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Begin New Search Topic Terrorism Content Type Policy Brief Publication Year within 3 Years

1. Bankrupting Iran’s Empire of Terror

Author:
Nate Sibley
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Hamas’s surprise attack on Israel has left thousands of innocent people dead, set the stage for a bloody and protracted conflict in Gaza, and precipitated a crisis that threatens to engulf the Middle East in a devastating new conflict. To prevent further escalation, the United States needs to act swiftly to intensify economic pressure on the Islamic Republic of Iran and dismantle its terrorist financing networks. Though Iran has denied any involvement, Hamas could not have planned an operation of this scale without critical support from its chief state sponsor. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has devoted enormous resources to building up proxy terrorist organizations in order to encircle Israel. According to a 2020 US government estimate, the IRGC provides as much as $700 million to Lebanese Hezbollah and $100 million to Hamas and other Palestinian groups each year. So far, this strategy appears to be working. Hezbollah, the IRGC’s most powerful terrorist partner, is poised to attack from the north, while other Iranian proxies threaten Israel from within Syria and elsewhere. Israel’s newly cordial relations with its Arab neighbors—including its nascent détente with Saudi Arabia—hang precariously in the balance. President Joe Biden’s immediate response to the attacks rightly focused on delivering Israel the political backing and military assistance that it urgently needs. But as the overseer of the global financial system, the United States can also deploy its unique capabilities to constrict the Islamic Republic’s revenues and shut down its global terrorist financing networks. Whether the United States succeeds in doing so will shape events far beyond the Middle East. This conflict is not just another flare-up in a long-troubled region. It reflects an ongoing global realignment wherein powerful adversaries test American strength and resolve with growing coordination and assertiveness. As Russia wages war in Ukraine and Beijing watches carefully, the stakes call for nothing less than a major US endeavor to bankrupt the Islamic Republic’s empire of terror once and for all.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Corruption, Terrorism, and Hamas
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

2. Exploiting a "Vast Jihad Arena": The Islamic State Takes Territory in Mali

Author:
Aaron Y. Zelin and Sarah Cahn
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
In April, Islamic State fighters in Mali seized villages surrounding the city of Menaka, marking the group’s first territorial conquest since losing its final Syrian foothold in 2019. The human cost of these advances has been steep. By May, at least 150,000 individuals had reportedly been displaced, and civilians have been subjected to targeted killings, kidnappings, and looting. The offensive occurred amid a string of regional of security setbacks: namely, France’s August 2022 military withdrawal (which followed the Malian junta’s expressed preference for Russia’s Wagner Group), the April 2023 dissolution of the UN mission in Mali, and the junta’s decision earlier this month to form a tripartite alliance with Burkina Faso and Niger, thereby undermining the French-led G5 Sahel framework designed to thwart jihadist actors in the region. In this amply illustrated Policy Note, Aaron Zelin and Sarah Cahn explain that while the United States may have limited room for maneuver in Mali today, it can promote regional stability and U.S. national interests by pursuing further sanctions against local Islamic State officials and exploring constructive arrangements with nearby African states.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, Islamic State, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Africa, North Africa, and Mali

3. Is Iran Looking to Inspire Shia Homegrown Violent Extremist Attacks?

Author:
Moustafa Ayad and Matthew Levitt
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
An October 2018 report by the National Counterterrorism Center defined Shia homegrown violent extremists as “individuals who are inspired or influenced by state actors such as Iran, foreign terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah, or Shia militant groups but who do not belong to these groups and are not directed by them.” At the time, the prospect of such Shia violence was largely theoretical, and officials could identify no tangible threats on American soil. But the January 2020 targeted killing of Iranian Qods Force commander Qasem Soleimani changed the picture, and U.S. officials could now point to a “catalyzing event,” as envisioned in the NCTC brief. Last year’s attack against writer Salman Rushdie and another at a Las Vegas hotel exemplified how Iran-inspired individuals were motivated to act. In this Policy Note, experts Moustafa Ayad and Matthew Levitt explore lone-offender Shia violence largely through the lens of social media. Closer tracking of online networks, they argue, could illuminate this flourishing virtual activity and how it might lead to real-world harm.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Terrorism, Violent Extremism, and Shia
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, and Middle East

4. What should the EU do about violent extremism?

Author:
Dylan Macchiarini Crosson, Tatjana Stankovic, Pernille Rieker, and Steven Blockmans
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:
Despite a recent spike in concern about a resurgence in great power conflict, addressing terrorism and violent extremism has driven the foreign policy debate in the collective West for the better part of two decades since 9/11. In the European Union, these concerns most prominently emerged in the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) that identified terrorism and “violent religious extremism” originating in the EU’s neighbourhood and caused by weak institutions, conflict, and state failure as a primary concern. The crux of the matter, however, is how this increased attention translates in policy terms. In other words, is the EU’s chosen CT-P/CVE policy mix balanced and fit for purpose? First, the EU’s CT-P/CVE action can hardly be framed according to a binary security versus democracy logic because of the significant emphasis placed by the EU on socio-economic development to address the structural causes of violent extremism. Second, despite the EU’s developmental focus, the language of good governance and peacebuilding, as well as funding for these areas, are key elements missing from the EU’s engagement. In order to remedy the many upstream and downstream diplomatic trade-offs that EU policymakers face in tackling violent extremism, the EU must begin to frame CT-P/CVE as part of its wider endeavour to support sustainable peace. It can do this by formulating an EU Agenda for Peace that once again underlines the EU’s commitment to promoting inclusive governance, community resilience, and social justice.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Terrorism, Violent Extremism, European Union, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Europe

5. Counterterrorism from the Sky? How to Think Over the Horizon about Drones

Author:
Erol Yayboke and Christopher Reid
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
August 31, 2021, marked the end of the United States’ two-decade military presence in Afghanistan. It also marked the end of U.S. military and intelligence eyes and ears on the ground in a place known to be a safe haven for violent extremist groups. In Afghanistan and other areas where the United States lacks a persistent, physical presence, the Biden administration announced a pivot to “over-the-horizon” counterterrorism operations (OTH- CT) that rely heavily on stand-off assets, such as overhead satellite technology and airpower, in the absence of eyes and ears. While the use of drones—or “remotely piloted aircraft” (RPAs)—to target potential terrorist threats seems to be a cost-effective approach from a military perspective, their use has come under increasing pressure from Capitol Hill, human rights and humanitarian organizations, and others for their effects on civilian populations. Military action almost always carries risk of collateral damage, but the disproportionate civilian impact associated with RPAs is not only troubling from rights and humanitarian perspectives, but it also calls into question the strategic, longer-term rationale of using them for counterterrorism purposes in the first place. Congressional leaders sent a letter to the president on January 20, 2022, about the ongoing OTH-CT strategy review. In it, they point out that “while the intent of U.S. counterterrorism policy may be to target terrorism suspects who threaten U.S. national security, in too many instances, U.S. drone strikes have instead led to unintended and deadly consequences—killing civilians and increasing anger towards the United States.” They, therefore, call on the administration to “review and overhaul U.S. counterterrorism policy to center human rights and the protection of civilians, align with U.S. and international law, prioritize non-lethal tools to address conflict and fragility, and only use force when it is lawful and as a last resort.” Reconciling the risks and implications of RPA strikes is necessary for genuinely implementing President Biden’s calls for a “targeted, precise strategy that goes after terror.” In doing so, the administration also needs to address concerns over civilian casualties alongside meaningful and justifiable military utilization of RPAs. Using RPAs against those who pose an imminent threat to the United States or its allies and partners is sometimes necessary and appropriate, especially in scenarios that are high-risk for crewed aircraft or ground forces. So why wouldn’t the United States use RPAs more broadly at low risk to blood and treasure? Why put soldiers in danger when we can extensively monitor threats and eventually address them from a remotely piloted aircraft high above? The answers are at once simple (e.g., impact on civilians) and complicated (e.g., limited military alternatives), exposing a gulf in understanding and approach to RPA utilization between the advocacy community (and some congressional leaders) and military and intelligence planners. This CSIS brief explores the challenge ahead for the Biden administration. It starts with a contextualization of the OTH-CT strategy review, followed by assessments of the short- and longer-term risks associated with RPA utilization and how to think about risk itself. Offering evidence and framing throughout, the brief ends by detailing two sets of recommendations
Topic:
Defense Policy, Terrorism, Military Strategy, Counter-terrorism, and Drones
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

6. Pushed to Extremes: Domestic Terrorism amid Polarization and Protest

Author:
Catrina Doxsee, Seth G. Jones, Jared Thompson, Grace Hwang, and Kateryna Halstead
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
There has been a significant rise in the number of domestic terrorist attacks and plots at demonstrations in the United States, according to new CSIS data. The result is escalating violence in U.S. cities between extremists from opposing sides, a major break from historical trends. In 2021, over half of all domestic terrorist incidents occurred in the context of metropolitan demonstrations. In addition, the most frequent targets of attacks were government, military, and law enforcement agencies, who are increasingly at the center of domestic terrorism by extremists of all ideologies.
Topic:
Terrorism, Violent Extremism, Polarization, and Domestic Terrorism
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

7. Violent Extremist and Terrorist Threats: Examining Ghana’s Preparedness

Author:
Mawusi Yaw Dumenu
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Ghana Center for Democratic Development
Abstract:
The growing spate of violent extremism and terrorism in the sub-region spells doom for the attainment of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), particularly Goal 16 which focuses on Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions. Ghana is now the only country among the earlier mentioned coastal states that has not suffered from any violent extremist and terrorist violence. This notwithstanding, there have been several alarming incidents involving extremist attacks that have occurred in close proximity to Ghana’s borders.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, Violent Extremism, and Sustainable Development Goals
Political Geography:
Africa and Ghana

8. Al-Shabab in Mozambique: Taking Stock of an Insurgency Under Cover

Author:
Tom Van Rentergem
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
Since the first attack in October 2017, Mozambique has been confronted with an extremist insurgency called Ansar Al-Sunna Wa Jamma (ASWJ), also known as Al-Shabab (not to be confused with Al-Shabab in Somalia). The alleged Jihadists targeted the Mozambican coastline and have carried out indiscriminate attacks in the Northern province of Cabo Delgado, with the capture of coastal towns Mocimboa Da Praia in 2020 and Palma in 2021 being important markers for the insurgents. The intense five-year conflict has resulted in 4,000 people dead and 800,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDP), roughly half of the province. The identity of the insurgents has become subject for debate among policy makers and researchers, raising questions about whether the group is primarily a local insurgency or whether there are tangible links to Jihadism in other areas of Africa and the Middle East.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, Insurgency, and Jihad
Political Geography:
Africa and Mozambique

9. Protecting Civilians From Those Who Should Protect Them

Author:
Delina Goxho
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
As violent attacks targeting civilians in the Sahel region of West Africa are mounting, allegations of abuses perpetrated by Sahelian armed forces share the news with attacks committed by non-state armed groups. This brief analyses the main shortcomings within the governments of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger with regard to ensuring meaningful Protection of Civilians (PoC) from their own security and defence forces. It finds that formal, structural measures to address state security forces’ abuse of civilians is lacking in all three states, although some promising initiatives to build trust between security forces and civilians have been held on a local level. On a regional level, the OHCHR-mandated Human Rights Compliance Framework, which has partially been adopted by regional force Force Conjointe – G5 Sahel (FC-G5S), represents an example of a mechanism that could ensure better protection of civilians both for the region, and on a national level. However, the advent of Russian paramilitary group Wagner in Mali and the most recent massacre of civilians in Moura is challenging all optimistic forecasting.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, Conflict, and Civilians
Political Geography:
Africa

10. Protection Dilemmas Arising from the Reintegration of Former Combatants and the Impact of the Terrorist Designation

Author:
Agathe Sarfati and Phoebe Donnelly
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Peace Institute
Abstract:
The concept and implementation of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) have evolved as DDR-related activities have increasingly occurred in environments where armed conflict is ongoing, no peace agreement has been signed, and armed groups designated as terrorist organizations (AGDTOs) are operating. In parallel, reintegration has increasingly been discussed in the UN counterterrorism architecture through the concept of prosecution, rehabilitation, and reintegration (PRR). The changing context has raised challenges related to reintegration, especially reintegration of former members of AGDTOs. This policy paper analyzes the risks faced by individuals taking part in reintegration processes and by the communities they are reintegrating into. In particular, it analyzes how the designation of an armed group as a terrorist organization by the UN Security Council or by a state impacts these risks while acknowledging that these risks largely depend on the broader context. The paper examines three case studies of current reintegration processes: (1) the process for reincorporating former combatants from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia–People’s Army (FARC-EP); (2) the defector program for former members of al-Shabaab in Somalia; and (3) the reintegration process for individuals associated with Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin. The paper concludes by recommending several steps the UN could take to help ensure that reintegration processes address protection risks, especially for former members of AGDTOs: Tailor reintegration programs to the context, not to whether a group is labeled as a terrorist organization; Design reintegration programs to be gender-sensitive and human rights–compliant; Ensure that PRR and DDR programs are complementary and adopt the Integrated DDR Standards module on AGDTOs; and Keep reintegration and counterterrorism goals distinct.
Topic:
Terrorism, Non State Actors, Armed Forces, Civilians, and Protection
Political Geography:
Africa and Colombia

11. Rhetoric Meets Reality in Jawlani’s Push for Self-Sufficiency

Author:
Aaron Y. Zelin
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
As a key UN vote approaches, Washington should push Turkey to help promote a diverse, balanced economy in HTS-controlled northwest Syria. On July 10, a United Nations vote will decide the future of the cross-border aid mechanism for northwest Syria, an area run by the jihadist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). The mechanism—which facilitates aid to northwest Syria via Turkey without having to go through Damascus—faces the prospect of nonrenewal for the first time since it was created in 2014, as a consequence of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. A failure to renew the mechanism would exacerbate an already daunting humanitarian situation in northwest Syria, where some three-fourths of the population consists of internally displaced persons (IDPs). While aid will likely continue on a far more limited basis if Russia vetoes the mechanism, from a U.S. perspective a more self-reliant HTS-run territory requiring less international assistance would actually be far preferable to a situation in which aid renewal remains subject to periodic dramas. Over the past roughly six years, HTS has transformed itself from an al-Qaeda branch into something resembling a typical regional state governing body, with the group engaging in human rights violations and embracing inflammatory rhetoric. To begin with, it has focused increasingly on developing local institutions and the economy. The group’s strides in governance have been facilitated, in part, by the March 2020 Turkey-Russia ceasefire agreement, which more or less froze the conflict line. Since then, HTS leader Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani has reiterated the value he places on self-sufficiency and constructing a new polity and society that does not rely on outside help. If HTS and its civilian-led Syrian Salvation Government (SSG) actually followed through on Jawlani’s ideas, locals could find other avenues to support themselves. Yet one must acknowledge at this point that HTS has not matched its lofty rhetoric with efforts to develop indigenous capabilities. Instead, it has worked hard to monopolize economic power.
Topic:
Politics, Terrorism, Reform, Democracy, and Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)
Political Geography:
Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

12. Looking for Legitimacy: Taliban Diplomacy Since the Fall of Kabul

Author:
Aaron Y. Zelin
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The group’s international profile has risen substantially with help from China, Turkey, and other states, but Western leaders should curtail their engagement so long as Kabul keeps gaslighting them about its al-Qaeda ties. When the Taliban first ruled Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001, only Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates recognized its “Islamic Emirate.” Yet while no country has officially recognized the new government established after the group recaptured Kabul one year ago, the Taliban is far less isolated today than it was during its first iteration. In March, for example, Turkish foreign minister Mevlut Cavusoglu called for international recognition of the Islamic Emirate, while his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov argued that it should be granted a seat at the United Nations. Just how extensive is this diplomatic momentum? And how might it be affected by the July 31 targeted killing of al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, who was reportedly being sheltered in Kabul by Taliban interior minister Sirajuddin Haqqani?
Topic:
Diplomacy, Terrorism, Reform, Taliban, Democracy, and Legitimacy
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and South Asia

13. Scoring Iraq’s New Government: Metrics for Preserving U.S. Interests

Author:
Michael Knights
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The protracted post-election process has been a step backward for Iraqi democracy, so Washington will need to closely monitor the new leadership’s actions and hold Baghdad to measurable benchmarks. Iraq’s stalled government formation process finally lurched forward on October 17, with new president Abdul Latif Rashid taking office more than a year after the 2021 election. Incoming prime minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani will now try to ratify his cabinet during a parliamentary session on October 22. If he succeeds as expected, Baghdad will finally close perhaps its most troubled electoral cycle yet—a chapter in which a clear popular vote nearly failed to produce a peaceful transition of power, and the losing factions spurred the biggest winner to abandon parliament through corrupt judicial rulings. Under these sad circumstances, the U.S. government and its partners need to quietly but insistently push for early, inclusive elections to restore legitimacy to the democratic process. Simultaneously, all of Iraq’s friends must watch the new government like a hawk to ensure that militias and corrupt politicians do not attempt to purge technocrats, conduct witch hunts against Western-leaning officials, cover up past graft, or initiate a new wave of “asset-stripping” via state institutions. After many false alarms, the survival of Iraq’s close relationship with the West is truly at stake right now, and only firm expectation-setting can ensure that the partnership continues.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Government, Terrorism, Reform, Democracy, and Military
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

14. Policy Journal by Women of Color: WCAPS Pipeline Fellows Publication

Author:
Adenikè Adegbidi, Beza Gebremariam, Caroline Mendoza, Clémence Kouamé, and Desiree Raymond
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Women of Color Advancing Peace, Security and Conflict Transformation (WCAPS)
Abstract:
The WCAPS Pipeline Fellowship Program provides an opportunity for college and university students, as well as young adults and early career professionals, to develop a broad understanding of the different dimensions of peace, security, and foreign policy through engagement with WCAPS members, to include young, mid-career and senior level women and men. Oftentimes, the WCAPS Pipeline Fellowship program serves as an introduction to these career paths for young women of color and allows them to seamlessly integrate into the WCAPS community and beyond, thus creating the pipeline we aimed for. The program started locally in Washington D.C. and has since expanded to include participants from across the globe. This most recent cohort had participants from four continents. This dynamic group of women learned about a variety of topics to include Redefining National Security (RNS), emotional intelligence, Women Peace and Security (WPS), and international law as it relates to peacebuilding. WCAPS is very proud to present the policy papers these young women wrote, following months of rigorous research, coordination, and collaboration.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, Migration, Race, Terrorism, United Nations, Water, Peacekeeping, Women, Food Security, Refugees, Conflict, Representation, Peace, Gender, and Femicide
Political Geography:
Latin America and Global Focus

15. The Jihadists’ War in Pakistan after the U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan: Lessons from Al-Qaeda’s Assassination of Benazir Bhutto

Author:
Abdul Sayed
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
The changing narratives and operations of al-Qaeda and its Pakistani ally, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), in recent years indicate that the anti-state jihadist war in Pakistan will not end with a U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 or thereafter (The News, March 1). Recent speeches by the TTP emir, Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud, to a coalition of senior TTP commanders on the future goals of the war in Pakistan is not the only piece of evidence signifying that this war will continue (Umar Media, August 18, 2020; Umar Media, December 15, 2020). Rather, history also shows this war still has a long way to go. Pakistani Islamists are widely believed to have originally supported al-Qaeda’s war against the Pakistani state due to post-9/11 changes in Pakistan’s foreign policy, which supported the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan that expelled the Taliban regime from Kabul. However, the anti-state jihadist war in Pakistan is deeply rooted in the pre-9/11 complexities of Pakistani politics, which culminated in Islamists enabling al-Qaeda operations within Pakistan immediately after 9/11. The war against the Pakistani government is so deeply entrenched that it will remain a challenge for the country even if the widely accepted jihad against the U.S. “infidel occupier” in Afghanistan and its allies, including Pakistan, is no longer a factor.
Topic:
Terrorism, Islamism, Jihad, and Benazir Bhutto
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, South Asia, and United States of America

16. Turkey Enters Tunisia’s Weapons Market With Combat-Proven Arms: A Technical and Strategic Assessment

Author:
Can Kasapoglu
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
In late 2020, Turkey finally secured a lucrative arms sale package to Tunisia after a long period of negotiations. The $150 million portfolio, which attracted key players of the Turkish defense technological and industrial base, such as Turkish Aerospace Industries (TUSAS) and British Motor Corporation (BMC), will mean more than only defense revenues for Turkey (TRT Haber, December 24, 2020). It will additionally mark Turkish weaponry’s entrance into the Tunisian market against the backdrop of Ankara’s geopolitical quests in North Africa, which has become a geopolitical flashpoint encompassing various forms of militancy, transnational terrorism, and proxy warfare.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Terrorism, Weapons, Drones, Arms Trade, and Proxy War
Political Geography:
Turkey, North Africa, Tunisia, and Mediterranean

17. Boko Haram’s Pan-Nigerian Affiliate System after the Kankara Kidnapping: A Microcosm of Islamic State’s ‘External Provinces’

Author:
Jacob Zenn
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
On December 11, 2020, around 300 male students were kidnapped from a Kankara, Katsina State school in northwestern Nigeria (TheCable, December 13, 2020). The attack was inconsistent with typical northwestern Nigeria banditry operations involving smaller-scale kidnapping and extortion, pillaging, and assassination of local political enemies that have escalated in northwestern Nigerian in recent years. The attack was, however, consistent with the past activities of the Boko Haram faction led by Abubakar Shekau. Shekau’s faction is responsible for the mass killing of male students in their dormitories in 2013 and the Chibok kidnapping of more than 200 female students in Borno State, northeastern Nigeria in 2014. Furthermore, the Kankara kidnapping reflected Boko Haram’s “affiliate system” because the attack was conducted by Boko Haram’s northwestern Nigerian “affiliate” in the Katsina-Niger-Zamfara state axis, which is comprised primarily of bandits (“Niger” refers to Niger State, Nigeria, not the Republic of Niger).
Topic:
Terrorism, Islamic State, and Boko Haram
Political Geography:
Africa and Nigeria

18. Neo-Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh’s Female Members Further Islamic State’s Recruitment and Propaganda

Author:
Animesh Roul
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
The Neo-Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (Neo-JMB), which was responsible for the deadly July 2016 Holey Artisan Bakery terrorist attack in Dhaka claimed by Islamic State (IS), has effectively nurtured and nourished a strong network of female jihadists in the country (refworld.org, November 15, 2016). These women members have proven to be a largely unseen, but potent force behind the group’s resilience. They have spearheaded recruitment and propaganda campaigns and even surprised security forces with a suicide bombing on December 26, 2016 in Ashkona area of the capital Dhaka (The Independent, December 26, 2016).
Topic:
Terrorism, Non State Actors, Women, Islamic State, and Propaganda
Political Geography:
Bangladesh and South Asia

19. Jihadi Radicalization: Between the Local and the Global

Author:
Olivier Roy
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Any counter-terrorist policy should be shaped according to the nature of the threat. For an alliance like NATO, it is particularly import- ant to distinguish the fundamental characteristics of global movements from local terrorist entities. Whilst global jihadi propaganda and Islamist ideology still represent a significant danger, in many instances, it is the local dynamics that prevail. Complex NATO operations – designed to prevent, stabilize or rebuild – must be framed and designed accordingly.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Globalization, Regional Cooperation, Terrorism, Military Strategy, Radicalization, Local, and Jihad
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

20. When jihadists broker peace: Natural resource conflicts as weapons of war in Mali’s protracted crisis

Author:
Boubacar Ba and Signe Marie Cold-Ravnkilde
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Following Mali’s coup d’état of 18 August 2020, the transitional government is yet to present a roadmap for peace in central Mali outlining a new strategy for dialogue with armed non-state actors. To support this process, it is important that Mali’s international donors identify already-existing local peace agreements and support local-level dialogue with all parties to conflicts. Recommendations: Immediate de-escalation of conflicts is needed through disarmament of militias and rebuilding of trust between local communities and Mali’s armed forces, with a strong focus on protecting civilians. Mali needs a national, comprehensive strategy for how to include jihadists and local militias in dialogue, reconciliation and dispute resolution. International donors need to identify already-existing local peace agreements and support local-level dialogue between all parties to conflicts. Long-term solutions regulating equal access to natural resources for different population groups are key.
Topic:
Agriculture, Climate Change, Democratization, Environment, Terrorism, Water, Food, Non State Actors, Governance, Fragile States, Investment, Peace, and Land Rights
Political Geography:
Africa and Mali

21. How the Islamic State Sees the Future: Why the end of times does not mean the end

Author:
Florence Gaub
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
One would not exactly think of the Islamic State (IS) as a future-oriented organisation: it uses medieval-sounding language and barbaric methods and preaches an archaic lifestyle. In reality, however, it is very much a forward-looking organisation with clear ideas not just on what the future will bring, but on what it should bring. In fact, it is this attitude towards the future that has not only enabled its past successes, but also allowed the organisation to persist and endure since losing its territory in Syria and Iraq – and, most importantly, what will determine its next steps and ambition. Understanding how IS conceives its own future will enable law enforcement authorities to take the necessary precautions ahead of time. This Brief first outlines why it is crucial to understand how the future as an organising principle shapes the strategy and posture of terrorist organisations, and shows that terrorist organisations lacking such a concept will lose traction faster than those that do. It goes on to examine IS’s future concept pre-and post-loss of its territory and to elaborate why it was and is an attractive future. Lastly, it seeks to anticipate the future trajectory IS will take based on its articulation of an eschatological vision of the future.
Topic:
Terrorism, Islamic State, and Future
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, North Africa, and Syria

22. Salafi-Jihadism in Africa: A winning strategy

Author:
Giovanni Faleg and Katariina Mustasilta
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
Violent extremism keeps spreading in Africa, showing notable resilience despite years of counter-extremism and prevention efforts by governments and international actors*. In addition to killing thousands, it costs the affected regions an estimated $97 billion in lost informal economic activity each year. Today, armed actors engaging in violent extremism in the continent are mainly affiliated with Islamist militant groups and organisations and particularly Salafi-jihadist ideology. Recent data indicates a dangerous expansion of Salafi-jihadist armed groups — often simply labelled as violent extremist or terrorist organisations — beyond the traditional hotspots in the Sahel, Lake Chad Basin and the Horn of Africa to West Africa’s coastal states and Central and Southern Africa. The proliferation of militants linked to the Islamic State (IS) in particular and the infighting and complex ties among groups affiliated to different jihadist networks are raising growing alarm among observers. The worrying trend is reflected in the increase of acts of violence designated as terrorism. According to the Global Terrorism Index (GTI), sub-Saharan Africa was the second region in the world affected by deadly terrorism in 2019, superseding the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) for a second consecutive year. Whereas globally the lethality of terrorism is somewhat decreasing, many countries in sub-Saharan Africa are experiencing a contrasting trend. Burkina Faso experienced the largest increase in terrorism in the world in 2019 with nearly 600 people killed in terrorist attacks. Terrorism was assessed to have increased significantly also in Mozambique, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Niger, among others. Seven out of the ten countries most impacted by terrorist violence in 2019 are located in the region. Similar developments continued in 2020. What makes Salafi-jihadist groups appear ‘invincible’? This Conflict Series Brief analyses how Salafi-jihadism spreads across Africa and explores its potential future trajectories. The first section of the Brief analyses the broader picture emerging from recent extremism-affiliated armed violence trends in the region. The second section analyses three aspects making these extremist groups particularly resilient and facilitating their spread in the continent. Based on the findings, the third section demonstrates the dangers of such adaptability, using two foresight scenarios for 2025. Finally, the concluding section outlines the main policy implications: what needs to change to prevent violent extremism from derailing Africa’s Agenda 2063 ?
Topic:
Terrorism, Violent Extremism, Salafism, Conflict, Islamism, and Jihad
Political Geography:
Africa and Sahel

23. The Evolving Rivalry: The future of the relationship between Taliban and ISKP in Afghanistan

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
The ISIS Amaq news agency on September 19 announced on its Telegram channel that the Islamic State Khorasan Province, or ISKP claim responsibility for three bombings in Jalalabad in Afghanistan’s eastern Nangarhar province. The Taliban accused the organization of carrying out a fourth attack in the Afghan capital Kabul. The developments come amid concerns in the West that the next terrorist threat from Afghanistan is this particular militant group.
Topic:
Terrorism, Taliban, Islamic State, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and South Asia