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Begin New Search Topic International Trade and Finance Political Geography China Content Type Special Report

1. China/United States: Europe off Balance

Author:
Thomas Gomart and Marc Hecker
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
As French President Emmanuel Macron (accompanied by Ursula von der Leyen) is on a state visit to China, some twenty Ifri researchers decipher the stakes of the U.S./China/Europe strategic triangle. This 16-text study follows Olaf Scholz’s visit to Beijing (November 2022) and precedes that of Emmanuel Macron (April 2023). It comes especially one year after the beginning of a geopolitical and geoeconomic shock of a rare magnitude: the invasion of Ukraine by Russia. The War in Ukraine or the Return of Bloc Geopolitics? The war in Ukraine has broken ties between the European Union (EU) and Russia for the foreseeable future, particularly in the field of energy, though not without consequences in the Middle East, Africa, and the Indo-Pacific. Furthermore, this war has become the main show of active indirect confrontation between the United States—which has provided military support to Ukrainians, with help from its European allies—and China, which has supported Russia politically and economically. In February 2022, Moscow and Beijing declared their “no limits friendship”; in March 2023, Xi Jinping offered his personal support to Vladimir Putin after the International Criminal Court issued a warrant for his arrest. In its position on the political settlement of the Ukraine crisis, presented in February 2023, China stated: “All parties should oppose the pursuit of one’s own security at the cost of others’ security, prevent bloc confrontation, and work together for peace and stability on the Eurasian Continent”. China is no more of a mediator than the United States: it would be unrealistic to believe so. We appear to be witnessing a return of bloc geopolitics, albeit in a starkly different context than that of the Cold War (1947-1991). Globalization has produced strong economic and technological interdependencies that make any prospect of decoupling very costly, if not impossible. Economic partners are no longer necessarily military allies, and vice versa. In other words, a gap is opening up between geopolitical perceptions and geoeconomic realities. The term “decoupling” is popular in the United States, though much less so elsewhere. The rejection of bloc geopolitics is particularly acute outside of the West, where a “pragmatic” approach to foreign policy is often promoted. The Saudi foreign minister summed this up during the World Policy Conference in December 2022: “Polarization is the last thing we need right now. […] We need to build bridges, strengthen connections, and find areas of cooperation”. A few months later, China pulled off an extraordinary diplomatic coup by brokering a deal to restore relations between Riyadh and Tehran. For the EU, the situation is particularly delicate: Europe is in the Western camp, but a severing of ties with Beijing would cause a crushing economic blow. In 2022, China accounted for more than 20% of the EU’s imports, while the United States accounted for around 12%. By 2030, the EU’s GDP is expected to rise to $20.5 trillion, compared to $30.5 trillion for the United States and $33.7 trillion for China. In January 2023, the President of the European Commission declared at Davos: “We still need to work and trade with China, especially when it comes to this transition. So, we need to refocus our approach on de-risking, rather than decoupling”. For its part, Beijing has encouraged European aspirations of “strategic autonomy”, understood in China as a form of detachment from the United States. At the same time, the EU is constantly strengthening its military, technological, financial and energy ties with the U.S. This collective study notes a hypothetical search for balance on the part of the Europeans, faced with a war on their territory (the Western peninsula of the heartland), who cannot escape Sino-American mechanisms, and who do not form a monolithic whole. It also analyzes the strategy of several important actors outside our continent, and shows that, from Ukraine to Taiwan, via Africa and the Middle East, Europeans have little room for maneuver. This is why the study proposes recommendations to try, at a crucial moment, to reinforce their positioning.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Climate Change, International Trade and Finance, Science and Technology, European Union, and Industry
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and United States of America

2. Trade Balances and International Competitiveness in Cyber-physical, Digital Task-intensive, ICT Capital-intensive and Traditional Industries

Author:
Alexandra Bykova and Roman Stöllinger
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
Abstract:
In this report, we analyse the international competitiveness of the EU in four industry groups over the period 1995-2018. The groups are delineated by specific factor intensities, where these intensities are assessed from digital tasks performed by labour services and ICT capital stocks. The EU’s positions relating to trade balances, revealed comparative advantages and unit value ratios are assessed relative to its main competitors, such as the US, China, Japan and South Korea. The trade specialisation patterns confirm EU advantages in traditional industries, which still represent the largest part of global trade, and in the group of digital task-intensive industries. In the cyber-physical group of industries, which are characterised by both high digital task and ICT capital intensities, the EU records a trade deficit, although this has been receding in recent years. Competitiveness indicators depict heterogeneity among EU countries. The loss of international competitiveness for some technology front-runners is a worrying sign. On the positive side, however, a reduction in trade deficits or an improvement in product quality and market shares is evident for certain EU countries, especially in the Central European region.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, European Union, Trade, Digitalization, and International Competition
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Europe, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

3. Rewriting the Future of America’s Maritime Industry to Compete with China

Author:
Michael Roberts
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
For decades, companies outside the United States have dominated the international commercial shipping and shipbuilding industries. At various times since World War II, Japan, Korea, and certain European countries have been able to leverage their export-driven manufacturing economies and government support to become world leaders in commercial shipbuilding and major players in international shipping. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has taken that strategy to a new level and now produces more than half the large commercial ships delivered annually, controls scores of seaports in dozens of foreign countries, and owns almost one-fifth of the global commercial fleet. American commercial shipbuilders and US flag shipping companies have long faced fierce headwinds in international markets and have seen support from the US government dwindle. The US reset its maritime policies in the 1990s when America was the sole superpower and the security benefits of a robust commercial maritime industry were in doubt. By the end of 2022, Americans owned only 3 percent of the 55,000 ships in the global commercial fleet, including just 178 large US flag cargo ships, 85 of which are committed to international trade (see tables 1 and 2 below for a breakdown of US and global commercial fleets). The emergence of the PRC as a challenger to America’s global leadership has forced sweeping changes in US policy and spending priorities to boost America’s economic and military security. This report recommends that the US reform its policies governing America’s commercial maritime industries because shipping and shipbuilding are core components of national power. These industries remain especially crucial in the twenty-first century, as international trade is more important to a healthy American economy today than ever before. Yet Americans have almost no control over the maritime logistics systems that feed the US economy. The pandemic-induced supply chain crisis showed how much damage can be done when those systems break down.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, National Security, Maritime, Industry, Domestic Policy, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

4. Trade and Supply Chain Issues for Taiwan and Australia

Author:
Bryce Wakefield
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Covid-19 has disrupted supply chains around the world, while political movements in the United States and Europe that predate the pandemic have raised the prospect that we are once more living in a world where regionalism and nationalism trump global integration of trade. China, meanwhile, has made it clear that it sees trade as a tool in its political statecraft, a factor that has been keenly felt in the region. Nervous actors in the Indo-Pacific are looking to diversify their trade away from China, but do nations in the region have many choices? What does this mean for Taiwan-Australia trade relations? How does Taiwan’s ambiguous position in the international system relate to recent trade agreements? Where do Taiwan and Australia, as mid-level powers, sit within the global trading order?
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and Australia

5. China's Belt and Road: Implications for the United States

Author:
Jennifer A. Hillman and David Sacks
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Chinese President Xi Jinping’s signature foreign policy undertaking and the world’s largest infrastructure program, poses a significant challenge to U.S. economic, political, climate change, security, and global health interests. Since BRI’s launch in 2013, Chinese banks and companies have financed and built everything from power plants, railways, highways, and ports to telecommunications infrastructure, fiber-optic cables, and smart cities around the world. If implemented sustainably and responsibly, BRI has the potential to meet long-standing developing country needs and spur global economic growth. To date, however, the risks for both the United States and recipient countries raised by BRI’s implementation considerably outweigh its benefits. BRI was initially designed to connect China’s modern coastal cities to its underdeveloped interior and to its Southeast, Central, and South Asian neighbors, cementing China’s position at the center of a more connected world. The initiative has since outgrown its original regional corridors, expanding to all corners of the globe. Its scope now includes a Digital Silk Road intended to improve recipients’ telecommunications networks, artificial intelligence capabilities, cloud computing, e-commerce and mobile payment systems, surveillance technology, and other high-tech areas, along with a Health Silk Road designed to operationalize China’s vision of global health governance.1 Hundreds of projects around the world now fall under the BRI umbrella.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Infrastructure, Hegemony, Conflict, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Regionalism
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

6. Can the Biggest Emitters Set Up a Climate Club? A Review of International Carbon Pricing Debates

Author:
Carole Mathieu
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The world’s largest emitting countries are reconsidering the role of carbon pricing instruments and increasingly looking at carbon border adjustment mechanisms (CBAMs) to address leakage concerns. This renewed momentum should trigger a broader discussion on how to make trade policies compatible with the climate agenda. With the Glasgow climate conference (COP26) approaching, the concept of putting a price on carbon is generating unprecedented interest in Canada and the United States (US), China and Japan. But the European Union (EU) still stands as an exception; it is the only regional trading bloc that is determined to leverage the full potential of its emissions trading system (ETS). To date, others have lacked the political backing to deploy nation-wide carbon pricing initiatives with a design sturdy enough to drive meaningful emission reductions. Canada has made significant progress with the adoption of a national framework for carbon pricing in 2018. The country’s draft regulations foresee the introduction of a federal ETS as of 2022 and a gradual increase in carbon prices, but its ambitions risk being upset by the lack of consistent efforts in the US, its largest trading partner. Given US political divides, a federal carbon pricing scheme is unlikely to materialize in the short run. In China, the long-delayed national ETS has finally been launched. However, its scope is restricted to the power sector for now, and it is likely to only have a modest impact on coal use with its current design. Several arguments may discourage China from fully extending its ETS as planned and rather argue in favor of introducing a complementary carbon tax. Japan has also engaged an expert debate on the benefits of introducing carbon pricing at the national level, but the government is struggling to find a balance between the risk of worsening competitiveness and the need to mobilize investment in clean technologies. For the EU, the upcoming reform of the EU ETS is an opportunity to introduce a truly demanding cap reduction for the 2023-2030 period and make this flagship instrument more robust, predictable, and fair. To initiate in-depth decarbonization of its industry, the EU will need to phase out free allowances. Therefore, other measures addressing unfair competition will have to be introduced and CBAM could be part of the solution. A unilateral application is however no panacea. The EU should move cautiously and start implementing the CBAM to a small set of sectors. This also means that the challenge of leveling the playing field with non-EU producers will remain largely unresolved. There is little chance that an international alliance on carbon pricing or “climate club” can be set up within a timeframe compatible with the climate emergency. Yet, the EU’s CBAM proposal can encourage trading partners to accelerate decision-making on carbon pricing, at least to obtain partial exemption. In addition, having a concrete anti-leakage proposal on the table leads to a sense of the inevitable mismatches between the global trade and climate agendas. Large emitters are starting to acknowledge the need for a multilateral discussion on how to decarbonize industries while maintaining a level playing field. The next step should be to kickstart an open discussion in all possible multilateral fora (G20, International Energy Agency, global industry associations, etc.) and mandate the World Trade Organization (WTO) to develop guidance on a wide range of instruments (including CBAM, but also eco-design labelling and standards, differentiated tariffs based on CO2 intensity, etc.) and including a common exemption approach for Least Developed Countries. Exploring a set of workable solutions should be more attractive to trade partners than pushing for a uniform solution, but results would still take time to materialize. Hence, establishing a level playing field with imports will likely require the EU – and all countries with an aggressive decarbonization agenda for their industries – to strengthen their financial and regulatory support to the deployment of innovative low-carbon manufacturing processes. Again, this almost-unavoidable resort to State aid would strongly benefit from a multilateral discussion.
Topic:
Climate Change, International Trade and Finance, European Union, Carbon Tax, and Carbon Emissions
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Europe, and Canada

7. Economic Cracks in the Great Wall of China: Is China's Current Economic Model Sustainable?

Author:
Thomas J. Duesterberg
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Since Deng Xiaoping changed the trajectory of Chinese economic policy in 1978, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has amassed an impressive record of economic growth. Many economists and political analysts, however, have come to question whether the top-down, mercantilist economic system in the PRC is sustainable in the medium to long term. This report explores the long-term structural and short-term economic problems in contemporary China, and in particular considers whether the Xi Jinping regime can avoid a financial crisis and effectively manage a transition to a stable new equilibrium. Structural issues include a looming downturn in the population and in the workforce; associated problems with an underdeveloped and underfinanced social safety and welfare net; income and regional inequality; environmental degradation; and domestic shortages of raw materials, agricultural production, and energy resources. The acute economic problems analyzed in the paper are a real estate bubble, the accumulation of dangerous levels of debt, dependence on external markets and financing, a difficult transition to a more consumer-oriented and less investment-driven economy, a crackdown on dynamic digital and financial sectors, a return to dominance of low-productivity state-owned enterprises and manufacturing firms, and weak governance from an increasingly authoritarian and unaccountable regime. Many of these acute issues result from Xi’s changes in policy since 2013. Xi’s turn toward greater economic self-reliance while maintaining mercantilist trade relations signals an effective decoupling from the US and allied economies. Some historical examples of bubble economies and financial crises are discussed as possible analogies to the current situation in China. One conclusion is that the Middle Kingdom will see a much slower-growing economy, which makes addressing the structural issues much more difficult. Inability or lack of determination to address the large array of issues may also undermine the political legitimacy of the current regime, which has been buttressed since 1978 by a rapid growth model based on debt, real estate, and investment, including infrastructure. The concluding section of this report offers policy tools that the United States and its allies could deploy to induce China to be a more responsible stakeholder in the world economy and a more reliable contributor to global sustainability. The tools considered in the study include trade policy and export controls, expanded oversight of foreign investment (both direct and portfolio investment), cooperation with allies on China policy, and defense-related sanctions. The paper also suggests that deployment of these tools could be a factor in weakening China’s economy as well as a means to convince its leadership to pursue less mercantilist and authoritarian global strategies, which are harmful to the US economy and to global stability.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Trade and Finance, Finance, Economy, and Economic Growth
Political Geography:
China and Asia

8. The Importance of the Western Balkans in China’s Foreign Policy

Author:
Marcin Przychodniak
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
China’s cooperation with the Western Balkans through the “17+1” format and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), among others, is primarily political. In the economic sphere, Chinese investments are to a large extent only declarations, and trade is marginal in comparison to cooperation with the EU or others. China’s goals are to gain political influence in future EU countries and limit their cooperation with the U.S. Competition with China in the region requires more intense EU-U.S. cooperation, made more difficult by the pandemic.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Trade and Finance, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Investment, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and Balkans

9. U.S. Policy in the Arctic

Author:
Paweł Markiewicz
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The Arctic has become another contested area between the U.S., Russia, and China. The region’s growing importance for global trade and American security means the U.S. goal is largely to maintain freedom of navigation in the Arctic. For this reason, the Trump administration strives to increase American capacities to operate in the Arctic. The effects of the COVID-19 pandemic will delay implementing these plans; nevertheless, they will be achieved in the long term and the U.S. will also expect support in the Arctic from NATO allies.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, and International Trade and Finance
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Arctic, and United States of America

10. The Impact Of Covid-19 On Sino-African Trade Activities

Author:
Egoh Aziz
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Nkafu Policy Institute
Abstract:
The recent outbreak of COVID-19 has caused waves of horror and anxiety across many nations in the world. Considering the intense unravelling of the pandemic, no exact figure as per the number of confirmed and death cases worldwide is definite because the situation changes almost every hour. However, on April 14, 2020 3:40 GMT, Worldometer reported 210 countries and territories across the globe having a total of 1,925,179 confirmed cases, and a dead toll of 119,699 deaths. The impact of the pandemic is disastrous globally affecting a variety of sectors including the service and supply chain, as well as trade, manufacturing, and tourism. This article aims to provide a synoptic assessment of the impact of COVID-19 on Sino-African trade activities. It stresses that, if African policymakers revamp their efforts to quickly address COVID-19, the human casualty will be less and African economic growth may experience lesser shock as previewed by the IMF. On the other hand, if they relent their efforts, the human casualty will soar while the growth rate may decline. The effect of COVID-19’s outbreak in China has caused a slowdown on exports and services directed towards China.According to statistics from the General Administration of Customs of China, in 2018, China’s total import and export volume with Africa was US$204.19 billion, a yearly increase of 19.7%, surpassing the total growth rate of foreign trade in the same period by 7.1 percentage points. Among these, China’s exports to Africa were US$104.91 billion, up 10.8% and China’s imports from Africa were US$99.28 billion, up 30.8%; the surplus was US$5.63 billion, down 70.0% every year. The growth rate of Sino African trade was the highest in the world in 2018. This shows that Sino-African trade has a significant contribution to the growth of African economies.
Topic:
Economics, Health, International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, Trade, Coronavirus, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Africa, China, Asia, and Cameroon

11. Brazil-China Post-Covid-19: The Digital City

Author:
Philip Yang, Chen Cai, Gao Changlin, Luciana Gama Muniz, Marcelo Motta, Miguel Pinto Guimarães, Renata Fraga, and Washington Fajardo
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)
Abstract:
Bilateral cooperation emerging from post-Covid-19 transformations brings challenges and opportunities, with the strengthening of digital cities standing out. This report presents the topics discussed in the webinar "Brazil-China post-Covid-19: The Digital City", held by CEBRI in partnership with the Embassy of China. Miguel Pinto Guimarães points out that "the future is being built by China over the last two decades at a fantastic growing speed that was made possible by planning, education, and intelligence". Chen Cai states that urban planning in large centers needs to be inclusive. "The objective of the smart cities is to have equality and services for everybody living in these cities, not only for some people."
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Bilateral Relations, Cities, COVID-19, and Digital Policy
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Brazil, and South America

12. U.S.-China Rivalry in the Trump Era

Publication Date:
08-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
World Politics Review
Abstract:
Integrating China into the liberal trade order was expected to have a moderating effect on Beijing. Instead, under President Xi Jinping, China has asserted its military control over the South China Sea and cracked down on domestic dissent, all while continuing to use unfair trade practices to boost its economy. As a result, a bipartisan consensus has emerged in Washington that the U.S. must rethink the assumptions underpinning its approach to China’s rise. But President Donald Trump’s confrontational approach, including a costly trade war, is unlikely to prove effective. This report provides a comprehensive look at the military and economic aspects of U.S.-China rivalry in the Trump era.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Military Affairs, Trade Wars, and Economic Policy
Political Geography:
United States and China

13. China’s Quest for Gas Supply Security: The Global Implications

Author:
Sylvie Cornot-Gandolphe
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The major transformations that are occurring on the Chinese gas market have profound repercussions on the global gas and LNG markets, especially on trade, investment and prices. In just two years, China has become the world’s first gas importer and is on track to become the largest importer of Liquefied natural gas (LNG). China alone explained 63% of the net global LNG demand growth in 2018 and now accounts for 17% of global LNG imports. The pace and scale of China’s LNG imports have reshaped the global LNG market. Over the past two years, fears of an LNG supply glut have largely been replaced by warnings that the lack of investments in new LNG capacity would lead to a supply shortage in the mid-2020s unless more LNG production project commitments are made soon. There is now a bullish outlook for future global LNG demand which has encouraged companies to sanction additional LNG projects, based on the anticipated supply shortage. China’s gas imports can be expected to continue to grow strongly, from 120 billion cubic meters (bcm) in 2018 to up to 300 bcm by 2030.
Topic:
Security, Energy Policy, International Trade and Finance, and Gas
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, Global Focus, and United States of America

14. Public and Opinion Leaders' Views on US-China Trade War

Author:
Craig Kafura
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:
The Trump Administration has taken an aggressive line on US-China trade issues. Starting with steel and aluminum tariffs in March 2018, the United States has gradually imposed a number of tariffs on various Chinese goods. China responded in turn to each round. Recent negotiations, though initially fruitful, foundered on issues of Chinese subsidies and what US trade representative Robert Lighthizer described as “an erosion in commitments by China.” Now the escalation cycle has resumed. According to surveys conducted in 2018 among foreign policy opinion leaders by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and the University of Texas, and the results of the 2018 Chicago Council Survey of the general US public, concerns about a potential trade war between the United States and China were already widespread before this most recent escalation.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Trade and Finance, Public Opinion, and Trade Wars
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

15. Americans Favor US-China Trade, Split Over Tariffs

Author:
Craig Kafura
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:
Over the past 18 months, the United States and China have engaged in a steady escalation of tariffs. Beginning with steel and aluminum tariffs imposed by the Trump administration in March 2018, the trade conflict has expanded to cover hundreds of billions of dollars in bilateral trade. Recent rounds of negotiations have made no new progress and have led to both sides escalating further. The most recent US tariffs on Chinese imports went into effect on September 1, covering $112 billion of goods. Beijing has countered with retaliatory tariffs and has halted all agricultural purchases from the United States, a move targeted at already-struggling US farmers. While Americans broadly support engaging in trade with China, they are split along partisan lines on how to engage in that trade. Republicans support raising tariffs on Chinese imports and believe it will help the US economy in the long run, while Democrats oppose doing so and believe it will be harmful.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Bilateral Relations, Tariffs, and Trade Wars
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

16. China’s Race to Global Technology Leadership

Author:
Alessia Amighini
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:
The current trade war between the US and China looks like a small piece in a much larger puzzle over world leadership in which China plays the part of the ascending challenger seeking to upset the existing balance of power. Technology and innovation seem to be Beijing’s weapons of choice in its frontal assault on Washington in sectors traditionally led by the US. China is not only acquiring technology. Its ambitions include the regulation of international trade and global governance. Just what a China-led global order would look like is still unclear, but the inherent dangers of technology need to be meticulously assessed, as they have the potential to alter the core values of modern societies. To what extent will technology facilitate China’s rise?
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Science and Technology, Governance, Leadership, and Trade Wars
Political Geography:
China and Asia

17. Trading the Global Future Part III: Bad Consequences

Author:
Dan Steinbock
Publication Date:
09-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
Abstract:
The Trump administration’s ‘America First’ policies come at a critical time in the global economy. These bad policies will have adverse consequences in international trade. In the absence of countervailing forces, they could unsettle the post-2008 global recovery and undermine postwar globalization.
Topic:
Globalization, International Trade and Finance, Economy, and Tariffs
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

18. The Trump-led Trade War with China: Energy Dominance Self-destructed?

Author:
Sylvie Cornot-Gandolphe and Jean-François Boittin
Publication Date:
09-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Under particular US legal rationale, such as calling foreign imports a “national security threat”, President Donald Trump has started imposing tariffs and/or quotas and has launched national security investigations on a growing number of imported goods from US allies and others alike.In March and June 2018, the US imposed tariffs or quotas on steel and aluminium on all trading partners, but Australia. In July and August 2018, the US began imposing tariffs on $50 billion in Chinese industrial goods on the ground of unfair trade practices. As China has retaliated with tit-for-tat measures, President Trump has imposed tariffs on $200 billion in Chinese goods from 24 September 2018 onwards, and in an unprecedented escalation of his trade war with China, he has also threatened to impose tariffs on an additional $267 billion in Chinese goods. If eventually carried out, Trump’s latest threat could result in tariffs on all Chinese goods entering the US. China has retaliated and imposed tariffs on $60 billion in US goods, including a 10% duty on liquefied natural gas (LNG). For the time being, trade tensions have had a limited impact on the energy market. But the new round of US tariffs and retaliation measures by China suggest that this is going to change.
Topic:
Climate Change, Energy Policy, International Trade and Finance, Gas, Renewable Energy, and Coal
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

19. Do Not Fall for the Hype on U.S.-China Natural Gas Trade

Author:
Melanie Hart, Luke Bassett, and Blaine Johnson
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
The Trump administration’s obsession with fossil fuel exports plays into Beijing’s grand strategy to become the next high-tech superpower.
Topic:
Energy Policy, International Trade and Finance, Science and Technology, Natural Resources, Hegemony, Gas, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

20. How should we view China's rise?

Author:
CHRISTOPHER K JOHNSON, Amy Searight, and Victor D. Cha
Publication Date:
12-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
It is evident that China’s rise will continue to dominate the geopolitics of Asia. How do the Chinese view this? Do its neighbors view it as inevitable, benign, or concerning? Where is there greatest convergence of Chinese views with that of its neighbors, and where is the greatest divergence?
Topic:
Globalization, International Political Economy, and International Trade and Finance
Political Geography:
China

21. U.S.-Sino Relations in the Arctic A Roadmap for Future Cooperation

Author:
Heather A. Conley
Publication Date:
01-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The emergence of the Arctic as a region of political and economic opportunity adds a new dimension to U.S.-China relations. Despite divergent priorities in the region, there are opportunities for greater cooperation. Both countries experience the physical challenges of climate change while investing in scientific research to gain a better understanding of a transforming Arctic. They both also seek cooperation through the Arctic Council and the International Maritime Organization to promote governance in the region. For these reasons, among others, the United States and China should create a more purposeful dialogue on a range of Arctic issues. U.S.-Sino Relations in the Arctic: A Roadmap for Future Cooperation is the result of fruitful exchanges between American and Chinese experts who addressed a range of issues: the future of Arctic governance, geopolitical factors shaping the Arctic’s future, international maritime issues in the Central Arctic Ocean, future trends in sustainable Arctic development, and new bilateral scientific research initiatives in the Arctic. Through frank and candid exchanges, this report aims to lay the foundation of strong bilateral cooperation between the United States and China in the Arctic.
Topic:
International Political Economy, International Trade and Finance, Geopolitics, and Climate Finance
Political Geography:
China, America, and Arctic

22. Arctic Imperatives: Reinforcing U.S. Strategy on America’s Fourth Coast

Author:
Thad W. Allen, Christine Todd Whitman, and Esther Brimmer
Publication Date:
03-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
"The United States, through Alaska, is a significant Arctic nation with strategic, economic, and scientific interests," asserts a new Council on Foreign Relations-sponsored (CFR) Independent Task Force report, Arctic Imperatives: Reinforcing U.S. Strategy on America's Fourth Coast. With the Arctic "warming at twice the rate as the rest of the planet" and melting sea ice opening up this resource-rich region to new trade routes and commercial activities, the report stresses that "the United States needs to increase its strategic commitment to the region or risk leaving its interests unprotected." The report notes that while Russia has numerous ice-breaking vessels and China is building a third icebreaker, the United States owns only two operational icebreaking ships—one heavy icebreaker and one medium-weight icebreaker—to serve both the Arctic and the Antarctic. Asserting that "icebreakers are a national capacity" required for a range of maritime missions to support U.S. security, economic, and commercial needs, the Task Force recommends that the United States fund and build additional icebreakers. The report also finds that the United States needs greater investment in Alaskan infrastructure, including deepwater ports, roads, and reliable telecommunications, to support economic development and a sustained security presence in the region. Currently, "almost no marine infrastructure is in place within the U.S. maritime Arctic."
Topic:
Climate Change, International Trade and Finance, Infrastructure, Hegemony, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, Arctic, and United States of America

23. Common Ground for the United States, Japan, and China in Southeast Asia

Author:
Brian Harding
Publication Date:
03-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
Over the past decade, Southeast Asia’s economic and geopolitical profile in the world has risen dramatically. Its $2.5 trillion economy is a rare bright spot for global growth.1 Plus, the increasingly integrated Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN, is a rare example of a regional political structure writing its own destiny—in this case, the agenda for the emerging regional security architecture of the Asia-Pacific.2 The region has also emerged, however, as a nexus for a range of transnational threats, ranging from trafficking in illicit goods to extreme weather events that are a result of climate change.3 Yet the region’s vital sea lanes have only grown more important, with more than half of the world’s merchant tonnage and one-third of global maritime traffic transiting the region every day on their journey from the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean to the economic powerhouses of Northeast Asia.4 The world has taken note of the opportunities presented by increased involvement in Southeast Asian affairs, as well as the challenges the region faces. Governments and multinational companies across the world are ramping up engagement with the region bilaterally with individual countries and multilaterally with ASEAN. Southeast Asian countries wholeheartedly welcome this global interest for both economic and strategic reasons. Economically, despite the region’s promise, all but Singapore and Brunei are developing countries in desperate need of foreign investment to continue their upward trajectories. Most critically, the region faces a multitrillion-dollar infrastructure gap that constrains economic growth and perpetuates inequality.5 With indigenous capital and even the commitments of international development banks unable to meet demand on this scale, investment by major powers is essential for the region to achieve its potential. Strategically, Southeast Asian countries welcome engagement by a wide range of outside powers to ensure that the region’s partnerships are highly diversified. As a grouping of small countries with modest military and economic power, robust partnerships with a range of actors ensure that no single outside power can dominate regional affairs. In essence, the region prefers a balance of power—or in Indonesian parlance, dynamic equilibrium. While welcoming and encouraging international involvement in regional affairs, Southeast Asian nations also naturally seek to do so on their own terms. For countries making national decisions regarding foreign investment or security cooperation with an outside power, these smaller countries can often find themselves in a position of weakness relative to the outside power. However, collectively, ASEAN provides a platform that allows each country to punch above its weight, providing a venue to make certain issues ASEAN issues rather than national issues for the purpose of creating greater leverage with outside powers. Quite remarkably, despite its flaws, the bloc has managed to maintain its position in the region as the driver of Asia-Pacific regionalism, while outside powers routinely reiterate the importance of “ASEAN centrality.”6 This report outlines findings from a recent trilateral dialogue, organized by the Center for American Progress, of Southeast Asia experts from the United States, Japan, and China. It describes the current state of U.S., Japanese, and Chinese engagement in Southeast Asia and presents four areas for potential U.S.-Japan-China collaboration with Southeast Asian partners on shared challenges.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, Partnerships, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, North America, Southeast Asia, and United States of America

24. The Blind Men and the Elephant: Making Sense of China's One Belt One Road Initiative

Author:
Nimmi Kurian
Publication Date:
12-2016
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Centre for Policy Research, India
Abstract:
China’s One Belt One Road Initiative has virtually been a lightning rod for divisive debate and a polarised narrative since it was announced in 2013. For India, it has been the proverbial elephant in the room, as it awkwardly swings between willful pretence and wishful erasure. The policy brief looks at the clues this initiative could offer on the likely drivers of China’s economic diplomacy in the region. There could be three signals for India to watch out for. A clear pointer is the growing role of domestic determinants in setting the direction and pace of China’s regional economic engagement. Another pointer could be China’s role in shaping and defining Asia’s new institutional financial architecture. Lastly, the initiative could be a signal of how China is likely to engage with the larger questions of benefit sharing, trade-offs and the allocation of risks and burdens in subregional Asia.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Trade and Finance, Regional Cooperation, Infrastructure, Economic Growth, and Soft Power
Political Geography:
China, South Asia, India, and Asia

25. Avoiding the Blind Alley China’s Economic Overhaul and Its Global Implications

Author:
Daniel H. Rosen
Publication Date:
10-2014
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
DURING THE PAST THREE DECADES, perhaps no country has turned in an economic performance as impressive and transformative as China’s. China has emerged as the world’s second largest economy and its greatest exporting nation, accumulating huge trade surpluses, vast foreign currency reserves, and enormous influence on the global economy. Despite all the attention that policymakers, business executives, and scholars have paid to China’s economic rise, much debate surrounds China’s future growth prospects. For their part, President Xi Jinping and the new generation of Chinese leaders responded to the risk of a major economic slowdown by announcing a far-reaching reform campaign at the Chinese Communist Party’s Third Plenum in November 2013. If Beijing shifts direction along the lines it has announced, the behavior of Chinese companies, government agencies, and individual members of society is likely to change in remarkable ways – and thereby create opportunities for the rest of the world. Should the reform program stall, the effects will be just as profound. Either way, China’s new policy design, and its success or failure in achieving it, will have a major influence on the international economy and stability and security in Asia and beyond. With so much at stake, and an outcome that is far from certain, there is an evident need for greater clarity about what the reform program consists of, how it is progressing, and what it means for policy and business.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance and Global Political Economy
Political Geography:
China