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Begin New Search Content Type Policy Brief Publication Year within 3 Years Publication Year within 25 Years

391. Financing Women, Peace and Security: A Review of WPS National Action Plans from 2005 to 2022

Author:
Our Secure Future
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Our Secure Future
Abstract:
This publication is a policy brief accompanying an upcoming in-depth report on financing Women, Peace and Security (WPS) National Action Plans (NAP). This brief provides an overview of WPS NAPs, as well as the current state of funding for WPS NAP implementation, and a breakdown of this data by region. Stay tuned for the upcoming report to learn more about financing WPS NAPs. Key Findings: • As of early 2023, 31 countries out of 101 have estimated the amount of money required to implement WPS NAP activities. Available information does not illuminate whether these funds are secured. • More than 50 WPS NAPs out of 101 mention that a budget is needed to implement WPS activities, but do not include specification of funding. • The majority of WPS NAPs with budget estimates identify responsible parties for activity implementation, including ministries and/or government institutions, predominantly related to foreign affairs and gender equality.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Budget, Women, Finance, and Peace
Political Geography:
Global Focus

392. Internal Control in Intelligence Services

Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF)
Abstract:
First, a lack of effective internal control prevents external oversight bodies, such as parliamentary committees, from fulfilling their role effectively. Intelligence service managers play a crucial role in facilitating scrutiny by oversight bodies not only by ensuring that major infractions are reported to the appropriate authority, but also by creating an environment that encourages cooperation with oversight bodies. Second, while transparency is essential to maintaining democratic control of government, intelligence services require a significant degree of secrecy to be effective. Consequently, intelligence services are subject to highly restricted oversight, unlike other public institutions. Effective internal control is therefore essential to rectify this inherent (and unavoidable) imbalance by ensuring that the day-to-day work of intelligence services is carried out in accordance with the law and with respect for human rights. Third, to avoid undue influence and ensure independent, objective analysis, intelligence services must retain a degree of autonomy from the executive. Executive control over intelligence services is therefore sometimes less pronounced, meaning that effective internal control is vital to ensuring intelligence services act within the rule of law. For the above reasons, intelligence services should be subject to both effective oversight and internal control. This Thematic Brief addresses the latter by examining internal control systems used in Euro-Atlantic countries.
Topic:
Security, Intelligence, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Global Focus

393. Developments in Kazakhstan 2022: Causes and Consequences

Author:
Yurii Poita
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:
In January 2022, mass protests arose in Kazakhstan due to an increase in gas prices for cars, which instantly covered almost the entire country. From the initial demands of the demonstrators in Zhanaozen in the southwest of the country they quickly transformed into anti-government ones: the protesters demanded the resignation of the government, a change in the current political regime and the departure of the first president, Nursultan Nazarbayev. The willingness of the Kazakh authorities to make concessions and satisfy part of the demands did not stop the protests: they expanded significantly both quantitatively and geographically and in a short time the protest was marginalized and transformed into pogroms and looting, especially in the city of Almaty in southern Kazakhstan.
Topic:
Governance, Social Movement, Protests, and Repression
Political Geography:
Central Asia, Kazakhstan, and Asia

394. Quo Vadis, Belarus?

Author:
Zoran Meter
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:
Year 2021 was one of the most turbulent for Belarus since its independence after the collapse of the USSR. In the West Belarus is sometimes called the “European North the global economic crisis in 2008 without too many problems and internal turmoil. Belarus has also successfully overcome problems with its neighbor the Russian Federation caused by Korea” and its longtime president Alexander Lukashenko, whom the West no longer recognizes, is dubbed “Europe’s Last Dictator.” Although this country is still to a large extent dug in its communist past, it has overcome disputes related to the content and dynamics of the implementation of the establishment of a Federal State between Belarus and Russia to which they previously committed.
Topic:
Economics, Governance, Leadership, Dictatorship, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Europe and Belarus

395. KDP and PUK in Sadir’s Chess Game

Author:
Dlawer Ala'Aldeen
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Middle East Research Institute (MERI)
Abstract:
Muqtada Al-Sadir, the Shiite Cleric Grandmaster, is playing to win; whatever the expense. In the build-up to the game, the Sunnis got their act together and seized the opportunity to become the main winners of the first round. However, the Kurds entered the fight on one leg, lost sight of the bigger picture and intensified their internal power rivalry. This has already proven costly for the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), and if they keep on as they started, the second round will be even dearer. Fortunately, it is not too late to minimise their losses or even end up winning future rounds. To do this, they need to take into account the complex power dynamics within not just the Shiite component of Iraq (Shiite House), but also the Shiite ‘Universe’ inside and outside Iraq.
Topic:
Governance, Leadership, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Iraq and Middle East

396. Inclusion of Women in the FY22 NDAA (P.L. 117-81)

Author:
Hans Hogrefe, Sahana Dharmapuri, and Cassandra Zavislak
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Our Secure Future
Abstract:
Congress is currently discussing the inclusion of women in the current NDAA. Read our brief summary of specific references to the inclusion of women in the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2022 (NDAA, P.L. 117-81). The NDAA emphasizes attention to sexual and gender based violence in the U.S. military and creates a pilot program to assess barriers to women’s participation in partner nation defense and security forces based on the WPS Act. The FY22 NDAA is making some important changes to the implementation of the Women, Peace and Security Act (P.L. 115-68): Requires Congressional briefing on the implementation status of the recommendations set forth in the report of the Independent Review Commission on Sexual Assault in the Military. Improves prosecution on how sexual harassment and assault within the U.S. military. Establishes WPS pilot program to support the implementation of the WPS Act of 2017. Requires a study of US Security Cooperation Programs focused on Afghanistan in accordance with the WPS Act of 2017 Requires DEI data collection Authorizes professional development
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Women, Sexual Violence, Inclusion, and WPS
Political Geography:
United States of America

397. Policy Papers by Women of Color: Decolonizing International Development

Author:
Tamara White, Aisha White, Gabrielle B. Gueye, Daniet Moges, and Eliza Gueye
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Women of Color Advancing Peace, Security and Conflict Transformation (WCAPS)
Abstract:
This series explores a handful of scenarios where colonial legacies surface in international development and humanitarian aid work, from staffing and institution building to food aid and global tourism. Exploring these topics and seeking to deconstruct the systems and structures that impede success in development and humanitarian efforts is critically important in ensuring that we ultimately meet global goals and restore integrity to our sector. Many believe international development and humanitarian aid are irreconcilable and that this work is an extension of colonialism, but our constituency believes that there is hope in transforming the sector and shifting power to those who should rightfully own this work and reap the benefits of development.
Topic:
Development, Humanitarian Aid, Tourism, Culture, Neoliberalism, Decolonization, Institutions, COVID-19, and Food Assistance
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America

398. Australia’s semiconductor national moonshot

Author:
Alex Capri and Robert Clark
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Australia has recently been forced to cross a Rubicon. Its wholehearted embrace of global free trade and just-in-time supply chains has had to confront the hard reality of geopolitics. In many parts of the world, geopolitics is choking free trade, and China—Australia’s largest trading partner—has shown itself particularly willing to use trade coercively and abrogate its free trade commitments, not just with Australia, but with countries all around the world. Advanced technologies are at the centre of this geopolitical struggle, because of the risk that withheld supply poses to national economies and security. As Covid-19 disruptions have demonstrated, the risks are not even limited to deliberate coercion. In this environment, bold action is warranted. Continuing to do what we did before is not an option because it will undermine the national interest. A new approach is needed that’s in part heretical to our old market-based approach but is driven by necessity: government intervention that works in tandem with industry expertise and drive. In this important policy brief, Alex Capri and Robert Clark lay out a vision for Australia to secure its place in the global semiconductor industry—an industry they describe as ‘the single most important technology underlying leading-edge industries’. Their proposal is to stimulate A$5 billion of semiconductor manufacturing activity through A$1.5 billion of government investment and financial incentives. Those subsidies and tax concessions would mirror similar initiatives such as the US ‘CHIPS’ and ‘FABS’ Acts, but are focused on Australia’s interests. They identify a logical niche for Australia that would initially establish a distributed commercial compound semiconductor foundry capability across Australia via a public–private partnership. In the longer term, they propose establishing a commercial silicon complementary metal-oxide semiconductor foundry at mature process scale. Government intervention in a market shouldn’t be made lightly, but Capri and Clark make a compelling case to do so. If policymakers agree that Australia needs access to semiconductors and that their supply from elsewhere can’t be guaranteed, then intervention is imperative. This policy brief lays out a ‘moonshot’ to get Australia there.
Topic:
Markets, Trade, Supply Chains, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:
Australia and Australia/Pacific

399. The Cost of Defence: ASPI Defence Budget Brief October 2022–2023

Author:
Marcus Hellyer
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Shortly before the recent election, the previous government released a defence budget that continued its record of delivering the funding it promised in the 2016 Defence White Paper (DWP) and subsequent 2020 Defence Strategic Update (DSU). The Albanese government’s first budget was not designed to focus on Australia’s security situation or defence spending. Tasked with sharing Australia’s difficult economic situation with the Australian public, the budget has more immediate fish to fry. For those Australians who want to see increased defence spending, this was not going to be that budget as it would have directly undercut existing defence reviews due within months. Certainly, the Prime Minister has stated that the government will do whatever is necessary to ensure Australia has the defence force it needs in these strategically uncertain times. But this budget gives no indication of how much the government is willing to spend to do that. With the Defence Strategic Review (DSR) under Stephen Smith and Angus Houston conducting its work and not due to report until March next year, the government has stuck with the existing funding line it inherited from its predecessor. That’s an artefact of the 2016 Defence White Paper—a document developed in a different era and quickly overtaken by events. So Defence is in a holding pattern while the government keeps its powder dry and waits for Smith and Houston (noting their interim report has recently been handed to the government). No doubt it has had conversations with the DSR leads indicating its comfort zone for additional spending, but that hasn’t been made public. What we can say from the information set out in this budget is that any increase to defence spending will require difficult reprioritisation. While the government received a revenue windfall this year due to high commodity prices, those are forecast to return to normal. And with the government committing to deliver the tax cuts agreed by its predecessor, its income is under further pressure. At the same time, it’s facing five growing spending pressures: interest on the growing debt, the National Disability Insurance Scheme, health care, aged care, and defence—and that’s before any increase to the existing defence funding line. The result is a forecast for deficit spending for the next 10 years. That’s not a good situation for the DSR leads. They’re tasked with delivering new military acquisitions faster in the next decade, but the existing acquisition plan is probably already unaffordable (without increased spending), with many entirely new capabilities or expensive replacement projects. And with nuclear-powered submarines and frigates on the untouchable list, the challenge of delivering more sooner gets even harder, as those two programs will consume tens of billions of dollars over the coming decade even before they deliver their first vessels. Moreover, inflation is rapidly eroding Defence’s buying power by billions of dollars every year. By the end of the forward estimates, Defence may have lost around $18 billion in buying power even if inflation rapidly returns to the Reserve Bank of Australia’s target rate. That’s the budget papers’ predictions, but those predictions haven’t been very accurate in recent years. This year, despite nominal growth of over 7% in defence spending, real growth is under 1% once inflation is taken into account (although, with inflation difficult to predict, it’s also difficult to reliably quantify real growth). It’s hard to see Defence affording its ambitious acquisition program with a budget that’s essentially static in real terms. Inflation is also driving nominal GDP growth at a predicted 8% this year. That means that defence spending is falling as a percentage of GDP for the second year in a row despite the government delivering the funding set out in the 2016 Defence White Paper and 2020 Defence Strategic Update. Predicted defence spending has also fallen significantly just since the March budget, from 2.11% to 1.96%, despite the funding line remaining fundamentally unchanged. In summary, there is no pot of gold available to cover increased defence spending. That doesn’t mean the government can’t or won’t increase defence spending, but any increase will require either higher taxes (which appears unlikely, since the government is proceeding with its predecessor’s planned tax cuts), greater borrowing (accelerating the vicious cycle of debts and deficits), or cuts to other priorities that have constituencies of their own. When we look at Defence’s big three areas of spending—capital acquisitions, people and sustainment—there have been no significant changes since the March budget. With the Australian dollar at a 20-year low against the US dollar, the Defence budget has received a large automatic top-up to maintain its purchasing, but there’s no adjustment to compensate for inflation. There are a few changes to spending, but they’re broadly consistent with what we would see in a mid-year budget update. For those who follow capability, the top 30 acquisition projects and sustainment products hold some interesting information, but the lists are quite consistent with previous plans. We’ll have to wait for the outcomes of the DSR to see anything new. Similarly there’s been no adjustment to Defence’s personnel allocation since March. But that still means the ADF needs to find roughly 13,000 more people this decade to operate the capabilities on its shopping list, even though it’s only managed to grow by an average of 300 per year since the 2016 White Paper. Smith and Houston may need to consider whether it makes sense to acquire capabilities that the ADF can’t crew, or at least how the ADF can maximise its combat power without many additional people. Of course, another HR strategy is one based on ‘if you build it, they will come.’ The situation is also difficult with Defence’s civilian and external workforce. To deliver its ambitious capability program, Defence has relied on growing numbers of contractors. They’ve helped Defence spend record amounts in its acquisition programs in recent years, despite the impact of Covid-19; however, they come at a cost. That growth may be over; in the October budget, the government is seeking $144.6 million in ‘savings from external labour and savings from advertising, travel and legal expenses’. That’s not a large percentage of Defence’s total budget but, if it means the organisation can’t hire the people it needs to manage the acquisition program, it’s hard to see how Defence will deliver more capability sooner. Overall, while there were no surprises, the October budget hasn’t made the job any easier for Smith and Houston.
Topic:
National Security, Budget, Economy, Industry, and Defense Spending
Political Geography:
Australia and Australia/Pacific

400. Terrorism in the Sahel Developments, Consequences of French Involvement and Options for European Security and Defence Policy

Author:
Naomi Moreno-Cosgrove
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
On August 15, 2022, the final contingent of Operation Barkhane crossed the border into Niger putting an end to almost a decade of French military intervention in Mali. The security void left by France in the country has now become the main means of competition between jihadist groups particularly in the tri-border area between Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Violent extremism together with community conflict over the access of natural resources, inter-ethnic violence, and the increasing number of internally displaced persons (IDP) continues to spill over towards the Gulf of Guinea, through the northern areas of Togo, Benin, Ivory Coast, and Ghana. While the number of fatalities show no sign of lowering, it seems unsuitable for France and its European counterparts to entirely desist their efforts in West Africa. At a time when the withdrawal of French forces from Mali has brought upon a new spin in the region’s conflict dynamics, this paper offers insights into the future of European engagement in the Sahel. It will do so by addressing the evolution of French intervention since 2013, assessing the current developments of the Sahel crisis after French involvement in Mali, and aiming at providing several entry points whereby the shift in paradigm could turn into an opportunity for French and European security and defence policies in the region.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, European Union, Counter-terrorism, and Instability
Political Geography:
North Africa and Sahel