached the Chinese boats. At this point, the fisherman sent a final message: “They’re boarding.”
Topic:
Military Strategy, Military Affairs, Geopolitics, Navy, Oceans and Seas, Seapower, and Port
Political Geography:
United States, China, and Asia

21. First Strike: China's Missile Threat to U.S. Bases in Asia

Author:
Thomas Shugart
Publication Date:
06-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
You may have heard that China’s military has developed a “carrier-killer” ballistic missile to threaten one of America’s premier power-projection tools, its unmatched fleet of aircraft carriers.1 Or perhaps you have read about China’s deployment of its own aircraft carrier to the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea. But heavily defended moving targets like aircraft carriers would be a challenge to hit in open ocean, and were China’s own aircraft carrier (or even two or three like it) to venture into open water in anger, the U.S. submarine force likely would make short work of it.2 In reality, the greatest military threat to U.S. vital interests in Asia may be one that has received somewhat less attention: the growing capability of China’s missile forces to threaten U.S. bases in the region.
Topic:
International Security and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
China

22. China Maritime Report No. 2: The Arming of China’s Maritime Frontier

Author:
Ryan D. Martinson
Publication Date:
06-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
China’s expansion in maritime East Asia has relied heavily on non-naval elements of sea power, above all white-hulled constabulary forces. This reflects a strategic decision. Coast guard vessels operating on the basis of routine administration and backed up by a powerful military can achieve many of China’s objectives without risking an armed clash, sullying China’s reputation, or provoking military intervention from outside powers. Among China’s many maritime agencies, two organizations particularly fit this bill: China Marine Surveillance (CMS) and China Fisheries Law Enforcement (FLE). With fleets comprising unarmed or lightly armed cutters crewed by civilian administrators, CMS and FLE could vigorously pursue China’s maritime claims while largely avoiding the costs and dangers associated with classic “gunboat diplomacy.”
Topic:
Military Strategy, Military Affairs, Geopolitics, Navy, Oceans and Seas, Seapower, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and People's Republic of China (PRC)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

23. China Maritime Report No. 1: China’s Third Sea Force, The People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia: Tethered to the PLA

Author:
Conor M. Kennedy and Andrew S. Erickson
Publication Date:
03-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
Amid growing awareness that China’s Maritime Militia acts as a Third Sea Force which has been involved in international sea incidents, it is necessary for decision-makers who may face such contingencies to understand the Maritime Militia’s role in China’s armed forces. Chinese-language open sources reveal a tremendous amount about Maritime Militia activities, both in coordination with and independent of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Using well-documented evidence from the authors’ extensive open source research, this report seeks to clarify the Maritime Militia’s exact identity, organization, and connection to the PLA as a reserve force that plays a parallel and supporting role to the PLA. Despite being a separate component of China’s People’s Armed Forces (PAF), the militia are organized and commanded directly by the PLA’s local military commands. The militia’s status as a separate non-PLA force whose units act as “helpers of the PLA” (解放军的 助手) is further reflected in China’s practice of carrying out “joint military, law enforcement, and civilian [Navy-Maritime Law Enforcement-Maritime Militia] defense” (军警民联防). To more accurately capture the identity of the Maritime Militia, the authors propose referring to these irregular forces as the “People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia” (PAFMM).
Topic:
Military Strategy, Military Affairs, Navy, Oceans and Seas, Seapower, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and People's Republic of China (PRC)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

24. China's Evolving Surface Fleet

Author:
Peter A. Dutton and Ryan D. Martinson
Publication Date:
07-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
The missile fast-attack craft and amphibious fleets of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy (PLAN) have undergone significant modernization over the past fifteen years. The capabilities of both categories of vessels have improved even if their actual numbers have not increased dramatically. Examined from the perspective of PLA doctrine and training, the missions of these forces represent the PLAN's past, present, and future.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Military Affairs, Geopolitics, Navy, Oceans and Seas, Seapower, and People's Republic of China (PRC)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

25. The U.S.-Japan Alliance in an Age of Elevated U.S.-China Relations

Author:
Brian Harding
Publication Date:
03-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
The U.S.-Japan alliance has been an extraordinary public good for more than half a century. Since the beginning of the Cold War, it has provided stability in a potentially volatile region and enabled Japan and its neighbors to forge the most dynamic regional economy in the world. Today, the alliance remains rooted in shared values and interests and continues to make the region and the world more secure and prosperous, with cooperation ranging from countering North Korean missile threats to development coordination in Africa.1 But the U.S.-Japan alliance is now far from the only relationship of substance for the United States in the Asia-Pacific region. Most notably, relations with China have become an enormous focus for U.S. policymakers in recent years and will continue to be a high priority for the foreseeable future.2 While fundamentally different from the U.S.-Japan relationship, the elevation of U.S.-China relations as a major focal point for U.S. foreign policy raises a critical question: How can policymakers ensure that the rise of U.S.-China relations does not come at the expense of the U.S.-Japan relationship?
Topic:
Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Bilateral Relations, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

26. A Sharper Choice on North Korea: Engaging China for a Stable Northeast Asia

Author:
Mike Mullen, Sam Nunn, and Adam Mount
Publication Date:
09-2016
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
A new Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) Independent Task Force report, A Sharper Choice on North Korea: Engaging China for a Stable Northeast Asia, finds that the United States’ policy of “strategic patience” with North Korea will neither halt that country’s recurring and dangerous cycle of provocation nor ensure the stability of Northeast Asia in the future. To the contrary, the Task Force warns, “If allowed to continue, current trends will predictably, progressively, and gravely threaten U.S. national security interests and those of its allies.” Asserting that “China’s policy toward the DPRK [Democratic People’s Republic of Korea] will critically affect the fate of the region,” the Task Force urges U.S. officials to encourage China to work with the United States, Japan and South Korea to establish a nonnuclear and unified Korean Peninsula. “Encouraging a transformation of China’s policy toward North Korea should be the next administration’s top priority in its relations with China,” says the report. “If China, the United States, and U.S. allies can work together to pressure North Korea to abandon its nuclear program and mitigate its threatening military posture,” the Task Force contends, “a stable, prosperous Northeast Asia led by China and U.S. allies can emerge.” To the extent that China declines to cooperate and North Korea continues to refuse to negotiate, however, the report finds that United States will have no choice but to work with Japan and Korea to “consider more assertive military and political actions, including those that directly threaten the existence of the [North Korean] regime and its nuclear and missile capabilities.” The Task Force proposes that the United States take steps to sharpen the consequences for North Korea, by imposing escalating costs on continued defiance and offering incentives for cooperation.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, Peace, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

27. Beyond the Wall: Chinese Far Seas Operation

Author:
Peter A. Dutton and Ryan D. Martinson
Publication Date:
05-2015
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
This volume is the product of a groundbreaking dialogue on sea-lane security held between People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy and U.S. Navy scholars at the Naval War College in August 2013, with additional material from a related conference,"China's Far Seas Operations," hosted by the China Maritime Studies Institute in May 2012. At that time the political climate in China was uncertain, in the shadow of the Bo Xilai crisis and of the impending transition of power between the Hu and Xi regimes; accordingly the PLA Navy, though invited to participate in the "Far Seas" conference, ultimately declined to do so. This was not entirely surprising. Attempts by various agencies of the U.S. Navy up to that time to engage in discussions to advance maritime cooperation between China and the United States had been met with lukewarm responses at best. But at a maritime security dialogue in Dalian in September 2012 Senior Capt. Zhang Junshe of the PLA Navy Research Institute, a key contributor to this volume and to the success of the academic cooperation between our two institutes, approached Peter Dutton to tell him that everything had changed.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Military Affairs, Geopolitics, Navy, Oceans and Seas, Seapower, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and People's Republic of China (PRC)
Political Geography:
United States, China, and Asia

28. The Recruitment, Education, and Training of PLA Navy Personnel

Author:
Kenneth Allen and Morgan Clemens
Publication Date:
08-2014
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
Looking back at the parlous state of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in the early 1980s, Liu Huaqing, its former commander, wrote, "All areas [of the navy] required significant strengthening, but I believed the key was developing capable personnel." Indeed, during Admiral Liu's tenure (1982-88), the PLAN embarked on a major effort to improve the quality of its officers and enlisted personnel an effort that continues to this day.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Military Affairs, Geopolitics, Navy, Oceans and Seas, and Seapower
Political Geography:
China and Asia

29. China Near Seas Combat Capabilities

Author:
Andrew S. Erickson, Ryan D. Martinson, and Peter A. Dutton
Publication Date:
02-2014
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
The capstone U.S. Defense Department study on the future operational environment declares, "China's rise represents the most significant single event on the international horizon since the collapse of the Cold War. Understanding and assessing changes in China's traditionally defensive naval strategy, doctrine, and force structure are of obvious importance to the U.S. Navy (USN) and other Pacific navies concerned with the possible security implications of that rise. This chapter examines the development of the Chinese navy's Houbei (Type 022) fast-attack-craft force and its roles and missions in China's near seas and discusses implications for the U.S. Navy and other navies in the region.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Military Affairs, Navy, Oceans and Seas, and Seapower
Political Geography:
China and Asia

30. No Substitute for Experience

Author:
Andrew S. Erickson and Austin M. Strange
Publication Date:
11-2013
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
The twenty-sixth of December 2012 marked an important date in Chinese military history—the fourth anniversary of China's furthest and most extensive naval operations to date, the ongoing antipiracy deployments in the Gulf of Aden. In the first-ever simultaneous three-fleet public display, China's North Sea Fleet, East Sea Fleet, and South Sea Fleet all held "open day activities." The guided-missile destroyers Qingdao, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen and guided-missile frigate Zhoushan, together with their associated helicopters and personnel, were visited by more than eight thousand people "from all sectors of the society" at the port cities after which they are named.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Military Affairs, Navy, Oceans and Seas, Seapower, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and People's Republic of China (PRC)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

31. Getting to “Yes” on Missile Defense: The Need to Rebalance U.S. Priorities & The Prospects for Transatlantic Cooperation

Author:
Jeffrey P. Bialos and Stuart L. Koehl
Publication Date:
01-2004
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Transatlantic Relations
Abstract:
At the end of the day, missile defense is and should be here to stay as a key element of U.S., and in all likelihood, European defense strategy for the twenty-first century. The threats are real and there is an emerging consensus about creating defenses against it. While the “macro” issues of ABM withdrawal and initial fielding of the U.S. midcourse segment are behind us, there are very legitimate issues that warrant debate on both sides of the Atlantic. We now need to focus on making the right choices to provide a better balance of capabilities between various strategic, regional, force protection, and homeland security needs. Moreover, U.S.-European engagement on missile defense is potentially, but not inevitably, a win-win proposition—binding alliance partners together geo-politically, creating a layered, multi-national plug and play “system of system” architecture, and enhancing our ability to fight wars together. And, an enhanced coalition war fighting capability is likely to have beneficial spillover effects on the broader Transatlantic relationship; it is axiomatic that countries that fight wars together tend to have congruent interests in a range of areas. But for this to happen, Europe needs to begin to seriously consider its missile defense needs soon and apply resources to the task and the United States needs to resolve the underlying technology transfer issues and questions of roles and responsibilities. Thus, with hard work and good will, multi-national cooperation between the United States and its allies offers “win-win” from the standpoint of strengthening the alliance and our mutual security.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Weapons, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
United States, China, and Europe