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1. How Much Have the Oil Supermajors Contributed to Climate Change?

Author:
Jiarui Chen, Perrine Toledano, and Martin Dietrich Brauch
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment
Abstract:
In the 40-year period 1980–2019, annual carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from fossil fuel combustion, including flaring, increased by more than 80%, and total emissions from those sources represented approximately 83% of anthropogenic CO2 emissions (also including cement production and land-use change) without accounting for sinks. Understanding the carbon footprint of countries and companies along the oil value chain is fundamental to outlining paths to reduced reliance on fossil fuels. However, academic analyses of carbon footprints are limited by the lack of a reliable dataset and carbon accounting method that would allow comparisons across countries and companies.
Topic:
Climate Change, Environment, Carbon Emissions, and Carbon Footprint
Political Geography:
Global Focus

2. Allocation of Climate-Related Risks in Investor–State Mining Contracts

Author:
Martin Dietrich Brauch, Perrine Toledano, and Cody Aceveda
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment
Abstract:
As the effects of climate change continue to worsen, mining projects, the communities surrounding them, and their host states are increasingly at risk of being affected by environmental disasters, with devastating social and economic consequences. Risk allocation provisions included in investor–state mining contracts, often considered boilerplate and replicated in agreements without careful consideration or negotiation, could potentially help the parties assign responsibilities between themselves and limit their losses in those cases. However, traditional risk allocation clauses within existing mining contracts, formulated before the world acknowledged the severity of climate change, do not adequately allocate climate-related risks and impacts between states and companies.
Topic:
Climate Change, Environment, International Cooperation, United Nations, and Risk
Political Geography:
Global Focus

3. Roadmap to Zero-Carbon Electrification of Africa by 2050: The Green Energy Transition and the Role of the Natural Resource Sector (Minerals, Fossil Fuels, and Land)

Author:
Jeffrey D. Sachs, Perrine Toledano, and Martin Dietrich Brauch
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment
Abstract:
All Africans—whether living in urban or rural areas—need access to affordable, clean, efficient, reliable, climateproof, and renewable energy for both residential and productive uses to achieve sustainable development objectives. This report sets out a comprehensive and actionable roadmap for Africa’s zero-carbon energy transformation by 2050, with most advances achieved by 2030. Natural resource management in minerals, fossil fuels, and land sits at the core of the strategy. The world is moving to decarbonization by 2050. This was the dominant geopolitical message of 2021, appearing, for example, in U.S. President Joe Biden’s online summit with world leaders in April 2021 and in the International Energy Agency’s (IEA) Report on Net Zero by 2050: A Roadmap for the Global Energy Sector, which stated that there was “no need for investment in new fossil fuel supply” in a pathway to net zero by 2050. Africa will be part of this global trend. The UNFCCC COP 26 evidenced the continued commitment to the world to this agenda, with the Global Methane Pledge and the Glasgow Leaders’ Declaration on Forest and Land Use, holding strong promises to respectively reduce methane by 2030 by 30% relatively to 2020 levels and end all deforestation by 2030 while strongly investing in reforestation. Prospective oil and gas projects in Africa will no longer be pursued as overseas markets and financing will shrink. The Russian war on Ukraine in 2022 has reinforced the determination of Europeans and Americans to wean off Russian gas in the short term and off all gas in the medium to long term, seeing in the energy transition an opportunity to meet parallel goals of decarbonization and energy independence. The IEA’s World Energy Outlook 2022 notes that, even under a relatively conservative “stated policies” scenario, global demand for coal, oil, and gas will peak or plateau in the coming years and subsequently fall. The report also notes that the energy crisis triggered by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, though leading to a short-term increase in fossil fuel demand, has consolidated the global long-term shift toward renewable energy, energy efficiency, and electrification. In parallel to this reality, Africa’s vast renewable energy potential, in the solar and hydropower sectors especially, will engage increasingly bankable and highly attractive investments. In net terms, Africa has a huge amount to gain from a decisive buildup of renewable energy and the capacity to produce the minerals, hardware, and software of the new zero-carbon energy economy.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Regional Cooperation, Natural Resources, Carbon Emissions, and Decarbonization
Political Geography:
Africa

4. Investment Incentives: A Survey of Policies and Approaches for Sustainable Investment

Author:
Lisa Johnson and Perrine Toledano
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment
Abstract:
In order to effectively harness public funds and leverage them to support sustainable development, governments have to be strategic in their use of capital. This means ensuring that government funds are used to help compensate for market failures that lead to the underproduction of public goods. It also means ensuring that government funds are not used to provide redundant support for private actors and subsidize environmentally or socially harmful activities. To achieve these policy objectives, governments need to be careful and deliberate in their use of investment incentives. Investment incentives, which may be defined (broadly) as nonmarket advantages used to influence the behavior of an economic actor, can represent significant costs to governments. These costs have the potential to generate various public benefits such as increased employment, development and dissemination of environmentally and socially sound technology, and other positive externalities. However, investment incentives are not often tailored or implemented in ways that ensure they produce the desired outcomes, or they do so at public costs that are less than their public benefits. Investment incentives have the potential to advance sustainable development but can also be misused, undermining their goals, and wasting public funds. This report provides an overview of investment incentives, their policy implications, and strategies for understanding and managing their costs and benefits.
Topic:
Development, Governance, Investment, and Sustainability
Political Geography:
Global Focus

5. Roadmap to Zero-Carbon Electrification of Africa by 2050: The Green Energy Transition and the Role of the Natural Resource Sector (Minerals, Fossil Fuels, and Land)

Author:
Jeffrey D. Sachs, Perrine Toledano, and Martin Dietrich Brauch
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment
Abstract:
All Africans—whether living in urban or rural areas—need access to affordable, clean, efficient, reliable, climate- proof, and renewable energy for both residential and productive uses to achieve sustainable development objectives. This report sets out a comprehensive and actionable roadmap for Africa’s zero-carbon energy transformation by 2050, with most advances achieved by 2030. Natural resource management in minerals, fossil fuels, and land sits at the core of the strategy. The world is moving to decarbonization by 2050. This is the dominant geopolitical message of 2021, appearing, for example, in U.S. President Joe Biden’s online summit with world leaders in April 2021 and in the new IEA Report on Net Zero by 2050: A Roadmap for the Global Energy Sector. Africa will be part of this global trend. Prospective oil and gas projects in Africa will no longer be pursued as overseas markets and financing will shrink. At the same time, Africa’s vast renewable energy potential, in the solar and hydropower sectors especially, will engage increasingly bankable and highly attractive investments. In net terms, Africa has a huge amount to gain from a decisive build-up of renewable energy and the capacity to produce the minerals, hardware, and software of the new zero-carbon energy economy. Starting from a simple and transparent model of the annual investment volumes needed to provide continent-wide access to electricity based on renewable sources (Section 2), the report addresses various imperatives and challenges regarding Africa’s energy planning (Section 3) and financing (Section 4) and outlines recommendations for immediate implementation of the strategy from 2022 (Section 5).
Topic:
Climate Change, Development, Energy Policy, Environment, Sustainable Development Goals, Sustainability, Decarbonization, and Energy Crisis
Political Geography:
Africa

6. New Producer Contract Terms and Uncertainty: Lessons From the Recent Past

Author:
Patrick Heller, Perrine Toledano, Tehtena Mebratu-Tsegaye, and David Mihalyi
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment
Abstract:
The petroleum industry is volatile, and governments in “new producer” countries have operated at a significant information disadvantage when negotiating with international oil companies. This challenge is growing today; new producer countries face intensifying questions around whether to offer fiscal incentives to maintain investment in the face of 1) the pandemic-induced volatility in oil prices and 2) long-term questions about the future of the industry in the face of the climate crisis and the global energy transition. This confluence of short-term and long-term uncertainty is prompting a reexamination of the narrative that once took hold in many new producer countries. The traditional story was one of linear progression from being non-producers to small levels of production to ultimately having oil and gas become a major economic contributor over the long term. This notion of progression was associated with a commonly held theory: After a country’s first major discovery, the geological risk that wells will be dry was expected to decrease. Countries could therefore shift from a position of having to grant tax breaks (and other concessions) to international investors, to taking a tougher stance in laws and negotiations for new projects going forward. In this paper we examine whether this theory has been borne out in practice and make recommendations to support new producers in their navigation of the uncertainty associated with the energy transition. Among the eight “new producer” countries, for which we analyzed a total of 26 contracts signed before and 25 contracts signed after discovery events (all occurring between 2001 and 2014), the evidence is mixed. Only three of the eight countries in our sample—Ghana, Mozambique and Uganda—demonstrated a clear pattern in the direction of more stringent terms in post-discovery contracts. They featured definitive steps to increase some of the obligations of contractors to the state, and no significant terms that became less stringent. Five out of eight countries did not meaningfully alter their approach to gain greater concessions from their company partners.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Oil, Governance, Gas, and Private Sector
Political Geography:
Uganda, Africa, Mozambique, and Ghana

7. COVID-19 and Land-based Investment: Changing Landscapes

Author:
Clarisse Marsac, Nathaniah Jacobs, and Tehtena Mebratu-Tsegaye
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment
Abstract:
The Covid-19 crisis has affected nearly all elements of the global economy, including the landscape of land-based investment (LBI). In addition to increased demand for land-based investment, especially among low- and middle-income countries which saw decreasing revenue and increasing spending in the first year of the pandemic, the crisis has also caused changes in the ways of doing business among host governments, home governments, and private sector actors involved in LBI. This report details and reflects on select Covid-19--related LBI developments in the short term, and potential longer-term shifts relevant to land-based investment practices in Sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia. It also suggests possibilities for how a post-Covid economic recovery could improve practices for sustainable and responsible LBI.
Topic:
Development, Economics, Sustainability, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Africa, Asia, Southeast Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa

8. Five Years After the Adoption of the Paris Agreement, Are Climate Change Considerations Reflected in Mining Contracts?

Author:
Tehtena Mebratu-Tsegaye, Perrine Toledano, Martin Dietrich Brauch, and Mara Greenberg
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment
Abstract:
At the 2015 Paris Climate Change Conference, the world’s governments set an ambitious goal of limiting global temperature rise to 1.5 °C over pre-industrial levels. To meet this goal, global anthropogenic CO2 emissions must decline steadily and reach net zero by about 2050.2 The pathway to a low-carbon future requires a fundamental shift away from fossil fuels and toward clean energy technologies. This transition will be mineral-intensive: the World Bank estimates that the production of minerals could increase by more than 450% by 2050 to meet the growing demand for clean energy technologies.3 How these minerals are produced will have a lasting effect on the clean energy transition. The mining and metal sector contributes 4–7% of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions globally.4 Without adequate regulation to incentivize climate- friendly sustainable operations, increases in mineral extraction risk increasing the sector’s carbon footprint.5 In addition, climate change acts as a risk multiplier by increasing the risk of flooding, drought, and landslides and, as such, exacerbates the negative externalities caused by poor mining practices. First and foremost, climate change considerations should be incorporated into the climate, environmental, water, forestry, energy, or mining laws of mineral-rich countries. For example, in 2016, Kenya passed a climate law that requires climate mainstreaming in all sectors.6 Guinea’s 2019 Environmental Code encourages the use of renewable energy wherever possible and mandates the environment minister to implement the National Strategy for Climate Change Adaptation.7 But the pace of legislative processes is often slow—and in countries where the legislation does not include climate change mitigation and adaptation requirements,8 countries may turn to contractual provi- sions to compel the mining sector to shift to climate- sensitive practices. This paper assesses the extent to which this is being done through an analysis of all publicly available mining contracts signed by fragile states in Africa9 after the adoption of the Paris Agreement in December 2015 that appear on ResourceContracts.org (21 contracts).10 Though the magnitude of African fragile states’ contri- bution to global GHG emissions is minimal, these states have a comparatively high degree of vulnerability to the impacts of climate change.11 In this context, governments can and should mobilize the mining sector to play a meaningful role in meeting their climate mitigation and adaptation needs and those of project-affected communities. In addition, the increased demand for critical minerals to produce renewable energy and battery solutions tends to increase investment flows into the mining sector of several of those fragile states,12 making it all the more crucial for their governments to ensure that new mining investments support each country’s sustainable development goals. Doing so, with respect to climate action, furthers both a country’s competitiveness in international markets13 and minimize the mining sector’s footprint on the country’s environment and communities. Though our analysis focuses on contracts concluded by fragile states in Africa, the policy recommendations that we draw from their analysis apply to all host governments that do not already have robust laws that operationalize mitigation and adaptation goals and are eager to leverage and strengthen the role of their mining sectors in achieving sustainable development. Our recommendations envision generating long-term savings over the life of the mines, even if some of those recommendations may in practice represent higher upfront costs for mining companies. For example, adopting renewable energy sources, though possibly more expensive at the outset, is more cost-effective than fossil fuels considering the life of a mine.14 Avoiding deforestation early on also generates savings for mining companies when the time comes to fulfill their mine closure and rehabilitation obligations. Furthermore, by supporting community efforts to build resilience to climate change, mining companies have the opportunity to meaningfully contribute to project-affected communities. Attention to climate change considerations that entail higher expenditures by mining investors at the initial stages of the operation of a mine also tend to reduce the tax revenues from mining for host governments in the short term. However, for governments, too, the long-term benefits outweigh the initial revenue reductions. As long as governments put strong progressive fiscal regimes in place,15 they will be able to reap the upside from a climate- aware, low-carbon mining sector that will be more profitable than a business-as-usual, carbon-intensive mining sector in the medium to long term.
Topic:
Climate Change, Environment, International Cooperation, and Carbon Emissions
Political Geography:
Global Focus

9. Comparison Between the IPCC Reporting Framework and Country Practice

Author:
Jiarui Chen and Martin Dietrich Brauch
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment
Abstract:
The 2006 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Guidelines (IPCC 2008) for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories (IPCC Guidelines) provide a recommend- ed (but not mandatory) methodology for preparing Na- tional Inventory Reports (NIR), which all Annex I Parties2 to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) must submit every year (Romijn et al. 2019). In practice, however, many countries apply modi- fied methodologies in their NIRs to reflect country-specif- ic situations better. While helpful in addressing country specificities, those modified methodologies may result in emission data that is less standardized and therefore harder to compare and consolidate. Also, the IPCC recom- mends that countries adopt higher tier methods and use more granular data. Since different emissions categorized by the IPCC3 can be calculated by multiple methods, and the granularity and quality of country emissions databas- es vary, different countries adopt different granularity lev- els and tier methods (IPCC 2008). The 160 Non-Annex I Parties to the UNFCCC (most of them developing countries) are not required to submit NIRs every year, but must submit Biennial Update Re- ports (BURs), including a national inventory report and information on mitigation actions, needs, and support re- ceived (Kainou 2016). Following the same IPCC Guidelines as NIRs, BURs are different from NIRs mainly in terms of reporting scope. The IPCC Guidelines require countries to report greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in NIRs from 1980 to the latest reporting period, while for BURs they merely encourage countries to submit summary informa- tion tables of inventories for previous submission years.4 Besides the required BURs, more Non-Annex I Parties have been submitting NIRs and Technical Annexes on REDD+ in recent years (Romijn et al. 2019). In 2020, 23 Non-Annex I Parties submitted NIRs (UNFCCC 2020). We recommend that the IPCC adopt, based on a man- date from the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC, a consolidated framework to indicate best practice for each emissions category. A consolidated framework would help unify the granularity levels and standards across all coun- tries’ NIRs. It could also be extended to countries that have not adopted the IPCC Guidelines or published NIRs. Since an increasing number of Non-Annex I Parties are submit- ting NIRs to the UNFCCC, it is crucial to have a widely appli- cable framework that developing countries can also use. A consolidated framework would also make it easier for countries to communicate their emissions reductions goals in their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement on Climate Change. With the Paris Agreement, countries established an enhanced transparency framework (ETF): starting in 2024, countries will report transparently on actions taken and progress in climate change mitigation, adaptation measures, and support provided or received. It also provides for interna- tional procedures for the review of the submitted NIRs. A standardized reporting framework for NIRs would comply with the requirement of transparency framework under Paris Agreement (Winkler et al. 2017). To exemplify how a consolidated framework would work, after a background note on scopes and approaches in greenhouse gas reporting (section 1), we present the re- sults of our empirical research on the NIRs of Australia, Germany, Japan, and the United States, focusing on the differences in the choice of methodology (section 2) and emission factors (section 3). Then we conduct a case study on the German iron and steel industry, exploring the dif- ferences in emission reporting under different methods (section 4). Finally, we study the case of China, which has submitted BURs but not yet published annual NIRs, to understand how the IPCC Guidelines could be applied to more countries (section 5). We outline our findings and recommendations in section 6.
Topic:
Climate Change, Development, Environment, and International Cooperation
Political Geography:
Global Focus

10. Responsible Coffee Sourcing: Towards a Living Income for Producers

Author:
Kaitlin Y. Cordes, Margaret Sagan, and Solina Kennedy
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment
Abstract:
Coffee company sourcing practices are a key tool for improving coffee producer and farmworker well-being. Companies are not the only actor responsible for addressing living income and living wages, and sourcing practices are not the only relevant tool. Governments and other stakeholders must use policies, programs, and other levers to address the structural factors that contribute to producers’ and farmworkers’ impoverishment. Yet the role of other actors and interventions should not be an excuse for company practices that contribute to producer and worker poverty. Credible options exist for roasters and retailers to improve producer and farmworker well-being through sourcing practices.
Topic:
Agriculture, Environment, Poverty, and Coffee
Political Geography:
Global Focus