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62. Mounting Turmoil: Is Lebanon witnessing a deterioration of the influence of Hezbollah and Iran?
- Author:
- FARAS
- Publication Date:
- 03-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
- Abstract:
- The Lebanese internal arena is experiencing escalating instability. This is clearly reflected in the influence of political forces, especially Hezbollah, which is under internal and external pressures as a result of the faltering formation of the government. The balance of power is drawing more to be in favor of the Bashar al-Assad regime over the past few years. In addition to its continued involvement in the Syrian conflict, Hezbollah identifies with the Iranian public discourse on many regional and international issues, particularly during the escalation of tensions with the US and Israel.
- Topic:
- Politics, Conflict, and Hezbollah
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Lebanon, and Syria
63. Whose Long Arm? Challenges to Understanding Turkish Diaspora Politics
- Author:
- Christopher Houtkamp and Kars de Bruijne
- Publication Date:
- 02-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
- Abstract:
- This Clingendael policy brief seeks to explain visible manifestations of Turkish politics in European cities. Why does Turkish politics lead to unrest in Rotterdam and Berlin and what institutional mechanisms facilitate this? The brief highlights various drivers, institutional manifestations and historical changes, but also points out that there are a number of uncertainties and questions about the motivations for, and modus operandi of, Turkey’s influence in European societies. These questions are all the more relevant as European policy-makers increasingly seek to take measures in order to curb this. The main argument developed in this brief is that effective policy ‘at home’ (in Europe) will require better knowledge of socio-political developments ‘abroad’ (in Turkey). The first and second parts of this brief, therefore, show how the drivers of Turkish influence on the diaspora have changed over time. The third section highlights how present-day diaspora politics is institutionally anchored in Western Europe. Most of the practical examples in this brief are drawn from the Dutch context, but the dynamics will be familiar to those observing this phenomenon in other Western European countries.
- Topic:
- Politics, Diaspora, and Institutions
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Turkey, and Middle East
64. ‘A careful foot can step anywhere’: The UAE and China in the Horn of Africa: Implications for EU engagement
- Author:
- Jos Meester and Guido Lanfranchi
- Publication Date:
- 06-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
- Abstract:
- Over the last decade, the UAE and China have vastly expanded their economic, political and military footprint in the Horn of Africa, and their actions now have the potential to shape developments in the region. Room for cooperation between Abu Dhabi and Beijing exists on issues such as maritime security, regional stability, and economic development. Moreover, the two countries’ interaction could lead to improvements in the Horn’s underdeveloped infrastructure by triggering a race to investment. Yet, development and stability in the region might suffer if the strategic interests of external players take precedence over local ones, or if local elites (mis)use external support for narrow domestic political calculations. The EU and its member states have high stakes in the Horn’s stability. To optimise their engagement, European policymakers should be aware of the implications of the Emirati and Chinese presence, and they should strive to improve cooperation among the wide range of external players active in the Horn.
- Topic:
- Economics, International Cooperation, Politics, Military Affairs, Economic Development, and Economic Stability
- Political Geography:
- Africa, China, Asia, and Horn of Africa
65. Fruitless cherry picking?: EU engagement with the Syrian opposition (Etilaf)
- Author:
- Lars Hauch
- Publication Date:
- 07-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
- Abstract:
- This policy brief examines the EU’s engagement and relationship with Syria’s main political opposition umbrella, the Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (Etilaf), which was founded in late 2012. It discusses the EU’s engagement strategies with the Etilaf and their impact on its development in the context of the Syrian conflict. The brief highlights that the EU did not substantiate the international legitimacy it granted the organisation early on during the conflict with policies that would have allowed it to expand its domestic legitimacy and capabilities. This policy contributed to developments in which the Etilaf rapidly lost its original potential. While the Etilaf today faces a range of structural and operational challenges that need to be addressed, the brief nevertheless recommends EU institutions and Member States to increase their support for the Etilaf and the Interim Government linked with it, if a number of conditions can be met. Such support will help maintain and develop these bodies into a viable centre of political opposition to the Assad regime. Practically speaking, this objective can be pursued by piloting conditional EU support to areas of northwestern and northern Syria that are nominally under the control of the Interim Government. It also requires building a partnership with Turkey to jointly support local Syrian administration(s) in the same areas.
- Topic:
- Politics, European Union, Conflict, Syrian War, Bashar al-Assad, and Opposition
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Middle East, and Syria
66. Turkey’s interventions in its near abroad: The case of Libya
- Author:
- Engin Yüksel
- Publication Date:
- 09-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
- Abstract:
- The strategic objectives of the Turkish military intervention in Libya in 2019–2020 in favour of the Government of National Accord (GNA) were geopolitical (establishing an entry point into Africa in addition to Somalia), geo-economical (related to gas exploration in the Mediterranean) and commercial (facilitating repayment of outstanding business debts and enabling future profits). The deeper drivers of Ankara’s intervention include a mix of more assertive nationalism based on a hegemonic conception of Turkey’s ‘near abroad’, a perceived need to counter the military campaign of the Libyan National Army (LNA)’s to conquer Tripolitania, and Turkey’s exclusion from Mediterranean gas politics. Ankara’s intervention and its institutionalisation proved effective in counterbalancing the LNA and its international backers – chiefly Russia and the UAE, but also France and Egypt – and produced a more stable political situation in the process. While Turkey has achieved its short- to medium-term objectives and is likely to retain a substantial permanent military, commercial and political presence in Libya, it also created tensions with the EU and US as well as antagonizing the LNA’s international backers. In brief, an improvement in Turkey’s geostrategic position might have come at the cost of its regional strategic relations.
- Topic:
- Politics, Military Affairs, Geopolitics, Military Intervention, and Regional Power
- Political Geography:
- Turkey, Middle East, and Libya
67. A strategic shift: The return of the Taliban in Afghanistan and its implications
- Author:
- Al Jazeera Center for Studies
- Publication Date:
- 08-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Al Jazeera Center for Studies
- Abstract:
- The Taliban was able to establish control over Afghanistan with surprising speed due to the collapse of solidarity between the forces opposing them. Nonetheless, its leaders were keen to allay the fears of both the Afghans and external forces to gain political legitimacy internally and externally.
- Topic:
- Politics, Taliban, Conflict, and Legitimacy
- Political Geography:
- Afghanistan, South Asia, and United States of America
68. Tunisia: An overlapping political and constitutional crisis
- Author:
- Al Jazeera Center for Studies
- Publication Date:
- 03-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Al Jazeera Center for Studies
- Abstract:
- Tunisian President Kais Saied’s rejection of governmental alteration is a reflection of a wider political crisis, stemming from the disagreement between the presidency and the parliamentary majority over the form of the political system and the distribution of powers among its pillars.
- Topic:
- Politics, Constitution, and Political Crisis
- Political Geography:
- North Africa and Tunisia
69. The Use of Games in Strategic Foresight: A Warning from the Future
- Author:
- Roderick Parkes and Mark McQuay
- Publication Date:
- 07-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
- Abstract:
- After a decade of crisis, the EU now routinely uses futures methods to anticipate the unexpected. Its aim is to address its blind spots. This paper details our experience of designing a foresight exercise to help EU diplomats face up to one of the most ingrained types of blind spot: a taboo issue. But our experience showed instead the dangers of such exercises. Far from needing encouragement to address a taboo, our target audience wanted an excuse to do so, reflecting a shift to a more “geopolitical EU.”
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, Politics, European Union, and Strategic Planning
- Political Geography:
- Europe
70. Field-by-Field Changes in China since Covid-19 and Implications for Korea
- Author:
- Jai Chul Heo
- Publication Date:
- 03-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
- Abstract:
- China has been able to escape from the Covid-19 outbreak relatively quickly compared to other countries. Nevertheless, it still remains greatly influenced by the Covid-19 pandemic across its politics, economy, society, culture, and other areas, which has led to various changes throughout China. Therefore, this study comprehensively examined the impact of the Covid-19 outbreak on various aspects of Chinese politics, economy, society, and culture. And in response to these changes in Chinese society, the study explores new strategies toward China in the post-Covid-19 era.
- Topic:
- Politics, Culture, Economy, COVID-19, and Society
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, and Korea
71. Twenty Years of One Country Two Systems in China: Evaluation and Future Prospects
- Author:
- Jai Chul Heo
- Publication Date:
- 04-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
- Abstract:
- This study evaluated China's model of “One Country, Two Systems” (一國兩制) 20 years into operation and the bilateral relationship between Taiwan and Mainland China ‒ focusing on Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan ‒ and examined future prospects. The study is meaningful in that it conducts a more objective evaluation than the previous studies by empirically analyzing data accumulated over the past 20 years of implementation of the One Country Two Systems principle from various perspectives. In addition, it is also a timely study in that it analyzes how the One Country Two Systems arrangement is likely to develop in the future, and what impact this would have, making considerations for changes in China's national strategy during the Xi Jinping period and the competition for hegemony between the U.S. and China. The results of the analysis indicate that over the past 20 years China has been experimenting with the possibility of coexisting different systems in one country, and that the One Country Two Systems arrangement, as a new form of unification which has never been attempted in the history of mankind, has actually shown the possibility of success. However, in recent years, various political contradictions have been exposed in the process of implementing the arrangement, mostly in the Hong Kong society, and the resulting conflict has gradually intensified. While maintaining the current capitalist system for 50 years, Macau is expected to gradually progress in its “Sinicization,” with continuing active economic and social exchanges and cooperation with mainland China. As a result, Macau is expected to be fully incorporated into China's socialist system in 2049, 50 years after the return, but it is likely to remain a city of special character considering Macau's region and its economic structure. On the other hand, the One Country Two Systems arrangement with Hong Kong is expected to undergo a difficult process in the future. In the midst of various conflicts surrounding Hong Kong, the guarantee for Hong Kong’s autonomy is expected to end in 2047 amid efforts on the part of the mainland government to sinicize Hong Kong. And China wants to apply the philosophy of “One Country, Two Systems” to its reunification with Taiwan as well, but in reality this remains very low in possibility.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Politics, Bilateral Relations, Hegemony, and Strategic Competition
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, Asia, Korea, Hong Kong, and Macau
72. Fit for 55: towards the achievement of an ambitious European political compromise for climate
- Author:
- Clémence Pèlegrin
- Publication Date:
- 07-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
- Abstract:
- The adoption by the European Parliament of the Climate Law on 24th June last and by the Council on 28th endorses the binding nature of the target to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions "by at least 55%" by 2030, compared to 1990 emission levels. After several months of sometimes heated dialogue between Member States, this adoption is a significant step forward in the EU's commitment to fight climate change under the Paris Agreement. On 14 July next, the ‘Fit for 55’ package, which is part of the Commission's work programme for 2021, will be published. This package will be presented in the particular context of the submission by Member States of their recovery plans and their assessment - and, where appropriate, support - by the Commission. This support is to be given with regard to compliance with the eleven assessment criteria defined by the Commission, two of which relate more specifically to climate and the environment. The first criterion concerns Member States' compliance with the 37% target for climate-focused expenditure. The second involves the respect of the “to do no significant harm” principle. For example, on 21st June, the Commission approved the Austrian recovery plan, which provides for 59% of recovery expenditure to be earmarked for the climate, well above the regulatory target of 37%. It is therefore in this context, which includes the confirmation of the Climate Law and the steering of recovery plans, that the future "Fit for 55" package will take place.
- Topic:
- Climate Change, Politics, European Union, and Carbon Emissions
- Political Geography:
- Europe
73. Getting From Ideas to Reality: Building Political Support to Translate Good Ideas Into Actual Practice
- Author:
- Columbia Centre on Sustainable Investment
- Publication Date:
- 09-2021
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment
- Abstract:
- While many actors within government wish to advance more responsible approaches to land-based investment, there are often political barriers for bringing law and policy proposals to fruition and translating those ideas into practice. This primer focuses on how government officials can improve the governance and practice of responsible land-based investment by building stronger political support. This is especially important given that government champions or "reformers" frequently interact with peers or superiors who have differing and sometimes opposing interests. The primer outlines strategic approaches which champions within government can take to improve the chances that their ideas are implemented, and examples of how the approaches could look or proceed in reality.
- Topic:
- Politics, Governance, Reform, and Land
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus
74. Understanding Resistance to Inclusive Peace Processes
- Author:
- Esra Cuhadar
- Publication Date:
- 03-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- United States Institute of Peace
- Abstract:
- Current peace processes are designed to be more inclusive of women, civil society, youth, opposition political parties, and other frequently marginalized communities. Implementation of inclusive peace processes, however, has not progressed smoothly—and are frequently met with resistance. Based on an examination of instances of resistance in thirty peace and transition negotiations since 1990, this report enhances practitioners’ understanding of who resists, against whose participation, using what tactics, and with what motives.
- Topic:
- Civil Society, Gender Issues, Politics, Women, Youth, and Peace
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus
75. Could Turkey’s new parties change the political balance?
- Author:
- Amanda Paul and Demir Murat Seyrek
- Publication Date:
- 03-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- European Policy Centre (EPC)
- Abstract:
- The establishment of two new political parties by former AKP heavyweights, Ahmet Davutoğlu and Ali Babacan, in December 2019 and March 2020 respectively is cause for hope. President Erdoğan’s AKP is suffering from mounting domestic headaches and a moribund economy, which is taking a toll on its public support. Still, he is sure to push back fiercely against any effort to weaken AKP rule. The EU must keep its channels of communication with Turkey open and work to improve and deepen their currently contentious relationship.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Politics, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and AKP
- Political Geography:
- Turkey and Mediterranean
76. The Election Official’s Handbook: Six steps local officials can take to safeguard America’s election systems
- Author:
- David Levine
- Publication Date:
- 02-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
- Abstract:
- Intelligence and law enforcement agencies warn that Russia, China, Iran, and other foreign actors will seek to interfere in the 2020 presidential election.1 Foreign actors are increasingly sophisticated at using cyber tools and social media to probe and penetrate electoral infrastructure, manipulate public opinion, and cast doubt on the integrity of the election process. On one hand, the United States is better prepared to address these threats now than during the 2016 presidential election. For example, after the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) designated election systems as critical infrastructure in 2017, it established the Elections Infrastructure Information Sharing and Analysis Center, which enabled states and localities to more easily share information about threats to elections. This mechanism has had the additional benefit of making DHS better at helping states manage risks, as well as distributing information from the federal government to the states about possible threats.2 On the other hand, in many states there are still vulnerabilities in election infrastructure that foreign actors can exploit. These vulnerabilities exist at almost every step of the election administration process, including registering voters, verifying their registration at polling places, securing the devices that capture and tally the vote, transmitting that data to a central location on election night, and executing an accurate recount.3 While states usually make decisions about the rules of elections (policymaking),4 localities are typically responsible for the “nuts and bolts” of running an election — such as finding polling places and recruiting poll workers.5 Local election officials also help preserve the integrity of America’s elections by protecting against hacks into voter rolls and local election websites and working closely with federal and state officials to ensure the security of their voting systems.6 As the February 3, 2020 Iowa Democratic caucuses demonstrated, such vulnerabilities are not merely theoretical. During the caucuses — which were administered by political party officials, not election officials — the new app that the Iowa Democratic Party planned to use to report its caucus results did not work. Many of the nearly 1,700 precinct chairs who were responsible for transmitting the results did not receive training on how to use the app, and a large number appear to have been unable to successfully download it.7 Revisions and updates to the app were made as late as two days before the caucuses, making it nearly impossible to vet and test adequately.8 Although the federal government recently agreed to allocate an additional $425 million in election administration and security funds to state election offices,9 federal resources will likely be insufficient to address all outstanding vulnerabilities before the 2020 presidential election. It is also unclear how much of this funding will be distributed to local elections officials in time for the 2020 presidential election. This handbook, therefore, provides a list of steps that local election officials can implement at relatively little cost to fortify their elections systems before the 2020 presidential election.
- Topic:
- Politics, Elections, and Foreign Interference
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Iran, North America, and United States of America
77. Friends and Enemies: A Framework for Understanding Chinese Political Interference in Democratic Countries
- Author:
- Matt Schrader
- Publication Date:
- 04-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
- Abstract:
- “For our friends, we produce fine wine. Jackals, we welcome with shotguns.” – Ambassador Gui Congyou, 2019 This was how a Chinese ambassador warned Sweden of potential consequences after Stockholm decided to honor a Swedish citizen imprisoned in China with a human rights prize. Ambassador Gui Congyou’s turn of phrase has a long history; it is the final line of a famous 1950s propaganda anthem written to eulogize China’s bloody contest with the United States on the Korean Peninsula.2 Gui’s statement would be easy to dismiss as the words of a single ambassador, but his statement is consistent with two patterns in the Chinese Communist Party’s interactions with the outside world.3 The first is China’s growing global assertiveness under Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping. Prior to Xi’s ascent there were signs that China’s leadership had concluded it was time to put aside Deng Xiaoping’s mantra that China should “hide its brilliance and bide its time.”4 But since Xi came to power in late 2012, party officials have more frequently noted that China is a large, powerful country, and that smaller, less powerful countries oppose its interests at their own risk.5 The second and more enduring theme is the party’s tendency to divide the world into friends and enemies. Inside China, the party’s friends are those who “uphold the leadership of the [Communist Party] and the socialist cause” through support for its policy agenda.6 Outside China, the party’s friends are “foreigners of influence and/or power who assist China’s interests.”7 The party’s enemies are those who publicly question how it chooses to exercise power. The party has operationalized this mindset by developing a sophisticated set of tools and a well-defined body of doctrine to attempt to maintain unchallenged power by “uniting friends” and “isolating enemies.”8 This divide-and-conquer strategy is predicated not only on rewarding friends for their support, but also on coercing the party’s enemies. Within China, coercive tactics include: extralegal detention, limits on public and private speech by individual citizens, control of all forms of media and key sectors of the economy, and cooption of elites by establishing personal and professional costs for opposing the party. This report describes how the party has increasingly employed many of these domestic tools to unite foreign friends and isolate foreign enemies.9 Ambassador Gui’s remarks are but one example in an expanding universe of cases. The threat of losing business in China means that foreign corporations are routinely pressed to censor themselves and their employees to avoid topics the party considers sensitive. Meanwhile, Chinese companies have built and sold the party’s tools of digital authoritarianism in South America, Africa, Asia, and elsewhere. Chinese diplomats have also tried to rally other countries in support of greater governmental control over the flow of digital information inside national borders. In Southeast Asia, party-state linked actors have sought to covertly alter the outcome of elections throughout Southeast Asia, combining cyberespionage prowess with the financial firepower of the PRC’s enormous policy banks.10 And the party has used the same vision of triumphant ethnic solidarity it pushes on its own population to justify its attempts to threaten, censor, and co-opt the Chinese diaspora. In so doing, the party hopes to influence democratic politicians and politics by controlling the external narrative presented of China.
- Topic:
- Politics, Democracy, Foreign Interference, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
- Political Geography:
- China and Asia
78. October Surprise: Simulating a Foreign Interference Crisis on the Eve of the 2020 Election
- Author:
- Nathan Kohlenberg
- Publication Date:
- 10-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
- Abstract:
- The United States, like many other democracies, faces concerted and sophisticated operations aimed at disrupting, delegitimizing, and in some cases altering the outcomes of its elections. While foreign interference operations are not bound by election cycles, elections constitute a unique window of increased vulnerability. To better understand how well U.S. institutions have adapted since the 2016 election, the Alliance for Securing Democracy conducted a table-top exercise to assess potential gaps in policies and practices by government, social media platforms, and campaigns. The exercise also considered the options, challenges, and trade-offs that politicians, policymakers, and corporate officers might face in the days leading up to the 2020 election. The exercise was conducted virtually in July 2020 with a bipartisan group of 14 experts representing senior government, political organizing, and technology industry leaders. The results were clear: information sharing stalled, lines of communication were lacking, and distrust was rampant. Parochial interests and the mitigation of personal and organizational risk often took priority over national interests. Meanwhile, many leaders struggled to gather the information they needed to commit to a course of action. Although a simulation can never capture the complexity of the systems and relationships it aims to approximate, this exercise underscores that there is work to be done to improve resilience in all three sectors analyzed: the U.S. government, professional politics, and the technology sector. Many shortcomings were immediately apparent to the experts who participated, while others became evident in the after-action analysis. Working with the participants and other experts on election interference, we have summarized in this report a number of lessons learned from the exercise in order to spotlight recent progress and remaining challenges. Our simulation strongly suggested that current policies and structures are insufficient to facilitate the cooperation between stakeholders that would be necessary to mitigate a sophisticated information operation targeting the election. In particular, our participants concluded that response mechanisms remained troublingly dependent on the personal integrity of decisionmakers in Washington and Silicon Valley, and current government and social media policies are insufficiently precise and unambiguous to provide clear guidance in many situations, especially as relate to privacy and First Amendment concerns. Nevertheless, the particular course of the exercise and approaches taken by the participants also shed light on what can be done to build greater responsiveness into the range of public and private institutions responsible for ensuring the integrity of our elections.
- Topic:
- National Security, Politics, Elections, and Foreign Interference
- Political Geography:
- United States of America
79. As Israel’s Kingmaker Gets Off the Fence, Gantz Gets a Boost
- Author:
- David Makovksy
- Publication Date:
- 03-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
- Abstract:
- Although Benny Gantz’s party lost the head-to-head battle, Avigdor Liberman’s favorable influence on the coalition math has left the general in a stronger position—and taken some diplomatic weight off the Trump administration’s shoulders. Israel’s third round of elections last week seemed inconclusive at first, but the deadlock may now be broken. Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu did better this time than in September’s round two, but his gains were insufficient to form a new government. Potential kingmaker Avigdor Liberman jettisoned his previous idea of getting the two top parties to join forces; instead, personal antipathy and policy differences have led him to definitely state that he will not join any government Netanyahu leads. Thus, while centrist Blue and White Party leader Benny Gantz may have options to shape a new government, Netanyahu has no pathway on his own. In theory, the center-left bloc has the requisite number of seats for a bare majority in the 120-member Knesset, since anti-Netanyahu forces won 62 seats. In reality, the situation is more complex.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Government, Politics, and Elections
- Political Geography:
- Middle East, Israel, North America, and United States of America
80. Iranian Succession and the Impact of Soleimani’s Death
- Author:
- Mehdi Khalaji
- Publication Date:
- 01-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
- Abstract:
- The general’s peerless domestic stature would have served a crucial mediatory role during the eventual transition to Khamenei’s successor, so his death brings significant uncertainty to that process. Following the assassination of Qasem Soleimani, much attention has been focused on the foreign operations conducted by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-Qods Force. Yet his organization also played a major role at home, one whose future is now unclear. In particular, Soleimani himself was well positioned to be a unifying, steadying figure once Iran faced the challenge of determining a successor to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
- Topic:
- Politics, Military Affairs, Authoritarianism, and Qassem Soleimani
- Political Geography:
- Iraq, Iran, Middle East, and United States of America