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Begin New Search Topic International Trade and Finance Content Type Policy Brief

41. Europe under US Monetary Hegemony: How the COVID-19 Pandemic Will Undermine a 100-Year-Old Relationship

Author:
Brendan Brown
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
This policy study is based on the newly released book, Europe’s Century of Crises under Dollar Hegemony: A Dialogue on the Global Tyranny of Unsound Money, by Brendan Brown and Philippe Simonnot, published by Palgrave Macmillan. One hundred years ago, the United States emerged from the First World War and its immediate aftermath, including the Spanish flu pandemic, as the global monetary hegemon, exercising immense power over the Old Continent. This new power quickly became the source of huge instability in Europe, culminating in the collapse of the Weimar Republic. After World War II, the Bretton Woods system set new contours for US monetary hegemony, ultimately resulting in the great economic crisis of 1973–75. This woeful history continues to the present day: Dollar hegemony has not been a force for good. It could have been different. The United States and Europe would both have gained from a US hegemony based on sound money principle. Instead, the guiding characteristic of US monetary power has been inflation, especially around election time. According to the doctrine made notorious by Treasury Secretary John Connally, who served under President Nixon, “the dollar is our currency but your problem.” The US monetary regime’s further lurch toward fundamental unsoundness during the COVID-19 pandemic is not getting the new century of US monetary hegemony off to a new start. The “known unknown” is whether forces will emerge in Europe that will again challenge US inflationary dominance, as occurred under Germany’s leadership in the 1970s. Could high inflation in the post-pandemic US economy cause US monetary hegemony over Europe to crumble?
Topic:
Economics, International Trade and Finance, History, Monetary Policy, Hegemony, Transatlantic Relations, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America

42. Curbing State-Driven Trade Policies: How to Craft New & Effective Approaches to Counter Distortive Practices

Author:
Wendy Cutler
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
Much attention has been focused on China’s unfair intellectual property practices and the imbalance in the U.S.-China trade relationship, but equally troubling are large-scale Chinese industrial subsidies, the behavior of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and in general, the oversized and opaque role of the Chinese state in the economy. While the U.S-China phase one trade deal tackled some important sources of bilateral tension and aimed to boost Chinese purchases of U.S. goods and services, it was silent on industrial subsidies and related matters, leaving them for the next phase of negotiations, the fate of which is now in question. U.S. concerns on these matters are shared by other trading partners including the European Union (EU) and Japan. Yet despite widespread disapproval of such practices, building new global rules to combat subsidies has proven challenging. This is due to several factors, ranging from gridlock at the WTO, differences of views among like-minded countries on the required level of ambition, and uncertainty as to how best to approach the enormous complexities in China’s subsidies and related policies. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has sought to unpack this complexity, conducting recent studies of Chinese subsidies in two key sectors: aluminum and semiconductors. Both studies illustrate how Chinese subsidies are not simple cash handouts from the state to protected firms so that they can sell at favorable and distorting prices. The OECD finds subsidies can take various forms, including downstream or upstream help that trickles up or down to the firm that’s intended to benefit. They can take the form of favorable equity or debt purchases or bonds provided at below-market rates. And with interconnected global value chains, subsidies can effectively be granted covertly, intended to benefit one firm that might be several links away along the chain. In China, the problem is compounded by an opaque “party-state” structure that obscures not only the recipients of subsidies, but also the source. According to Mark Wu, a Harvard Law School professor who previously served as the Director for Intellectual Property in the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, subsidies not only flow directly from government bodies in Beijing, but also indirectly through informal responses to directives — sometimes even left unsaid, but understood — from the Chinese Communist Party. Against this backdrop, the Asia Society Policy Institute (ASPI) convened two roundtables in the fall of 2019 and the spring of 2020 to discuss how best to build a new rules-based infrastructure that might combat such subsidies and prevent trade-distorting results such as unfair competition, market access barriers, and, above all, overcapacity in global markets. Experts from the private sector, think tanks, governments, and academia weighed in with possible solutions, which included: Negotiating new rules in the WTO; Using the WTO dispute settlement system, despite its often-discussed flaws; Forming ad hoc rules-based approaches, where possible, like the U.S-EU-Japan trilateral initiative; Plurilateral negotiations conducted on a sector-by-sector basis; Forming coalitions of like-minded trading partners to establish an alternative model, much in the way that the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) was framed. During the roundtables, most experts agreed that there is no silver bullet that solves the subsidy and related issues on its own. And most agree that, left unaddressed, the problem is likely to deepen. The COVID-19 pandemic might even exacerbate it by leading to more state involvement in economies around the world and making it hard to discipline Beijing’s practices. Recognizing all of these real challenges that the international trade community faces, the roundtables reached the following key conclusions: Transparency on the scope, level, and nature of industrial subsidies is vital; Efforts to publicize the ongoing work in these areas, particularly that being done by the OECD, should accelerate; Turning research into tangible new policies is a key step; and Persuading China to agree to updated rules will be necessary, given that China is a singular contributor to overcapacity.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Treaties and Agreements, Trade, Industry, and WTO
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

43. Work for Others, not Yourself: Globalization, Protectionism and Europe’s Quest for Strategic Autonomy

Author:
Fredrik Erixon
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
Protectionism and mercantilism are yet again at the centre of global economic policy. “America First” is the guiding ethos in a good part of US international economic policy. Beijing is taking a larger stake in China’s economy and hand out privileges to domestic firms. Europe is increasingly occupied by achieving “strategic autonomy” and to create European champions at the expense of competition. Old and disreputed economic doctrines are getting a new lease on life. Behind this new orientation in international economic policy stands the old idea that a strong economy is an economy not dependent on others. Human prosperity – our story of rags to riches – tells a very different story. Prosperity is generated when people collaborate and improve our collective intelligence. Open economies are much better at creating wealth because they operate by the principle that people should work for others, not themselves. They specialize – and in the process, they get far more dependent on others. Dependency is a factor of success; economic sovereignty is a sure way of depriving people of opportunity and prosperity.
Topic:
International Political Economy, International Trade and Finance, Global Markets, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
United States, China, and Europe

44. Globalization Isn’t in Decline: It’s Changing

Author:
Erik van der Marel
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
Globalization isn’t in decline; it is simply changing. Although the COVID-19 crisis has seen a dramatic decline in goods trade, investments and the movement of people, a new type of globalization is emerging. This “new globalization” is based on digital services, research and development, data, ideas, and other intangibles. This development has been going on for a while and has evolved more rapidly after the previous global financial crisis (GFC) in 2008-9. For instance, the GFC caused digital services trade to significantly “de-link” from goods-related services trade. This pattern illustrates that the COVID-19 crisis will likely mark another break in trade patterns and that future growth in globalization will depend crucially on digital trade and cross-border exchange in intangibles.
Topic:
Globalization, International Political Economy, International Trade and Finance, Digital Economy, R&D, Data, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Global Focus

45. Ambition on Unstable Foundations: The UK Trade Policy Readiness Assessment 2020

Author:
David Henig
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
The UK’s road to an independent trade policy has reached a critical moment. Within the next six months Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) containing long term arrangements and rules could be finalised with the United States and / or European Union, who between them constitute around 65% of UK trade. Talks have also started with Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. Our updated Trade Policy Readiness Assessment suggests that the UK government is not fully ready for this activity. On a scale where 1 suggests no work being undertaken, 3 a stable position to begin talks, and 5 successful delivery, we find problems in seeking consensus, expanding priorities beyond the traditional tariff reduction, and putting in place a realistic implementation plan.
Topic:
International Political Economy, International Trade and Finance, Treaties and Agreements, Free Trade, and Trade
Political Geography:
United Kingdom

46. Discrimination, Exclusion and Environmental Harm: Why EU Lawmakers Need to Ban Freight Transport Restrictions to Save the Single Market

Author:
Matthias Bauer
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
The EU’s Mobility Package 1 legislative proposal was once intended to improve the working conditions of truck and small-van drivers in the EU. Initially, the European Commission also aimed at securing a smooth and non-discriminatory functioning of the Single Market. Some provisions of the current package may indeed have a positive impact on drivers’ working conditions, e.g. limits on working time and obligatory rest periods. However, over the past three years, the legislative procedure towards the current draft of the Mobility Package 1 was hijacked by the protectionist agenda of Western Europe’s haulage and logistics businesses. Spearheaded by the French government, some national governments and Members of the European Parliament called for tighter freight cabotage and return-to-home provisions to shield Western European transport markets against competition from other EU Member States. The proposed restrictions to cross-border trade in the European Single Market are up for a vote in the European Parliament in mid-2020. Learnings from the Covid-19 situation in the Single Market: In its response to Covid-19 border measures, the European Commission called on EU governments “to act immediately to temporarily suspend all types of road access restrictions in place in their territory (weekend bans, night bans, sectoral bans, etc.) for road freight transport and for the necessary free movement of transport workers.” These actions are step in the right direction and should continue even once the Covid-19 crisis is over, yet they are the exception not the rule in the EU. The rise of protectionist measures to Member States’ national transport markets vividly demonstrates the need to abolish freight cabotage restrictions in defence of the Single Market. For the sake of a greener, more inclusive and better functioning of the European Single Market, lawmakers need to abandon all existing restrictions on freight cabotage services in the EU27 and vote against new restrictions such as cooling-off periods and return-to-home policies. Maintaining legal restrictions on the freedom to provide transport services in the EU’s Single Market would increase tensions between economically less-developed countries in Central and Eastern Europe and more developed Western European countries – economically, mentally and politically. Discrimination on the basis of EU passport: Cabotage restrictions infringe upon the fundamental values stipulated in the Lisbon Treaty. Furthermore, data on transport flows and employment demonstrate that cabotage regulations disproportionately discriminate against Eastern European companies and citizens. Available data shows that Polish (4,574 enterprises), Romanian (1,864), Lithuanian (519), Hungarian (398), Slovakian (347), and Dutch (309) haulage companies are disproportionately affected by current EU-imposed cabotage restrictions. By contrast, only a very small number of French freight transport companies (an estimated number of 70 enterprises) directly depend on intra-EU cabotage services. In France, only about 800 workers employed in road freight transport services are directly affected by the restrictions. The numbers are substantially higher for other, particularly Central and Eastern European, countries: 20,100 persons in Poland, 9,800 in Romania, 6,300 in Lithuania, 3,400 in the Netherlands, 2,300 in Portugal, 2,200 in Hungary, and 2,100 in Germany. Exclusion from economic opportunity: Freight cabotage restrictions increase the administrative burden for internationally operating haulage companies across the EU. Industry assessments indicate that additional limitations on international freight transport services within Europe’s Single Market would raise the prices of transporting goods in Western Europe. Negative impacts are estimated for employment, wage growth and the process of economic convergence in Central and Eastern Europe. In addition to the EU’s existing freight cabotage restrictions, new limits on cross-border freight transport in the EU – such as EU law-imposed return-to-home trips and EU-mandated cooling-off periods – would deprive many Eastern European households of economic opportunities and impede the process of economic convergence and converging standards of living in the EU. Environmental harm: The return-to-home policies proposed in the latest Mobility Package 1 would require companies to send drivers back to operational centres or the driver’s place of residence. Return-to-home provisions would substantially increase the number of empty trailers on European roads. Accordingly, and adding to the adverse environmental impacts caused by existing freight cabotage restrictions, new EU-imposed return-to-home obligations would deteriorate Member States’ carbon emission footprints. The highest increases would take place in the EU’s major transit countries such as Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and France. While this is recognised by the European Commission, the majority of the European Parliament’s Transport Committee is still pushing for such policies to be implemented as the EU law. How to save the EU’s fundamental values and the freedoms of the Single Market – lessons from aviation: In 1993, the EU completed the EU’s internal aviation market for passenger cabotage. Guided by the European Commission, EU lawmakers should follow the same rationale for freight cabotage services to render the Single Market more single and less discriminatory. In the process towards a real, more inclusive Single Market, EU lawmakers must abstain from catering Western European companies’ vested commercial interests, which stifle economic opportunity across the EU and stand in opposition to the EU’s fundamental principles for international trade and a competitive and social market economy.
Topic:
International Political Economy, International Trade and Finance, Law, European Union, Global Markets, Legislation, Shipping, and Protectionism
Political Geography:
Europe

47. Remolding China’s ‘Empty’ Belt and Road Initiative: An Opportunity for the EU

Author:
Jasper Roctus
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
China’s controversial Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been subject to ample scrutiny since its inception in 2013. Practical results could be said to be severely lacking in contrast to the project’s ambitious plans. Chinese engagement abroad has irrefutably intensified since Xi Jinping assumed power in 2012, but whether this can be classified as the fruits of BRI remains unclear. China, in fact, is developing BRI on the go. That gives the EU an opportunity to engage with BRI and remold it into a more desirable form. Because China increasingly sees Europe as BRI’s “final destination”, the EU has a lot more leverage than it commonly assumes.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Infrastructure, Hegemony, European Union, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

48. Central Bank Digital Currencies: Tools for an Inclusive Future?

Author:
Eve Lee
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs) have rapidly evolved from a sci-fi concept to a plausible alternative to cash that is being studied by central banks all over the world. According to a Belfer Center tracker, over 50 central banks have pursued or are engaging in CBDC work as of August 2020. However, while 10 central banks have already piloted or announced plans to pilot a CBDC in the near term, most are in the early stages of research and experimentation. In this brief, we outline the common motivations driving central bank work on CBDCs. We then explore CBDCs’ potential impacts on financial inclusion, a primary motivation in developing and emerging markets that has also gained significant traction in developed economies during the COVID-19 related global recession. We conclude that for CBDCs to achieve its financial inclusion goals, more technical advancement in offline adaptability and policy deliberations around issues of identity and traceability are needed.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Economics, International Trade and Finance, International Affairs, and Monetary Policy
Political Geography:
Global Focus

49. The US–China trade deal and its impact on China’s key trading partners

Author:
Sonali Chowdhry and Gabriel Felbermayr
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
The US–China Economic and Trade Agreement (ETA) entered into force on 14th February 2020, marking a new phase in their protracted trade and geopolitical rivalry. The ETA includes specific targets for increased Chinese imports of US goods and services, amounting to 200 bn USD over 2020 and 2021. The authors show that these purchase commitments can generate substantial trade diversion effects and market share shifts for China’s top trading partners. In manufacturing, Germany is likely to experience the greatest trade diversion effects in a number of industries such as vehicles (-1.28 bn USD), aircraft (-1.59 bn USD) and industrial machinery (-0.72 bn USD). Moreover, developing countries will be hit if China re-directs its imports towards US suppliers. E.g. Brazil could experience a reduction of 4.95 bn USD in soybeans exports to China in 2021 as a result of the ETA.
Topic:
International Political Economy, International Trade and Finance, Exports, Trade, Trade Policy, and Imports
Political Geography:
United States and China

50. The European Union and its model to regulate international trade relations

Author:
Danièle Hervieu-Léger
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
The European Union is one of the main promoters of free trade agreements (FTAs). This position is not new: since the mid-2000s, and even more so in the decade now ending, the Commission, supported by the Council and the European Parliament, has constantly sought to negotiate and conclude new trade agreements. This strategy has paid off. In 2018, almost a third of trade between Europe and the rest of the world was covered by the preferential provisions of an FTA, a figure that is expected to increase significantly in 2020, following the entry into force of the agreement with Vietnam, and to rise in the coming years to more than 40% if the agreements currently being negotiated with Mercosur, the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and possibly the United Kingdom come into force.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, European Union, Free Trade, and Trade
Political Geography:
Europe