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301. Investing in inclusive governance yields dividends in Africa

Author:
Pranish Desai, Monique Bennett, Nnaemeka Ohamadike, and Chrissy Dube
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Good Governance Africa (GGA)
Abstract:
Over the long term, there is a clear association between accountable and inclusive governance on the one hand and broad-based economic development on the other.1 We find empirical support for this assessment at the global, African, and regional levels within Africa across both shorter and more extended periods of time. The explanation is that a long-term governance environment which embraces accountability is also more politically stable, enabling consistent policymaking, which can sustain economic dynamism and meet citizens’ needs. Concerningly, there are African countries, including Angola, which have recently sought to repress rather than encourage participation. This has been one contributing factor to the recent stagnation and reversals which Angola has experienced in critical measures of human development pertaining to education, health and economic outcomes. This intelligence report identifies the critical implications that this finding has for companies with committed financial interests in African countries: • The importance of inclusive governance is that a more participatory, accountable and nondiscriminatory society will also see corresponding improvements in broad-based economic development, which benefits businesses and citizens in tandem. • The private sector has both an incentive and a responsibility to actively invest in mechanisms that encourage accountable governance in African countries where they operate. Investing in these mechanisms minimises the reputational risk companies open themselves up to by engaging in opportunistic behaviour which bolsters rather than blocks repressive behaviour by African governments. • Through supporting inclusive governance initiatives emanating from African civil society and local communities, companies can demonstrate that they have a long-term commitment to fostering economic development in the world’s fastest-growing continent.
Topic:
Governance, Investment, Economic Development, Private Sector, and Inclusion
Political Geography:
Africa

302. The state of the renewable energy independent power producer procurement programme: Where to from here?

Author:
Busisipho Siyobi
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Good Governance Africa (GGA)
Abstract:
Minister of Electricity, Kgosientsho Ramokgopa, recently briefed South Africa on the progress of the Energy Action Plan and the challenges associated with its implementation. Minister Ramokgopa further remarked on the positive socio-economic impact that the Renewable Energy Independent Power Procurement Programme (REIPPPP) has had on the industry and economy. Over R300 billion has been attracted for infrastructure investment and over 120 independent power producers have been selected as preferred bidders. These success factors indicate great potential for an optimal energy mix, led by renewable energy sources, to be attained. They also highlight opportunities for more private-sector investment. For this potential to be fully maximised, programme design, programme management and market dynamics will be critical to factor in. This report assesses the abovementioned overarching categories and illustrates mechanisms that will be integral to facilitating increased private sector investment into grid-connected renewable energy generation. This will yield efficient management of REIPPPP and further enable improved economic growth and sustainable development.
Topic:
Development, Governance, Renewable Energy, Sustainability, and Energy
Political Geography:
Africa and South Africa

303. Community Health Workers as Rights Defenders: Exploring the Collective Identity of the Mitanins of Chhattisgarh, India

Author:
Shriyuta Abhishek and Samir Garg
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Accountability Research Center (ARC), American University
Abstract:
This Working Paper discusses the Mitanin program, a state-run community health worker program in Chhattisgarh state, India. It is based on a year-long reflection and action research exercise by the implementing organization, the State Health Resource Centre (SHRC). It argues that the collective identity of these community health workers (Mitanins) is central to their work defending the social and economic rights of their community. Collective identity often plays an important role in social movements for people’s economic and political rights. However, government-funded workers rarely get involved in such movements. The authors wanted to understand whether collective identity plays a role in driving the multi-issue activism of community health workers. A composite definition of this collective identity emerged from the research. Throughout the interviews and discussions, the Mitanins described their collective identity as a sense of solidarity that all Mitanins share with the community they serve and belong to, and a feeling of sisterhood with other women and each other. It is the shared experience of being a group of empowered women with a common mission who must use their knowledge and compassion to support the people they serve. The value system underpinning their mission dictates that people should not be denied their rights. The Mitanins’ collective identity is layered; they are not merely frontline health workers, but women who care deeply about their community. They are problem-solvers, activists, and community leaders. Their collective action and collective identity as women leaders in solidarity with the community is mutually reinforcing, and has enabled them to undertake multi-issue activism and transform themselves into frontline rights defenders. The authors conducted a state-wide survey along with focus group discussions and in-depth interviews. The survey (n=558) aimed to establish what proportion of Mitanins are involved in multi-issue activism. It found that in the preceding three years, 84 percent had taken rights-based action in at least one of three domains: food security and nutrition (68 percent); healthcare (56 percent); and gender-based violence (21 percent). They refer to these actions as ‘rights-based’ because they involve negotiation and confrontation with local elites and government officials, as well as writing formal complaints to government officials. Other than rights-based actions, Mitanins also provide information to community members about their rights and entitlements to health programs, food security, and nutrition under government programs—information that is often not readily accessible to poor people in India. This paper analyzes the patterns of autonomous collective action through discussion, interviews, and the rights-based songs and slogans written by Mitanins. The authors argue that the Mitanins’ collective identity was formed due to two main factors: the program’s movement-building approach; and the degree of autonomy enjoyed by Mitanins. The movement-building approach nurtured the activist tendencies of Mitanins, and the voluntary nature of their work allowed them to retain their autonomy vis-à-vis the health system bureaucracy
Topic:
Health, Human Rights, Women, and Communal Identity
Political Geography:
South Asia and India

304. HIV, Hepatitis & Drug Policy Reform

Author:
Global Commission On Drug Policy
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Global Commission On Drug Policy
Abstract:
This report, “HIV, Hepatitis & Drug Policy Reform” follows the Global Commission’s thematic reports on “The War on Drugs and HIV/AIDS” (2012) and “The Negative Impact of the War on Drugs on Public Health: The Hidden Hepatitis C Epidemic” (2013). Despite a decade-old call for urgent action, current drug control efforts fail, with HIV and hepatitis prevalence persisting among drug users. In 2023, approximately 354 million people around the world are currently living with hepatitis B or C. People who use drugs, especially people who inject drugs, are at a higher risk for blood- borne HIV, hepatitis B and hepatitis C. Although there has been some success — for example, the scale-up of antiretroviral treatments that reduced HIV related deaths to their lowest in almost three decades — progress has been uneven and people who use drugs are still left behind. This must change. Prohibition and criminalization of drug use hinder HIV and hepatitis prevention, escalating risks and obstructing treatment. People who use drugs face disproportionate incarceration, abusive policing, and stigma. Inadequate resources are dedicated to proven harm reduction options while billions are spent on punitive law enforcement measures. Achievable UN targets for ending these epidemics by 2030 exist, but a crucial course correction demands political will to embrace a new approach to drugs. The time to act is now.
Topic:
HIV/AIDS, Reform, Drugs, Public Health, and Hepatitis
Political Geography:
Global Focus

305. Framework to Decolonize Child & Youth Philanthropy

Author:
DA Global
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Elevate Children Funders Group
Abstract:
In 2022, ECFG commissioned Degan Ali and her team to lead us through a decolonizing grantmaking journey that included learning webinars, collective learning and reflection, the identification of promising practices, and the development of a framework that funders could use to elevate equitable grantmaking. After developing an understanding of our network’s needs and goals, our decolonizing philanthropy working group engaged in deep partnership design with DA Global to create The Decolonizing Child and Youth Philanthropy Framework. This framework recognizes that our members and partners are at different stages of their journey in tackling colonialism within their organizations and grantmaking. While there are universally relevant lessons gained from existing decolonization efforts in the philanthropic and charity sectors, this framework is designed to support the different types, sizes and needs of the funders who belong to this group. This is not a magic solution, but a tool in our decolonizing child and youth philanthropy toolbox. This tool is intentionally focused on supporting those who have embarked on a change process within their organizations, those who want to make additional adjustments, and those who are grappling with how to get started.
Topic:
Children, Youth, Decolonization, and Philanthropy
Political Geography:
Global Focus

306. Global Resources Report: A Francophone Perspective

Author:
Global Philanthropy Project (GPP)
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Global Philanthropy Project (GPP)
Abstract:
We are pleased to present this special brief for the Global Resources Report: Government and Philanthropic Support for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Intersex Communities, with a Francophone perspective. The Global Resources Report is a comprehensive report on the state of funding by foundations, corporations, NGO intermediaries, and government and multilateral agencies for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) issues. The Global Resources Report has published four biennial editions to date, analyzing data from the years 2013 to 2020. Such remarkable research work allows us to release this special report, which aims to document the funding specifically awarded to LGBTI communities in Francophone countries or territories, showing comprehensive data across eight years. This edition covers 1,002 grants awarded by 84 foundations, intermediary NGOs, corporations, and 10 donor governments, and multilateral agencies. The report details the distribution of LGBTI funding by geography, issue, population focus, and donor type.
Topic:
Civil Society, LGBT+, Philanthropy, Funding, and Resources
Political Geography:
Global Focus

307. “Don’t Abandon Us”: Preventing Mass Atrocities in Papua, Indonesia

Author:
Made Supriatma
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
Abstract:
This report assesses the risk of mass atrocities (large-scale, systematic violence against civilian populations) in Papua, Indonesia, over the next 12–18 months. Since its integration into Indonesia in 1969, Papua has seen ongoing political resistance and armed rebellion in favor of independence, and government repression in response. The region is home to Indigenous Papuans and a growing population of migrants from other parts of Indonesia, layering intercommunal tensions on top of the conflict over the region’s governance. An upward trend in the frequency of violent incidents prompted this analysis of the potential for mass atrocities. This report is based on field research in Indonesia, including in Papua, from March to August 2021, as well as on expert consultations and a literature review. The report’s conceptual framework and research questions draw from the atrocity assessment framework developed by the US government.
Topic:
Security, Armed Forces, Indigenous, Industry, Atrocity Prevention, and Risk Assessment
Political Geography:
Indonesia, Southeast Asia, and Papua

308. Justice Options for Ethiopia: Eight Options to Provide Redress for Ethiopia's Victims

Author:
Sarah McIntosh
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
Abstract:
The most recent conflict in Ethiopia has claimed thousands of lives and perpetrators have enjoyed almost complete impunity for their crimes. Ɣ Justice and accountability for perpetrators on all sides are desperately needed to demonstrate that perpetrators will not escape punishment, to provide recognition and repair to victims, and to promote social healing and reconciliation. Ɣ Ethiopian civil society representatives have called for the full spectrum of transitional justice mechanisms including criminal accountability, reparations, truth telling, and guarantees of non-recurrence.
Topic:
Civil Society, Transitional Justice, Impunity, Accountability, Atrocities, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Africa, Ethiopia, Eritrea, East Africa, and Tigray

309. Mass Atrocities in Ukraine: Assessing Risks of Significant Escalation

Author:
Daniel Solomon
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
Abstract:
On October 11, 2022, the Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide at the US Holocaust Memorial Museum convened a private roundtable to discuss potential scenarios of mass atrocity escalation in Ukraine. The discussion featured preliminary remarks by three Ukraine experts, followed by a facilitated discussion. The discussion aimed to encourage more systematic thinking about how the current pattern of mass atrocities in Ukraine could escalate, in terms of severity, lethality, and/or systematicity to inform policy makers’ consideration of preventive options. The 2022 United States Strategy to Anticipate, Prevent, and Respond to Atrocities states, “In cases of ongoing atrocities, the [Atrocity Prevention] Task Force supports regional policy processes in developing and monitoring targeted response options and adjusting course as needed.” Assessing potential pathways to escalation is one way to help identify targeted response options that could mitigate atrocity risks. Even in a case like Ukraine, where the core US strategy is to help Ukraine repel Russia’s invasion, additional options may be available to help protect vulnerable populations or head-off future escalation. At the time of the convening, little analysis of this type appeared to exist, despite the substantial attention to documenting atrocity crimes, monitoring day-to-day developments in the war, and anticipating potential future scenarios of the conflict in general. Therefore, the discussion focused on the following prompts: What are the major potential triggers or drivers of potential significant escalation of atrocities in Ukraine over the next year or so? What strategies might policy makers use to anticipate, prevent, or respond to the potential escalation of atrocities? What observable trends or events would indicate increasing likelihood of a significant escalation of atrocities in Ukraine? The discussion took place under the Chatham House rule. This rapporteur’s report summarizes key discussion points and questions without attribution.
Topic:
Atrocities, Armed Conflict, Russia-Ukraine War, and Risk Assessment
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

310. Promoting the Inclusion of Europe’s Migrants and Minorities in Arts and Culture

Author:
Lucía Salgado and Liam Patuzzi
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Migration Policy Institute (MPI)
Abstract:
Decades of sustained immigration have transformed many European cities into mosaics of different cultures. Yet this diversity is not always mirrored in the art celebrated in museums, the plays produced in major theaters, and the music heard in concert halls. In addition, well-intended efforts to celebrate ethnic and cultural diversity through art and culture run the risk of overemphasizing differences, exoticizing minority groups rather than contributing to the normalization of diversity within society. But this status quo may be changing. Widespread anti-racism protests have prompted long-overdue conversations about mis- and under-representation of minorities as well as discrimination in the cultural scene. At the same time, pandemic-related restrictions have placed further financial strains on the already fragile cultural sector, challenging organizations to reach new audiences in new ways. This MPI Europe report, which draws on interviews with cultural professionals from 11 European countries, explores approaches to strengthening the participation of migrant and minority communities in arts and culture, with potential benefits for immigrant integration outcomes, social cohesion, and the vibrancy and sustainability of cultural institutions. It examines migrants’ and minorities’ inclusion on three levels: as visitors of cultural venues and consumers of art, as featured artists and performers, and as leaders and staff within cultural institutions. The research was conducted within the framework of the Urban Agenda Partnership on the Inclusion of Migrants and Refugees, co-led by the City of Amsterdam and the European Commission and funded by the European Commission's Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs.
Topic:
Migration, Arts, Culture, Minorities, European Union, Integration, and Inclusion
Political Geography:
Europe

311. Digital Health Credentials and COVID-19: Can Vaccine and Testing Requirements Restart Global Mobility?

Author:
Lawrence Huang
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Migration Policy Institute (MPI)
Abstract:
More than two years into the COVID-19 pandemic, rising vaccination levels and widespread testing in many countries are giving governments and the public increasing confidence in international travel. A central part of efforts to restart mobility are digital health credentials, which verify a person’s vaccination, testing, and/or recovery status. These credentials help to minimize the risk of travelers carrying the virus, and unlike paper credentials that must be manually inspected in airports and at borders, digital credentials can be automatically verified. But even as digital health credentials are becoming increasingly common, gaps in international coordination and technical integration issues between different credential systems remain. As a result, migrants and travelers moving between—and at times within—countries must navigate a complex maze of digital systems. This report examines the implications of digital health credentials for international travel and for immigrants’ and travelers’ access to domestic services and venues that also use such credentials. It also explores the implications for specific groups: tourists and business travelers, students, labor migrants, asylum seekers and refugees, and unauthorized migrants. Finally, it offers policy recommendations to facilitate mobility and minimize risks for people on the move.
Topic:
Health, Immigration, Border Control, Employment, Mobility, Vaccine, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Global Focus

312. Destination-Country Policies to Foster Diaspora Engagement in Development

Author:
Kathleen Newland
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Migration Policy Institute (MPI)
Abstract:
It is now widely recognized that emigrants and their descendants contribute greatly to the development of their countries of origin or ancestry, not only with remittances but also by starting businesses, through exchanges of knowledge, and more. And many migrant-origin countries have invested in connecting with their diaspora and leveraging its contributions. Far less attention has gone, though, to how countries of destination with substantial official development assistance programs are supporting—or could support—their resident diasporas’ engagement in the development of countries of origin. This report explores the diaspora engagement actions and policies of Western donor governments—including France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, and the United States—highlighting distinctive features. It considers a variety of modes of engagement, such as assistance with forming or strengthening diaspora organizations, grants for diaspora-led development projects, consultations, skills circulation initiatives, and support for entrepreneurship. The report also explores why more destination countries have not (consistently) operated diaspora-for-development programs, and offers lessons about effectiveness and sustainability.
Topic:
Development, International Cooperation, International Organization, Migration, Diaspora, Immigration, Governance, and Integration
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America

313. From Fear to Solidarity: The Difficulty in Shifting Public Narratives about Refugees

Author:
Natalia Banulescu-Bogdan
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Migration Policy Institute (MPI)
Abstract:
Refugees and asylum seekers are alternatively depicted as heroes or security threats, victims or exceptional workers, exemplary neighbors or opportunists. And though public narratives are sometimes described as a binary, in reality, people can hold multiple, competing beliefs and opinions about forced migration and its impacts on society. They may, for example, experience pride in their country’s humanitarian response and compassion for refugees alongside anxiety over changing cultural norms or fear of competition for scarce jobs, each of which can become more or less salient under different circumstances. These public attitudes can create or constrain the space needed for sensible and creative policy responses, as well as community cohesion. As a result, governments, international organizations, and advocates have invested in myriad programs and campaigns to bolster solidarity and defuse negative reactions to forced migrants. Yet, as this study discusses, changing people’s minds is far from straightforward. This report—the first in the Beyond Territorial Asylum: Making Protection Work in a Bordered World initiative led by MPI and the Robert Bosch Stiftung—examines the different narratives that tend to emerge in communities welcoming forced migrants, looking at a variety of geographic, socioeconomic, and historical contexts. It also explores two categories of interventions that aim to address negative narratives about refugees and asylum seekers: information campaigns that aim to defuse threat narratives and “contact-building” initiatives that seek to build connections between refugees and host communities. The report concludes by offering strategies to promote solidarity and mitigate tensions.
Topic:
Immigration, Employment, Refugees, Economy, Asylum, Integration, Social Cohesion, COVID-19, and Labor Market
Political Geography:
Europe

314. The Future of Remote Work: Digital Nomads and the Implications for Immigration Systems

Author:
Kate Hooper and Meghan Benton
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Migration Policy Institute (MPI)
Abstract:
The pandemic spurred a rapid shift in working practices. In the decades leading up to the COVID-19 crisis, technological advances had allowed a growing number of people with jobs not tied to a specific location to work remotely, particularly in high-income countries with robust technological infrastructure. But the social-distancing and lockdown measures implemented in early 2020 accelerated this trend, with many people working remotely for the first time and some “digital nomads” seeking to do so internationally. These changes in the world of work have important ramifications for immigration systems worldwide, most of which are poorly attuned to remote work arrangements. Finding ways to adapt immigration policies to keep pace with remote work trends is likely to remain important even as the public-health threat recedes in many places, as there are signs that many employers will continue to demonstrate far greater flexibility about where their employees work—both as a means to streamline operations and to attract and retain workers who are increasingly demanding the option to work remotely. This report examines the challenges that remote workers and their employers face when navigating immigration systems, and analyzes opportunities to introduce greater flexibility into immigration, employment, and tax policies to accommodate the rapid rise of nontraditional working arrangements. In the immigration sphere, it identifies options for adapting existing immigration pathways to accommodate remote work and discusses the new digital nomad visas that have sprung up in countries around the world.
Topic:
Migration, Employment, Immigration Policy, Remote Work, and Digital Nomads
Political Geography:
Global Focus

315. The COVID-19 Catalyst: Learning from Pandemic-Driven Innovations in Immigrant Integration Policy

Author:
Jasmijn Slootjes
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Migration Policy Institute (MPI)
Abstract:
Despite talk of COVID-19 as a “great equalizer,” the pandemic and its economic fallout have hit certain segments of European and North American societies particularly hard. Among them are immigrants and refugees, and especially groups with distinct vulnerabilities, such as refugee children, irregular migrants, and migrant women. Without swift government intervention, the twin public-health and economic crises risk jeopardizing immigrant integration and creating durable rifts in diverse societies. Yet precisely at a time when bold and agile policy responses are needed, the pandemic has disrupted governments’ usual ways of working. When lockdown and social-distancing measures were introduced in 2020, many in-person integration services were suspended, and both these programs and the day-to-day work of governments and civil-society organizations shifted online. This opened new opportunities but also hindered the engagement of migrants, policymakers, and other stakeholders with limited digital access or literacy. This report examines how governments’ immigrant integration strategies, partnerships, and policy priorities have changed in the two years since the pandemic began. It explores how this period of forced adaption has worked as a catalyst for innovation at the local, national, and (in Europe) EU level, drawing on interviews with senior policymakers and other experts in North America and Europe. The report then distills recommendations on how to leverage these innovations to durably improve the governance of immigrant integration.
Topic:
Education, Employment, Innovation, COVID-19, and Immigration Policy
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

316. Rebooting the Asylum System? The Role of Digital Tools in International Protection

Author:
Hanne Beirens
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Migration Policy Institute (MPI)
Abstract:
The COVID-19 pandemic is changing the way asylum systems use technology. After the initial pause on asylum processing in many countries, officials have turned to digital tools to revive these systems—and increasingly, to reimagine how they work. From the further digitalization of identification and security-check processes to chatbots that help asylum seekers register their protection claims and interviews conducted remotely via video call, such tools have permeated every corner of migration, asylum, and border management systems. This is particularly the case in Europe, where the 2015–16 migration and refugee crisis kickstarted a first round of growth in this area. With digital tools here to stay, the time is ripe to examine what impact their use has on people and processes, and how digitalization may interact with other developments in the international protection field. This report—part of the Beyond Territorial Asylum: Making Protection Work in a Bordered World initiative led by MPI and the Robert Bosch Stiftung—catalogues the use of digital tools in protection systems in Europe and elsewhere, and reflects on what the ramifications could be for humanitarian protection in the years to come. “Digitalization in and of itself is no universal cure,” the author writes, “and depending on how such efforts are carried out, they could obstruct the asylum process and violate asylum seekers’ rights as easily as they could facilitate or protect them.” This report highlights both the potential benefits of the increasing use of digital technology in different stages of asylum processes as well as key challenges and risks that need to be addressed, including concerns about data privacy, opaque decision-making, and how technology changes the nature of human communication.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Infrastructure, Border Control, Refugees, Asylum, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Global Focus

317. Financing Responses to Climate Migration: The Unique Role of Multilateral Development Banks

Author:
Lawrence Huang, Ravenna Sohst, and Camille Le Coz
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Migration Policy Institute (MPI)
Abstract:
As climate change increasingly contributes to migration and displacement in many parts of the world, there is a pressing need for measures that build resilience and prevent displacement as well as those that help climate-affected people move to safety and support receiving communities. Multilateral development banks (MDBs) are critical, if sometimes overlooked, players because of their ability to invest in large-scale projects that contribute to sustainable development, primarily in low- and middle-income countries. This report explores the unique role of MDBs in the climate finance landscape and highlights opportunities for migration, humanitarian, and other key actors to partner with them on projects that effectively target climate-related migration and displacement. After reviewing the evidence on the complex linkages between climate and mobility, the report examines MDBs’ climate-related work to date, challenges they face to scaling up these efforts, and strategies to begin to address hurdles. These recommendations include learning from past MDB investments that have touched on climate migration, funding data collection or sharing to strengthen understanding of climate migration trends, and developing partnerships to support policy and project development, financing, and implementation.
Topic:
Climate Change, Development, Migration, Finance, and Banks
Political Geography:
Global Focus

318. Countering Terrorism on Tomorrow’s Battlefield: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resiliency (NATO COE-DAT Handbook 2)

Author:
Sarah J. Lohmann, Lucas M. Cox, Denise Feldner, Trevor P. Helmy, and Katherine L. Kuzminski
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
Every day, malicious actors target emerging technologies and medical resilience or seek to wreak havoc in the wake of disasters brought on by climate change, energy insecurity, and supply-chain disruptions. Countering Terrorism on Tomorrow’s Battlefield is a handbook on how to strengthen critical infrastructure resilience in an era of emerging threats. The counterterrorism research produced for this volume is in alignment with NATO’s Warfighting Capstone Concept, which details how NATO Allies can transform and maintain their advantage despite new threats for the next two decades. The topics are rooted in NATO’s Seven Baseline requirements, which set the standard for enhancing resilience in every aspect of critical infrastructure and civil society. As terrorists hone their skills to operate lethal drones, use biometric data to target innocents, and take advantage of the chaos left by pandemics and natural disasters for nefarious purposes, NATO forces must be prepared to respond and prevent terrorist events before they happen. Big-data analytics provides potential for NATO states to receive early warning to prevent pandemics, cyberattacks, and kinetic attacks. NATO is perfecting drone operations through interoperability exercises, and space is being exploited by adversaries. Hypersonic weapons are actively being used on the battlefield, and satellites have been targeted to take down wind farms and control navigation. This handbook is a guide for the future, providing actionable information and recommendations to keep our democracies safe today and in the years to come.
Topic:
NATO, Climate Change, Terrorism, Infrastructure, Elections, Drones, Pandemic, Resilience, Supply Chains, and Energy Sector
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, Global Focus, and United States of America

319. What Ukraine Taught NATO about Hybrid Warfare

Author:
Sarah J. Lohmann, Chuck Benson, Vytautas Butrimas, Georgios Giannoulis, and Gabriel Raicu
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 forced the United States and its NATO partners to be confronted with the impact of hybrid warfare far beyond the battlefield. Targeting Europe’s energy security, Russia’s malign influence campaigns and malicious cyber intrusions are affecting global gas prices, driving up food costs, disrupting supply chains and grids, and testing US and Allied military mobility. This study examines how hybrid warfare is being used by NATO’s adversaries, what vulnerabilities in energy security exist across the Alliance, and what mitigation strategies are available to the member states. Cyberattacks targeting the renewable energy landscape during Europe’s green transition are increasing, making it urgent that new tools are developed to protect these emerging technologies. No less significant are the cyber and information operations targeting energy security in Eastern Europe as it seeks to become independent from Russia. Economic coercion is being used against Western and Central Europe to stop gas from flowing. China’s malign investments in Southern and Mediterranean Europe are enabling Beijing to control several NATO member states’ critical energy infrastructure at a critical moment in the global balance of power. What Ukraine Taught NATO about Hybrid Warfare will be an important reference for NATO officials and US installations operating in the European theater.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Economics, Infrastructure, Cybersecurity, Renewable Energy, and Hybrid Warfare
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, Central Europe, Western Europe, and Southeast Europe

320. Enabling NATO’s Collective Defense: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resiliency (NATO COE-DAT Handbook 1)

Author:
Carl V. Evans, Chris Anderson, Malcom Baker, Ronald Bearse, and Salih Biçakci
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
In 2014 NATO’s Centre of Excellence-Defence Against Terrorism (COE-DAT) launched the inaugural course on “Critical Infrastructure Protection Against Terrorist Attacks.” As this course garnered increased attendance and interest, the core lecturer team felt the need to update the course in critical infrastructure (CI) taking into account the shift from an emphasis on “protection” of CI assets to “security and resiliency.” What was lacking in the fields of academe, emergency management, and the industry practitioner community was a handbook that leveraged the collective subject matter expertise of the core lecturer team, a handbook that could serve to educate government leaders, state and private-sector owners and operators of critical infrastructure, academicians, and policymakers in NATO and partner countries. Enabling NATO’s Collective Defense: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resiliency is the culmination of such an effort, the first major collaborative research project under a Memorandum of Understanding between the US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), and NATO COE-DAT. The research project began in October 2020 with a series of four workshops hosted by SSI. The draft chapters for the book were completed in late January 2022. Little did the research team envision the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February this year. The Russian occupation of the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant, successive missile attacks against Ukraine’s electric generation and distribution facilities, rail transport, and cyberattacks against almost every sector of the country’s critical infrastructure have been on world display. Russian use of its gas supplies as a means of economic warfare against Europe—designed to undermine NATO unity and support for Ukraine—is another timely example of why adversaries, nation-states, and terrorists alike target critical infrastructure. Hence, the need for public-private sector partnerships to secure that infrastructure and build the resiliency to sustain it when attacked. Ukraine also highlights the need for NATO allies to understand where vulnerabilities exist in host nation infrastructure that will undermine collective defense and give more urgency to redressing and mitigating those fissures.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Infrastructure, Cybersecurity, Alliance, Crisis Management, and Risk Assessment
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

321. The Future of the Joint Warfighting Headquarters: An Alternative Approach to the Joint Task Force

Author:
Eric Bissonette, Thomas Bruscino, Kelvin Mote, Matthew Powell, and Marc Sanborn
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
The US military must create standing, numbered, and regionally aligned Joint warfighting headquarters— American Expeditionary Forces (AEFs)—around a command council and a staff organized into Joint centers and cells. Calls for standing Joint force headquarters are not new, but the demonstrated military effectiveness of the Joint Task Force (JTF) model coupled with increasing service-specific resource requirements and tightening fiscal constraints have resulted in little evolution in joint force headquarters construction since the end of World War II. Analysis of the historical record has shown that joint warfighting is best conducted with a Joint warfighting command subordinate to the geographic combatant commands. However, the Joint Task Force model is problematic because the ad-hoc, post-crisis activation of JTFs, along with their antiquated command and control structure, inherently puts the United States at a strategic and operational disadvantage. In the future, the US military will primarily maintain its competitive advantage, especially in great-power competition, by being a superior and sustainable joint force sooner than its adversaries. The proposed AEFs draw on generations of hard-earned experience to maintain and grow American supremacy in Joint warfighting in an increasingly dangerous world.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Army, and Joint Operations
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

322. Coercing Fluently: The Grammar of Coercion in the Twenty-first Century

Author:
C. Anthony Pfaff
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
To illustrate the logic and grammar of coercion, this analysis relies on decision-theory methods, such as game theory, that examine the strategic decision-making process in interactions with adversaries and partners. The intent here is not to offer predictive models of rational-actor behavior. Rather, the intent is to use game-theory and similar approaches to understand how coercion works better. This analysis considers competitive interactions between actors that have discrete and qualifiable, if not quantifiable, preferences and who behave rationally, though this analysis acknowledges the behavior that is considered rational is frequently informed by nonrational social, cultural, and psychological factors. Considering these competitive interactions allows one to identify “rules of thumb” that can orient and guide actors as they compete. This analysis emphasizes coercion does not depend simply on imposing costs; rather, it depends on placing adversaries in positions in which they must act and their most rational option is the one most beneficial to one’s own cause. To achieve this result, actors must carefully calibrate their demands to ensure their adversary’s cost of concession is as low as possible. To prevent challenges in the first place, actors should convince the adversary acting on a threat is one’s most rational response. If convincing the adversary is not possible, then one must find ways to decrease the value of the adversary’s challenge. When none of those options are possible, preparing for conflict is likely one’s rational option. This analysis then applies the rules of thumb to US relations with China, Russia, and Iran.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Game Theory, Coercion, and International Competition
Political Geography:
China, Iran, Middle East, and Asia

323. Enabling a More Externally Focused and Operational PLA – 2020 PLA Conference Papers

Author:
Lucie Béraud-Sudreau, David Brewster, Christopher Cairns, Roger Cliff, and R. Evan Ellis
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
Although the People’s Liberation Army is not yet a global expeditionary force on par with the US military, the former has nevertheless significantly expanded its ability to operate abroad. Through enhanced technological capabilities, robust relationships with foreign militaries, increased access to overseas military bases and dual-use facilities, and the implementation of major structural reforms, the People’s Liberation Army has built a more integrated joint force capable of conducting a wider and more complex array of missions. This volume advances the understanding of the People’s Liberation Army’s capability to conduct overseas missions by examining China’s military relations with Europe, Africa, and Latin America; the country’s military activities in the Indian Ocean, polar regions, and Pacific Island countries; and the emerging roles of the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force and the Joint Logistic Support Force. This volume finds the People’s Liberation Army is engaged in a wide range of activities throughout the world, including port calls, joint exercises, seminars, and personnel exchanges. China sells weapons to some parts of the world and seeks to acquire military and dual-use technology from others. In addition, the People’s Liberation Army seeks to increase its capability to operate in parts of the world, such as the Indian Ocean, Pacific Island countries, and polar regions, where the organization has only had a minimal presence in the past.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Military, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America

324. The Grand Strategy of Gertrude Bell: From the Arab Bureau to the Creation of Iraq

Author:
Heather S. Gregg
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
The remarkable life of early-twentieth-century British adventurer Gertrude Bell has been well documented through her biographies and numerous travel books. Bell’s role as a grand strategist for the British government in the Middle East during World War I and the postwar period, however, is surprisingly understudied. Investigating Gertrude Bell as both a military strategist and a grand strategist offers important insights into how Great Britain devised its military strategy in the Middle East during World War I—particularly, Britain’s efforts to work through saboteurs and secret societies to undermine the Ottoman Empire during the war and the country’s attempts to stabilize the region after the war through the creation of the modern state of Iraq. As importantly, studying the life and work of Bell offers a glimpse into how this unique woman was able to become one of the principal architects of British strategy at this time and the extraordinary set of skills and perspectives she brought to these efforts—particularly, her ability to make and maintain relationships with key individuals. Bell’s life and work offer insights into the roles women have played and continue to play as influencers of grand strategy.
Topic:
History, Military Strategy, Grand Strategy, World War I, and Gertrude Bell
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, and Mesopotamia

325. The Coming Storm: Insights from Ukraine about Escalation in Modern War

Author:
Benjamin Jensen and Adrian Bogart
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Based on three crisis simulations held in late March 2022 with think tank fellows, military planners, and congressional staffers, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) will likely struggle to address escalation vectors almost certain to push the current war in Ukraine beyond the country’s borders. This paper captures key insights from across these simulations based on two triggering events: (1) a Russian surgical strike on a NATO logistics hub used to provide weapons to Ukraine in southeast Poland, and (2) Russian use of chemical weapons along the Polish border while simultaneously mobilizing to threaten the Baltics. As the conflict crossed a key threshold and risked becoming a regional war, most participants found a natural pull to escalate in each scenario despite limited expectations of achieving a position of competitive advantage. Analyzing how individuals and teams approached decision making provides insights on rethinking escalation models in the twenty-first century and taking advantage of new concepts and capabilities to better support signaling during a crisis.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

326. Localizing Humanitarian Action in Africa

Author:
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele, Kurtzer Jacob D., and Hareem Fatima Abdullah
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The international humanitarian community is increasingly focusing on the need for local and national actors to lead humanitarian response and recovery efforts in conflict-affected or disaster-prone regions, especially in the Global South. Local and national actors responding to crises remain severely underfunded, particularly in Africa, where civil society organizations (CSOs) receive insufficient funding from African and international actors alike. African funders reportedly directed 9 percent of large gifts to African CSOs between 2010 and 2019, while non-African philanthropists provided 14 percent of their funding to these groups. The United States is the world’s largest foreign assistance donor, having contributed $35.5 billion in overseas development assistance (ODA) in 2020. Much of this aid goes to sub-Saharan Africa, including $8.5 billion to 47 countries and 8 regional programs in 2020. Yet national and local organizations receive little of this funding directly. At the same time, Washington has repeatedly signaled a commitment to the “localization” of humanitarian aid, or the shift of decisionmaking power, program implementation, and resources to local and national actors. Yet localized humanitarian assistance in Africa has failed to materialize. Bureaucratic and regulatory hurdles, as well as geostrategic calculations, pose a challenge to localization efforts. African voices are excluded from the decisionmaking landscape—in donor discussions and localization efforts themselves—resulting in a gap in cultural competency. The conversation on localization in Africa cannot be limited to the African continent; it must occur in donor capitals, with African voices leading the dialogue. To achieve sustainable localization, the U.S. and African policy landscapes should resolve bureaucratic obstacles and shift an exclusionary aid paradigm to one that is inclusive and builds on existing successes.
Topic:
Security, Humanitarian Aid, Humanitarian Intervention, and Humanitarian Crisis
Political Geography:
Africa

327. Strengthening a Transnational Semiconductor Industry

Author:
James Lewis
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
If data is the new oil, it could be said that chips are the new steel—a fundamental component of national power similar to the foundational role steel production played in the industrial age. As such, semiconductor chips are a natural focus for government intervention and support to accelerate growth and build secure supply chains. The specific goals for U.S. semiconductor policy are to increase reliability and trust in supply, reinforce all elements of chip-making capacity, and reduce China’s role in the supply chain. Chip production is based on complex, globally distributed, specialized supply chains involving many stages in production, including specialized materials, production equipment, design and related software, fabrication, testing, and packaging. In some stages of production, labor costs are important; in others, it is capital costs because a cutting-edge fabrication plant, or fab, can cost more than $12 billion. Taiwan, South Korea, the United States, Japan, Singapore, and China are the leading chip-producing nations. There are also important facilities (often subsidiaries of a leading producer) in Europe, Southeast Asia, South America, and Israel. This global distribution has led some to push for greater production in the United States, but trying to “reshore” a global supply chain spread across many countries would be counterproductive if the goal is a reliable and more productive supply chain. The problem is China, not global production. The politics of the chip industry are generally favorable to the United States. One leading producer, South Korea, is a treaty ally and faces less risk of disruption from China than does Taiwan. Another leading producer, Japan, is one of the most important U.S. security partners and, with the United States, dominates the production of semiconductor manufacturing equipment (SME). ASML, another leading producer of SME, based in the Netherlands, is also an important ally. Singapore, while it would prefer not to be caught in a battle between giants, is also a dependable partner. These countries share democratic values and in many instances are treaty allies. The global distribution of chip-making in countries friendly to the United States is an advantage.
Topic:
Science and Technology, transnationalism, Emerging Technology, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:
Global Focus

328. CCP Inc. in West Africa: How Chinese Party-State Actors Secured Critical Minerals in Guinea

Author:
Briana Boland, Lauren Maranto, and Jude Blanchette
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
This CCP Inc. case study explores how Chinese diplomatic, regulatory, financial, and commercial actors work in concert to secure critical minerals in the West African nation of Guinea. Efforts in Guinea to mine bauxite and iron ore, the primary inputs for aluminum and steel, illuminate Beijing’s conduits for influencing and supporting its geo-economic objectives. Examining one key Chinese player in Guinea’s mining sector, this study highlights state actors’ connections with nominally private Chinese companies and the importance of partnerships with state-owned enterprises for building costly infrastructure. Across multiple bauxite and iron ore mining ventures, Chinese diplomatic support and state financing provided conduits to help further favored projects and increase Chinese companies’ access to Guinea’s mining industries.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Natural Resources, Hegemony, Mining, and Superpower
Political Geography:
Africa, China, Asia, and Guinea

329. Concurrent Crises in the Horn of Africa

Author:
Kurtzer Jacob D., Sierra Ballard, and Hareem Fatima Abdullah
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
The greater Horn of Africa, stretching from southern Ethiopia to northern Kenya and Somalia, is experiencing its worst drought in four decades. A fourth consecutive failed rainy season caused by the La Niña weather phenomenon has generated extreme drought conditions that have curtailed agricultural production, destroyed crops, and killed more than 3 million livestock, threatening the livelihoods and lives of millions of farmers and pastoralists. Across the region, more than 20 million people currently face starvation, and nearly 6 million children under the age of five are acutely malnourished. The number of individuals impacted by acute food insecurity will likely increase to over 25 million by mid-2022, hitting conflict-affected Ethiopia and Somalia the hardest, potentially leading to widespread malnutrition and starvation. Droughts in the region are not new, but they are becoming more frequent and severe, resulting in longer-term impacts. Climate models forecast the upcoming October–December rains to underperform, meaning the region will likely see an unprecedented five-season drought. Rangelands are unable to recover from increasing drought cycles and pastoralist livelihoods may no longer be viable in many areas. The current drought is the latest of many crises afflicting the Horn, including the Covid-19 pandemic, devastating floods, and locust outbreaks. The Horn is also one of the most conflict-affected regions of the world. Each country in the Horn has experienced some measure of political strife for decades. Conflict and violence have compounded the effects of climatic shocks on affected populations by creating additional needs and barriers for international humanitarian organizations and frontline local actors. Women and girls are bearing the brunt of these concurrent crises due to prevailing gender inequalities, which hinder their participation in decisionmaking mechanisms and humanitarian response and recovery efforts, undermining the integration of local actors in humanitarian action. While resilience-building efforts have made some progress in mitigating impacts from drought, they are not yet scaled to the overwhelming need. The combined effects of the climatic and political crises necessitate both an emergency humanitarian response and the implementation of long-term climate adaptation and resilience strategies.
Topic:
Environment, Water, Disaster Management, and Drought
Political Geography:
Africa

330. Donor Funding Models for Innovation: A Review

Author:
Conor M. Savoy
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Donors have rhetorically supported the importance of innovation in global development, but the level of resources committed has seldom matched the level of this rhetoric. There are clear barriers to expanding funding for the innovation ecosystem: (1) innovation remains under-resourced, and models that are providing clear results are not properly supported; (2) pathways to scale remain limited because of the total funding available; and (3) the risk appetite of donors remains too conservative to properly support and scale innovation. Recent impact evaluations suggest that innovations supported by the United States Agency for International Development’s (USAID) Development Innovation Ventures (DIV) and the Global Innovation Fund (GIF) have yielded impressive returns. But more importantly, innovation also leverages scarce funding resources and engages with locally based partners.
Topic:
Development, Natural Resources, Innovation, and Donors
Political Geography:
Global Focus

331. Allied Smart Cities

Author:
Matthew Goodman, Akhil Thadani, and Matthew Wayland
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Population growth and rapid urbanization are reshaping global networks and driving demand for digital infrastructure beyond advanced economies. These trends are accelerating U.S.-China commercial competition in third markets, where governments must decide which communication and technology governance systems to adopt. Developing a high-standard smart city model can help to successfully rejuvenate domestic infrastructure, close the global digital divide, and promote democratic values in digital infrastructure.
Topic:
Urban, Cities, Sustainability, and Digital Revolution
Political Geography:
Global Focus

332. The Lessons of the Afghan War That No One Will Want to Learn

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
At the best of times, the U.S. tends to rush out heavily politicized studies of the lessons of war that are more political ammunition than serious analyses, and while these are followed by long formal studies that are often quite good, they then are often ignored as the flow of events moves on. These are scarcely the best of times. The collapse of the Afghan government and forces has occurred during one of the most partisan periods in American politics, followed by a totally different kind of conflict in Ukraine, all while the U.S. focus on terrorism and regional conflicts that began with 9/11 has been replaced by a focus on competition with nuclear superpowers like Russia and China. The very fact that the war stretched out over two decades has meant that much of the focus on lessons has ignored the first half or more of the war, and the almost inevitable chaos following the U.S. decision to withdraw has led to the focus on the collapse of the Afghan forces and the central government rather than on the actual conduct of the war – and few within the U.S. government now want to rake over the list of past mistakes that turned an initial tactical victory into a massive grand strategic defeat.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

333. Cyber War and Ukraine

Author:
James Andrew Lewis
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
This is a preliminary review of cyber operations in the Ukraine conflict based on publicly available information. Ukraine was not the first “cyber war”—the term itself makes little sense—but it was the first major conflict involving large-scale cyber operations. The so-far inept Russian invasion, where cyber operations have provided little benefit, raises questions about the balance between defense and offense in cyberspace, the utility of offensive cyber operations, and the requirements for planning and coordination. Better-than-expected Ukrainian defenses seem to be one hallmark of this invasion and the primary reason why Russian cyber efforts have had limited effect. It is likely that Ukraine, forewarned by Russian cyber actions that began as early as 2014, was better prepared as a result. It was also assisted in its cyber defense by friendly countries and private actors with whom it had developed cooperative relationships before the conflict. This preparation allowed it to deflect many Russian offensive cyber operations, suggesting that a well-prepared and energetic defense can have the advantage over offense in cyberspace. Russia had previously used cyberattacks against Ukraine to destroy or damage infrastructure and data. It attempted to do so again in 2022. Based on publicly available information, Russia launched a broad cyber campaign shortly before the invasion (see the appendix for a list of known events). Some reporting showed a huge increase in exploits on the first day. The intent appears to have been to create disorder and overwhelm Ukrainian defenses. Russia sought to disrupt services and install destructive malware on Ukrainian networks included phishing, denial of service, and taking advantage of software vulnerabilities. One company identified eight different families of destructive software used by Russia in these attacks. The primary targets were Ukrainian government websites, energy and telecom service providers, financial institutions, and media outlets, but the cyberattacks encompassed most critical sectors. This was a wide-ranging attack using the full suite of Russian cyber capabilities to disrupt Ukraine, but it was not a success. Russia’s most significant cyber success so far was the disruption of the Viasat Inc’s KA-SAT satellite. This created significant damage that spread beyond Ukraine but ultimately did not provide military advantage to Russia. The attack may have been intended to be part of a larger, coordinated cyberattack that proved unsuccessful, or the Russians may not have expected the rapid restoration of service that was provided with outside assistance. The metric for Viasat and for other actions is not whether a cyberattack is effective in terms of network penetration or the disruption of services or data, but whether its effect helps achieve in this case, the occupation of Ukraine and the elimination of its elected government. By this metric, the Viasat attack was not a success.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Cybersecurity, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Ukraine

334. The Geopolitics of Hydrogen in the Indo-Pacific Region

Author:
Jane Nakano
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Large energy consumers in the Indo-Pacific region and their traditional energy suppliers are examining the potential role of clean hydrogen in energy systems as well as their own potential roles in hydrogen supply chains. Several Asian governments are leading the charge in creating a clean hydrogen economy by releasing and executing hydrogen strategies and funding new projects, while others are beginning to articulate visions and strategies. This report surveys national visions and strategies of leading Asian economies and their traditional energy suppliers and presents key implications of clean hydrogen development in the Indo-Pacific region. The report further offers recommendations on the role the United States could play in this rising market, including ensuring resilience and robustness in clean hydrogen supply chains, recognizing the energy security benefit of clean hydrogen exports from the United States, and ensuring the environmental sustainability in hydrogen value-chain creation.
Topic:
Security, Energy Policy, Environment, Sustainability, and Hydrogen
Political Geography:
Indo-Pacific

335. Genomes: The Era of Purposeful Manipulation Begins

Author:
Carol Kuntz
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The purposeful manipulation of genomes is now possible. Such manipulation has great promise and broad strategic implications; it is creating useful molecules of various sorts and, over time, it could eliminate genetic disease. Like many emerging technologies, genome manipulation could grow into an important economic sector, contributing to a replicating cycle of innovation and enabling the United States to favorably shape its strategic future at home and abroad. Advances in these technologies are fueled by a global commercial and academic community. The United States should ensure that it fully remains a member of that community, but also that key capabilities—such as large, well-curated databases and biofoundries—are created and sustained domestically. The United States needs to rationalize its policy on heritable human genome editing, allowing legitimate types of edits but contributing to international norms against illegitimate ones. A robust biotechnology sector at home would yield many benefits—economic, technological, medical—and provide the critical reservoir of expertise within which national security interests could be secured. The Department of Defense needs to make structural reforms in its approach to emerging technologies, particularly by creating career paths for uniformed practitioners. Otherwise, it will continue failing in its effort to incorporate emerging technologies into its operational concepts, budgets, and programs—leading to diminished capabilities in the United States, particularly as compared to China. In time, falling behind on these key areas of science could lead to many problems, including failures in deterrence and, ultimately, in war.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, and Medicine
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

336. The Need for a New NATO Force Planning Exercise

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman and Grace Hwang
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
NATO countries have already provided massive amounts of military aid to Ukraine, deployed additional forces to support the NATO countries that share a border with Russia, improved the Alliance’s ability to rapidly deploy forces forward in a crisis, and worked with key powers like Poland to strengthen its capabilities. NATO has accepted Finland and Sweden as future members of the Alliance, and it has made numerous other short-term adjustments to its force posture that enhance its deterrence and defense capabilities. NATO faces a future, however, where it cannot predict how much territory Ukraine will lose and where it must now view Russia as an ongoing major threat at virtually every level from the limited conventional threats Russia poses to the NATO countries on its border to the major increases in its threat of strategic nuclear forces. NATO cannot continue to treat Russia as a potential partner, and that seems to be an unlikely path forward so long as Putin or anyone like him is in power. NATO also cannot ignore the rise in China’s military and economic power or the prospects of closer Russian and Chinese strategic cooperation. The challenge NATO faces goes far beyond Ukraine. The days in which NATO countries could keep taking peace dividends by cutting their forces, failing to modernize, and failing to adopt new forces of tactics and interoperability are over. NATO cannot deal with the Russian threat in terms of half-measures or by continuing to focus on empty and virtually meaningless force goals like spending 2% of national GDP on defense and 20% of defense expenditure on equipment. NATO needs to act now to look far beyond the short-term priorities of the Ukraine conflict. It needs to revitalize its entire force planning progress. It needs to create effective levels of deterrence and defense capability, while it modernizes its forces to deal with radically new requirements like joint all-domain operations (JADO), emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs), new precision-strike capabilities, changes in air and missile warfare and defense, and the revival of Russian naval power and the growth of a Chinese blue-water navy. The Emeritus Chair in Strategy has prepared a report, entitled, The Need for a New NATO Force Planning Exercise, that examines how NATO must approach an effective force planning exercise that can give its new strategy real meaning. This report documents the pointless character of NATO’s present emphasis on burdensharing, and it examines the real-world shifts in spending and forces in NATO since 2014, as well as how these changes have affected the national forces in given sectors of Europe.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

337. North America Is a Region, Too: An Integrated, Phased, and Affordable Approach to Air and Missile Defense for the Homeland

Author:
Tom Karako, Matthew Strohmeyer, Wes Rumbaugh, and Ken Harmon
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
U.S. air and missile defense efforts have long been characterized by a striking dichotomy. Defenses for the homeland have largely focused on long-range ballistic threats, while cruise missile defense and other air defense efforts have focused on regional and force protection applications to the exclusion of the homeland. This compartmentalization assumes that battles in one place will only consist of certain parts of the threat spectrum, and battles elsewhere will consist only of others. That lingering dichotomy creates a vulnerability that near-peer adversaries now seek to exploit. In a sense, the homeland-regional dichotomy ignores the fact that North America is a region, too. As with any other region, attacks on assets in North America could be designed to shape the political and military calculus of U.S. policymakers. This report explores the strategic significance of air and missile defense for the homeland, considers principles informing defense design, and develops and costs an architecture based on those principles.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Homeland Security, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

338. Aiming for a Quasi-alliance

Author:
Kojiro Tonosaki
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Japan and the United States have introduced strategies to maintain regional stability and prosperity by realizing a Free and Open Indo-Pacific region, and enhancing cooperation with Southeast Asian partners such as the Philippines is critically important to those efforts. Japan has a long history of engagement with the Philippines rooted in economic cooperation, but gradually expanding the agenda to include defense cooperation and capacity building is critical to managing an increasingly complex regional security environment. Japan should further develop its security partnership with the Philippines to reflect its geopolitical importance and address its security vulnerabilities in coordination with the United States and other regional partners. This report details ways to sustain momentum for bilateral security cooperation between Japan and the Philippines as a step toward multilateral security cooperation with the United States and other partners in the future, all aimed at contributing to the stability and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific region.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, and Philippines

339. Making Hydrogen Hubs a Success

Author:
Joseph Majkut, Jane Nakano, and Mathias Zacarias
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
In a low-carbon world, low-emissions hydrogen will be useful as an energy carrier and when end uses are too hard or expensive to electrify. Thus, hydrogen plays a key role in modeled scenarios of a decarbonized future. Notably, the International Energy Agency’s (IEA) Net-zero Scenario has called for hydrogen from low-carbon sources to make up 10 percent of final energy consumption worldwide by 2050. This large scale of projected consumption means that standing up an industry to make, process, and use low-carbon hydrogen is one part of a needed response for many countries, including the United States. In the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA), the U.S. Congress authorized the creation of Regional Clean Hydrogen Hubs (H2Hubs) to address the multiple challenges facing this nascent industry. In the United States, there is presently little production of low-emissions hydrogen, few users, and almost no linkages between them. To solve these challenges, the legislation calls for each H2Hub to establish “a network of clean hydrogen producers, potential clean hydrogen consumers, and connective infrastructure located in close proximity” to demonstrate the production, processing, storage, transportation, and use of clean hydrogen. Under the legislation, hydrogen is considered clean if less than two kilograms of carbon dioxide (CO2) is emitted for every kilogram of hydrogen produced. The production of such low-emissions hydrogen is the key requirement of the H2Hubs program, which also needs to demonstrate the production of clean hydrogen from different sources, including fossil fuel feedstocks, renewables, and nuclear power. H2Hubs will also need to demonstrate the use of hydrogen in power generation, industry, heating, and transportation. The legislation also calls for H2Hubs to be an engine of economic growth and investment in the regions where the hubs are located. Beyond the formal requirements for technical demonstration, the only other instruction from Congress is that the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) “shall give priority to regional clean hydrogen hubs that are likely to create opportunities for skilled training and long-term employment to the greatest number of residents in the region.” In a June 2022 announcement on the program, the DOE highlighted how the economic goals of the program are part of the IIJA and President Biden’s agenda, including by “enhancing U.S. competitiveness in the world, creating good jobs, and ensuring stronger access to these economic benefits for underserved communities.” The H2Hubs program offers $8 billion in investment for a nascent industry that could both help the United States reduce greenhouse gas emissions and lead the way in a growing part of the global energy industry, creating jobs and economic benefits at home. As communities, states, and consortia compete for H2Hubs grants, they can design hubs for technical and economic success. And the DOE can build upon existing experience instituting Energy Innovation Hubs to build ecosystems of innovation at a large scale. In spring 2022, the CSIS Energy Security and Climate Change Program hosted several workshops to explore how best practices in regional economic development and innovation policy could help inform the design and administration of H2Hubs. The program also considered how hub models are being used around the world to foster investment in clean-hydrogen production and create market demand for it. This report is a product of those workshops and research that preceded and followed them.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Environment, Electricity, and Hydrogen
Political Geography:
Global Focus

340. Securing Semiconductor Supply Chains: An Affirmative Agenda for International Cooperation

Author:
William Alan Reinsch, Emily Benson, and Aidan Arasasingham
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Technological innovation has been a driving force for U.S. global leadership and economic prosperity for over a century. This legacy of innovation largely stands on the foundation of a key component: semiconductor chips, found today in almost all electronic products. Semiconductors are an integral component of various consumer products across industries, including cars, smartphones, and household appliances. But semiconductors can also be used in dual-use goods—products that have both military and civilian applications—such as air guidance systems for both civilian and military aircraft. The tension between economic gain and security risk inherent within dual-use semiconductor goods is heightened in fields with national security implications, such as supercomputing and artificial intelligence (AI). How the government and private sector manage the global value chains (GVCs) of chips will directly affect U.S. global competitiveness and national security going forward. Given the evolving security relationship between the United States, the Quad, and the European Union, this paper focuses on both Quad and EU countries and the possibilities for friend-shoring in both. It assesses how the EU and U.S. governments can collaborate to avoid duplicative policies that fail to enhance the overall resiliency of transatlantic semiconductor supply chains.
Topic:
International Relations, Science and Technology, European Union, Transatlantic Relations, Supply Chains, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

341. Looking beyond the Biden Visit to the Middle East and the “Fist Bump”

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
If one looks back on media coverage of Biden’s visit to Saudi Arabia – and far too many of the analyses of the visit that have followed – it is amazing to see how much of that coverage focused on the assassination of Jamal Khashoggi, the President’s “fist bump,” and on short term issues and trends. The key strategic challenges the U.S. faces in the Middle East are longer term and they go far beyond most of the reporting and discussion of the Biden visit.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Middle East, North America, and United States of America

342. Setting the Right Conditions for Aid to Afghanistan—and Other Nations as Well

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
A year of Taliban rule over Afghanistan has shown all too clearly that there are good reasons to debate the future level of aid to Afghanistan. The Emeritus Chair in Strategy at CSIS has prepared a detailed analysis of these issues, drawing on key sources like the UN, OHC, World Bank, CIA, and SIGAR.
Topic:
Human Rights, Humanitarian Aid, International Cooperation, and Equality
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and Middle East

343. Addressing the Continuing Phenomenon of Enforced Disappearances

Author:
Diane Webber and Khaola Sherani
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
An enforced disappearance is the “arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty” by state agents or their proxies, followed by a refusal to acknowledge or disclose the fate of a seized individual. Unlike arbitrary detention, which may also involve arrest and inhumane treatment, enforced disappearances frequently leave families with no information as to the victim’s whereabouts or status. In many cases, it is ultimately revealed that the victim was killed rather than detained. Enforced disappearances violate multiple human rights, including the right to security and dignity of person; the right not to be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; the right to liberty; the right to humane conditions of detention; the right to a legal personality; the right to a fair trial; the right to a family life; and the right to life. The phenomenon of enforced disappearances first emerged as a state practice during the Nazi era but became widespread under the military regimes in Latin America during the 1960s. The Commission for Historical Clarification in Guatemala found that from the mid-1960s until the 1996 peace agreement, security forces and “death squads” carried out approximately 45,000 enforced disappearances against anti-government forces and suspected opponents, including members of Mayan communities. The governments of Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, and Peru developed a transnational cooperation mechanism called “Operation Condor” to share intelligence about political dissidents for the purposes of carrying out transnational enforced disappearances. The practice of enforced disappearances was soon taken up by governments in other parts of the world, as well. In Sri Lanka, for example, Amnesty International estimates that there have been “at least 60,000 and as many as 100,000 cases of enforced disappearance” since the 1980s. The problem persists today, occurring at a large scale in many countries in the context of both armed conflicts and repressive, unaccountable regimes. The Syrian Network for Human Rights reported that from 2011 to 2021, the Syrian regime carried out 102,000 disappearances to suppress dissent during the civil war. Meanwhile, China’s Residential Surveillance at a Designated Location (RSDL) decree empowers authorities to detain foreign or Chinese nationals for a period of six months without disclosing their location. A Spain-based rights group, Safeguard Defenders, claims that between 27,000 and 57,000 people have gone through China’s RSDL system since 2013, citing data from the Supreme People’s Court and the testimony of survivors and lawyers. Altogether, the United Nations Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances (UN Working Group) has recorded more than 59,000 cases of enforced disappearances across 110 countries since 1980, including 651 new cases originating in 30 countries in its most recent annual report. More than 46,000 cases remain unresolved. The international community was slow to respond to the growing problem of enforced disappearances, initially addressing the problem only as part of broader “ad hoc working groups” on human rights issues in countries like Chile and Cyprus. It was not until 1992 that the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, which condemned acts of enforced disappearance as violations of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and called on states to prevent, eradicate, and punish acts of enforced disappearance under criminal law. The international legal regime has since expanded: in 1996, the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons (Inter-American Convention) entered into force, and in December 2010, the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (Enforced Disappearance Convention) came into force. Enforced disappearances can also now be prosecuted as a crime against humanity under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.
Topic:
International Cooperation, International Criminal Court (ICC), Humanitarian Crisis, and Legal Sector
Political Geography:
Global Focus

344. Creating a New Energy Strategy for a Post Ukraine War World

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman and Paul Cormarie
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
There is every reason for the U.S. to focus on the dangers of climate change and the need to change the sources of its energy supplies to reduce carbon emissions. The new Inflation Reduction Act that President Biden signed on August 16, 2022, is an important step toward achieving these goals. At the same time, the U.S. needs to work with its European strategic partners to permanently reduce their dependence on Russian oil and gas exports and work with Asian partners like Japan and South Korea to ensure that they will not confront a similar threat in the future from China.
Topic:
Climate Change, Energy Policy, Environment, International Cooperation, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Global Focus

345. Demographic Change in the Arab/Persian Gulf: A Case Study by Country Image

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman and Paul Cormarie
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
It is hard for anyone who has not traveled extensively in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) over a period of decades to realize just how much each nation in the region has changed in terms of basic demographics. There has been a massive increase in population in every MENA country since the end of World War II and the colonial period, and the nations in the Arab/Persian Gulf are no exception. The Emeritus Chair in Strategy has prepared a three-part analysis of the MENA’s demographics and detailed how population pressure has impacted the region’s stability. This first part is entitled Demographic Change in the Arab/Persian Gulf: A Case Study by Country. A downloadable copy is attached at the end of this transmittal, and it is available on the CSIS website at https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/220829_Cordesman_Arab_Demographics.pdf?vbd_oUraxn6ZI7VyBKiThkc1Z6lZ8Ogx There are no precise figures for population growth that are fully reliable, but the broad trends are still clear. Many MENA countries have never had a credible census, and even reliable broad estimates of population trends only became available for many countries in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Work by the UN and World Bank is now reliable enough, however, to show that all MENA countries experienced massive increases in population through 2021 and that the resulting pressures on their economies, governance, and social stability have been—and will be—a key factor affecting their stability.
Topic:
Demographics, Population, Regionalism, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:
Middle East and Persian Gulf

346. Software-Defined Warfare: Architecting the DOD's Transition to the Digital Age

Author:
Nand Mulchandani and John Shanahan
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The U.S. Department of Defense's (DOD) massive bureaucracy struggles with the kind of periodic “tech refresh” that has been instrumental to commercial industry success. While it is insulated from market competition within the U.S. economy, the DOD is not immune from the kind of revolutionary, secular, and wide-ranging technological changes happening outside the government. Nor is it immune from the threat of competition with other militaries around the world. In the future, warfighting will only become more complex, even more chaotic, and even faster. The only way for the DOD to stay competitive in a new warfighting environment is to ensure that it uses the most potent weapon available: technology, and more specifically, software. For the United States to retain its dominant position in the future— which is not a guaranteed outcome—the DOD needs a new design and architecture that will allow it to be far more flexible, scale on demand, and adapt dynamically to changing conditions. And it must do so at a dramatically lower cost as it delivers its critical services. This paper provides a blueprint for the way forward.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, War, Military Strategy, Digitalization, and Software
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

347. The CNO’s Navigation Plan for 2022: A Critique

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
There should be a clear difference between efforts to provide unclassified documents that explain and justify U.S. military forces and issuing official reports that are little more than public relations exercises. The U.S. faces major security challenges and the annual cost of U.S. defense is over $760 billion, even if one ignores the cost of nuclear weapons, the Veterans Administration, related activities of the State Department and other agencies, and substantial additional intelligence activity. The effort to shape U.S. forces and strategy must deal with very real threats. They include a Russia that has invaded the Ukraine, a China that is actively seeking to challenge the U.S. in military and economic power, and regional threats like Iran and North Korea. The U.S. must cope with emerging and disruptive technologies that constantly alter the nature of military forces in unexpected ways, support America’s strategic partners on a global level, and deal with near collapse of many arms control efforts and major increases in Russian and Chinese nuclear and long-range strike programs. Far too often, however, the Department of Defense issues documents that are little more than sales pitches – filled with slogans, and that are an awkward cross between a shipping list that borders on being a child’s letter to Santa Claus and a used car commercial. The CNO’s Navigation Plan for 2022 is a case in point. In fairness, does highlight a long list of important points about the threat, and the need to reshape U.S. naval forces, but it comes far too close to burying them in overall and hype. It fails to meaningfully address and justify the cost of the U.S. Navy, to provide any clear picture of the threat, to address the need to cooperate with key U.S. allies, and to provide a clear program for shaping the Navy’s future. It is scarcely unique in failing to provide a clear and meaningful plan. The defense budget requests talk about being strategic documents, but almost all of their contents are shopping lists for individual military services. U.S. strategy documents have become little more than long lists of broad goals and wish lists with no actual plan, program, or budget.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Public Relations
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

348. Renew SBIR, Just Defend the Recipients against China

Author:
Charles Wessner and Sujai Shivakumar
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
An April 2021 internal report by the Department of Defense (DOD) found that companies funded by the DOD’s Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program are being targeted by state-sponsored Chinese firms. Based on an examination of a sampling of SBIR award recipients, the Pentagon study concluded that “nearly all cases show that China, not the U.S., is the ultimate beneficiary of DoD and other U.S. government research investments, some of which are significant in size.” The study’s authors cautioned that the study sample was small and that their methodologies warrant review, but their findings are clearly a matter of concern for U.S. policymakers. This justified concern, however, seems to have morphed into quite a different approach. Citing the Pentagon study’s findings, Senator Rand Paul (R-KY), the senior Republican on the Senate Small Business and Entrepreneurship Committee, said in June 2022 that he would not support reauthorizing the SBIR program “without reforms to strengthen research security and stop abusive behavior by bad actors lining their pockets with taxpayer dollars.” In a move unrelated to national security, Senator Paul and several other lawmakers are also seeking limits on the number of awards that can be made to individual SBIR companies. (There is no empirical basis for such a restriction, nor could it be effectively implemented, but the proposed measure emerges anew as SBIR comes up for reauthorization.) The risks, however, are real. The Wall Street Journal reported in July that SBIR and the related Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) program face “an overhaul or outright extinction” if Congress does not renew their budgets and funding runs out at the end of September. The DOD has already canceled a round of SBIR award solicitations “because of uncertainty over the program’s future.”
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Intellectual Property/Copyright, Business, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

349. The Importance of Democracy Promotion to Great Power Competition in Latin America and the Caribbean

Author:
Rebecca Aaberg
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
There are many reasons to believe democracy and democracy promotion are imperative in the great power competition with China, which is occurring with ever-greater intensity in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). LAC has played host to great power competition in previous eras, but in grand strategic terms, competition with China in the twenty-first century is fundamentally different than the rivalry of the Cold War against Soviet Russia. Whereas during the Cold War the United States supported friendly, anti-communist military regimes in LAC, success against China in the twenty-first century will necessitate robust support for democracy, liberal institutions, and democracy promotion. The Kirkpatrick Doctrine—which advocated for supporting “friendly authoritarian” regimes that went along with Washington’s aims—applied so deliberately to LAC during the Cold War, is outmoded and likely to be highly counterproductive today. On the contrary, there are many reasons to believe that successfully countering China in great power competition will be intimately linked to the democratic health of LAC as a region. This is the democracy imperative. This paper begins with background on U.S. policy toward LAC during the Cold War. Then, it places the question of a Kirkpatrick Doctrine for the twenty-first century within the context of great power competition with China and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which has prompted the Biden administration to consider re-engaging pariah regimes such as the Maduro dictatorship in Venezuela. The paper will then adumbrate reasons why great power competition with China is fundamentally different than previous iterations of competition against Soviet Russia, which saw U.S. support for anti-communist military regimes.
Topic:
Security, Hegemony, Democracy, and Competition
Political Geography:
Latin America, Caribbean, North America, and United States of America

350. Supporting Water Programming in the Sahel

Author:
Conor M. Savoy and Alexandra Norris
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The Sahel region of Africa is one of the most climate-affected regions in the world. Temperatures are rising 1.5 percent faster than the global average rate. Increasing temperatures and irregular rainfall have resulted in regular droughts and floods that disrupt traditional agropastoral patterns and contribute to broader instability and fragility. Lake Chad, a crucial water and livelihood source for 30 million people in the Sahel, has shrunk by 90 percent since 1960, displacing 2.3 million people and creating a humanitarian crisis. Periods of prolonged and intense drought and improper land use have degraded much of the soil in the Sahel. In Burkina Faso, over one-third of farmland is degraded, meaning some land cannot sustain agriculture even when there is enough rainfall. A rapidly increasing population, coupled with the impact of climate change, means more people are competing for diminishing water resources. This results in a vicious cycle of population growth, land degradation, and food instability. The greater the population, the greater the demand for food and the greater the use of unsustainable farming practices, exacerbating food scarcity and demand for additional farmland. As the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) updates its water strategy, it is important to examine the interplay of economic and conflict fragility, irregular migration, climate change, and water availability in the Sahel to identify interventions for greater resilience. In a region like the Sahel, water is critical to resilience and adaptation to the effects of climate change. While water strategy is not a cure-all, it can improve outcomes for other challenges. The Biden administration recently announced the new Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII), an initiative to mobilize private capital investment in infrastructure. The four pillars of this initiative—climate and energy security, digital connectivity, health and health security, and gender equality and equity—could support additional investments in water infrastructure.
Topic:
Climate Change, Environment, Health, Water, and Infrastructure
Political Geography:
Africa and Sahel

351. Of Ships and Cyber: Transposing the Incidents at Sea Agreement

Author:
Alexander Klimburg
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Amid the geopolitical crises caused by Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, it may seem wildly optimistic—or even bad diplomacy—to consider future arms-control scenarios for cyber operations. However, good policy needs to prepare for the day after tomorrow, and smart policy will look at what has gone wrong today and what can be learned from yesterday. Arguably, one element that may have contributed to rising geopolitical tensions over the past decade has been a lack of clear cyber signals among the main adversaries. This makes it even more urgent to consider what can be learned from past arms-control exercises such as the vaunted Incidents at Sea (INCSEA) Agreement—especially as this accord was conceived in the wake of several of its own perilous crises. In 1962, a lack of agreed signaling protocols nearly led to World War III. According to a riveting account in the 2020 book Nuclear Folly, 1 on October 27, 1962—at the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis—the U.S. Navy cornered one of the few Soviet submarines unaccounted for off Cuba. In an effort to convince the Foxtrot-class B-59 submarine to surface, the destroyer USS Cony employed practice depth charges—which were not accurately identified as such by B-59’s beleaguered crew. When, in the middle of the night, the submarine did indeed surface, a low-flying anti-submarine aircraft dropped flares and pyrotechnics so it could take better photographs. This seemed like an attack to the submarine, and the exhausted captain of B-59 ordered a crash dive and speculated that perhaps the war had already broken out. He gave orders to prepare to launch a 10-kiloton nuclear torpedo at the U.S. Navy task force. It took a near-mutiny by senior officers to stop him. This close call remained unknown until fairly recently. But several more prominent naval incidents throughout 1960s convinced the Soviet Union and the United States that a basic common agreement was necessary, and the Cold War “thaw” of the early 1970s made this possible.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Cybersecurity, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America

352. Hard Choices in a Ransomware Attack

Author:
Emily Harding and Harshana Ghoorhoo
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Ransomware attacks started as a novelty but have now become a clear and present danger to entities of every size and function. The number of ransomware attacks and the price of demanded ransoms have escalated steeply since 2018. Legislation and policy have not kept up. Policymakers have sought to shape the incentive structure for victims to incentivize defense and disincentivize ransom payments. While they are sympathetic to businesses who fall victim to these attacks, which can sometimes be existentially threatening, few policymakers (or their staff) have ever experienced the shock of an attack firsthand and, as a result, are searching with incomplete information for the right combination of carrots and sticks that will help victims and hurt attackers. This report aims to put the reader in the shoes of the victim—the shocking, powerless moment of realization of a ransomware attack. It walks through a set of decisions that victim must make on their worst day and in the weeks to follow. How well an entity succeeds in navigating that peril depends on decisions made well before an attack, so the report also makes recommendations for both government and industry on how to encourage preparation and simple defensive steps.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
Global Focus

353. It's Moving Time: Taiwanese Business Responds to Growing U.S.-China Tensions

Author:
Scott Kennedy
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
A new report by the CSIS Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics interprets a formal survey of over 500 Taiwanese business executives, documenting their views about the evolving environment on the island and beyond. The Washington policy community is quite familiar with the views that U.S. and European companies hold toward China, but less clear are the views of Taiwanese companies that are central to the story of the world’s interaction with China. Their opinions have implications for Taiwan’s economic trajectory, cross-strait relations, global supply chains, and the effectiveness of U.S. policy in the region. The report documents that Taiwanese companies are highly concerned about their potential overdependence on the Chinese economy and the possibility of a military conflict. As a result, there is significant support for expanding trade and investment ties via regional arrangements and bilaterally with the United States, as well as for maintaining Taiwan’s technological edge through more spending on research and development and broadening restrictions for technology transfer to China. But perhaps the most noteworthy finding is that Taiwanese companies appear to be moving their businesses at record levels from Mainland China, but also from Taiwan. This report, by Trustee Chair Scott Kennedy, explains how the survey was carried out, then analyzes the sources of Taiwanese companies’ anxieties and the ways they are responding, and concludes by considering the policy implications for all parties involved. The report’s appendix provides a full summary of the original survey results.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Territorial Disputes, Business, Conflict, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

354. Reshoring Semiconductor Manufacturing: Addressing the Workforce Challenge

Author:
Sujai Shivakumar, Charles Wessner, and Thomas Howell
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
On August 9, 2022, President Biden signed the CHIPS and Science Act, sweeping legislation that seeks to strengthen the U.S. semiconductor supply chain, encourage investments in semiconductor manufacturing facilities in the United States, stimulate semiconductor research and development (R&D), and disincentivize U.S. investments in chip-making plants in China. Among other things, the legislation will provide $52.7 billion in federal outlays over five years for loans, loan guarantees, grants, and other financial support for domestic chip-making investments, as well as a 25 percent tax credit for semiconductor investments in the United States. Bolstered by this unprecedented level of federal support, six major chip makers are investing in new wafer fabrication facilities (“fabs”) in the United States: Intel, Samsung, TSMC, GlobalFoundries, Texas Instruments, and Micron Technology.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Manufacturing, Industrialization, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

355. What If . . . Alternatives to a Chinese Military Invasion of Taiwan Image

Author:
Benjamin Jensen, Riley McCabe, and Adrian Bogart
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
With the 20th Party Congress approaching and Xi Jinping seeking an unprecedented third term, it is important to explore the full range of actions Beijing could take to coerce Taiwan over the next 10 years. History provides a range of historical cases that suggest alternatives to a full-scale invasion. As part of its On Future War series, the CSIS International Security Program adapted six historical cases of coercion China could use to target Taiwan short of a costly amphibious invasion. The report looks back to look ahead, using the logic of historical cases ranging from the 1948 Berlin Airlift to the 1980s Tanker War in the Arabian Gulf to identify ways and means Beijing could use to compel Taiwan. The resulting range of scenarios point toward an urgent need to develop new escalation management frameworks supporting the new integrated deterrence strategy.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

356. Choking off China’s Access to the Future of AI

Author:
Gregory Allen
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
On October 7, 2022, the Biden administration announced a new export controls policy on artificial intelligence (AI) and semiconductor technologies to China. These new controls—a genuine landmark in U.S.-China relations—provide the complete picture after a partial disclosure in early September generated confusion. For weeks the Biden administration has been receiving criticism in many quarters for a new round of semiconductor export control restrictions, first disclosed on September 1. The restrictions block leading U.S. AI computer chip designers, such as Nvidia and AMD, from selling their high-end chips for AI and supercomputing to China. The criticism typically goes like this: China’s domestic AI chip design companies could not win customers in China because their chip designs could not compete with Nvidia and AMD on performance. Chinese firms could not catch up to Nvidia and AMD on performance because they did not have enough customers to benefit from economies of scale and network effects. Because of the new export controls, revenues that formerly flowed to U.S. chip companies will now go to Chinese chip companies, offering a viable path to economies of scale and competitive performance. In the short term, this policy will significantly harm Chinese AI data center companies. However, blocking U.S. AI chip designers from selling their world-leading chips is actually good for China in the longer term because it will strengthen China’s domestic chip design ecosystem. While the reasoning in this criticism is sound, it does not imply that the Biden administration’s actions are self-defeating. Rather, it shows how the policy as disclosed in September was incomplete. A policy like this would not make sense if that is the only step the administration planned to take. Clearly something was missing, and industry experts have been waiting for the other shoe to drop ever since. On October 7, the other shoe dropped. The Biden administration announced a massive policy shift on semiconductor exports to China as well as revised rules for how the lists of restricted parties are managed. In recent decades, U.S. semiconductor policy has been primarily market driven and laissez faire. With the new policy, which comes on the heels of the CHIPS Act’s passage, the United States is firmly focused on retaining control over so-called “chokepoint” (or as it is sometimes translated from Chinese “stranglehold”) technologies in the global semiconductor technology supply chain. The most important chokepoints in the context of this discussion are AI chip designs, electronic design automation software, semiconductor manufacturing equipment, and equipment components. The Biden administration’s latest actions simultaneously exploit U.S. dominance across all four of these chokepoints. In doing so, these actions demonstrate an unprecedented degree of U.S. government intervention to not only preserve chokepoint control but also begin a new U.S. policy of actively strangling large segments of the Chinese technology industry—strangling with an intent to kill.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Hegemony, Artificial Intelligence, Rivalry, and Emerging Technology
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

357. Engines of Prosperity: The Promise of the Zones for Employment and Economic Development (ZEDEs) in Honduras Image

Author:
Ryan C. Berg and Matthew Carusi
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Special economic zones (SEZs) are autonomous zones designed to facilitate free-trade operations. SEZs can be broken down into the following types of zones: free-trade zones, which are duty-free areas to warehouse and transit goods; enterprise zones, which provide tax benefits to underperforming industries; specialized zones, which include technology parks; and freeports—the largest type of economic zones, combining work and residential spaces. A 2008 World Bank report defined SEZs as having the following characteristics: a geographically secured area, a single management system, eligibility for benefits based on the location within the zone, and a separate customs area. Advocates of SEZs argue that they can improve a country’s economic standing by making it more competitive on the global stage. One way to achieve this goal is by improving a country’s infrastructure. Building out more extensive road networks or port systems is beneficial not only for businesses operating inside the SEZ, but also for the entire country’s future economic trajectory. Another argument in favor of SEZs is that they strengthen a country’s institutional framework. In developing countries, this narrative can be particularly relevant because weak institutions often constrain foreign investors from making large-scale commitments. SEZs attempt to fill this gap by increasing the efficiency of the regulatory frameworks, property rights, and investment flows. Since a wealth of SEZs are awarded a certain level of legal autonomy, establishing these unique governance structures can be arranged. SEZs offer similar advantages for streamlining efficiency in the labor market. Wages can be more flexible and the process of hiring and firing employees can become easier. Workers can further be attracted by the availability of better healthcare and education systems, as well as by the availability of internet or phone services. All these factors are crucial in attracting the best possible talent, both domestically and internationally, giving them reasons to set up operations inside an SEZ. The intended results of these characteristics are that GDP per capita within the SEZ would increase substantially and that surrounding areas would be able to reap these rewards. These are known as spillover effects, wherein new influxes of foreign and intellectual capital would spill over into the surrounding communities. However, the verdict on this subject is less clear. According to a 2017 World Bank study, the literature on SEZs does not confirm a clear link between achieving widespread spillovers and increasing regional employment levels. There is more evidence to support the claim that limited spillover effects exist in surrounding areas up to 50 kilometers outside the SEZ.
Topic:
Development, Economics, Employment, and Special Economic Zones
Political Geography:
Central America, North America, and Honduras

358. How Innovative Financing Models Can Support the Scaling of Supply Chain Innovations

Author:
Allie Dichiara and John Simon
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Substantial progress has been made toward achieving Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 3: Health and Well-Being for All. However, progress is plateauing as global health development funding decelerates, and much of the remaining gaps are among the hardest to address, especially for the most vulnerable and hardest-to-reach communities. A key element to reigniting progress toward SDG 3 is significantly improving the effectiveness of the current fragmented health commodity supply chain, through which billions in spending—approximately $6 billion in donor funds in 2015 and $50 billion in overall spending in 2017—flow each year to low- and lower-middle-income countries (LMICs). Fortunately, there is a growing number of innovative supply chain solutions available across sub-Saharan Africa that could have the potential to dramatically improve the underperforming status quo.
Topic:
Economics, Science and Technology, Innovation, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:
Africa

359. CCP Inc. in Greece: State Grid and China’s Role in the Greek Energy Sector

Author:
Briana Boland, Jude Blanchette, and Cory Combs
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
How did one of China’s core state-owned enterprises gain a foothold in Greece’s electricity sector? This case study examines the “CCP Inc.” ecosystem of Chinese officials, state-owned enterprises, policy banks, and private firms that helped State Grid Corporation of China (State Grid) and other Chinese companies gain a stake in the national electric grid and renewable energy projects in Greece. State Grid is the world’s largest utility company, pursuing an international strategy of expansion that both implements and informs Beijing’s policy goals for global energy infrastructure. By investigating how State Grid acquired a stake in Greece’s national power grid operator, the Chinese financing and energy sector business deals that followed State Grid’s investment, and the constraints that limited State Grid’s later efforts to expand its control over Greece’s electric grid, this case study offers insight to the role of state-owned enterprises in the global reach of China’s state capitalist system.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Finance, Electricity, and State-Owned Enterprises
Political Geography:
China and Asia

360. Modernizing Ukraine’s Transport and Logistics Infrastructure

Author:
Romina Bandura, Janina Staguhn, and Benjamin Jensen
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine is yielding devastating human and material costs. But with the destruction comes a rare opportunity to modernize Ukraine’s economy by building state-of-the-art infrastructure. Rebuilding hospitals, schools, and housing will be critical to bringing refugees back, while constructing new roads and rail networks alongside ports and airfields could catalyze the economic reconstruction and link the growth of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to global supply chains and markets. Infrastructure investments can achieve a rare combination of political and economic objectives, connecting Ukraine to Europe while helping its large industrial base and educated workforce reach global markets. In other words, rebuilding the transportation and logistics infrastructure in Ukraine provides an opportunity for democratic leaders to realize the vision of the Group of Seven (G7) Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII). A successful reconstruction would include a Ukraine that is connected to and firmly embedded in the Euro-Atlantic community. Ukraine has a large industrial base, with a well-educated and skilled population that has the potential to build a highly competitive manufacturing sector to complement the European Union. However, to unlock this potential, Ukraine needs to build quality transport and logistics infrastructure (i.e., civilian airports, roads, bridges, ports, and railways) connected to the West. Over the next 10 years, the transport and logistics infrastructure sector will require significant financing, prioritization, and coordination among the Ukrainian government and international actors (bilateral partners, multilateral institutions, and the private sector). Foreign direct investment (FDI), including through long-term public-private partnership and concession contracts financed by the private sector, will also be critical for funding large-scale projects and providing know-how so there is a world-class infrastructure base in Ukraine. International donors and foreign investors need to assess how to best support Ukraine’s future economic and trade recovery, specifically regarding its transport and logistics infrastructure. Ukraine can also be the country where the PGII conducts its first project, testing its capabilities and providing a demonstration for other investors.
Topic:
Infrastructure, Modernization, Transportation, and Logistics
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

361. The Ending the HIV Epidemic in the U.S. Initiative: An Interim Assessment and Policy Recommendations

Author:
Jeffrey L. Sturchio, Mackenzie Burke, and Maclane Speer
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The Ending the HIV Epidemic in the U.S. (EHE) initiative is a promising federal program launched by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) in February 2019 with the aim of reducing new HIV infections by 75 percent by 2025 and 90 percent by 2030 (from a baseline of more than 38,000 new diagnoses in 2017). While the EHE initiative set ambitious targets for ending the HIV epidemic in the United States in the context of a sound and sensible plan, it is at present off track. Now, three years in—at the midpoint of the first EHE phase, which has a target of reducing new HIV infections to 9,250 people or fewer by 2025—is an opportune moment to assess its status and the challenges it faces. After a review of progress to date, this report examines the collision between the logical plan behind the EHE initiative and the complicated patchwork of programs that provide HIV prevention, care, and treatment to the diverse communities affected across all EHE jurisdictions. The analysis is informed by several roundtable discussions convened by CSIS with the participation of a representative group of people living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHA), community advocates, physicians, service providers, researchers, and policymakers who are implementing the EHE initiative around the country. The report concludes with policy recommendations in four areas: (1) meet people where they are by building programs that are centered on the needs of populations directly affected by the HIV epidemic; (2) address flexibility in design and implementation; (3) improve data, metrics, and accountability; and (4) heighten political advocacy to ensure future funding of the EHE initiative. A strong theme that runs throughout the report is that lessons from the global HIV response—the importance of building interventions from the ground up, of engaging with affected communities, and of taking an integrated approach across a spectrum of biomedical, clinical, social, behavioral, economic, and political dimensions—can inform and strengthen the U.S. domestic response to HIV/AIDS.
Topic:
HIV/AIDS, Health, Medicine, and Epidemic
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

362. Brazil: Five Phenomena and Three Scenarios

Author:
Lauri Tahtinen
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Brazil heads into the second round of its general election on Sunday, October 30. This will include runoffs for the governorships in 12 of Brazil’s 26 states, including São Paulo, the most populous and wealthy state. However, most eyes are on the presidential race in which incumbent Jair Bolsonaro is seeking his second term in office and former president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva is seeking his third. In the first round on Sunday, October 2, Lula received 48.4 percent of the vote and Bolsonaro received 43.2 percent. This analysis paints three scenarios for Brazil’s election. The baseline for these scenarios is Lula’s narrow win, and a narrow win for Lula remains the most plausible outcome. If the trends prevalent in September have accelerated through October, Bolsonaro could win narrowly. Conversely, if the trends of September decelerate or even reverse in October, Lula could win handsomely. Based on the first-round results, earlier runoffs, and simple election math, a major Bolsonaro victory is not a realistic outcome.
Topic:
Elections, Democracy, Leadership, Voting, and Partisanship
Political Geography:
Brazil and South America

363. Transforming Health Crises with Pandemic Therapies Image

Author:
Katherine E. Bliss and J. Stephen Morrison
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The CSIS Commission on Strengthening America’s Health Security convened a working group on Covid-19 therapies in the fall of 2021 to develop policy recommendations aimed at strengthening U.S. leadership and global action to ensure development of, access to, and uptake of Covid-19 therapies worldwide. Drawing on insights gleaned through private meetings and roundtable discussions with pharmaceutical manufacturers, government officials, representatives of multilateral organizations, and nongovernmental organizations, and building on points raised in an interim report published in July 2022.
Topic:
Health, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Health Crisis
Political Geography:
Global Focus

364. Colombia’s Relationship with the PRC

Author:
Evan Ellis
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
From October 6 to 16, the author traveled throughout Colombia to speak with businesspeople, academics, and other professionals about the country’s security panorama, its commercial and other relationships with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and prospects for evolving those relationships under the new government of Gustavo Petro. This white paper, the first of two on those interactions, addresses the country’s important and deepening relationship with the PRC and its companies. In recent years, Colombia’s political and security relationship with the PRC has been limited. This arguably reflects Bogotá’s perception that deepening political and security ties with the PRC might damage its close and important relationship with the United States. Nonetheless, despite perceptions that the PRC is more of a threat than an opportunity in the commercial arena, the presence of Chinese companies and their representatives in the country has expanded remarkably. Under the Petro government, all dimensions of Colombia’s relationship with the PRC, from political and security affairs to economic ones, are poised to expand and shift in ways that may cause unease in Washington.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, Hegemony, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Colombia, and South America

365. A Seismic Shift: The New U.S. Semiconductor Export Controls and the Implications for U.S. Firms, Allies, and the Innovation Ecosystem

Author:
Sujai Shivakumar, Charles Wessner, and Thomas Howell
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
On October 7, 2022, the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) announced sweeping revisions to its export controls, which are aimed at restricting China’s ability to obtain certain high-end semiconductor devices with potential military applications, develop and maintain supercomputers, and manufacture advanced semiconductor devices. This announcement, the most expansive export control action in decades, represents a fundamental shift in the traditional strategy underlying the U.S. and allied export control regime. As National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan put it , until now, “we previously maintained a ‘sliding scale’ approach that said we need to stay only a couple of generations ahead. That is not the strategic environment we are in today. Given the foundational nature of certain technologies, such as advanced logic and memory chips, we must maintain as large of a lead as possible.” In effect, the new measures are intended to dramatically slow, if not freeze Chinese developmental capability.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Innovation, Rivalry, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

366. Baltic Conflict: Russia’s Goal to Distract NATO?

Author:
Courtney Stiles Herdt and Matthew "BINCS" Zublic
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The Baltics are a key strategic region where the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Russian military and economic interests overlap. Sabotage of the Nordstream 2 pipeline, regardless of who executed the attack, has signaled that conflict in the region is no longer left of bang. Gray zone operations are underway, and the United States, NATO, and their partners need to be ready to act in unity against an increasingly hostile Russia that is now trying to distract attention from its military shortcomings in Ukraine. In this effort, Russia’s playbook will test the limits and try to exploit the seams of the alliance. An exacting response is needed to deny Russia control and ensure full conflict is avoided. The NATO summit in Vilnius will be critical to strengthening resolve and a path forward to a combined strategy to deter further Russian aggression.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North America, and Baltic States

367. CCP Inc. in Portugal: China's Investments in Financial Services and the Reach of the Chinese Communist Party in the Private Sector

Author:
Andrew Polk
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
This “CCP Inc.” case study explores how an ecosystem of Chinese party-state actors enabled a range of state-owned and private Chinese companies to embed themselves in Portugal’s financial system, creating a foothold to widen China’s financial presence within the country and beyond. The report specifically focuses on Fosun International Limited, a subsidiary of the Chinese conglomerate Fosun Group, which became a key source of foreign direct investment in Portugal through strategic acquisitions that opened market access for Chinese firms. Fosun’s investments in Portugal provide insight into the Chinese Communist Party’s activism in shaping the business environment for private sector players, as the company’s international strategy faced the challenge of balancing alignment with state goals against a regulatory crackdown on private sector outbound spending.
Topic:
Finance, Investment, Private Sector, and International Competition
Political Geography:
China and Asia

368. A World in Crisis: The “Winter Wars” of 2022–2023

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman and Paul Cormarie
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
t is obvious that the world now faces a wide range of potential wars and crises. What is far less obvious is the level of confrontation between the U.S. and its strategic partners with both Russia and China, the rising levels of other types of violence that are emerging on a global level, how serious these wars and crises can become, and what kind of future could eventually emerge out of so many different crises, confrontations and conflicts, and trends. These issues are addressed in depth in a new analysis by the Emeritus Chair in Strategy at the CSIS entitled A World in Crisis: The “Winter Wars” of 2022–2023. This analysis explores the risk on the basis that war does not have to mean actual military conflict. Here, it is important to note that avoiding or minimizing combat is scarcely peace. As Sun Tzu pointed out in the Art of War well over 2,000 years ago, “war” does not have to involve the use of military force or any form of actual combat. His statement that “the supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting” applies to every form of major military confrontation and gray area warfare between opposing powers. It recognizes that it is all too easy to predict dire outcomes from the War in Ukraine, the current arms races with Russia and China, and growing levels of violence and confrontation between other states. There is still a case, however, for examining the broader impact of the war, the growing intensity of the arms races with Russia and China, and the current overall patterns of global conflict as the world enters the winter of 2022-2023. It is already clear that this will be a deeply troubled winter in many areas of the globe, that the level of confrontation between major powers has risen sharply, that they do seek to subdue the enemy without fighting, and their rivalry has become the equivalent of political and economic warfare. It is equally clear that the wide range of lower-level conflicts between other powers, their civil wars, and the abuses many governments commit against their own citizens are also intensifying, although many of these conflicts have been going on in some form for years or even decades. In far too many cases, the world is not moving toward peace. It is moving towards repression and war. Accordingly, this analysis argues that the world already faces a series of possible and ongoing “Winter Wars” in 2022-2023 that may not escalate to open military conflict but that are wars at the political and economic level and in competition to build-up more lethal military forces both for deterrence and to exert political leverage. It also shows that these “Wars” already pose serious risks and could escalate sharply and in unpredictable ways for at least the next five to ten years.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Rivalry, and Competition
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

369. Galvanising the Ship of the Indian State: An Agenda for Research and Dialogue

Author:
Saurabh Kumar
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
India International Centre (IIC)
Abstract:
Three major tipping points affecting the future of the country vitally kick into play at about the same time, no more than a few decades from now: • reversal of the (currently favourable) youthful demography of the country (by 2055 or so); • danger of calamitous climate change globally beginning to affect the Indian subcontinent harshly; • likely disruptive impact of mainstreaming of Artificial Intelligence (AI) on the socio-economic order (and therefore on political stability) as a result of robots surpassing human capabilities and replacing all human labour in repetitive and routine tasks. The prospect of large sections of society finding themselves free of want (basic survival needs) but idle, and therefore terribly distraught, in other words— an ‘unknown unknown’ that would beat the classical recipe for breeding a fair crop of devil’s workshops hands down. Especially so in conjunction with maturing and convergence of other fourth generation technologies (digital, nano, bio and machine learning) and increasing fusion of cyber and physical spaces. This essay, a strategic take on the overall Indian situation, is premised on the reading that the latter two of these mega challenges (which can, without exaggeration, be characterised as existential ones) cannot be addressed adequately in ‘business as usual’ (BAU) mode within the ambit of the existing organisational structures of over a century inherited by the Indian Republic from the colonial State. The likely sweeping, 360-degree impact of these overarching trends makes for urgent review of the machinery and mechanisms of the Indian State in a pragmatic, strategic mindset aimed at bracing up for the new challenges.
Topic:
Climate Change, Government, Research, State, and Dialogue
Political Geography:
South Asia and India

370. Implications of the European Union’s Digital Regulations on U.S. and EU Economic and Strategic Interests

Author:
Kati Suominen
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
In recent months, the European Union has adopted several sweeping digital regulations, such as the Digital Services Act (DSA) and Digital Markets Act (DMA), while proposing a number of new measures—including the Data Act, the Artificial Intelligence Act, and the Media Freedom Act. These regulations will shape, likely quite dramatically, the environment for doing digital business in Europe and beyond. They will have profound implications on the leading U.S. digital service providers designated by the European Union as “gatekeepers”—large digital services providers that are expected to adhere to regulatory requirements—as well as these companies’ hundreds of millions of transatlantic European business and individual customers. By impacting primarily U.S. companies instead of Asian or European ones, Europe’s digital policies will also shape U.S. and European global strategic and national security interests. This study will assess the potential implications of new and proposed EU digital acts on U.S. digital service providers, on their customers in Europe and the United States, and on the EU and U.S. economies and exports.
Topic:
European Union, Regulation, Regionalism, Strategic Interests, and Digitalization
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

371. A Model Comprehensive MSME Policy for Indian States

Author:
Richard M. Rossow
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Small businesses are the job-creating engines of any healthy economy. Having a supportive policy environment can help high-potential businesses accelerate. Creating such an environment is a shared responsibility of both the central government and India’s 28 states. Many state governments in India have piecemeal policies and programs to support micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs). About one-third of India’s states have worked to craft multifaceted and supportive policies and practices to encourage MSME growth. This paper reviews the ideas already enacted in different Indian states, as well as in national and subnational governments around the world. Developing a single comprehensive MSME policy is an effective approach for a state-level government to consider. It allows small firms to find policy incentives and programs in a single place, and perhaps most importantly, it allows a state to directly consider a range of intertwined incentives that can work together. This will maximize the positive impact to small firms that are poised for growth. Facilitating the growth of MSMEs will have a much wider impact on India’s job growth overall. The large multinational manufacturers that India hopes to lure to invest through programs like Make in India require a diverse and efficient network of suppliers. Supporting MSME growth can create a multiplier effect—driving new investment and employment generation by larger firms. The central government has affirmed a 25 percent target of gross domestic product (GDP) for manufacturing, up from around 14 percent today. This white paper provides leading international examples in the promotion of small businesses, while also enumerating best practices from Indian states’ MSME policies. The final section lays out the 30 elements commonly utilized by Indian states to offer targeted assistance to MSMEs as a roadmap for other states that want to provide best-in-class policy interventions.
Topic:
Development, Economics, Business, and Job Creation
Political Geography:
India and Asia

372. Growing Challenges, Rising Ambitions: AUSMIN 2022 and Expanding U.S.-Australia Cooperation

Author:
Charles Edel and Lam Tran
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
On December 6, 2022, the U.S. secretaries of state and defense, Antony Blinken and Lloyd Austin, will host their Australian counterparts, Penny Wong and Richard Marles, at the 32nd iteration of AUSMIN—the annual Australian-U.S. Ministerial Consultations. Taking place against a backdrop of increasing geopolitical and geoeconomic challenges, AUSMIN 2022 not only is a platform to facilitate dialogue among top leaders from the United States but also can serve as an enabling mechanism—harnessing shared values to propel a vision for the region forward. This CSIS report, Growing Challenges, Rising Ambitions: AUSMIN 2022 and Expanding U.S.-Australia Cooperation, examines a range of pathways for U.S.-Australia cooperation to evolve and deepen. Covering economic, technological, diplomatic, development, and defense topics, the 18 essays in this report outline the state of play on each topic, frame the most salient questions and challenges, and offer concrete recommendations for advancing the alliance.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Leadership, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Australia, North America, and United States of America

373. How Much Have the Oil Supermajors Contributed to Climate Change?

Author:
Jiarui Chen, Perrine Toledano, and Martin Dietrich Brauch
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment
Abstract:
In the 40-year period 1980–2019, annual carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from fossil fuel combustion, including flaring, increased by more than 80%, and total emissions from those sources represented approximately 83% of anthropogenic CO2 emissions (also including cement production and land-use change) without accounting for sinks. Understanding the carbon footprint of countries and companies along the oil value chain is fundamental to outlining paths to reduced reliance on fossil fuels. However, academic analyses of carbon footprints are limited by the lack of a reliable dataset and carbon accounting method that would allow comparisons across countries and companies.
Topic:
Climate Change, Environment, Carbon Emissions, and Carbon Footprint
Political Geography:
Global Focus

374. Allocation of Climate-Related Risks in Investor–State Mining Contracts

Author:
Martin Dietrich Brauch, Perrine Toledano, and Cody Aceveda
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment
Abstract:
As the effects of climate change continue to worsen, mining projects, the communities surrounding them, and their host states are increasingly at risk of being affected by environmental disasters, with devastating social and economic consequences. Risk allocation provisions included in investor–state mining contracts, often considered boilerplate and replicated in agreements without careful consideration or negotiation, could potentially help the parties assign responsibilities between themselves and limit their losses in those cases. However, traditional risk allocation clauses within existing mining contracts, formulated before the world acknowledged the severity of climate change, do not adequately allocate climate-related risks and impacts between states and companies.
Topic:
Climate Change, Environment, International Cooperation, United Nations, and Risk
Political Geography:
Global Focus

375. Roadmap to Zero-Carbon Electrification of Africa by 2050: The Green Energy Transition and the Role of the Natural Resource Sector (Minerals, Fossil Fuels, and Land)

Author:
Jeffrey D. Sachs, Perrine Toledano, and Martin Dietrich Brauch
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment
Abstract:
All Africans—whether living in urban or rural areas—need access to affordable, clean, efficient, reliable, climateproof, and renewable energy for both residential and productive uses to achieve sustainable development objectives. This report sets out a comprehensive and actionable roadmap for Africa’s zero-carbon energy transformation by 2050, with most advances achieved by 2030. Natural resource management in minerals, fossil fuels, and land sits at the core of the strategy. The world is moving to decarbonization by 2050. This was the dominant geopolitical message of 2021, appearing, for example, in U.S. President Joe Biden’s online summit with world leaders in April 2021 and in the International Energy Agency’s (IEA) Report on Net Zero by 2050: A Roadmap for the Global Energy Sector, which stated that there was “no need for investment in new fossil fuel supply” in a pathway to net zero by 2050. Africa will be part of this global trend. The UNFCCC COP 26 evidenced the continued commitment to the world to this agenda, with the Global Methane Pledge and the Glasgow Leaders’ Declaration on Forest and Land Use, holding strong promises to respectively reduce methane by 2030 by 30% relatively to 2020 levels and end all deforestation by 2030 while strongly investing in reforestation. Prospective oil and gas projects in Africa will no longer be pursued as overseas markets and financing will shrink. The Russian war on Ukraine in 2022 has reinforced the determination of Europeans and Americans to wean off Russian gas in the short term and off all gas in the medium to long term, seeing in the energy transition an opportunity to meet parallel goals of decarbonization and energy independence. The IEA’s World Energy Outlook 2022 notes that, even under a relatively conservative “stated policies” scenario, global demand for coal, oil, and gas will peak or plateau in the coming years and subsequently fall. The report also notes that the energy crisis triggered by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, though leading to a short-term increase in fossil fuel demand, has consolidated the global long-term shift toward renewable energy, energy efficiency, and electrification. In parallel to this reality, Africa’s vast renewable energy potential, in the solar and hydropower sectors especially, will engage increasingly bankable and highly attractive investments. In net terms, Africa has a huge amount to gain from a decisive buildup of renewable energy and the capacity to produce the minerals, hardware, and software of the new zero-carbon energy economy.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Regional Cooperation, Natural Resources, Carbon Emissions, and Decarbonization
Political Geography:
Africa

376. Investment Incentives: A Survey of Policies and Approaches for Sustainable Investment

Author:
Lisa Johnson and Perrine Toledano
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment
Abstract:
In order to effectively harness public funds and leverage them to support sustainable development, governments have to be strategic in their use of capital. This means ensuring that government funds are used to help compensate for market failures that lead to the underproduction of public goods. It also means ensuring that government funds are not used to provide redundant support for private actors and subsidize environmentally or socially harmful activities. To achieve these policy objectives, governments need to be careful and deliberate in their use of investment incentives. Investment incentives, which may be defined (broadly) as nonmarket advantages used to influence the behavior of an economic actor, can represent significant costs to governments. These costs have the potential to generate various public benefits such as increased employment, development and dissemination of environmentally and socially sound technology, and other positive externalities. However, investment incentives are not often tailored or implemented in ways that ensure they produce the desired outcomes, or they do so at public costs that are less than their public benefits. Investment incentives have the potential to advance sustainable development but can also be misused, undermining their goals, and wasting public funds. This report provides an overview of investment incentives, their policy implications, and strategies for understanding and managing their costs and benefits.
Topic:
Development, Governance, Investment, and Sustainability
Political Geography:
Global Focus

377. Establishing research priorities on violence against women and girls in the Latin American and Caribbean region

Author:
Carmen Porras Gomez, Ana Landa Ugarte, Ivonne Argueta Vasquez, and Beiby Vaca Parada
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Sexual Violence Research Initiative
Abstract:
While it is recognized that violence against women and children is a multidimensional problem, it becomes necessary to establish research priorities to achieve better use of available resources and to advance more systematically in response to violence against them. In this way, SVRI promoted with its partner organizations to identify global research priorities on violence against women under an open, collaborative approach so that diverse voices and perspectives were included. Within this framework, a collective set of priorities for the Latin American and Caribbean region was developed based on the findings of the Global Shared Research Agenda, including violence against girls. This research considers different sources of information, both quantitative and qualitative. However, it aims to give visibility, presence, and reason to the voices of the experts consulted, with special attention to non-academic voices. Therefore, the Regional Agenda of research priorities of violence against women and girls considers the needs of civil society organizations working in this field. This, in opposition to traditional methodologies built from the priorities of funders or academia, surpassing the ‘expert’ judgment of a limited group of people. The process itself is as valuable as the results when it comes to a new approach. The following report is structured in three parts. The first section presents the objectives and background, the methodology, the scope and limitations encountered. The second part includes the results of the process of collective construction of the Regional Agenda. Finally, the third part displays the conclusions and recommendations.
Topic:
Gender Issues, Women, Gender Based Violence, and Sexual Violence
Political Geography:
Latin America, Caribbean, and North America

378. Advancing SVRI’s Work on VAC and CSA to Strategically Contribute to the Field

Author:
Ayesha Mago, Anik Gevers, and Elizabeth Dartnall
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Sexual Violence Research Initiative
Abstract:
The SVRI is a global south based, women-run organisation, focusing on supporting practitioner research partnerships for evidence-building around the issue of violence against women (VAW) and violence against children (VAC), committed to building a gender equitable world, where we can all live free from violence driven by gender inequality. Through our strategic plan we contribute to regional and global evidence building on what works to end violence against women and violence against children, with a focus on low and middle income countries (LMICs) where the burden of gendered violence is greatest, yet where the least resources are available for research and evidence based response and prevention efforts.
Topic:
Gender Issues, Gender Based Violence, Violence, and Sexual Violence
Political Geography:
Global Focus

379. Software Power The Economic and Geopolitical Implications of Open Source Software

Author:
Alice Pannier
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Open source plays a central role in software development, both in parallel with proprietary software and increasingly intertwined with it. It has become a major factor for companies’ innovation processes and for the success and popularity of their products. For users, using open source software can alleviate risks stemming from proprietary solutions, including data privacy concerns or trade restrictions. Beyond that, open source is the foundation of critical software bricks and Internet languages and protocols. However, open source is a victim of its own success. It suffers of a lack of resources dedicated to the maintenance of open source components, even though vulnerabilities in open source code can have serious consequences, as illustrated by the Log4Shell vulnerability in December 2021. For these reasons, private companies are investing ever more money and human resources in the development and maintenance of open source software, and acquiring structuring roles in the governance of the ecosystem. This support, however, is not without risk for the open source ecosystem, which is increasingly shaped by the private interests of Big Tech companies. Meanwhile, governments are getting increasingly concerned with the cybersecurity implications of open source software, and with risks not only of accidental vulnerabilities, but also manipulation of codes by criminals and foreign agents. The interest of governments in open source is not new, but it is evolving: governments are no longer only seeking to adopt open source or to develop software solutions, but also to contribute to the financing or even the governance of open source ecosystems, at the national and/or global level. An analysis of the United States, Chinese and European cases show that government involvement in open source is not only pragmatic; it is increasingly politicized, and serves to uphold governments’ ambitions for national security, international influence, or digital sovereignty. The study highlights the dilemmas that emerge, for public authorities, from the tensions between the desire to secure universally used, critical open source components, the desire to develop “sovereign” technologies, and the risk of encroaching on the horizontal and decentralized functioning of open source.
Topic:
European Union, Cybersecurity, Geopolitics, Economy, Software, and Open Source
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and United States of America

380. Military Stockpiles: A Life-Insurance Policy in a High-Intensity Conflict?

Author:
Léo Péria-Peigné
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
For the first time after thirty years of budgetary restriction, European armies must face a high-intensity conflict involving heavy human and material losses. Having run down their military stockpiles to the bare minimum, supporting Ukraine has taken a heavy toll on their operational inventory; as modern operational inventories are limited, much decommissioned and older equipment has also been donated. Russia too has mobilized its extensive military stockpiles, inherited from the USSR, to maintain its combat capability after the initial failure of its “special military operation”. Russian efforts to retrofit older systems have also intensified as production of modern equipment has stalled. As a result, we are seeing modern and ancient weapons pitted against each other in Ukraine. This situation raises questions about France’s military storage strategy and prompts comparisons with those of other nations. US forces have kept a significant proportion of their Cold War arsenal in working condition, using it as a valuable commercial, diplomatic, and military asset. This arsenal also allows the United States to dominate the second-hand weapons market as it can supply cheap and almost immediately available systems. In Russia, despite an apparent modernization process, military power still relies on Soviet-era stocks of vehicles and weapons. For the Russian navy, modernization of old hulls is a way to compensate for the slow production of modern ships. Chinese armed forces are being modernized and rationalized: substantial quantities of older equipment could therefore become available before 2030, a potential asset for Chinese diplomacy. In Europe, military stockpiling strategies diverge along a rough east–west line. Western powers such as the United Kingdom and France chose quality over quantity, while Eastern ones, closer to the Russian threat, try to maintain large volumes while also modernizing their equipment. While the war in Ukraine may prompt Western nations to begin a reinforcement program, Eastern European countries such as Poland had already begun their own before 2014 and the Crimea crisis. After the 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris, France began to restore its military means and budgets, but the overall size of its armed forces is still inadequate to face a high-intensity conflict. The professionalization of the armed forces, the 2008 financial crisis, and budget cuts progressively led to the practice of stockpiling being replaced with a generalized “just-in-time” approach, to reduce infrastructure needs and costs more broadly. French armed forces had to make tough choices with their limited budgets, keeping what was immediately useful to their current missions and abandoning what was not. Operations in Africa and the Middle East and anti-terrorist operations in French cities absorbed considerable budgets, while specialized military units and infrastructure necessary to maintain stocks required for high-intensity conflicts were disbanded. Several initiatives and processes are at work to restore minimum storage capabilities, but a relevant stockpiling strategy, in line with France’s resources and strategic context, is still far off. The French army is building several military reserve units that could drive greater retention of older equipment and vehicles, although compatibility issues with more recent models may arise. As storing combat aircraft would be far too costly, the French Air and Space Force is trying to optimize the availability of its fleet, especially through a new approach to private industry partners in maintenance and training. The French navy has initiated a reform and rationalization process of its spare-parts-storage policy to optimize the availability of its ships as well as their capabilities. A coherent equipment reserve and stockpiling program is an essential component of a military driven by a clear strategic framework. However, in the French case, this strategy is currently being pulled in two directions: between the probable end of expeditionary operations in Africa and the Middle East, and the likelihood of a high-intensity conflict. The whole French stockpiling approach cannot be based entirely on the experience in Ukraine, and it is therefore necessary to evaluate multiple probable scenarios to develop relevant recommendations. A conflict in Eastern Europe fought by a coalition differs from one led by Europe without US support, or from a major crisis in the French territories of the Pacific or Indian Ocean. Moreover, recommendations must reflect military realities, as French resources are limited and would not allow for the creation of a reserve stock strategy similar to that of the United States. To support an allied nation under attack, the French army would need a much expanded ammunition stockpile. Similarly, the French air force lacks advanced munitions, while the French navy needs to rebuild a support fleet sufficient to enable combat operations far away from the French mainland and infrastructure.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Conflict, Industry, and Armament
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, France, and United States of America

381. Connectivity in Central Asia at the Crossroads of International Crises: Transport, Energy and Water from Interdependence to New Cooperation Ways

Author:
Michaël Levystone
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
From the reestablishment of an Islamic Emirate in Afghanistan by the Taliban to the war in Ukraine, not forgetting climate change, the most serious international crises, whether circumstantial or systemic, are having a severe impact on connectivity in Central Asia with regard to transport, energy, and water. While the search, which is an existential one for the countries of this landlocked region (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan), for foreign partners has been legitimized and even encouraged by the troubling context in which they are evolving, the steps they have taken in this respect since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine on February 24, 2022, show an obvious desire to bypass Russia, which has been heavily sanctioned by the West. As a result, Central Asian transportation networks are developing in two directions: to the west, with Kazakhstan and the Caspian Sea as key links in Sino-European trade routes; and to the south, whether by sea (development of port links from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan and Iran) or by land (creation of a railway line between Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan). In the energy sector, Kazakhstan, hindered by Russian blockades of its main oil pipeline, is turning to the Caspian Sea in order to be able to continue transporting oil to European markets. Turkmenistan exports its gas to the Chinese and South Asian markets, where its projects, but also those of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in the field of hydropower, are being hampered by developments in Afghanistan. Lastly, the question of water highlights the paradox of interdependent countries that are divided between those that control Central Asia's water resources (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) and the rest, located downstream of the Syr Darya and the Amu Darya (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan). While a growing number of initiatives are being launched to promote smart management of the region's significant water resources, this remains the most polarizing issue in Central Asia, despite its urgent nature.
Topic:
Water, Regional Integration, Transportation, Connectivity, and Energy
Political Geography:
Central Asia

382. What Strategic Posture Should France Adopt in the Middle East?

Author:
Héloïse Fayet
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
France has a historical presence in the Middle East, where it has many interests to defend: the fight against terrorism, the promotion of the arms industry, the dissemination of humanitarian values, etc. To this end, it has a number of resources at its disposal, notably military: French forces are deployed in Iraq, Syria and Jordan as part of Operation Chammal, in Lebanon for the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), and in the United Arab Emirates. This strategic posture, inherited from the history and "Arab policy" of the 20th century, is now being called into question by the geopolitical upheavals in the region. The resizing of the American presence in the Middle East, initiated by the withdrawal from Afghanistan, is accompanied by a growing assumption of responsibility for their own security by local actors. This evolution is embodied, for example, in the signing of the Abraham Accords, which redefine the place of Israel. The American pulling out also allows extra-regional powers such as China and Russia to become progressively involved in the area. These transformations require an adaptation of the French posture in order to position itself as a credible actor in the strategic competition. It is therefore necessary to move away from the sole focus on counterterrorism, which no longer gathers partners, and more broadly to redefine the partnership strategy and the mechanism deployed on the ground. A strengthened interministerial, or even European, dynamic also seems essential in order to mobilize all the levers available to France.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Armed Forces, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, France, and Syria

383. Neither Surveillance Nor Algorithm-driven Consumerism: Toward an Alternative European Model for Smart Cities

Author:
Jacques Priol and Joé Vincent-Galtié
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Smart city projects take many forms, ranging from the installation of connected street lights to total initiatives such as The Line – the gargantuan and futuristic project carried out by Saudi Arabia. In one form or another, these initiatives are multiplying, guided by the objectives of efficiency and the improvement of public policies. What they have in common is that they mobilize various digital tools and use data to develop and manage public services. As they are exported, these projects also become levers for international influence. Where does Europe stand on this spectrum? While many smart territory projects have already been implemented on the continent, Europe is still looking for its own model. Two models are unanimously rejected: the one promoted by China, and the one implemented by certain North American cities. The first subordinates the smart city to security and social control imperatives and contributes to the constant surveillance of the population. In contrast to this model, which is primarily concerned with control and surveillance on behalf of the State, the Californian-inspired North American model is criticized for its massive use of personal data, which is collected and used by private actors. Users are alarmed by the potential use of this data for commercial purposes and denounce the replacement of democratic decision-making by automated tools. From there, developing a European model requires taking these pitfalls into account and respecting both the issues related to privacy protection and the maintenance of open and democratic procedures. Europe can rely on an ambitious regulatory framework, capable of encouraging the development of smart cities in its territory. This framework can also be a real asset for exporting its model to other continents. European initiatives in the field of smart cities are also part of efforts to promote digital sovereignty. In this respect, matters of standardization, interoperability and infrastructure are at the heart of the debate and must be fully integrated into the projects implemented. They are also subject to intense international competition.
Topic:
Infrastructure, Governance, Geopolitics, Urban, Smart Cities, and Data
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and United States of America

384. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Misleading Doctrine, Misguided Strategy

Author:
Pavel Baev
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The blame for committing the blunder of starting the war with Ukraine is deservedly placed on President Vladimir Putin, but a single-explanation interpretation of the unfolding disaster is unsatisfactory. The scope of problems with the chain of command and logistics, scant air support and poor morale indicates that Russian planning and preparations for the war were seriously flawed and misguided. On the level of doctrine, the assertion of Russia’s ability to deter North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), defined as the main adversary, by employing the complete set of nuclear, conventional and “hybrid” capabilities, laid the foundation for the failure of attack on what was presumed to be a frangible Ukraine. Strategic guidelines on gaining a quick and complete victory by establishing air dominance and executing offensive maneuvers by armored battalion tactical groups (BTGs), led to the confusion of poorly coordinated attacks without proper air support. The strategic culture, pro-forma conservative but distorted by bureaucratic sycophancy and corruption, produced inflexible chains of command, demoralization of poorly led combat units and ugly atrocities. The sum total of these flaws is too high for the Russian army to learn useful lessons in the six months of fighting, so it has fallen back on the old pattern of positional warfare based on destroying the enemy by heavy artillery fire. The strategy of protracted war of attrition can lead to victory only if the economy and society are mobilized fully for delivering the necessary resources to the fighting army, but such mobilization—while proceeding in defiant Ukraine—remains politically impossible in discontented, isolated and economically degraded Russia.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

385. The Geopolitics of Seawater Desalination

Author:
Marc-Antoine Eyl-Mazzega and Élise Cassignol
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Water desalination is gradually emerging as the leading solution to cope with increasing water stress: i.e., the imbalance between water demand and quantities available. The United Nations estimates that by 2025, two-thirds of the world’s population will be affected by such challenges. The causes of water scarcity are multiple, including climate change, intensive agriculture, and population growth. This requires states to rethink their water policies, which are central to preserving their stability, resilience and sovereignty. A real “boom” in desalination industries is at work. The majority of Gulf countries now largely depend on desalinated water for their inhabitants’ consumption: in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), 42% of drinking water comes from desalination plants producing more than 7 million cubic meters (m3) per day, in Kuwait it is 90%, in Oman 86%, and in Saudi Arabia 70%. In 2022, there were more than 21,000 seawater desalination plants in operation worldwide, almost twice as many as a decade ago, and the sector’s capacity is growing at between +6% and +12% per year. By 2030, desalination capacity in Middle Eastern countries is expected to almost double, as part of plans announced in the region to prepare these economies for their transition to “post-oil” and to foster resilience. Saudi Arabia’s desalination capacity is set to increase from 5.6 million cubic meter (m3) per day in 2022 to 8.5 million m3 per day in 2025, and it will have to cover more than 90% of the country’s water consumption. The same holds for the UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain and Israel, where the production of desalinated water will more than double by 2030. With the rise of available solutions to meet all such needs, these technologies are now in demand on virtually every continent, while the Middle East today represents only 50% of installed capacity worldwide. In Africa, large-scale projects have recently been announced in Algeria and Morocco, countries that until now have had sufficient resources. Other countries such as Ghana, Senegal and Kenya supply many cities with desalinated seawater. This is also the case for Cairo. In the Indo-pacific region, particularly in China and India, the needs for desalinated water are increasing, driven by growing industries and decreasing available water. In 2020 alone, the construction of more than 35 desalination plants was announced in China, as well as six in the Philippines, and six in Taiwan. In the Americas, the west coast of the United States stands out with important projects in California, and Texas is not far behind. In Latin America, new projects are emerging in Peru and Chile, driven mainly by the needs of the mining industry, while in Mexico the demand for desalinated water notably comes from the population. Finally, island areas stand out for their strong needs for desalinated water: Cebu in the Philippines, Cape Verde, the Canary Islands and the Maldives are increasingly using desalination capabilities. European firms still lead, but Asian or local players are taking off There are many industrial players of varied size, although some have emerged for more than ten years as undisputed market leaders: in France, they include Engie and Veolia, whose merger with Suez opened up new prospects in the Americas, the Middle East and Europe; but there is also IDE Technologies, the Israeli champion of desalination; Korea’s Doosan Heavy, China’s Abengoa, and Spain’s Acciona. More recently, companies in emerging countries have distinguished themselves by obtaining large-scale contracts. This is particularly the case of Gulf players like the Emirati company Metito and the Saudi firm Advanced Water Technologies. Egypt also has industrial actors. Overall, the technology of reverse osmosis is largely mastered, while production differentiation concerns capacity, operational costs, electricity consumption and plant life.
Topic:
Agriculture, Climate Change, Water, Industry, and Desalination
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar, and Gulf Nations

386. The Pacific caught in the World Wide Web? Geopolitics of submarine cables in Oceania

Author:
Camille Morel
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
This article provides a review of the digital connectivity of the Pacific Islands nations (Polynesia, Melanesia, and Micronesia) and the main challenges and prospects arising from it, at a time when the submarine cable market is undergoing profound change and a growing politicization of this technology on the international scene. In 2022, the 450 fiber-optic cables stretching across the world’s seabed carry more than 98 percent of international data and have become essential to the proper functioning of our societies. Submarine cable connection is all the more important to the geographically isolated Pacific islands because it enables them to digitize various sectors of the economy and society (industry, education, health, etc.) and to maintain a virtual link to the rest of the world. When a submarine cable is disabled, satellite links cannot completely offset this loss. The topic of submarine cables in Oceania is inextricably tied up with the geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific and rivalries between powers. Because of the long distances separating them from the rest of the world and the high cost of cables, the island territories of the Pacific are more liable to be dependent on other countries and subject to outside influence. Cables are also involved in the escalation of maritime competition between states, in a context of military, economic, demographic, and environmental issues, including seabed warfare. Against the backdrop of growing connectivity in the Pacific region since 2011 and the rise of China, the Pacific Ocean has become one of the three main routes for data in the twenty-first century. Within the region, the insular Pacific has several distinguishing features: Because of its particular geography, it appears under-meshed compared with the northern trans-Pacific route and the inter-Asia links. It looks more like a transit zone than a genuine space for investment. Its ecosystem and the methods used by public and private actors to commission, manage, and operate submarine links in the region have been adapted to local constraints and challenges. The main winners in this scenario are Australia and the United States, while the main loser is China, whose growing ambitions in the region are continuously thwarted. As a stage for Sino-American rivalry, the insular Pacific has to adapt to circumvent political difficulties and respond to its population’s urgent need for digital resilience. This challenge seems likely to result in a number of alternative cable projects emerging, offering new opportunities in the digital domain.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Geopolitics, and Connectivity
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Australia, United States of America, and Pacific Ocean

387. Five Years after China’s Plastic Import Ban Have Europeans Taken Responsibility?

Author:
Eugénie Joltreau
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
After the 2017 Chinese waste import ban, the international and European Union (EU) legislative framework on waste exports has been revised. • The amendment to the Basel Convention is stricter on the possibility to export plastic waste outside the EU, which has integrated the amendment in the waste shipment regulation (WSR) and is considering further export restrictions. Moreover, a Directive to reduce the use of single-use plastics and stimulate local demand for recycled plastics has been adopted. • The recycling rate of plastic packaging has been deteriorating since 2016 in view of the growing quantities of plastic packaging waste and limited export outlets, despite an increase in the tonnage recycled. Exports of plastic waste from the European Union have been reduced and partly redirected, with some negative environmental impacts reported. The EU demand for certain recycled plastics has boomed, encouraged by the new regulation, yet overall, EU plastic packaging consumption keeps increasing. • The debate on the export ban opposes a view of responsibility for the treatment of waste with the promotion of international waste trade as a means to achieve a global circular economy (for plastics). However, there is no evidence that the waste trade enables to increase the global recycling rate, reduces the use of virgin plastic, and reinforces sustainability. • The European Commission (EC) has released a new legislative proposal that tightens up waste export possibilities but does not ban it.
Topic:
Climate Change, Economy, Recycling, Waste, Imports, and Plastic
Political Geography:
China and Europe

388. Artists killed in Latin America for exercising their freedom of artistic expression

Author:
Cecilia Noce and Diana Arévalo
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for the Opening and Development of Latin America (CADAL)
Abstract:
This is an executive summary of the original report produced in Spanish that focuses only on violence against artists, like targeted killings related to the exercise of their right to freedom of expression and artistic creativity in Latin America. In 2021, CADAL recorded 378 attacks on freedom of artistic expression, of which 23 were murders. Artists and cultural workers who participated in protests in Colombia and Cuba were harassed, detained, and repressed. Musicians and cultural leaders were also involved in the violence between organized crime groups in countries such as Mexico and Brazil.
Topic:
Arts, Culture, Freedom of Expression, Protests, Targeted Killing, and Organized Crime
Political Geography:
Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, Latin America, and Mexico

389. Anticorruption Guidance for Partners of State-Owned Enterprises

Author:
Alexandra Gillies and Tom Shipley
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Natural Resource Governance Institute
Abstract:
Drawing on broad stakeholder consultations, corruption case analysis and reviews of existing best practices, this guidance proposes concrete measures that international oil, gas a mining companies should adopt to reduce corruption risks in their work with state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the oil, gas and mining industries. It also recommends measures SOEs can take to strengthen their anticorruption safeguards. The guidance for private-sector companies has five parts: Conducting due diligence on SOEs; Avoiding high-risk agents; Responding to political exposure; Safeguarding payments; Protecting joint ventures from corruption. The final section identifies corresponding recommendations for SOEs in each of these five areas.
Topic:
Corruption, Natural Resources, Business, Risk, and State-Owned Enterprises
Political Geography:
Global Focus

390. New Producer Contract Terms and Uncertainty: Lessons From the Recent Past

Author:
Patrick Heller, Perrine Toledano, David Mihalyi, and Tehtena Mebratu-Tsegaye
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Natural Resource Governance Institute
Abstract:
The petroleum industry is volatile, and governments in “new producer” countries have operated at a significant information disadvantage when negotiating with international oil companies. This challenge is growing today; new producer countries face intensifying questions around whether to offer fiscal incentives to maintain investment in the face of 1) the pandemic-induced volatility in oil prices and 2) long-term questions about the future of the industry in the face of the climate crisis and the global energy transition. This confluence of short-term and long-term uncertainty is prompting a reexamination of the narrative that once took hold in many new producer countries. The traditional story was one of linear progression from being non-producers to small levels of production to ultimately having oil and gas become a major economic contributor over the long term. This notion of progression was associated with a commonly held theory: After a country’s first major discovery, the geological risk that wells will be dry was expected to decrease. Countries could therefore shift from a position of having to grant tax breaks (and other concessions) to international investors, to taking a tougher stance in laws and negotiations for new projects going forward. In this paper we examine whether this theory has been borne out in practice and make recommendations to support new producers in their navigation of the uncertainty associated with the energy transition. Among the eight “new producer” countries, for which we analyzed a total of 26 contracts signed before and 25 contracts signed after discovery events (all occurring between 2001 and 2014), the evidence is mixed.
Topic:
Gas, Transparency, Contracts, Monitoring, Energy, and Green Transition
Political Geography:
Global Focus

391. No Time to Waste: Governing Cobalt Amid the Energy Transition

Author:
David Manley, Patrick Heller, and William Davis
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Natural Resource Governance Institute
Abstract:
Cobalt is critical. Along with other critical minerals, cobalt has important economic uses and currently few viable substitutes, yet its supply faces a high risk of disruption. Manufacturers of batteries for electric vehicles (EVs) want the metal. EV sales—and likewise, cobalt demand— could grow a lot more. Yet, cobalt may not remain critical for decades to come. EV buyers, battery manufacturers and miners fear the high prices and disrupted supply, as well as human right abuses, environmental destruction, corruption, and political risk. As with other critical minerals, industries are seeking to use less of the metal. The time available for the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and other countries to benefit from mining the metal may be short-lived. Good governance is therefore important both for people in mining countries and for humanity to meet the Paris Climate Agreement. This report aims to help governments and their advisors in mining countries, such as the DRC, derive value from mining cobalt, develop industry along the battery-supply chains and address a host of problems from human rights abuses to corruption. The report is also for policy-makers working to ensure that the world delivers enough cobalt in time for the global energy transition.
Topic:
Natural Resources, Energy, Green Transition, and Cobalt
Political Geography:
Africa and Democratic Republic of Congo

392. Debt Policy of State-Owned Mining Enterprises in Mongolia

Author:
Andrew Bauer and Batpurev Ayushsuren
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Natural Resource Governance Institute
Abstract:
Mongolia relies heavily on state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to manage several key mining assets. Baganuur, Shivee Ovoo, Erdenet, Mongolrostsvetmet and Erdenes Tavan Tolgoi are the most important majority state-owned companies operating large-scale mines. From 2019 to 2021, debt held by mining SOEs increased 4.3 times. The total liabilities of these companies reached USD 2.3 billion, representing 15 percent of GDP. The new debt was largely issued to cover social spending and an economically questionable railway project. It is unclear how the government intends to service this debt, particularly since profitability at most mining SOEs has been weak and most face liquidity challenges. Mining SOEs’ poor financial health is due to the combination of quasi-fiscal activity financing, poor project selection and management, and inadequate legislation and control mechanisms for new debt issuance. Legal reforms to new debt issuance and stronger Ministry of Finance oversight of SOEs are needed, in addition to stricter implementation of existing legal requirements such as collecting and disclosing complete data on SOE debt. Mongolia’s government should also review mining SOE quasi-fiscal expenditures, such as price controls on coal, and other reasons for low profitability of mines.
Topic:
Debt, Natural Resources, Mining, and State-Owned Enterprises
Political Geography:
Mongolia and Asia

393. Triple Win: How Mining Can Benefit Africa’s Citizens, Their Environment and the Energy Transition

Author:
Papa Daouda Diene, David Manley, Silas Olan'g, and Thomas Scurfield
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Natural Resource Governance Institute
Abstract:
Africa’s mineral wealth is essential for the energy transition and for the hundreds of millions of people currently living in poverty in African mining countries. Whether and how governments and companies move to further extract this mineral wealth is not only economically and environmentally important for Africa, but also for the vital importance of protecting the world’s rapidly diminishing forests. The world therefore needs a mining triple win: policies that can benefit Africa’s citizens, their environment, and the energy transition. These policies need to work for all if they are to work for any of them. But mining in Africa has been riddled with injustice. Humanity cannot afford to repeat the mistakes that have beset Africa’s mining in the past. To achieve a triple win, this time must be different. There are a whole host of policies available, and many ideas from experts. NRGI has brought these together and considered how they may work to truly achieve a triple win.
Topic:
Environment, Poverty, Natural Resources, Mining, Minerals, Energy, and Green Transition
Political Geography:
Africa

394. Developing Nuclear Energy in Estonia: An Amplifier of Strategic Partnership with the United States?

Author:
Tomas Jermalavicius, Max Bergmann, Peter Crall, Thomas O'Donnell, Tomas Janeliūnas, and Tõnis Idarand
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Estonia’s climate neutrality commitments and its simultaneous pursuit of national security mean that it will need to develop and cultivate new zero- or low-carbon, affordable, secure and safe domestic sources of energy. Nuclear energy is increasingly regarded as one of the critical ingredients of successful transition to climate-neutral energy system and as a viable part of the future decarbonised mix of energy supply. Therefore, Estonia is officially considering the possibility to adopt nuclear energy generated by new-design Small Modular Reactors (SMR). This choice, however, is not purely environmental, economic or technical, but also has geopolitical implications. It would create new long-term inter-dependencies with foreign partners which could represent fresh opportunities for closer cooperation in security and foreign policy domain, but also could create some new political, reputational, and national security risks. This geopolitical dimension is of particular importance to countries such as Estonia that seek greater involvement of key allies such as the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Germany in the Nordic-Baltic area to counter the geopolitical pressure from Russia and, increasingly, China. The report assumes that Estonia might eventually opt for nuclear energy and would then choose the US as its SMR technology supplier. It explores how Estonia’s foreign and security policy interests would benefit from a potential adoption of nuclear energy and development of technological and commercial relations in this field with the US. The report also maps various potential risks in relations with several key fellow member states of the European Union that may arise from Estonia turning to nuclear power as a major source of energy and to the US for a technological solution. It considers how certain structural issues in national energy policies and divergent geopolitical perspectives of Germany, France, and Poland – as well as some persistent characteristics of intra-European relations manifest through the EU’s common policies – may impair or facilitate Estonian nuclear aspirations. The study also highlights that Estonia’s affirmative decision concerning nuclear energy is likely to draw the attention and actions of malignant actors such as Russia aiming to discredit nuclear energy in general, as a viable pathway to energy security and climate neutrality, and US SMR technology in particular; undermine trust – domestically and internationally – in the ability of the Estonian government and enterprises to ensure competent and responsible stewardship of nuclear energy, and pit Estonia against some key regional and European allies. The report articulates some recommendations on how to better exploit the opportunities related to the US involvement in the development of Estonia’s nuclear energy programme and mitigate the identified risks.
Topic:
Climate Change, National Security, Partnerships, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:
Eastern Europe, Estonia, North America, and United States of America

395. Resilience Against Disinformation: A New Baltic Way to Follow?

Author:
Dmitri Teperik, Solvita Denisa-Liepniece, Dalia Bankauskaitė, and Kaarel Kullamaa
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The Baltic states, although not immune to disinformation, have accumulated unique experience and developed effective methods to resist and combat this malice. This report is based on in-depth semi-structured interviews and supplementary surveys conducted with the representatives of several clusters – media, civil society organisations, state institutions, think-tanks/academia and business communities. It aims to assess risks and vulnerabilities, as well as the three nations’ preparedness to counteract foreign-led disinformation. This report also reviews the existing indices that lead to a greater understanding of the intricate nature and interdependences of resilience-shaping factors at various levels, while contributing the unique Baltic perspective to the evolving, global study of disinformation. Multiple overlapping crises of 2020-21 – ripple effects from the political upheaval in Belarus, surge in illegal migration engineered by the regime in Minsk, the COVID-19 pandemic and accompanying socio-political perturbations, as well as China’s economic and diplomatic coercion against Lithuania – served as a reminder that no country could afford neglecting national resilience. The start of a major inter-state conventional war in Europe in 2022 has triggered a multitude of changes in the information environment of the Baltic states and prompted some radical adjustments and responses. Although the report does not cover the developments since 24 February, when Russia launched a full-scale invasion against Ukraine, neither foreign exploitation of vulnerabilities nor the responses of the Baltic governments that have been on display since then come in a vacuum. This report provides useful background and context that will help to understand what conceptual, legal, policy, institutional, political and societal precursors shape the current situation and determine successes or failures of disinformation and counter-disinformation efforts. The general strength of the Baltic states arises from their historical memory of totalitarianism and occupation, as well as their unique regional context. However, Western-focused internationalisation in all spheres of life has proven beneficial to combatting foreign-led disinformation, which strengthens electoral integrity and ensures continued democratic traditions. That said, efforts to improve civic education and strengthen cognitive security of the societies must be redoubled. National resilience to disinformation must be maintained and further increased by investing in national and especially local high-quality media. Resilience – as a whole-of government and whole-of society effort – requires all stakeholders to continuously cooperate, creating a multi-layered cross-sectoral network, or a team-of-teams approach, able to identify and counter malignant influence campaigns. These and other insights and experiences of the Baltic states highlighted in the report remain as relevant in the post-24/02 world as during the global and regional crises of 2020-21.
Topic:
Resilience, COVID-19, Disinformation, and Civil Unrest
Political Geography:
Baltic States

396. Germany’s Position on CSDP: Is There Anything for the Baltics?

Author:
Margarita Šešelgytė and Emilė Indrašiūtė
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
In the third brief in our Germany and Baltic Security series, Margarita Šešelgytė and Emilė Indrašiūtė examine Germany’s approach to the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy and the broader question of Europe’s strategic autonomy and consider whether Germany’s policies align with Baltic views. Following Russia’s 2014 illegal annexation of Crimea and intervention in eastern Ukraine, Germany not only strengthened its contribution to NATO’s collective defence and deterrence, but also took a greater role in shaping EU security and defence policies, a field it had previously shied away from. Germany’s involvement was instrumental in ensuring that the EU’s Permanent Structured Cooperation was implemented in a form that is more palatable to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and that the debate on European strategic autonomy was broadened and blunted to be more in tune with Baltic positions. Germany’s policy positions on European defence are unlikely to shift dramatically under Chancellor Scholz. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania will continue to look to Germany to balance France’s ambitions during its Presidency of the European Council and beyond.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, European Union, Strategic Autonomy, and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)
Political Geography:
Germany, Estonia, and Baltic States

397. Geopolitics of Europe’s Hydrogen Aspirations: Creating Sustainable Equilibrium or a Combustible Mix?

Author:
Tomas Jermalavicius, Tomas Janeliūnas, Andrian Prokip, Iliya Kusa, Alan Riley, Andrei V. Belyi, Pier Paolo Raimondi, and Miguel Sainz de Vicuña
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Discussions about hydrogen’s role in the transition to carbon-neutral economies and the EU’s Green Deal seldom include consideration of geopolitical aspects and/or national security imperatives. However, given the importance of energy as a factor in global and regional geopolitical trends and national security, hydrogen development will reshape not only energy relations between countries but will also alter the broader geopolitical picture. While elevating new aspects of geopolitical interplays, such as the importance of technology and regional clusters, hydrogen development might also unwittingly transplant present-day challenges—such as excessive dependence on the energy supply from hostile powers—into the carbon-neutral future. Since Europe’s energy sovereignty and geopolitical role in its neighbourhood could be at stake, the nexus of geopolitics, energy security and hydrogen development should be given serious attention. At the same time, the transformative socioeconomic impact of energy transition will create winners and losers within and between nations, which in some cases will have national security implications; hydrogen development could offer ways to mitigate this. This report focuses on exploring the impact that the European Union’s ambitions and plans for hydrogen development—including an expansion of its infrastructure in the form of the European Hydrogen Backbone—on its geopolitical position up to 2040. It first looks into the greater detail of the EU Hydrogen Strategy and how it links with the Energy Union, as well as with European strategic autonomy and energy sovereignty issues. It finds that hydrogen development—alongside the growth of the renewable energy sector—offers a great opportunity to reduce the current exposure to hostile actors through the energy sector that often hampers Europe’s ability to act as a geopolitical force in its neighbourhood. However, it also warns that the lack of unity and coherence currently afflicting the Energy Union, and manifest in such recent controversies as the Nord Stream 2 undersea gas pipeline from Russia to Germany before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, could potentially weaken such a positive geopolitical impact of hydrogen. Although hydrogen development requires Europe to draw upon external suppliers, the fact that this supply can come from many countries provides a significant opportunity for diversification and reducing the potency of energy supply as a geopolitical weapon. In this regard, two directions stand out in the EU’s neighbourhood—Ukraine in the east, and the Mediterranean along with the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) to the south. Both have huge potential for playing major roles in the European hydrogen supply chains, and their cultivation by the EU would provide many opportunities both to strengthen the EU’s influence in its neighbourhood and to build new partnerships. Certainly, neither of those directions comes without risks and downsides: political instability and armed conflicts, poor governance, unstable investment environment, water scarcity, and in some cases dependence on the hydrocarbons industry for income will be significant factors hampering the efforts to unlock their potential. Ukraine in particular will require sustained reconstruction efforts to tackle the massive devastation caused by Russia’s war. This will divert resources and attention, but transforming its energy sector and developing its hydrogen production base could still be important strands of these efforts. Europe’s own potential for domestic hydrogen production is another direction that this report looks into as a way to disentangle from the present-day geopolitically toxic dependencies and enhance its energy sovereignty. The Baltic states and Finland represent an interesting case study on how hydrogen could underpin a regional cooperation cluster with a high degree of integration—one of the new characteristics of the hydrogen era that will have geopolitical implications. The report, however, finds that different national perspectives on hydrogen, lack of coordination, and certain issues of trust arising from recent failures of solidarity and unity when tackling the regional nexus of energy security and geopolitics might hamper future regional cooperation in hydrogen. The hydrogen economy also offers some important benefits in managing national security challenges at the national level. In Estonia, the loss of the fossil fuel-based industry in the highly sensitive north-eastern region of Ida-Virumaa will be a socioeconomic blow to the local population. This report highlights how the vulnerability of the region, dominated by the Russian-speaking ethnic minorities who are already highly exposed to Russia’s malignant influence activities, could imperil Estonia’s energy transition and its national security. Creating a national hydrogen cluster in this region, drawing upon its industrial infrastructure and human capital, could mitigate the consequences of decarbonisation and energy transition. However, these considerations do not seem to receive sufficient attention from the government and energy businesses when drawing Estonia’s hydrogen map of the future. The report recommends that various stakeholders in the EU—including those behind the European Hydrogen Backbone—continuously monitor and assess the geopolitical risks, especially in terms of their impact on European energy sovereignty, when creating and managing new hydrogen-related interdependencies with the regions and countries outside the EU. The report urges the EU to support energy transition and necessary market and governance reforms in post-war Ukraine and the MENA countries to facilitate their emergence as crucial and reliable partners in hydrogen value chains. The report also recommends closer coordination and common planning between hydrogen stakeholders of the Baltic states and Finland when forming a regional cluster of hydrogen supply that would contribute to European energy sovereignty. Last but not least, it suggests that, for national security and resilience reasons, Estonia should focus more attention on the Ida-Virumaa region when developing its national hydrogen roadmap.
Topic:
Security, European Union, Geopolitics, Hydrogen, and Energy
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Middle East, North Africa, and Baltic States

398. A 'Bright Path' Forward or a Grim Dead End? The Political Impact of the Belt and Road Initiative in Kazakhstan

Author:
Anton Louthan
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
This report assesses the political impact of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Kazakhstan. Specifically, it examines whether and how the People’s Republic of China can pursue a strategy of economic statecraft to further its foreign policy and political interests in Kazakhstan. Despite Kazakhstan’s importance for the success of the BRI’s overland trade corridors, the report argues that important financial, foreign policy, and political constraints limit Beijing’s potential to influence Nur-Sultan. Beijing’s concerns over upsetting its relationship with the Russian Federation and the fact that the value of bilateral trade, investment, and Kazakhstani indebtedness to China have decreased in recent years suggest that Beijing is less willing to, capable of, or interested in using the BRI to influence Kazakhstan. The perceived closeness in this bilateral relationship has less to do with the influence of the BRI and more to do with the alignment of both countries’ geopolitical interests before the initiative’s creation. The report does not suggest that Chinese influence has decreased, but rather shows how Kazakhstan has been able to maintain a degree of political autonomy. Nur-Sultan has played a proactive role in forming its relationship with Beijing through its pursuit of former President Nursultan Nazarbayev’s “multi-vector” foreign policy strategy. In diversifying Kazakhstan’s diplomatic, economic, and political ties with Russia, China, the European Union, and the United States, Nur-Sultan has been able to avoid complete dependence on one country. Furthermore, Kazakhstan has been able to shape the size and scope of Chinese economic activity by guiding the initiative’s investments and projects to further the government’s domestic development agenda, Nurly Zhol (translated as “Bright Path”). However, issues related to corruption and deepening ties between Chinese and Kazakhstani elites through the BRI have likely strengthened Kazakhstan’s authoritarian political structure.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, Bilateral Relations, Infrastructure, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Autonomy, and Influence
Political Geography:
China, Kazakhstan, and Asia

399. Turkey's Response to the Russia-Ukraine Crisis

Author:
Aaron Stein
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
On October 26, 2021, Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense released video of a TB2 unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) striking a separatist D-30 howitzer in Russian-occupied Donbas. The strike was Ukraine’s first confirmed use of the now ubiquitous TB2, the Bayraktar-manufactured drone that the Turkish military has used to great tactical effect in Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh. The Turkish-Ukrainian defense relationship is understudied, but it could become an important factor in how Russian elites view North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) support for non-member Ukraine, and be used to justify an invasion to assuage Moscow’s concerns about a US-allied military presence along its borders. The Turkish support for Ukraine is not the main driver of Russian discomfort about the future of Ukraine. The TB2 is also not a decisive game changer, and the use of UCAVs is almost certain to have little impact on how Russian leadership weighs risk during debates about the efficacy of armed conflict in a neighboring state. Nevertheless, Turkish-Ukrainian defense ties are worthy of deeper study, precisely because Ankara’s relationships with Kyiv and Moscow have a secondary impact on American interests in Eastern Europe. The Turkish-Russian relationship is marred by bureaucratic distrust, which is papered over by a very functional leader-to-leader dynamic that enables the two Black Sea neighbors to cooperate and manage numerous regional conflicts. The Turkish-Ukrainian dynamic, in turn, is part of a broader Turkish effort to establish itself as an independent actor, committed to pursuing a foreign policy that often clashes with much of the NATO alliance. This paper will explore Turkish-Russian and Turkish-Ukrainian relations; the reasons for Turkey’s efforts to “fence sit” and establish itself as a neutral political actor in the Black Sea; and what these efforts portend for US interests in the region.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Turkey, Ukraine, and Middle East

400. How Will China Respond to the Russia-Ukraine Crisis?

Author:
Chris Miller
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
How will China respond to a potential Russian military escalation against Ukraine? Relations between Russia and China have intensified in recent years, with Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping holding regular summits and the two countries’ militaries participating in joint exercises and cooperating in some defense industrial efforts. Ties between Moscow and Beijing are now closer than any time since the days of Stalin and Mao, driven by a shared perception that the United States is each country’s primary foreign policy challenge. One top Russian official told media in December 2021 that the relationship now “exceeds an alliance.”[1] Chinese state media, meanwhile, have vocally backed Russia in arguing that the current crisis stems from the US “using NATO as a tool to cannibalize and squeeze Russia’s strategic space.”[2] The 2014 war in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea was an important factor driving Russia and China closer to each other, as Russia sought to reduce post-Crimea international isolation and as Beijing realized it could drive a hard bargain in its bilateral relationship with Russia on issues like energy. China’s response to the 2014 war, however, was generally to avoid taking sides. China accepted a narrative that placed blame on the West for causing the crisis, with top diplomats citing Western “foreign interference for causing the crisis,” but didn’t approve of Russia’s seizure of Crimea or its military actions in the Donbas.[3] China abstained from voting on the key United Nations resolutions regarding Crimea, for example, and it still declines to recognize Crimea as Russian territory. Similarly, it verbally rejected US and European sanctions on Russia though it let Chinese firms, including the country’s big state-owned banks, abide by these sanctions to avoid being cut off from US financial markets and the international banking system. Compared to 2014, however, China may find it more difficult to avoid involvement in an escalating crisis. Leaders in Beijing and around the world will see the US response to any military escalation against Ukraine as sending signals about whether the US could effectively respond to future crises in the Taiwan Strait or East or South China Seas. The success or failure of US efforts to impose meaningful costs on Russia if it escalates will be seen as a test of whether the US could do something similar in Asia. Moreover, after repeated summits between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin, including Xi’s description of Putin as his “best friend,” China’s approach to Russia amid a crisis will also be interpreted as sending signals about China’s own capabilities and influence. Because of this, China will not see a new phase of war between Russia and Ukraine as a peripheral issue in its foreign policy, even though China has no core issues at stake in Ukraine itself. China is most likely to be implicated in the crisis by potential Western sanctions on Russia, which in contrast to 2014 will impose substantially more pressure on Beijing to take sides. China’s decision either to adhere to new Western sanctions or to help Russia avoid them will shape escalation pathways and determine the magnitude of economic and political isolation that sanctions impose.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Sanctions, Military Affairs, Economy, Crisis Management, and Escalation
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, and Asia