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101. China in Sub-Saharan Africa: Reaching far beyond natural resources

Author:
Amin Mohseni-Cheraghlou and Naomi Aladekoba
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
This work empirically examines China’s growing footprint in Sub-Saharan Africa’s investment, trade, cultural, and security landscape over the past two decades. It highlights China’s increasing appetite for Sub-Saharan Africa’s natural resources and growing young labor force—identifying the region’s consumer market as an important destination for Chinese goods and services over the next few decades. The analysis identifies more than 600 Chinese investments and construction contracts in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), valued at over $303 billion, signed between 2006 and 2020. Four sectors attract 87 percent of China’s investment and construction in the region: energy at 34 percent; transport, 29 precent; metals, 13 percent; and real estate, 11 percent. This is very similar to the Middle East and North Africa Region, where the energy sector attracts close to 50 percent of China’s investment, followed by transport, 19 percent; real estate, 15 percent; and metals, 6 percent. In terms of trade, this work shows that between 2001 and 2020, China’s merchandise trade with the region increased by a whopping 1,864 percent—surpassing SSA’s trade with both the United States and the European Union. In other words, from 2001 to 2020, China’s share in total merchandise trade in SSA rose from 4 percent to 25.6 percent, while during the same period, the shares of the United States and the EU in SSA’s total trade declined by 10 percentage points and 8 percentage points, respectively. The report also takes a look at China’s arms trade with the region. Twenty-two percent of SSA’s arms imports are sourced from China, making China the region’s second-largest supplier of arms and military equipment, with Russia in the lead (24 percent). Finally, the report highlights the fact that the size of Chinese migrants in Africa is estimated at one to two million, with around one million permanently residing in the region. The largest numbers are in Ghana, South Africa, Madagascar, Zambia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.This work is the first in a series of empirical analyses that will be conducted on China’s presence in developing economies and low-income countries.
Topic:
Natural Resources, Economy, Business, Economic Growth, Macroeconomics, Trade, and Inclusion
Political Geography:
Africa, China, Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa

102. How allied Sweden and Finland can secure Northern Europe

Author:
Anna Wieslander, Eric Adamson, and Jesper Lehto
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
NATO is approaching its ninth round of enlargement. The accession of Sweden and Finland—two solid democracies and defenders of the international-rules based order—into the Alliance will strengthen the core of the transatlantic community. Their NATO membership opens up new opportunities to bolster regional deterrence and defense in Northern Europe, increase transatlantic burden sharing, and secure the Alliance as a whole in ways not previously possible. This issue brief sets the stage by suggesting that the Alliance use the accession of Sweden and Finland to create an ambitious deterrence-by-denial “bubble” over Northern Europe. Such a strategy does not merely include military capabilities but must be underpinned by civil robustness and resilience that stretch across NATO territory. Operationally, allies in Northern Europe should prepare to assume greater responsibility as first responders in case of a severe security situation, below or at the level of Article 5. For this to succeed, political cooperation and agenda setting must intensify among Northern European allies.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Alliance, and Resilience
Political Geography:
Finland, Sweden, and Northern Europe

103. Energy investment in a time of inflation

Author:
Charles Lichfield and Joseph Webster
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
High rates of inflation across the world are forcing central banks to reluctantly tighten monetary policy despite accompanying recession risks. Moreover, restricted credit access could jeopardize energy investments, particularly for capital-intensive clean energy projects, potentially rendering the world more vulnera­ble energy to price shocks, which are a significant contributor to the current crisis. This paper briefly considers the macroeconomic drivers of inflation in late 2022, including Russia’s war in Ukraine and uncertainties around energy supply, supply-chain resets, and lingering COVID-19 disruptions, before examining the persistent energy underinvestment of the past decade and how this has left markets exposed to varying degrees. As such, this paper also considers how private capital can accelerate cleaner energy adoption, suited to different markets’ unique conditions and needs. Bor­rowing costs will rise, but this doesn’t have to bring the transition to a standstill. With the Great Moderation of low volatility, interest rates, and inflation perhaps a relic of the past, assets offering inflation protection, such as infrastructure, may become increas­ingly attractive to investors. There is a fear that global inflation will sharply curtail energy investment into emerging markets. The fear is justified. Higher interest rates in developed markets mean higher rates of return which will lure emerging markets investors back to the US and Europe. Still, it’s not all bad news for emerging markets. Quasi-state actors like Pension and Sovereign Welfare funds are interested in very long term, high-yield projects—two criteria to which emerging market energy infrastructure correspond. Disruptions to interest rates and inflation, triggered in part by energy underinvestment, will cause disparate impacts in different markets. Inflation is not, perhaps, everywhere and always a mone­tary phenomenon. Energy investment faltered from 2014 to 2020, despite low interest rates. Meanwhile, aggre­gate supply shocks—first due to COVID, then from Putin’s invasion of Ukraine—have pressured energy production and prices, raising inflation and necessitating interest rate hikes. The consequences of persistent energy underinvest­ment are now becoming apparent. The need for new energy infrastructure cannot be met without private investment. This was the case when infla­tion was lower; it is even more important now.
Topic:
Environment, Markets, Oil, Governance, Gas, Economy, Investment, Inflation, and Energy
Political Geography:
Global Focus

104. Area C: From a Hub of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict to a Space for “Creeping Peace”

Author:
Omer Zanany
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
Abstract:
Area C of the Occupied Palestinian Territories is a key hub of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict claimed by Israelis and Palestinians and left under temporary Israeli responsibility by the Interim Agreement (1995). For almost three decades, Israel has been reducing the Palestinian living space in the area and deepening its hold, managing all planning and building processes, expanding settlement areas and so-called “state lands” and demarcating “military zones” and “nature reserves” for itself. The collapse of the peace process also encouraged the Palestinian Authority (since 2009) to act unilaterally on the ground. While Israel has assumed a “piecemeal” approach and sees Area C as a vital space for settlement and security, the Palestinians have taken a “holistic” approach, viewing the area as a necessary space for a contiguous and sustainable state. The campaign currently being waged on the ground perpetuates friction and a bloody struggle over land and infrastructure, distances the chance of a stable Israeli-Palestinian agreement, prevents development and construction for Palestinians, poses a tangible danger to nature and the environment, and deepens humanitarian and legal challenges of population expulsion and relocation. Turning this important area into a foundation for Israeli-Palestinian progress requires two types of policies – a reactive policy in the short term to prevent further deterioration, and a long-term policy of practical cooperation. In light of the new radical right-wing government’s policy advocating the de facto annexation of Area C to Israel, the pro-peace camp must take preventive measures: promote a campaign to “unmask” the government’s moves and intentions and expose the dangers of annexation as a fatal blow to Israel’s identity, security, and political and economic standing; expand demonstrations in conjunction with the overall protest against the new government’s anti-democratic policies; file objections to settlement construction and to harmful measures against the Palestinians. Down the line, Israel and the Palestinians must abandon their “zero sum game” approach and instead formulate joint systemic planning and promote positive steps in Area C: approve outline plans for Palestinian construction that were already submitted to Israel for approval, prevent crime and piracy, and promote joint projects with international and Arab assistance. These include solar power fields, agricultural and food cultivation areas, water and wastewater treatment facilities, and industrial zones. Advancing these measures without a political horizon will result, at most, in some specific improvement. On the other hand, advancing measures with a view to a political settlement – including the transfer of parts of Area C to the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the advancement of a comprehensive economic plan for the Palestinians – will lead to a real change, strengthen Palestinian ability and motivation to prevent terrorism, and make it possible to gradually advance the two-state vision based on the “Creeping Peace” strategy.
Topic:
Occupation, Conflict, Peace, and Peacebuilding
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

105. Building Resilience? The Cybersecurity, Economic & Trade Impacts of Cloud Immunity Requirements

Author:
Matthias Bauer
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
EU Member States should call on the EU’s Cybersecurity Agency (ENISA) and the European Commission to abandon immunity requirements in the proposed EU Cloud Certification Scheme (EUCS). With immunity requirements in the EUCS, the EU risks opening a Pandora’s box, paving the way for data localisation, foreign ownership restrictions, and local establishment requirements in digital industries globally leading to rising trade tensions. ENISA’s current proposal could increase policymakers’ appetite for data localisation in the EU. It would empower the European Commission and Member State authorities to exclude foreign businesses from domestic cloud services markets and set a dangerous precedent for any data-intensive sector. The list of “sectors of high criticality” could be logically extended to both existing services (e.g., financial services) and to new technologies and business models, such as IoT in the energy and healthcare sectors, and autonomous driving in the transport sector. Non-EU jurisdictions would be pressured to respond in kind. EUCS immunity requirements would increase cloud adopters’ exposure to cybersecurity risks. Data localisation often creates obstacles to an integrated management approach towards cybersecurity risks. Country of headquarter and foreign ownership restrictions in the proposed EUCS risk removing global frontier cybersecurity technologies from Member State markets. Excluding these and other EU and non-EU companies from EU Member States could result in a long-lasting security deficit of EU cloud adopters vis-à-vis organisations that are still able to use reliable and often best-practice cloud services offered by providers from outside EU Member States. Immunity requirements in the EUCS are discriminatory by design. They could provoke retaliatory measures by EU trading partners, either unilaterally or through WTO or bilateral FTA (e.g., UK-EU) Dispute Settlement. Local establishment requirements and foreign ownership restrictions would by design discriminate against foreign cloud providers. US-headquartered companies, which currently serve more than 75% of the EU market, would be most affected by EU immunity requirements.[1] Depending on US preferences and the scope of the proposed EUCS, the EU could be subject to retaliatory tariffs of up to USD 12 billion worth of EU goods exports or equivalent restrictions for EU services exports to the US. Other governments could lodge complaints via the WTO as well (e.g., Singapore, Japan, Canada and others, where cloud development is advancing rapidly). EU suppliers are currently in no position to manage a broad-based transition to cloud, and thus such requirements would delay significant efficiency and security gains that current foreign suppliers could offer. A blanket exclusion of non-EU cloud vendors would also likely undermine Europe’s objective to achieve a 75% cloud adoption rate for EU enterprises. Sensitive European businesses and public sector organisations would have to delay migration and make do with legacy systems for a very long time. Contrary to large countries, these negative impacts would be much more pronounced for smaller EU Member States, which lack the presence of large domestic incumbents and generally rely much more on an open international trading regime for digital services. ENISA’s cloud certification scheme should be limited to technical and transparency requirements. Immunity requirements for non-personal data should be addressed in bilateral initiatives such as the EU-US Trade and Technology Council (TTC) or agreements requiring a company that sought to offer services of the highest level of sensitivity to be headquartered in a country granted adequacy with EU data protection rules, or a country that is an adherent to the OECD’s Trusted Government Access principles, or (concerning the US) a participant in the upcoming Trans-Atlantic Data Privacy Framework. Excluding foreign companies from operating in the EU would have far-reaching consequences. If that is the intent, it should require a sound legal analysis and the decision should be taken through a formal legislative procedure at the EU level.
Topic:
Economics, Markets, European Union, Cybersecurity, Digital Economy, Trade, and Resilience
Political Geography:
Europe

106. The Economic Dividend of Competitiveness

Author:
Fredrik Erixon, Oscar Guinea, Philipp Lamprecht, Elena Sisto, and Erik van der Marel
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
In a world of technological and economic rivalry, the EU must devote increased attention to its competitiveness. Higher levels of competitiveness will help the EU build a more prosperous economy which will in turn produce innovation and resources to address the great challenges of our time. ECIPE published a study presenting a competitiveness compass with concrete policy recommendations that will improve EU’s competitiveness. These policy recommendations, once implemented, will bring tangible benefits to the EU economy in the form of higher levels of trade and productivity. This report presents five scenarios in which the EU pursues competitiveness policies that lead to higher economic growth.
Topic:
Economics, Science and Technology, European Union, Economic Growth, and Competition
Political Geography:
Europe

107. Building a Mature UK Trade Policy

Author:
David Henig
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
Global Britain has not delivered according to the hopes expressed by supporters of leaving the EU. Trade with the rest of the world has not grown to make up for leaving a bloc with seamless trade, early Free Trade Agreements with Australia and New Zealand are of minor economic significance, and it is hard to discern much of a strategy beyond completing a few more similar deals. Meanwhile the world of trade policy is transformed since 2016, negatively. The US has essentially declared its national interests to be more important than global rules, while the EU wants to act unilaterally as the global regulator. In both, the climate crisis is being used as an excuse to reintroduce protectionist measures threatening economic damage and global stability. Expectations of what a UK outside of the EU could achieve were exaggerated, but nonetheless the country could be doing a lot better in its trade policy. There is no good reason for such tensions as exist with a broad range of frustrated stakeholders, the absence of clear purpose on UK strengths such as services, or the defensiveness that seemingly takes pride in secrecy and resistance to proper scrutiny. Adjustment time was inevitable, but six years should have been enough.
Topic:
Economics, European Union, Free Trade, and Trade Policy
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

108. Reforming Standard Essential Patents: Trade, Specialisation, and International Jurisprudence

Author:
Fredrik Erixon and Oscar Guinea
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
The European Commission is considering a radical overhaul of the system governing Standard Essential Patents (SEPs). A leaked proposal suggests that the Commission wants to take control over the registration of SEPs, take efforts to regulate their essentiality, and intervene in negotiations over royalty rates if parties do not come to an agreement. The underlying assumption is that such a system will benefit SEP implementers and the European economy, and that the common holders of SEPs will be cut down a size or two. The logic behind this policy is that, since there are more SEP implementers than holders, any change in favour of implementers will have a net positive effect on the EU economy. However, this is doubtful. The EU is a R&D powerhouse for many of the technologies protected under SEPs and since most of the global production of the goods using these technologies is done outside Europe, the EU is a net exporter of innovation and a receiver of revenues from the licensing of these technologies. Using data on trade, specialisation, and market revenues, this paper comes to a different conclusion: the EU economy is likely to be a net loser if the balance between holders and implementers is changed. Moreover, there is a general and fundamental interest for Europe to preserve a system of standards and SEPs that allows it to punch above its weight in international policies and practices in standards and patents.
Topic:
Reform, European Union, Trade, Patents, Specialization, European Commission, and Jurisprudence
Political Geography:
Europe

109. Trade and Competitiveness: Putting the Firm at the Centre of the Analysis

Author:
Lucian Cernat and Oscar Guinea
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
The European Commission published its communication for the long-term competitiveness of the EU. Trade and Open Strategic Autonomy were among the selected policy areas that will drive EU competitiveness in the future and trade with the rest of the world as a share of EU Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was the selected indicator to measure progress. This Policy Brief proposes a new set of indicators that complement this and similar indicators that focus on the value of trade. Using the Trade by Enterprise Characteristics (TEC) database, this paper produces indicators that measure the number of exporters, non-EU suppliers, non-EU customers, and foreign companies. By putting the firm at the centre of the analysis, these indicators offer insights that complement policy-makers’ views on trade and competitiveness.
Topic:
European Union, GDP, Trade, Strategic Autonomy, European Commission, Economic Competition, and Competition
Political Geography:
Europe

110. Potential and Pitfalls for African Industrialization in Chinese-built Standard Gauge Railways

Author:
Yunnan Chen
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Centre for Business and Development Studies (CBDS), Copenhagen Business School
Abstract:
Railway development has been a key feature of transport infrastructure investments in several African economies, with several new standard gauge railways (SGR) built in the last ten years in Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Kenya. These planned projects have also entailed substantial Chinese involvement through construction contractors, in financing, and in the operations and management, becoming part of the wider Chinese discourse of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). They also have significant potential in supporting the industrialization plans of African states, and in some cases, have been explicitly linked to plans for a green transformation. This brief draws from case studies across Africa with a focus on Ethiopia, to highlight the significant potential of railway investments as a low-cost, low-carbon transport for green industrialization, but also its pitfalls and challenges as an infrastructure for governance, and local technology transfer.
Topic:
Development, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Industrialization, and Railways
Political Geography:
China and Africa

111. Electric Vehicles and the Changing Automotive GVC: A Window of Opportunity for African Countries?

Author:
Tobias Wuttke
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Centre for Business and Development Studies (CBDS), Copenhagen Business School
Abstract:
Only two African countries have successfully integrated with the automotive GVC to date: South Africa and Morocco. Their experiences, compared to other even more successful developing and emerging economies with automotive industries, highlight both the opportunities as well as the limitations of automotive GVC participation as an economic development engine. Scale in vehicle production, facilitated by government industrial policy, is the key prerequisite for successful participation with localisation benefits. These fundamentals do not change with the shift to electric vehicles. Governments in Africa and elsewhere need to attract FDI in electric vehicle production and from there can support the development of a local component and materials value chain. Once these basics are covered, governments and local firms can aim for making use of the technological window of opportunity by investing in EV-related technology, mainly battery technology, to potentially capture more value from automotive GVC participation than has traditionally been possible in the ICE vehicle value chain.
Topic:
Development, Industrial Policy, Foreign Direct Investment, Global Value Chains, Automotive Industry, and Electric Vehicles
Political Geography:
Africa

112. Current Capabilities and Future Potential of African Textile and Apparel Industries

Author:
Lindsay Whitfield and Chema Triki
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Centre for Business and Development Studies (CBDS), Copenhagen Business School
Abstract:
The textile and apparel industry is a globalised industry characterised by a high degree of dependency and fragmentation in global supply chains. From the mid-20th century, cotton textile and apparel manufacturing production relocated from industrialised to developing countries, particularly in Asia, and was quickly followed by the emergence of the petrochemical industry and synthetic fibre production in East Asian countries, while South Asia continued to focus on cotton and natural fibres. China, Bangladesh, and Vietnam are currently the central players in global apparel supply chains, with China and increasingly Vietnam having vertically integrated industries with access to a diverse range of fabrics and thus a large product portfolio. The largest apparel consumer markets are concentrated in Europe, North America, and other wealthy countries such as Japan, as they have higher purchasing power and economically larger markets. Large emerging economies such as China and India largely supply their domestic markets but have not yet become major destination consumption markets for other developing economies. Changes in international trade over the past 30 years fostered the textile and apparel global value chain dynamic. These changes were marked by opening trade borders, lowering tariffs, tax breaks or subsidies offered by various governments, and free trade agreements. Low labour costs and lower production costs have shaped the decisions of global actors to relocate their operations from one country to another. Current global trends are set to transform the global value chains of textiles and apparel again. These trends include increasing production costs in China, the drive to shorten supply chains post-Covid pandemic through nearshoring and seeking countries with yarn-to-garment (or vertical) production capabilities, and a sustainability shift. These trends are leading global apparel buyers to diversify their sourcing away from China and Asia more generally and to consider new supply bases. These structural trends in the industry, together with the AfCFTA, represent a window of opportunity for African countries. African industry actors and their governments should build new textile and apparel industries that seek to participate in global and regional markets and engage with global technologies and international partnerships. Attracting foreign firms with the necessary technical, organisational, and managerial capabilities is essential. The AfCFTA represents a powerful tool to respond to the verticality need of the industry, considering the current production levels of raw materials, but also an opportunity to increase the number of African countries with industrial capabilities in textile and apparel. The ongoing negotiations on rules of origin will significantly impact the continent's potential to create synergetic regional value chains.
Topic:
Development, Industrial Policy, International Trade and Finance, Business, Supply Chains, and Textile Industry
Political Geography:
Africa

113. Climate Change Mitigation for Late Industrialisers: The Role of Technology Intensity in Manufacturing

Author:
Elvis Korku Avenyo and Fiona Tregenna
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Centre for Business and Development Studies (CBDS), Copenhagen Business School
Abstract:
Many developing countries now have a renewed focus on industrialisation and industrial policy. This is based on the recognition that industrialisation is a key driver of long-term economic progress and is the central route to improve the well-being of citizens in developing countries (Chenery, 1955; Tregenna, 2016; United Nations Industrial Development Organization [UNIDO], 2016). At the same time, the climate crisis poses an existential threat to the global economy and to humanity and has emerged as a challenge to the industrial development prospects and pathways of developing countries. This is because industrialisation is an important contributor to global warming, specifically to anthropogenic emissions of cardon dioxide (CO2.) (Adom et al., 2012; Han & Chatterjee, 1997). Late industrialisers thus face a dual challenge: industrialising while mitigating climate change (Altenburg & Rodrik, 2017). Hence, there is now a degree of tension as to how late industrialisers can achieve long-term economic development under paths involving heavy or intensive industrialisation, while mitigating emissions and environmental damage more broadly. An emerging discourse recognises the critical need for developing countries to push towards industrial development that, while generating growth in productivity and jobs, is also environmentally sustainable. This is especially important, as poorer countries are particularly vulnerable to the immediate effects of the climate crisis (Altenburg & Rodrik, 2017; Padilla, 2017). Thus, transforming towards sustainable production systems and green industrial policies offers developing countries opportunities to industrialise in an environmentally sustainable way while contributing to job creation and economic prosperity (Altenburg & Rodrik, 2017; Padilla, 2017; Rodrik, 2014). However, the high ‘green premia’ and new access barriers to the ‘green’ energy technologies from advanced economies directly threaten this potential sustainable industrial development pathway in developing countries.
Topic:
Climate Change, Development, Science and Technology, Manufacturing, Industrialization, Sustainability, and Carbon Emissions
Political Geography:
Global Focus

114. Security at Sea: A Turning Point in Maritime

Author:
Scott Tait
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
Abstract:
Since the end of the Second World War, the United States has been the pre-eminent naval power and ultimate guarantor of global maritime security. It has also been one of the primary beneficiaries of the global maritime economic system, which in turn resourced its naval strength and increased the incentive to use that strength to protect the freedom of the seas. But a number of global changes, all likely beyond the United States’ control, are driving new dynamics in both security and economics in the maritime domain. These challenges include the return of great power competition at sea, the maritime consequences of climate change, increased pollution, the rapid rise of illicit trade and resource exploitation, and the erosion of maritime governance. These challenges are dynamic and inter-related—a change in one will often drive second and third order changes in the others. The United States has proven historically to be resilient and adaptive in the face of great challenges, and the maritime community has traditionally been a leader in innovation, collaboration, and positive-sum solutions. To meet the challenges of today and tomorrow, the United States should double down on those strengths, and work with allies to maintain and strengthen the rules-based international maritime system. Moreover, the United States should be a leader in envisioning changes to that system that will ensure it equitably meets the needs of all, accounts for the changes being driven by climate change and pollution, and anticipates a near-term future where autonomous systems will play a major role in the ecosystem.
Topic:
Security, Environment, Science and Technology, United Nations, and Maritime
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

115. Is the Pursuit of Nukes Driven by Leaders or Systems?

Author:
So Yeon (Ellen) Park
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
Abstract:
Nuclear weapons are widely regarded as one of the most lethal aspects of military arsenals ever created. As such, international relations and security experts have long been concerned about their proliferation. To prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, both policymakers and academic researchers have focused on what are commonly thought to be the primary drivers of proliferation: security concerns and domestic politics and economies. This brief examines another important driver: the role of national leaders themselves. Based on a study of 1,400 leaders in office between 1945 and 2000, author Ellen Park shows that leader personality and experience drive decisions about whether—or not—to pursue nuclear weapons, a finding that holds true across countries (rather than being limited to a few unique cases). Put simply, the pursuit of nuclear weapons is systematically influenced by certain attributes of leaders, such as college major, socioeconomic background, and military and international experience. To predict when and where the spread of nuclear and other emerging technologies will emerge next, policymakers should promote interdisciplinary dialogue to cultivate leader profiles and expand their use.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Global Focus

116. Action for Peacekeeping Plus (A4P+): An Update on Monitoring and Implementation after Two Years

Author:
Daniel Forti
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Peace Institute
Abstract:
The UN secretary-general launched Action for Peacekeeping Plus (A4P+) in March 2021, three years after introducing the Action for Peacekeeping (A4P) initiative. A4P+ was conceptualized as a two-year implementation strategy for A4P that prioritizes urgent challenges facing UN peacekeeping. To monitor progress toward achieving these priorities, the UN has developed the A4P+ Plan and the A4P+ Monitoring Framework with specific results, deliverables, and indicators. To date, the UN Department of Peace Operations (DPO) has published two reports assessing the implementation of A4P+ and the impact of these efforts on UN peacekeeping operations. This issue brief takes stock of the monitoring and implementation of A4P+ over the past two years. It begins by explaining the A4P+ priorities and tracing their emergence out of the A4P initiative and Declaration of Shared Commitments. It then discusses highlights from the A4P+ Plan and the two progress reports published as of March 2023 and examines the benefits and limitations of current approaches to monitoring and implementing A4P+. The paper concludes that moving forward, UN officials will need to balance ambitious goals for progress with realistic expectations about what peacekeeping operations can achieve, and when. The UN will also have to decide whether to extend the current set of A4P+ priorities beyond 2023. Ultimately, while A4P+ can help grease the machinery of UN peacekeeping, its long-term impact will depend on member states delivering on their existing political, operational, and financial commitments.
Topic:
United Nations, Peacekeeping, and Monitoring
Political Geography:
Global Focus

117. Accountability for Crimes against Peacekeepers

Author:
Agathe Sarfati
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Peace Institute
Abstract:
Since 1948, more than 1,000 UN personnel have been killed in malicious acts while serving in UN peacekeeping operations. Since 2013, the vast majority of fatalities have taken place in the Central African Republic (CAR), Mali, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). To address this trend, the UN Secretariat and member states have increasingly focused on strengthening the policy framework on accountability to peacekeepers. They have also increasingly focused specifically on how to pursue justice for peacekeepers who have been victims of attacks. This paper focuses on advancing justice for crimes against peacekeepers as one aspect of the overall effort to enhance accountability to peacekeepers. It provides an overview of the role of UN peacekeeping operations in investigating and prosecuting crimes against peacekeepers and the UN’s growing focus on advancing and prioritizing accountability for these crimes. It then examines case studies of criminal cases supported by the UN missions in CAR (MINUSCA), Mali (MINUSMA), and the DRC (MONUSCO) in their respective host states and provides an overview of cross-cutting challenges they have faced. The paper concludes with recommendations to help the UN Secretariat, peacekeeping operations, the Security Council, and other member states accelerate the investigation and prosecution of crimes against peacekeepers in a consistent and balanced manner: The UN Secretariat should maintain a comprehensive approach to accountability, develop a common definition of crimes against peacekeepers, ensure that host states adhere to human rights standards when engaging with those accused of crimes against peacekeepers, and improve internal and external coordination in this area. UN missions should pursue a comprehensive approach to accountability, continue to support host-state investigations and prosecutions of those accused of crimes against peacekeepers, advocate for host-state authorities to pursue accountability, and ensure sustained documentation of and follow-up on cases. The Security Council should reinforce peacekeeping mandates to build the host state’s capacity to pursue accountability and encourage legal clarity on the nature of crimes against peacekeepers. UN member states should use the group of friends to offer new ideas on ways to promote accountability and use the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations to discuss ways to improve coordination in this area.
Topic:
Crime, United Nations, Peacekeeping, and Accountability
Political Geography:
Global Focus

118. Peacekeeping in Nonpermissive Environments: Assessing Troop-Contributing Countries’ Perspectives on Capabilities and Mindsets

Author:
Fiifi Edu-Afful
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Peace Institute
Abstract:
Many peacekeepers are deployed in areas where ongoing armed conflicts or other situations of violence, including attacks against peacekeepers, have constrained their capacity to implement their mandate and protect themselves. This has led some troop-contributing countries (TCCs) to raise concerns about the high-risk environments to which their troops are deployed. One of the most critical issues when deploying troops to nonpermissive environments is ensuring they have the right capabilities and mindset. This paper interrogates TCCs’ perspectives on capabilities and mindsets and explores their implications for peacekeeping policy and practice. The goal is not only to deepen understanding of the UN’s progress on implementing the A4P+ priorities but, more importantly, to assess the state of play of peacekeeping in nonpermissive environments, drawing on the diverse perspectives of TCCs. The paper concludes by considering how capabilities and mindsets relate to accounta­bility for and accountability of peacekeepers. Failure to properly train, equip, and support troops being deployed to nonpermissive environments raises questions about whether the UN and TCCs are accountable to peacekeepers. Likewise, it is unclear to what extent peacekeepers should be held accountable for their performance when they have not been provided the proper equipment, training, and mindset.
Topic:
Environment, United Nations, Peacekeeping, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Global Focus

119. Forced Marriage by Non-state Armed Groups: Frequency, Forms, and Impact

Author:
Phoebe Donnelly and Emily Myers
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Peace Institute
Abstract:
Many non-state armed groups use forced marriage during armed conflict. This practice has been documented across all geographic regions, in every decade since the 1940s, and across armed groups with many different ideologies. Yet while policymakers, scholars, and practitioners recognize forced marriage as an important form of conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV), there are no frameworks for conceptualizing the frequency and range of forms of forced marriage that occur in conflict. To fill that gap, this paper introduces an original dataset tracking forced marriage in armed conflict and uses the data and illustrative examples to divide forced marriage in armed conflict into three types: member–member forced marriage, member–civilian forced marriage, and civilian–civilian forced marriage. This dataset can be a tool for policymakers and practitioners to understand the impacts of forced marriage in armed conflict and better design prevention strategies and survivor-centered responses. The report concludes with an overview of existing policy, legal, and programmatic responses to forced marriage in conflict settings, including by non-state armed groups, and provides recommendations for how these responses can better address this complex phenomenon: Data collection: Disaggregate data on CRSV by the form of violence (when possible), avoid linking sexual slavery and forced marriage, and gather more data on the unique needs of survivors of forced marriage. Criminal accountability: Continue prosecuting forced marriage as a distinct crime against humanity and promote the inclusion of forced marriage as a distinct crime against humanity during negotiations on the treaty on crimes against humanity. Sanctions: Continue to include information on CRSV in the reports of sanctions monitoring committees, ensure that sanctions listing criteria are applied against perpetrators of forced marriage, and ensure that every panel of experts includes at least one member with expertise on gender issues or CRSV. Reintegration: Factor the different types of forced marriage into the design of reintegration programs and provide support that considers the unique needs of individuals exiting forced marriage.
Topic:
Security, Armed Forces, Women, Peace, Armed Conflict, and Forced Marriage
Political Geography:
Global Focus

120. Financing Loss and Damage at Scale: Toward a Mosaic Approach

Author:
Michael Franczak
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Peace Institute
Abstract:
The historic decision on loss and damage (L&D) at the 2022 UN Climate Change Conference (COP27) calls for a new fund and funding arrangements focused on addressing L&D. It also tasks a Transitional Committee to prepare recommendations on the new fund and funding arrangements for adoption at the 2023 UN Climate Change Conference (COP28) in Dubai. This decision reflects a recognition that existing funding arrangements are grossly inadequate to address the escalating scale of L&D. Addressing L&D will require both enhancing these existing arrangements and creating a new fund and funding arrangements, forming a mosaic of solutions across countries, institutions, and markets. This paper aims to aid the Transitional Committee and other stakeholders by providing an initial sketch of that mosaic. First, it examines existing arrangements, modalities, and sources of funding for addressing L&D from UN humanitarian agencies, multilateral development banks and international financial institutions, and insurance and bond markets. Second, it proposes reforms to existing arrangements that would address key finance gaps and bottlenecks. Third, it identifies elements of a new L&D fund that would complement existing arrangements and make use of innovative finance (including levies and bond issuances) to operate at scale. With roughly six months left until COP28, the Transitional Committee will need to work efficiently to achieve its mandate, which includes determining the fund’s institutional arrangements, modalities, structure, governance, sources of funding, and coordination and complementarity with existing funding arrangements. To this end, the paper recommends that it should: Begin securing financing before COP28, particularly innovative financing, which takes longer to secure than traditional donor contributions; Consult with the private sector to determine its role, including in the use of insurance mechanisms and risk pools, frontloading, and connections between L&D and jobs; Determine the form and role of triggers, including for slow-onset events; Consider how to address noneconomic losses, including displacement and forced migration; and Identify the actions, mechanisms, and institutions required to operationalize the fund, including an internal or external coordination mechanism.
Topic:
Climate Change, Development, United Nations, and Finance
Political Geography:
Global Focus

121. The UN’s Response to the COVID-19 Infodemic

Author:
Gabriel Delsol and Albert Trithart
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Peace Institute
Abstract:
The COVID-19 pandemic has been accompanied by a related “infodemic.” This infodemic emerged as widespread demand for information about the public health emergency was met with large volumes of false and misleading information. Many of the national and international institutions leading the response to the COVID-19 pandemic, including the UN, quickly recognized that they also needed to respond to the infodemic. This led to a quick, broad-based response by a broad array of UN agencies and partners. To date, however, there has been no systematic mapping or assessment of the range of initiatives across the UN system. To begin filling that gap, this paper provides an overview of the UN system’s response to the COVID-19 infodemic across four areas: monitoring harmful information related to COVID-19; dispelling false information and providing authoritative information; building information resilience; and setting the agenda. It then assesses some of the successes and challenges of the response across four areas: external partnerships, including with governments, civil society, academia, and social media companies; coordination within the UN system; financial, human, and technological capacity; and impact assessment. The report concludes that the UN’s infodemic response finds itself at a pivotal point: Due to donor fatigue around COVID-19, funding for the infodemic response is falling even while the need for a robust infrastructure to address infodemics and other information disorders may be increasing. UN entities working to address the infodemic and other information disorders should therefore consider the following: Engaging in a consultative process to develop a shared understanding of the infodemic by defining its specific harms in relation to each of their mandates; Sustaining and building capacity to counter infodemics and other information disorders, both in communications departments and in other sections working on infodemic management; Adopting a more standardized, system-wide approach to the use of new technologies and engagement with technology platforms; and Continuing to strengthen long-term information resilience by building the capacity of governments to manage infodemics and supporting strong, independent media.
Topic:
Health, Science and Technology, United Nations, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Global Focus

122. The EU can manage without Russian liquified natural gas

Author:
Ben McWilliams, Giovanni Sgaravatti, Simone Tagliapietra, and Georg Zachmann
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
The European Union has committed to eliminate all Russian fossil-fuel imports by 2027. Progress has been made, with sanctions on oil and coal already introduced. The glaring exception is natural gas, on which the EU has so far refrained from imposing limitations, owing to greater dependence on Russia. Nevertheless, pipeline gas imports have fallen by four-fifths following Russia’s weaponisation of gas supplies. However, Russia’s exports of liquified natural gas (LNG) to the EU have increased since the invasion of Ukraine. The EU needs a coherent strategy for these LNG imports. Our analysis shows that the EU can manage without Russian LNG. Anticipated impacts are not comparable to those felt in 2022 as Russian pipeline gas dried up. The regional impact would be most significant for the Iberian Peninsula, which has the highest share of Russian LNG in total gas supply. Meanwhile, the global LNG market is tight, and we anticipate that Russia would find new buyers for cargos that no longer enter Europe. We discuss the options available to the EU. Wait-and-see implies delaying any action until 2027, while soft sanctions would discourage additional purchases but not break long-term contracts. We argue instead for an EU embargo on Russian LNG, to reduce exposure to an unreliable and adversarial entity, and to limit the extent to which EU consumers fund the Russian state. The embargo may be designed to allow purchases only if they are coordinated via the EU’s Energy Platform, with limited volumes and below market prices. This could be accompanied by the implementation of a price cap on Russian LNG cargos that use EU or G7 trans-shipment, insurance or shipping services.
Topic:
European Union, Gas, Energy, and Green Economy
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

123. Can Chinese growth defy gravity?

Author:
Alicia Garcia-Herrero
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Chinese growth, astounding since the beginning of the reform era, has slowed in the last decade. We offer a baseline estimate (based on the current trend) of China’s medium-term growth rate, which we project to fall to 2.4 percent by 2035. Several factors create uncertainty around this baseline. China’s rapid aging is already incorporated into our long-term growth scenario, but its impact on growth will depend on how China’s remaining urbanisation process spreads over time, how the shrinking labour supply affects labour productivity and whether the decline in total factor productivity growth, reflecting the lack of reform during the last decade and possibly the rising role of the state, can be reversed. Investment in China, for decades the largest factor in China’s growth, is expected to contribute less to growth given the increasingly low return on assets, particularly on state-led investment. The rapid piling up of public debt is also becoming a heavy burden for the Chinese economy. Finally, the COVID-19 pandemic may have left significant scarring effects, such as structurally high youth unemployment and low investment confidence. On the upside for China, the rise in human capital and research and development expenditure may support innovation and growth, but the magnitude of this effect is uncertain, because it is unclear if higher innovation will translate into higher total factor productivity, and because of the United States’s push to contain China technologically.
Topic:
Industrial Policy, European Union, Economic Growth, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

124. Adjusting to the energy shock: the right policies for European industry

Author:
Giovanni Sgaravatti, Simone Tagliapietra, and Georg Zachmann
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
In 2022, overall European Union industrial employment and output increased above 2021 levels, despite rocketing energy prices. However, output declined from energy-intensive industries including basic metals, chemicals, non-metallic minerals and paper, for which energy costs represent a much bigger share of production costs than for less energy-intensive manufacturing. Energy prices are likely to remain above historic levels for the foreseeable future. In its industrial strategy response to this context, the EU must ask first whether the energy-intensive parts of the value chain should be outsourced permanently. Conditional on the answer being no, the second question is how to reduce energy prices to ensure the competitiveness of the energy-intensive productions stages that remain in the EU. First, the EU could bridge the high energy price period with unconditional subsidies, which seems to be the preferred strategy currently. This will avoid irreversible large-scale relocation abroad but is expensive, does not help to drive down energy prices and poses risks of fragmentation within the EU. It will only succeed if internationally competitive energy supplies are made available quickly. Second, the EU could support decarbonised production processes built on large-scale deployment of domestic renewables, grid interconnectors and storage. This would accelerate the green transition and reduce clean-tech prices worldwide. However, EU taxpayers would bear the cost of new technologies, without any guarantee of solving the current cost-competitiveness issue. Third, the EU could facilitate imports of energy-intensive products, while helping EU industry move to higher value-added parts of the value chain. Subsidies could be given directly to industrial sectors that have not become structurally uncompetitive, while bringing down energy demand and thus energy prices. However, this strategy would result in temporarily higher unemployment and factory closures in energy-intensive industries, would need to accommodate concerns over excessive reliance on imports and would need to be engineered to address carbon leakage. Policymakers should implement a mix of these policies. The EU should subsidise existing energy-intensive industries only in clearly justified cases, while deciding which energy-intensive products can be left to international market forces. By choosing which decarbonisation investments should be supported in Europe, the EU can combine industrial competitiveness and environmental sustainability.
Topic:
Industrial Policy, European Union, Value Chains, Energy, and Green Economy
Political Geography:
Europe

125. The longer-term fiscal challenges facing the European Union

Author:
Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Gregory Claeys, Zsolt Darvas, Lennard Welslau, and Stavros Zenios
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
The pandemic and subsequent price shocks triggered by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, have increased longer-term fiscal pressures in the European Union through higher debt, higher expected real interest rates and higher public investment needs. This Policy Brief makes some simple quantitative assessments of those effects and discusses policy implications, with the following results. First, long-term increases in primary fiscal balances required to offset higher debt and higher expected real interest rates are in the range of 0.5 percent to 1.5 percent of GDP for most EU countries. However, because of pre-existing differences in fiscal space, not all countries will need to undertake that adjustment, while some countries may need to adjust by substantially more. Among the 21 EU countries for which we have data to undertake this analysis, 14 will need to adjust by more than they were planning to do by 2025. Second, the required additional fiscal adjustment looks manageable, although it is substantial in some cases. To achieve medium-term debt-reducing primary balances, several EU countries will need to raise primary balances by more than 2 percent of GDP above their 2025 target, but no country will need additional fiscal adjustment of more than 3 percent of GDP. Third, market data suggests that the future path of real interest rates is very uncertain. Compared to the period immediately preceding the pandemic, longer-term expected real interest rates have increased by about 2 percentage points but remain low on average, at about 1 percent in real terms. Future developments depend on whether the structural factors that led to low interest rates in the first place persist or unwind. While interest rates might decline again, fiscal policymakers should not make plans that assume such a decline. Fourth, public spending needs for additional defence and climate spending run well above 1 percent of GDP per year. These needs do not appear to have been incorporated into current fiscal baselines, and hence will come on top of the adjustment described above. To ensure that fiscal adjustment does not defeat its purpose by slowing growth, it is essential that it is conducted gradually. In countries that require such adjustment, it should start as soon as cyclical conditions allow.
Topic:
Governance, European Union, Finance, and Fiscal Policy
Political Geography:
Europe

126. Will China’s new financial regulatory reform be enough to meet the challenges?

Author:
Martin Chorzempa and Nicolas Veron
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Effective financial supervision plays a crucial role in maintaining financial stability and a healthy financial system. China’s leadership has made financial risk a core priority, and in reforms approved in March 2023, it reassigned regulatory responsibilities, creating a new supervisory body that will take over some responsibilities from the central bank, the banking and insurance regulator, and the securities regulator. The aim is that a change to the financial supervisory architecture (who does what in financial supervision) will make China’s system more effective and stable. In this policy brief, we argue that this incremental reform will not solve the core issues China faces in financial supervisory effectiveness. We provide an overview of China’s large and complex financial system, including its largely state-owned banks (some of which are the largest in the world by assets), securities markets and other financial intermediaries. Traditional divisions between different types of activities and institutions have been blurred by the rise of large financial conglomerates, risk-transfer techniques and internet-based finance. Reforms in 2018 to China’s supervisory architecture did not eliminate perceived shortcomings, including failures to effectively regulate financial conglomerates, fintech and regional banks. We then survey global benchmarks against which China’s financial supervisory architecture can be compared, including the United States and European Union. China’s supervisory system is already more streamlined, at least on paper, than either of these most comparable global counterparts. Like them, China’s system does not correspond exactly to any of the three textbook archetypes of supervision: sectoral, twin-peaks or integrated supervision. Ultimately, the effectiveness of China’s financial supervisory architecture suffers from excessive state intervention in the financial system through other channels, including through the unique and pervasive influence of the communist party, which hampers supervisory independence and makes it difficult to establish accountability for regulatory failures. While the recently announced reform may improve coordination across supervisory bodies, coordination within the new quasi-integrated supervisor, across central departments, and between them and local branches, will remain a challenge.
Topic:
Reform, Regulation, Finance, and Financial Stability
Political Geography:
China and Asia

127. The potential of sovereign sustainability-linked bonds in the drive for net-zero

Author:
Alexander Lehmann and Catarina Martins
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
European Union governments have for some years issued green bonds that raise funds for climate-related spending. These bonds have been received well in capital markets but because they promise a certain use of proceeds, they complicate budget management and may not match investors’ claims of having an impact on national climate policies. Public commitments made by major investors and asset owners suggest that limiting climate transition risks and the assessment of the alignment of sovereigns with net-zero targets will now become key determinants of portfolio allocation. Yield differentials in bond markets are already beginning to reflect transition risks that arise from the inadequate pursuit by issuers of climate targets. Unlike standard green bonds, sustainability-linked bonds (SLBs) create a link between performance (outcome) indicators and the financial terms of the bonds. SLBs have grown rapidly in importance in private markets and are now being assessed by sovereign issuers. We show that sovereign SLBs could help incentivise climate policies in EU countries, and accelerate emission reductions. They would be an effective tool for signalling commitment. A common EU framework for issuance by EU countries would enhance capital market integration and the transparency of national policies, and would limit climate transition risks in EU capital markets more broadly.
Topic:
Climate Change, European Union, Finance, Carbon Emissions, and Sovereign Bonds
Political Geography:
Europe

128. A model for a participative approach to digital competition regulation

Author:
Christophe Carugati
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Digital competition regulations often put in place participative approaches to ensure competition in digital markets. The participative approach aims to involve regulated firms, stakeholders and regulators in the design of compliance measures. The approach is particularly relevant in complex and fast-evolving digital markets, where whole industries often depend on the behaviours of the regulated firms. The participative approach enables stakeholders and regulated firms to design compliance measures that are optimal for all because they ensure legal certainty for regulated firms, save time for regulators and take into account the views of stakeholders. However, the participative approach is subject to regulatory capture. The regulated firms and stakeholders might try to promote their interests to the regulator. This could result in endless discussions at best, and the adoption of inappropriate solutions following intense lobbying at worst. A governance model is necessary to ensure that the participative approach works without risks of regulatory capture. The model should define clearly each participant's role, duties and rights. There should be: 1) equal and transparent access of all stakeholders to the dialogue; 2) the presentation of tangible and evidence-based solutions from stakeholders and regulated firms; 3) public decisions from the regulator that contain assessments of the proposed solutions, with guidance to clarify rules; and 4) compliance measures proposed by the regulated firm in line with the guidance. The model should provide an assessment framework for the proposed solutions to identify the most effective. The assessment should rely on the principle of proportionality to assess whether the proposed compliance measure is proportionate, to ensure the effectiveness of the regulation. Finally, the model should safeguard against regulatory capture thanks to transparency rules and external monitoring.
Topic:
Regulation, Digital Economy, Innovation, Stakeholders, and Competition
Political Geography:
Global Focus

129. How Europe should answer the US Inflation Reduction Act

Author:
David Kleimann, Niclas Poitiers, André Sapir, Simone Tagliapietra, Nicolas Veron, Reinhilde Veugelers, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
The 2022 United States Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) is a significant and welcome climate law. It also includes trade-distortive subsidies, including local-content requirements prohibited under World Trade Organisation rules – the first time the US has done this and a blow to the international trading system that could trigger protectionism in other countries. The expected IRA green subsidies are of similar size to those available in the European Union, except in renewable energy production, where EU subsidies remain far larger. However, there are important qualitative differences. Some IRA subsidies discriminate against foreign producers while EU subsidies do not. IRA clean-tech subsidies are simpler and less fragmented, and they focus mainly on mass deployment of green technologies rather than innovation. The IRA will likely harm Europe through its competitiveness effect, while it will likely benefit climate transition in Europe and most of the rest of the world. However, the magnitude of both effects is very uncertain, partly because the IRA will induce substitution away from Chinese inputs. By forcing the reorganisation of supply chains, the IRA may make the EU and other economies more competitive relative to China. It may also initially slow the green transition. But in the longer run, this effect should be outweighed by the reduction in the cost of clean tech driven by the IRA. In responding to the IRA, the EU should not just seek to protect its competitiveness relative to the US but to pursue broader aims, including competitiveness in general, speedy decarbonisation and broad foreign policy and development policy goals. These aims imply that the EU should not impose local-content requirements of its own, should not loosen state-aid rules and should not mimic the IRA’s approach to manufacturing subsidies. Rather, it should focus on boosting its structural competitiveness, formulate a trade policy response that includes reform of the international subsidies regime, and develop an instrument for EU-level subsidies that focuses on early-stage development and increasing EU resilience to trade disruptions.
Topic:
Governance, European Union, Inflation, and Trade
Political Geography:
Europe

130. Climate versus trade? Reconciling international subsidy rules with industrial decarbonisation

Author:
David Kleimann
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
The vast environmental subsidies that may be required for the transition to net-zero greenhouse gas emissions are starting to generate international trade and political frictions between the world’s largest economies. This puts (supra-)national industrial decarbonisation efforts on a collision course with international subsidies rules and national countervailing duty (ie anti-foreign subsidy) laws and regulations. International cooperation will be essential to defuse such tensions before they escalate and impede effective climate policy rollouts, and before they lead to economic countermeasures that create new barriers to trade in environmental goods. This requires agreement on permissible environmental subsidy practices that minimise distortions. Meanwhile, it will be crucial to provide financial transfers to assist poorer economies with industrial decarbonisation at the same time as those poorer economies are suffering from the cross-border negative economic impacts of otherwise net-global-welfare enhancing environmental subsidies paid out by wealthy countries. Various forums can host the technical and political negotiations necessary to set the parameters of net global-welfare enhancing subsidies. These include the G7, the G20, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the World Trade Organisation’s Trade and Environment Committee and WTO Trade and Environmental Sustainability Structured Discussions, and the Coalition of Trade Ministers on Climate.
Topic:
Climate Change, Political Economy, Trade, Carbon Emissions, Subsidies, and Decarbonization
Political Geography:
Global Focus

131. How best to ensure international digital competition cooperation

Author:
Christophe Carugati
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Large digital firms pose similar competition issues worldwide, such as promoting their own services over those of rivals, or imposing unfair terms and conditions. Competition authorities have opened several antitrust investigations and policymakers have proposed digital competition regulations to tackle these issues. G7 competition authorities have called for several years for international cooperation on digital markets. They want competition cases and laws around the world that are consistent and work together. However, the question of how this can be done remains. A toolbox for international cooperation in competition enforcement already exists, but it does not provide for cooperation in competition policy and has shortcomings in relation to competition enforcement. Current and proposed legislation targets the largest digital firms to tackle the characteristics of digital markets, such as multi-sidedness, and the same or very similar behaviours, such as self-preferencing. Legislation in different jurisdictions addresses these issues with similar rules. While there is some convergence, some rules diverge in substance and some are at high risk of divergence in interpretation. Inconsistency is thus likely to arise from a divergence of interpretation rather than substance. The solution would be to ensure a coherent approach to competition in digital markets. This could be done by developing a framework based on four elements: (1) adoption of common legal phases for future digital competition laws to ensure clarity; (2) adoption of a common legal interpretation through guidance drafted by international forums, such as the International Competition Network (ICN); (3) adoption of common technical requirements developed in the context of ICN technical workshops, when the rules require it; and (4) the implementation of an international monitoring committee within the ICN to evaluate whether competition authorities and courts enforce the rules consistently. The impact of the framework might be limited because of the non-binding nature of the approach, and the focus on specific competition-related legislation, excluding laws that can also address the issues, such as civil law. Countries can overcome these limitations if they are willing to cooperate to ensure a consistent approach.
Topic:
Markets, Digital Economy, Digital Cooperation, and Competition
Political Geography:
Global Focus

132. Preparing for the next winter: Europe’s gas outlook for 2023

Author:
Ben McWilliams, Simone Tagliapietra, Georg Zachmann, and Thierry Deschuyteneer
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
The European Union has so far weathered the energy crisis brought on by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and will manage winter 2022/23 even if Russia abruptly halts all pipeline gas flows. However, preparations must be made for winter 2023-24. In particular, gas storage facilities should be 90 percent full by 1 October 2023. We assess the demand reduction needed if the 90 percent storage target is to be achieved. Our assessment takes into account EU imports, exports to refill gas storage facilities in Ukraine and Moldova, the weather and the situation in power markets, where gas demand is highly dependent on non-gas energy sources. Assuming limited Russian exports continue, and weather conditions are typical, demand up to 1 October 2023 must remain 13 percent lower than the previous five-year average. The EU should therefore extend its demand-reduction target, which is currently set to expire on 31 March 2023. Two variables will determine how easily the target can be met: 1) liquified natural gas (LNG) supply, and 2) the nature of demand reductions. Plans for rapid deployment of regasification units will alleviate concerns over LNG import infrastructure capacity. However, the EU will continue to compete internationally for LNG cargoes, and will remain vulnerable to global dynamics. Strong economic growth in China, for example, could further tighten markets. The way demand is reduced will determine the economic consequences. So far, large reductions in industrial gas demand have not been accompanied by dramatic drops in industrial output, suggesting good substitution options. However, hardly any gas was saved in the power sector last year, because of weak nuclear and hydro output. The return of French nuclear output will therefore be a huge positive. Finally, households have reduced gas demand, partly driven by warmer than usual weather. Record numbers of heat pumps were deployed in 2022, suggesting the start of a structural shift away from gas demand for heating. Policy should support a continued structural shift away from gas. This involves enabling rapid deployment of renewables and the accompanying grid infrastructure, energy-efficiency measures, help for households that want to switch to cleaner heating, and collaboration with industry to accelerate adoption of new low-carbon production methods.
Topic:
Security, Gas, Energy, Russia-Ukraine War, and Green Economy
Political Geography:
Europe

133. The Long‐​Run Effects of Immigration: Evidence across a Barrier to Refugee Settlement

Author:
Antonio Ciccone and Jan Nimczik
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
Some 280 million people around the world are first‐​generation immigrants; in Organisation for Economic Co‐​operation and Development countries, first‐​generation immigrants make up around 14 percent of the population. The economic effects of immigration have become better understood in recent decades. A new focus of research on the effects of immigration is its long‐​run impact on productivity, wages, and income. We contribute to this research by examining the long‐​run economic effects of the arrival of refugees in what would become West Germany after the end of World War II (WWII) in 1945. This period was characterized by one of the largest population movements in modern times. Between 1945 and 1949, millions of people from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and eastern parts of prewar Germany were displaced westward. When the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) was founded in 1949, these refugees made up around 15 percent of the country’s population.
Topic:
History, Immigration, Refugees, Resettlement, and World War II
Political Geography:
Europe, France, Germany, and United States of America

134. The Political Economy of Anti‐​bribery Enforcement

Author:
Lauren Cohen and Bo Li
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
A level playing field for firm competition is a fundamental requirement for any market to maximize its potential and achieve productive efficiency. When government favors a set of firms or individuals over others, distortions arise that reverberate throughout entire industries, affecting sales, production, innovation, and more. This is not to say that barriers to firms may not sometimes naturally arise, but if a finger is placed on the scale by government to allow certain firms to gain some unerodable advantage, this can have large implications on allocation and overall economic development.
Topic:
Corruption, Political Economy, Law Enforcement, Accountability, and Bribery
Political Geography:
Global Focus

135. The Economic Effects of the English Parliamentary Enclosures

Author:
Leander Heldring, James A. Robinson, and Sebastian Vollmer
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
In 1808, the English agriculturist Arthur Young stumbled on something interesting. He noticed that the adjacent Cambridgeshire parishes of Childersley and Hardwicke in England had startlingly different economic outcomes, even though they were divided only by a hedgerow. In Hardwicke, wheat yields were 16 bushels per acre, whereas in Childersley, on the other side of the hedgerow, they were 24 bushels per acre—50 percent higher. What could explain the difference? It wasn’t economic fundamentals, because Childersley consisted of similar soil. Rather, Young attributed the difference to the fact that the land in Hardwicke remained in “common field” while the land in Childersley was enclosed.
Topic:
Agriculture, History, Economy, Enclosure, and Parliament
Political Geography:
Europe and England

136. Uncle Sucker: Why U.S. Efforts at Defense Burdensharing Fail

Author:
Justin Logan
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
In 2022, the United States counted 50 of the world’s 195 countries as formal treaty allies, not including dozens more informal security relationships. U.S. allies do not carry a proportionate share of the burden of their defense; Washington’s allies account for roughly 36 percent of world economic output but only 24 percent of world military spending. In every alliance, the United States is the most important member and gives more than it gets in return. American politicians and the American public regularly express frustration with allies’ behavior. In 1959, for example, President Dwight D. Eisenhower lamented that the insufficient defense efforts of U.S. allies in Europe meant that the Europeans were close to “making a sucker out of Uncle Sam.” Things have gotten worse since 1959. Today, America’s alliances act as transfer payments from U.S. taxpayers to taxpayers in allied countries. History and theory both suggest that hectoring allies is unlikely to produce much change. Allies know that they can pocket the gains from U.S. commitments, then spend their own money in the ways they believe benefit them most. Policymakers should evaluate alliance commitments in the context of the net contributions of U.S. allies to U.S. defense, weighed against the costs and benefits of a non‐​alliance. The only way to produce more equitable burdensharing is to make allies doubt the strength of the U.S. commitment: the stronger the belief in the U.S. commitment, the harder it is to get allies to defend themselves. Unless policymakers fundamentally change their approach to alliances, there is little hope that defense burdens can be spread more equitably.
Topic:
History, Alliance, Defense Spending, Military, and Burden-sharing
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

137. The Fiscal Impact of Immigration in the United States

Author:
Alex Nowrasteh, Sarah Eckhardt, and Michael Howard
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
The National Research Council and the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) published groundbreaking investigations into the economics of immigration in 1997 and 2017. Both publications contained thorough literature surveys compiled by experts, academics, and think tank scholars on how immigration affects many aspects of the U.S. economy. The 2017 NAS report included an original fiscal impact model as a unique contribution to immigration scholarship. Its findings have been used by policymakers, economists, journalists, and others to debate immigration reform. Here, we acquired the exact methods used by the NAS from its authors to replicate, update, and expand upon the 2017 fiscal impact model published in the NAS’s The Economic and Fiscal Consequences of Immigration. This paper presents two analyses: a measure of the historical fiscal impacts of immigrants from 1994 to 2018 and the projected long‐​term fiscal impact of an additional immigrant and that immigrant’s descendants. An individual’s fiscal impact refers to the difference between the taxes that person paid and the benefits that person received over a given period. We use and compare two models for these analyses: the first follows the NAS’s methodology as closely as possible and updates the data for more recent years (hereafter referred to as the Updated Model), and the second makes several methodological changes that we believe improve the accuracy of the final results (hereafter referred to as the Cato Model). The most substantial changes made in the Cato Model include correcting for a downward bias in the estimation of immigrants’ future fiscal contributions identified by Michael Clemens in 2021, allocating the fiscal impact of U.S.-born dependents of immigrants to the second generation group, and using a predictive regression to assign future education levels to individuals who are too young to have completed their education. Other minor changes are discussed in later sections. Immigrants have a more positive net fiscal impact than that of native‐​born Americans in most scenarios in the Updated Model and in every scenario in the Cato Model, depending on how the costs of public goods are allocated. The Cato Model finds that immigrant individuals who arrive at age 25 and who are high school dropouts have a net fiscal impact of +$216,000 in net present value terms, which does not include their descendants. Including the fiscal impact of those immigrants’ descendants reduces those immigrants’ net fiscal impact to +$57,000. By comparison, native‐​born American high school dropouts of the same age have a net fiscal impact of −$32,000 that drops to −$177,000 when their descendants are included (see Table 31). Results also differ by level of government. State and local governments often incur a less positive or even negative net fiscal impact from immigration, whereas the federal government almost always sees revenues rise above expenditures in response to immigration. With some variation and exceptions, the net fiscal impact of immigrants is more positive than it is for native‐​born Americans and positive overall for the federal and state/​local governments.
Topic:
Immigration, History, and Fiscal Policy
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

138. The Impact of Regulation on Innovation

Author:
Philippe Aghion, Antonin Bergeaud, and John Van Reenen
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
There is considerable research on the economic impacts of regulations but relatively few studies about their impact on technological innovation. Moreover, most analyses focus on the costs and benefits of regulation at a point in time, rather than on its effects over time. Yet potential effects on economic growth are likely to be much more pronounced in the long run. Many scholars have been concerned that slower growth in countries with heavy labor regulations could be due to firms’ reluctance to innovate given the burden of red tape. For example, the slower growth of Southern European countries and parts of Latin America have often been blamed on onerous labor laws.
Topic:
Labor Issues, Regulation, Economic Growth, and Innovation
Political Geography:
Global Focus

139. Balance of Trade, Balance of Power: How the Trade Deficit Reflects U.S. Influence in the World

Author:
Daniel Griswold and Andreas Freytag
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
The U.S. trade deficit is a misunderstood symbol of U.S. economic strength and influence in the world. The deficit is not driven by unfair trade abroad or industrial weakness at home and, as the Trump years show, cannot be “fixed” through higher tariffs. Instead, the trade deficit is driven by a persistent net inflow of foreign capital, which reduces interest rates and fuels economic output. Contrary to myth, the trade deficit is not a cause of deindustrialization or a loss of manufacturing jobs. In fact, the current balance of trade points to America’s continuing influence in global affairs—as a haven for global investment, as a robust producer and buyer of global goods and services, and as the provider of a strong dollar that remains at the center of the global economy. Policymakers should reject measures that restrict trade and foreign investment and instead seek to expand America’s commercial ties to the rest of the world.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economy, Trade, and Trade Deficit
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

140. Course Correction: Charting a More Effective Approach to U.S.-China Trade

Author:
Clark Packard and Scott Lincicome
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
Over the past several years the U.S.-China economic relationship has soured and become subordinated to broader concerns about national security and geopolitics. After a decades‐​long reform agenda in China that lifted hundreds of millions out of grinding poverty, Chinese president Xi Jinping has increasingly turned inward—reembracing Maoist socialism and heavy‐​handed central planning. Washington’s response to these worrisome developments has been reflexively hawkish economically, scattershot, and woefully inadequate for the economic challenge that China presents.
Topic:
National Security, Bilateral Relations, Economy, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

141. The Vagaries of the Sea: Evidence on the Real Effects of Money from Maritime Disasters in the Spanish Empire

Author:
Adam Brzezinski, Yao Chen, Felix Ward, and Nuno Palma
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
The Columbian voyage of 1492 marked the beginning of three centuries in which vast amounts of monetary silver were shipped from America to Spain. During that time, Spain’s money supply was subjected to the vagaries of the sea. Maritime disasters that resulted in the loss of silver‐​laden ships gave rise to random contractions in the amount of money that arrived in Spain. We studied these maritime disasters to obtain estimates of the causal effects of changes in the money supply on economic output and prices.
Topic:
Imperialism, History, Economy, and Maritime
Political Geography:
Europe and Spain

142. The Future of the WTO: Multilateral or Plurilateral?

Author:
James Bacchus
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
Since its 1947 inception as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the World Trade Organization (WTO) has generally practiced an all‐​or‐​nothing approach to multilateral negotiations in which the consensus of all WTO members was for trade liberalization. Although this approach worked throughout the second half of the 20th century, its shortcomings were laid bare by the failure of the Doha Development Agenda and the inability of WTO members to achieve further broad, multilateral trade liberalization. Today, amid heightened animosity toward additional trade liberalization, prospects for the traditional consensus‐​based approach seem dimmer than ever.
Topic:
Treaties and Agreements, World Trade Organization, Multilateralism, and Trade
Political Geography:
Global Focus

143. The Regressive Nature of the U.S. Tariff Code: Origins and Implications

Author:
Lydia Cox
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
Tariffs are often thought of as taxes that fall uniformly across goods or industries. In reality, however, the U.S. tariff schedule is extremely complex—the modern‐​day tariff code comprises 4,394 pages of tariffs on 19,347 varieties of goods. As a result, there is a lot of variation in tariff rates, even within narrowly defined categories of goods. We study this complexity through the lens of a little‐​known but consequential pattern in the modern U.S. tariff schedule: tariff rates are systematically higher on low‐​value versions of goods relative to their high‐​value counterparts. For example, the tariff on a $400 handbag made of reptile leather is 5.3 percent, while the tariff on an $8 plastic‐​sided handbag is 16 percent. Through a comprehensive analysis of U.S. tariffs over the past 100 years, we show that this regressive pattern is, and has been, a systematic feature of tariffs for decades. Our findings are emblematic of a more fundamental feature of U.S. tariff policy: tariffs set to meet policy objectives of the past have persisted through vast changes in the economic landscape and, despite their historical origins, are still affecting consumers today.
Topic:
Economics, Tariffs, and Trade Policy
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

144. Global Inequality in Well‐​Being Has Decreased across Many Dimensions: Introducing the Inequality of Human Progress Index

Author:
Chelsea Follett and Vincent Geloso
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
The world has seen dramatic, global human progress across a broad range of indicators in recent decades, but have those gains been widely shared? The Inequality of Human Progress Index (IHPI) measures relative gaps in global development. It surveys international inequality across a greater number of dimensions than any prior index. By analyzing inequality in a multidimensional way, the IHPI takes inequality more seriously than those indexes that focus on income inequality alone. The IHPI considers material well‐​being and seven additional metrics: lifespan, infant mortality, adequate nutrition, environmental safety, access to opportunity (as measured by education), access to information (as measured by internet access), and political freedom. Across all but two of those dimensions, the world has become more equal since 1990. Globalization and market liberalization over the past few decades have not only raised absolute living standards but also reduced overall inequality.
Topic:
Development, Inequality, Economy, and Well-Being
Political Geography:
Global Focus

145. Information Manipulation and Repression: A Theory and Evidence from the COVID-19 Response in Russia

Author:
Natalia Lamberova and Konstantin Sonin
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
The COVID-19 pandemic has called for provision of public goods and services that require a high state capacity, including producing and distributing vaccines, enforcing mask mandates, limiting potential super‐​spreader events, and so on. The rationale for public intervention was that private actions, such as getting vaccinated, wearing masks, and avoiding large gatherings, have benefits to broader society, so they are likely to be undersupplied by individuals on their own. In these circumstances, one might expect the power of the state coercing others into compliance to be beneficial. Are authoritarian leaders, less constrained by institutions and less accountable to voters, better equipped to deal with health emergencies?
Topic:
Authoritarianism, Repression, Public Health, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

146. Indian Nationalism and the Historical Fantasy of a Golden Hindu Period

Author:
Swaminathan S. Anklesaria Aiyar
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
India’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) promotes its Hindu nationalist agenda by claiming that India was the world’s richest region under glorious Hindu rule for thousands of years before being conquered by Muslim invaders in the 11th century and British invaders in the 18th century. BJP politicians say foreign invaders transformed a “golden bird” into an impoverished chattel. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has promised to restore India to its historical eminence. To support their narrative, BJP partisans often cite historian Angus Maddison, who estimated that India accounted for 32 percent of the world’s gross domestic product in 1 CE (during the Hindu period), but this number plummeted to 4 percent by the time British rule ended in 1947. But a closer look at Maddison’s work shows that the BJP is cherry‐​picking data to create a bogus historical narrative. In 1 CE, India’s per capita income was below the world average, at a pathetic $450. It did not rise at all during the following thousand years of Hindu rule. It did not worsen after the Muslim and British conquests, as BJP partisans claim, though it improved very slowly. The supposedly golden Hindu period was one of stark poverty and economic stagnation. Disease, drought, and war kept India’s population stagnant at 75 million people throughout a thousand years of Hindu rule in India, when just staying alive was a challenge. Under Muslim and British rule, death rates fell and the population grew, and it grew still more after independence. Both in terms of income and life expectancy, the “golden period”—if it can be called that—is today, not in the Hindu era.
Topic:
Nationalism, Economy, Domestic Politics, and Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
Political Geography:
South Asia and India

147. Skilled Immigration, Task Allocation, and the Innovation of Firms

Author:
Anna Maria Mayda, Gianluca Orefice, and Gianluca Santoni
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
Immigration continues to be a hotly debated topic in several destination countries. Policy and academic discussions have focused on different types of immigration, depending on the host country. While research is voluminous on the United States and countries with skill‐​points‐​based immigration systems, the discussion in Europe has mostly centered on lesser‐​skilled migrants and political refugees, as they represent the largest proportion of arrivals. However, Europe has been receiving skilled migrants in increasing numbers. For example, in France, the share of college‐​educated immigrants is 23 percent— lower than in the United States, Canada, or the UK—but it increased by 11 percentage points between 1995 and 2010.
Topic:
Immigration, Economy, Innovation, and Skills
Political Geography:
Global Focus

148. Rational Eviction: How Landlords Use Evictions in Response to Rent Control

Author:
Eilidh Geddes and Nicole Holz
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
As housing prices rise, cities are turning to rent control policies, hoping to ensure longterm affordable housing. Typically, rent control policies require leases to be renewed at statutorily limited rent increases. Rent control policies reduce the returns from operating in the rental market, creating well‐​studied incentives for landlords to leave the rental market. Many rent control policies—including San Francisco’s—feature vacancy decontrol provisions, which allow landlords to reset rents to market rates when tenants move. These policies limit the reductions in returns to operating in the rental market but create incentives for landlords to induce tenant turnover, possibly through evictions. The more tenants move, the more often a landlord can raise rents to market rates.
Topic:
Markets, Economy, Eviction, Housing, and Rent
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

149. Central Bank Digital Currency: The Risks and the Myths

Author:
Nicholas Anthony and Norbert Michel
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
Central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) have the potential to radically transform the American financial system—ultimately usurping the private sector and endangering Americans’ core freedoms. Although CBDCs have gained the attention of politicians, central bankers, and the tech industry, this experiment should be left on the drawing board. This paper provides a summary of why Congress should explicitly prohibit the Federal Reserve and the Department of the Treasury from issuing a CBDC.
Topic:
Finance, Economy, Fiscal Policy, Banking, and Digital Currency
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

150. Self‐​Service Bans and Gasoline Prices: The Effect of Allowing Consumers to Pump Their Own Gas

Author:
Vitor Melo
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
Billions of people live in countries that ban self‐​service fueling at gasoline stations, including some of the world’s largest countries by population, including China, India, and Brazil, among many others. The impact of these bans is largely understudied despite their prevalence presumably because this policy is often implemented at the national level and because there have been no policy changes in these countries that allow for an assessment of these bans on gasoline prices.
Topic:
Gas, Regulation, Economy, and Consumer Behavior
Political Geography:
North America, Global Focus, and United States of America