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Begin New Search Topic Defense Policy Content Type Policy Brief

201. UN Funding Cuts for Peacekeeping Have Consequences for Ghana: After sixty years of UN peacekeeping

Author:
Fiifi Edu-Afful, Kwesi Aning, Emma Birikorang, Maya Mynster Christensen, Naila Salihu, and Peter Albrecht
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Contributing personnel to UN peacekeepinghas been central to Ghana’s foreign policy andessential in shaping the country’s security sector. However, with the police and militarystill facing considerable challenges at home, and with the prospect of funding for UN peacekeeping missions being cut, Ghana’s domestic stability might be affected. RECOMMENDATIONS ■ Peacekeeping experiences should be used more forcefully to create accountability among Ghana’s security forces. ■ There should be a comprehensive review of Ghana’s approach to international peacekeeping with a view to understanding and articulating more clearly the relationship between strategic foreign-policy objectives and the provision of domestic security. ■ The UN and troop-contributing countries should make an effort to understand the implications for them both of planned cuts in peacekeeping budgets.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Democratization, Development, Non State Actors, Fragile States, Violence, Peace, and Justice
Political Geography:
Africa and Ghana

202. Ghana's Peacekeeping Efforts Abroad Have an Impact at Home: The Many Implications of UN Peacekeeping

Author:
Festus Aubyn, Kwesi Aning, Emma Birikorang, Fiifi Edu-Afful, Maya Mynster Christensen, and Peter Albrecht
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
The UN deploys thousands of peacekeepers in support of peace processes and state-building in countries and regions that are emerging from conflict. The example of Ghana shows that the impacts of these missions are not just felt in countries that host UN missions, but also in those that provide them with troops. Recommendations ■ The Ghanaian government should conduct a comprehensive assessment of the impacts of peacekeeping on the country’s security sector in order to inform its contributions to the UN in the future. ■ The Ghanaian army and police should continue to build on the lessons learned from deploying security personnel abroad and maintain their focus on consolidating the democratic and accountable foundations of the security sector. ■ The UN should build a stronger understanding of how countries that contribute to peace- keeping missions are affected politically, financially and in respect of their security by making these contributions.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Democratization, Development, Non State Actors, Fragile States, Violence, Peace, Police, and Justice
Political Geography:
Africa and Ghana

203. We Need to Distinguish Between Local and Globalist Foreign Fighters

Author:
Maja Touzari Greenwood
Publication Date:
03-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
The broad definition of the term ‘foreign fighter’ causes operational problems for risk assessments. It is therefore important for security officials to identify significant variations by classifying actors into major categories. RECOMMENDATIONS ■When assessing the risk of continued security threats from foreign fighters, it is crucial to distinguish strategically between foreign fighters who join local rebel groups and those who join globalist groups. ■Ways should be provided for foreign fighters who have joined local rebel groups to ‘opt out’ and return home after the end of fighting in order to discourage them from becoming globalist foreign fighters and to stem potential flows of foreign fighters to new theatres of conflict.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Terrorism, and Fragile States
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

204. Inside the Russian Digital Domain: Plug in, plug out

Author:
Flemming Splidsboel Hansen
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
The digital domain is an arena of opportunity for Russia in which to attempt to achieve its various objectives. However, it is also a source of threat, as it contains the possibility of attacks on Russia’s digital infrastructure, including the ability to send a relatively uninterrupted flow of information to the public. The continued development of artificial intelligence has the potential to upset the system, and Russia, which will trail the leading states within this field, is still in the early phases of formulating a response to this challenge. Recommendations ■ Remember that the digital domain in Russia is seen not only as an arena of opportunity, but also as a source of threat to the state (or rather to the regime). ■ Be prepared for Russia to think creatively to minimize the gap separating it from the world’s leaders in the development of AI. ■ Be prepared for Russia to work for an international regime restricting the use of AI for military purposes.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Power Politics, and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

205. Achieving a Sustainable Peace in Yemen Lies with Locally Driven Initiatives

Author:
Maria-Louise Clausen
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
The conflict in Yemen will not be solved by a peace agreement between the Houthis and the internationally recognized government due to the increased fragmentation of internal political and economic structures. RECOMMENDATIONS ■Denmark is well positioned to take on a bigger role in pushing for a sustainable peace agreement and a realistic transitional framework. ■Denmark should prioritize building close links with local actors. ■Denmark should support and empower local authorities and communities in parallel with an effort to build the capacity of the Yemeni state.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Non State Actors, and Fragile States
Political Geography:
Yemen and Gulf Nations

206. Can China Buy Peace? Money and Security in the South China Sea

Author:
Yang Jiang
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Despite China’s strong economic influence over Southeast Asian countries, tensions in the South China Sea have been flaring up again this year, as domestic oppositions and external interventions create dilemma for Southeast Asian governments. RECOMMENDATIONS ■ When considering joining the freedom of navigation operations in the SCS Denmark should consider that foreign interference will likely escalate Chinese military activities. ■ Denmark’s delicate relationship with the US and China must be carefully evaluated and managed. ■As a major maritime nation it is important for Denmark to secure a free sea through diplomacy and UN institutions. ■European countries have much room to enhance their contribution to regional development in Southeast Asia.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, International Organization, History, Power Politics, Economy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
China and Asia

207. Denmark's China Challenge

Author:
Luke Patey
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
A common refrain in Denmark is that China is too far away to be a threat to Danish economic, foreign and security policy interests. This is no longer the case. Danish policy-makers acknowledge that China’s rise as a global superpower presents Denmark with new challenges. However, transforming this strategic thinking into practice is no simple task. Recommendations Intensify cooperation between the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs to ensure Denmark’s initiatives in foreign policy, security and economic relations with China are more closely integrated. Beware of the bilateral. Beijing’s new assertive foreign policy and US-China strategic competition require that Denmark leverage its interests increasingly through the EU, NATO and other multilateral bodies. Assess the economic vulnerabilities of Danish industries in China and diversify trade and investment across Asia’s emerging markets and developed economies in the G7/EU.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Power Politics, Bilateral Relations, Cybersecurity, and Global Political Economy
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and Denmark

208. The Impact of Remote Surveillance in Iraq: A tool of coercion or public security

Author:
Maria-Louise Clausen
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
The state of Iraq is struggling to exert control over its territory. As a result, remote surveillance is being used to enhance the effectiveness of policing. However, constant surveillance may have a negative impact on emerging state–society relations. RECOMMENDATIONS ■ Invest in research focusing on the impact of surveillance on state–society relations in the Global South. ■ Work to introduce transparency in the use of surveillance in the Global South. ■ Encourage a discussion of issues of privacy and the regulation of airspace in the Global South.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Fragile States, Surveillance, Violence, and Justice
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, and Global South

209. Defense Transparency Index 2019

Author:
IGCC
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
Abstract:
In an increasingly volatile world, mutual trust and confidence among defense establishments is critical. Growing arms competition and security anxiety in Northeast Asia, one of the most strategically important but politically volatile regions of the world, is increasing the demand for defense information, not only from governments and militaries but also from businesses, the media, and concerned citizens. The Defense Transparency Index (DTI), a project of the University of California’s Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, ranks six countries on their efforts to promote transparency in defense and national security. Included in the Index are the People’s Republic of China, Japan, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), and the Republic of Korea, along with the external major powers most involved in the region—the United States and Russia. What constitutes “defense transparency” is contested, and there is a lack of agreed-upon definitions and standardized means of measurement. The DTI addresses this gap by providing a framework for defining and measuring defense transparency. We rank countries across eight indicators to come up with overall rankings and for each country, providing a rigorous measurement of this essential but contested concept. Countries score well for budgetary disclosures, issuance of defense white papers, and being transparent on their military capabilities. The DTI is presented at the annual Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD), a multilateral forum for track-two diplomacy. NEACD, which was founded by Susan Shirk, seeks to reduce the risk of military conflict in the region and to lay the groundwork for an official multilateral process in Northeast Asia by providing a regular channel of informal communication among the six governments.
Topic:
Defense Policy, International Cooperation, and Transparency
Political Geography:
Russia, Japan, China, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

210. A New Dimension of Air-Based Threats: Germany, the EU, and NATO Need New Political Initiatives and Military Defense Systems

Author:
Torben Schütz, Christian Mölling, and Zoe Stanley-Lockman
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
The range of air-based threats is expanding with considerable speed and intensity. The main reason is the proliferation of technologies and weapons systems. Germany could play a leading role in the necessary adaptation of arms control regimes and in the development of new air defense capabilities. To this end, Germany should initiate a PESCO project on short-range air defense and an air defense capability cluster within NATO.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Military Strategy, and European Union
Political Geography:
Europe and Germany

211. The Compact Roadmap: Towards a New Level of Professionalization in Civilian CSDP

Author:
Carina Böttcher
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
EU member states agreed the Civilian CSDP Compact in late 2018 to breathe new life into EU civilian crisis management. Its 22 commitments are a response to a double challenge: a rapidly changing security environment and persistent shortfalls in the planning, deployment, and conduct of missions. Implementation will be challenging. Political momentum depends on producing tangible results early on, notably through National Implementation Plans and a workable Civilian Capability Review process.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, European Union, Crisis Management, and Professionalism
Political Geography:
Europe

212. A Europe that Protects? U.S. Opportunities in EU Defense

Author:
Seth Johnston
Publication Date:
11-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Europe is pursuing significant new defense initiatives that span capability development, policy, and institutional cooperation. Many of these efforts occur under the auspices of the European Union and are part of the EU’s longstanding aim to grow itself as a security and foreign policy actor. But real security challenges in Europe—from Russian aggression to terrorism and regional instability—have contributed to the importance and potential of European efforts. The political dynamics of the transatlantic relationship may also favor Europe’s initiatives: although the Trump administration’s calls for greater European defense spending have rankled European leaders and U.S. officials have legitimate concerns about the details of EU initiatives, the larger issue of strengthening European defense is consistent with U.S. goals. The EU’s security and defense efforts have implications for the transatlantic economy and defense industry, the NATO alliance, and U.S.-European relations generally. While the United States should work to ensure continued transatlantic defense policy coordination, secure and competitive markets for the defense industry, and preservation of the longstanding principle of ‘no duplication’ with NATO, it should also broadly support European efforts to invest more and more wisely on defense. Both the United States and Europe stand to benefit from greater European defense investment and capability. The history of intra-European and transatlantic differences over European defense cooperation endures in the EU’s current efforts. But today’s environment favors change and represents a rare opportunity for bold action.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, International Security, Europe, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America

213. Military Offensive Cyber-Capabilities: Small-State Perspectives

Author:
Lilly Pijnenburg Muller
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
This Policy Brief provides an overview of the military cyber-defence strategies and capabilities of Norway and of the Netherlands. Comparison of the two different approaches offers insights into their differing tactics and future policy directions. The Brief contributes with a small-state perspective on this malleable and constantly changing field, nuancing the hitherto US-centred debate on the utility and need for deterrence and defence in cyberspace.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Affairs, Cybersecurity, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Norway, Netherlands, and United States of America

214. Why Franco-German leadership on European defense is not in sight

Author:
Barbara Kunz
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Emmanuel Macron, already as a presidential candidate, bet heavily on Europe and the Franco-German tandem. This choice, which required a certain amount of political capital, resulted in a number of initiatives, many of them outlined in his September 2017 Sorbonne speech. It also resulted in the bilateral Aachen Treaty Macron and Angela Merkel signed in January 2019, intended to renew the 1963 Elysée Treaty. But the pomp surrounding the signing ceremony in Aachen barely hides the fact that things are not going too well in Franco-German relations. Frustration with Berlin has reached new peaks in Paris, not least due to Germany’s failure to provide an “answer” to Macron’s vision for Europe. When the Christian Democrats’ new president, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, wrote a debate article in March 2019, this was widely considered too little too late – in addition to the protocol faux pas of a party president without any government position responding to a head of state. It seems clear that Germany is not willing to embark on a great journey toward “refounding Europe” together with Macron’s France, although Paris and Berlin of course do cooperate on many issues.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and NATO
Political Geography:
Europe, France, and Germany

215. Breaking the Defense Barrier

Author:
Arthur Herman
Publication Date:
03-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The key to strengthening and deepening the U.S.-Japan alliance in order to better meet regional threats is to increase defense trade and defense industrial cooperation between the two countries. A Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty (DTCT), a formal agreement between two countries which exempts their trade in certain specified defense and defense-related articles from the arms export regulations of both nations, would be an important way to achieve that goal.
Topic:
International Relations, Defense Policy, Treaties and Agreements, Bilateral Relations, and Trade
Political Geography:
East Asia, Asia, North America, and United States of America

216. NATO and Asymmetric Threats: A Blueprint for Defense and Deterrence

Author:
Brittany Beaulieu and David Salvo
Publication Date:
07-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Russia is increasingly turning its asymmetric arsenal on NATO allies to attack the credibility of the Alliance, undermine democratic institutions across member states, and disrupt NATO cohesion on a variety of policy and security issues. Despite falling below the threshold of conventional warfare, asymmetric threats are designed to weaken the security of the Alliance and individual allies, as well as destabilize allied governments and societies. NATO has taken some measures to address hybrid threats; however, NATO needs a more comprehensive strategy to counter the growing threat that asymmetric interference poses. The NATO Brussels Summit taking place July 11 and 12 presents an important opportunity on this front. To better position itself to tackle these challenges, the Alliance should: (1) elevate discussion of hybrid threats in the North Atlantic Council (NAC), permit allies to invoke Article 4 when confronted with hybrid threats to share information and request assistance through hybrid response teams, and internally clarify thresholds for coordinated response in times of hybrid crises; (2) work with NATO allies and with the EU to ensure the optimal utilization of resources and expertise in combating asymmetric threats; (3) develop stronger public-private partnerships to address asymmetric threats outside the purview of the Alliance; (4) invest in resources to improve resilience in individual member states, as mandated by Article 3; and (5) issue a declaratory statement that hybrid, asymmetric tactics pose a serious threat to the Alliance and that allies will respond appropriately.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, European Union, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

217. Stepping up Synergies of the Danish Comprehensive Approach: The Peace and Stabilization Fund

Author:
Jessica Larsen and Christine Nissen
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
The Danish Peace and Stabilisation Fund is a prime example of how to combine civilian and military instruments to address conflicts in fragile states. However, there is still room for stepping up synergies of the military-civilian balance in Denmark’s comprehensive conflict management. Recommendations ■ Increase the frequency of formal feedback between the field and the strategic level of the PSF to avoid loss of knowledge. ■ Synergies between civilian and military instruments should take place through complimentary-but-separate interventions. ■ Take PSF instruments into account when planning Denmark’s broader engagement in conflicts to ensure a more comprehensive security policy effort.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Democratization, Development, Non State Actors, Fragile States, Violence, Peace, Police, and Justice
Political Geography:
Europe and Denmark

218. European strategic autonomy: Policy Brief Going it alone?

Author:
Margriet Drent
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
With the boost that has been given to the EU’s defence policy, some of the St. Malo reflexes have reoccurred in Washington. Mostly, there are some misgivings in the United States about the exact meaning of ‘European strategic autonomy’, as it featured in the 2016 EU Global Strategy. But also in Europe, it is not clear what strategic autonomy means. In light of the increasing uncertainty among the EU and European NATO-members about the solidity of the American security guarantees, strategic autonomy gains a new quality. If Europe were forced ‘to go it alone’, what would that take, both in terms of conventional and nuclear capabilities? In her latest Policy Brief author Margriet Drent concludes that European countries face a dilemma: they have to simultaneously invest in their strategic autonomy and in keeping the United States committed to their security.
Topic:
International Relations, Defense Policy, European Union, and Autonomy
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America

219. The risks of being an ally

Author:
Jakub M. Godzimirski
Publication Date:
11-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
States join security alliances to increase their level of security vis-à-vis neighbours that may pose a threat. The deterrence logic that was the main rationale for joining NATO in 1949 still represents the cornerstone of Norway’s security policy. However, belonging to a military alliance can also pose challenges. This policy brief focuses on some possible negative spillover effects that could emerge from being member of a military alliance. The focus here is on current challenges within NATO, and the possible implications for Norway. First, we present a broader conceptual framework. What are the internal and external challenges facing NATO? How do NATO and its members deal with them? We then proceed to the implications for Norway. Due to structural factors that shape relations in Norway’s strategic environment – including the location of Russian strategic bases close to the border, and the clear asymmetry in capabilities – negative developments in other regions and theatres may influence Norwegian security directly. We argue that, in order to minimize the likelihood of negative trends spilling over to Norway’s strategic neighbourhood, it is important to communicate the special features of this neighbourhood clearly to other members of the alliance. Further, to facilitate intra-alliance trust and cohesion, Norway should also emphasize NATO’s internal, shared value-base, in order to make the alliance better prepared to meet external security challenges.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

220. Policing Practices in a Global Perspective

Author:
Peter Albrecht
Publication Date:
12-2017
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Policing in the global North and the global South is becoming more alike. An increasingly common characteristic is the blurring of boundaries between rule-based and more personalized policing styles. Reasons for this approximation include a growing focus on fighting or preventing radicalisation globally, and a general debureaucratisation of policing that has occurred in the global North.
Topic:
Defense Policy and International Affairs
Political Geography:
Global Focus

221. Beyond NORAD and Modernization to North American Defence Evolution

Author:
Andrea Charron and James Fergusson
Publication Date:
05-2017
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
While most attention on NORAD and North American defence cooperation is focused on the modernization of the North Warning System (NWS), significant developments have occurred that suggest modernization will be accompanied by significant evolutionary changes to the Command. The new threat environment, centered upon Russian behaviour in Crimea, Ukraine and Syria, a new Russian strategic doctrine, and a new generation of advanced Russian long-range cruise missiles dictate not only layered, multi-sensor early warning system, but also changes in NORAD command arrangements. In addition, the maritime component of the cruise missile threat, alongside continuing concerns of terrorists employing freighters as cruise missile platforms, raise the question whether NORAD should evolve into a binational air-maritime defence command. These considerations are central to the ongoing Evolution of North American Defence (EVONAD) study, emanating from the Canada-US Permanent Joint Board on Defence, under the lead of NORAD, in collaboration with the Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC) and US Northern Command (the tri-command structure). The final result is difficult to predict. However, it is clear that both modernization and evolution will be driven by the militaries engaged, with civilian authorities guiding the process, and the public and Canadian government not paying attention.
Topic:
International Relations, Defense Policy, and International Security
Political Geography:
Canada

222. Minsk-Beijing: What Kind of Strategic Partnership?

Author:
Anaïs Marin
Publication Date:
06-2017
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Since they signed a “comprehensive strategic partnership” agreement in 2013, military-industrial cooperation has intensified, thereby substantiating Belarusian hopes for closer ties with China, which are meant to counterbalance Minsk’s complex relations with Moscow and Brussels. In the eyes of its Chinese partners, however, Belarus seems to enjoy only limited appeal compared with other central and eastern European (CEE) countries, which are more advanced on the road to economic transformation and better integrated into the global system
Topic:
International Relations, Defense Policy, and International Affairs
Political Geography:
China

223. Iran Is ‘On Notice’—What’s Next?

Author:
Brian Katulis and Muath Al Wari
Publication Date:
04-2017
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
President Donald Trump has pledged to address Iran’s destabilizing policies in the Middle East. His first national security adviser, Michael Flynn, infamously put Iran “on notice” in early February.1 But more than two months into his presidency, it has become clear that the Trump administration lacks a comprehensive strategy to deal effectively with Iran while moving forward in the fight against the Islamic State, or IS, and long-term efforts to stabilize the region. Already, the United States risks ramping up military operations in a way that could contribute to the fragmentation of the Middle East’s state system and open the space for the continued rise of nonstate actors. Without a broader regional strategy that links military approaches to diplomatic efforts in conflict resolution, tactical and operational shifts in U.S. military policy in the Middle East could make the region even more unstable.2 Congress, then, should adopt a look-before-you-leap approach when it comes to the idea of new sanctions against Iran.3 Such an approach would allow Congress to carefully hone any new measures to deal effectively with Iran’s policies. Congress also has an important role in asking tough questions about proposed increased military operations in places such as Yemen, Syria, and Iraq.4 Furthermore, Congress should carefully scrutinize Trump’s proposed budget cuts to funding for national security institutions central to the fight for stability in the Middle East. These cuts would prolong the fight against ISIS and weaken America’s hand in dealing with Iran using a multifaceted, integrated approach.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

224. Reckless Endangerment: President Trump and the Use of Military Force

Author:
Peter Juul and Ken Gude
Publication Date:
05-2017
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
During his first 100 days in office, it has become clear that President Donald Trump views military force as his primary—if not only—foreign policy tool. From a botched special operations raid in Yemen to a cruise missile strike against an Assad-regime airfield in Syria, Trump has proven more than willing to order America’s armed forces into action. Moreover, his administration’s proposed “hard-power budget” cuts U.S. State Department funding by more than one-quarter to help pay for a $54 billion increase in military spending.1 President Trump’s reliance on military force at the literal expense of America’s other foreign policy tools is bad policy. No U.S. foreign policy failure this century has been due to insufficient military power. Having chosen to buy more ammunition rather than fully fund the Department of State—something his own secretary of defense, James Mattis, advised against when he served as the commander of American forces in the Middle East—Trump is painting America into a dangerous corner.2 In crisis situations, he will be faced with a stark choice between using military force or backing down.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Military Intervention, and Conflict
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

225. Trump’s First 100 Days in the Middle East

Author:
Daniel Benaim
Publication Date:
04-2017
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
The 10th week of Donald Trump’s presidency began with his aides’ declaration that America no longer sought the departure of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad.1 It ended with missile strikes on Assad’s bases.2 The sharp shifts in Trump’s approach were a reminder that, even under the best of circumstances, the first 100 days of any presidency represent a work in progress—a moment of fluidity as campaign rhetoric gives way to governing realities; policy reviews give way to articulated strategy; and, if a president hopes to succeed, a vital window to reflect on early lessons learned.3 To date, President Trump’s actions in the Middle East have told a starkly different story from his bombastic rhetoric. While his process has been erratic, his initial policy approach to the region as president has been marked less by wholesale departures from former President Barack Obama’s policies than by shifts in emphasis that, unless corrected, risk longer-term damage to U.S. interests and regional stability.4 Trump’s limited strikes in Syria in early April are illustrative: While many cast the decision to launch limited strikes in Syria as a stark departure, Trump rushed to reassert his earlier hands-off policy regarding Syria’s civil war.5
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Leadership, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:
Middle East, North America, and United States of America

226. An Alliance in Crisis: Europe Needs to Act Quickly to Defend Itself

Author:
Max Bergmann
Publication Date:
06-2017
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
President Donald Trump’s European trip has thrown the trans-Atlantic alliance into crisis. The president’s unwillingness to reaffirm the U.S. commitment to Article 5 of the NATO treaty—that an attack on one NATO member is an attack on all—not only has revealed that America has become an unreliable ally but also has cast doubt on the integrity of NATO’s Article 5 and therefore the alliance itself. This is incredibly dangerous, as Europe is facing a clear and present security threat from the Russian Federation. Weakness invites aggression, and President Trump’s disdain for the alliance, as well as his apparent desire to appease Russia by removing sanctions,1 is practically inviting Russian President Vladimir Putin to test the strength of America’s Article 5 commitment. For the past 70 years, Europe has relied on America to guarantee its security, but should Putin instigate a security crisis, Europe will not be able to count on a Trump-led America to deter Russia or to come to Europe’s aid. Europe may now be on its own. Yet in this volatile and dangerous geopolitical moment, Europe is presently not ready or able to ensure its own defense. It needs to act fast.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Military Strategy, and Regionalism
Political Geography:
Europe

227. A Responsible Approach to North Korea

Author:
Kelly Magsamen, Melanie Hart, Michael Fuchs, and Vikram Singh
Publication Date:
11-2017
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
Kim Jong Un’s reckless and illegal nuclear and missile programs pose a serious and growing threat to U.S. national security and the security of U.S. allies. His refusal to abide by U.N. Security Council resolutions has rallied the world against him. Unfortunately, President Donald Trump is bucking this international consensus with his reckless and contradictory statements. This dynamic is both dangerous and counterproductive; it increases the risk of miscalculation on the Korean Peninsula and squanders an opportunity to press North Korea back into a diplomatic process. There are no perfect solutions to the challenge North Korea poses. The country has made rapid progress on nuclear weapons that it deems critical to its survival. Yet the United States has deterred and contained North Korea for decades, preventing another devastating war on the peninsula. To prevent war and get back to diplomacy aimed at addressing North Korea’s threats, the United States needs a more responsible approach: aggressive diplomacy with a strong team; active U.S. efforts to reassure allies of America’s commitment to their security and to smart deterrence of North Korea; and concrete steps to isolate North Korea from the global economy. This policy approach could reduce the chances of unintended conflict, protect U.S. national security interests, and open a pathway to curb North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

228. Why Cyber Operations Do Not Always Favor the Offense

Author:
Rebecca Slayton
Publication Date:
02-2017
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Bottom Lines: Creating unnecessary vulnerabilities. Making offensive cyber operations a national priority can increase instabilities in international relations and worsen national vulnerabilities to attack. But because the skills needed for offense and defense are similar, military offensive readiness can be maintained by focusing on defensive operations that make the world safer, rather than on offensive operations. Managing complexity. The ease of both offense and defense increases as organizational skills and capability in managing complex technology improve; it declines as the complexity of cyber operations rises. What appears to be offensive advantage is primarily a result of the offense’s relatively simple goals and the defense’s poor management. Assessing kinetic effects. It is often more expensive for the offense to achieve kinetic effects—for instance, sabotaging machinery—than for the defense to prevent them. An empirical analysis of the Stuxnet cyberattacks on Iran’s nuclear enrichment facilities shows that Stuxnet likely cost the offense more than the defense and was relatively ineffective.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, International Security, Nuclear Power, and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:
Middle East and North America

229. FROM EU STRATEGY TO DEFENCE SERIES New kid on the block The European Commission and European defence

Author:
Dick Zandee
Publication Date:
12-2016
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
The newly launched European Defence Action Plan (EDAP) opens the door to EU spending on defence. This Policy Brief analyses why the EDAP has been launched, what it is and how it will work in practice. It argues that the plan is a step change in the European Commission’s growing involvement in defence and a potential game changer in solving the problem of European military shortfalls. European capitals should therefore embrace the new kid on the block and make full use of the potential offered by the EDAP.
Topic:
Defense Policy, International Political Economy, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
Europe and Global Focus

230. Defence industrial policy in Belgium and the Netherlands

Author:
Dick Zandee
Publication Date:
10-2016
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
Belgium and the Netherlands work closely together in defence. Both countries for example have a combined naval command; they also have single schools and maintenance facilities for their M-frigates and minehunters. Yet, the Belgian and Dutch defence industries are quite different. This report, issued by the Armaments Industry European Research Group (Ares), compares the defence industrial policies of both countries. Clingendael senior research fellow Dick Zandee has contributed to the report by writing the sections on the Netherlands.
Topic:
International Relations, Defense Policy, International Security, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
Belgium and Netherlands

231. On Political Forgiveness: Some Preliminary Reflections

Author:
Wendy Sherman
Publication Date:
06-2016
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
This policy brief examines political forgiveness, when countries or groups are able to reconcile or set aside historic enmities. The inability to overcome longstanding grievances—however justified and deeply rooted—often undermine a group’s or nation’s current core interests. This lack of forgiveness manifests throughout the world: tribal warfare in South Sudan, hostility between Saudi Arabia and Iran, seemingly irreconcilable differences within the European neighborhood, and the failure to reach a two-state solution between Israelis and Palestinians. Deep animus often seems to take precedence over interests. What conditions are necessary for political forgiveness, and through what process is it achieved? How is it that some countries, like Germany, have been able to find their way through this thicket, while others, such as Japan, have not—or at least not to a comparable extent? And, in cases of genocide, such as Rwanda, where political forgiveness may well be impossible, should the international community more purposefully examine the social license extended to victims? Ambassador Wendy Sherman makes the case that insights from frameworks of personal forgiveness can help nations seize the moment when their interests align and, accordingly, move to achieve political forgiveness. First, the process of forgiveness requires a sense of justice—victims must feel that perpetrators have been held accountable and will no longer be able to hurt them. It must also be a deep, extended undertaking: when perpetrators offer only superficial acknowledgments of the victims’ pain and attempt to move on quickly, victims perceive those efforts as perfunctory, even disingenuous. Additionally, countries must reestablish genuine, ongoing contact to overcome narratives of “the other” that inhibit forgiveness. They should not assume, however, that political forgiveness will proceed as a linear, three-part process in which the perpetrator issues an apology, the victim accepts the apology, and the two subsequently cultivate their ties on the basis of aligned national interests. This examination finds that the process works best in the reverse order: only upon discerning that their strategic interests happen to align do conflicting countries begin to move toward reconciliation and forgiveness.
Topic:
International Relations, Defense Policy, International Security, and Forgiveness
Political Geography:
Europe and Asia-Pacific

232. Beyond Camp David: A Gradualist Strategy to Upgrade the US-Gulf Security Partnership

Author:
Bilal Y. Saab and Barry Pavel
Publication Date:
05-2015
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
President Barack Obama's summit meeting with Gulf leaders at Camp David on May 14 will end in failure if the administration does not propose a substantial upgrade in US-Gulf security relations that is as bold and strategically significant as the nuclear agreement–and likely formal deal–with Iran. While the summit will not suddenly eliminate mistrust and resolve all differences, it presents an historic opportunity to put back on track a decades-old US-Gulf partnership that has served both sides and the region well, yet lately has experienced deep turbulence. Failure to strengthen these ties will have consequences, the most dramatic of which could be the acceleration of the regional order's collapse. In a March 2015 Atlantic Council report entitled Artful Balance: Future US Defense Strategy and Force Posture in the Gulf, we made the case for a mutual defense treaty between the United States and willing Arab Gulf partners. In this issue in focus, we offer a more comprehensive and detailed assessment of the risks, concerns, benefits, and opportunities that would be inherent in such a treaty. We recommend a gradualist approach for significantly upgrading US-Gulf security relations that effectively reduces the risks and maximizes the benefits of more formal US security commitments to willing Arab Gulf states.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
Iran and Persian Gulf

233. Reimagining Pakistan’s Militia Policy

Author:
Yelena Biberman
Publication Date:
04-2015
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Abstract:
If ever a turning point seemed inevitable in Pakistan's militia policy, it was in the aftermath of the Peshawar school massacre in December 2014. Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) killed 152 people, 133 of them children, in the bloodiest terrorist attack in Pakistan's history. The carnage sparked an unprecedented national dialogue about the costs and contradictions of the Pakistani political and military establishment's reliance on violent proxies, such as the Afghan Taliban (from which the TTP originates), for security. Why does Pakistan continue to differentiate between "good" and "bad" militias in the face of the Peshawar massacre? What are the costs of playing the good-bad militia game? What can be done to end Pakistan's dependency on armed nonstate groups? In "Reimagining Pakistan's Militia Policy," Visiting Assistant Professor of Government at Skidmore College and US-Pakistan Program Exchange Fellow at the Atlantic Council's South Asia Center, argues that Pakistan's unwillingness to crack down on all terrorist groups is more a product of cold calculation than ideological shortsightedness. Understanding Pakistan's close relationship with militias requires recognizing the strategic logic through which many states outsource violence.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Politics, Terrorism, Military Affairs, and Taliban
Political Geography:
Pakistan

234. The Silence of the Guns: Can the Cease-Fire in Donbass Last?

Author:
Stanislav Secrieru
Publication Date:
11-2015
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
For the first time since the outbreak of the war in Donbass, the situation on the frontline is nearly a proper cease-fire. This is the outcome of the interplay of three factors: the political-military balance in Donbass, sanctions and Russia’s military intervention in Syria. Nevertheless, it is premature to assume that military options in Donbass are no longer in the cards. Russia is likely to use force if needed to repel a Ukrainian attempt to retake parts of the area, to obstruct the Minsk process if it goes in a disadvantageous direction for Moscow, or to seize more territory if there is further political and social turmoil in Ukraine. To minimize the risks of an eruption of violence in Donbass, the EU and U.S. should prolong the sanctions, fine-tune the diplomatic pressure on both sides to implement and uphold the Minsk Protocols, and pay more attention to the political and economic transformations in the rest of Ukraine.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Defense Policy, Politics, Military Strategy, and Sanctions
Political Geography:
Russia and Ukraine

235. Destination NATO: Kosovo’s Alternatives towards NATO Membership

Author:
Plator Avdiu
Publication Date:
05-2015
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:
The report addresses key challenges and existing complex relations between the Kosovo institutions and NATO. KCSS’ research has highlighted that the membership process of Kosovo towards NATO is challenged by external and internal impediments. Kosovo is the only country in the region of the Western Balkans left out of the NATO enlargement process. Furthermore, the country has not established any official or contractual cooperation and relations with NATO. This is due to non-recognition of Kosovo by four NATO member countries, NATO’s neutral stance towards the state of Kosovo since its Declaration of Independence on 17 February 2008 as well as NATO’s commitment that its peacekeeping mission in Kosovo (KFOR) to operate within the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244. On the other hand, until recently neither the Kosovo institutions have not demonstrated readiness and practical commitment with respect to NATO integration. From 2008 to 2014, Kosovo has not indicated a firm political will that demands the commencement of official cooperation with NATO. The Kosovo policymakers have shown only declarative commitments as to Euro-Atlantic integration, whereas membership of Kosovo in NATO only became a priority for the Kosovo institutions in 2014. Additionally, Kosovo should undertake the necessary reforms related to establishing better cooperation and coordination of all institutions involved in NATO’s integration process.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Treaties and Agreements, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Europe, Kosovo, and Balkans

236. Nuclear Cruise Missiles: Asset or Liability?

Author:
Greg Thielmann
Publication Date:
03-2015
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
The future of U.S. and Russian nuclear cruise missiles is at an inflection point. Russia's alleged testing of a ground-launched cruise missile has jeopardized not only the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, but other bilateral nuclear agreements as well, adding further strain to the U.S.-Russian relationship. The U.S. allegation and Moscow's three counter charges should be resolved with the help of the treaty's Special Verification Commission, which was explicitly designed to deal with compliance issues. But the two countries need to take a broader look at nuclear cruise missiles. New strategic cruise missiles are part of an unaffordable drive by Washington and Moscow to simultaneously modernize all three legs of their strategic arsenals. Given the increasingly marginal role that nuclear cruise missiles play in ensuring a U.S.-Russian balance and their destabilizing impact when deployed by emerging nuclear powers such as Pakistan, it is time to consider doing away with them entirely.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America

237. Taiwan’s Naval Role in the Rebalance to Asia

Author:
Ian Easton
Publication Date:
03-2015
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Project 2049 Institute
Abstract:
A comprehensive strategy for Asia begins with a careful assessment of the region’s geography and politics, which directly influence the trends we see unfolding today. Once the geostrategic contours of the region are mapped out, it quickly becomes clear that Taiwan may be the single most under- appreciated asset that the United States has for the rebalance to Asia. This article provides a brief assessment of Taiwan’s defense capabilities and potential role in the United States rebalance to Asia. In particular, it will focus on what Taiwan can contribute in the maritime domain and what Washington should do to improve naval coordination with Taipei.
Topic:
Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Politics, Geopolitics, Navy, and Geography
Political Geography:
Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

238. Cybersecurity and Stability in the Gulf

Author:
James Andrew Lewis
Publication Date:
01-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The Gulf has become a flashpoint for cyber conflict. Cyberspace has become an arena for covert struggle, with the United States, Israel and other nations on one side, and Iran and Russia on the other. Iran has far outpaced the GCC states in developing its cyber capabilities, both for monitoring internal dissent and deploying hackers to disrupt or attack foreign targets. Several such attacks over the past two years were likely either directed or permitted by Iranian state authorities. Even if Iran holds back from offensive actions as nuclear talks progress, the growth in Iranian capabilities remains a potential security threat for other Gulf states. The GCC countries have begun to develop their defensive capabilities, but they will need to expand their defenses and collaborate more effectively to deter future threats.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Defense Policy, Development, and Science and Technology
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Arabia

239. Japan's New Security Policy: Breaking Away from the Post–War Regime?

Author:
Bart Gaens
Publication Date:
02-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
China is challenging the regional balance of power in East Asia through a military buildup and an increasingly assertive foreign policy. The US is forced to find the right balance between cooperating with China while benefiting from its economic rise, and countering China's regional reach by carrying out its self-declared "pivot" to Asia in spite of domestic and budgetary constraints. With just over one year in office, Japan's Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has received wide domestic support for his ambitious plans to revive Japan's economy through his threefold policy of Abenomics. At the same time, however, he has implemented a number of significant policies in the defence and security sphere. In response to China's military rise, the Abe administration increased and recalibrated the defence budget. Furthermore, in order to reinforce the alliance with the US, the government approved the creation of a US-style National Security Council, passed a Secrecy Bill, and aims to reverse Japan's self-imposed ban on exercising the right to collective self-defence. Under the banner of "proactive pacifism", the Abe cabinet is seizing the momentum caused by the changing regional power dynamics in order to edge closer towards "breaking away from the postwar regime". A proposed revision of Japan's constitution, unchanged since 1947, symbolizes the ruling Liberal Democratic Party's (LDP) objective to bring about a more autonomous role for Japan both in the security alliance with the US and as an international actor.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Economics, and International Trade and Finance
Political Geography:
Japan, China, and Asia

240. Japan's new approach to national security

Author:
Elena Atanassova-Cornelis
Publication Date:
01-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
December 2013 marked an important turning point in Japan's evolving security and defence policies. While the debate about Japan's so-called security 'normalisation' has been going on now for more than a decade, by releasing three national security-related documents the conservative government led by Shinzo Abe since 2012 has dissipated any doubts that may still linger regarding the 'why, what and how' of Japan's national security.
Topic:
Defense Policy and Arms Control and Proliferation
Political Geography:
Japan and East Asia

241. Compounding Uncertainty in Afghanistan: Economic Consequences of Delay in Signing the Bilateral Security Agreement

Author:
Casey Garret Johnson, William A. Byrd, and Sanaullah Tasal
Publication Date:
02-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
The still unsigned Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) between Afghanistan and the United States provides the legal basis for continuing U.S. military presence in Afghanistan. In addition to its substantive importance, the BSA is also a confidence-building mechanism. The delay in putting it in place is compounding uncertainty and further diminishing economic confidence during Afghanistan's already challenging and uncertain transition. Afghans' responses include, among others, hedging behavior (legal and illegal), personal decisions on whether to come back to or stay in Afghanistan, delays in investments, incipient job losses, declining demand for goods and services and real estate prices, and farmers planting more opium poppy.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Democratization, Development, Treaties and Agreements, Insurgency, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, and Asia

242. EU cyber-defence: a work in progress

Author:
Neil Robinson
Publication Date:
03-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
The EU's cyber defence agenda provides an opportunity to ask questions about what the EU could do in terms of setting security priorities. Furthermore, as a possible area for cooperation, cyber defence shares with military air logistics the peculiarity of being a common capability which does not require explicit war-like conditions to demonstrate its utility. Indeed, the diversity and complexity of the threat environment – coupled with challenges of attribution – suggests the opposite: military cyber defence capabilities might offer better value for money in peacetime rather than in times of war.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Science and Technology, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
Europe

243. One size to fit all? Setting standards for European defence

Author:
Daniel Fiott
Publication Date:
04-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
While the crisis in Ukraine may contribute to a revision of defence expenditures in a number of European countries, the task of finding the right balance between cost-effective and strategicallyrelevant defence spending in Europe is still critical. As defence expenditure generally remains in decline across Europe, a range of innovative measures to ensure that defence budgets are spent more efficiently and effectively are being devised.
Topic:
Defense Policy and Economics
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

244. Creating Spaces for Effective CVE Approaches

Author:
Georgia Holmer
Publication Date:
09-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
Countering violent extremism efforts strive to prevent at-risk individuals from being recruited into or joining extremist groups. Identifying who is at risk and who poses a threat, however, is a complicated inquiry. In Kenya, as in many other places experiencing violent extremism, the young, the undecided, the coerced and others might—if properly guided—move away from rather than toward violence. Many at risk of becoming involved in violent extremist groups are too quickly categorized as an enemy and given no opportunity to move in a different direction. Empathy is critical both to learning why individuals are vulnerable to engaging in violent extremism and to creating the space and willingness in a community to help those at risk.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
Kenya and Somalia

245. The summit of our ambition? European defence between Brussels and Wales

Author:
Sven Biscop
Publication Date:
03-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
When they meet at NATO's Wales Summit in Newport on 4-5 September, the European Heads of State and Government should not see this as the first chapter of a new book, but as the next chapter of an existing one. The previous chapter was their meeting in Brussels last December for the European Council. The title of the book is European defence.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, and International Cooperation
Political Geography:
Europe

246. Building European Defence: An Architect and a Bank

Author:
Sven Biscop and Jo Coelmont
Publication Date:
05-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
If a set of investors plan a grand apartment building in which they can each afford just one apartment, they need an architect to design a building that is both affordable and that meets all their needs, to negotiate with the constructor, and to ensure follow - up. When building capabilities for European defence, the sole possible architect is the European Defence Agency (EDA). Those who have to reach consensus and invest are the EU Member States. And there is even a European Investment Bank (EIB) to assist them.
Topic:
Defense Policy and NATO
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

247. Cardiff: Birthplace of a new Transatlantic Narrative?

Author:
Jo Coelmont
Publication Date:
07-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
Cardiff has the potential to turn into a "great meeting", if the focus is on forging a new and attractive narrative to underpin a solid transatlantic security relationship, in which NATO finds its place. But Europeans must become serious on defence-and not only because the US asks for it. Otherwise, the EU and for sure the European States will become strategic bystanders and even objects of great power competition. That would be a real game-changer. That is why, in Cardiff, "we" ought to be ambitious enough to deal with the real issues, including the relationship between NATO and the CSDP.
Topic:
Security and Defense Policy
Political Geography:
United States and Europe

248. Trends in international arms transfers, 2013

Author:
Siemon T. Wezeman and Pieter D. Wezeman
Publication Date:
03-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
The volume of international transfers of major weapons in 2009–13 was 14 per cent higher than in 2004–2008 (see figure 1). The five biggest exporters in 2009–13 were the United States, Russia, Germany, China and France and the five biggest importers were India, China, Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, War, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Russia, United States, China, India, Paris, France, Germany, and Saudi Arabia

249. A Fairer Deal for Syrians: International commitments needed to arrest the deepening crisis in Syria and the region

Author:
Daniel Gorevan
Publication Date:
09-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Oxfam Publishing
Abstract:
While the world's attention is on crises in Gaza, Ukraine and elsewhere, the humanitarian crisis in Syria continues to deteriorate beyond anything that could have been envisaged when protests broke out over three years ago. A staggering 190,000 people have been killed and 6.5 million displaced inside the country, and the conflict shows little sign of abating. There are three million registered refugees from Syria in neighbouring countries and an unknown number who have not registered. Jordan's planning minister has highlighted the fact that the presence of Syrian refugees in Jordan is akin to 'the United States absorbing the entire population of Canada'.
Topic:
Security and Defense Policy
Political Geography:
Iraq, Canada, Syria, and Jordan

250. Kenya: Al-Shabaab – Closer to Home

Publication Date:
09-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
One year after the Westgate Mall terrorist attack in Nairobi, Al–Shabaab is more entrenched and a graver threat to Kenya. But the deeper danger is less in the long established terrorist cells that perpetrated the act–horrific as it was–and more in managing and healing the rising communal tensions and historic divides that Al- Shabaab violence has deliberately agitated, most recently in Lamu county. To prevent extremists from further articulating local grievances with global jihad, the Kenyan government–including county governments most affected-opposition politicians and Kenyan Muslim leaders, must work together to address historical grievances of marginalisation among Muslim communities in Nairobi, the coast and the north east, and institutional discrimination at a national level, as well as ensuring that counter-terrorism operations are better targeted at the perpetrators and do not persecute wider ethnic and faith communities they have purposefully infiltrated.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Terrorism, and International Security
Political Geography:
Kenya

251. From Black Boots to Desert Boots: The All-Volunteer Army Experiment Continues

Author:
Leonard Wong
Publication Date:
05-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
In 1970, the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force delivered its report to the President of the United States, Richard Nixon. In the report, better known as the Gates Commission due to the leadership of former Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates, the members of the Commission stated, "We unanimously believe that the nation's interests will be better served by an all-volunteer force, supported by an effective stand-by draft." They added, "We have satisfied ourselves that a volunteer force will not jeopardize national security, and we believe it will have a beneficial effect on the military as well as the rest of our society." In June of 1973, after years of debate, the statutory authority for the draft expired and the all-volunteer force became a reality.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Governance
Political Geography:
United States

252. Cybersecurity and Tailored Deterrence

Author:
Franklin D. Kramer and Melanie J. Teplinsky
Publication Date:
01-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Cyber has become the new conflict arena. It ranks as one of the greatest national security challenges facing the United States for three reasons. First, as the revelations about the National Security Agency's (NSA's) activities suggest, cyber offense has far outpaced cyber defense. Second, cyber capabilities are prevalent worldwide and increasingly are being used to achieve the strategic goals of nations and actors adverse to the United States. Third, it is highly unlikely that cyber espionage and other cyber intrusions will soon cease. While the NSA disclosures focus on the United States and the United Kingdom, there is little doubt that China, Russia, Iran, North Korea and others are engaged in significant cyber activities. The fundamental question is whether the cyber realm can, consistent with the national interest, be made more stable and secure.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Science and Technology, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, United Kingdom, Iran, and North Korea

253. Ten Ideas for Smarter NATO Missile Defense

Author:
Patrick O'Reilly
Publication Date:
01-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
NATO leaders have cited missile defense as an example of applying the principles of the Smart Defense initiative endorsed at the 2012 NATO Summit to enhance collective defense at minimum cost. As ballistic missiles continue to proliferate and become more accessible to both state and nonstate actors, it is important to foster global partnerships to pursue NATO's missile defense mission and protect North American and European interests. NATO should consider opportunities to further apply the principles of Smart Defense now to reduce future costs of deterring and countering missile proliferation.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, and Arms Control and Proliferation
Political Geography:
Europe, Middle East, Asia, and North America

254. Disrupt or Be Disrupted: How Governments Can Develop Decisive Military Technologies

Author:
James Hasik and Byron Callan
Publication Date:
04-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Just what makes a military technology disruptive? How does one know who will disrupt, and who will be disrupted? How can we aim to develop disruptive technologies, and how can we spot them before others use them to disrupt our security? Recent studies suggest that five factors matter most in developing those technologies into real military capabilities: financial resources, industrial readiness, systems integration, cultural receptivity, and organizational capacity. Prototyping and field experimentation leverage all these factors, and help make the potentially disruptive ultimately decisive in war.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Military Strategy, and Governance

255. Why Nuclear Deterrence Still Matters to NATO

Author:
Walter B. Slocombe and Matthew Kroenig
Publication Date:
08-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
NATO's Strategic Concept (SC), adopted at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, includes a number of propositions that define NATO's nuclear policy. Most fundamentally, NATO's most important strategy document declares that "[d]eterrence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities, remains a core element of" the Alliance's "overall strategy."
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and International Security

256. A Difficult Balancing Act: Backing the Kurds in the fight against IS in Iraq and Syria

Publication Date:
11-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
The Kurdish forces now provide the necessary boots on the ground in the framework of Operation Inherent Resolve. However, the strong backing of the Kurds presents a number of challenges and difficult balancing acts for Western and regional actors.
Topic:
Political Violence, Defense Policy, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, and Syria

257. Prioritising European Defence Cooperation: The next step for the common security and defence policy

Publication Date:
11-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
The European council's decisions on the common Security and Defence policy (CSDP) in December 2013 and the process that now follows should be used by EU member states as a means to progressively empower the CSDP within a short-term future.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:
Europe

258. Making Sense of Cyberwar

Author:
Erik Gartzke
Publication Date:
01-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta's warning that “the next Pearl Harbor” might arrive via the internet has captured considerable attention. The internet is said to be revolutionary because it is a leveler— reducing Western military advantages—and because dependence on the internet makes developed countries more vulnerable to attack. The conviction that the internet is an Achilles' heel for the existing world order is based on narrow conceptions of the potential for harm. The internet cannot perform functions traditionally assigned to military force. To the contrary, cyberwar creates another advantage for powerful status quo nations and interests.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Terrorism, and War
Political Geography:
United States

259. Balancing Without Containment: An American Strategy for Managing China

Author:
Ashley J. Tellis
Publication Date:
01-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
China is poised to become a major strategic rival to the United States. Whether or not Beijing intends to challenge Washington's primacy, its economic boom and growing national ambitions make competition inevitable. And as China rises, American power will diminish in relative terms, threatening the foundations of the U.S.-backed global order that has engendered unprecedented prosperity worldwide. To avoid this costly outcome, Washington needs a novel strategy to balance China without containing it.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Development, and Emerging Markets
Political Geography:
United States, China, America, Washington, Beijing, and Asia

260. Deterring Russia after Ukraine: CEE Divided on the Future of NATO Policy

Author:
Artur Kacprzyk
Publication Date:
07-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
In the context of the Ukraine crisis, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Romania have called for significant strengthening of NATO’s deterrence and defence policy and for permanent deployments of Allied troops in the region. This position is, however, not shared by the rest of the Central and Eastern European NATO members. Similar to Western European countries, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia do not feel as threatened by Russia’s actions and do not support moves that could damage their political and economic relations with Moscow. Fundamental differences among the current positions of the regional Allies indicate a profound divide between Central and Eastern European NATO members.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Economics, Politics, and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:
Russia and Ukraine

261. China’s Air Defense Identification System: The Role of PLA Air Surveillance

Author:
Mark Stokes
Publication Date:
05-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Project 2049 Institute
Abstract:
In the wake of the 18th Central Committee’s Third Plenum in November 2013, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) Ministry of National Defense (MND) announced the establishment of its first air defense identification zone (ADIZ). Assessments of the ADIZ to date have focused in large part on implications for territorial and maritime disputes in region. However, other potential drivers may offer additional context for the decision. Among these include coercion of Taiwan, unprecedented changes in China’s national airspace management system, and technical advances that have enhanced interoperability between the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and Navy (PLAN).
Topic:
Defense Policy, Territorial Disputes, Surveillance, and Air Force
Political Geography:
China and Asia

262. The Future of the European Defence Industry after the December Summit: Ten Polish Priorities

Author:
Paulina Zamelek
Publication Date:
12-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
December's European Council Summit for heads of state or government has been tasked to deliberate European defence industry issues based on proposals provided by the European Commission. A divergence of interests expressed by interlocutors representing Member States, national defence industries and European institutions could result in heated political debate. The ability to accommodate the interests of Central Eastern Europe and Poland in particular in this process is not yet certain, especially as the EU's ambitious plans for strengthening the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) are discordant with the current level playing field across Europe.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and Arms Control and Proliferation
Political Geography:
Europe

263. Diversion of Weapons within Peace Operations: Understanding the Phenomenon

Author:
Eric G. Berman and Mihaela Racovita
Publication Date:
08-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Driven by the new security challenges of the post-Cold War period, peacekeeping has increased in tempo, scope and complexity. Missions have taken on broader mandates, with greater responsibilities, such as the protection of civilians, disarmament, demobilisation, and the reintegration of former combatants, and security sector reform. In this context, peacekeeping operations must overcome political, financial and operational challenges before they are even deployed. Once on the ground, peacekeepers become increasingly the targets of violence and crime. A former U.S. Senior Adviser on Darfur commented in October 2013: "It's kind of open season on UNAMID." This situation is not limited to Darfur. Rather, 'protecting the protectors' and their assets across missions and contexts has turned into a challenge in its own right.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Cold War, and Peacekeeping
Political Geography:
United States

264. Domestic and Regional Challenges in Mali after the French Intervention

Author:
Gerald Hainzl
Publication Date:
04-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
On 11 January 2013, France initiated an intervention in Mali in order to stop rebel and Islamist fighters marching towards the capital Bamako. Exactly one month later, on 11 February, French President François Hollande claimed victory against Islamist insurgents. On 18 February, a group of seven tourists was kidnapped in Cameroon, near the Nigerian border, by Ansaru, a militant group loosely affiliated to the Nigerian group Boko Haram. One day later, a French soldier was killed in a clash with Islamist fighters in the mountainous region in Northern Mali. France originally planned to leave Mali in March 2013, but has since extended its commitment.
Topic:
Security and Defense Policy
Political Geography:
France, Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, and Northern Mali

265. The changing European defence market: Will the new European defence market legislation be a game-changer for Finland?

Author:
Harri Mikkola, Jukka Anteroinen, and Ville Lauttamäki
Publication Date:
02-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The European defence industrial base is transforming. The changes in the European defence market legislation, the decrease in defence materiel demand and changing defence requirements are redefining the industry in a way that has not been seen in decades. The new European legislation in particular poses serious challenges for the Finnish defence industry, including the national market opening and the diminishing possibility for offset arrangements. It is likely that the major European states are trying to protect their own defence industrial base. The future of the Finnish defence industry will be determined by whether the European market opens up in the first place, in part or in its entirety. There is no going back to the time preceding the new legislation. It is crucial for the Finnish defence industry to find and utilize new market opportunities. Networking with the European system integrators and sub-contracting chains will be of paramount importance.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Economics, and Industrial Policy
Political Geography:
Europe and Finland

266. Making the Case: Stopping Iran's Nuclear Weapons Program

Author:
Mieke Eoyang and Aki Peritz
Publication Date:
03-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Third Way
Abstract:
The U.S. is currently leading a multinational effort to squeeze Iran and force them to give up its weapons program. Here's how to make the case for that approach and why it makes sense: A nuclear-armed Iran is unacceptable. Sanctions are working—they are wrecking the Iranian economy—but they need more time to have their full impact. We can blunt Iran's capabilities by strengthening our allies' missile defense systems. Military strikes now could exacerbate the problem, but all options must remain on the table.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States, Iran, and North America

267. Making the Case: North Korea's Nuclear and Missile Efforts

Author:
Mieke Eoyang and Aki Peritz
Publication Date:
03-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Third Way
Abstract:
The U.S. is currently leading the effort to halt North Korea's nuclear weapons program and protect our allies in the Asia-Pacific region. Here is how to discuss this important issue: North Korea's missile and nuclear programs threaten our interests and our allies. We will defend our friends—and ourselves—starting with our planned deployment of more missile interceptors in Alaska. The U.S. has been making progress toward convincing the international community to crack down on Pyongyang even further. Given the threat, we must maintain a robust military presence in Asia to maintain the peace in the Asia-Pacific region. We must work with China—North Korea's only ally—to achieve a lasting end to Pyongyang's continuing nuclear intransigence.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and North Korea

268. Making the Case: How Obama's Defense Budget Strengthens Security

Author:
Mieke Eoyang
Publication Date:
04-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Third Way
Abstract:
Despite what the critics would have you believe, the President's FY2014 budget strengthens our national security, because it: Provides robust spending levels for the military—greater than other proposed budgets; Tackles long-term cost growth; and Supports a flexible, modern military.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Economics, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
North America

269. The Israeli Experience in Missile Defense: Lessons for NATO

Author:
Guillaume Lasconjarias and Jean-loup Samaan
Publication Date:
08-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
In recent years, the issue of missile defense has become one of the most prominent features of Israel's military debate. During Operation Pillar of Defense in the Gaza Strip on November 2012, air defense systems such as Iron Dome proved crucial against rockets targeting Israeli territory. As a result, they have attracted increasing political attention. Against this backdrop, international media and policy circles now focus on Israel as the most advanced case to test the validity of missile defense. NATO, in particular, has dedicated a lot of attention to the Israeli experience in missile defense and the lessons to be drawn from it.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Middle East and Israel

270. Is NATO Set to Go on Standby?

Author:
Karl-Heinz Kamp
Publication Date:
09-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
While the withdrawal of all combat forces from Afghanistan by the end of 2014 will be welcomed in most NATO capitals, it raises stark questions for the future of the Atlantic Alliance. Can it justify its existence without a direct threat to the security of its members? Is it enough for NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen to state that the Alliance has to evolve from “deployed NATO to prepared NATO,” without answering the question: prepared for what? Or will NATO have to accept that it is now less relevant, placing itself in standby mode to hibernate until it is reawakened by a new mission inside or outside Europe?
Topic:
Defense Policy, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Europe, and North America

271. Global Trends and the Future of NATO: Alliance Security in an Era of Global Competition

Author:
Barry Pavel and Magnus Nordenman
Publication Date:
10-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The current turbulent global landscape recalls past key transition points in history such as 1815, 1919, 1945, and 1989, when the path forward was not so clear-cut and the world faced the possibility of very different global futures. As the US National Intelligence Council suggested in its landmark 2012 report, Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds, the transatlantic community is entering a new era in history that will pose a very different set of challenges and offer unprecedented opportunities. If it is to survive, the NATO Alliance must navigate this crucial period by fundamentally reconsidering its place in the global landscape as well as its future roles, missions, and functions from a strategic, long-term perspective. The world is changing rapidly, and if NATO does not adapt with foresight for this new era, then it will very likely disintegrate.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, Demographics, Economics, Politics, Military Strategy, and Reform
Political Geography:
United States

272. Innovative Immigration and Border Control Reform

Author:
Stephanie Sanok Kostro and Scott F. Mann
Publication Date:
08-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Over the last 10 years, the United States placed great emphasis on securing its borders and improving its immigration process. Concerns about terrorism in the shadow of the September 11, 2001, attacks led to the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as a means for streamlining and improving the government's ability to protect the United States, its citizens, and its infrastructure inside the nation's borders. From intelligence gathering and sharing to interdiction and apprehension, the goal was to bring all of the essential homeland security agencies in to one federal department and reduce the characteristically disparate and disconnected nature of previous homeland security agencies and responsibilities. Despite attempts to improve efficiency and efficacy, regulating the U.S. border and enforcing U.S. immigration policies remain significant challenges. The complexity of operations required to achieve the stated policy goals of the U.S. government, combined with the sheer volume of border traffic (licit and illicit, human and trade), hampered past attempts at effective border control, and cloud the potential for success of future operational undertakings.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Migration, Terrorism, Immigration, and Infrastructure
Political Geography:
United States

273. A more in-depth, technical Q from Siegfried Hecker on North Korea

Author:
Siegfried S. Hecker
Publication Date:
04-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), Stanford University
Abstract:
North Korea announced on April 2, 2013, that it would restart its nuclear facilities, including its 5 megawatt-electric (MWe) nuclear reactor in Yongbyon, north of the capital, which had been disabled and mothballed since an agreement in October 2007.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
United States, Israel, and North Korea

274. Engaging Indonesia

Author:
David Camroux
Publication Date:
09-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
The presence of Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono at the G20 Summit in St Petersburg in early September went virtually unnoticed by the European media. That his attendance was overlooked can be explained by immediate factors, namely the overriding importance of the Syrian conflict in the discussions among leaders, and the fact that SBY (as President Yudhoyono is commonly known) is a lame-duck president with less than a year to go before the end of his two-term limit. Lacking BRIC status (for now at least), Indonesia – unlike China, India or even Brazil – barely registers on the radar screen of public awareness in Europe. Symptomatic of this neglect is the fact that, almost four years after its signing in November 2009, two EU member state parliaments (and the European Parliament itself) have yet to ratify the EU-Indonesia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Economics, International Trade and Finance, Treaties and Agreements, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
China, Europe, India, Brazil, Syria, and Southeast Asia

275. Cyber world: site under construction

Author:
Patryk Pawlak
Publication Date:
09-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
The Union's cyber security policy may still be in its infancy and hampered by difficulties, but the EU could yet become a key player in the field – if it plays its cards wisely. While the US has been seriously hit by the scandal surrounding the secret NSA surveillance programmes, the struggle over how to frame internet governance goes on and, more than ever, needs core stakeholders capable of defending freedom, democracy and the rule of law in cyberspace.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Intelligence, Science and Technology, and Communications
Political Geography:
United States and Europe

276. The added value of CSDP operations

Author:
Hadewych Hazelzet
Publication Date:
09-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
Over the past two years, many high-level discussions within the EU have centred around the question of the 'added value' of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). In times of fiscal austerity, member states want to make sure they invest their resources where their impact is strongest. In the current climate of financial crisis and retrenchment, there are no resources or time to waste on a 'beauty contest' between organisations or instruments. In order to prepare for the next decade of deployments, the question to ask is therefore not whether but under what conditions CSDP has brought added value, to date, in responding to given contingencies.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Economics, Regional Cooperation, and Financial Crisis
Political Geography:
Europe

277. Europe: spread (not lost) in space

Author:
Lucia Marta
Publication Date:
06-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
Since the launch of its two 'flagship programmes' in the late 1990s, the European Union (EU) has been increasingly involved in space activities. The earth observation programme GMES (Global Monitoring for Environment and Security, recently renamed Copernicus) and Galileo (positioning and navigation, just like the American GPS) will soon be operational and will support a whole spectrum of European policies, from environment and transport to security and defence.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Economics, Science and Technology, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
America and Europe

278. More Competitive, More Efficient? The 2013 European Commission Defence Communication

Author:
Daniel Fiott
Publication Date:
09-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
The European Commission has now released its renewed vision of European defence industrial cooperation called Towards a More Competitive and Efficient Defence and Security Sector. It is a Communication that can be characterised as an interesting hybrid of regulatory and project-based proposals. The Commission began thinking seriously about European defence in 1996 with the release of its first Communication; the latest version is the sixth since this time. Indeed, not perhaps since its 2003 defence Communication – developed in the context of the establishment of the European Security and Defence Policy, the convention on the Future of Europe and the then impending EU enlargement – has a Commission Communication on defence been so eagerly anticipated.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Industrial Policy, and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:
Europe

279. The Start-Up Fund – An Elegant Treaty Mechanism for Sustaining Defence Capabilities

Author:
Dinesh H.C. Rempling and Quentin Huxham
Publication Date:
06-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
At his regular press briefing on 6 May 2013, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, dramatically threw down the gauntlet to Europe's leaders ahead of this December's European Council. Emphasising the need for improved cooperation and coordination between NATO and the EU, he called on Europe's leaders to ensure that, as a result of the first discussion about European security since the financial crisis at the European Council in December, Europe would be both willing and able to act in the interests of transatlantic security.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Defense Policy, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
Europe and Lisbon

280. A European Global Security Strategy: Offering Seven - League Boots to Become a Global Actor

Author:
Jo Coelmont
Publication Date:
03-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
This paper will argue that the objective should be to pave the way for political discussions at the highest level and eventually the adoption by the European Council of a global security strategy. It is labelled “global” to indicate that this strategy is not only dealing with the EU's Foreign, Security, and Defence Policies , CFSP and CSDP sensu stricto , but is to encapsulate all security aspects related to EU external action. In other words, a European Global Security Strategy (EGSS) should be aimed at.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Globalization, Regional Cooperation, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
Europe

281. Pool it, Share it, Use it: The European Council on Defence

Author:
Sven Biscop
Publication Date:
03-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
The December 2013 European Council will address the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Pooling Sharing of military capabilities will be high on the agenda. What should be expected from the Heads of State and Government? Capabilities now, capabilities in the future, and a common idea on what to use them for.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:
Europe

282. European Defence Under Scrutiny: What can be expected from the European Council?

Author:
Tuomas Iso-Markku
Publication Date:
11-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The decision to place security and defence policy on the agenda of the December European Council and the intensive pre-summit preparations have given renewed impetus to this policy area and raised the level of expectations ahead of the meeting. While there is now widespread agreement among the member states on the main challenges facing the EU in the area of security and defence, conflicting political and economic interests still exist and continue to hamper the Union's efforts. The December summit is unlikely to engage in a major strategic debate, but it will discuss steps to improve the implementation of the Union's security and defence policy, to enhance cooperation in the area of capabilities, and to support the European defence industry. A major novelty is the European Commission's stronger involvement, which remains controversial, however. The most crucial task for the EU heads of state and government is to translate the momentum created by the pre-summit process into a lasting commitment on the part of all actors involved, by putting forward binding timelines, specific targets and concrete follow-up projects.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Arms Control and Proliferation
Political Geography:
Europe

283. The Governance Gap in European Security and Defence

Author:
Giovanni Faleg
Publication Date:
12-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:
Let us take three assumptions: The demand for security provision continues to increase in Europe's fragile neighbourhood (notably following the 'Arab Spring'); Austerity restrictions have hit national defence budgets heavily; The balance of power is shifting 'from the West to the rest' and the Americans are pivoting eastwards. Under these circumstances, it is no surprise that the EU is struggling to establish itself as a credible and effective security actor. The final report of High Representative Catherine Ashton, released in preparation for the December 2013 European Council on Security and Defence, admits that Europe "faces rising security challenges within a changing strategic context while the financial crisis is increasingly affecting its security and defence capability". But these are not the true causes of CSDP inertia.
Topic:
Defense Policy and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:
Europe

284. The European Global Strategy and the Mediterranean

Author:
Roberto Aliboni
Publication Date:
06-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
IEMed/EuroMeSCo
Abstract:
Many recent comments on the EU's Mediterranean policy come to the conclusion that the challenge raised by the Arab Spring has less to do with existing policies than with lack of strategy. Both in the southern neighborhood and in general, all parameters underlying the Mediterranean policy have changed dramatically.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, and European Union
Political Geography:
Europe and Middle East

285. Iran's Missile Program and Its Implications for U.S. Missile Defense

Author:
Greg Thielmann
Publication Date:
02-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
Although plans for expanding U.S. strategic missile defenses focus on the Iranian ICBM threat, that threat is not emerging as was previously predicted. Iran conducted no long-range ballistic missile tests in 2012 and has not flown even the larger space launch vehicle that it displayed two years ago, which could have helped advance ICBM technology. Moreover, Tehran has still not decided to build nuclear weapons and continues to focus on short- and medium-range rather than longer-range ballistic missiles. It is, therefore, time to adapt U.S. missile defense plans accordingly by suspending the fourth phase of the European Phased Adaptive Approach. Doing so would remove an obstacle to negotiating further reductions in the strategic forces of Russia - the only country that poses an unambiguous existential threat to the United States.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Missile Defense, and ICBM
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

286. Upgrading the Japan-U.S. Defense Guidelines: Toward a New Phase of Operational Coordination

Author:
Sugio Takahashi
Publication Date:
06-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Project 2049 Institute
Abstract:
The Japan-U.S. alliance has unique organizational characteristics compared to other major U.S. military alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the U.S.-ROK (Republic of Korea) alliance. While these two alliances have a single integrated command and control (C2) structure for wartime coalition operation, the Japan-U.S. alliance lacks a permanent institution for combined operation. In the event of a military contingency, Japanese Self-Defense Force (SDF) and U.S. military forces must operate separately. In the absence of a C2 structure, the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (hereafter “Defense Guidelines”) in effect embody procedures for operational coordination for the Japan-U.S. alliance.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

287. Coastal Defense in Japan’s Southwestern Islands: Force Posture Options for Securing Japan’s Southern Flank

Author:
Eric Sayers
Publication Date:
01-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Project 2049 Institute
Abstract:
How Japan chooses to adapt its forces in the Ryukyus and East China Sea to the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) actions in these waters is a central question for defense planners in Tokyo in the decade ahead. While the defense investments called for in the Mid-Term Defense Program (2011-2015) budget have initiated this process, the specific defense posture Japan will choose to adopt for this task remains unresolved.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Armed Forces, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

288. The Future of Foreign Military Training

Author:
Mike Jeffery
Publication Date:
03-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
This paper examines the nature of foreign military training, Canada’s history in the provision of military training assistance, including its training mission in Afghanistan, evaluates the success of these commitments and assesses the future of such missions. It concludes that, as a professional force, the Canadian Forces has excelled at providing foreign military training. However, the effectiveness of such assistance is limited by the nation’s lack of a strategic focus and the consequent short term provision of training. The process of developing a professional military capable of defending the nation and supporting the government is a long one, and only through consistent and trusted mentoring can nations like Canada expect to achieve the influence essential for success. The paper suggests that foreign military training is a very effective diplomatic tool and should form a key component of Canada’s long term focus for international development.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Development, Diplomacy, Governance, and Armed Forces
Political Geography:
Canada and North America

289. The Future of Drones in Canada: Perspectives from a Former RCAF Fighter Pilot

Author:
DF Holman
Publication Date:
08-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
What are the prospects for implementation of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in the Canadian military? Holman explores many aspects of how UAVs operate, their strengths and shortcomings. Examining them in the context of the overall systems that enable their capabilities, he looks at communications vulnerabilities, degrees of automation and autonomy, categories of UAV, rotary versus fixed wing applications, legal and airspace management constraints, and the potential roles in which UAVs might offer an immediate advantage. He concludes that surveillance is a very likely application, particularly in Canada’s far north. He is less sanguine about armed UAV roles, particularly when it comes to air combat. Improved reliability, a matured regulatory framework, and a more stable customer base are the critical elements for future system development.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Armed Forces, Weapons, and Drones
Political Geography:
Canada and North America

290. North Korea, Ballistic Missile Defence and Canada-US Defence Cooperation

Author:
Frank Harvey
Publication Date:
07-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
In December 2012, North Korea launched the Unha-3 rocket – a three-stage, intercontinental ballistic missile with an estimated range of 10,000 kilometres. When combined with North Korea’s latest underground nuclear test in January, these moves represent a concerted effort by the regime to develop and deploy an offensive nuclear capability. When acquired, a nuclear tipped intercontinental ballistic missile will provide Pyongyang with a credible deterrent that will seriously diminish our coercive leverage in subsequent military security crises involving North and South Korea. The imperative on the part of the international community to move forward with research, development and deployment of ballistic missile defences (BMD) is becoming more pressing each year. In November 2010, 28 NATO members signed NATO’s new Strategic Concept. The most relevant part of the alliance’s new strategy is the commitment by all NATO members to: “Develop the capability to defend our populations and territories against ballistic missile attack as a core element of our collective defence.” As a NATO member, Canada now officially endorses the logic, strategic utility and security benefits of ballistic missile defence, but, apparently, only in terms of protecting European and American territory and populations. The most perplexing aspect of Canada’s policy is the ongoing refusal to engage in bilateral discussions with our most important NATO ally to negotiate BMD architecture to protect Canadian territory and populations. Canadian officials have the luxury to sit back and let allies protect our territory, but this is a foreign policy strategy that has reached the point of taking free-riding to a new and somewhat disturbing level.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Missile Defense, and Ballistic Missile
Political Geography:
China, Canada, Asia, North Korea, and United States of America

291. Is NATO Still Necessary for Canada?

Author:
J. L. Granatstein
Publication Date:
03-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has been the most successful military alliance of the modern era. Set up in 1949 to counter the Soviet Union, NATO won the Cold War some four decades later without firing a shot. Perhaps it might have been better if NATO had wound itself up at the end of the Cold War. The alliance instead sought a new role and found it out of area. It conducted operations in Former Yugoslavia, war against al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, and later still an air campaign that brought down Gaddafi in Libya. None of these operations were notable successes. In 2011, then U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated that NATO faced “the real possibility [of] a dim, if not dismal future....The military capabilities simply aren’t there." The transatlantic alliance, Gates said, must confront fundamental strategic questions about its future. All this makes a hard look at NATO essential. The European nations can readily handle the defence of their territory, and it is time to ask if NATO is the best way for us to contribute to Western defence, to ask which nations can and will act to protect democratic values? The "Anglosphere" states all fought in Afghanistan. So too did France and Denmark. And in Asia, there are other friendly states. There is no talk of a military alliance yet but there is the possibility of coalitions of the willing. Instead of pledging fealty to NATO's hollow shell, it is time for Canadians to produce a strategy for the next twenty years. Any such review will give primacy to Canada’s alliance with the United States. But one question must be asked and answered: does NATO any longer serve our political and military needs?
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe, Canada, North America, and United States of America

292. How Should Canada's Parliament Decide Military Deployments? Lessons from the United Kingdom

Author:
Philippe Lagassé
Publication Date:
12-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
Since 2006, Canada’s House of Commons has been asked to vote on military deployments. These votes have allowed Members of Parliament to express their views on the operations of the Canadian Forces, while serving to democratize the executive ’ s power to send armed forces overseas. However, this practice of consulting the Commons does not impose any binding legal or political constraints on the executive ’ s prerogative to deploy the military. The legal and constitutional authority to send forces abroad still rests with the prime minister and Cabinet. The practice of consulting MPs when deploying the military remains a courtesy, rather than an obligation. In contrast, the British House of Commons has been granted politica l control of the executive ’ s military deployment prerogative through a constitutional convention. The effect of this convention was recently shown in the vote involving British military strikes against Syria. Unlike in Canada, the British government is pol itically bound to consult and adhere to the views of MPs before considering military deployments overseas. This paper examines whether Canada should follow the British example, granting member s of Parliament control over the executive ’ s power to deploy the armed forces by means of a constitutional convention. It concludes that Canada ’ s existing practice has many advantages, and that Canadian parliamentarians should be mindful of the risks and costs involved in adopting a constitutional convention to control the executive ’ s military deployment prerogative.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Parliament, and Military
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Canada, and North America

293. Homegrown Jihadists and the Evolution of al-Qaeda

Author:
Barry Cooper
Publication Date:
02-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
Accurate assessments of the threat posed by al-Qaeda to Western interests and government have been hampered by imprecise language and an absence of historical memory. Arguably the organization is over thirty years old. Unquestionably the franchises and self-described affiliates of al-Qaeda bear little resemblance to the elite terrorist organization that attacked the United States on 11 September, 2001. This paper describes the evolution of al-Qaeda from being a source of assistance to mujahedeen fighting the Red Army in Afghanistan to the armed insurgents operating today in Africa and the Greater Middle East, on the one hand, and the homegrown, often self-recruited and largely incompetent “jihadists” who are more a nuisance to western police forces than they are a serious military threat. This change in the effectiveness and operational capability of al-Qaeda does not mean that it will disappear, not least of all because the members of that organization think of themselves as fighting an endless war. It does mean that we ought to have a realistic understanding of the reduced nature of the threat that al-Qaeda can make to our interests.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Terrorism, and Al Qaeda
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, South Asia, and Eurasia

294. Exigencies of Future Deployments: What Canada must Exact from its Military Partners

Author:
Hugh Segal and Jessica McLean
Publication Date:
06-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
An increase in global threats, failing states, and crisis prone regions around the world, coupled with shrinking defence budgets in the US, as well as budget cuts in Canada’s most loyal joint deployment partners – France, the UK, and The Netherlands – indicates there will be no less of a demand for Canadian deployable capacity over the next few years. In this context, understanding the ‘political’ requirements for various kinds of deployments is important and a key planning area for defence policy makers as well as military and strategic practitioners. To better understand the future of Canadian military deployments it is first necessary to examine the historical context of our post-war NATO and UN deployments as well as Prime Minister Harper’s 2006 commitment that required all significant military deployments to have parliamentary approval. Each deployment since WW II has been unique. The command structures, intelligence-sharing, mission design and assigned areas of responsibility for Canada, whether under the UN or NATO, have varied by the deployment itself and the nature of the mission. This requires our political and command requirements to adapt to the mission at hand. But whether or not Canada will participate in future deployments relies on not just being able to answer the question of “why”, but also “why us”. Reticence on the part of NATO allies will continue to be a problem in the future and so Canada must be capable to ensure it only takes part in “coalition of the willing” deployments to ensure realistic burden sharing. The pivot towards the Pacific will also require fresh and deeper intelligence cooperation with Australia, other Commonwealth partners in the region and enhanced interoperable capacity with our American allies.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Troop Deployment, and Military
Political Geography:
Europe, Canada, North America, and United States of America

295. Canadian Defence Commitments: Overview and Status of Selected Acquistions and Initatives

Author:
Elinor Sloan
Publication Date:
12-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
For years, successive Canadian governments have been overpromising and under-delivering on defence procurement. Timetables have slipped even as repair and maintenance costs for aging equipment have soared, while elaborate rules have obscured the acquisition process in a bureaucratic fog. This paper assembles information from a wide range of official sources and cuts through the confusion. It surveys 15 Canadian defence acquisitions and initiatives, each anticipated to cost more than $100 million, to account for the delays. Final replacements for the ancient Sea King helicopters are no closer to arriving — after almost 30 years — because the DND failed to recognize that it asked for technology that is still in development. The Joint Support Ship project is years behind schedule because, as originally conceived, it sought to integrate so many capabilities that it was unbuildable. The Integrated Soldier System Project is almost as far behind because Ottawa’s procurement rules are so complex and niggling that no bidder could fulfill every single one. Canada faces evolving threats, but efforts to equip the Canadian Forces to meet them have been marked by a long litany of failures — failures of communication, of organization and of vision. This paper sets out the military procurement process, and concisely explains the most egregious flaws, making it essential reading for anyone interested in the future of Canada’s military.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Procurement, and Military
Political Geography:
Canada and North America

296. The Three Versions of Al Qaeda: A Primer

Author:
Clint Watts
Publication Date:
12-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
Al Qaeda today only slightly resembles the al Qaeda of yesteryear. Al Qaeda operatives or "al Qaeda-like" organizations stretch throughout North Africa, across the Middle East and into South Asia. This disparate string of organizations hosts a handful of al Qaeda's original Afghanistan and Pakistan veterans but mostly consist of newcomers inspired by al Qaeda's message -- disenfranchised young men seeking an adventurous fight in the wake of a tumultuous Arab Spring. Al Qaeda, or more appropriately jihadism pursued under al Qaeda's banner, has morphed in several waves over the course of more than two decades.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Defense Policy, Islam, Terrorism, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Middle East, Canada, and Arabia

297. Not just another arms deal: The security policy implications of the United States selling advanced missiles to Finland

Author:
Charly Salonius-Pasternak
Publication Date:
09-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Finland's decision to acquire advanced semi-stealthy Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles (JASSM) from the United States is much more than an arms deal – it has significant political and regional military implications. Finland is only the second country to be approved for JASSM. No NATO country has ever received such approval. This suggests something about the closeness of the relationship between the United States and Finland, as well as something about how the United States sees European and regional defence arrangements. In the web of multilateral, multinational and bilateral relationships that Finland is weaving to enhance its security, the US relationship is a key cable The JASSM acquisition significantly changes Finland's ability to disrupt enemy activities, both within Finland and beyond its borders. Despite being a conventional weapon, it will serve as a deterrent. Finnish decision-makers have a responsibility to understand both the implications of the new capabilities, and to ensure that the continued development of the Finnish Defence Forces is not inhibited due to misunderstandings of what a modern defence requires and consists of.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, and Finland

298. After austerity: futures for Europe's defence industry

Author:
Andrea Gilli
Publication Date:
11-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
In October 2012, the merger between BAE Systems (GB) and EADS (France, Germany and Spain), two of the biggest defence contractors in the world, failed. Despite this setback, further consolidation within the European defence industry is likely to occur in the near future. Because of the eurozone crisis, in recent years EU countries have significantly curtailed their public expenditure, defence included. This has important implications for the structure of the European defence industrial base. Specifically, defence companies are dependent on public defence expenditure. When defence spending declines, industrial overcapacity results. This, in turn, calls for restructuring and consolidation. Inevitably, EU countries will have to go down this road. However, given their ongoing concerns regarding sovereignty, technology and jobs, there are good reasons to think that they will promote the consolidation of their defence industry through a mix of Europe, NATO, extra-EU and purely national solutions.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Economics, and Industrial Policy
Political Geography:
Europe, France, Germany, and Spain

299. Beyond Attribution: Seeking National Responsibility in Cyber Attacks

Author:
Jason Healey
Publication Date:
02-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
For more than two decades, cyber defenders, intelligence analysts, and policymakers have struggled to determine the source of the most damaging attacks. This "attribution problem" will only become more critical as we move into a new era of cyber conflict with even more attacks ignored, encouraged, supported, or conducted by national governments.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Terrorism, International Security, and Reform
Political Geography:
China

300. NATO's Cyber Capabilities: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow

Author:
Jason Healey and Leendert van Bochoven
Publication Date:
02-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
NATO's central missions of collective defense and cooperative security must be as effective in cyberspace as in the other domains of air, land, sea, and space.
Topic:
Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Science and Technology, and Reform
Political Geography:
Europe