Content Type: Special Report / Political Geography: China / Publication Year: within 10 Years / Topic: Foreign Policy

1. China/United States: Europe off Balance

Author:: Thomas Gomart and Marc Hecker
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: As French President Emmanuel Macron (accompanied by Ursula von der Leyen) is on a state visit to China, some twenty Ifri researchers decipher the stakes of the U.S./China/Europe strategic triangle. This 16-text study follows Olaf Scholz’s visit to Beijing (November 2022) and precedes that of Emmanuel Macron (April 2023). It comes especially one year after the beginning of a geopolitical and geoeconomic shock of a rare magnitude: the invasion of Ukraine by Russia. The War in Ukraine or the Return of Bloc Geopolitics? The war in Ukraine has broken ties between the European Union (EU) and Russia for the foreseeable future, particularly in the field of energy, though not without consequences in the Middle East, Africa, and the Indo-Pacific. Furthermore, this war has become the main show of active indirect confrontation between the United States—which has provided military support to Ukrainians, with help from its European allies—and China, which has supported Russia politically and economically. In February 2022, Moscow and Beijing declared their “no limits friendship”; in March 2023, Xi Jinping offered his personal support to Vladimir Putin after the International Criminal Court issued a warrant for his arrest. In its position on the political settlement of the Ukraine crisis, presented in February 2023, China stated: “All parties should oppose the pursuit of one’s own security at the cost of others’ security, prevent bloc confrontation, and work together for peace and stability on the Eurasian Continent”. China is no more of a mediator than the United States: it would be unrealistic to believe so. We appear to be witnessing a return of bloc geopolitics, albeit in a starkly different context than that of the Cold War (1947-1991). Globalization has produced strong economic and technological interdependencies that make any prospect of decoupling very costly, if not impossible. Economic partners are no longer necessarily military allies, and vice versa. In other words, a gap is opening up between geopolitical perceptions and geoeconomic realities. The term “decoupling” is popular in the United States, though much less so elsewhere. The rejection of bloc geopolitics is particularly acute outside of the West, where a “pragmatic” approach to foreign policy is often promoted. The Saudi foreign minister summed this up during the World Policy Conference in December 2022: “Polarization is the last thing we need right now. […] We need to build bridges, strengthen connections, and find areas of cooperation”. A few months later, China pulled off an extraordinary diplomatic coup by brokering a deal to restore relations between Riyadh and Tehran. For the EU, the situation is particularly delicate: Europe is in the Western camp, but a severing of ties with Beijing would cause a crushing economic blow. In 2022, China accounted for more than 20% of the EU’s imports, while the United States accounted for around 12%. By 2030, the EU’s GDP is expected to rise to $20.5 trillion, compared to $30.5 trillion for the United States and $33.7 trillion for China. In January 2023, the President of the European Commission declared at Davos: “We still need to work and trade with China, especially when it comes to this transition. So, we need to refocus our approach on de-risking, rather than decoupling”. For its part, Beijing has encouraged European aspirations of “strategic autonomy”, understood in China as a form of detachment from the United States. At the same time, the EU is constantly strengthening its military, technological, financial and energy ties with the U.S. This collective study notes a hypothetical search for balance on the part of the Europeans, faced with a war on their territory (the Western peninsula of the heartland), who cannot escape Sino-American mechanisms, and who do not form a monolithic whole. It also analyzes the strategy of several important actors outside our continent, and shows that, from Ukraine to Taiwan, via Africa and the Middle East, Europeans have little room for maneuver. This is why the study proposes recommendations to try, at a crucial moment, to reinforce their positioning.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Climate Change, International Trade and Finance, Science and Technology, European Union, and Industry
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and United States of America

2. Chinese foreign policy in 2023: Stepping back from the brink

Author:: Thomas Eder
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:: When it comes to Chinese foreign policy in 2023, decision-makers in Austria and Europe have to most importantly consider three partly interrelated and highly topical questions that are and should be preoccupying China researchers. Will China escalate its support for Russia during the war in Ukraine? Will China invade Taiwan? How will China’s protest movement and exit from Zero-COVID impact foreign policy? Further trends in China research will address the need to employ digital methods due to a lack of access for fieldwork (COVID or political restrictions) (BCCN 2022), the importance of protests more broadly (labour issues or Hong Kong democracy) (Wei and Chan 2022; Cheng et al 2022), and the fragility of a centralized system around Xi Jinping with no succession plan as Xi enters his third term as president in March 2023 (Tsang and Cheung 2021). Following Russia’s full invasion of Ukraine, Beijing has supported Moscow in the informational and diplomatic domain, but has remained self-interested in the economic domain, and has not shifted from previous policies in the military domain (Chestnut Greitens 2022, 751). China needs Russia as a partner in mounting a (normative) challenge to US power and the liberal international order (Johnston 2022, 1307), gaining influence in multilateral institutions (Wang and Sampson 2022, 374), and preserving the Communist Party regime (Pavel, Kirchberger and Sinjen 2022, 295). The Chinese leadership would like to see a Russian victory, and dreads a defeatinduced regime collapse in Moscow (Lo 2022). Beijing has condemned the West for provoking the war and for imposing sanctions. In the UN, China abstained or voted for Russia. At the same time, since the beginning of the war, bilateral trade has grown significantly. Yet, Chinese companies and banks have partly withdrawn or broken off ties with Russian counterparts to steer clear of secondary sanctions. Moreover, while joint military exercises continue, there is no clear evidence for arms or equipment deliveries.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Economy, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: China and Asia

3. US Trade Policy Options for Pacific Islands States Require Washington’s Political Commitment

Author:: Marcus Noland
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: East-West Center
Abstract:: The Pacific Islands have emerged as a zone of contestation in the ongoing rivalry between China and the United States. While the US has long been the dominant military power in the region, China is raising its profile through activities like port visits, military exercises, and establishing diplomatic and security ties with regional states like Kiribati and the Solomon Islands. In 2018, Chinese leader Xi Jinping visited Papua New Guinea for the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit. President Biden was supposed to visit PNG in May 2023, in the first ever visit of a sitting US president to the Pacific Islands, but that trip was scuttled due to the debt ceiling fiasco in Washington. In the economics sphere, the US has attempted to counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) together with Japan and Australia through the Blue Dot Network and the Indo-Pacific Infrastructure Trilateral to promote high-quality, transparent, and sustainable infrastructure development. The region contains considerable natural resources, and the US has been working with Pacific Island nations to promote sustainable resource management, in contrast to China’s alleged illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in the Pacific. What has been missing, however, is a trade policy component to the US strategy to counterbalance China’s exploration of a free trade agreement with the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF).
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Economics, Politics, and Trade Policy
Political Geography:: China, North America, United States of America, and Pacific Islands

4. The Quad's Next Chapter

Author:: Karl Friedhoff
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:: Advancing the group's pillars of prosperity and development will be at the very heart of competition with China in the coming decade. The Quad—the country grouping including the United States, Japan, Australia, and India—now stands at a crossroads as it enters its third phase. The Quad 3.0 comes as the grouping has established the dialogue as a meeting place for leaders of the four countries but must now decide what shape competition with China will take and how to best address that competition. Thus far the Quad has struggled to find function for its form. Statements issued by Quad leaders stress the importance of “development, stability, and prosperity” in an effort to roll back China’s influence across the Indo-Pacific. However, its most high-profile activities focus on stability via high-profile military exercises. Closer internal coordination along the security axis serves to highlight the lack of visible progress on the external delivery of development and prosperity to countries outside the Quad. Efforts to deliver development and prosperity are hemmed in by the Quad itself. Neither the United States or India are party to either of the major regional trade agreements—the CPTPP and RCEP. The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), held up by the Biden administration as America’s economic engagement with Asia, remains a mirage. Meanwhile, as the United States de-risks its economic relationship with China, it is effectively warning that doing business with Beijing may come at a cost to relations with Washington—an unpopular message across much of the Indo-Pacific. Additionally, any hint of security cooperation with China by smaller countries in the region creates a flurry of diplomatic reaction from the United States. To move forward, the Quad needs to better balance its portfolio and how it messages that portfolio. The overt promotion of the security agenda is actively undermining perceptions of the Quad’s ability to engage on development and prosperity. A first corrective step is to balance the group’s internal goal of improved security coordination and cohesion with the Quad’s external goal of delivering development and prosperity to countries in the region. Committing to an agenda that brings the people of the region, not its seas, to the fore of the Quad mission should be a top priority. This means rejecting the dogma that every China initiative in the region needs a Quad alternative. Instead, advancing Quad goals requires identifying China’s activities that can be co-opted for Quad purposes. This will mean working around, and sometimes with, China’s initiatives to better serve not only the Quad’s goals in prosperity and development but also the people of the region.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Development, Geopolitics, Trade, Strategic Competition, and Quad Alliance
Political Geography:: Japan, China, South Asia, India, East Asia, Australia, North America, United States of America, and Oceania

5. The Dragon and the Bear in Africa: Stress-Testing Chinese-Russian Relations

Author:: Robert E. Hamilton
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: This report is based on a chapter of my forthcoming book on the relationship between China and Russia. For the US, this is arguably the most important bilateral relationship in the world today. A robust, resilient partnership between Beijing and Moscow has the potential to remake world order. It would usher in an era of international relations based on power and polarity, eroding the role of international law and institutions, and undermining the sovereignty and agency of smaller states. This world order would represent a serious threat to US interests, as currently defined. On the other hand, transactional, “thin” ties between China and Russia allow the US some breathing space. Instead of a revisionist authoritarian alliance, the US would confront two states that represent different types of challenges. In this case, Washington could deal with the acute, militarized threat of Russia in the near term, while remaining postured to confront the “pacing” threat of China—the only potential peer competitor to the US—over the longer term. The academic and policy worlds have been seized with the China-Russia relationship for almost two decades. Policy debates revolve around how to confront the two, with some arguing that the current focus on reversing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine puts the US at risk of being unprepared for the threat China represents. Others argue that Russia is not merely a disruptive power but represents a profound and immediate danger to US interests. Competition for resources often lurks in the background of this debate: US government organizations focused on Europe tend to argue for focusing on Russia first; those with an Indo-Pacific focus tend to argue that China should be the focus. What this debate often fails to consider is the nature of their relationship and its impact on US policy options. The scholarly debate fills this gap by focusing directly on the nature of the relationship: one camp defines it as a strategic partnership and the other defines it as an “axis of convenience.” Often missing from scholarly analysis, though, is an analysis of the implications for US policy. In other words, scholars often argue forcefully for one of these characterizations of the China-Russia relationship but then fail to advise what the US should do in response. Instead, their analysis focuses on the implications of the relationship for theoretical approaches to international relations. The book that will include this report aims to close this gap between the policy and scholarly debates. It aims to provide a better understanding of the nature of the China-Russia relationship and use that understanding to inform US policy options. It will do this through a novel approach. Instead of focusing on Chinese-Russian interaction at the level of the international system, as most approaches do, it focuses on their interaction “on the ground” in regions where both have important interests at stake. This report examines Chinese-Russian interaction in Africa; other chapters of the book focus on Central Asia, Eastern Europe, and East Asia. Africa and Central Asia provide good testing grounds for the China-Russia relationship because both have important but different interests there. How they advance and defend those interests and how they interact in doing so, can yield important insights into the nature of their overall relationship. These regions are also important because the US footprint is light. The US has been called the “binding agent” in ties between Beijing and Moscow. The idea here is that shared resistance to the US is the only major thing they have in common. In this view, removing the US from the equation will make China and Russia more likely to find reasons to compete rather than cooperate.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

6. Success in the Struggle against the People's Republic of China

Author:: John Lee and Lavina Lee
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: In April 2023, the Australian government released the officially commissioned but independently produced Defence Strategic Review. Intended to assist the government of Australia with its strategic and defense policies over the next decade and beyond, the report offered the fundamental assessment that the Indo-Pacific region “faces increasing competition that operates on multiple levels—economic, military, strategic and diplomatic—all interwoven and all framed by an intense contest of values and narratives.”1 The Biden administration’s National Security Strategy, which had been released several months earlier (October 2022), stated the challenge in even starker terms: “The People’s Republic of China harbors the intention and, increasingly, the capacity to reshape the international order in favor of one that tilts the global playing field to its benefit.”2 At the heart of these statements is the perception that China poses a systemic and comprehensive challenge, not just to the vital interests and values of the United States and Australia, but to the entire system and order that was cobbled together after the Second World War. These postwar rules, norms, institutions, conventions, practices, alliances, and security relationships have been underwritten by US material power. They constitute a liberal order that is under intense challenge from China.3 This report explores what success in relation to China looks like for the US, Australia, and allies such as Japan. Several substantial and thoughtful pieces have described what victory would look like for China,4 and there have also been many good efforts to describe what victory would look like for the US and its allies, given China’s goals and objectives. The current report focuses on a US and Australian vision of success in which the geopolitical contest and struggle are enduring and do not end with a victory for any side. Victory generally means defeating an enemy or opponent in a specific context or activity. Unsurprisingly, the term is commonly associated with defeating an enemy during a battle or compelling the unconditional surrender of the enemy when engaging in war. In victory, there is a clear winner and loser. By way of contrast, success or successful struggle means the accomplishment of an aim or purpose in general or specific contexts. It might include subduing an opponent and attaining victory over that opponent. But success can also be achieved without the strict formal requirement of victory, depending on one’s objective. The term success is used here because the scope of this report is broader than victory in a traditional war context (even if the use of force is always an option to achieve success or deny it to the opponent). It will be apparent that the Chinese notion of war is far broader than the Western notion. The West holds that war is fought within and across identified air, sea, land, space, and cyber domains, and that war has a discernible beginning and end. In the Chinese conception, war has no boundaries or restrictive form and does not necessarily involve the kinetic use of force. It is material, but also ideational, psychological, and structural.5 Indeed, for the Chinese, the apogee of conflict is to win without fighting, even if the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) sees the environment as one of perpetual struggle. Hence, war may have no formal beginning or end. For this reason, a US and Australian vision of success cannot simply be about achieving specific key objectives, like maintaining Taiwanese de facto independence or preventing further Chinese militarization of the South China Sea. To be sure, a vision of success is based on certain fundamental end states (such as preventing Chinese material and normative dominance in East Asia). However, it also accepts the likelihood of a constant struggle against a formidable China, just as China assumes the long-term existence of a formidable US with significant allies in the region. In other words, the authors work on the prudent assumption that China will be neither defeated nor terminally weakened, and that its expansionist ambitions and substantial capabilities will remain. Rather than focusing on a final victory or endpoint, a vision of success conceptualizes an advantageous and enduring state of affairs or system of arrangements in the region that supports the fundamental objectives of the US and its allies in the Indo-Pacific. This report is about successful struggle, but not in the context of a major war where one side wins decisively and the next step is to establish a sensible peace. This is not to discount the possibility that the use of force could be decisive in shaping the region. But the report focuses on scenarios of an increasingly tense competition and rivalry occurring over the next decade and explores what success looks like in that context. It does not discount the possibility or necessity of limited military action, but does not assume that any such action would be decisive in producing a permanent winner and loser.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Asia, Australia, and United States of America

7. Strength in Unity: A Sustainable US-Led Regional Security Construct in the Middle East

Author:: Robert Greenway
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: China and Russia are exploiting US indifference toward the Middle East and efforts to integrate Iran into the region, threatening regional stability, Israel’s security, and global markets. The convergence of threats encompasses an Iranian nuclear threshold state controlling a constellation of terrorist groups, resurgent non-state terrorist groups including ISIS and al-Qaeda, and Russian and Chinese exploitation of receding American presence. We are reaching an inflection point at which the United States risks the irrevocable loss of a favorable balance of both trade and forces, resulting in instability that will threaten our vital interests and the global economy. This constitutes an unprecedented range of challenges beyond our capacity, and the capacity of our partners and allies, to address threats to global energy and trade as we struggle to recover from a global pandemic. We have not faced a similar period of risk in the Middle East since the turmoil following the Iranian Revolution, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and storming of the Grand Mosque in 1979. The US shares vital national security interests with longtime partners in the region and, as a result, they prefer US leadership in both the economic and security domains. A sustainable US-led regional security construct in the Middle East that includes effective partners based on convergent interests is the most efficient way to address the unacceptable risk, which results from the disconnect between the vital national interests of the US and its partners and the resources both have committed. A constellation of mutually beneficial trade relationships providing both the resources and rationale for a regional security construct would strengthen such an arrangement.1 Establishing a US-led enduring regional security architecture comprised of more capable partners and allies is the most effective way for the United States to safeguard our vital national security interests in the Middle East. This architecture would provide five key benefits: Secure our vital interests. The US and global economies depend on the uninterrupted flow of energy from and trade through the Middle East, which remains a vital national security interest. Compete with China. China depends on the Middle East for energy to sustain its economy and military. Beijing is exploiting the vacuum created by US indifference to securing the Middle East. Manage risk and uncertainty. Threats in the region are approaching a quantitative military advantage over America’s partners, which creates unacceptable risk to US interests. Leverage our relationships. We retain advantages in the long-term diplomatic, economic, and security relationships that we have derived from convergent interests with partners. Build on a sound foundation. Historic efforts to build collective security constructs, many of which have occurred within the Middle East, provide valuable lessons.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Non State Actors, Strategic Competition, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Iran, and Middle East

8. India-China Border Tensions and U.S. Strategy in the Indo-Pacific

Author:: Lisa Curtis and Derek Grossman
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: India-China border intrusions and clashes have become more frequent and threaten to lead to all-out conflict between the two Asian giants. In recent years, China has upped the ante in its border disputes with India through infrastructure development, military deployments, capability enhancements, and periodic efforts to encroach into territory controlled by India. The first deadly border clash between the two countries in 45 years occurred on June 15, 2020, in the Galwan River Valley, where 20 Indian troops and at least four Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops were killed. More recently, on December 9, 2022, Chinese and Indian forces clashed along the disputed border in the mountains near Tawang in the northeastern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh after an estimated 300 Chinese PLA soldiers tried to cross the border. While the Chinese and Indian militaries have since pulled back forces from the most contentious standoff sites where the 2020 buildup occurred and established temporary buffer zones, both sides retain high numbers of troops forward deployed along the disputed frontier, and there are several flashpoints that could erupt into another border crisis at any time. The most recent clash that took place near Tawang is a reminder that, even though recent attention has been focused on the Ladakh region, there are multiple trigger points along the 2,100-mile-long Line of Actual Control (LAC) that bear monitoring.1 With both China and India enhancing infrastructure and introducing new and advanced weapons systems on their sides of the disputed border, combined with forward deployments and heightened lack of trust, the chances for continued standoffs that could erupt into local or even full-blown conflict remain high.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Territorial Disputes, and Borders
Political Geography:: China, India, Asia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

9. Resisting China’s Gray Zone Military Pressure on Taiwan

Author:: Jacob Stokes
Publication Date:: 12-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: The People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) has sharply escalated its pressure campaign targeting the Republic of China (ROC or Taiwan) in recent years. Beijing appears likely to use Taiwan’s upcoming presidential election in January 2024 as a pretext to apply more pressure on the self-governing island, particularly in the “gray zone” using China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), along with other tools of state power. There is no precise and commonly agreed upon definition of what gray zone activities are and are not. In general, though, the concept refers to actions that fall into the space between, on one side, peace and, on the other, full-scale kinetic war.1 Gray zone activities are coercive and aggressive but designed to stay below the threshold of triggering major conflict. China uses gray zone operations as part of a comprehensive strategy to pressure Taiwan that spans the areas of diplomacy, information, economics, and security. This policy brief examines one major component of that campaign: gray zone military and security operations. It starts by detailing the capabilities and tactics China uses to put security pressure on Taiwan. Then, it explains what Beijing seeks to achieve with those actions. The paper concludes with recommendations for how U.S. and Taiwan policymakers can resist and counter China’s gray zone operations.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, Military Affairs, and Information
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and Asia

10. Transatlantic Trends 2023: Public Opinion in a Shifting Global Order

Author:: Alexandra de Hoop Scheffer, Martin Quencez, and Gusine Weber
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: Transatlantic Trends 2023 presents the results of representative surveys conducted in 14 countries on both sides of the Atlantic: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Türkiye, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Divided into five chapters, this report assesses public opinion on contemporary structural issues impacting the world order, transatlantic relations, security and defense, China, and global challenges.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, European Union, Democracy, Geopolitics, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:: China, United Kingdom, Europe, Turkey, Ukraine, France, Poland, Germany, Global Focus, and United States of America

11. Next Generation Perspectives on Taiwan: Insights from the 2023 Taiwan-US Policy Program

Author:: Bonnie S. Glaser
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: Taiwan faces growing threats to its security. The circumstances and factors that have deterred for decades an attack by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on Taiwan and enabled its people to remain secure and prosperous are changing. The conventional military balance in the western Pacific has tipped in China’s favor, although its military, the People’s Liberation Army, is not yet ready to seize and control Taiwan. Apart from the military threats of invasion, blockade, and seizure of one of its small outlying islands, Taiwan is the target of Chinese economic and diplomatic pressure, disinformation, united front tactics, and other forms of psychological warfare. Most of the global focus on Taiwan centers on the risk of war, leaving insufficient attention to these gray-zone threats that are designed to sow doubts about US willingness to defend Taiwan if attacked and to induce a sense of deep psychological despair about its future unless it is integrated into the PRC. Beijing’s ultimate goal is to convince the people of Taiwan to lose faith in their democracy and to surrender sovereignty. China is more likely to succeed in that endeavor if Taiwan becomes isolated from the rest of the world. Only 13 sovereign states now maintain full diplomatic relations with the Republic of China, the official name that Taiwan uses to distinguish itself from its giant neighbor. Since President Tsai Ing-wen took office in 2016, Beijing has poached nine of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies and blocked Taipei from participating in international organizations, including the World Health Organization and its decision-making body, the World Health Assembly. On the economic front, Taiwan remains an active member of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), but it has been excluded from the ASEAN-inspired Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the US-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). Beijing is lobbying members of the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) to oppose Taipei’s application for membership. Easing Taiwan’s isolation and providing reassurance that the world cares deeply about the fate and well-being of its 23.5 million people are crucial to preserving the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. The Taiwan-US Policy Program (TUPP) was launched in 2017 to encourage young professionals to include Taiwan in their research and help Taipei expand its global networks. TUPP enables future leaders to acquire a deeper understanding of Taiwan and its relations with the United States through meetings with officials and experts in Washington, followed by a visit to Taiwan to gain first-hand exposure to its politics, culture, and history. Experiencing Taiwan influences how these future leaders approach their work and their writing. It impacts their worldview by imbuing them with an appreciation for Taiwan’s history and commitment to the principles of democracy and human rights that undergird the existing international order. It also reinforces the importance of maintaining robust bilateral relations and strengthening international support for maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, East Asia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

12. Enemies Foreign and Domestic: Confronting Kleptocrats at Home and Abroad

Author:: Kelly M. McFarland
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University
Abstract:: As Putin and his kleptocratic regime of oligarchs wage a devastating war in Ukraine, the costs of corruption have never been so starkly visible. Beyond Russia, recent examples of corruption in China, Afghanistan, the Northern Triangle, the Solomon Islands, and elsewhere, prove that rampant corruption poses a significant threat to aspirations for a greener, healthier, more peaceful, and more democratic world. Countries such as Russia and China have elevated their brand of corruption into a distinct and powerful aspect of their foreign policy. They employ this strategic corruption abroad to stunt economic growth; prop-up fellow authoritarian regimes; exacerbate social inequality; erase political trust; accelerate pandemics and degrade healthcare systems; exploit the environment; and propel state oppression. As U.S. policymakers seek to counter this strategic corruption, they must first recognize the extent to which domestic laws and actors within the United States enable this corruption to fester. In the fall of 2021 and spring of 2022, ISD convened a series of New Global Commons working group meetings with participants drawn from academia, think tanks, government, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector. The group crafted workable definitions of corruption, evaluated the unique political and related threats posed by corruption and kleptocracy, assessed Russia and China’s use of strategic corruption, and developed principles and recommendations for government and non-government entities to build a global, sustained, anti-corruption response.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Corruption, Diplomacy, Authoritarianism, and Kleptocracy
Political Geography:: Russia, China, North America, and United States of America

13. A 'Bright Path' Forward or a Grim Dead End? The Political Impact of the Belt and Road Initiative in Kazakhstan

Author:: Anton Louthan
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: This report assesses the political impact of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Kazakhstan. Specifically, it examines whether and how the People’s Republic of China can pursue a strategy of economic statecraft to further its foreign policy and political interests in Kazakhstan. Despite Kazakhstan’s importance for the success of the BRI’s overland trade corridors, the report argues that important financial, foreign policy, and political constraints limit Beijing’s potential to influence Nur-Sultan. Beijing’s concerns over upsetting its relationship with the Russian Federation and the fact that the value of bilateral trade, investment, and Kazakhstani indebtedness to China have decreased in recent years suggest that Beijing is less willing to, capable of, or interested in using the BRI to influence Kazakhstan. The perceived closeness in this bilateral relationship has less to do with the influence of the BRI and more to do with the alignment of both countries’ geopolitical interests before the initiative’s creation. The report does not suggest that Chinese influence has decreased, but rather shows how Kazakhstan has been able to maintain a degree of political autonomy. Nur-Sultan has played a proactive role in forming its relationship with Beijing through its pursuit of former President Nursultan Nazarbayev’s “multi-vector” foreign policy strategy. In diversifying Kazakhstan’s diplomatic, economic, and political ties with Russia, China, the European Union, and the United States, Nur-Sultan has been able to avoid complete dependence on one country. Furthermore, Kazakhstan has been able to shape the size and scope of Chinese economic activity by guiding the initiative’s investments and projects to further the government’s domestic development agenda, Nurly Zhol (translated as “Bright Path”). However, issues related to corruption and deepening ties between Chinese and Kazakhstani elites through the BRI have likely strengthened Kazakhstan’s authoritarian political structure.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Development, Bilateral Relations, Infrastructure, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Autonomy, and Influence
Political Geography:: China, Kazakhstan, and Asia

14. How Will China Respond to the Russia-Ukraine Crisis?

Author:: Chris Miller
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: How will China respond to a potential Russian military escalation against Ukraine? Relations between Russia and China have intensified in recent years, with Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping holding regular summits and the two countries’ militaries participating in joint exercises and cooperating in some defense industrial efforts. Ties between Moscow and Beijing are now closer than any time since the days of Stalin and Mao, driven by a shared perception that the United States is each country’s primary foreign policy challenge. One top Russian official told media in December 2021 that the relationship now “exceeds an alliance.”[1] Chinese state media, meanwhile, have vocally backed Russia in arguing that the current crisis stems from the US “using NATO as a tool to cannibalize and squeeze Russia’s strategic space.”[2] The 2014 war in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea was an important factor driving Russia and China closer to each other, as Russia sought to reduce post-Crimea international isolation and as Beijing realized it could drive a hard bargain in its bilateral relationship with Russia on issues like energy. China’s response to the 2014 war, however, was generally to avoid taking sides. China accepted a narrative that placed blame on the West for causing the crisis, with top diplomats citing Western “foreign interference for causing the crisis,” but didn’t approve of Russia’s seizure of Crimea or its military actions in the Donbas.[3] China abstained from voting on the key United Nations resolutions regarding Crimea, for example, and it still declines to recognize Crimea as Russian territory. Similarly, it verbally rejected US and European sanctions on Russia though it let Chinese firms, including the country’s big state-owned banks, abide by these sanctions to avoid being cut off from US financial markets and the international banking system. Compared to 2014, however, China may find it more difficult to avoid involvement in an escalating crisis. Leaders in Beijing and around the world will see the US response to any military escalation against Ukraine as sending signals about whether the US could effectively respond to future crises in the Taiwan Strait or East or South China Seas. The success or failure of US efforts to impose meaningful costs on Russia if it escalates will be seen as a test of whether the US could do something similar in Asia. Moreover, after repeated summits between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin, including Xi’s description of Putin as his “best friend,” China’s approach to Russia amid a crisis will also be interpreted as sending signals about China’s own capabilities and influence. Because of this, China will not see a new phase of war between Russia and Ukraine as a peripheral issue in its foreign policy, even though China has no core issues at stake in Ukraine itself. China is most likely to be implicated in the crisis by potential Western sanctions on Russia, which in contrast to 2014 will impose substantially more pressure on Beijing to take sides. China’s decision either to adhere to new Western sanctions or to help Russia avoid them will shape escalation pathways and determine the magnitude of economic and political isolation that sanctions impose.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Politics, Sanctions, Military Affairs, Economy, Crisis Management, and Escalation
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, and Asia

15. Correlates of Politics and Economics: How Chinese Investment in Africa Changes Political Influence

Author:: Carla D. Jones, Mengge Li, and Hermann A. Ndofor
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: This study investigates the impact of Chinese economic engagement in Africa (FDI and loans from China to African countries) on African countries’ international political alignment as evidenced by voting patterns in the UN General Assembly. We find three seasons of Chinese policy in Africa. Pre 2008, Chinese economic engagement in Africa was driven primarily by economic considerations, market seeking for FDI and likely resource seeking for loans. During the Great Recession, China came to terms with its rise as an economic power and thus started leveraging its economic power in international relationships. During this season, both Chinese FDI and loans were no longer driven by economic considerations but rather by international relations which led to increased political alignment with recipient African countries. The final season captured the Xi Jinping era beginning 2013. During this season, Chinese FDI had no effect on African countries’ foreign policy alignment with China, but Chinese loans still had a significant positive effect. This likely reflects a movement away from FDI to less transparent bilateral loans as a means of utilizing Chinese economic power to influence foreign policy. During the entire period of the study, Chinese FDI to Africa resulted in reduced political alignment between African countries and the United States.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Economics, Politics, Investment, and Influence
Political Geography:: Africa, China, and Asia

16. Serbia on Edge

Author:: Richard Kraemer
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: The time has come to openly regard the Republic of Serbia for what it is: A stalwart Russian and Chinese ally run by a semi-authoritarian government that proactively pursues ideologically irredentist territorial expansion in the Western Balkans. Today’s Serbia poses a threat to regional and transatlantic security. Under President Aleksandar Vučić’s Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), the Serbian government is rapidly building its military, overtly backing ultranationalist provocateurs in neighboring states, cementing Belgrade’s ties to Moscow, and consolidating partnerships with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Integral to its efforts to actualize the “Greater Serbia” ideology, Serbia’s and Russia’s Orthodox Church leadership cooperate closely and in concert with their political counterparts. Without a significant Westward shift in its orientation, Serbia will continue on an authoritarian trajectory aligned with U.S. adversaries. Contemporary Serbia presents a quandary for U.S. and European strategists and policymakers. A genuinely democratic and Euro-Atlantic-oriented Serbia has been sought by Brussels and Washington alike. Yet, decades after Yugoslavia’s violent dissolution and related North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) interventions in the 1990s, most Serbians reject NATO cooperation and are lukewarm towards the European Union (EU). Consequently, the U.S. and its democratic allies in Europe are less able to leverage prospective memberships as a means of transatlantic integration. Further complicating relations with Serbia is Aleksandar Vučić’s overt embrace of Beijing and Moscow. The depth of Serbia’s growing dependence on those powers jeopardizes U.S and European security on multiple fronts. The Vučić government’s enduring endorsement of ultranationalist narratives and their subversive purveyors continues to intensify discord in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and North Macedonia. Its military build-up is gravely disconcerting; Belgrade responds only with specious explanations. The country’s ever-greater reliance on Russian oil and gas as a client and transit state for Gazprom, Russia’s state-owned energy giant, puts it at odds with Brussels, Washington, and several Central-Eastern European capitals. Belgrade and Beijing’s economic, technological, and increasingly military cooperation accelerates as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) further entrenches itself in southeast Europe. In sum: Serbia’s expanding alignment with authoritarian powers and regional anti-democratic forces reflects its illiberal worldview and disabling narrative of national victimhood. Western policymakers persistently view Belgrade’s government with the misunderstanding that, given the right incentives, Serbia will moderate, democratize, and gradually integrate into transatlantic institutions. This assumption is misguided. It diminishes, if not excludes, the need for a national reckoning among the Serbian people. As with post-war Germany’s Willy Brandt, Serbia needs courageous and sincere leadership to acknowledge past sins and move the nation forward. For example: A genuine Kniefall von Warschau event could spur an honest discussion among Serbian peoples about the atrocities committed during Yugoslavia’s dissolution. Whatever the catalyst, a broad acknowledgment of past crimes against humanity is categorical if Serbia is ever to become a democratic and open society. Without it, Serbs will remain disproportionately susceptible to domestic irredentist forces fed by malign foreign powers set on keeping the Western Balkans removed from the transatlantic community. Until such a national reckoning, Western decision-makers should adopt a more pragmatic approach to relations with a Belgrade government dismissive of genuine transatlantic partnerships. For as long as Pan-Serb ultranationalism is considered by Serbia’s leaders to be acceptable in political discourse, the kind of genuine democratic values and institutions shared within the transatlantic community will remain unrealized. Accordingly, the U.S. and its European allies should encourage Serbia to focus on itself, not its neighbors. In that vein, Western policymakers would be wise to stop expecting a breakthrough in Kosovo-Serbia status negotiations. It has become an empty dialogue that only keeps Kosovo locked outside of international institutions and other benefits of recognized statehood. A revised approach should also discontinue pushing an ineffective EU integration process as the primary means of democratically transforming Serbia.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Ideology, and Expansion
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eastern Europe, Serbia, and Balkans

17. China's Security Management Towards Central Asia

Author:: Niva Yau Tsz Yan
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: In the early years of diplomatic relations between the People’s Republic of China and Central Asian countries (roughly 1992-1999), bilateral security discussions strictly focused on the then-looming influence of a Uyghur-led independence movement in Xinjiang. Chinese officials directly asked Central Asian states to not support the East Turkestan Movement, orienting the issue as a regional mutual security interest. While concerns for stability in Xinjiang continue as the foundational drive towards deepening security relations with Central Asian states, new security interests have entered discussions since the late 2010s as expanded bilateral trade brought new issues, such as investment security and corruption-fuelled anti-China sentiment. Also, domestic issues in Central Asia, concerning leadership transition, economic decline, and nationalism, expanded the Chinese discussion of the role of Islam in politics and implications on Xinjiang’s stability. To address these interests, Chinese security engagement in Central Asia has steadily expanded. Within and beyond the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), multilateral dialogue on security issues have been regularized among all ranks of Central Asian security officers. The SCO has conducted annual security exercises since 2010, though the size of deployment, focus, and scope have changed. Between 2010 and 2019, the SCO created five expert groups to coordinate regional law enforcement agencies in order to address specific security issues. However, in comparison, bilateral security engagement remains more diverse. The number of meetings is increasing, and their formats are becoming more efficient. There are joint patrols and operation, regular military exercises pre-pandemic, short-term training and long-term military degree programs in China, transfer of security equipment, construction of security infrastructure, and the presence of Chinese private security companies. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are the two most responsive countries towards welcoming these initiatives. In addition to multilateral and bilateral security engagement, the PRC has increased its military capacity in its western region. More emphasis has been placed on increased combat readiness, as well on the condition and human capacity on the border. While some areas of existing security cooperation are productive in meeting security goals, such as consensus over non-tolerance of Uyghur independence supporters and tightening illegal cross-border activities, two problems persist. First, while the PRC to an extend desires a regional approach to security, deliverables are more visible as the outcome of bilateral cooperation in Central Asia. These regional efforts are meant to deter any Central Asian governments from making independent assessments and forming their own foreign policy on Xinjiang without PRC participation. Second, language remains the most difficult operational obstacle to overcome. The dominance of the Russian language cements a substantial cultural and operational gap between the armies. So far, Central Asia-PRC cooperation has been a pragmatic, opportunistic choice—a choice that Central Asian leaders made due to the absence of comparable committed engagement from other major powers. Moving forward, in order to balance PRC security engagement, Central Asia’s strategic significance must be independently considered outside of its role in securing Xinjiang for the PRC.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Engagement
Political Geography:: China, Central Asia, and Asia

18. 'Win Without Fighting': The Chinese Communist Party's Political and Institutional Warfare Against the West

Author:: John Lee and Lavina Lee
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: When compared to Western forms of diplomatic conversation and strategic discussion, phrases emanating from Beijing and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) can appear peculiar, platitudinous, and so ambiguous as to be devoid of practical content. China’s paramount leader Xi Jinping speaks frequently about a ‘community of shared future,’ a ‘common destiny for mankind’ as part of his ‘China dream,’ or of his country’s ‘rejuvenation.’ He promises to pursue and achieve a ‘new type of great-power relations’ with the United States that will ‘expand the converging interests of all and build a big global family of harmony and cooperation.’ Yielding to the temptation to dismiss these phrases as glib and meaningless or as empty promises to the world would be a serious mistake. Emerging as the victorious side after the world was reshaped in the aftermath of the Second World War, and, more recently, the formal end of the Cold War, the United States and its allies have generally enjoyed dominance in all forms of power. The challenge and threat of China is largely understood in the context of its increase in material power, which is relatively easy to understand and quantify. In contrast, far less attention is being paid to non-material power, which is, admittedly, more nebulous and difficult to assess. However, China’s focus has been on relentlessly building its ‘comprehensive national power’ (CNP), that is, the sum-total of its powers and strengths—economic, military affair, science and technology, education, and resource—and influence. Thus, CNP encompasses both material and non-material power, and China’s buildup of both of these forms of power best explains its strategic and diplomatic successes. Chinese ‘rejuvenation’ is also not just about building GDP or having the world’s largest naval fleet. Rather, the CCP’s vision of a ‘community of shared future for mankind’ is very much about displacing the dominance enjoyed by the US and other advanced democracies in shaping global discourse and conversations, norms and standards, and influence within and through institutions. The advanced democracies have taken these less obvious forms of power for granted, a complacency that Beijing has exploited. As the CCP recognizes, “In the final analysis, the rise of a great power is a cultural phenomenon. It (that power) must be accepted by the international community. Be accommodated by the international system, rely on the international system, and be recognised by international norms.” To be sure, there is a rich and growing literature on the CCP’s various information, influence, and institutional resources and activities, and this report does not seek to reproduce the excellent work already in the public domain. Rather, it begins from the uncomfortable but growing realization that the CCP believes it has long been at war with the US and its allies, even though kinetic force has been used in only a few instances. It looks at why this war is being waged, what the hallmarks of success for Beijing look like, and how the use of non-material strategies in the form of political and institutional warfare complements and augments China’s better known material approaches in the CCP’s determined attempts to win this ongoing war or struggle. The report seeks to emphasize that, in understanding the challenge and threat of China, political and institutional warfare should not be treated as optional or interesting adjuncts to traditional notions of warfare or that their effects are peripheral to core strategic and even military objectives. On the contrary, non-material approaches are essential to the Chinese strategy and have real-world outcomes that are often the same ones that the use of force or economic coercion is intended to achieve. Just as the CCP views comprehensive power as encompassing material and non-material elements, its notion of waging and winning a war may or may not include a military element. We need to do the same when countering, deterring, and, if necessary, defeating Chinese strategies and actions. Moreover, the CCP’s approach is not just about putting its views forward in overt or veiled ways in the hope that it will change our minds about various issues. Instead, Beijing’s strategy is much more proactive and profound than that. The CCP’s political and institutional approaches are about fundamentally changing and shaping even the way we begin to think about or analyze an issue or what we perceive to be its ‘first principles.’ It is designed to shape the way we talk (or do not talk) about an issue, the presumptive and analytical frameworks we employ to do so, and the discourse regarding it that is accepted and deemed acceptable. At first glance, such a deeply cognitive approach might seem fanciful and impossible to implement. However, this report offers two recent case studies of instances where the CCP enjoyed considerable success in melding the material and the cognitive—with tangible and real-world results. This report then offers a summary of the real-world strategic effects and their impacts on the tactical decision-making of countries and their elites that should concern those in charge of our political, economic, military, and diplomatic policies and activities. In conclusion, it suggests some general responses to the CCP’s strategy, approach, and actions in these contexts.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Politics, Economy, Institutions, Strategic Competition, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

19. Chinese Political Warfare: The PLA’s Information and Influence Operations

Author:: John Lee
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: Material power is relatively easy to understand and quantify. Much less attention is given to nonmaterial power, which is admittedly more nebulous and difficult to assess. Even so, if power is broadly defined as the capacity to exercise or impose one’s will over another, then nonmaterial forms of power need to be taken seriously. This means understanding them, increasing one’s capacity to operationalize and exercise them, and institutionalizing their use to achieve national and security interests. The issue of nonmaterial power (especially information and influence operations, which will fall under the term political warfare) is arising because these forms of power have been taken for granted or have been largely ignored by the advanced democracies. Beijing is exploiting our complacency. There is already a rich and growing body of literature on the various information, influence, and institutional resources and activities of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This brief does not seek to reproduce the excellent work already out there
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Politics, Armed Forces, and Information Warfare
Political Geography:: China and Asia

20. Understanding and Countering China's Approach to Economic Decoupling from the United States

Author:: John Lee
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: Many experts have highlighted American efforts to partially decouple from China. Yet China began pursuing a far more ambitious and comprehensive decoupling strategy vis-à-vis the United States long before Donald Trump entered the White House. This monograph examines China’s evolving approach to economic decoupling from the US. It makes the following arguments and conclusions. First, on the back of a preexisting mercantilist political economic structure, China has been explicitly pursuing economic decoupling from US and allied economies on Chinese terms for at least a decade. Second, while the US seeks to decouple some aspects of its economic activity from China, the latter seeks to dominate vast segments of the Asian economy and to decouple these segments from the US. This is the Chinese strategy and threat that the US vastly underappreciates. Third, the most important segments are the high-tech and high-value sectors. These sectors are where competition is the most consequential and where decoupling on US terms needs to occur. Fourth, China faces increasingly serious problems and obstacles regarding its decoupling strategy. Many of these arise out of structural weaknesses inherent in its political economy. The monograph is written to assist the Biden administration and those who follow it to possess a deeper understanding of: China’s actions and the motives behind them; China’s strengths, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities; and How the US and its allies can craft an evolving approach that better plays to their individual and collective strengths and advantages. China hopes the US and its allies will adopt a cautious, gradualist, and ineffective approach to countering Beijing’s strategy and objectives. The Chinese Communist Party knows the US and other advanced economies still have immense advantages despite clever Chinese messaging to the contrary. The US and its allies continue to enjoy considerable leverage and remain well placed to partially decouple from China on their preferred terms, but they need to act quickly, collectively, and decisively.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Economics, and National Security
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

21. Chinese Information and Influence Warfare in Asia and the Pacific

Author:: John Lee
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: The People’s Liberation Army’s increasingly provocative and reckless activities in and around disputed zones such as Taiwan, the Senkaku Islands, and the South China Sea constitute only one means through which Beijing seeks to change key aspects of the regional order and compel others to “accept its interests.” However, the Chinese Communist Party and PLA are already decades into China’s information and influence war, which is designed to either weaken the will and capabilities of the United States and its allies should military conflict break out or, even better, eliminate the need for China to use military force to achieve its primary objectives (i.e., to “win without fighting”). In this context, the PLA is several steps ahead of the West; whereas Western analysts observe that the PLA is operating in the “grey zone,” the PLA is instead redefining and expanding this grey zone by manipulating how other countries think about it. With respect to this so-called grey zone, a cost-benefit analysis encompassing both objective and subjective elements typically determines an entity’s decision to respond with military force. For example, crafting narratives about the PLA’s military superiority, elite capture, ability to foment disunity within a target country, or normalization of coercion raises the West’s threshold of what provocations demand a military response—thereby expanding the grey zone within which the PLA and CCP are allowed to operate. Thus, Beijing is well ahead of the US and its allies in conceptualizing and operationalizing the use of military actions other than (kinetic) war to achieve political or strategic objectives. Finally, Asia and the Pacific constitute both the primary and most suitable region within which the Chinese can conduct information and influence warfare. These sub-regions’ unique material, geographical, ideational, and cultural characteristics render them especially suitable for Beijing to successfully wage political warfare. This policy memo describes the key objectives, strategies, and tactics of Chinese information and influence warfare developed and refined for use in the Asia-Pacific region. It focuses on maritime Southeast Asia and the Pacific, the areas of highest interest for the US, Australia, and their allies. Offering Singapore, Thailand, and the Solomon Islands as three pertinent case studies, the memo also lays the groundwork for an examination of effective US and allied counters to Beijing’s activities in these contexts, which follow-up reports in this series will present.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Economics, National Security, Territorial Disputes, and Information Warfare
Political Geography:: China and Asia

22. An Assessment of US and Allied Information and Influence Warfare

Author:: John Lee
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: The first two policy memos in this series on Chinese information and influence warfare pointed out that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) believes it is engaged in a perpetual “struggle” against the West and makes no fundamental distinction between wartime and peacetime. These reports also explained that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) plays a central and often dominant role in leading doctrine and operations when it comes to informational and influence warfare. Additionally, the previous memos argued that Asia and the Pacific are both the primary and most suitable subregions for the conduct of such Chinese activities. For the CCP and PLA, the region has unique material, geographical, ideational, and cultural characteristics that render it especially suitable for Beijing to successfully wage political warfare. Previous memos focused on the PLA’s Three Warfares framework, which consists of public opinion, psychological, and legal warfare. The Chinese intent is not merely to disrupt, confuse, or create mischief but to craft and control grand narratives. Doing so is extremely effective because these narratives determine how we reflexively interpret information and situations, what seems possible or not, what seems prudent rather than reckless, and what appears to be rational and in one’s long-term interest. Grand narratives determine how we think about a problem, issue, or development. In doing so, they predetermine the range of “reasonable” options and solutions that we believe are available. The previous memos also offered analysis and examples of how the CCP and PLA are using political warfare to achieve strategic objectives and to undermine the interests of the United States and its allies. Ominously, and in important respects, Beijing is not just “winning without fighting” but taking the more insidious approach of achieving strategic goals without victory.1 This third memo in the series examines US and allied information and influence doctrine and operations, especially by the defense establishments. In these democracies, the government has largely allowed the defense establishments to lead doctrine and capability for the information and influence elements of political warfare. The paper looks at the strengths and shortcomings of how the US and others conceive of information and influence warfare as it relates to responding to Chinese efforts in the region, as detailed in the first two memos. In doing so, it prepares the way for the fourth and final memo, which will look at specific policies and activities that the US and its allies could engage in to advance its interests and values and to counter some of the more damaging and insidious elements of Chinese political warfare in the region. The memo focuses on the US and, to a lesser extent, Australia because these Five Eyes countries are the most active and invested in understanding and countering Chinese information and influencing warfare efforts in the region. It is important to remember that such warfare is different in nature, purpose, and implementation from the usual diplomatic and soft-power efforts undertaken by democracies. The first memo argues as follows: Engaging in information and influence operations (or countering those by other countries) is a whole-of-government enterprise. [But it is] very different from the usual public messaging and soft power efforts led by diplomats and embassies. Engagement in this kind of political warfare is far more akin to missions undertaken by defense forces in that there must be specific objectives, tactics designed based on the objectives and resources available, and quick implementation by ready and well-resourced teams formed specifically for these tasks—even if this type of warfare is relentless and a protracted struggle.2
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, and Information Warfare
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

23. Competitive Connectivity: Crafting Transatlantic Responses to China’s Belt and Road Initiative

Author:: Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Lisa Curtis, Jacob Stokes, Carisa Nietsche, Joshua Fitt, and Nicholas Lokker
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: Given the uncertain future of BRI, researchers at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) identified the major drivers likely to influence the direction of the program and examined their numerous permutations. The authors selected three scenarios and focused on how conditions of each scenario would play out in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. For each scenario, the report identifies the risks and implications for the United States and its allies. The scenarios are designed to prepare policymakers and planners for the possible futures they could face, including key challenges and opportunities that may arise in the years to come. Lastly, this paper identifies additional policy steps that will prepare the transatlantic allies to both compete with China’s investments and increase their own resilience.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Infrastructure, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Transatlantic Relations, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and United States of America

24. Precision and Posture: Defense Spending Trends and the FY23 Budget Request

Author:: Stacie L. Pettyjohn and Hannah Dennis
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: This report examines the fiscal year (FY) 2023 defense budget request and assesses whether it sufficiently resources what was known of the Biden administration’s national defense strategy when the budget was released. Because of the delay of the full, unclassified version of the strategy, the analysis focuses on two factors—high-end munitions stockpiles and overseas posture—that past studies have indicated are critical for strengthening deterrence against China and Russia in the near term. This report concludes that while the FY23 request makes some strides on both issues, more must be done today to improve the United States’ chances of deterring and, if necessary, defeating the adversary tomorrow. The ongoing war in Ukraine has elevated the issue of munitions stockpiles to front-page news as both Ukrainian and Russian forces continue to consume high volumes of key weapons. We examine the sufficiency of existing critical conventional munitions stockpiles and the future procurement plans to meet the threats posed by China and Russia. We find that while the services have shifted to investing in longer-range weapons, they are still underinvesting in the specific capabilities, in particular anti-ship and area-effects weapons, that would be needed to counter China in a variety of scenarios. Moreover, the Department of Defense (DoD) is not buying enough of these weapons to blunt and defeat an initial invasion, and it certainly is not stockpiling enough precision-guided munitions (PGMs) for a protracted war.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Budget, Defense Spending, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, and United States of America

25. Building a Flywheel: The Biden Administration's Opportunity to Forge a New Path with North Korea

Author:: John Park
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: As the United States seeks to maintain a level of stability in its increasingly competitive relationship with China, North Korea has the potential to complicate their intensifying rivalry. Dealing with North Korea is a complex endeavor that requires deft handling by both nations because the stakes are high and instability can spread rapidly. For decades, China has been seeking to bolster the stability of the Kim family regime and increase China’s economic engagement with North Korea, to the point where North Korea Inc.—the Kim regime’s network of elite state trading companies—has embedded itself in major commercial hubs throughout China. By prioritizing the stability of the North Korean regime over denuclearization in its policy actions, China created a loophole in which the North Korean regime could enjoy economic benefits without having to do denuclearization work. Beijing thus impeded the development of a connection to a larger process in which major denuclearization activity would be paired with major economic and diplomatic concessions. In contrast to China’s sustained engagement with North Korea, U.S. policy toward North Korea over the last decade has focused substantially on sanctions implementation. There was a brief period of summit diplomacy during the Trump administration, but those efforts failed to bring about progress toward denuclearization. The North Korean nuclear issue has mutated into a much more complex challenge that no longer fits into past policy molds that rely heavily on sanctions implementation. President Joe Biden’s administration will need to recognize that North Korea under Kim Jong Un has become highly resilient to U.S. policy tools such as sanctions, largely due to far-reaching advancements in the relationship between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) as well as the migration and embedding of North Korea Inc. deep inside the Chinese national economy.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Strategic Competition, Strategic Stability, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:: China, North Korea, and United States of America

26. The Distortion of UN Resolution 2758 to Limit Taiwan’s Access to the United Nations

Author:: Jessica Drun and Bonnie S. Glaser
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: There is a campaign underway by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to reinterpret UN Resolution 2758 as based on its “One China” Principle and spread the fallacy that, through the resolution, UN member states came to a determination that Taiwan is a part of the PRC. Yet, in passing the resolution in 1971, the countries solely intended to grant the seat occupied by the Republic of China in the General Assembly and the Security Council to the PRC. This is reflected in the official historic record and meeting minutes as well as in the resolutions raised at the time for the General Assembly’s consideration. The PRC understood then that the resolution did not contain the Taiwan conclusions it wanted. Prime Minister Zhou Enlai noted that, if Resolution 2758 passed, “the status of Taiwan is not yet decided.” Beijing, through its proxies at the UN, expressed its unwillingness to join the organization if it allowed “‘two Chinas,’ ‘one China, one Taiwan,’ or ‘the status of Taiwan remaining to be determined.’” However, given that Beijing did not enjoy the same level of international influence then as it does today, it did not reject the resolution when it passed. Instead, PRC officials assumed the “China” seat and only later began to leverage their position to promote Beijing’s stance on Taiwan at the UN level. The PRC’s efforts to rewrite Taiwan’s status at the UN ramped up in the 1990s and early 2000s at the same time as the island’s democratization. The PRC has since worked to “internationalize” its “One China” Principle and to conflate it with UN Resolution 2758, a revisionist shift from the original intent of the document. Beijing has managed to further institutionalize and normalize its stance on Taiwan within the UN by signing secret agreements with UN bodies, restricting Taiwan’s access to the UN and its facilities, and embedding PRC nationals across various levels of UN staff. The UN and its specialized agencies have not made the texts of these agreements, such as that of the 2005 memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the PRC and the World Health Organization, available to the public or to any entity beyond the main signatories, though leaked guidance memos provide insights into the scope of the MOU’s content (See Appendix B). The PRC has likewise sought to force its views on nomenclature relating to Taiwan within the UN. This includes withholding UN accreditation from NGOs and civil society groups that do not refer to Taiwan as a part of the PRC in their organizational materials or on their websites. Recently, it has come to light that the PRC and its representatives have altered historic UN documents to change references of “Taiwan” to “Taiwan, Province of China.” (Examples are presented in a case study.) These developments have played out alongside marked shifts in the guidance of the UN Office of Legal Affairs on Taiwan, where it only 15 years ago cited an ambiguous and undefined “One China” policy, but now reiterates the PRC position on Taiwan. The PRC has likewise used UN Resolution 2758 and bilateral normalization agreements with other member states to falsely claim that its “One China” Principle is a universally accepted norm. It has also ensured that a plurality of countries back its views at the UN level and will cast votes alongside it—particularly on issues of Taiwan’s participation—and it reinforces this support through economic pressure on governments. The PRC’s efforts to constrain Taiwan at the UN have broader implications for international governance, as it shows a prioritization of one member state’s national interests over the global community’s—as exemplified by Taiwan’s damaging exclusion from global health debates during the coronavirus pandemic. The United States opposes the PRC’s attempts to redefine UN Resolution 2758 and has pushed back against UN statements claiming that Taiwan is a province of the PRC, including issuing a 2007 “non-paper” asserting its position that Taiwan’s status is not yet determined. The PRC has recently attempted to use its narrative of the “One China” Principle as embedded in UN Resolution 2758 to call into question the legitimacy of longstanding US policy on Taiwan—including the Taiwan Relations Act, which is US law.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Sovereignty, United Nations, and International Community
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and United States of America

27. Education, Training and Capacity Building in the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) 2021: Multilateral and Bilateral Ambitions Twenty Years On

Author:: Kenneth King
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: LSE IDEAS
Abstract:: The latest Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) took place in Dakar, Senegal in November 2021. Among the huge range of pledges and agreements, one of the most extensive was capacity building through scholarships, targeted training and people-to-people exchanges. In this Occasional Paper, Kenneth King analyses China’s pledges not just in the sphere of formal education, but across the many different sectors of China’s collaboration with Africa for the next three years. While the impact of COVID-19 can be seen in the reduction of some face-to-face opportunities in China, the extent of what is agreed to be implemented in Africa remains significant. Though these ambitious promises are agreed multilaterally with the whole of Africa, they are delivered bilaterally across the continent in more than fifty different country settings, reflecting how the Africa-China relationship remains strong after two decades of growing engagement.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Education, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, Multilateralism, Training, and Capacity Building
Political Geography:: Africa and China

28. China's Foreign Policies Today: Who Is in Charge of What

Author:: Axel Berkofsky and Giulia Sciorati
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:: While the war in Ukraine is a game changer for international and in particular European security, China appears to be marching on. And, in some ways, it is true. Since Xi Jinping took power in 2012, China’s foreign policy has significantly shifted from a defensive to an assertive approach. For decades, Beijing worked to integrate into the liberal international order, presenting itself as a peacefully rising power. By contrast, under Xi’s leadership, the country is attempting to create a global system that is more favourable to its own interests. The Report examines China’s current approach to foreign policy, and the drivers of the country’s shift away from tradition. What are the main characteristics of China’s foreign policy in the wake of the Ukraine war? How are decisions being taken, and to what extent do interest groups continue to have a say in decision-making after the recent power centralisation?
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Ukraine, and Asia

29. China's messaging on the Ukraine conflict

Author:: Samantha Hoffman and Matthew Knight
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: In the early days of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, social media posts by Chinese diplomats on US platforms almost exclusively blamed the US, NATO and the West for the conflict. Chinese diplomats amplified Russian disinformation about US biological weapon labs in Ukraine, linking this narrative with conspiracy theories about the origins of COVID-19. Chinese state media mirrored these narratives, as well as replicating the Kremlin’s language describing the invasion as a ‘special military operation’. ASPI found that China’s diplomatic messaging was distributed in multiple languages, with its framing tailored to different regions. In the early stage of the conflict, tweets about Ukraine by Chinese diplomats performed better than unrelated content, particularly when the content attacked or blamed the West. ASPI’s research suggests that, in terms of its international facing propaganda, the Russia–Ukraine conflict initially offered the party-state’s international-facing propaganda system an opportunity to reassert enduring preoccupations that the Chinese Communist Party perceives as fundamental to its political security.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Cybersecurity, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia

30. Producing policy-relevant China research and analysis in an era of strategic competition

Author:: Samantha Hoffman
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: This brief report explores the challenge of producing policy-relevant China research and analysis. Policy-relevant research is defined as work that drives action, affects decision-making, or both. It’s the kind of research think tanks seek to do, bridging the gap between academia and civil servants who work on policy. This paper focuses on two key findings: There’s a distinction between conducting policy-relevant research and the process of disseminating it in a way that will effectively shape and influence the policy process in particular places by particular policy- and decision-makers. In practice, the difference between the two isn’t always clearly understood and perhaps not clearly taught. There’s limited training that prepares the China analytical community to deal with the challenges of producing policy-relevant research under conditions of restricted access to China. Researchers require more support in navigating the research environment and filling skill-set gaps.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Cybersecurity, Strategic Competition, and Decision-Making
Political Geography:: China, Australia, and Asia-Pacific

31. US-China Mutual Vulnerability: Perspectives on the Debate

Author:: David Santoro
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: The study US-China Mutual Vulnerability: Perspectives on the Debate analyzes the mutual vulnerability question in US-China strategic nuclear relations. It asks whether the United States should acknowledge mutual vulnerability with China and, if so, how and under what conditions it should do so. The goal is not to give a yes-or-no answer but to provide a comprehensive examination of the issue to better understand the benefits, costs, and risks associated with various options. The study includes chapters by US, Japanese, South Korean, Australian, and Chinese scholars.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Strategic Competition, and Vulnerability
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

32. Trouble on the Rocks: US Policy in East China Sea and South China Sea Disputes

Author:: Benjamin Tracy
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: The South and East China Seas are strategic not only for US security and commercial interests, but are vitally so for US treaty allies Japan and the Philippines. Both countries are involved in territorial disputes with China, a rising power and security concern for the US and its allies. Despite treaty alliances with both, the United States has consistently confirmed that the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea are covered under Article V of the US-Japan Security Treaty while stating that Philippine-claimed islands in the South China Sea are not explicitly covered in the Mutual Defense Treaty. This research project aims to understand why US policy is inconsistent in defending treaty allies’ territory. The methods used to solve this question are to look at the historical context of both disputes as well as strategic interests. UNCLOS is also analyzed to see whether international law influenced US policy. The result was that the US more consistently covered the Senkaku Islands due to the need to gain Japan’s trust as an ally in the post-war order and the US has an interest in maintaining status-quo in the region. There are three recommendations for the US in order to create a more consistent policy, which include signing UNCLOS, reengaging with regional allies such as the Philippines to establish a stronger defense commitment, and strengthening alliances with actors such as the Quad as well as the UK and France.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Treaties and Agreements, Territorial Disputes, and Alliance
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Philippines, North America, United States of America, and South China Sea

33. Ukraine Will Not Happen in Asia: America Seeks to Check China through Taiwan Visit and Quad Initiatives

Author:: Sarosh Bana
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: East-West Center
Abstract:: Sarosh Bana, Executive Editor of Business India in Mumbai and former board member of the East-West Centre (EWC) Association—an organization representing the more than 65,000 individuals who have participated in East-West Center programs,
Topic:: Conflict Prevention, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Quad Alliance
Political Geography:: China, Ukraine, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

34. FSM Engagement with the United States and China: A Lesson Learned for the Pacific Islands

Author:: Gonzaga Puas
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: East-West Center
Abstract:: Dr. Gonzaga Puas, Professor at Pacific Islands University and Founder of Micronesia Institute of Research and Development, explains that the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) is at a "junction, where the confluence of the two super-powers [the United States and China] meet... FSM is aware of its strategic importance and is judiciously managing the influence of both superpowers."
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Strategic Competition, and Dialogue
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, United States of America, Oceania, and Micronesia

35. From Strategic Ambiguity to Strategic Clarity? The Dynamics of South Korea’s Navigation of US-China Competition

Author:: Clint Work
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: East-West Center
Abstract:: Dr. Clint Work, Nonresident Fellow with the Henry L. Stimson Center's 38 North Program, explains that while President Yoon has made it clear that he will opt for strategic clarity amidst a growing US-China rivalry, he must navigate the challenges all previous ROK presidents have faced in dealing with Beijing
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, and Rivalry
Political Geography:: China, Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

36. The Future of Xi’s China. Scenarios and Implications for Europe

Author:: Alessia Amighini
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:: At the upcoming 20th Party Congress, which opens Sunday in China, Xi Jinping is expected to be confirmed as the country's Secretary General for an unprecedented third term. At a time of international instability caused by the Covid pandemic and the war in Ukraine, as well as rising competition between international superpowers, the Chinese leadership is called to increase the country's international standing, while ensuring economic growth at the domestic level. However, achieving these goals will not be without challenges. This Report analyses China’s hard road to international prestige and development. Which prospects for China's economic growth? Which obstacles to its rise at the global level? To which extent can the Party steer the country’s direction?
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Development, Economy, Xi Jinping, and Instability
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and Asia

37. Suppressing the truth and spreading lies: How the CCP is influencing Solomon Islands’ information environment

Author:: Blake Johnson, Miah Hammond-Errey, Daria Impiombato, Albert Zhang, and Joshua Dunne
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is attempting to influence public discourse in Solomon Islands through coordinated information operations that seek to spread false narratives and suppress information on a range of topics. Following the November 2021 Honiara riots and the March 2022 leaking of the China – Solomon Islands security agreement, the CCP has used its propaganda and disinformation capabilities to push false narratives in an effort to shape the Solomon Islands public’s perception of security issues and foreign partners. In alignment with the CCP’s regional security objectives, those messages have a strong focus on undermining Solomon Islands’ existing partnerships with Australia and the US. Although some of the CCP’s messaging occurs through routine diplomatic engagement, there’s a coordinated effort to influence the population across a broad spectrum of information channels. That spectrum includes Chinese party-state media, CCP official-led statements and publications in local and social media, and the amplification of particular individual and pro-CCP content via targeted Facebook groups. There’s now growing evidence to suggest that CCP officials are also seeking to suppress information that doesn’t align with the party-state’s narratives across the Pacific islands through the coercion of local journalists and media institutions.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Propaganda, Disinformation, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:: China, Solomon Islands, and Asia-Pacific

38. Navigating an uncertain future: An exploration of China’s influence on the Netherlands’ future maritime logistics hub function

Author:: Frans-Paul van der Putten and Xiaoxue Martin
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:: The maritime logistics hub function is of strategic importance to the Netherlands as a trading country. The Netherlands positions itself as the ‘Gateway to Europe’ thanks to its advanced logistics network and plays an important role in the global economy. This position nevertheless faces an uncertain future: there is no guarantee that the Netherlands will remain a leader in the years ahead. Geopolitics, and particularly the influence of China, will have a major impact on the Dutch maritime logistics hub function. On behalf of the Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this report examines China’s influence on the Netherlands’ maritime logistics hub function. The main question posed in the study is: How is China’s influence on the central position of the Netherlands’ maritime logistics hub function likely to evolve in the decades ahead and what possible actions could the Dutch government take in response to it? The purpose of this study is to assess scenarios as a basis for possible actions by the Dutch government and the Dutch maritime logistics sector, particularly with regard to the Netherlands’ central position and strategic autonomy as a maritime logistics hub.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Maritime, and Logistics
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and Netherlands

39. After Hegemony: Japan’s role and dilemma in maintaining the rules-based order

Author:: Yu Inagaki
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: East-West Center
Abstract:: The phrase “rules-based order” has recently become a recurring theme in the Japan-US alliance . This is based on the recognition that the liberal international order (LIO)—which the United States built and maintained, and that Japan has significantly benefited from—is now being challenged. While the war in Ukraine has heightened the sense of crisis over global power dynamics, China has been considered the main threat to the LIO. The United States has identified China as not just a security threat but a “ most consequential strategic competitor and the pacing challenge ,” and Japan has come to view the current international environment from a larger perspective, international order. In fact, Japan has expected to play a leading role in maintaining the LIO as US international engagement weakened under the Trump administration. However, is it possible for Japan, a constrained middle power, to maintain the existing order in the face of a declining hegemon and rising challengers? This raises a classic question in international relations: What will happen to the international order after hegemony; and what can and will Japan, occupying a particular place and role in the international system, be able and willing to do regarding international order?
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Politics, Hegemony, and International Order
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

40. US Arms Sales Reveal Discord in Taiwan's Defense Strategy

Author:: Ethan Kessler
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:: Washington has started selling arms that serve a "porcupine" defense strategy to Taiwan. Whether Taipei fully embraces this new approach remains to be seen. Taiwan, claimed by China as a rogue province and armed by the United States, is at a crossroads. Should it continue buying big-ticket US arms, such as advanced fighter jets and tanks, to counter Chinese forces in case of a blockade or invasion? Taipei’s longstanding conventional strategy, which calls for these kinds of arms, views the ambiguous US defense commitment as concerning. Since Washington may not intervene against a Chinese attack, conventionalists want to hold on to Taiwan’s traditional, long-range weapons. Conventionalists also claim that buying big-ticket arms strengthens Washington’s political commitment to Taiwan. However, officials and experts increasingly see another strategy as prudent. Recent Chinese economic growth and military modernization have greatly enhanced Beijing’s capabilities, to the point that many believe Taiwan could not hold out alone against a Chinese invasion. Reformers thus argue that Taiwan needs to start building its forces around small, easily distributed weapons such as mobile anti-ship missiles and patrol boats and make greater investments in reserve forces and territorial defense. This “porcupine” defense strategy can theoretically buy more time for US forces to arrive in a war. The fate of Taiwan’s military strategy, which also depends greatly on political relations between Beijing, Taipei, and Washington, will help determine the strength of deterrence in the Taiwan Strait. A breakdown in this deterrence could lead to US-China war. The United States not only influences Taiwan’s strategy, but has a great stake in its future.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Military Affairs, Budget, Defense Spending, and Arms Sales
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

41. Arms-production Capabilities in the Indo-Pacific Region: Measuring Self-reliance

Author:: Lucie Béraud-Sudreau, Xiao Liang, Siemon T. Wezeman, and Ming Sun
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:: Armed forces in the Indo-Pacific region remain dependent on weapon systems imported from foreign suppliers. This is despite the efforts of many governments in the Indo-Pacific to implement policies that support the development of local arms industrial capabilities with the aim of increasing self-reliance. This report develops three indicators to give a score and regional ranking of self-reliance in arms production to 12 jurisdictions in the Indo-Pacific region: Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand and Viet Nam. Overall, this report contributes to knowledge and debates on armament trends and military modernization in the Indo-Pacific. In a region where tensions among neighbours are rising, it further contributes to transparency with regard to levels of self-reliance in domestic arms production, allowing for an independent assessment of the region’s respective arms industries.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Arms Trade, and Imports
Political Geography:: China, Australia, and Indo-Pacific

42. Economic Cracks in the Great Wall of China: Is China's Current Economic Model Sustainable?

Author:: Thomas J. Duesterberg
Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: Since Deng Xiaoping changed the trajectory of Chinese economic policy in 1978, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has amassed an impressive record of economic growth. Many economists and political analysts, however, have come to question whether the top-down, mercantilist economic system in the PRC is sustainable in the medium to long term. This report explores the long-term structural and short-term economic problems in contemporary China, and in particular considers whether the Xi Jinping regime can avoid a financial crisis and effectively manage a transition to a stable new equilibrium. Structural issues include a looming downturn in the population and in the workforce; associated problems with an underdeveloped and underfinanced social safety and welfare net; income and regional inequality; environmental degradation; and domestic shortages of raw materials, agricultural production, and energy resources. The acute economic problems analyzed in the paper are a real estate bubble, the accumulation of dangerous levels of debt, dependence on external markets and financing, a difficult transition to a more consumer-oriented and less investment-driven economy, a crackdown on dynamic digital and financial sectors, a return to dominance of low-productivity state-owned enterprises and manufacturing firms, and weak governance from an increasingly authoritarian and unaccountable regime. Many of these acute issues result from Xi’s changes in policy since 2013. Xi’s turn toward greater economic self-reliance while maintaining mercantilist trade relations signals an effective decoupling from the US and allied economies. Some historical examples of bubble economies and financial crises are discussed as possible analogies to the current situation in China. One conclusion is that the Middle Kingdom will see a much slower-growing economy, which makes addressing the structural issues much more difficult. Inability or lack of determination to address the large array of issues may also undermine the political legitimacy of the current regime, which has been buttressed since 1978 by a rapid growth model based on debt, real estate, and investment, including infrastructure. The concluding section of this report offers policy tools that the United States and its allies could deploy to induce China to be a more responsible stakeholder in the world economy and a more reliable contributor to global sustainability. The tools considered in the study include trade policy and export controls, expanded oversight of foreign investment (both direct and portfolio investment), cooperation with allies on China policy, and defense-related sanctions. The paper also suggests that deployment of these tools could be a factor in weakening China’s economy as well as a means to convince its leadership to pursue less mercantilist and authoritarian global strategies, which are harmful to the US economy and to global stability.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, International Trade and Finance, Finance, Economy, and Economic Growth
Political Geography:: China and Asia

43. The Diminishing Path to Growth: Can Xi Jinping Avoid Crisis during China's Economic Transition

Author:: Thomas J. Duesterberg
Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: Since Deng Xiaoping changed the trajectory of Chinese economic policy in 1978, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has amassed an impressive record of economic growth. Starting as a poverty-stricken agricultural society under rigid socialist rule, the country has grown steadily and rapidly to become the second largest economy in the world and carved out a growth path whose strength and longevity is historically unprecedented. As the 21st century has unfolded, the PRC has become a near peer competitor to the United States and other developed countries in terms of economic and political power. It is deploying this power in multiple ways that explicitly challenge US leadership in both the economic and global political spheres. If the PRC manages to maintain recent growth rates of around 6 percent per year, it will soon overtake the United States as the world’s largest economy and enhance its ability to challenge the global US leadership position, which has been a pillar of stability since World War II. The US and its allies had hoped that the PRC would become a responsible stakeholder in a liberal international order, but these hopes have been undermined in recent years by China’s increasingly apparent mercantilist economic policies, its aggressive expansion of political power, the resurgent dominance of state-owned enterprises, and the ever-more evident suppression of political liberties and traditional cultures in its sphere of influence. Many economists and political analysts, however, have come to question whether the top-down, mercantilist economic system in the PRC is sustainable in the medium to long term. A number of trends suggest weaknesses in the traditional economic and political structures that have propelled growth in China: growing private and public sector debt, adversely shifting demography, the return to prioritizing state-run enterprises over private firms, the continued reliance on an export-oriented economic system, growing weaknesses in the financial system, dependence on external commodity and technology suppliers, persistent economic and geographic inequality, and continued reliance on external financing. Recent economic data show that bankruptcies are growing, returns on investment are shrinking, and capital controls are contributing to unrealistic valuations of internal capital stock and housing stock. Additionally, regulations are stifling innovative sectors of the economy, and opaque and unregulated consumer financing products are undermining central bank monetary policy and contributing to over-leveraged balance sheets among consumers and small businesses. Consumer purchasing power that is consistently too weak to absorb domestic production, along with incentives to increase that production, has resulted in sustained trade surpluses that create a closed loop of increased investment in manufacturing and the need for growing markets. More recently, US-led efforts to deny China access to certain high-technology products and materials have underscored Chinese vulnerabilities in key sectors like telecommunications and semiconductors. This dynamic results in trade tensions with developing countries and in economically questionable investment in the developing world. These tensions, along with the undermining of developing world markets through subsidized PRC production, are increasingly causing costly disruptions in trade flows and placing pressure on the state banking system, which is the source of most external financing. If the mounting problems with the current Chinese economic model result in material slowing of growth or even sustained recession in the PRC, this would have substantial impact on the United States and its allies in two important ways. First, given that the PRC is the second largest (or in some measures the largest) economy in the world and has been an engine of growth for economies in Europe and the rest of Asia, slower growth or recession in China would likely lead to a global slowdown or recession. Second, because growth has immense political salience in the PRC—it justifies the authoritarian system of governance—a significant slowdown or recession could lead to political instability. Given Chinese nationalist rhetoric and revanchist ambitions toward Taiwan, political instability could in turn motivate risky military activities that escalate into confrontations with democratic, market-oriented countries. From the perspective of the United States, a slowdown could exacerbate the already serious trade and economic tensions, especially if nationalist forces in China sought to cast the US as the scapegoat for its internal problems. In sum, a better understanding of the weaknesses within the PRC growth model and its potential frailties would allow policymakers to craft targeted tools when needed to support US policy objectives, either economic or political, and to deter PRC aggression or the undermining of US economic interests. Policy tools such as trade tariffs, export controls, and limitations on direct investments and access to US financial markets could have material impact on Chinese performance. A more robust understanding of the impact of these tools would help the United States and its allies craft overall strategies to meet the Chinese economic and political challenge. Even while operating in a time frame longer than twelve months, many financial analysts have begun to describe the unfolding economic challenges in the PRC. The general public, including political opinion leaders and government analysts, have not generally understood the extent of the danger of economic crisis in China. Instead, the common assumption is that growth in the PRC, albeit a continuing economic threat to the US economy, is not in danger of faltering. This white paper takes a different view, exploring the structural weaknesses characterizing the current Chinese economic model and the recent policy changes initiated by President Xi Jinping. Its working assumption is that the combination of these two factors will result in a material weakening of the dynamic growth China has enjoyed since Deng Xiaoping set his country on a more Western-style growth path in the late 1970s. At a minimum, various factors will slow growth to levels more characteristic of modern developed economies; and at the extreme these factors may possibly lead to negative growth and weakening of the political strength that underpins the dictatorship of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Economics, Economic Growth, and Xi Jinping
Political Geography:: China and Asia

44. A Principled Middle Power Diplomacy Approach For South Korea to Navigate the U.S.-China Rivalry

Author:: Saeme Kim
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: In the context of growing US-China tensions, South Korean administrations have opted for degrees of strategic ambiguity, refraining from overt actions that suggest South Korea is taking sides. While strategic ambiguity has been moderately successful, there are limits to this approach which make it unsustainable. This paper will argue that rather, South Korea needs to apply a principled middle power diplomacy, which refers to a middle power carrying out roles expected of it in accordance with a set of rules or values that uphold the liberal international order. The goal of principled middle power diplomacy would be to shape the environment in which the current great power rivalry is unfolding, in order to moderate the fallout of great power competition. After an analysis of South Korea’s middle power diplomacy, this paper will recommend that South Korea double down on its commitment to multilateralism so that it can augment its roles as a facilitator and agenda-setter on the international stage.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Multilateralism, and Rivalry
Political Geography:: China, Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

45. Building on the Middle: Diversifying South Korea’s Foreign Policy Narrative and Economic Ties

Author:: Carolin Wefer
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: The rivalry between the United States and China is affecting countries in its midst. This particularly applies to South Korea. The country is a strong economic player with a successful net of free trade agreements. Additionally, it has branded itself as a middle power, a multilateralist, and good international citizen. However, South Korea’s middle power perspective has recently assumed a literal definition of being situated in the middle of two great powers. Seoul’s dependencies on both the U.S. and China are undeniable. As the conflict intensifies, it is thus essential for South Korea to diversify its ties through trade policy and multilateral fora. This requires leaving the literal middle power definition behind and leveraging its economic standing towards an increase in international status, as well as refocusing on the figurative middle power narrative that brought the country to its initial global esteem. Through diversification and the build-up of its economic and multilateral prowess, South Korea stands to lessen the shocks of the U.S.-China rivalry. Joining RCEP and obtaining a guest role at the G7 were important steps in that direction. They offer an expansion of both regional and global ties and an involvement in discussions on the redefinition of international fora, but more can be done.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Economics, Multilateralism, Rivalry, and Middle Power
Political Geography:: China, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

46. Resilient Aerial Refueling: Safeguarding the US Military’s Global Reach

Author:: Timothy A. Walton and Bryan Clark
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: The US military’s aerial refueling enterprise is a critical component of its ability to project power globally in defense of American interests. As the US military adopts new concepts to enhance its lethality and gain decision advantage, aerial refueling is increasingly necessary to enable a more distributed and dynamic force. However, with an aging inventory of tanker aircraft and stiff budgetary headwinds, it is an open question whether the US Air Force is capable of fielding the aerial refueling force that the nation needs. This study assesses the current and programmed US aerial refueling enterprise and has found that it likely would be unable to support US strategy and operational concepts at scale against peer adversaries such as the People’s Republic of China. However, the US military could address these shortfalls and improve the operational resilience of its aerial refueling enterprise by adopting new concepts, capabilities, capacities, and posture.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Science and Technology, and Military Spending
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

47. Transforming the Middle East: The Origins, Impact, and Evolution of the Abraham Accords

Author:: Robert Greenway
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: The Abraham Accords constitute the beginning of a transformation of a region that has confounded many, and that will continue to be a vital battleground astride the security and economic interests of world powers. American leadership was a necessary but alone insufficient condition to the emergence of this agreement. American leadership will remain essential to its growth and evolution. The alignment of our regional partners and allies in both economic and security domains will ensure that the agreement endures. It will also incentivize others to join us in pooling critical capacities to advance and defend mutual interests. This transformation serves to constrain Iran – the threat from which has been recognized as causal – even as it constrains the malign influence and predatory practices of China and Russia. They will continue to manufacture and exploit fissures among the U.S. and its regional partners if we fail to exploit the favorable shift in the region’s security and economic architecture. On the other hand, appropriate support will allow the Abraham Accords to advance and secure America’s interests with the use of significantly fewer resources and with more capable partners integrated as never before.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, and Negotiation
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

48. How China Regards its Future in the World

Author:: Marcos Caramuru and Philip Yang
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)
Abstract:: China’s post-Covid plans regarding national investment and foreign policy are ambitious and its success depends on the ability to build trustworthy relations with its Asian neighbors and the great powers. The XXII China Analysis Group meeting gathered experts to discuss China’s positioning and the ways in which it could overcome challenges and aim for a positive bilateral agenda with the USA during the Biden administration.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Investment, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and United States of America

49. Directions of Innovation Policy: Contrasting Views of China and the US

Author:: Anna Jaguaribe and Kamila Aben Athar
Publication Date:: 08-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)
Abstract:: At the 24th China Analysis Group Meeting, experts analyzed the contrasting views of innovation policies in China and in the United States. The 14th five-year plan continues most of the economic efforts that characterized the last decade while also challenging some certain well-established elements. Internet development is still the dominant focus, but we can also observe the shift towards a service-based economy and high investment in infrastructure. According to the participants, one of the most relevant differences between the US and China is the way non-state actors are connected to the national government. American innovation efforts heavily feature research groups and private corporations having an active role, while in China the government puts up barriers that distort the market and influence it more directly. The tension between the two countries is stronger than ever and the new Biden administration brings a new set of uncertainties to the table, but at the same time, both China and the US are heavily dependent on each other economically. China’s efforts to expand its influence worldwide by negotiating with multiple countries will most likely exacerbate the conflict and talks regarding a decoupling, which currently seems unlikable.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Economics, Markets, Infrastructure, and Innovation
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and United States of America

50. The post-Covid city: the ongoing spatial and technological reconfiguration in China and the world

Author:: Philip Yang, Carlo Ratti, Kamila Aben Athar, and Yung Ho Chang
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)
Abstract:: Considering the impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic on our everyday life, the XXV China Analysis Group Meeting focused on the organization of large cities and the reordering of urban agglomerations. According to the participants, the maintenance of this model and the rearrangement, focused on urban sprawl, are valid alternatives, each with its own set of advantages and disadvantages. Another issue discussed was the impact of technologies on how cities are shaped in the 21st century, to which participants responded by mentioning the role of artificial intelligence and big data in making the architecture behave like a living organism. However, they also warned about the importance of developing a balance between the natural and the artificial world. Finally, the participants said that for achieving carbon neutrality by 2050, it is necessary for each city to adopt specific policies that suit its own reality, because there is not a universal formula.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Climate Change, Science and Technology, Cities, Carbon Emissions, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Global Focus

51. A Limited Partnership: Russia-China Relations in the Mediterranean

Author:: Jim Townsend, Andrea Kendall-Taylor, David Shullman, and Gibbs McKinley
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: The last several years have seen a worrisome increase in tensions in the Mediterranean involving age-old rivals such as Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus, as well as increased involvement from newer players like Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and China, or returning players in the case of Russia. Many analysts have noted an increase in power struggles between some of these actors in the region. It is against this backdrop of competition that observers have questioned whether the Mediterranean will become a new arena for increased collaboration between China and Russia. In the last several years, the two countries have increased their presence and influence in the Mediterranean, creating opportunities for growing cooperation at odds with U.S. interests and objectives in the region. As the authors have argued in previous CNAS research, the increasing depth of Russia and China’s partnership creates challenges for U.S. interests and increases the risk that both countries pose to the United States. For this reason, the United States should not write off Russia-China relations as just an uncomfortable or unnatural partnership. But nor should Washington seek to counter their cooperation in every dimension of their partnership or compete intensely in every region.1 The alignment between Russia and China presents a comprehensive challenge; addressing it will require policymakers to prioritize and address their cooperation in the areas likely to pose the greatest threats to U.S. interests, and conversely, avoid focusing on areas of lesser concern. The Mediterranean is a region where U.S. policymakers should not overstate the potential for Russia-China cooperation, nor the significance of the implications of their partnership. As Russia and China have increased their activities in the Mediterranean, they have done so largely through parallel and complementary efforts, rather than explicit cooperation. Russia and China share an interest in dividing the European Union and NATO and increasing their own image and influence in the region, especially at the expense of the United States’ influence. However, the Mediterranean is not a priority for Russia or China; the two countries have divergent priorities in the region, and they pursue these priorities differently, limiting the common ground for active engagement between them. Russia has prioritized its security presence and relationships, while Beijing is focused on advancing its economic interests.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Partnerships
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eurasia, Asia, and Mediterranean

52. Tangled Threats: Integrating U.S. Strategies toward China and North Korea

Author:: Jacob Stokes
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: China and North Korea pose intertwined challenges for U.S. and allied policy. The Korean Peninsula constitutes just one area among many in U.S.-China relations. Meanwhile, issues on the peninsula remain central to the future stability and security of Northeast Asia and implicate many broader questions about regional and global order. Dealing with China and North Korea as an interlocking pair requires integrated policies that balance the risks and rewards of various possible approaches. This policy brief explains how to develop such policies and why they are the best option for the current regional landscape. North Korea plays several roles in China’s foreign policy. These include diverting geopolitical attention away from China, providing Beijing with an opportunity to cooperate with other states, creating a point of leverage for China to extract concessions on separate issues, and acting as a flashpoint with the potential for a regional war that directly affects China’s security. At any given time, some roles will be more pronounced than others, but each of them is always present to some degree. Any integrated U.S. strategy toward the pair will have to account for a volatile geopolitical landscape in Northeast Asia. Major trends include closer ties between Beijing and Pyongyang, deteriorating U.S.-China relations, and South Korea’s desire, especially under the government of President Moon Jae-in, to engage North Korea while balancing ties with China and the United States. The United States should employ a strategy toward China and North Korea that blends calibrated pressure and results-oriented engagement. The goal of this strategy should be problem-management rather than problem-solving. Washington should implement this approach across four areas: shaping U.S.-China relations regarding the Korean Peninsula; engaging North Korea on political and security issues; promoting stable deterrence in the region; and coordinating a shared inter-Korean and foreign policy with South Korea. Key recommendations for the United States include acknowledging that major breakthroughs are unlikely with either China or North Korea; proposing four-party nuclear and peace talks with South Korea, North Korea, China, and the United States; and standing up a Nuclear Planning Group that includes Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo to bolster deterrence and stem nuclear proliferation pressures.
Topic:: Conflict Prevention, International Relations, Foreign Policy, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North Korea, and United States of America

53. Containing Crisis: Strategic Concepts for Coercive Economic Statecraft

Author:: Emily Kilcrease, Emily Jin, and Rachel Ziemba
Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: As the United States and China seek to manage an increasingly tense relationship, both sides have turned to coercive economic statecraft as a core part of their broader foreign policy, with disruptive impacts on the global economic order. A growing body of research examines the use of coercive economic tools, including prior work by the CNAS Energy, Economics, and Security program. This report adds to that literature by specifically examining the use of coercive economic tools during periods of geopolitical crisis to assess their value in de-escalating tensions or deterring further economic coercion. The researchers developed scenario exercises to examine these dynamics, supported by a literature review and extensive engagement with subject matter experts. The insights from the research informed the development of two overarching strategic concepts intended to guide U.S. policymakers when deploying economic tools as part of a crisis management situation.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Economics, Bilateral Relations, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

54. FOCAC at 21: Future Trajectories of China-Africa Relations

Author:: Chris Alden, Stephen Paduano, Mzukisi Qobo, Lukas Fiala, Iginio Gagliardone, Yu-Shan Wu, Gidon Gautel, and Lina Benabdallah
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: LSE IDEAS
Abstract:: The China-Africa relationship has continued to evolve over the last years. In light of the 8th Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) that will take place later in 2021, the latest report from LSE IDEAS China Foresight brings together an international team of experts to shed light on emerging and consolidated areas of engagement between China and Africa that will likely shape the relationship in the years to come.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Engagement
Political Geography:: Africa and China

55. The Dragon Lands in Belgrade: The Drivers of Sino-Serbian Partnership

Author:: Vuk Vuksanovic
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: LSE IDEAS
Abstract:: In recent years, the partnership between Serbia and China has been elevated to a historically unprecedented level. This partnership manifests itself through Chinese economic statecraft, technological partnership, security partnership, with political ties reaching an unprecedented degree during the COVID-19 pandemic. However, as Vuk Vuksanovic examines, the future of this partnership will be dependent on the trajectory of China’s relationship with the West. As US-China relations are becoming adversarial, and as China’s relations with the EU are shaken, it will become increasingly difficult and risky for Belgrade to maintain its ties with Beijing. From ‘vaccine diplomacy’ to ‘debt-trap diplomacy’, this Strategic Update examines the Sino-Serbian partnership we are witnessing and what the future has in store for Serbian policymakers.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Economics, Partnerships, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Serbia

56. US, Japan, and South Korea Coordination Key to Competing in Southeast Asia

Author:: Karl Friedhoff and Lea Chang
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:: In picking fronts that offer the paths of least resistance, trilateral cooperation will maximize the presence of all three countries in ASEAN, maintaining balance in the region and making collective progress toward economic and development goals. Despite its size, economic dynamism, and geographic position, Southeast Asia has received comparatively little attention in US foreign policy. Even as American policy becomes more focused on China, the United States lacks a coordinated strategy to respond to and compete with China’s vast trade and investment in Southeast Asia. But most ASEAN countries are wary of China’s growing influence and would be open to US involvement as they look to diversify. To take advantage of this opportunity, the United States must supplement its focus on the South China Sea with diplomatic and financial efforts on land. These efforts should offer an alternative to China’s largesse but should not seek a direct competition in hard infrastructure or in terms of dollar amounts invested. Nor should the United States go it alone. Instead, it should seek to cooperate with its allies—Japan and South Korea in particular—to pursue their respective competitive advantages. These include identifying and investing in small- and medium-sized enterprises in ASEAN, developing human capital in the region, and conducting joint maritime cleanup activities in coordination with ASEAN countries. Creating coordinated activities with Japan and South Korea in Southeast Asia should be the first step for the United States to roll back China’s influence in the region. But these efforts will need to be calibrated to ensure that they focus on the needs of countries in the region and not just engulf the region in the US-China competition.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Infrastructure, Investment, and Trade
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Asia, North America, Southeast Asia, and United States of America

57. Americans, Japanese, and South Koreans Wary of China's Intentions

Author:: Karl Friedhoff, Craig Kafura, and Dina Smeltz
Publication Date:: 08-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:: American, Japanese, and South Korean publics see China as a more of a threat than a partner. Trilateral cooperation will be key to managing China's rise. Against a backdrop of growing regional rivalry, March and April 2021 surveys conducted in the United States, Japan, and South Korea show that publics in all three countries share similar views of China’s growing influence and intentions. But the data also show that internal divisions within the US-Japan-South Korea relationship will pose challenges to deeper cooperation.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, and Public Opinion
Political Geography:: Japan, China, East Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

58. 2021 Chicago Council Survey: A Foreign Policy for the Middle Class—What Americans Think

Author:: Dina Smeltz, Ivo H. Daalder, Karl Friedhoff, Craig Kafura, and Emily Sullivan
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:: While the Biden administration seems to understand where Americans stand on China and domestic renewal to support global competitiveness, the data disproves their assumptions that Americans are skeptical about trade and weary of US global engagement and leadership.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Politics, Public Opinion, Trade, and Survey
Political Geography:: China, North America, and United States of America

59. Cooperating, Competing, Confronting: US-Japan-South Korea Trilateral Cooperation as China Rises

Author:: Ichiro Fujisaki, Han Sung-Joo, and Karl Friedhoff
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:: The US-China relationship will be one of the most important in defining the international order in the 21st century. As the two countries enter an increasingly competitive phase in relations, both must manage the policy mix of confrontation, competition, and cooperation. If mismanaged, competition could quickly tilt toward miscalculation and armed conflict. For the United States, a poor mix of these policy elements could also lead to a hastened US decline, rapidly ceding the Asia-Pacific to China’s leadership, leaving regional allies at risk of coercion under the threat of China’s military and economic power. The nature of the challenge posed by China, the economic interdependence in the region, and serious questions about US leadership necessitate a fundamental reevaluation of trilateral cooperation. Effective US policy in the region hinges on getting policy right with the two most important US allies in the region—Japan and South Korea. While alliances are among the most important advantages the United States holds in its competition with China, South Korea and Japan hold particular importance given the values they share with the United States, as well as their dynamic economies, growing military capabilities, influence in the region, and geostrategic location. But the inherent advantages of these allies can only be drawn upon if the United States recommits itself to the region and to investing in and upholding these long-standing relationships. The persistent doubts about US commitment to and leadership in the region involve not only political will and competence but growing questions of economic feasibility as well. Doubts about the United States are leading Japan and South Korea to consider all options in terms of their security. Unlike the Cold War with the Soviet Union, the United States will not be able to draw a line in the sand, demand that its allies and partners toe that line, and still expect to compete effectively. Such an approach will further erode US credibility and confidence in US leadership. This reality will necessitate a deep mutual trust between the trilateral partners and greater tolerance for the distinct needs and interests of all three countries. A better understanding of how each country views its role in the region, its relationship with China, areas of cooperation, and the limits for each country in dealing with China is vital.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Public Opinion
Political Geography:: China, East Asia, Asia, and Southeast Asia

60. Re-Thinking Assumptions for a 21st Century Middle East

Author:: Douglas A. Ollivant
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: American policy in the Middle East is based on outdated assumptions. There are at least four novel elements in or impacting the Middle East that require an adjustment in strategy: North American Oil Independence: The United States no longer relies on the Middle East for its supply of energy and could choose to act without that significant tie. Rise of China: The People’s Republic of China is now a near-peer to the United States and is taking steps to protect its own interests in the Middle East. Diminishing Conventional Threats to Israel: All conceivable regional enemies are now peace signatories, wrestling with internal instability, or both. Unconventional threats continue to challenge Israel’s security, but a ground invasion is now a remote possibility. Rise of Sub-State Actors: In addition to widely recognized terror and insurgent groups, other actors, such as financial firms, technology firms, and private military firms, interact with power that rivals that of weak states. These new factors—alone and in concert—make legacy strategies at least suboptimal, if not unsuitable. Today’s Middle East exhibits very different characteristics than that of the Middle East of the past century. An acceptable and suitable strategy must incorporate these new data points.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Oil, Non State Actors, Geopolitics, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: China, Middle East, Israel, North America, and United States of America

61. Washington and the Next Arab Spring

Author:: Sarah Feuer and David Schenker
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Should protests grow more destabilizing, the United States will need to balance its values and interests regarding bilateral ties, the popular movement in question, broader regional dynamics, and competition with Russia or China. Against the backdrop of simmering protests, endemic economic challenges, the continuing struggle to contain the Covid-19 pandemic, and fallout from the U.S. Afghanistan withdrawal, The Washington Institute has launched a series of policy papers to help guide the Biden administration’s approach on democracy, reform, human rights, and political change across the Middle East and North Africa. The series addresses a range of questions: How do changes in the region over the last decade affect the new administration’s approach to these issues? How should the administration best prepare for the “new normal” of protests in the region? What are the policy tools at America’s disposal, and how might they be improved? How can Washington turn much-needed attention to new areas of focus, such as corruption and public-sector reform? What does public opinion research tell us about what the region’s publics want in their countries—and from the United States? And where might enhanced U.S.-EU coordination play a constructive role? The proposed answers will assist policymakers in advancing opportunities for reform, preserving U.S. interests, and navigating Middle East realities in the context of America’s global priorities. In the second essay of the series, Sarah Feuer, David Schenker, and their coauthors discuss the resurgence of protest activity across the region, the result of deteriorating economic circumstances and abysmal governance, worsened by the Covid-19 pandemic. Should protests become more destabilizing, the authors explain, the United States—before taking any action—will need to carefully balance its values and interests with respect to bilateral ties, the protest movement in question, broader regional dynamics, and competition with Russia or China.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Economy, Arab Spring, Protests, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Middle East, and United States of America

62. Iron ore futures: possible paths for Australia’s biggest trade with China

Author:: David Uren
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: The iron ore market is wrong-footing forecasters again, as it has throughout the last 20 years. Nobody expected the iron ore price to surpass US$200 a tonne as it did in May and no one predicted it would then plunge to less than US$100 as it has this week. This report argues that Australia’s troubled relationship with China will be influenced by which path the iron ore market takes over the medium term. China’s authorities are determined to reduce their dependence on Australian iron ore, both by seeking alternative supplies and by capping their steel production. However, China has been trying and failing to curb its steel production for the past five years, with many local governments ignoring central orders. In just the first six months of this year, 18 new blast furnaces capable of producing as much steel as Germany’s entire output were approved. Although China will never be able to rid itself entirely of the need for Australian supplies, this report warns that if an iron ore glut emerges, whether by Chinese government design or because of an economic downturn, the commodity may join the list of other Australian exports subject to Chinese coercion. The report also highlights that the effort to reduce its dependence on Australia will come at considerable cost to China. Australia is by far the cheapest and closest source of high-quality iron ore for China’s mills.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Natural Resources, Mining, and Trade
Political Geography:: China and Asia

63. Economic coercion in Indo-Pacific island states: Building resilience

Author:: Richard Herr and David Brewster
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: Indo-Pacific island states face diverse challenges as they grapple with their own unique vulnerabilities to the geopolitical consequences of growing strategic competition in the region. This report explores the vulnerability of island states to economic coercion and the risks they face in navigating the growing economic power of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In this report, the authors examine four perceived examples of economic coercion within the region that challenge the Quad’s vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific. China’s increasing interest in the island states of the Indo-Pacific has led to concern that the imbalance in those relationships is so large that both domestic and broader regional stability are at risk. This report offers a number of policy recommendations to protect Indo-Pacific island states from economic coercion, including: Island states must be better invested in the rules-based international economic order; Establishing codes of conduct to limit economic duress, limit undue economic influence and strengthen the rules-based international system; Strengthening government institutions so they can resist economic coercion; International partners should work with Indo-Pacific island states to help strengthen the ability of local businesses to take collective action against economic coercion.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Economy, and Resilience
Political Geography:: China, Australia, and Asia-Pacific

64. No One is Satisfied: Two Theories of the US-China Global Rivalry and the International Order

Author:: Younn Shwe Sin Htay
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: A remarkable shift is underway in the geostrategic relations between the United States, long a dominant global power, and China, a relentless economic engine with a rapidly growing military. Their competition promises to change the face of global politics in the 21st century. This paper examines that conflict from the perspectives of two discrete political theories: power transition theory and hegemonic stability theory, which come to different conclusions when applied to China and the United States separately. However, taken together with both nations in mind, they arrive at six possible futures, including regional warfare and a wholesale overhaul of the existing international order.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Hegemony, Strategic Competition, Strategic Stability, and International Order
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

65. The Opportunity is There: South Koreans’ Views of China and the Future of the US-ROK Alliance

Author:: John Lee
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: Officially, relations between the Republic of Korea and the People’s Republic of China remain cordial. Because of China’s economic heft and South Korea’s reliance on unmolested trade with the former for its continued economic development, South Korea takes great pains to be as neutral as possible between the United States and China despite its formal alliance with the US. As such, many pejoratively refer to South Korea as “the weak link” in America’s Northeast Asia alliance system. However, on a civil society level, an overwhelming majority of the South Korean public has a negative view of China—a view that has steadily gotten worse over time. Being a democracy that reflects voters’ popular will, growing anti-Chinese sentiment among voters means South Korea’s current policy of placating China will not be sustainable indefinitely. Meanwhile, the Trump administration largely neglected the alliance between South Korea and the United States. That neglect notwithstanding, an overwhelming majority of South Koreans either strongly or somewhat support the alliance with the United States. Conditions are perfect for the Biden administration to seek to repair and strengthen relations with South Korea to empower the alliance to serve as a credible bulwark against Chinese expansionism—this paper offers solutions on how to do so.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Economy, Alliance, and Trade
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and South Korea

66. The United States’ Indo–Pacific Strategy and a Revisionist China: Partnering with Small and Middle Powers in the Pacific Islands Region

Author:: Patrick Dupont
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: The advent of the Biden administration brings with it an opportunity for the United States to take a fresh look at the Pacific Islands Region (PIR) in the face of new geopolitical realities. Since the end of the Cold War, the PIR has largely been viewed by the United States as a tranquil backwater with little need for attention. Traditionally, the attention Washington did give to the region was exclusively focused on Micronesia—a region which contains both the Freely Associated States (FAS) and US territories such as Guam. The remainder of the PIR, the sub–regions of Melanesia and Polynesia, were often left to close US partners such as Australia and New Zealand. Washington’s strategic neglect of the PIR—coupled with a clear prioritisation of the FAS over other regional states—has overlapped with a gradual encroachment by non–traditional partners in an area where the United States has traditionally been the principal external power. These non–traditional partners range from US friends and allies such as Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan to strategic competitors such as Russia and China. Of these non–traditional partners, China has distinguished itself as the most significant in the PIR.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Partnerships, Geopolitics, Competition, and Strategic Engagement
Political Geography:: China, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

67. The Prospects of Thailand-U.S. Economic Cooperation

Author:: Kaewkamol Karen Pitakdumrongkit
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: East-West Center
Abstract:: Dr. Kaewkamol Pitakdumrongkit, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) of Nanyang Technological University, Singapore., explains that “data runs contrary to the perception that Bangkok is leaning towards Beijing… Thailand embraces American economic clout while dreading its Chinese counterpart.”
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Economics, Trade, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:: China, North America, Thailand, Southeast Asia, and United States of America

68. A Vision of the Future: The U.S. Intelligence Report “Global Trends 2040”

Author:: Marcin Andrzej Piotrowski
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: In April 2021, the U.S. intelligence community published the extensive report “Global Trends 2040: A More Contested World”. It analyses the main demographic, political, and strategic trends that will likely shape the world for the next two decades. The report will be intensively used by the Biden administration in the preparation of the new U.S. National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy, as well as in new military doctrines. The “Global Trends” document reflects the main tendencies in American strategic thinking, such as the growing “Sinocentrism” and traditional U.S. attachment to transatlantic relations.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Climate Change, Intelligence, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:: China and United States of America

69. A Crash Test: EU Strategic Autonomy in the Foreign Policy of France

Author:: Łukasz Maślanka
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: France uses the idea of EU strategic autonomy as a tool in its own foreign policy. France’s aim is to redefine the Union’s partnership with the U.S. and NATO. Hence, the activity of President Emmanuel Macron in emphasising the differences between the positions of the U.S. and the EU, especially in relations with China and Russia. Macron’s rhetoric worries other European countries and hides the real problems in EU security policy, such as insufficient financing of the Common Security and Defence Policy as well as the lack of a clear definition of strategic autonomy.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, European Union, and Strategic Autonomy
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, France, and United States of America

70. NATO on the Road to a New Strategy

Author:: Wojciech Lorenz
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: During the meeting of NATO foreign ministers on 2–3 December 2020, a group of experts presented the report “NATO 2030. United for a New Era” about strengthening the political dimension and consultation mechanisms of the Alliance. The report indicates a possible consensus on the expansion of the Alliance’s tasks, including on a common policy towards China. The document increases the chances that the allies will decide to start work on a new NATO strategy.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, Military Strategy, Alliance, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and United States of America

71. Mitigating the risk of a China–India conflict

Author:: Arzan Tarapore
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: More than a year has passed since Chinese troops began to occupy previously Indian-controlled territory on their disputed border in Ladakh. The crisis has cooled and settled into a stalemate. This report warns that it could escalate again, and flare into a conflict with region-wide implications. The report assesses the risk of conflict by analysing its likelihood and consequences. A possible war would be costly for both India and China. But a possible war could also risk stirring Indian distrust of its new partners, especially in the Quad – Australia, Japan, and the United States. The report outlines some conditions under which a war would disrupt or dampen those developing partnerships. The report concludes by offering a framework for policymakers to shape India’s expectations and the strategic environment before and during a possible war.
Topic:: Conflict Prevention, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:: China, India, Australia, and Asia-Pacific

72. Losing our agnosticism. How to make Australia’s foreign influence laws work

Author:: Daniel Ward
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: Country agnosticism, under which Australia’s laws treat all foreign influence efforts in the same way, regardless of their source country, is the key failing of Australia’s statutory response to foreign governments’ influence activities. It has imposed sweeping, unnecessary regulatory costs. It has caused waste of taxpayer-funded enforcement resources. It has diverted those resources from the issues that really matter. And it has brought unnecessary legal complexity. Yet for all that, nobody believes that the laws are truly country agnostic. Not the Australian media, which routinely describe them as ‘aimed at’ China. Nor, presumably, the media’s audience. Nor, certainly, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which regards itself as the target, explicitly citing the laws as a key grievance. Perhaps the greatest cost of country agnosticism is that the current statutory framework isn’t as effective as it needs to be. Why? In adopting a country-agnostic stance, we blinded ourselves to the very factor that matters most in evaluating and responding to foreign influence—its source country. It’s time to remove the blindfold. We should recognise this basic truth: foreign influence transparency requirements must be more stringent in relation to some source countries than others.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: China, Australia, and Asia-Pacific

73. What if …? Economic consequences for Australia of a US-China conflict over Taiwan

Author:: David Uren
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: hat if China were to attempt to seize Taiwan by force and the US and allies responded militarily? One consequence would be the disruption of China’s trade with many countries, including Australia. While strategic analysts have been working over such scenarios for years, there’s been little study of the likely economic consequences. This study is focused on the short-term shock to Australia’s economy. The objective is to contribute to an understanding of the nature of Australia’s economic relationship with China and the likely paths of adjustment should that trade be severed. It also explores the options available to the Australian Government to ameliorate the worst of the effects of what would be a severe economic shock. The conclusion of this report is that the disruption to the Australian economy would be significant. There would be widespread loss of employment, along with consumer and business goods shortages that would be likely to necessitate rationing.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Economics, National Security, and Conflict
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America

74. Leaping across the ocean: The port operators behind China's naval expansion

Author:: Charlie Lyons Jones and Raphael Veit
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has become increasingly willing to project military power overseas while coercing and co-opting countries into accepting the objectives of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Beijing’s greater willingness to flex its muscles, both politically and militarily, is supported by its overseas investments in critical infrastructure, which provide the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) with the logistical enablers needed to project military power beyond the ‘first island chain’ in the Western Pacific. ‘Controlling the seas in the region, leaping across the ocean for force projection’ (区域控海，跨洋投送) is the term Chinese naval commentators use when referring to the PLA Navy’s bid to project power across the world. Australia should build its research and analytical capacity to better understand the nexus between the CCP and SOEs. That due diligence, building on open-source research conducted for this report, will better illuminate the PRC’s global expansion, potential grey-zone operations and the companies and individuals involved.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, and Navy
Political Geography:: China, Asia-Pacific, and South China Sea

75. Afghanistan – Opportunities and Challenges for the Russian Federation

Author:: Giorgio Bilanishvili
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:: Lately, the discussions about a possible weakening of US influence in international politics has become more frequent. Parallel to this, there is talk about the activation of Russia and, especially, China in this regard with their influence growing on the international stage. The increasing confrontation between these two countries and the United States has also become one of the most pressing matters. Given all of this, it is now stated more frequently that the world order is changing and a new multi-polar international system is being formed which will be followed by the redistribution of the spheres of influence in the world, leading to increased roles played by China and Russia. The US withdrawal from Afghanistan is considered to be a development of such importance that it could influence the aforementioned international processes and, therefore, commands special attention in that regard as well. Apart from this, the political and security situation in Afghanistan concerns a multitude of states which includes the great powers of the region such as India, China, Russia, Iran and Turkey that play important roles regionally or globally. The interests of these countries, including with regard to Afghanistan, converge in certain cases while diverging in others. At the moment, it is largely unclear how the relations of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan created by the Taliban may develop with its neighbors. Experts assess the prospects of Afghan-Indian and Afghan-Iranian relations especially unfavorably. The return of the Taliban in Afghanistan’s leadership is also important in terms of international security. In this regard, the main cause of concern is the threat of the activation of international terrorism. All of the things mentioned above comprise an incomplete list of the important aspects of the current situation in Afghanistan which, as a whole, create a complex and multi-dimensional picture. For Russia, therefore, Afghanistan also does not have a single dimension. It is, on the one hand, a certain opportunity for the Russian Federation in order for it to bolster influence on the international arena. At the same time, however, the threats that have increased in Afghanistan given the new realities naturally cannot stay outside of Moscow’s attention.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Conflict, and International System
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, China, South Asia, United States of America, and Russian Federation

76. Russian Foreign Policy in 2020: Strengthening Multi-vectorialism

Author:: András Rácz and Milan Nič
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: In 2020, DGAP’s Strategy Group on Russia focused on Moscow’s long-term efforts to diversify its foreign policy portfolio, turn away from Europe, and build-up other non-Western vectors in its diplomacy. Against this background, this report assesses Russia’s relations with the EU, China, and the United States. While Russian relations with the West are unlikely to improve in 2021 – especially ahead of this fall’s Duma election – there is still a chance for limited engagement on issues of mutual interest.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, European Union, Democracy, and International Order
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Eurasia, and United States of America

77. Ambition and Overreach: Countering One Belt One Road and Beijing’s Plans to Dominate Global Innovation

Author:: John Lee
Publication Date:: 02-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: The first monograph in this series, China’s Economic Slowdown: Root Causes, Beijing’s Response and Strategic Implications for the US and Allies, examined the structural problems in the Chinese economy that have led to a recent permanent slowdown after three decades of double-digit growth rates. The monograph focused on the political and economic costs of the slowdown and efforts to stabilize an economy that has poured far too much national wealth into commercially unproductive areas. Yet the Communist Party is not passively awaiting an unhappy economic fate in connection with its mounting imbalances and domestic economic dysfunction. In many respects, its leaders have been highly creative in seeking solutions that do not entail a weakening of the party’s hold on economic power. On the contrary, the party has been busily shaping and pursuing grand strategic policies such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Made in China 2025 (MIC 2025) to solve or alleviate many of its domestic political-economic problems. This monograph, part two in the series, examines how the US and its allies can confront and counter these Chinese strategies and initiatives. It will do so by taking seriously the challenge they present and suggesting responses that take into account Chinese vulnerabilities and the points of leverage available to the US and its allies. This linking of China’s vulnerabilities and weaknesses, on the one hand, and its ambition and purpose with respect to its outward-focused policies, is essential for effective policy responses. If the domestic is not linked with the external, US policies are much more likely to become complacent, counterproductive, or susceptible to overreaching. In linking analyses of Beijing’s domestic political economy with its external policies, the monograph will challenge some enduring but incorrect grand narratives that play into the hands of the CCP.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Economics, Science and Technology, and Trade
Political Geography:: China and Asia

78. A Global Survey of US-China Competition in the Coronavirus Era

Author:: Eric B. Brown, Patrick M. Cronin, H.R. McMaster, Husain Haqqani, Aparna Pande, Satoru Nagao, John Lee, Seth Cropsey, Peter Rough, Liselotte Odgaard, Blaise Misztal, Douglas J. Feith, and Michael Doran
Publication Date:: 05-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: The outbreak of the novel coronavirus has introduced a series of new stresses and factors in the US-China relationship. While the world has struggled to contain the pandemic and its tragic repercussions, the People’s Republic of China has used the outbreak to launch a global campaign of misinformation, further its economic coercion through the Belt and Road Initiative, and continue military expansion efforts in the South China Sea. China’s attempt to exploit the pandemic for political, strategic, and economic gain is problematic in the current environment, yet it is consistent with, and a continuation of, China’s long-term strategy. This report offers a global survey and assessment of attempts by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to expand its influence, including by exploiting the pandemic. As the United States and its allies focus on combatting the virus and salvaging their economies, there is an opportunity to better understand China’s strategy and develop a unified response.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Economics, Strategic Competition, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: China, South Asia, Asia, North America, and United States of America

79. Boosting Taiwan’s Economic Status is Good Strategy, Economics, and Domestic Policy

Author:: John Lee
Publication Date:: 06-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: This report makes the following arguments: From Taiwan’s perspective, the greater its economic presence and importance to the world, the better positioned it is to reduce its dependency on China and maintain its autonomy. This also serves US interests. From the US perspective, deepening the economic relationship with Taiwan in strategic ways will assist it in achieving greater economic distance from China and reducing the extent to which China can capture and dominate global supply and value chains in the future. The US and Taiwanese economies are largely complementary, and this can become even more so. Thus, a deeper bilateral economic relationship will be generally consistent with domestic economic objectives, such as prioritizing high-value job creation and preventing high-value supply chains from remaining in China or leaving the United States. The report offers recommendations to: help prevent the hollowing out of Taiwan’s competitive strengths; help Taiwan broaden and deepen its participation in the regional and international economic space, which is currently being narrowed by China; assist with Taiwan’s desire to lower dependency on China-based supply chains, especially with respect to high-value-added processes; encourage more bilateral investment, intra-industry relations and firm-to-firm activity between the United States and Taiwan.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Economics, and Domestic Policy
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and Asia

80. Dangerous Synergies Countering Chinese and Russian Digital Influence Operations

Author:: Daniel Kliman, Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Kristine Lee, Joshua Fitt, and Carisa Nietsche
Publication Date:: 05-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: The 2016 U.S. presidential election and the 2018 and 2020 Taiwanese local and presidential elections crystallized that Russia and China are using digital interference to shape the contest between democracies and autocracies. While foreign information operations are time-tested methods of authoritarian influence, the digital space has increased the scope and speed with which these operations can be waged. Although there is no concrete evidence to suggest that Beijing and Moscow explicitly coordinate their information operations, the two countries are increasingly finding common cause as their interests align on a number of issues and in strategic regions.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Science and Technology, Authoritarianism, and Digital Policy
Political Geography:: Russia, China, and Asia

81. Rising to the China Challenge: Renewing American Competitiveness in the Indo-Pacific

Author:: Ely Ratner, Daniel Kliman, Susanna V. Blume, Rush Doshi, Chris Dougherty, Richard Fontaine, Peter Harrell, Martijn Rasser, Elizabeth Rosenberg, Eric Sayers, Daleep Singh, Paul Scharre, Loren DeJonge Schulman, Neil Bhatiya, Ashley Feng, Joshua Fitt, Megan Lamberth, Kristine Lee, and Ainikki Riikonen
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: The United States and China are locked in strategic competition over the future of the Indo-Pacific—the most populous, dynamic, and consequential region in the world. At stake are competing visions for the rules, norms, and institutions that will govern international relations in the decades to come.1 The U.S. government aspires toward a “free and open” Indo-Pacific, defined by respect for sovereignty and the independence of nations, peaceful resolution of disputes, free and fair trade, adherence to international law, and greater transparency and good governance.2 For the United States, successful realization of this regional order would include strong U.S. alliances and security partnerships; a military able to operate throughout the region, consistent with international law; U.S. firms with access to leading markets, and benefiting from updated technology standards, investment rules, and trade agreements; U.S. participation in effective regional and international institutions; and the spread of democracy and individual freedoms in the context of an open information environment and vibrant civil society.3 By contrast, China is driving toward a more closed and illiberal future for the Indo-Pacific, core aspects of which would undermine vital U.S. interests.4 Key features of China-led order would include the People’s Liberation Army controlling the South and East China Seas; regional countries sufficiently coerced into acquiescing to China’s preferences on military, economic, and diplomatic matters; an economic order in which Beijing sets trade and investment rules in its favor, with dominance over leading technologies, data, and standards; and Beijing with de facto rule over Taiwan and agenda-setting power over regional institutions. The order would be further characterized by weak civil society, a dearth of independent media, and the gradual spread of authoritarianism, reinforced by the proliferation of China’s high-tech surveillance state. The net result would be a less secure, less prosperous United States that is less able to exert power and influence in the world.5 Ultimately, the competition between the United States and China in the Indo-Pacific is a contest over which of these futures will come closer to fruition, even as neither is likely to attain in its entirety. In the two years since the 2017 National Security Strategy and 2018 National Defense Strategy aptly identified this competition over the regional order in Asia, the U.S. government has taken initial steps toward its goal of a free and open region. On balance, however, critical areas of U.S. policy remain inconsistent, uncoordinated, underresourced, and—to be blunt—uncompetitive and counterproductive to advancing U.S. values and interests. This independent assessment—mandated by the U.S. Congress in the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act—is intended to help close the considerable gap between the current administration’s stated aspirations for a free and open Indo-Pacific and the actual implementation of policies to advance that vision. Specifically, Congress called for “an assessment of the geopolitical conditions in the Indo-Pacific region that are necessary for the successful implementation of the National Defense Strategy,” with a particular focus on how to “support United States military requirements for forward defense, assured access, extensive forward basing, and alliance and partnership formation and strengthening in such region.”6 This report examines how the U.S. government as a whole, not just the Department of Defense, can realize these outcomes. Although the focus of this assessment is on the Indo-Pacific, it is critical to underscore that the China challenge is a global phenomenon, and many of the actions recommended in this report should be taken to bolster U.S. competitiveness beyond the region. Consistent with the bipartisan mission of the Center for a New American Security, the report’s authors have collectively served on both sides of the aisle in Congress and in the administrations of Presidents George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump at the White House, State Department, Defense Department, Treasury Department, Central Intelligence Agency, and Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. Included herein are nearly a hundred specific and actionable policy recommendations across critical vectors of American competitiveness in the Indo-Pacific. Before turning to these recommendations, the remainder of this section describes six core principles that undergird the assessment and should form the foundations of U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific region.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Partnerships, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

82. The Role of China in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Beyond Economic Interests?

Author:: Katarzyna Sidlo
Publication Date:: 07-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: IEMed/EuroMeSCo
Abstract:: China is a relative newcomer to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Indeed, as it is not in China’s immediate neighbourhood, for a long time its importance to Beijing remained low. This began to change in the early 2000s. Due to its impressive economic expansion, marked by joining the World Trade Organization in 2001, China’s energy consumption growth rate accelerated, making the energy-rich region increasingly crucial to China’s energy security. Thus, the destabilization that came to the MENA with the Global War on Terror declared by the United States as a result of the 9/11 terrorist attack, endangered its interests. At the same time, however, having significant Muslim minorities of its own, China was keen to maintain the security of its Muslim-majority provinces and used the GWOT as justification for curbing the threat of its internal, separatist “Islamic terrorism”. Eventually, then, to accommodate its growing interest in the region, China expanded its “greater neighbourhood” to include the MENA as well (currently, a good part of Europe has also been declared a part of it). Presently, while still not a key partner for Beijing, the region is one of the main suppliers of China’s gas and oil, an increasingly important export destination, a territory of continuous construction activity of Chinese companies under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and an object of a large-scale Chinese charm offensive. Slowly, it is becoming an object of Beijing’s security interests as well.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Hegemony, and Influence
Political Geography:: Africa, China, Middle East, Asia, North Africa, and MENA

83. Towards a More Principled European China Policy?

Author:: Stephan Frühling
Publication Date:: 11-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: Promoting political values (democracy, human rights and the rule of law) in China is a colossal undertaking, but the EU could be more effective than we think. To do so, it must act strategically, in unity, and in concert with like-minded partners. It must also strengthen its record of upholding political values and reform its procedures for foreign policy decision-making. On 30 June 2020, China adopted a National Security Law for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region that not only undermines human rights and the rule of law that were promised to its citizens, but also violates international law. A few weeks before, when China’s intention became public, the European Union reacted cautiously, expressing concern but clarifying that the introduction of the law would not adversely affect its relations with China. The EU’s first reaction fell far short of statements released by the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia, among others. But the EU’s reaction grew more critical over time. The first EU institution to adopt a tougher approach was the European Parliament. Shortly after, the European Commission and – to a lesser extent – the European Council followed with statements by its presidents after the EU-China summit held on 22 June 2020. This episode could turn out to be exemplary for the role of political values in the European Union’s relations with China. China and Europe have fundamentally divergent political values, even though they often use the same terminology. For a long time, many Europeans believed that China’s definition of democracy, human rights and the rule of law –, the three constitutive values enshrined in the Treaty of the European Union – would ultimately converge with the European understanding. This has not turned out to be the case. China is growing more self-confident, not only defending but starting to spread its own definitions of the triad of political values. This comes at a time when the EU is realigning its China policy more generally. The new European Commission strives to be a “geopolitical” entity strategically engaging to achieve concrete results in its bilateral relations with China. The starting point of this shift is the 2019 “Strategic Outlook” developed by the European External Action Service, which defines China not only as a “partner”, but also a “competitor” and a “systemic rival”. On political values, China clearly is a “systemic rival”. The crucial question is whether “systemic rivalry” in the field of political values carries implications for other policy fields in which the EU and China are partners or competitors. A general consensus that the EU should adopt a more principled China policy and defend and promote its political values spells out very differently across EU institutions. By institutional design, the European Council is a pragmatic rather than principled institution. Compromise resulting from bargaining among member states with different interests shapes its approach. At the other end of the spectrum, the European Parliament serves a principled watchdog function, but has very limited competencies in foreign and security affairs. The European Commission strives to overcome the decades-old challenge of policy silos resulting from its fragmented institutional structure and the more than 60 sectoral dialogues with China. This carries the potential to turn more principled. However, to this day it is not clear whether the European Commission will make the promotion of political values a policy priority even if this comes at the cost of economic cooperation. This paper outlines ongoing debates on the EU’s new China policy and the role of political values in it, and provides 25 concrete policy recommendations for a more principled China policy that defends and promotes democracy, human rights and the rule of law.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Human Rights, Democracy, and Rule of Law
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and Asia

84. Mapping China’s Global Future: Playing Ball or Rocking the Boat?

Author:: Axel Berkofsky and Giulia Sciorati
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:: China’s future role on the global stage hinges upon a mixture of strengths and weaknesses. Beijing’s meteoric rise in economic terms has been coupled by increasing military expenditures and a more assertive foreign policy stance. But the country is also facing a potential backlash, exemplified by protests in Hong Kong, while it remains to be seen whether (and how) the governance of the coronavirus outbreak will affect China's image abroad. This report sets out to explore some of the key aspects of China’s regional and global foreign policy. It analyses the core tenets that motivate and shape China’s preferences, ideals, and actions, and explores how they interact with its partners, allies, and rivals.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Governance, Military Spending, COVID-19, and Future
Political Geography:: China and Asia

85. National Security Update 12: Status of 2020 Defense Authorization/Appropriations and NDAA Highlights

Author:: Jack Kelly
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA)
Abstract:: Our twelfth IFPA National Security Update examines the current status of the U.S. defense authorization, appropriations, and budget process with a focus on the Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and assesses its strengths and weaknesses in light of key programs and policies discussed in previous Updates. Topics addressed in our National Security Update series include hypersonic missiles, missile defense priorities, nuclear modernization issues, President Trump's Executive Order on Electromagnetic Pulse, the status of the Space Force, China’s actions in the South China Sea and U.S. options, and the military applications of artificial intelligence. In early 2017, the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis initiated an online series entitled National Security Update. Its purpose is to examine key foreign policy/defense issues and to set forth policy options. These updates are made available to the broad policy community within and outside government, including key policy makers in Washington, D.C.; members of Congress and their staffs; academic specialists; and other members of the private-sector security community. Future National Security Updates will address a range of topics in an effort to provide timely analyses and policy options.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Government, National Security, Budget, Weapons, Missile Defense, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:: China, North America, South China, and United States of America

86. The Berlin Pulse 2020 Special Edition: German Foreign Policy in Times of COVID-19

Author:: Pascal Lamy, Feng Zhongping, and Karen Donfried
Publication Date:: 11-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Körber-Stiftung
Abstract:: “Uncertainty is the only certainty” – these words are credited to the Roman philosopher Pliny the Elder, who died in the wake of an eruption of Mount Vesuvius in the year AD 79 which buried the city of Pompeii under volcanic ash. Whether or not the corona pandemic will be remembered 2,000 years from now, the virus reminds us of Pliny’s words: We may not yet know how SARS-CoV-2 will affect our societies, but affect them it will. Given this momentous event, like other organizations, we at Körber-Stiftung have had to respond with flexibility and a willingness to do things a little differently – one of the results is this special issue, juxtaposing German public opinion with international perspectives on the policy choices facing Berlin. This pandemic is occurring at a time of profound political change. Experts and policy-makers have pointed out for the better part of two decades now that whatever happens in China is likely to affect us. The absence of US leadership, a divided Europe, the increasing prevalence of international mistrust – like a focal lens, the coronavirus has shown us in all too much detail how these dynamics might play out over the next few decades. Germany has long struggled to adapt to these new realities. Germans have been told that their country will need to take on “more responsibility”, and that we will need to “take our fate into our own hands”. One example of how Berlin has tried to do so is through a renewed emphasis on multilateralism as a pillar of its foreign policy, not least by crafting the Alliance for Multilateralism. But how do these dynamics, and the spotlight they have cast on Berlin’s role in international affairs, square with public opinion? To answer this question remains the mission and idea of The Berlin Pulse.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, Multilateralism, Crisis Management, Transparency, COVID-19, Disinformation, and Health Crisis
Political Geography:: Africa, China, Europe, and Germany

87. The Berlin Pulse 2020/21 (full issue)

Author:: Gro Harlem Brundtland, Paolo Gentiloni, Peter Altmaier, and H.R. McMaster
Publication Date:: 11-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Körber-Stiftung
Abstract:: In last year’s edition, we called 2020 an ‘eventful year’ with Germany’s presidency of the European Council and the US presidential election. But no one would have thought that a pandemic might be added to the list of major events affecting German foreign policy and political priorities around the globe. One year – and a COVID-19 special edition of The Berlin Pulse in between – later, international policy-making is slowly adjusting to the new level of uncertainty the pandemic brought into our lives. Despite these uncertain times, German public opinion on involvement or restraint in international crises remains solid as a rock: 44 percent of respondents say that Germany should get more strongly involved while 49 percent still prefer restraint. Since Körber-Stiftung posed this question for the first time in 2014, the public’s perspective has barely changed. In spite of this continuity, the present issue is also full of surprises and novelties. The idea of The Berlin Pulse is to identify potential gaps between German public opinion and expectations of international policy-makers. In 2020, another gap becomes an eye-catcher – the one between German and US public perceptions of the transatlantic partnership. A wide majority of US respondents considers Germany as a partner when tackling issues, such as protecting human rights and democracy (75 percent) or the environment (76 percent). By contrast, German respondents hardly reciprocate this feeling. With the US presidential election just behind us, an increasing US-Chinese rivalry in which Europe risks becoming – as Pauline Neville-Jones puts it – ‘the pig in the middle’ and crises beyond COVID-19 on the horizon, the present issue dedicates one chapter to each of these three developments to which German foreign policy needs to respond.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, Public Opinion, European Union, Multilateralism, Trade, Transatlantic Relations, and WTO
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, India, Germany, Syria, and United States of America

88. China Maritime Report No. 8: Winning Friends and Influencing People: Naval Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics

Author:: Timothy R. Heath
Publication Date:: 09-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:: In recent years, Chinese leaders have called on the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to carry out tasks related to naval diplomacy beyond maritime East Asia, in the “far seas.” Designed to directly support broader strategic and foreign policy objectives, the PLAN participates in a range of overtly political naval diplomatic activities, both ashore and at sea, from senior leader engagements to joint exercises with foreign navies. These activities have involved a catalogue of platforms, from surface combatants to hospital ships, and included Chinese naval personnel of all ranks. To date, these acts of naval diplomacy have been generally peaceful and cooperative in nature, owing primarily to the service’s limited power projection capabilities and China’s focus on more pressing security matters closer to home. However, in the future a more blue-water capable PLAN could serve more overtly coercive functions to defend and advance China’s rapidly growing overseas interests when operating abroad.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Navy, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:: China and Asia

89. China Maritime Report No. 7: Gwadar: China's Potential Strategic Strongpoint in Pakistan

Author:: Isaac B. Kardon, Conor M. Kennedy, and Peter A. Dutton
Publication Date:: 08-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:: This China Maritime Report on Gwadar is the second in a series of case studies on China’s Indian Ocean “strategic strongpoints” (战略支点). People’s Republic of China (PRC) officials, military officers, and civilian analysts use the strategic strongpoint concept to describe certain strategically valuable foreign ports with terminals and commercial zones owned and operated by Chinese firms.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Port, and Commerce
Political Geography:: Pakistan, China, and Asia

90. The Importance of the Western Balkans in China’s Foreign Policy

Author:: Marcin Przychodniak
Publication Date:: 06-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: China’s cooperation with the Western Balkans through the “17+1” format and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), among others, is primarily political. In the economic sphere, Chinese investments are to a large extent only declarations, and trade is marginal in comparison to cooperation with the EU or others. China’s goals are to gain political influence in future EU countries and limit their cooperation with the U.S. Competition with China in the region requires more intense EU-U.S. cooperation, made more difficult by the pandemic.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, International Trade and Finance, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Investment, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and Balkans

91. U.S. Policy in the Arctic

Author:: Paweł Markiewicz
Publication Date:: 06-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: The Arctic has become another contested area between the U.S., Russia, and China. The region’s growing importance for global trade and American security means the U.S. goal is largely to maintain freedom of navigation in the Arctic. For this reason, the Trump administration strives to increase American capacities to operate in the Arctic. The effects of the COVID-19 pandemic will delay implementing these plans; nevertheless, they will be achieved in the long term and the U.S. will also expect support in the Arctic from NATO allies.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, and International Trade and Finance
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Arctic, and United States of America

92. US Trade Policy in the Biden Administration: The Challenge of China’s Rise

Author:: Simon Lester and Huan Zhu
Publication Date:: 12-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
Abstract:: The Trump administration has left the Biden administration a number of difficult trade policy issues to deal with, but the biggest challenge is likely to be China. The Biden administration will need to find a way forward in the increasingly tense US-China relationship, which covers aspects of trade, as well as foreign policy, security, and human rights issues. This article describes the rise of China as a priority in US trade policy, reviews the current set of US-China trade issues, and makes suggestions for the Biden administration going forward.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Grand Strategy, Multilateralism, Trade, Donald Trump, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

93. National Security Upate 13: Accessing the Technologies and Capabilities of the U.S. Commercial High-Tech Sector: A Defense Department Priority

Author:: Jack Kelly
Publication Date:: 03-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA)
Abstract:: Our thirteenth IFPA National Security Update examines the growing need of the Department of Defense to access and leverage the advanced dual-use technologies increasingly being developed in the commercial high-tech sector to maintain U.S. technological and military superiority. It focuses on the impediments facing the U.S. government and Defense Department in accessing commercial high-tech technologies, strategies and policies to remove these impediments, specific programs and initiatives to address the problem, and the concerns about the growing technological and military capabilities of China. Topics addressed in our National Security Update series include the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act, hypersonic missiles, military applications of artificial intelligence, missile defense priorities, the Trump Administration’s Executive Order on Electromagnetic Pulse, the status of the Space Force, and China’s actions in the South China Sea and U.S. options.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Government, Science and Technology, Strategic Competition, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:: China, North America, and United States of America

94. The party speaks for you: Foreign interference and the Chinese Communist Party’s united front system

Author:: Alex Joske
Publication Date:: 06-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: What’s the problem? The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is strengthening its influence by co-opting representatives of ethnic minority groups, religious movements, and business, science and political groups. It claims the right to speak on behalf of those groups and uses them to claim legitimacy. These efforts are carried out by the united front system, which is a network of party and state agencies responsible for influencing groups outside the party, particularly those claiming to represent civil society. It manages and expands the United Front, a coalition of entities working towards the party’s goals.1 The CCP’s role in this system’s activities, known as united front work, is often covert or deceptive.2 The united front system’s reach beyond the borders of the People’s Republic of China (PRC)—such as into foreign political parties, diaspora communities and multinational corporations—is an exportation of the CCP’s political system.3 This undermines social cohesion, exacerbates racial tension, influences politics, harms media integrity, facilitates espionage, and increases unsupervised technology transfer. General Secretary Xi Jinping’s reinvigoration of this system underlines the need for stronger responses to CCP influence and technology-transfer operations around the world. However, governments are still struggling to manage it effectively and there is little publicly available analysis of the united front system. This lack of information can cause Western observers to underestimate the significance of the united front system and to reduce its methods into familiar categories. For example, diplomats might see united front work as ‘public diplomacy’ or ‘propaganda’ but fail to appreciate the extent of related covert activities. Security officials may be alert to criminal activity or espionage while underestimating the significance of open activities that facilitate it. Analysts risk overlooking the interrelated facets of CCP influence that combine to make it effective.4 What’s the solution? Governments should disrupt the CCP’s capacity to use united front figures and groups as vehicles for covert influence and technology transfer. They should begin by developing analytical capacity for understanding foreign interference. On that basis, they should issue declaratory policy statements that frame efforts to counter it. Countermeasures should involve law enforcement, legislative reform, deterrence and capacity building across relevant areas of government. Governments should mitigate the divisive effect united front work can have on communities through engagement and careful use of language. Law enforcement, while critically important, shouldn’t be all or even most of the solution. Foreign interference often takes place in a grey area that’s difficult to address through law enforcement actions. Strengthening civil society and media must be a fundamental part of protecting against interference. Policymakers should make measures to raise the transparency of foreign influence a key part of the response
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Science and Technology, Foreign Interference, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:: China, Australia, and Australia/Pacific

95. Eyes wide open: Managing the Australia-China Antarctic relationship

Author:: Anthony Bergin and Tony Press
Publication Date:: 04-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: Given recent broader tensions in the China–Australia relationship, China’s global ambitions, lack of progress on key Antarctic policy initiatives and the potential for significant geopolitical consequences for the future of Antarctica and for Australia’s strategic interests, it’s important that Australian policymakers reconsider our long-term Antarctic policy settings. The report found no clear evidence that China is violating the Antarctic Treaty. But it argues we should apply a more sharply focused assessment of the costs and benefits of cooperation, given China’s more assertive international posture and increasing interests in Antarctica. The recommendations in the report are designed to maximise the value and mitigate the downside risks of China engagement for our Antarctic and broader national interests. Overall, we should adopt a more transactional approach in our Antarctic engagement with China, making it clear what we require from cooperation and what we expect from China. Given the track record Beijing has in moving rapidly on a broad front, as it’s done in the South China Sea, we need to be prepared to respond to a rapid increase in the speed and scale of China’s actions in Antarctica.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Climate Change, National Security, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: China, Asia, Australia, Australia/Pacific, and Antarctica

96. Chinese Discourse on NATO

Author:: Justyna Szczudlik
Publication Date:: 06-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Chinese experts’ interest in NATO has been growing for a year. The reason is the debate on China that began in the Alliance last year. China treats NATO as part of its rivalry with the U.S., vindicated by Chinese analysts’ emphasis on divergences between members, critical assessments of U.S. NATO policy and their conciliatory approach to European members. The continuation of the Alliance debate on China, including recognizing it as a threat, may lead the latter to intensify efforts to widen the divisions and seek closer cooperation with Russia.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, and Alliance
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

97. Russia’s Arctic Policy

Author:: Agnieszka Legucka
Publication Date:: 06-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Russia views the Arctic as a contested area with the U.S. and a place of competition with China. It regards any loss of its dominant position as the most important challenge in the Arctic region. To counteract it, Russia develops energy, military, and logistics infrastructure in the region. Although the role of transport in the Arctic, along the Northern Sea Route (NSR), is limited for now, the increased Russian military presence in the region is already a challenge for the security of NATO countries.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, and Territorial Disputes
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Arctic, and United States of America

98. Consequences of Hong Kong’s National Security Law

Author:: Marcin Przychodniak
Publication Date:: 08-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: The National Security Law, imposed on Hong Kong by China on 30 June, has reduced protests against China’s policy. The scale of the restrictions, including those potentially affecting foreigners, and China’s supervision over the implementation of the law have already worsened the living conditions of Hong Kong residents and functioning of foreign companies. China’s actions caused an international reaction, mainly from the UK, the U.S. and the EU. Concerned about the safety of its citizens, the EU recommends that Member States suspend their extradition agreements with Hong Kong.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, National Security, Law, European Union, and Freedom
Political Geography:: China, United Kingdom, Europe, Asia, Hong Kong, and United States of America

99. The Most Important Challenges in China’s Foreign Policy after the First Phase of the Pandemic

Author:: Marcin Przychodniak
Publication Date:: 10-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: China’s rivalry with the U.S. is intensifying. New American sanctions threaten, among others, Huawei’s global position. As a result of China’s aggressive foreign policy, relations with the EU and Australia have worsened, and the border conflict with India has intensified. To counter these failures and re-build their image, the Chinese authorities are trying to shift the responsibility for the problems to the U.S., strengthening anti-Western rhetoric, and presenting the world with new multilateral initiatives, such as one related to data security. With China’s foreign policy being idealogised, any successful cooperation with the EU on climate matters is unrealistic.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, European Union, Borders, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: China, Europe, India, Asia, and Australia

100. Through the Looking Glass: Chinese Open Source Assessments of North Korea's Ballistic Missile Capabilities

Author:: Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga and Scott W. Harold
Publication Date:: 09-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: North Korea’s ballistic missile program has long been a concern for the United States, South Korea, and Japan. Foreign researchers have increasingly leveraged advanced open source intelligence technology and cooperated across countries to track the North’s developments over the last 25 years. But one country has been left out – China. Are there open source Chinese analyses of DPRK ballistic missiles, do they align with U.S. assessments, and is there anything for other researchers to gain from reading these analyses? This report examines Chinese assessments of North Korean ballistic missile capabilities between 1998 and 2017. We find that Chinese analysts have paid growing attention to the North’s missile capabilities but are still not as attentive as Western observers, from whom they draw most of their information and analytic insights. Chinese analyses broadly mirror Western experts’ conclusions about the state of North Korea’s missile capabilities, most notably that North Korea has a functional, if not fully perfected, intercontinental-range ballistic missile (ICBM) that can reach the United States with a nuclear weapon. However, there is little original Chinese analysis that would enhance foreign experts’ preexisting understanding of DPRK missiles.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Weapons, and Research
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and North Korea

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS