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451. The Mixed Record of China’s Belt and Road Initiative

Author:
Thomas J. Duesterberg
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a signature program of Xi Jinping, has had undoubted success in supporting Xi’s ambitions to reestablish China as a global leader while strengthening its mercantilist economy. Nonetheless, developed and developing countries are reconsidering the program because of its success—largely for China itself—and because of the global economic and political crises since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. BRI also has increasingly visible problems caused by its operating structure, prompting participants and developed countries whose geoeconomic and geopolitical interests are undermined by the program’s expansion to reassess it. Continued BRI growth is at best questionable and probably unlikely in the wake of growing pushback to the program as well as growing problems inside China itself.`
Topic:
Economics, Infrastructure, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Xi Jinping
Political Geography:
China and Asia

452. Democratic Backsliding in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Hudson Institute
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
A negative trend of democratic recession has steadily unfolded across the Indo-Pacific region since the 2010s. Subregionally, Southeast Asia has suffered from the most severe drop in democracy scores, while East Asia and South Asia have experienced a moderate decrease. Oceania remains the most democratic subregion and has achieved a slight increase in its democracy scores. There has been a remarkable shift of balance from democratic advancement to democratic backsliding in the Indo-Pacific. In the three years from 2019 to 2021, the percentage of political regimes experiencing democratic backsliding surpassed those making democratic advancement. Evidence also shows that democratic recession is much more pronounced in populous societies than in sparsely populated societies. Overall, both the number and percentage of people living under autocratic-leaning regimes and autocratic regimes have reached record high levels. Democratic recession in the Indo-Pacific is caused by the coupling of domestic and geopolitical forces. Domestically, democratic recession has principally been driven by deep-rooted cleavages inherent within the countries and territories where illiberal strongmen, including populist leaders, army generals, and nationalist state leaders, exploit such cleavages to reinforce their repression of democracy. Geopolitically, under a multipolar Indo-Pacific, illiberal powers including China and Russia are expanding their spheres of influence by providing support to illiberal strongmen across the region. Traditionally, “democracy” and “security” are seen as two separate fields in the policy world. The major findings of this report, which documents the coupling of domestic and geopolitical forces in causing democratic recession across the Indo-Pacific, raises questions on the validity of the conventional thought pertaining to democracy promotion and security competition. Today, the Indo-Pacific region presents the free world with a double-challenge of democratic recession and security competition, indicating that it’s the time to tear down the longstanding artificial wall between democracy and security. There is an urgent need to invest in new knowledge infrastructures that can provide integrated strategic analysis to policymakers and practitioners.  
Topic:
Authoritarianism, Democracy, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Indo-Pacific

453. Eleven Myths and Realities about Biden’s Missile Defense Review

Author:
Rebeccah L. Heinrichs
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
On October 27, 2022, the Biden administration released the public version of the Missile Defense Review (MDR). The document is commendable in some respects and is concerning in others. Below are some myths and realities about the Biden MDR.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Weapons, Missile Defense, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

454. US Needs to Play Larger Role as Swing Producer of Oil and Gas in the Current Crisis

Author:
Thomas J. Duesterberg
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
In response to Russian aggression in Ukraine, European nations have drastically reduced imports of crude oil, refined petroleum products, and natural gas from Russia. The 2021 levels of these energy imports were around 2.2 million barrels per day (mbd) of crude oil, 1.2 mbd of refined products, and 155 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas on an annual basis.In addition to extreme difficulties in obtaining new sources of natural gas and to a lesser extent oil, the price increases throughout Europe since the onset of the war have been of historic proportions. In the days following the invasion, natural gas prices shot up by 62 percent, and UK energy prices were up by 150 percent. The full impact of the war, along with the related need to rein in the highest inflation numbers in over 40 years, has pushed Europe into a recession that threatens households and small businesses as well as European manufacturers’ ability to remain competitive. As a result, if the region cannot quickly assemble alternative supplies, the European commitment to assist in containing Russian aggression may weaken.
Topic:
Economics, Oil, Gas, Crisis Management, Supply Chains, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

455. US Reengagement with Pakistan: Ideas for Reviving an Important Relationship

Author:
Husain Haqqani
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The US-Pakistan relationship has gone through many changes. The relationship had a high point when President Dwight Eisenhower described Pakistan as the ‘‘most allied ally of the United States,” and another high point occurred when President Ronald Reagan said that “the American people support close ties with Pakistan and look forward to expanding them.” The relationship has also had low points, such as when in January 2018 President Donald Trump said, “The United States has foolishly given Pakistan more than $33 billion in aid over the last 15 years, and they have given us nothing but lies and deceit, thinking of our leaders as fools. They give safe haven to the terrorists we hunt in Afghanistan, with little help. No more!” US administrations going back to President Eisenhower have pinned great hopes on their alliance with Pakistan only to be disappointed and frustrated. For policymakers in both countries, some of the most important recent issues have been Pakistan’s poorly veiled support for the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan, its backing for jihadi groups targeting Kashmir, its close embrace of China, and its expanding nuclear arsenal. Successive American administrations have assumed that with the right kind of incentives—economic and military—Pakistan would finally change how its policy diverges from US interests. However, neither the award of military and civilian aid nor the cutoff of aid has been able to change Pakistan’s existing national security paradigm and the policies framed by its security establishment. Pakistan, for its part, has been upset as it believes it has offered a fair exchange to the US for its aid by abetting US strategic plans: containment of communism in the 1950s and 1960s, military assistance against the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s, and post-2001 logistical and political support for the American military mission. Pakistan complains that Washington does not respect its contribution or fully appreciate its security threats, regional concerns, and aspirations.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Bilateral Relations, and Strategic Engagement
Political Geography:
Pakistan, South Asia, North America, and United States of America

456. Advancing the Quantum Advantage: Hybrid Quantum Systems and the Future of American High-Tech Leadership

Author:
Arthur Herman
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Quantum computers mark a transformational revolution in information technology. Whereas most computers process data using bits that consist of either a zero or one, quantum computers can use those digits simultaneously through superposition.1 The many resulting benefits will include the discovery of new drugs, new processes for carbon capture and advanced battery research, and a new exactitude in weather prediction, including in dealing with climate change.2 All in all, experts expect the global quantum computing industry to grow to $450–850 billion in value in the next 15 to 30 years.3 Yet because of the challenges of engineering qubits—the physical basis of quantum computing—most authorities push the timeline for full-scale quantum computer commercialization beyond 2040 and as far as 2050. Even some quantum experts do not expect any big breakthroughs until the 2030s at the earliest. The true path to the quantum future is the combination of quantum and classical digital technology, especially in computing, which will powerfully accelerate access to the potential benefits of quantum information science. While key players in the industry, including IBM and Microsoft, have recognized the potential synergy of hybrid architectures and applications, the federal government needs to expand its attention and resources devoted to this aspect of securing America’s quantum future and its leadership in the twenty-first century.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Science and Technology, Leadership, Innovation, and Quantum Computers
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

457. Schumpeter’s Creative Destruction as a Radical Departure: New Paradigm for Analyzing Capitalism

Author:
Leonardo Burlamaqui
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)
Abstract:
The paper’s core contribution is a reinterpretation of Schumpeter’s development theory, through the "creative destruction paradigm" provided in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (CSD). By linking the core propositions of the latter with the brilliant, but underdeveloped, innovations from The Theory of Economic Development (TED) and some largely ignored historical and institutional insights provided in Business Cycles (BC), the seeds of a new analytical framework emerge. One which is completely out of balance, centered on finance, entrepreneurial action, uncertainty, institutions, and competition by means of innovation.
Topic:
Development, Political Economy, Capitalism, Finance, Entrepreneurship, and Innovation
Political Geography:
Global Focus

458. Polanyi, Market Fundamentalism, and the Institutional Structure of Capitalism

Author:
Leonardo Burlamaqui
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)
Abstract:
The basic proposition of this paper is that the so-called "new economic sociology", which is rooted in key ideas of Karl Polanyi, is an indispensable "tool" for two tasks: a) it provides us with a powerful critique of market fundamentalism, and b) it allows us to analyze the economic performance of contemporary capitalism by accessing the working of its institutional structure. From an analytical perspective, the paper suggests that Polanyian Economic Sociology is an essential complement to both the Schumpeterian and the Post-Keynesian perspectives in economics. This is especially so when it comes to the discussion of "socioeconomic stability" and, more precisely, as Keynes himself stated in the General Theory: to explain why capitalist economies manifest themselves in different ways and degrees, in spite of encompassing inherent elements of instability and unpredictability.
Topic:
Economics, Markets, Political Economy, Sociology, and Capitalism
Political Geography:
Global Focus

459. Hydrogen and Energy Transition: Opportunities for Brazil

Author:
Rafaela Guedes, Gregório Cruz Araújo Maciel, and André Bello
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)
Abstract:
Hydrogen has an important versatility in the context of energy transition. It can be used directly as a low or zero-carbon energy source in sectors that are difficult to decarbonize or in energy storage, enabling a larger share of intermittent renewables, such as wind and solar power. In 2021, the Royal General Consulate of Norway in Rio de Janeiro and CEBRI promoted a discussion on the perspectives, technical challenges and economic feasibility of hydrogen production projects, as well as alternative national development strategies for this technology and its potential advantages for Brazil. Panelists from several companies involved in the sector (DNV, NEL Hydrogen, Air Products, Hyrton), as well as Giovani Machado, Director for Energy Economics and Environmental Studies at EPE, Mariane Fosland,General Consul of Norway, and CEBRI Trustee, Winston Fritsch, participated in the panel.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Hydrogen, Energy, and Green Transition
Political Geography:
Norway, Brazil, and South America

460. Energy in a World in Transition: Challenges, Opportunities and Perspectives

Author:
Jorge Camargo, Pedro Malan, Winston Fritsch, Clarissa Lins, and Alessandra Amaral
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)
Abstract:
The Energy Transition process is complex and multifaceted, with substantial impacts on the energy industries’ business models. In order to contribute with a greater understanding of this trend, CEBRI, in partnership with BMA, organized a collection of articles that analyzes the main implications of this process, which is well positioned to be one of the major drivers of economic transformation in this historic period. Published in English and Portuguese, the collection is structured around the theme “Energy in a World in Transition”, and assesses a global process from a Brazilian perspective. The first edition, published in June, included important reflections on the future of Brazilian energy.
Topic:
Economy, Business, Industry, Energy, and Green Transition
Political Geography:
Brazil, South America, and Global Focus

461. Brazilian Perspectives for BRICS

Author:
Marcos Caramuru, José Mário Antunes, and Tatiana Rosito
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)
Abstract:
The project “Brazilian Perspectives for BRICS - 2022”, developed by CEBRI at the invitation of the Chinese Embassy in Brazil, aimed at mapping trends and defining concrete strategies and proposals to, from a Brazilian perspective, inform the agenda and improve the joint action and international projection of the group, whose rotating presidency is held by China in 2022. The development, coordination, and results of the project were the responsibility of CEBRI and, beyond the original objective, constitute a contribution to the debate on BRICS in Brazil. The project brought together about 30 high-level Brazilian specialists from various areas (academia, civil society, private sector, and public sector) in three closed meetings. This Executive Summary presents a synthesis of the discussions.
Topic:
Development, Geopolitics, Trade, and BRICS
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Brazil, and South America

462. Reboot: Framework for a New American Industrial Policy

Author:
Martijn Rasser, Megan Lamberth, Hannah Kelley, and Ryan Johnson
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
This paper presents an initial framework for a new American industrial policy, a blueprint for what is needed to ensure the United States has the vision, goals, plans, and resources for an era of sustained strategic competition. The concept, informed by an overarching national technology strategy and a supply chain resilience strategy, is the initial contribution in a larger effort to provide policymakers with a comprehensive toolkit to navigate competition with China and engage with countries around the world, friend and foe alike.4 To provide tangible real-world examples of a new sensible American industrial policy and to illustrate how policies would vary by sector and over time, subsequent reports will detail what a new American industrial policy would look like in action for three key sectors: biotechnology, semiconductors, and green technologies.
Topic:
Economy, Green Technology, Strategic Competition, Industry, Biotechnology, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:
China, North America, and United States of America

463. Revitalizing the U.S.-Philippines Alliance to Address Strategic Competition in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Lisa Curtis, Joshua Fitt, and Zachary Durkee
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The purpose of this report is to assess the current state of the relationship and provide recommendations for revitalizing and expanding bilateral ties following a six-year period marked by turbulence and volatility. While Duterte has tested the flexibility of the alliance with his controversial counternarcotics campaign and attempted realignment toward China, his actions have also highlighted a broader need for the United States to reprioritize its oldest ally in Asia. To reinvigorate U.S.-Philippines relations, the report makes a series of policy recommendations regarding security and defense ties, foreign assistance, energy cooperation, and diplomatic ties. It further proposes ways to improve the narrative regarding U.S.-Philippines legacy issues and the two countries’ complicated colonial history.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Alliance, Strategic Competition, and Rodrigo Duterte
Political Geography:
Philippines, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

464. Dangerous Straits: Wargaming a Future Conflict over Taiwan

Author:
Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Becca Wasser, and Chris Dougherty
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Until recently, U.S. policymakers and subject matter experts have viewed the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC’s) forcible unification with Taiwan as a distant threat. But the mix of rapid Chinese military modernization, a narrow window for localized near-parity with the U.S. military, and growing pessimism about the prospects for peaceful unification may lead the PRC to perceive that it has the ability to pursue a successful operation against Taiwan. Beijing’s lessons learned from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine could prompt the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to adjust its war plans for Taiwan to become more effective and deadly. Coupled together, these developments may suggest an accelerated timeline for seizing Taiwan. It is therefore urgent that the United States, in conjunction with its regional allies and partners, identify ways to deter the PRC from invading Taiwan and prevent a future conflict. To do so, the Gaming Lab at CNAS, in partnership with NBC’s Meet the Press, conducted a high-level strategic-operational wargame exploring a fictional war over Taiwan, set in 2027. The wargame sought to illuminate the dilemmas that U.S. and Chinese policymakers might face in such a conflict, along with the strategies they might adopt to achieve their overarching objectives. The game was intended to produce insights as to how the United States and its allies and partners could deter the PRC from invading Taiwan and could better position themselves to defend Taiwan and defeat such aggression should deterrence fail.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Conflict, and War Games
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America

465. Operationalizing the Quad

Author:
Lisa Curtis, Jacob Stokes, Joshua Fitt, and Andrew J. Adams
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
This paper assesses Quad activities and the progress the group has made toward its stated objective of promoting a free and open Indo-Pacific. It also provides policy recommendations for strengthening Quad cooperation across the six identified priority areas (vaccines, critical and emerging technologies, climate change, infrastructure, space, and cybersecurity) as well as on trade and economics and security and defense.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Science and Technology, Economy, Trade, and Quad Alliance
Political Geography:
Japan, India, Australia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

466. Regenerate: Biotechnology and U.S. Industrial Policy

Author:
Ryan Fedasiuk
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Arevolution in biotechnology is dawning at the precise moment the world needs it most. Amid an ongoing climate crisis, fast-paced technological maturation, and a global pandemic, humans must find new ways to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, improve food security, develop new vaccines and therapeutics, recycle waste, synthesize new materials, and adapt to a changing world. But incentive structures in the U.S. private sector are generally biased against risk, and therefore constrain development in ways that do not have the same effect on firms in China and other U.S. competitors. This puts the United States at a relative disadvantage and risks ceding American leadership over one of the most powerful and transformative fields of technology in recent memory. The United States needs some form of industrial policy to promote its bioeconomy—one that is enshrined in democratic values and focused on improving access to four key drivers of bioeconomic growth: equipment, personnel, information, and capital. This report attempts to measure the health and outlook of the U.S. synthetic biology industry and broader bioeconomy by examining U.S. access to each of these four resources. It concludes that the United States still possesses an advantage in each of these fields—but that, absent a proactive strategy to ensure resource access, and without a significant infusion of capital, the U.S. bioeconomy risks languishing behind competitors such as China in the decades ahead.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Industry, Capital, Biotechnology, Personnel, and Information
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

467. Lighting the Path: Framing a Transatlantic Technology Strategy

Author:
Carisa Nietsche, Emily Jin, Hannah Kelley, Emily Kilcrease, and Megan Lamberth
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The world’s leading powers are engaged in an unprecedented technology competition. Autocratic regimes are advancing a vision for technology use—a techno-totalitarianism that entrenches authoritarian rule—that directly opposes the interests of democratic states. This vision, which includes control over key economic inputs, the domination of supply chains, breakthrough capabilities in emerging technologies, and unfettered surveillance, threatens to upend a decades-old rules-based system that promotes economic competitiveness and freedoms, supports democratic values, and protects fundamental rights. How this technology competition unfolds will shape the global economic, political, and military balance for decades. Collaboration among the world’s tech-leading democracies will be essential to maximize the odds of a favorable outcome. Perhaps the most important factor in this dynamic is reimagining the long-standing transatlantic partnership to meet this challenge. To succeed, the United States and Europe must compete or risk ceding the competition to autocracies. They must be guided by a strategy that matches the moment. Yet no such strategy currently exists. This report aims to light that path by developing the contours of a transatlantic technology strategy. This framework has a two-part approach. First, it identifies persistent friction in technology policy between the United States and Europe. The transatlantic partners must align approaches, when possible, and manage disagreement in the relationship to pave the way for a cooperative agenda. Second, this report advances a promote and protect agenda to ensure U.S. and EU economic security and long-term technological competitiveness. The report covers seven areas in which transatlantic cooperation will be key: artificial intelligence (AI), biotechnology, clean energy technology, information and communications technology and services (ICTS), quantum information science and technology (QIST), semiconductors, and standard-setting. This report offers concrete, actionable recommendations to maintain the transatlantic partners’ technological edge, ensure economic competitiveness, and protect democratic values. Ultimately, the report charts a blueprint for transatlantic success in a wide-ranging and consequential technology competition.
Topic:
Science and Technology, European Union, Partnerships, Transatlantic Relations, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

468. Reimagine: Clean Energy Technology and U.S. Industrial Policy

Author:
Jonas Nahm
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Historically, the United States has been the largest public investor in clean energy research and development (R&D). U.S. research institutions and private firms continue to hold a technological lead in many next-generation technologies that could make the transition away from fossil fuels cheaper and more efficient. Such technologies include next-generation solar photovoltaic technologies, advanced battery chemistries, and software to manage complex energy systems, including those with high penetrations of wind energy. Although the United States was an early leader in clean energy R&D and continues to make major technological advances, it has, over time, fallen behind in the commercialization and manufacturing of the technologies developed domestically. This study reviews U.S. industrial policy for clean energy sectors and argues that other economies have more frequently used proactive industrial policies to support the development of domestic clean energy technology industries. Too often, the United States has not mounted an equivalent industrial policy response. The U.S. government has instead focused more narrowly on funding the invention of new technologies and, intermittently, supported domestic markets for clean energy technologies through federal and state programs. Such policies have included, for instance, federal R&D grants for universities, research institutes, and the private sector, as well as subsidies and regulations to support the growth of clean energy markets at the federal and state level. This U.S. approach to encouraging the growth of domestic clean energy industries has assumed that market failures primarily exist in innovation. Since firms cannot in all cases reap all the gains from investments in the development of new technologies, they are likely to underinvest in innovation, creating a need for governments to supplement private-sector investments in R&D. The U.S. approach to clean energy industrial policy also assumes that investments in R&D will eventually spur the growth of domestic industries if combined with sufficient market demand. Yet U.S. industrial policy has not addressed key institutional shortcomings in segments of clean energy supply chains that are not well supported domestically, particularly in scaling new technologies to mass manufacturing. As a consequence, many technologies developed with public R&D funding failed to reach domestic mass production, as firms were unable to make the investments required to bring the technologies to market domestically. The report develops four recommendations to improve the competitiveness of domestic clean energy industries. First, the United States should establish a state development bank that could fund domestic manufacturing projects in sectors, such as clean energy, that have struggled to raise financing from U.S. financial institutions. The scarcity of capital for clean energy manufacturing has prevented domestic startups from raising the financing required to commercialize and produce their technologies domestically. Second, the U.S. government should ramp up investments in vocational training programs that would meet the workforce needs of growing clean energy manufacturing sectors. Third, the federal government should set stable regulatory requirements and binding targets for clean energy markets as part of a national strategy for competitiveness in clean energy sectors. This would reduce uncertainty injected by the intermittent and fragmented nature of current government support for clean energy sectors and create incentives for the private sector to invest in domestic supply chains for clean energy technologies. Fourth, the United States should limit the use of trade restrictions as industrial policy tools and instead focus on improving the competitiveness of domestic clean energy firms through proactive industrial policies. Trade restrictions can limit the ability of domestic clean energy firms to source materials, parts, and components through global supply chains; may lead to increased prices in ways that can harm domestic clean energy service industries; and obstruct the climate diplomacy needed to meet the goals of the Paris Agreement. At the moment, geopolitical shifts, strategic competition with China, and the ripple effects of the war in Ukraine provide a political opening for the consistent deployment of more ambitious industrial policies. The United States should use this opportunity or risk falling behind other economies, including those in Europe, that have made the development of domestic clean energy supply chains central elements of their response to climate change.
Topic:
Green Technology, Industry, Research and Development, and Energy
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

469. Rebuild: Toolkit for a New American Industrial Policy

Author:
Emily Kilcrease and Emily Jin
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
As economic security comes to the forefront of U.S. foreign policy, the U.S. strategy has been largely reactive and focused on playing defense rather than offense. Actions have centered on slowing down competitors—namely China—rather than defining an affirmative vision for growing American strength in the economic domain. A uniquely American industrial policy is the missing piece of the U.S. economic security strategy. Pursuit of industrial policy must recognize the immense benefits of free markets while also grappling with their limitations. Policymakers must promote the efficiency and productivity gains of a competitive open market while also seeking resilient and secure supply chains, fair and reciprocal trading relations, and uninterrupted access to those goods and services critical to the national defense, critical infrastructure, and smooth functioning of the society writ large. Industrial policy advocates must also get comfortable with a new way of thinking about global competition. They must be clear-eyed about the fact that the security of the United States and its allies may be threatened by China’s technological and economic advances. Simply leveling the playing field with China is no longer enough. The United States needs to play to win. The first report in this Center for a New American Security (CNAS) project outlined the intellectual framework for a uniquely American industrial policy, one that can “secure the United States’ standing as the world’s premier technology power, so that it can empower its citizens, compete economically, and secure its geostrategic interests without compromising its values or sovereignty."
Topic:
Defense Policy, Strategic Competition, Industry, and Economic Security
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

470. Competitive Connectivity: Crafting Transatlantic Responses to China’s Belt and Road Initiative

Author:
Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Lisa Curtis, Jacob Stokes, Carisa Nietsche, Joshua Fitt, and Nicholas Lokker
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Given the uncertain future of BRI, researchers at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) identified the major drivers likely to influence the direction of the program and examined their numerous permutations. The authors selected three scenarios and focused on how conditions of each scenario would play out in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. For each scenario, the report identifies the risks and implications for the United States and its allies. The scenarios are designed to prepare policymakers and planners for the possible futures they could face, including key challenges and opportunities that may arise in the years to come. Lastly, this paper identifies additional policy steps that will prepare the transatlantic allies to both compete with China’s investments and increase their own resilience.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Infrastructure, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Transatlantic Relations, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and United States of America

471. Russia in the Arctic: Gauging How Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine Will Alter Regional Dynamics

Author:
Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Jim Townsend, Nicholas Lokker, Heli Hautala, and James Frey
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Russia’s reinvasion of Ukraine in February 2022 is producing ripple effects that will reverberate far beyond Ukraine for years to come, affecting issue areas and regions where the United States and Europe must manage relations with Moscow. Such effects will certainly be felt in the Arctic (which for this study will be limited to the European Arctic or the “High North”). Already, Russia’s aggression in Ukraine has compelled Finland and Sweden to apply for NATO membership, altering the region’s security architecture. Amid the changes that are unfolding, it is critical that analysts and policymakers reexamine long-standing assessments and assumptions about Russia. To that end, this paper reexamines Russia’s approach to the Arctic in light of events in Ukraine. Given the high degree of uncertainty about the trajectory of the war in Ukraine and its effect on Russia, it is impossible to confidently project a single future for Russia’s Arctic policy. CNAS researchers, therefore, identified four drivers that are most likely to shape Russia’s approach to the Arctic: Russia’s perception of the Western threat, the impact of Western sanctions, China’s role in the Arctic, and whether Putin remains in power. Using different permutations of those drivers, the authors developed three scenarios for how the future Russian approach to the Arctic could evolve looking out to 2025.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Arctic, and United States of America

472. Rewire: Semiconductors and U.S. Industrial Policy

Author:
Chris Miller
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
As the United States considers industrial policy for the first time in decades, it should learn lessons from prior government efforts to shape the semiconductor industry, in the United States and abroad. The U.S. government has played a major role in the semiconductor industry since the invention of the first integrated circuit, via funding scientific research and via military procurement, which has driven the commercialization of new technology. However, though government—and specifically, the Defense Department—has had deep connections with the chip industry, it has played only a supportive role in building America’s semiconductor industry, with the key innovations and firms emerging from private-sector expertise. Other countries have experimented with industrial policy toward semiconductors too. Success stories in industrial policy generally have involved investing in skilled workforces and ensuring competitiveness by pushing domestic firms to sell to international markets. Simply pouring capital into a country’s chip industry rarely has been a winning strategy. Today, the U.S. government should focus policy toward the semiconductor industry around four main objectives: promoting technological advances, guaranteeing security of semiconductor supply, retaining control of choke points, and slowing China’s technological advances.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Strategic Competition, Industry, Semiconductors, and Policymaking
Political Geography:
China, North America, and United States of America

473. Artificial Intelligence and Arms Control

Author:
Paul Scharre and Megan Lamberth
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Advances in artificial intelligence (AI) pose immense opportunity for militaries around the world. With this rising potential for AI-enabled military systems, some activists are sounding the alarm, calling for restrictions or outright bans on some AI-enabled weapon systems.1 Conversely, skeptics of AI arms control argue that as a general-purpose technology developed in the civilian context, AI will be exceptionally hard to control.2 AI is an enabling technology with countless nonmilitary applications; this factor differentiates it from many other military technologies, such as landmines or missiles.3 Because of its widespread availability, an absolute ban on all military applications of AI is likely infeasible. There is, however, a potential for prohibiting or regulating specific use cases. The international community has, at times, banned or regulated weapons with varying degrees of success. In some cases, such as the ban on permanently blinding lasers, arms control has worked remarkably well to date. In other cases, however, such as attempted limits on unrestricted submarine warfare or aerial bombardment of cities, states failed to achieve lasting restraint in war. States’ motivations for controlling or regulating weapons vary. States may seek to limit the diffusion of a weapon that is particularly disruptive to political or social stability, contributes to excessive civilian casualties, or causes inhumane injury to combatants. This paper examines the potential for arms control for military applications of AI by exploring historical cases of attempted arms control, analyzing both successes and failures. The first part of the paper explores existing academic literature related to why some arms control measures succeed while others fail. The paper then proposes several criteria that influence the success of arms control.4 Finally, it analyzes the potential for AI arms control and suggests next steps for policymakers. Detailed historical cases of attempted arms control—from ancient prohibitions to modern agreements—can be found in appendix A in the pdf available for download. For a summary table of historical attempts at arms control, see appendix B. History teaches us that policymakers, scholars, and members of civil society can take concrete steps today to improve the chances of successful AI arms control in the future. These include taking policy actions to shape the way the technology evolves and increasing dialogue at all levels to better understand how AI applications may be used in warfare. Any AI arms control will be challenging. There may be cases, however, where arms control is possible under the right conditions, and small steps today could help lay the groundwork for future successes.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Artificial Intelligence, and Military
Political Geography:
Global Focus

474. Assessing Russian State Capacity to Develop and Deploy Advanced Military Technology

Author:
Samuel Bendett, Richard Connolly, Jeffrey Edmonds, Andrea Kendall-Taylor, and Michael Kofman
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Even before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, many analysts and policymakers viewed Russia as a declining power. This mindset, formed by the sharp juxtaposition between the seeming strength of the Soviet Union and the chaos and weakness of Russia in the 1990s, has been an enduring heuristic for how Russia today is understood. The country’s stagnant and resource-dependent economy, declining population, and substantial brain drain have fed a sense that Russia’s days as a global power are numbered. The war in Ukraine has only accelerated some of these trends, further reinforcing such views. The Russian military’s poor performance, the degradation of its forces, and the imposition of sanctions and export controls that will restrict Russia’s ability to regenerate its forces have already led some to dismiss the country as a Potemkin power and pronounce the end of its great power status.1 Russia undoubtedly will emerge from its war on Ukraine as a weaker power. But even during the post-Soviet period of sustained economic stagnation, brain drain, and demographic decline, the Russian state developed a new generation of hypersonic missiles, air and missile defenses, and nuclear weapons with novel means of propulsion. Russia has demonstrated that it is able not only to bring to fruition late-Soviet designs, but also to develop a follow-on generation of capabilities. Likewise, the Kremlin has continued to modernize and expand its nuclear capabilities. Despite economic constraints, the Kremlin prioritized the development of its strategic nuclear forces by investing significant resources into developing and deploying new nuclear warheads and launchers, upgrading all legs of the nuclear triad, completing work on a hypersonic glide vehicle, and building a new intercontinental, nuclear-armed, nuclear-powered undersea autonomous torpedo. Of course, Russia’s past performance was under a different set of conditions. Moving forward, as a result of its invasion of Ukraine, Russia will face new and more significant constraints on its ability to modernize its military. But it is too soon to count Russia out. Policymakers need a more nuanced assessment of the nature of the future Russian threat. This report provides such an assessment, focusing on Russia’s ability to develop and deploy its nuclear capabilities through 2030. To that end, this report first identifies Russia’s own stated goals and objectives for the development of its nuclear forces looking out to 2030. Because Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the resulting military degradation and economic sanctions and export controls introduce critical uncertainties about the Kremlin’s ability to execute these objectives, this report adopts a scenarios approach to forecasting Russia’s future nuclear capabilities. The report identifies two drivers that the authors view as most critical in shaping Russia’s ability to fulfill its stated objectives: the impact of Western sanctions on Russia’s government revenue and ability to access critical technology, and the extent of the degradation of the Russian military in Ukraine, which will force choices on the Kremlin about how to prioritize military expenditures. This report uses these two drivers to describe two scenarios that define the upper and lower boundaries of expectations for Russia’s nuclear capabilities, along with the implications of each of these scenarios for the United States and its allies. The scenarios, in other words, describe both a worst- and best-case state of affairs for Russia, and thus they help frame the problem for U.S. policymakers and planners. The report concludes with an assessment of key findings that emerge from the analysis and associated recommendations for the United States and Europe.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Sanctions, Military, Russia-Ukraine War, and Policymaking
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

475. U.S.-ROK Strategy for Enhancing Cooperation on Combating and Deterring Cyber-Enabled Financial Crime

Author:
Jason Bartlett
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The May 2022 U.S.-ROK Summit between President Joe Biden and President Yoon Suk-yeol revitalized previous bilateral commitments to establish a joint cyber working group to address the growing issue of cyber-enabled financial crime with specific emphasis on cryptocurrency, blockchain technology, and illicit North Korean cyber activity.1 This report provides specific policy recommendations for Washington and Seoul to incorporate within the cyber working group to enhance cooperation on combating and deterring cyber-enabled financial crime, especially from state-sponsored actors. North Korea has become the greatest state-sponsored threat to the global financial services sector. From 2021 to June 2022 alone, North Korean cyber operatives and their facilitators stole more than $1 billion (in U.S. currency, as throughout this report unless otherwise indicated) in digital assets through hacking cryptocurrency exchanges and laundering the stolen funds using various financial technologies and obfuscation techniques, including cryptocurrency mixers and foreign over-the-counter brokers. Pyongyang will likely maintain this position as long as the potential gains of cyber operations against financial services are greater than the potential risks and resources needed to conduct these operations. Washington and Seoul must work together to change this reality. This report compiles the findings of a year-long research project to generate actionable policy recommendations for Washington and Seoul to incorporate within their joint cyber working group to strengthen joint deterrence against state-sponsored cyber-enabled financial crime that continues to target both U.S. and South Korean social, financial, and cyber infrastructure. Based on intensive field research and interviews with U.S. and ROK stakeholders, this report outlines current challenges to enhancing U.S.-ROK cyber coordination, details the evolution of North Korea’s cyber program and modern-day threats, provides policy recommendations for the joint cyber working group, and includes an appendix with all relevant U.S. and ROK agencies that can contribute valuable expertise to the group.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, Cybersecurity, and Financial Crimes
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

476. Precision and Posture: Defense Spending Trends and the FY23 Budget Request

Author:
Stacie L. Pettyjohn and Hannah Dennis
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
This report examines the fiscal year (FY) 2023 defense budget request and assesses whether it sufficiently resources what was known of the Biden administration’s national defense strategy when the budget was released. Because of the delay of the full, unclassified version of the strategy, the analysis focuses on two factors—high-end munitions stockpiles and overseas posture—that past studies have indicated are critical for strengthening deterrence against China and Russia in the near term. This report concludes that while the FY23 request makes some strides on both issues, more must be done today to improve the United States’ chances of deterring and, if necessary, defeating the adversary tomorrow. The ongoing war in Ukraine has elevated the issue of munitions stockpiles to front-page news as both Ukrainian and Russian forces continue to consume high volumes of key weapons. We examine the sufficiency of existing critical conventional munitions stockpiles and the future procurement plans to meet the threats posed by China and Russia. We find that while the services have shifted to investing in longer-range weapons, they are still underinvesting in the specific capabilities, in particular anti-ship and area-effects weapons, that would be needed to counter China in a variety of scenarios. Moreover, the Department of Defense (DoD) is not buying enough of these weapons to blunt and defeat an initial invasion, and it certainly is not stockpiling enough precision-guided munitions (PGMs) for a protracted war.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Budget, Defense Spending, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and United States of America

477. Supporting Russian Civil Society: A Report of the Transatlantic Forum on Russia

Author:
Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Maria Snegovaya
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Since Russia re-invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022, repression inside Russia has worsened. The trend toward greater repression predates Moscow’s unprovoked invasion. The Kremlin had already increased its crackdown on all facets of Russian civil society, including targeting journalists and political opposition and tightening the country’s information environment ahead of its parliamentary election in September 2021. Since the invasion, the Kremlin has intensified its repressive efforts to shut down the possibility of dissent and insulate its hold on power from any blowback from the war. Experience from authoritarian regimes like Putin’s Russia suggests that high levels of repression are here to stay as long as Putin remains in power—authoritarian regimes are unlikely to walk back repression for fear that doing so would indicate regime weakness and embolden activists who advocate for political change. Rising repression inside Russia created immediate risks to journalists, activists, and other Russians who support a freer and more democratic Russia (as well as to their families). In the longer term, it also creates a potential barrier to a less confrontational relationship with a post-Putin Russia. As repression has risen, the Kremlin has doubled down on anti–United States and anti-Western rhetoric and shut down opportunities for exchanges between Russian scientists and academics and their Western counterparts. The Kremlin’s propagation of anti-Western messages and the lack of exchange between Russians and the West—exacerbated by a loss of economic ties amid Western sanctions—engender mistrust and misunderstanding, creating a long-term barrier to a less confrontational relationship. Steps to deny Russian tourists visas and other forms of collective punishment, while understandable, have the potential to sour Russian attitudes toward the West, hurting the prospects for any future improvement in relations with a post-Putin Russia. This policy brief identifies how the United States and Europe together can continue to support Russian civil society despite the dismal state of relations with Russia. It outlines the state of play of the Kremlin’s crackdown on Russian civil society, U.S. and European responses to date, shared interests in coordinated support, and recommendations for what the transatlantic community can do to support Russian civil society in this new era of relations with Russia. Given the barriers to supporting activists inside Russia, this memo’s recommendations focus on assistance to those Russians who have left the country.
Topic:
Civil Society, Authoritarianism, Transatlantic Relations, Exile, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and United States of America

478. Long Shadows: Deterrence in a Multipolar Nuclear Age

Author:
Stacie L. Pettyjohn and Jennie Matuschak
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
This report examines the nuclear policies and postures of the United States and its three primary nuclear adversaries: China, Russia, and North Korea. It concludes that the world is entering a multipolar nuclear era, which is unprecedented, and far more complex and challenging than the Cold War. The current nuclear order has been gradually shifting over the past decade. Russia remains the United States’ only nuclear peer, but the arms control regime that constrained the superpowers’ nuclear arsenals is disintegrating. Relations between Washington and Moscow have worsened since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling. China’s nuclear arsenal is growing in size and sophistication, potentially enabling Beijing to launch conventional attacks behind its nuclear shield. This development will shape both competition among Beijing, Washington, and Moscow and potential future military confrontations. Similarly, North Korea has a small but expanding number of deployed nuclear weapons and is improving its missile technology. In this new nuclear environment, the United States must deter two nuclear-armed great powers as well as a regional nuclear power from launching conventional and nuclear attacks on itself and its allies. As the number of nuclear-armed states grow, interactions become more complex and the risks of miscalculation and misperception increase. The ramifications of this new reality are not well understood, aside from the implication that there is a growing risk that nuclear weapons might be used. The study’s findings have five primary implications for American policy and nuclear posture. To improve strategic stability and enhance deterrence, the United States should take several courses of action.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:
Russia, China, North Korea, and United States of America

479. Risk and Responsibility: Managing Future Iranian Weapons of Mass Destruction Threats

Author:
Becca Wasser and Jennie Matuschak
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Washington is reimagining its global role, leading the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) to make difficult choices about priorities, resources, and risk to better address the long-term “pacing challenge” posed by China. To do so, the United States plans to accept risks in the Middle East and against future Iran threats. Iran’s possession and potential use of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs)—specifically, its nuclear program, chemical weapons, and biological agents—pose the greatest threat to U.S. interests and Washington’s ability to accept risk in the region. But how Iran might leverage WMDs to threaten U.S. interests and upend Washington’s plans to make trade-offs in global responsibilities is unclear, while the risks of failing to address these challenges remain high. As a result, the DoD and its component organizations, such as the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), must enhance their understanding of the threat posed by Iran’s nuclear, chemical, and biological capabilities and the escalation dynamics surrounding Iranian WMDs during crisis and conflict. By doing so, the United States can better accept risk in the Middle East and revise its global priorities while still protecting core U.S. interests. To improve the DoD’s understanding of future Iranian WMD-related threats and escalation dynamics, the Gaming Lab at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) conducted a series of three virtual strategic-operational tabletop exercises (TTXs) exploring future Iranian nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons use. The TTXs indicated that even if Iran acquires a nuclear weapon, the likelihood the regime will use it is low. Instead, the regime may be more likely to use chemical and biological weapons to escalate conflict. Moreover, there are significant asymmetries between American and Iranian views of conflict timelines, escalation redlines, and risk tolerance, all of which make it difficult to offer and signal credible ways to de-escalate a crisis. Differences between Washington’s risk acceptance and that of its regional partners—Israel, in particular—further complicate U.S.-Iran interactions. The TTXs aimed to enable the United States to identify where and how it might mitigate the risk it must accept to better marshal resources in support of the department’s strategic guidance. Accepting greater risk against Iran and in the Middle East more broadly means shifting U.S. strategic priorities in the region. This shift has the potential to unsettle allies and partners, and may possibly embolden Iran in the near term, but such tough choices must be made if the United States wishes to prioritize other long-term threats that may be of greater impact to U.S. security, such as China.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Weapons, and Risk
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

480. Global Island: Sustaining Taiwan’s International Participation Amid Mounting Pressure from China

Author:
Jacob Stokes, Alexander Sullivan, and Zachary Durkee
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
China under Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping has ramped up political, economic, and military pressure on Taiwan. The roots of Beijing’s pressure campaign, including Xi’s personal interactions with Taiwan policy, go back decades. But recent events have deepened and intensified China’s efforts, which include seeking to block Taiwan from engaging the rest of the world as part of a comprehensive strategy to force Taipei to move toward unification with the mainland on Beijing’s terms. China’s comprehensive isolation campaign against Taiwan has three main lines of effort. First, since the election of the Tsai Ing-wen government in 2016, Beijing has revived a campaign to break the few official diplomatic relationships Taiwan enjoys by inducing or coercing the states that recognize Taiwan to shift their recognition to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Second, China seeks to cajole and bully states that have unofficial relations with Taiwan—including advanced liberal democracies—into curtailing those ties. Third, China uses its growing heft in international institutions to prevent Taiwan from playing any role whatsoever in global governance of transnational issues. Taken together, these prongs make up a multi-layered strategy to sever Taiwan’s links with global society. Washington, Taipei, and like-minded partners will have to develop sophisticated strategies to counter China’s moves in order to effectively maintain and advance Taiwan’s international participation while also aligning with the larger objective of sustaining cross-Strait peace and stability. Resources and political will are limited, so choices to focus on particular initiatives should be based on the substantive value they provide more than the symbolism they might hold. In general, Washington and Taipei should roughly prioritize deepening unofficial relations with major and like-minded countries first, expanding multilateral participation second, and protecting Taiwan’s group of official diplomatic relations last. Finally, the authors make three general recommendations for policymakers from the United States, Taiwan, and like-minded partners for sustaining Taiwan’s international participation and detail specific steps to advance them: First, keep U.S. and Taiwan policies aligned on common strategies that maximize substance over symbolism and foster deep, politically sustainable ties across their governments, legislatures, and societies. Second, facilitate the expansion of unofficial links between Taiwan and like-minded allies and partners that can help sustain the political status quo and blunt China’s isolation campaign. Third, defend and advance Taiwan’s ability to contribute to multilateral international organizations in ways that are consistent with long-standing U.S. policy.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, and Participation
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

481. Digital Allies: Deepening U.S.–South Korea Cooperation on Technology and Innovation

Author:
Jacob Stokes, Alexander Sullivan, and Joshua Fitt
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Rapid advances in digital and other emerging technologies have become a defining feature of international geopolitics and geoeconomics in the 21st century. This report explores how the United States and South Korea can broaden and deepen their alliance through expanded cooperation on issues related to technology and innovation. Despite the continued centrality of traditional security threats—especially those emanating from North Korea—both the United States and South Korea are seeking to deepen and broaden alliance cooperation to address a larger set of shared challenges and opportunities. To that end, both capitals have noted the increasing importance of key technologies for economic growth as well as for security and governance. The two countries are at the very beginning of defining how an augmented alliance will approach technology coordination, but they have decades of economic and trade ties on which to build. Technology issues are central to the policy platforms of both U.S. President Joe Biden’s and South Korean President Moon Jae-in’s administrations and will continue to be important under future administrations in both countries. In addition to examining general consultative frameworks, enhancing U.S.-South Korea technology cooperation requires assessing the state of bilateral interactions sector by sector and issue by issue. The two countries occupy leading roles in many foundational technology ecosystems within the evolving global economy, such as semiconductors, telecommunications, and advanced batteries. In emerging fields such as artificial intelligence and quantum computing, U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK) collaboration harbors the potential not only to raise living standards through technological breakthroughs but also to promote governance norms in accordance with liberal democratic principles. Potential opportunities for Washington and Seoul to deepen cooperation extend beyond the bilateral context to regional and global affairs, through coordination of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy and South Korea’s New Southern Policy or its successor under the new president-elect, Yoon Suk-yeol. Rapid technological growth and digitization in Indo-Pacific countries, particularly those of Southeast Asia, present both immense economic opportunity and a range of governance challenges. The United States and South Korea have an important opportunity to ensure that technological development promotes a free, open, secure, and prosperous region. Taken together, the strategic rationales for enhancing U.S.-South Korea cooperation on technology issues are strong. Meaningful efforts to that end are already underway, but more can and should be done to deepen alliance coordination. Policymakers in Washington and Seoul should consider recommendations spanning the areas of foreign policy and international organizations, coordination on key technologies, trade and investment, and digital governance and domestic policy. Doing so will enable the alliance to meet the challenges and seize the opportunities presented by the current regional and global landscape.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Science and Technology, Bilateral Relations, Alliance, and Innovation
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

482. The Tangled Web We Wove: Rebalancing America’s Supply Chains

Author:
Megan Lamberth, Martijn Rasser, Ryan Johnson, and Henry Wu
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The pendulum of globalization has swung too far. What the fallout of the ongoing pandemic makes clear is that decades of offshoring and cost-cutting in the pursuit of efficiency and a better bottom line have left the supply chains of the United States and its allies and partners unacceptably brittle. Restoring balance to the system—with greater resilience through reducing dependence on potential adversaries, greater geographic diversity, and a pragmatic approach to building a mix of domestic capabilities and sourcing from reliable partners—will be a complex, expensive, and far-reaching undertaking. It could well reshape the global economy and strengthen ties between the world’s democracies, and is likely to be a key factor in determining the course of the global strategic competition. Tackling America’s supply chain problems will require a new conceptual framework that is fit for the current geopolitical context. The United States and China are engaged in a complex economic, political, and military competition marked by sharp ideological and normative differences and economic dependencies. Global trade and supply chain dynamics reflect much of the spectrum of this competition, the overreliance on China for key inputs and manufacturing capacity most prominently. Correcting this imbalance and assuring the resilience and security required is needed to ensure long-term American competitiveness. The framework with which to address that imbalance has three core elements: adjusting the role of government, checking the key assumptions that shaped current global supply chains, and balancing the tension between self-reliance and interdependencies. Policymakers and business leaders alike must rethink how government and industry engage each other on supply chain matters as part of a new form of industrial policy. For example, government officials need to better understand global supply chains to identify vulnerabilities and pursue opportunities. At the same time, company officers must strive for greater transparency and continuous supply chain assessments.
Topic:
Globalization, Geopolitics, Supply Chains, and Economic Security
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

483. Aligning U.S.-Israeli Cooperation on Technology Issues and China

Author:
Jonathan Schanzer, Shira Efron, Martijn Rasser, and Alice Hickson
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The United States and Israel have a long history of working together as close allies. Theirs is a relationship based on common values and security interests. In recent years, the alliance’s highlights have included close cooperation on counterterrorism and intelligence, as well as deepening economic ties, technological cooperation, and mutual knowledge transfer. The United States continues to provide Israel with significant security assistance based on a memorandum of understanding signed by both countries in 2016, which commits the United States to provide Israel with at least $3.8 billion per year in aid. The relationship is further strengthened by deep personal connections at the government and business levels as well as through collaboration between the two countries’ technology sectors. In recent years, however, the United States and Israel have differed regarding their threat perceptions and approaches to China. Whereas Israel sees China primarily as an economic partner and is increasing its ties with the country, the consensus view in Washington increasingly sees China as a global strategic rival—militarily, economically, and technologically—even while the Joe Biden administration preserves space for cooperation with Beijing in areas of common interest. In recent years, U.S. and Israeli officials have had public and private disagreements over several Chinese investments in Israeli infrastructure and technology. Although Chinese investments in Israel have declined since their peak in 2018, and even though these disagreements have yet to be aired publicly by the Biden administration and the Naftali Bennett–Yair Lapid government, this issue is likely to remain high on the agenda. The most critical challenges in the bilateral relationship are technology protection and collaborative innovation. Chinese investment in Israeli technology companies, including those that develop dual-use technologies, remains largely unregulated. Although Israel does not export defense technology to China and has placed stringent regulation on the export of dual-use technologies, the line between civilian and dual use is increasingly blurred, and Israel has yet to fully adapt to this reality. Washington, for its part, has not been entirely clear about how it expects American companies and allies to limit their roles. The United States has been slow to offer alternatives to allies such as Israel for forgoing cooperation with China and has yet to develop a collaborative technological innovation framework that builds on the cumulative strengths of the United States and its allies, benefits all, and helps to tip the balance in the technological competition with Beijing. To address the multidimensional challenge presented by China, the United States must enhance collaboration with its allies, including Israel, its closest partner in the Middle East. Fortunately, when the United States and Israel have had differing perspectives in the past, they have successfully engaged in deep bilateral consultations to work through these differences. These efforts have not always resulted in complete alignment, but they have significantly reduced disagreements and allowed for greater cooperation. This paper represents the most comprehensive public analysis to date of the challenges facing U.S.-Israeli cooperation on issues related to technology and China. It proposes an approach for the United States and Israel to align their policies and bridge differences by focusing on three central areas.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Science and Technology, Bilateral Relations, and Alliance
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, Israel, North America, and United States of America

484. Building a Flywheel: The Biden Administration's Opportunity to Forge a New Path with North Korea

Author:
John Park
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
As the United States seeks to maintain a level of stability in its increasingly competitive relationship with China, North Korea has the potential to complicate their intensifying rivalry. Dealing with North Korea is a complex endeavor that requires deft handling by both nations because the stakes are high and instability can spread rapidly. For decades, China has been seeking to bolster the stability of the Kim family regime and increase China’s economic engagement with North Korea, to the point where North Korea Inc.—the Kim regime’s network of elite state trading companies—has embedded itself in major commercial hubs throughout China. By prioritizing the stability of the North Korean regime over denuclearization in its policy actions, China created a loophole in which the North Korean regime could enjoy economic benefits without having to do denuclearization work. Beijing thus impeded the development of a connection to a larger process in which major denuclearization activity would be paired with major economic and diplomatic concessions. In contrast to China’s sustained engagement with North Korea, U.S. policy toward North Korea over the last decade has focused substantially on sanctions implementation. There was a brief period of summit diplomacy during the Trump administration, but those efforts failed to bring about progress toward denuclearization. The North Korean nuclear issue has mutated into a much more complex challenge that no longer fits into past policy molds that rely heavily on sanctions implementation. President Joe Biden’s administration will need to recognize that North Korea under Kim Jong Un has become highly resilient to U.S. policy tools such as sanctions, largely due to far-reaching advancements in the relationship between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) as well as the migration and embedding of North Korea Inc. deep inside the Chinese national economy.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Strategic Competition, Strategic Stability, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:
China, North Korea, and United States of America

485. Toward a New Transatlantic Approach to Russia Sanctions

Author:
Edward Fishman, Andrea Kendall-Taylor, and Angela Stent
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
This policy brief is a product of the Center for a New American Security Transatlantic Forum on Russia, an initiative designed to spur coordination between the United States and Europe on Russia-related policy across multiple issue areas. The policy briefs are informed by a series of dialogues with leading experts from both sides of the Atlantic. The analysis and recommendations in the memo reflect areas of agreement between U.S. and European experts. Where there are notable differences in perspective, we highlight those to better enable policymakers to navigate fissures that can hinder coordination. We thank all the experts who contributed to such fruitful dialogue, especially Nigel Gould-Davies, Brian O’Toole, and Maria Shagina. Introduction As Russia continues to build its forces on Ukraine’s border, the United States and its allies have laid out the economic costs that Russian President Vladimir Putin would face for any further aggression against Ukraine. The Biden administration has stated it is willing to pursue “economic measures that we've refrained from using in the past.”1 In addition, the United States has indicated it is prepared to use export controls on U.S.-origin technologies that are key to Russia’s industrial sectors and potentially enact a Russia-focused Foreign Direct Product Rule—a tool that, to date, has only been used against Huawei. It is unclear if such a package is enough to deter Putin, especially if he is intent on pursuing his maximalist objectives—autonomy for parts of eastern Ukraine that would give Russia a veto over Ukrainian foreign policy and closing NATO’s door to Ukraine. Nonetheless, implementing such sanctions if Putin further escalates in Ukraine is critical for raising the costs to Putin and for restricting Russia’s ability to sustain its aggressive foreign policy over the long term. Regardless of what happens in Ukraine, however, U.S.-Russia relations are on a new course. The era of working toward a stable and predictable relationship with Russia is over for now. The United States will need a new, more proactive approach—one in which sanctions will be a tool (among many) that Washington should use to deter future Russian attacks on liberal democracies and disrupt Russia’s destabilizing actions, especially the corrupt networks that Moscow uses to spread its influence and sustain its hold on power. This policy brief outlines the current state of play of U.S. and European sanctions policies on Russia and how the United States and Europe can update its sanctions approach in this new era of relations with Russia.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Sanctions, Crisis Management, Deterrence, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and United States of America

486. Following the Crypto: Using Blockchain Analysis to Assess the Strengths and Vulnerabilities of North Korean Hackers

Author:
Jason Bartlett
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Under heavy and sustained pressure from decades of economic sanctions, North Korea has rapidly expanded its illicit activity within the cyber domain. In particular, Pyongyang has demonstrated an increasing interest in using evolving financial platforms, such as cryptocurrency and blockchain technology, to compensate for the fiscal losses related to economic sanctions on more traditional forms of commercial activity. Since 2014, the Pyongyang-led cybercrime organization known as the Lazarus Group has transformed from a rogue team of hackers to a masterful army of cybercriminals and foreign affiliates, capable of compromising major national financial networks and stealing hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of virtual assets. The international community and national governments often incorrectly correlate North Korea’s lack of access to modern computer hardware within its borders to its ability to successfully execute software-reliant cyberattacks. While Beijing and Moscow captivate the attention of most democratic governments concerned about pending cyber intrusions, Pyongyang continues to defy miscalculated expectations by successfully employing myriad sophisticated cyberattacks that target new and developing financial technology. North Korea will likely continue to adapt its cybercrime tactics targeting cryptocurrency to circumvent obstacles presented by economic sanctions on more traditional forms of financial activity and commerce. This report provides in-depth analysis of North Korea’s demonstrated ability to exploit financial technologies, in particular cryptocurrencies and blockchain technology, to procure funds for its illicit nuclear and ballistic weapons development programs. This research was supported through blockchain analysis conducted in partnership with TRM Labs, a leading blockchain intelligence firm that seeks to monitor, investigate, and mitigate crypto fraud and financial crime. Through analyzing three case studies of major North Korean hacks, this report outlines key strengths and vulnerabilities in the Lazarus Group’s campaigns to infiltrate cryptocurrency exchanges and steal, launder, and liquidate funds. The report also provides a snapshot of key policy oversights within the regulatory environment in the crypto space of central stakeholders and countries, such as China, the United States, and South Korea. Lastly, this study offers a prospective look into the future of North Korea–led crypto hacks and provides a series of policy recommendations to strengthen cyber resilience against these efforts.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Sanctions, Cybersecurity, and Blockchain
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

487. When the Chips Are Down: Gaming the Global Semiconductor Competition

Author:
Becca Wasser, Martijn Rasser, and Hannah Kelley
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The United States is in a strategic competition with a well-resourced and capable opponent. China seeks a global role that is broadly at odds with the strategic interests and values of America and fellow democracies. Technology, a key enabler of political, economic, and military power, is at the center of this competition. Within this competition, semiconductors loom large. Chips are a driving force for breakthroughs in a range of critical technology areas, from AI to synthetic biology to quantum computing. Semiconductors are essential to the military systems used by the United States and its allies and partners to defend themselves and their interests. At a fundamental level, the day-to-day functioning of modern society hinges on dependable access to chips; critical infrastructure, transportation networks, and digital communication cannot function without them. Semiconductor supply chains form an intricate global web, with several countries and companies serving as important nodes. Some of these nodes have such outsized importance that any disruption would have significant and detrimental cascading effects for U.S. national and economic security. Taiwan is the central node in the semiconductor supply chain. Home to the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), the world’s largest contract chip foundry, more than half of the world’s outsourced semiconductor manufacturing and nearly all leading-edge manufacturing capacity is in Taiwan. Secure access to the output of Taiwan’s semiconductor industry is therefore a strategic necessity. Yet, while policymakers understand the critical importance of Taiwan’s semiconductor industry, the myriad of factors and nuances essential to developing policies and plans that protect its integrity, mitigate risk, and reduce second-order consequences are insufficiently studied.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Strategic Competition, Industry, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

488. Dealing with a Taliban-Controlled Afghanistan: Supporting the Afghan People without Legitimizing the Regime

Author:
Lisa Curtis
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Nearly 20 years after U.S. forces overturned Taliban rule in Afghanistan, the fundamentalist Islamist movement is back in power. This follows the U.S. troop withdrawal in summer 2021 and a failed peace agreement between the United States and the Taliban that was concluded during the Trump administration. The U.S. government must continue to monitor terrorism threats emanating from Afghanistan and work with like-minded nations to protect Afghan civil society, especially women and girls. While competing with China may be America’s number one foreign policy priority, managing terrorism threats and protecting women’s rights in Afghanistan also demands continued U.S. attention and resources. First and foremost, the United States and other international donors must help Afghanistan avoid a humanitarian disaster and ensure average Afghans can meet their basic needs for food, shelter, and access to healthcare. While the United Nations and international humanitarian organizations are finding ways to get cash into the system without funneling it through the Taliban, there is a need to identify a more reliable and sustainable solution to Afghanistan’s liquidity crisis. However, releasing to the Taliban without conditions the nearly $7 billion in Afghan foreign reserves that Washington froze following the Taliban takeover of the country is not the answer. The Biden administration must avoid giving these assets to the Taliban interim government, which comprises mostly individuals who have been sanctioned for their involvement in terrorism.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Humanitarian Aid, Terrorism, Taliban, and Humanitarian Crisis
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and South Asia

489. Finding Firmer Ground: The Role of Higher Education in U.S.-China Relations

Author:
Yawei Liu and Michael Cerny
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Carter Center
Abstract:
This annual report is the third issue of the Carter Center’s Finding Firmer Ground series on U.S.-China Relations. This series is published by the Carter Center’s China Focus with generous support from the Ford Foundation and other organizations.
Topic:
Education, Bilateral Relations, Higher Education, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

490. Analysis of the Botnets that Operated in Honduras During the Primary and General Elections of 2021

Author:
The Carter Center
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Carter Center
Abstract:
The Carter Center analyzed social media in Honduras during the 2021 electoral process, focusing on the period around the primaries in March and the general election in November. The purpose was to assess the political debate on social networks during the elections, the extent of disinformation and how it spread, and the role played by Honduran politicians.
Topic:
Elections, Media, Social Media, and Digitalization
Political Geography:
Central America, North America, and Honduras

491. Risk-Limiting Audits: A Guide for Election Observation Efforts

Author:
The Carter Center
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Carter Center
Abstract:
The risk-limiting audit (RLA) is a statistical technique for limiting the risk of certifying an incorrect election outcome — that is, the risk that the apparent winner did not in fact receive the most votes. A random sample of paper ballots is visually checked by auditors, and the results are compared with the outcome reported by the tabulator/scanner equipment. If there is sufficiently strong statistical evidence based on this sample that the reported outcome was correct, the audit stops and the tabulated result is confirmed. If evidence from the sample is inconclusive, another sample is drawn, potentially progressing all the way to a full hand recount. The RLA thus either confirms the reported outcome or corrects it.
Topic:
Elections, Election watch, Election Observation, and Audit
Political Geography:
Global Focus

492. Risks, Recruits, and Plots: Understanding and Mitigating the Influence of the Islamic State in Malaysia

Author:
Amira Jadoon, Nakissa Jahanbani, Elina Noor, Marley Carroll, and William Frangia
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
This report traces the evolution of the Islamic State’s influence in Malaysia between January 2014 and December 2019, shedding light on the various local and international factors that facilitated the rise of the Islamic State’s influence in the country. In addition to considering underlying historical and current sociopolitical factors, the report draws on original data on Islamic State-affiliated arrests and plots to uncover new insights about the men and women who were arrested due to their involvement with the Islamic State’s brand of militancy in Malaysia. The overall findings of the report indicate a few macroscopic trends about the Islamic State’s activities in Malaysia over six years. First, the Syrian civil war played a major role in shaping Malaysia’s militant landscape with respect to the Islamic State threat—both as a destination and as a source of radicalization and recruitment for the Islamic State—which is largely characterized by disparate cells and social media platforms. Second, between 2014 and 2019, there were a total of 23 reported plots in six Malaysian states or federal territories, with only one resulting in casualties—indicative of the Islamic State’s limited operational capacity in the country. Third, with regard to tactics, compared to the Philippines and Indonesia, Malaysian plotters did not turn to suicide attacks to the same extent: Per the authors’ data, there was only a single report of a planned suicide attack. However, Malaysian fighters were involved in planning or conducting suicide attacks in Iraq, Syria, and the Philippines. Finally, the report also yields interesting findings about the profiles of the arrests of Islamic State-affiliated individuals in Malaysia, which totaled 319 people between 2014 and 2019 across 15 provinces. The majority of the individuals arrested were Malaysian men, although the arrests also included women, with limited numbers of Indonesians and Filipinos. For men, the largest number of arrests was in the “planning/threatening attack” category while for women, the largest category across the six years was “attempted/planned travel.” Overall, the findings of this report suggest that one of the most dangerous characteristics associated with the Islamic State’s influence in Malaysia is its potential to radicalize and mobilize both men and women inspired by its extreme ideology without the existence of a formal Islamic State affiliate. The report concludes with a discussion of the need and potential pathways to strengthen community resilience to violent extremism within Malaysia.
Topic:
Non State Actors, Violent Extremism, Counter-terrorism, Islamic State, and Recruitment
Political Geography:
Malaysia and Southeast Asia

493. AQIM’s Imperial Playbook: Understanding al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb’s Expansion into West Africa

Author:
Caleb Weiss
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
In 2021, the United Nations noted the newfound threats of the Group for Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM), a branch of al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), that extended into Burkina Faso and the Ivory Coast, stretching farther yet into Ghana, Togo, and Benin. Had an observer in 2006 had this information presented to them, they might have scarcely believed it. That year, in which AQIM was formed, the group was a thoroughly North African organization and based primarily in Algeria. Fast forward 15 years, how did AQIM end up nearly 1,300 miles away, now posing immediate threats in the states of littoral West Africa? Relying on a combination of primary source jihadi propaganda and historical research, this report argues that over the past 30 years, al-Qa`ida and its branches and allies in North and West Africa have followed what this report calls “al- Qa`ida’s Imperial Playbook,” as they have sought to expand their areas of influence southward. Al-Qa`ida’s “playbook,” this report shows, is composed of five fundamental tactics: befriending or creating militant groups operating in the midst of conflict; integrating themselves into communities where those militants exist; exploiting grievances of those communities to gain sympathy; addressing internal or external dissent either passively or aggressively; and looking toward new theaters once their base is solidified. Al-Qa`ida has subsequently utilized this playbook to expand southward from its Algeria base in five distinct historical periods: from 1992- 1998; 1998-2006; 2006-2012; 2013-2017; and 2017-present. The report concludes that al-Qa`ida and its affiliates in northern and western Africa are likely to continue to use this playbook as they continue their contemporary expansion into West Africa.
Topic:
Non State Actors, Counter-terrorism, Al Qaeda, and History
Political Geography:
Africa and West Africa

494. Iran Entangled: Iran and Hezbollah’s Support to Proxies Operating in Syria

Author:
Nakissa Jahanbani and Suzanne Weedon Levy
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
At a time when power dynamics in the Middle East region are in flux due to the shifting circumstances of the Islamic State, the drawdown of U.S. troops in the region, and the intensification of Iranian-backed attacks on U.S. and Saudi Arabian targets in the region, an historical look at the support Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) provided to proxies during the Syrian civil war may yield insights into Iran’s past and present playbook not only in Syria but potentially other contexts. The civil war in Syria was a unique catalyst that intensified Iranian economic, political, and religious activity in the country, which was ongoing since the 1980s. During the conflict, Iran demonstrated the ability to exert influence tactically while also building a religious and social support base in Syrian society. Iran achieved these goals, in part, through raising and supporting various non-state militant groups in Syria. Drawing on open sources and interviews with subject matter experts, this report investigates the nature of Iranian and LH support to proxies operating in Syria from 2011 to 2019. While the nature of Iran’s proxy network is dynamic, it is useful to investigate the network at its peak years to understand existing and potential future structures and capabilities for Iranian external operations. This report investigates support from Iranian actors—inclusive of the IRGC and its various components, notably the Quds Force (IRGC-QF), as well as the Iranian government more generally—and LH through the lens of kinetic (e.g., joint attacks between the militias and Iranian actors and/or LH, personnel placed with militias, and training and weapons provided to militias) and non-kinetic assistance (e.g., funding, logistical support, recruitment and social service assistance, and meetings between Iranian actors and/or LH and militias). Looking at these two categories of support provides a more holistic snapshot of Iranian influence and capacity-building with proxies in Syria. The report’s findings indicate a pattern of support on the part of Iran and LH that potentially indicates a phased rollout of battlefield-related supports to be replaced with longer-term societal entrenchment efforts. Furthermore, Iran and LH share a division of labor between Iranian actors and LH for kinetic supports, but not non-kinetic ones. Specifically, this report found training, weapons provisions, funding, and joint attacks among the most common supports provided by Iran and LH. Finally, of all Iranian actors, this report found the IRGC to be the most prolific supporter to proxies operating in Syria.
Topic:
Terrorism, Weapons, Syrian War, Hezbollah, Proxy War, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC), Strategy, and Military Tactics
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and Syria

495. Assessing U.S. Counterterrorism in Africa, 2001-2021: Summary Document of CTC’s Africa Regional Workshop

Author:
Jason Warner, Julia Broomer, and Stephanie Lizzo
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
On October 21, 2021, the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point, as part of the Recrudescence Project (a research collaboration with the Middle East Institute and the Center on National Security at Fordham Law), hosted a closed-door workshop with 18 top observers of U.S.-Africa policy from across government, academia, think-tanks, and the private sector. The goal of CTC’s Africa Regional Workshop was to assess the successes and challenges of U.S. policy to address terrorism by violent extremist organizations (VEOs) and to assist in counterterrorism (CT) efforts on the African continent over the past 20 years (2001-2021), and to consider how these approaches might be improved in the future. This anonymized summary document offers an overview of the findings from that workshop. Three topics of concern are the focus of this summary: assessments of U.S. kinetic counterterrorism engagement in Africa; assessments of U.S. non-kinetic counterterrorism engagement in Africa; and the future of U.S.-Africa policy beyond a counterterrorism lens.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Violent Extremism, and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:
Africa, North America, and United States of America

496. Cybersecurity and Human Rights in the Western Balkans: Mapping Governance and Actors – Case Study Serbia

Author:
Maja Bjelos and Marija Pavlovic
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Belgrade Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Despite a solid legal framework, Serbia’s fight against cyber attacks and crime progresses slowly due to the chronic lack of qualified staff, as well as the politicized priorities of the competent institutions. This is one of the conclusions of the latest publication on the cybersecurity context in Serbia. Official statistics indicate an increasing trend in the number of cyber attacks and cybercrime cases in Serbia. About 26 million significant cyber attacks on information and communication technology (ICT) systems occurred in 2020 – the most common of which involved attempted intrusions into ICT systems and unauthorized data collection. Serbian citizens also witnessed massive violations of their right to privacy and personal data during the pandemic, as well as an increase in the number of attacks against human rights defenders and political dissidents in the digital and physical space. In late 2021, the idea of using biometric surveillance to counter terrorism and organized crime was reintroduced. However, due to the rapid backsliding of democracy and the rule of law, citizens fear that the new face recognition technologies will be directed against them, rather than against criminals and potential terrorists. Since the beginning of 2022, there have been several attempts to commit internet fraud and steal the identities and data of users of the Raiffeisen Bank and the Post of Serbia. In the most recent incident, a hacker attacked the country’s cadastre and shared electronic reports about bombs planted in various public and private institutions, causing widespread concern in society and temporarily disabling the day-to-day work of the institutions affected. Threats to journalists via social networks have also become more frequent. Cyber attacks are now a part of daily life in Serbia, and threats posed by the internet and social networks are likely to intensify and become more complicated in the future. It is therefore important for state authorities to be prepared to respond to any challenge, risk, or threat quickly and effectively, while respecting human rights and the rule of law. The Belgrade Centre for Security Policy addresses the topic of cybercrime from the perspective of human rights and the rule of law. In this context, the centre conducted a baseline analysis and 22 interviews with governmental and non-governmental stakeholders in Serbia, from mid-January to end March 2022, to assess the level of legal and institutional development of the competent authorities in the area of information and cyber security, as well as the challenges facing cybersecurity and human rights in the country. This publication is part of the larger report that focuses on mapping cybersecurity-related human rights opportunities and challenges, and represents an area that is under-explored in the region. There are six chapters in total, one for each economy in the Western Balkans. Each begins with essential conceptual background information regarding the cybersecurity and human rights contexts of each economy. They then each explore four core thematic issues: cybersecurity and the right to privacy, cybersecurity and freedom of expression, cybersecurity and freedom of peaceful assembly (and, where relevant, freedom of association), and cybersecurity and anti-discrimination. Finally, they present ways forward, with concrete recommendations for stakeholders. The study as a whole aims to offer recommendations for the inclusion of human rights standards in cybersecurity governance and for better implementation of cybersecurity norms within the human rights frameworks of the Western Balkans region.
Topic:
Security, Human Rights, Science and Technology, and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:
Europe and Serbia

497. Understanding the Red Wall: Politics and identity in the new electoral battlegrounds

Author:
Paula Surridge and Alan Wager
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
UK in a Changing Europe, King's College London
Abstract:
The 2019 general election gave birth to a new term for understanding electoral geography, the Red Wall. This report, ‘Understanding the Red Wall: Politics and identity in the new electoral battlegrounds’, focusses on a series of focus groups conducted by Ipsos on behalf of UK in a Changing Europe with voters in seats across Yorkshire and Humberside, that had either been won by the Conservatives in 2019 or held by Labour with a significantly reduced majority.
Topic:
Politics, Public Opinion, Brexit, and Society
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

498. British politics after Brexit

Author:
Anand Menon, Paula Surridge, and Alan Wager
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
UK in a Changing Europe, King's College London
Abstract:
Drawing on the expertise of over 40 of the UK’s top experts on public opinion, British Politics after Brexit provides a comprehensive overview of public opinion in the UK. The landscape of British politics is as complicated as it has ever been. But if you are looking to navigate it then this report – exploring the public’s views across party politics, public policy and the UK’s constitutional future – is a good place as any to start.
Topic:
Politics, Public Opinion, Brexit, and Political Parties
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

499. Constitution and Governance in the UK

Author:
Anand Menon, Jill Rutter, and Sarah Overton
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
UK in a Changing Europe, King's College London
Abstract:
The UK constitution and system of governance have recently been subjected to unprecedented strain. Brexit and Covid-19, in conjunction with the governing style adopted by the Johnson administration, have raised profound questions as to whether the norms and conventions that form the basis of the UK’s uncodified constitution are still fit for purpose. These are the issues that are brought together in this report, in which 41 leading scholars assess the impacts of Brexit, Covid-19 and the Johnson government on our constitution and system of governance. They discuss whether these arrangements, that have evolved over decades if not centuries, are sufficiently robust and fit for the purpose of governing a diverse and complex UK.
Topic:
Governance, Constitution, Brexit, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

500. UK-EU regulatory divergence tracker: third edition

Author:
Joël Reland, Jill Rutter, and Anand Menon
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
UK in a Changing Europe, King's College London
Abstract:
This is the third edition of the UK in a Changing Europe’s UK-EU regulatory divergence tracker, covering 27 cases of divergence since December 2021. There are fourteen cases of active divergence (where the UK – or some part of it – takes steps to move away from retained EU law), ten of passive divergence (where the EU legislates and the UK – or some part – does not follow), and three of procedural divergence (where the UK has to introduce new systems to manage policy absent substantive divergence). There are also eleven cases with an additional ‘internal impact’ label, to indicate where UK-EU divergence is leading either to divergence in regulation between different parts of the UK, or has some other impact on the operation of relations between the four UK governments.
Topic:
European Union, Regulation, and Brexit
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe