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Begin New Search Topic International Trade and Finance Political Geography China Content Type Special Report Publication Year within 3 Years

1. Trade Balances and International Competitiveness in Cyber-physical, Digital Task-intensive, ICT Capital-intensive and Traditional Industries

Author:
Alexandra Bykova and Roman Stöllinger
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
Abstract:
In this report, we analyse the international competitiveness of the EU in four industry groups over the period 1995-2018. The groups are delineated by specific factor intensities, where these intensities are assessed from digital tasks performed by labour services and ICT capital stocks. The EU’s positions relating to trade balances, revealed comparative advantages and unit value ratios are assessed relative to its main competitors, such as the US, China, Japan and South Korea. The trade specialisation patterns confirm EU advantages in traditional industries, which still represent the largest part of global trade, and in the group of digital task-intensive industries. In the cyber-physical group of industries, which are characterised by both high digital task and ICT capital intensities, the EU records a trade deficit, although this has been receding in recent years. Competitiveness indicators depict heterogeneity among EU countries. The loss of international competitiveness for some technology front-runners is a worrying sign. On the positive side, however, a reduction in trade deficits or an improvement in product quality and market shares is evident for certain EU countries, especially in the Central European region.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, European Union, Trade, Digitalization, and International Competition
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Europe, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

2. Rewriting the Future of America’s Maritime Industry to Compete with China

Author:
Michael Roberts
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
For decades, companies outside the United States have dominated the international commercial shipping and shipbuilding industries. At various times since World War II, Japan, Korea, and certain European countries have been able to leverage their export-driven manufacturing economies and government support to become world leaders in commercial shipbuilding and major players in international shipping. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has taken that strategy to a new level and now produces more than half the large commercial ships delivered annually, controls scores of seaports in dozens of foreign countries, and owns almost one-fifth of the global commercial fleet. American commercial shipbuilders and US flag shipping companies have long faced fierce headwinds in international markets and have seen support from the US government dwindle. The US reset its maritime policies in the 1990s when America was the sole superpower and the security benefits of a robust commercial maritime industry were in doubt. By the end of 2022, Americans owned only 3 percent of the 55,000 ships in the global commercial fleet, including just 178 large US flag cargo ships, 85 of which are committed to international trade (see tables 1 and 2 below for a breakdown of US and global commercial fleets). The emergence of the PRC as a challenger to America’s global leadership has forced sweeping changes in US policy and spending priorities to boost America’s economic and military security. This report recommends that the US reform its policies governing America’s commercial maritime industries because shipping and shipbuilding are core components of national power. These industries remain especially crucial in the twenty-first century, as international trade is more important to a healthy American economy today than ever before. Yet Americans have almost no control over the maritime logistics systems that feed the US economy. The pandemic-induced supply chain crisis showed how much damage can be done when those systems break down.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, National Security, Maritime, Industry, Domestic Policy, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

3. China/United States: Europe off Balance

Author:
Thomas Gomart and Marc Hecker
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
As French President Emmanuel Macron (accompanied by Ursula von der Leyen) is on a state visit to China, some twenty Ifri researchers decipher the stakes of the U.S./China/Europe strategic triangle. This 16-text study follows Olaf Scholz’s visit to Beijing (November 2022) and precedes that of Emmanuel Macron (April 2023). It comes especially one year after the beginning of a geopolitical and geoeconomic shock of a rare magnitude: the invasion of Ukraine by Russia. The War in Ukraine or the Return of Bloc Geopolitics? The war in Ukraine has broken ties between the European Union (EU) and Russia for the foreseeable future, particularly in the field of energy, though not without consequences in the Middle East, Africa, and the Indo-Pacific. Furthermore, this war has become the main show of active indirect confrontation between the United States—which has provided military support to Ukrainians, with help from its European allies—and China, which has supported Russia politically and economically. In February 2022, Moscow and Beijing declared their “no limits friendship”; in March 2023, Xi Jinping offered his personal support to Vladimir Putin after the International Criminal Court issued a warrant for his arrest. In its position on the political settlement of the Ukraine crisis, presented in February 2023, China stated: “All parties should oppose the pursuit of one’s own security at the cost of others’ security, prevent bloc confrontation, and work together for peace and stability on the Eurasian Continent”. China is no more of a mediator than the United States: it would be unrealistic to believe so. We appear to be witnessing a return of bloc geopolitics, albeit in a starkly different context than that of the Cold War (1947-1991). Globalization has produced strong economic and technological interdependencies that make any prospect of decoupling very costly, if not impossible. Economic partners are no longer necessarily military allies, and vice versa. In other words, a gap is opening up between geopolitical perceptions and geoeconomic realities. The term “decoupling” is popular in the United States, though much less so elsewhere. The rejection of bloc geopolitics is particularly acute outside of the West, where a “pragmatic” approach to foreign policy is often promoted. The Saudi foreign minister summed this up during the World Policy Conference in December 2022: “Polarization is the last thing we need right now. […] We need to build bridges, strengthen connections, and find areas of cooperation”. A few months later, China pulled off an extraordinary diplomatic coup by brokering a deal to restore relations between Riyadh and Tehran. For the EU, the situation is particularly delicate: Europe is in the Western camp, but a severing of ties with Beijing would cause a crushing economic blow. In 2022, China accounted for more than 20% of the EU’s imports, while the United States accounted for around 12%. By 2030, the EU’s GDP is expected to rise to $20.5 trillion, compared to $30.5 trillion for the United States and $33.7 trillion for China. In January 2023, the President of the European Commission declared at Davos: “We still need to work and trade with China, especially when it comes to this transition. So, we need to refocus our approach on de-risking, rather than decoupling”. For its part, Beijing has encouraged European aspirations of “strategic autonomy”, understood in China as a form of detachment from the United States. At the same time, the EU is constantly strengthening its military, technological, financial and energy ties with the U.S. This collective study notes a hypothetical search for balance on the part of the Europeans, faced with a war on their territory (the Western peninsula of the heartland), who cannot escape Sino-American mechanisms, and who do not form a monolithic whole. It also analyzes the strategy of several important actors outside our continent, and shows that, from Ukraine to Taiwan, via Africa and the Middle East, Europeans have little room for maneuver. This is why the study proposes recommendations to try, at a crucial moment, to reinforce their positioning.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Climate Change, International Trade and Finance, Science and Technology, European Union, and Industry
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and United States of America

4. Trade and Supply Chain Issues for Taiwan and Australia

Author:
Bryce Wakefield
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Covid-19 has disrupted supply chains around the world, while political movements in the United States and Europe that predate the pandemic have raised the prospect that we are once more living in a world where regionalism and nationalism trump global integration of trade. China, meanwhile, has made it clear that it sees trade as a tool in its political statecraft, a factor that has been keenly felt in the region. Nervous actors in the Indo-Pacific are looking to diversify their trade away from China, but do nations in the region have many choices? What does this mean for Taiwan-Australia trade relations? How does Taiwan’s ambiguous position in the international system relate to recent trade agreements? Where do Taiwan and Australia, as mid-level powers, sit within the global trading order?
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and Australia

5. China's Belt and Road: Implications for the United States

Author:
Jennifer A. Hillman and David Sacks
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Chinese President Xi Jinping’s signature foreign policy undertaking and the world’s largest infrastructure program, poses a significant challenge to U.S. economic, political, climate change, security, and global health interests. Since BRI’s launch in 2013, Chinese banks and companies have financed and built everything from power plants, railways, highways, and ports to telecommunications infrastructure, fiber-optic cables, and smart cities around the world. If implemented sustainably and responsibly, BRI has the potential to meet long-standing developing country needs and spur global economic growth. To date, however, the risks for both the United States and recipient countries raised by BRI’s implementation considerably outweigh its benefits. BRI was initially designed to connect China’s modern coastal cities to its underdeveloped interior and to its Southeast, Central, and South Asian neighbors, cementing China’s position at the center of a more connected world. The initiative has since outgrown its original regional corridors, expanding to all corners of the globe. Its scope now includes a Digital Silk Road intended to improve recipients’ telecommunications networks, artificial intelligence capabilities, cloud computing, e-commerce and mobile payment systems, surveillance technology, and other high-tech areas, along with a Health Silk Road designed to operationalize China’s vision of global health governance.1 Hundreds of projects around the world now fall under the BRI umbrella.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Infrastructure, Hegemony, Conflict, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Regionalism
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

6. Economic Cracks in the Great Wall of China: Is China's Current Economic Model Sustainable?

Author:
Thomas J. Duesterberg
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Since Deng Xiaoping changed the trajectory of Chinese economic policy in 1978, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has amassed an impressive record of economic growth. Many economists and political analysts, however, have come to question whether the top-down, mercantilist economic system in the PRC is sustainable in the medium to long term. This report explores the long-term structural and short-term economic problems in contemporary China, and in particular considers whether the Xi Jinping regime can avoid a financial crisis and effectively manage a transition to a stable new equilibrium. Structural issues include a looming downturn in the population and in the workforce; associated problems with an underdeveloped and underfinanced social safety and welfare net; income and regional inequality; environmental degradation; and domestic shortages of raw materials, agricultural production, and energy resources. The acute economic problems analyzed in the paper are a real estate bubble, the accumulation of dangerous levels of debt, dependence on external markets and financing, a difficult transition to a more consumer-oriented and less investment-driven economy, a crackdown on dynamic digital and financial sectors, a return to dominance of low-productivity state-owned enterprises and manufacturing firms, and weak governance from an increasingly authoritarian and unaccountable regime. Many of these acute issues result from Xi’s changes in policy since 2013. Xi’s turn toward greater economic self-reliance while maintaining mercantilist trade relations signals an effective decoupling from the US and allied economies. Some historical examples of bubble economies and financial crises are discussed as possible analogies to the current situation in China. One conclusion is that the Middle Kingdom will see a much slower-growing economy, which makes addressing the structural issues much more difficult. Inability or lack of determination to address the large array of issues may also undermine the political legitimacy of the current regime, which has been buttressed since 1978 by a rapid growth model based on debt, real estate, and investment, including infrastructure. The concluding section of this report offers policy tools that the United States and its allies could deploy to induce China to be a more responsible stakeholder in the world economy and a more reliable contributor to global sustainability. The tools considered in the study include trade policy and export controls, expanded oversight of foreign investment (both direct and portfolio investment), cooperation with allies on China policy, and defense-related sanctions. The paper also suggests that deployment of these tools could be a factor in weakening China’s economy as well as a means to convince its leadership to pursue less mercantilist and authoritarian global strategies, which are harmful to the US economy and to global stability.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Trade and Finance, Finance, Economy, and Economic Growth
Political Geography:
China and Asia

7. Can the Biggest Emitters Set Up a Climate Club? A Review of International Carbon Pricing Debates

Author:
Carole Mathieu
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The world’s largest emitting countries are reconsidering the role of carbon pricing instruments and increasingly looking at carbon border adjustment mechanisms (CBAMs) to address leakage concerns. This renewed momentum should trigger a broader discussion on how to make trade policies compatible with the climate agenda. With the Glasgow climate conference (COP26) approaching, the concept of putting a price on carbon is generating unprecedented interest in Canada and the United States (US), China and Japan. But the European Union (EU) still stands as an exception; it is the only regional trading bloc that is determined to leverage the full potential of its emissions trading system (ETS). To date, others have lacked the political backing to deploy nation-wide carbon pricing initiatives with a design sturdy enough to drive meaningful emission reductions. Canada has made significant progress with the adoption of a national framework for carbon pricing in 2018. The country’s draft regulations foresee the introduction of a federal ETS as of 2022 and a gradual increase in carbon prices, but its ambitions risk being upset by the lack of consistent efforts in the US, its largest trading partner. Given US political divides, a federal carbon pricing scheme is unlikely to materialize in the short run. In China, the long-delayed national ETS has finally been launched. However, its scope is restricted to the power sector for now, and it is likely to only have a modest impact on coal use with its current design. Several arguments may discourage China from fully extending its ETS as planned and rather argue in favor of introducing a complementary carbon tax. Japan has also engaged an expert debate on the benefits of introducing carbon pricing at the national level, but the government is struggling to find a balance between the risk of worsening competitiveness and the need to mobilize investment in clean technologies. For the EU, the upcoming reform of the EU ETS is an opportunity to introduce a truly demanding cap reduction for the 2023-2030 period and make this flagship instrument more robust, predictable, and fair. To initiate in-depth decarbonization of its industry, the EU will need to phase out free allowances. Therefore, other measures addressing unfair competition will have to be introduced and CBAM could be part of the solution. A unilateral application is however no panacea. The EU should move cautiously and start implementing the CBAM to a small set of sectors. This also means that the challenge of leveling the playing field with non-EU producers will remain largely unresolved. There is little chance that an international alliance on carbon pricing or “climate club” can be set up within a timeframe compatible with the climate emergency. Yet, the EU’s CBAM proposal can encourage trading partners to accelerate decision-making on carbon pricing, at least to obtain partial exemption. In addition, having a concrete anti-leakage proposal on the table leads to a sense of the inevitable mismatches between the global trade and climate agendas. Large emitters are starting to acknowledge the need for a multilateral discussion on how to decarbonize industries while maintaining a level playing field. The next step should be to kickstart an open discussion in all possible multilateral fora (G20, International Energy Agency, global industry associations, etc.) and mandate the World Trade Organization (WTO) to develop guidance on a wide range of instruments (including CBAM, but also eco-design labelling and standards, differentiated tariffs based on CO2 intensity, etc.) and including a common exemption approach for Least Developed Countries. Exploring a set of workable solutions should be more attractive to trade partners than pushing for a uniform solution, but results would still take time to materialize. Hence, establishing a level playing field with imports will likely require the EU – and all countries with an aggressive decarbonization agenda for their industries – to strengthen their financial and regulatory support to the deployment of innovative low-carbon manufacturing processes. Again, this almost-unavoidable resort to State aid would strongly benefit from a multilateral discussion.
Topic:
Climate Change, International Trade and Finance, European Union, Carbon Tax, and Carbon Emissions
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Europe, and Canada