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Begin New Search Political Geography Russia Content Type Research Paper Publication Year within 3 Years

1. Russia’s Aggression Against Ukraine: Concept, Ideology, Objectives, Means, Consequences

Author:
Plamen Pantev
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
The study tries to outline interim conclusions about the concept, the ideology, the objectives and the tools used by the Russian federation in this barbaric war of attrition against Ukraine – a war of a nuclear superpower against a smaller neighbouring country. The study does not aim to analyse the strange way the war is developing – Russians carry on military attacks in both a regular and terrorist manner 7 on the whole territory of Ukraine, while the Ukrainians are deterred to counter-attack the aggressor on the latter’s own territory and to fight with longer-range arms even on their own land. The author understands how many issues from the theoretic fields of international relations, foreign, security and defense studies need to be considered to understand in a holistic way the final result of the interaction of domestic Russian, international, political, economic, governance, psychological and other problems that led to launching an aggressive and devastating war in the European continent by Moscow. The purpose of the study is not to outline the avalanche of mistakes in the policy of the collective West towards a showing for decades signs of revenge imperialist Russia. Neither it aims to point to the multitude of military mistakes by the aggressor in the last year. The aim of the study is to outline and discuss the concept, the ideology, the objectives and the means of the Russian aggression. Revealing the Nazi-like behaviour of the Russian leadership and its armed forces could serve to construct the broader picture of the developing conflict and learn how to prevent a similar invasion by Moscow. The study aims to prove that the legal and moral consequences of the war will be the conviction of the aggressor for the genocide and the war crimes. This would be the only possibility for normalising the life of the Ukrainians and the Russians as well as of the broader international relations system.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, NATO, Imperialism, Sovereignty, European Union, Conflict, Ideology, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

2. Making a Better Open Skies Treaty

Author:
Peter Jones
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
The US withdrawal from the Treaty on Open Skies was motivated by ideological considerations within the Trump Administration. In response, Russia announced its intention to withdraw on January 15, but has not yet notified the depositaries of the treaty to begin the six-month clock. If the treaty is to be sustained, its two main members must reconsider these decisions. This paper proposes ideas as to how the Biden Administration may wish to re-join the treaty, how Russia may be persuaded to stay in it, and also steps that the other treaty members can take to facilitate these objectives. Going further, the paper argues that the treaty, which is now almost 30 years old, could be strengthened in its operations and applied in other contexts. Proposals are advanced in the paper as to how all of this might be done in a phased manner, with basic steps required to sustain the treaty coming first and then more ambitious reforms being considered over time.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Treaties and Agreements, Reform, and Peace
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America

3. Implications of Russia’s Activities in the Middle East and North Africa Region for U.S. Strategy and Interests

Author:
Chen Kane and Miles A. Pomper
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Russia’s ability to project power into the region remains limited today, and the status quo seems tolerable. But there are risks to U.S. interests in the future. The United States’ military withdrawals from Afghanistan, the Gulf and Iraq have significantly affected both U.S. regional posture and perceptions of U.S. commitment. Against that backdrop, the United States confronts multiple challenges as it seeks to “do more with less” in the region. Russia’s opportunities in the region increase as U.S. involvement decreases. Moscow’s “low investment, high disruption” approach works because it leverages the self-interest of actors, stakeholders, and governments in pursuit of limited aims. The U.S. approach of “high investment, low disruption” to preserve favorable regional balances of power is more costly and affords the United States less latitude, since it is rooted in principles and values. Russia is well-positioned (along with China) to undermine U.S. interests incrementally. That is true in MENA itself and, given the impact of Russia’s activities in this region for U.S. strategic advantages, in other regions of importance to the U.S., such as Europe and Asia. Countering Moscow’s efforts now should, therefore, be an important element of a revised and more comprehensive, yet also tailored, U.S. approach to the MENA region. What is needed is an adapted approach that leverages the United States’ comparative advantages to mitigate Moscow’s influence and that includes shifting some of the current U.S. presence to a more agile and unpredictable posture. Throughout the report, regional countries are categorized into four groups reflecting their anticipated vulnerability to Russian influence-building: (1) “Russia’s friends” (Iran and Syria); (2) “Balancers critical to NATO’s power projection” (Libya and Turkey); (3) “U.S. friends requiring sustained attention” (Egypt and Iraq); and (4) “U.S. allies seeking limited engagement with Russia” (the GCC and Israel). The U.S. should tailor its efforts to: contain Russia’s influence in Iran and Syria, roll back Russia’s influence in Libya and Turkey, manage Russia’s influence — especially on the military and defense sectors —in Egypt and Iraq, and offer reassurance to the GCC and Israel in order to minimize Russian influence in those countries.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Hegemony, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, Europe, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

4. Digital Activism and Authoritarian Adaptation in the Middle East

Author:
Larry Diamond, Eileen Donahoe, Ahmed Shaheed, Benjamin Greenacre, James Shires, Alexei Abrahams, Joshua Tucker, Xiao Qiang, Marwa Fatafta, Andrew Leber, Alexei Abrahams, Marc Owen Jones, Afef Abroughi, Mohamed Najem, Mahsa Alimardani, Mona Elswah, Alexandra A. Siegel, H. Akin Unver, Ahmet Kurnaz, Anita Gohdes, and Zachary Steinert-Threlkeld
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS)
Abstract:
The Project on Middle East Political Science partnered with Stanford University’s Center for Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law and its Global Digital Policy Incubator for an innovative two week online seminar to explore the issues surrounding digital activism and authoritarianism. This workshop was built upon more than a decade of our collaboration on issues related to the internet and politics in the Middle East, beginning in 2011 with a series of workshops in the “Blogs and Bullets” project supported by the United States Institute for Peace and the PeaceTech Lab. This new collaboration brought together more than a dozen scholars and practitioners with deep experience in digital policy and activism, some focused on the Middle East and others offering a global and comparative perspective. POMEPS STUDIES 43 collects essays from that workshop, shaped by two weeks of public and private discussion.
Topic:
Security, Civil War, Government, Human Rights, Science and Technology, Infrastructure, Authoritarianism, Political Activism, Democracy, Media, Inequality, Social Media, Surveillance, Borders, Digital Culture, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Middle East, and North Africa

5. The Nagorno-Karabakh war: a spur to Moscow’s UAV efforts?

Author:
Julian Cooper
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
For Russian observers and analysts, the 44-day war in 2020 between Azerbaijan and Armenia highlighted the comparative lack in Russia’s own armed uninhabited aerial vehicle (UAV) inventory, as well as the patchy performance of Russian-made short-range ground-based air-defence systems in countering UAVs. Nearly two decades after the US began to operate armed UAVs and as the number of countries possessing armed UAVs around the world steadily increases, Russia has yet to field a similar capability. Factors contributing to this failing include the collapse of Russian defence spending in the 1990s, the more recent focus on recapitalising in-service capabilities, the neglect of some of the required-technology building blocks for UAV systems, and Western sanctions. In 2009 Russia imported ten small Birdeye 400 and two larger Searcher Mk II UAVs and the associated ground-control and support systems from Israel. In September 2011 the Defence Ministry opened a tender for ISR and armed UAVs, and a far higher-performance uninhabited combat air vehicle (UCAV) with Sukhoi eventually being the preferred UCAV developer. Two medium-altitude long-endurance designs were selected, the Kronstadt Orion (Inokhodets-BLA) single-engine UAV, and the now-UWCA Altius twin-engine platform. As of early-2021, neither project has entered service in significant numbers. Engine-supply issues have been a contributory factor. For Moscow, the task of producing a modern, competitive small piston engine suitable for UAV applications has represented a challenge. This engine-supply problem is rooted in a decades-long focus on advanced propulsion technologies at the cost of the humble piston engine, and – at the time – the capacity to source these from elsewhere within the USSR. By the time the gap was beginning to be recognised in the 1990s funding was not available to revive the domestic development of piston aeroengines. Other contributing factors to the Russian UAV gap include the fact that relatively cheap piston engines for UAVs lack the prestige to command resources and administrative authority, especially in a decision-making system where the development of advanced weapons appears to be in the hands of a relatively small circle of people with little involvement of civilian experts. Inter-service rivalry may also have hindered the introduction of ISR and armed UAVs into the inventory. Given the extended difficulties Russia has had in getting ISR and armed UAVs into service there remains a question as to why it has not turned more to the international market to address the capability gap. While Beijing might have been willing to supply armed UAVs to Russia, this would have required Moscow to purchase from what was previously a client state in terms of weapons sales. It would also be considered a tacit admission it was lagging China in UAV development. In addition, for all its difficulties, Russia may well still view the UAV-export market as one it could enter. In this context China would be a competitor. The Nagorno-Karabakh war and Russia’s experience in Syria have underscored the challenges to current ground-based air-defence systems when defending against UAVs and loitering munitions. Along with gun and missile-based counters the Defence Ministry is looking at electronic countermeasures. A more novel approach has been to look at using certain UAVs as a counter measure. Training now also includes more counter-UAV activities.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

6. DPRK strategic capabilities and security on the Korean Peninsula: looking ahead

Author:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Believing that Russian–US cooperation could play an important role in developing and implementing proposals for denuclearisation and creating lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula, the Moscow-based Center for Energy and Security Studies and the IISS undertook a joint assessment of North Korea’s progress in developing nuclear and missile capabilities and an examination of possible international steps towards a solution. The spectre of nuclear war has haunted the Korean Peninsula for nearly seven decades. In November 1950, United States president Harry Truman publicly raised the option of using nuclear weapons in the Korean War. For about 40 years after the war, the US deployed several types of tactical nuclear weapons in the Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea). The ROK and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) also launched their own nuclear-weapons programmes. While Seoul abandoned its dedicated weapons effort soon after ROK president Park Chung-hee was assassinated in October 1979, Pyongyang persisted, announcing its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2003 and subsequently making rapid progress in building up nuclear and missile capabilities, while enshrining a nuclear-armed status in the country’s constitution. In September 2017, North Korea’s sixth nuclear test achieved a thermonuclear yield. Two months later, the DPRK launched a Hwasong-15 ballistic missile, which Pyongyang says is an intercontinental weapon system that can reach the entire US mainland. At that point, North Korea announced that its mission to build its nuclear forces was accomplished. The year 2017 saw military escalation on the Korean Peninsula reach an unprecedented level in the post-Korean War period. Many analysts believed that the situation had become the most volatile since the 1968 USS Pueblo crisis, or even since the end of Korean War hostilities in 1953. Some experts drew parallels with the Cuban Missile Crisis. Given Russia’s historical relationship with North Korea and the US alliance with South Korea, Moscow and Washington have special roles to play in promoting stability on the Korean Peninsula. As permanent members of the UN Security Council and depository states of the NPT, Russia and the US also bear special responsibility for upholding peace and international security. Their joint efforts, along with other major powers, were instrumental, for example, in resolving the crisis over the Iranian nuclear programme through the adoption of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in July 2015. Despite US president Donald Trump’s decision in May 2018 to take the US out of the JCPOA, the deal remains a model of what can be achieved through multilateral diplomacy, especially when US–Russian cooperation is harnessed to promote nuclear non-proliferation. Similarly, should the key players demonstrate the political will to seek a sustainable solution to the security problems on the Korean Peninsula, Russian–US cooperation in a multilateral framework could play an important role in developing and implementing proposals. The opportunities are clear. For example, more than 67 years since the shooting stopped, the Korean War still remains officially unresolved. The Armistice Agreement of 1953 has yet to be replaced by a proper peace treaty or a more comprehensive accord. In these circumstances, the Moscow-based Center for Energy and Security Studies (CENESS) and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) agreed in 2017 to conduct a joint assessment of North Korea’s progress in developing nuclear and missile capabilities. They also undertook to develop proposals on possible international steps to facilitate the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula and create lasting peace and security mechanisms. The two parties began their work in January 2018 and completed it in about 33 months. They received valuable assistance from a Russian working group led by CENESS and a US working group led by the IISS. The two working groups included former military officials, diplomats, nuclear specialists and scholars specialising in Korean studies. The two groups worked independently, then compared and consolidated their drafts. The results are summarised in this joint report prepared by the project co-chairs. All the contributing experts, listed in annexes one and two, participated in a personal capacity. The report does not necessarily reflect the views of all the experts involved in the study, or of the organisations they represent. CENESS and IISS hope that the report will serve as a catalyst for further discussions between researchers and officials on possible measures to reduce tensions and nuclear-related risks and build confidence in the region. We also hope that the report will help to facilitate discussions on how to promote pragmatic and effective Russian–US cooperation, an aim which has also been emphasised by the leadership of the two countries.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

7. Ending the Threat of War in Ukraine: A Negotiated Solution to the Donbas Conflict and the Crimean Dispute

Author:
Anatol Lieven
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
The unresolved conflict between Russia and Ukraine in the Donbas region represents by far the greatest danger of a new war in Europe — and by far the greatest risk of a new crisis in relations between the United States and Russia. The Biden administration does not wish to escalate tensions with Russia, and no doubt appreciates that admitting Ukraine into NATO is impossible for the foreseeable future, if only because Germany and France would veto it. Nonetheless, so long as the dispute remains unresolved, the United States will be hostage to developments on the ground that could drag it into a new and perilous crisis.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Diplomacy, War, Conflict, and Negotiation
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

8. The SolarWinds Cybersecurity Case in US-Russia Relations

Author:
Hiroshi Yamazoe
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Japan Institute Of International Affairs (JIIA)
Abstract:
On April 13, 2021, US President Joe Biden held a telephone conversation with Russian President Vladimir Putin to discuss several issues that are hindering US-Russia relations. Two days later, the White House announced economic sanctions and other retaliatory measures, saying that these would impose costs for Russia's harmful activities. This statement gave a relatively detailed description of a cyberattack using SolarWinds products that surfaced in December 2020. On April 15, 2021, the same day that the retaliatory measures were announced, US and UK intelligence agencies officially designated Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) the responsible party for the first time. This article discusses some of the cybersecurity issues in US-Russia relations, focusing on the issues surrounding SolarWinds products, and uses part of my manuscript written in February 2021 for a report by the Japan Institute of International Affairs' Russian Study Group, with some additions made based on developments in April and May.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Bilateral Relations, and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:
Russia and United States of America

9. Russia in NATO's South Expansionist Strategy or Defensive Posture?

Author:
Chloe Berger and Cynthia Salloum
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Russia’s presence in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is a significant component of contemporary Russian foreign and security policy. Moscow’s approach to NATO’s South1 has undoubtedly undergone considerable change since the collapse of the Soviet Union. During the Cold War, it had built a set of alliances with Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Algeria and Libya, among others, which gave Moscow important leverage throughout the region. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan stirred resistance and opposition in the Muslim world, marking a major turning point in its Middle Eastern foreign policy. With the demise of its empire, in addition to its economic and military weaknesses, Russia faced a series of new challenges: a further disintegration of its own south, notably in the South Caucasus, the rise of radical extremism in Chechnya and Dagestan and a NATO programme of partnerships and cooperation that threatened its influence. All of these constrained Moscow’s foreign policy at large, including its Middle Eastern arrangements. In pursuing interests above values, Russia, in the last twenty years, developed channels of dialogue and cooperation with several Sunni Arab states traditionally close to the US, including Saudi Arabia, while deepening diplomatic and military ties with Iran and the Syrian regime. Russia maintained relations with Fatah and recognized Hamas after it won the Palestinian parliamentary elections in 2006, while successfully engaging pragmatically with Israel.2 Keeping contacts open with all relevant parties marks continuity between Soviet and Russian foreign policies. Moreover, in the last decade, the increasing instability across the Middle East and North Africa after the Arab Spring, from which Moscow kept its distance, offered new opportunities for influence and power projection, most notably in Syria and Libya. Putin is tracking two main objectives there: one is building status as a regional actor; the other is enhancing his prestige domestically.3 From the Libyan power vacuum to the US retreat from Afghanistan, the Kremlin is making the most of strategic opportunities and may continue to do so. However, it remains to be seen whether its regained confidence will lead to a more permanent Russian presence and influence. In the South, Moscow has today a relative free rein. But an increasingly mature European Union and most importantly a powerful and more strategically oriented US under President Biden may seriously constrain Russia’s room for manoeuvre. Several drivers, ranging from domestic and economic politics to regional and global geopolitics, could explain Russian involvement in the MENA. Firstly, Russia is building a defensive strategy aimed at reinforcing its front line against Western encroachment and Islamist terrorist attacks. Secondly, it is displaying an expansionist drive, aimed at controlling at least parts of the Eastern and Southern Mediterranean by consolidating old alliances and building new coalitions including with business and arms traders. Thirdly, Russia’s presence in the MENA can be seen as a classic zero-sum game of power politics with the US whereby Moscow is trying to fill the void left by Washington. Last, but certainly not least, it is also driven by domestic considerations that strengthen Putin’s grip on power, and Russia’s regional influence and international prestige. While all these factors play a role, this edited volume shows that opportunism and contingency remain key variables to explain Russian behaviour in the MENA. All of these drivers were somehow on display in Syria, which became an ideal case-study to explain Russian policy in the South. Yet, beyond the specific rationale, some questions still remain about Russia’s future role and influence in the region. Is the MENA region significant enough to help Russia recover a status of global power beyond regional leadership? Do status and prestige suffice, and if so, at what cost? What are Russia’s current and future investments in the region and what are their consequences on trade, energy, and its military posture? What would the real benefits of a Russian return to the MENA region be for its economy and power? Most importantly, what would be the consequences of an assertive Russia for NATO and its partners in the South?
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

10. NATO Strategy: Integrating Defense and Collaborative Security

Author:
Schuyler Foerster and Jeffrey A. Larsen
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
This Research Paper addresses four key issues: 1) a holistic definition of strategic stability, highlighting the principal sources of instability in Europe and identifying requirements for strengthening stability in Europe; 2) an examination of recent NATO efforts to shore up its defense and deterrent capabilities, while underscoring the need to address defense against non-military threats to stability; 3) a discussion of how a comprehensive arms control agenda could contribute to strategic stability, including wide-ranging discussions with Moscow about Russia’s place in an evolving European security framework; and 4) an analysis of three different strategic approaches that NATO might pursue, each of which combines enhancements to military and non-military defense and the possibility of a broader collaborative security agenda. The continuing volatility of NATO’s strategic environment will require that NATO maintain its long-established strategies of deterrence, defense, and reassurance. However, a strategy that depends almost exclusively on the deployment of military forces will be insufficient to sustain strategic stability in the long run. NATO also requires a clear and purposeful strategy that incorporates both defense and dialogue – including arms control policies – as integral and complementary tools for addressing threats. The authors recommend that NATO should proceed to shape a new Strategic Concept by outlining a 21st century Harmel Doctrine, emphasizing both defense and dialogue with Russia as complementary paths to improving strategic stability. Simultaneously, NATO should fulfill its requirements for a 21st century strategy for deterrence and defense in dealing with nuclear, conventional, cyber, hybrid, and other military and non-military threats. For the foreseeable future, NATO will need to craft a strategy for security and stability in Europe based on the assumption that Russia does not share the West’s worldview and will likely continue to seek to undermine the stability and cohesion achieved in Europe following the end of the Cold War. If Russia proves unwilling to engage in a meaningful collaborative security relationship, NATO will be justified in embarking on a 21st century version of a renewed “containment” policy that includes the reintroduction of even greater military capabilities in Europe. In all cases, NATO should ensure that Alliance cohesion – including its transatlantic security link – is preserved even as it deliberates difficult strategic questions.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North Atlantic, and North America