Search

Begin New Search Content Type Special Report Publishing Institution Center for Strategic and International Studies Publication Year within 10 Years

1. The Coming Storm: Insights from Ukraine about Escalation in Modern War

Author:
Benjamin Jensen and Adrian Bogart
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Based on three crisis simulations held in late March 2022 with think tank fellows, military planners, and congressional staffers, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) will likely struggle to address escalation vectors almost certain to push the current war in Ukraine beyond the country’s borders. This paper captures key insights from across these simulations based on two triggering events: (1) a Russian surgical strike on a NATO logistics hub used to provide weapons to Ukraine in southeast Poland, and (2) Russian use of chemical weapons along the Polish border while simultaneously mobilizing to threaten the Baltics. As the conflict crossed a key threshold and risked becoming a regional war, most participants found a natural pull to escalate in each scenario despite limited expectations of achieving a position of competitive advantage. Analyzing how individuals and teams approached decision making provides insights on rethinking escalation models in the twenty-first century and taking advantage of new concepts and capabilities to better support signaling during a crisis.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

2. Localizing Humanitarian Action in Africa

Author:
Mvemba Phezo Dizolele, Kurtzer Jacob D., and Hareem Fatima Abdullah
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The international humanitarian community is increasingly focusing on the need for local and national actors to lead humanitarian response and recovery efforts in conflict-affected or disaster-prone regions, especially in the Global South. Local and national actors responding to crises remain severely underfunded, particularly in Africa, where civil society organizations (CSOs) receive insufficient funding from African and international actors alike. African funders reportedly directed 9 percent of large gifts to African CSOs between 2010 and 2019, while non-African philanthropists provided 14 percent of their funding to these groups. The United States is the world’s largest foreign assistance donor, having contributed $35.5 billion in overseas development assistance (ODA) in 2020. Much of this aid goes to sub-Saharan Africa, including $8.5 billion to 47 countries and 8 regional programs in 2020. Yet national and local organizations receive little of this funding directly. At the same time, Washington has repeatedly signaled a commitment to the “localization” of humanitarian aid, or the shift of decisionmaking power, program implementation, and resources to local and national actors. Yet localized humanitarian assistance in Africa has failed to materialize. Bureaucratic and regulatory hurdles, as well as geostrategic calculations, pose a challenge to localization efforts. African voices are excluded from the decisionmaking landscape—in donor discussions and localization efforts themselves—resulting in a gap in cultural competency. The conversation on localization in Africa cannot be limited to the African continent; it must occur in donor capitals, with African voices leading the dialogue. To achieve sustainable localization, the U.S. and African policy landscapes should resolve bureaucratic obstacles and shift an exclusionary aid paradigm to one that is inclusive and builds on existing successes.
Topic:
Security, Humanitarian Aid, Humanitarian Intervention, and Humanitarian Crisis
Political Geography:
Africa

3. Strengthening a Transnational Semiconductor Industry

Author:
James Lewis
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
If data is the new oil, it could be said that chips are the new steel—a fundamental component of national power similar to the foundational role steel production played in the industrial age. As such, semiconductor chips are a natural focus for government intervention and support to accelerate growth and build secure supply chains. The specific goals for U.S. semiconductor policy are to increase reliability and trust in supply, reinforce all elements of chip-making capacity, and reduce China’s role in the supply chain. Chip production is based on complex, globally distributed, specialized supply chains involving many stages in production, including specialized materials, production equipment, design and related software, fabrication, testing, and packaging. In some stages of production, labor costs are important; in others, it is capital costs because a cutting-edge fabrication plant, or fab, can cost more than $12 billion. Taiwan, South Korea, the United States, Japan, Singapore, and China are the leading chip-producing nations. There are also important facilities (often subsidiaries of a leading producer) in Europe, Southeast Asia, South America, and Israel. This global distribution has led some to push for greater production in the United States, but trying to “reshore” a global supply chain spread across many countries would be counterproductive if the goal is a reliable and more productive supply chain. The problem is China, not global production. The politics of the chip industry are generally favorable to the United States. One leading producer, South Korea, is a treaty ally and faces less risk of disruption from China than does Taiwan. Another leading producer, Japan, is one of the most important U.S. security partners and, with the United States, dominates the production of semiconductor manufacturing equipment (SME). ASML, another leading producer of SME, based in the Netherlands, is also an important ally. Singapore, while it would prefer not to be caught in a battle between giants, is also a dependable partner. These countries share democratic values and in many instances are treaty allies. The global distribution of chip-making in countries friendly to the United States is an advantage.
Topic:
Science and Technology, transnationalism, Emerging Technology, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:
Global Focus

4. CCP Inc. in West Africa: How Chinese Party-State Actors Secured Critical Minerals in Guinea

Author:
Briana Boland, Lauren Maranto, and Jude Blanchette
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
This CCP Inc. case study explores how Chinese diplomatic, regulatory, financial, and commercial actors work in concert to secure critical minerals in the West African nation of Guinea. Efforts in Guinea to mine bauxite and iron ore, the primary inputs for aluminum and steel, illuminate Beijing’s conduits for influencing and supporting its geo-economic objectives. Examining one key Chinese player in Guinea’s mining sector, this study highlights state actors’ connections with nominally private Chinese companies and the importance of partnerships with state-owned enterprises for building costly infrastructure. Across multiple bauxite and iron ore mining ventures, Chinese diplomatic support and state financing provided conduits to help further favored projects and increase Chinese companies’ access to Guinea’s mining industries.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Natural Resources, Hegemony, Mining, and Superpower
Political Geography:
Africa, China, Asia, and Guinea

5. Donor Funding Models for Innovation: A Review

Author:
Conor M. Savoy
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Donors have rhetorically supported the importance of innovation in global development, but the level of resources committed has seldom matched the level of this rhetoric. There are clear barriers to expanding funding for the innovation ecosystem: (1) innovation remains under-resourced, and models that are providing clear results are not properly supported; (2) pathways to scale remain limited because of the total funding available; and (3) the risk appetite of donors remains too conservative to properly support and scale innovation. Recent impact evaluations suggest that innovations supported by the United States Agency for International Development’s (USAID) Development Innovation Ventures (DIV) and the Global Innovation Fund (GIF) have yielded impressive returns. But more importantly, innovation also leverages scarce funding resources and engages with locally based partners.
Topic:
Development, Natural Resources, Innovation, and Donors
Political Geography:
Global Focus

6. Allied Smart Cities

Author:
Matthew Goodman, Akhil Thadani, and Matthew Wayland
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Population growth and rapid urbanization are reshaping global networks and driving demand for digital infrastructure beyond advanced economies. These trends are accelerating U.S.-China commercial competition in third markets, where governments must decide which communication and technology governance systems to adopt. Developing a high-standard smart city model can help to successfully rejuvenate domestic infrastructure, close the global digital divide, and promote democratic values in digital infrastructure.
Topic:
Urban, Cities, Sustainability, and Digital Revolution
Political Geography:
Global Focus

7. The Lessons of the Afghan War That No One Will Want to Learn

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
At the best of times, the U.S. tends to rush out heavily politicized studies of the lessons of war that are more political ammunition than serious analyses, and while these are followed by long formal studies that are often quite good, they then are often ignored as the flow of events moves on. These are scarcely the best of times. The collapse of the Afghan government and forces has occurred during one of the most partisan periods in American politics, followed by a totally different kind of conflict in Ukraine, all while the U.S. focus on terrorism and regional conflicts that began with 9/11 has been replaced by a focus on competition with nuclear superpowers like Russia and China. The very fact that the war stretched out over two decades has meant that much of the focus on lessons has ignored the first half or more of the war, and the almost inevitable chaos following the U.S. decision to withdraw has led to the focus on the collapse of the Afghan forces and the central government rather than on the actual conduct of the war – and few within the U.S. government now want to rake over the list of past mistakes that turned an initial tactical victory into a massive grand strategic defeat.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

8. Cyber War and Ukraine

Author:
James Andrew Lewis
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
This is a preliminary review of cyber operations in the Ukraine conflict based on publicly available information. Ukraine was not the first “cyber war”—the term itself makes little sense—but it was the first major conflict involving large-scale cyber operations. The so-far inept Russian invasion, where cyber operations have provided little benefit, raises questions about the balance between defense and offense in cyberspace, the utility of offensive cyber operations, and the requirements for planning and coordination. Better-than-expected Ukrainian defenses seem to be one hallmark of this invasion and the primary reason why Russian cyber efforts have had limited effect. It is likely that Ukraine, forewarned by Russian cyber actions that began as early as 2014, was better prepared as a result. It was also assisted in its cyber defense by friendly countries and private actors with whom it had developed cooperative relationships before the conflict. This preparation allowed it to deflect many Russian offensive cyber operations, suggesting that a well-prepared and energetic defense can have the advantage over offense in cyberspace. Russia had previously used cyberattacks against Ukraine to destroy or damage infrastructure and data. It attempted to do so again in 2022. Based on publicly available information, Russia launched a broad cyber campaign shortly before the invasion (see the appendix for a list of known events). Some reporting showed a huge increase in exploits on the first day. The intent appears to have been to create disorder and overwhelm Ukrainian defenses. Russia sought to disrupt services and install destructive malware on Ukrainian networks included phishing, denial of service, and taking advantage of software vulnerabilities. One company identified eight different families of destructive software used by Russia in these attacks. The primary targets were Ukrainian government websites, energy and telecom service providers, financial institutions, and media outlets, but the cyberattacks encompassed most critical sectors. This was a wide-ranging attack using the full suite of Russian cyber capabilities to disrupt Ukraine, but it was not a success. Russia’s most significant cyber success so far was the disruption of the Viasat Inc’s KA-SAT satellite. This created significant damage that spread beyond Ukraine but ultimately did not provide military advantage to Russia. The attack may have been intended to be part of a larger, coordinated cyberattack that proved unsuccessful, or the Russians may not have expected the rapid restoration of service that was provided with outside assistance. The metric for Viasat and for other actions is not whether a cyberattack is effective in terms of network penetration or the disruption of services or data, but whether its effect helps achieve in this case, the occupation of Ukraine and the elimination of its elected government. By this metric, the Viasat attack was not a success.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Cybersecurity, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Ukraine

9. The Geopolitics of Hydrogen in the Indo-Pacific Region

Author:
Jane Nakano
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Large energy consumers in the Indo-Pacific region and their traditional energy suppliers are examining the potential role of clean hydrogen in energy systems as well as their own potential roles in hydrogen supply chains. Several Asian governments are leading the charge in creating a clean hydrogen economy by releasing and executing hydrogen strategies and funding new projects, while others are beginning to articulate visions and strategies. This report surveys national visions and strategies of leading Asian economies and their traditional energy suppliers and presents key implications of clean hydrogen development in the Indo-Pacific region. The report further offers recommendations on the role the United States could play in this rising market, including ensuring resilience and robustness in clean hydrogen supply chains, recognizing the energy security benefit of clean hydrogen exports from the United States, and ensuring the environmental sustainability in hydrogen value-chain creation.
Topic:
Security, Energy Policy, Environment, Sustainability, and Hydrogen
Political Geography:
Indo-Pacific

10. Genomes: The Era of Purposeful Manipulation Begins

Author:
Carol Kuntz
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The purposeful manipulation of genomes is now possible. Such manipulation has great promise and broad strategic implications; it is creating useful molecules of various sorts and, over time, it could eliminate genetic disease. Like many emerging technologies, genome manipulation could grow into an important economic sector, contributing to a replicating cycle of innovation and enabling the United States to favorably shape its strategic future at home and abroad. Advances in these technologies are fueled by a global commercial and academic community. The United States should ensure that it fully remains a member of that community, but also that key capabilities—such as large, well-curated databases and biofoundries—are created and sustained domestically. The United States needs to rationalize its policy on heritable human genome editing, allowing legitimate types of edits but contributing to international norms against illegitimate ones. A robust biotechnology sector at home would yield many benefits—economic, technological, medical—and provide the critical reservoir of expertise within which national security interests could be secured. The Department of Defense needs to make structural reforms in its approach to emerging technologies, particularly by creating career paths for uniformed practitioners. Otherwise, it will continue failing in its effort to incorporate emerging technologies into its operational concepts, budgets, and programs—leading to diminished capabilities in the United States, particularly as compared to China. In time, falling behind on these key areas of science could lead to many problems, including failures in deterrence and, ultimately, in war.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, and Medicine
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America