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Begin New Search Content Type Policy Brief Publication Year within 3 Years Publication Year within 25 Years

341. Malaysia’s Blue Economy: Position, Initiatives, and Challenges

Author:
Abdul Hafizh Mohd Azam, Muhamad Rias K.V. Zainuddin, and Tamat Sarmidi
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
Malaysia leverages the economic activities in and around its oceans, seas, and coastal areas, as its maritime space is double the country’s land area. The marine-based or blue economy contributes about 23% of Malaysia’s GDP. Realising the importance of the blue economy led Malaysian policymakers to incorporate the concept of the blue economy in the Twelfth Malaysia Plan, which was developed in consultation with relevant ministries and organisations. Although the blue economy has been identified as a key area of growth for Malaysia, its development faces numerous challenges such as the absence of a comprehensive national ocean policy and marine spatial plan, overlapping jurisdiction amongst government agencies, and shortage of labour. Thus, a systematic approach is necessary to analyse the gaps in the ‘8i-ecosystem’ to ensure the effective development and management of Malaysia's blue economy. To ensure that the initiatives for the blue economy in Malaysia are on track and delivering the intended outcomes, appropriate monitoring and evaluation approaches and mechanisms must be in place.
Topic:
Governance, Regulation, Services, Trade, ASEAN, and Blue Economy
Political Geography:
Malaysia and Southeast Asia

342. Developing the Blue Economy in Indonesia

Author:
Keanu Can Can and Teguh Dartano
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
During Indonesia’s chairmanship of ASEAN in 2023, it has highlighted the blue economy as a key sector for the region’s sustainable future. A greener and bluer economy requires both environmental and societal balance. In prioritising the sector, Indonesia recognises both the steep challenges and the abundant potential associated with the blue economy, alongside the need for international and inter-sectoral cooperation to fully leverage the sector’s capacity for a more inclusive and equitable future. This brief explores Indonesia’s existing progress in harnessing its blue economy, what challenges lie ahead, and what strategic initiatives Indonesia must undertake to pave a pathway towards a blue economic transformation.
Topic:
Infrastructure, Governance, Regulation, and Blue Economy
Political Geography:
Indonesia and Southeast Asia

343. ASEAN Digital Community (ADC) 2045

Author:
Lili Yan Ing, Imam Pambagyo, Yessi Vadila, Ivana Markus, and Livia Feliciani Nazara
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
Digital transformation has profoundly reshaped not only the way we work but also the way we live. It has shifted the focus of goods and services trade, emphasising not only what is produced and traded, but also how it is traded, customised, and delivered. The rapid digital transformation within the ASEAN region has ushered in an array of risks and challenges. These challenges encompass a spectrum of concerns, ranging from the safeguarding of data privacy and fortification against cyber threats to grappling with intensified competition and addressing the ever-widening digital divide. To fully embrace the opportunities presented by the digital age, ASEAN must lay the foundation for an ASEAN Digital Community (ADC) 2045, that can serve as a vision for ASEAN in embracing a new era. This visionary pursuit must be anchored in four pivotal cornerstones: robust data governance, the infusion of value-added principles, the establishment of seamless digital connectivity, and the propagation of digital inclusivity.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Digital Economy, Innovation, Integration, and ASEAN
Political Geography:
Southeast Asia

344. Developing a National Blue Economy Framework for Lao PDR

Author:
Aloun Phonvisay
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
This policy brief discusses the development of a national blue economy framework for the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) to capitalise on the country’s rich water and forest resources in a sustainable manner. The framework would promote sustainable development of the blue economy, identify priority areas for investment, enhance stakeholder capacity, and promote the Lao PDR blue economy. The priority sectors identified for investment include fisheries, forest carbon, inland marine connectivity, and hydropower development.
Topic:
Sustainable Development Goals, Investment, and Blue Economy
Political Geography:
Southeast Asia and Laos

345. A Strategy for US Public Diplomacy in the Age of Disinformation

Author:
Bret Schafer, Rachael Dean Wilson, and Jessica Brandt
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
“Would you rather have the bitter truth or more sweet lies?” This is the question posed by an assertive series of videos produced by the State Department in recent months, targeting Russian audiences, that juxtapose statements by Russian President Vladimir Putin with evidence that he is lying about the course of the war in Ukraine. DOWNLOAD PDF The effort, alongside revelations laid bare by Washington and its allies at the start of the war, reflects a new understanding: that the information domain is perhaps the most consequential terrain that Putin is contesting and that it is an essential theater of the broader, emerging, persistent, asymmetric competition between liberal democracies and their authoritarian challengers. As part of this competition, autocrats—in Moscow and Beijing, but also elsewhere—have leveraged multiple asymmetries. Both Russia and China operate vast propaganda networks that use multiple modes of communication—from state media websites to popular social media accounts to leading search engines—to disseminate their preferred, often slanted, versions of events. Both have spread multiple, sometimes conflicting, conspiracy theories designed to deflect blame for their own malfeasance, undermine the soft power of the United States, and erode the idea that there is such a thing as objective truth. Both also deploy proxy influencers to agitate anti-American sentiment and frequently engage in “whataboutism” to cast US policy as hypocritical to audiences around the world. Some of this content is targeted at broad swaths of the public within Western societies—in Russia’s case with the goal of polarizing them, and in so doing, weakening Europe and the United States from within. Other content is targeted at the global south, with the goal of eroding popular support for Western policies and, in China’s case, promoting alternatives to the Western model. For the United States, like other democracies, an open information environment confers enormous long-term advantages, but it also creates vulnerabilities that can be exploited using low-cost tools and tactics, often with plausible deniability. Where democracies depend on the idea that the truth is knowable and citizens can discern it to govern themselves, autocracies have no such need for a vibrant, open, trusted information environment. In fact, autocrats benefit from widespread public skepticism in the notion of objective truth. Because autocratic regimes tightly control their own information environments, they are more insulated from criticism than democratic ones. Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping effectively ban many Western social media platforms from operating within their borders in order to close space for dissent, all the while using them quite effectively to target audiences abroad. In doing so, unlike their democratic competitors, autocrats face few normative constraints on lying—a dynamic they freely exploit. As a result, autocrats have made remarkable advances in the contest that is now underway in the information domain. To push back on these advances, the United States should leverage its own asymmetric advantages—including its economic might, cyber capabilities, soft power, and the legitimacy that comes from democratic governance—recognizing that successful competitors play to their strengths. A focal point of US strategy should be to harness truthful information to contest the information domain, recognizing that competition in this realm is ongoing and there is a first mover advantage to setting the terms of the debate. Such an approach should entail simultaneously highlighting the strengths of liberal democracies (such as their openness to new information and ability to course correct, innovate, and improve) and the failures and false promises of authoritarian regimes (like kleptocracy and repression). It must do so not just to reach those who live in closed spaces, such as Russia and China, but to reach those who live in countries that are backsliding or where democracy is not fully consolidated. This paper—which is based on conversations with more than a dozen subject-matter experts, including current and former diplomats—offers recommendations for updating US public diplomacy to compete successfully with Russia and China. The focus, however, is limited to US international broadcasting and strategic communication activities and does not include recommendations to improve other elements of US public diplomacy, including but not limited to cultural diplomacy and people-to-people exchanges. The authors recognize that public diplomacy is not merely about crafting a winning message and that an effective US approach must include activities that lie outside of the information domain. This paper should therefore be viewed as an attempt at improving a piece of, but not the whole, public diplomacy puzzle.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Democracy, Media, and Disinformation
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

346. Assessing the Risk of Foreign Influence in UK Search Results

Author:
Bret Schafer and Peter Benzoni
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
As the de facto gateway to the vast troves of information available online, search services play a critical role in the modern information ecosystem. They are often the starting points for people’s questions about the world around them, from the innocuous to the deeply consequential. The results generated by search algorithms can therefore influence everything from consumer behavior to people’s political and social preferences, often in ways that are imperceptible to users of those systems. Given this significant power, search services are also targets of those who seek to manipulate information to advance a particular, and at times malign, agenda. This includes those working for or on behalf of autocratic foreign governments, who can attempt to leverage search results to whitewash human rights abuses, attack opponents, or interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. The threat is particularly acute with well-resourced states that operate global state-backed media outlets, troll farms, and other state-aligned information outlets that allow them to exploit search services through strategic content production, search engine optimization, or intentional manipulation. DOWNLOAD PDF To evaluate this potential risk, we analyzed data over a 30-day period across six search products on four search services (Google Search, Google News, Microsoft Bing, Bing News, Yandex Search, and Baidu Search) to assess the prominence of foreign state-linked websites, or those that reproduce content from those websites, in search returns for queries related to topics of national importance to the United Kingdom. Importantly, we could not assess, nor was it our intention to assess, whether the prominence of any state-linked sources in search results was the result of deliberate manipulation by those states or merely the product of search algorithms determining that the content produced by those sites was relevant to a given query. We also did not assess the relative quality of any individual state media outlets. We recognize that state-backed information sources exist on a broad spectrum in terms of their authoritativeness and journalistic standards, and that a connection to a foreign state is not necessarily problematic and should not be viewed by search services as an inherent risk. In short, our efforts to understand the prominence of state-linked sources in search results should not be viewed as an attempt to document wrongdoing, either by the sources themselves or by the search services that surfaced those sources. In addition, although we attempted to select topics that were important to UK interests instead of those that favored the interests of any one foreign government, some of the chosen queries—notably those related to the war against Ukraine—were more likely to be the focus of messaging from certain countries. Results from this study should therefore not be used as comparative data points to suggest that any one state is more influential in UK search results than any other. Instead, the goal of this research was simply to gain a better understanding of how and how often content from websites with direct or indirect links to foreign states—primarily state-backed media outlets but also websites directly or indirectly linked to foreign governments or foreign intelligence services—surfaced in search results in the four constituent countries of the UK. Though we offer several illustrative examples highlighting specific vulnerabilities uncovered by our research, the bulk of this report is focused on assessing a potential risk of foreign interference by identifying the types of variables—from the topic searched for to the language used—that regularly generated search results from state-linked websites, without assessing whether the content of those search results is potentially illegal under the UK’s newly created Foreign Interference Offense included in the National Security Act 2023. We did, however, pay particular attention to the presence of content produced by media outlets currently sanctioned by the UK government, namely Russian state media outlets that were sanctioned after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Democracy, Media, and Disinformation
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

347. Family Rule in Iraq and the Challenge to State and Democracy

Author:
Sardar Aziz and Bilal Wahab
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
After the fall of Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship in 2003, Iraqi political parties proliferated in a show of enthusiasm for the country’s emerging democracy. In recent years, however, a handful of personalities and families have consumed all of the country’s political oxygen, dashing hopes for a truly pluralistic ecosystem. Especially discouraging has been the authoritarian shift in Kurdistan, once viewed as a democratic beacon in the Middle East. At the federal level, feuding between the Sadr and Maliki camps now dominates Shia politics, and Mohammed al-Halbousi has crowded out other Sunni players. Meanwhile, corruption touches every surface, and the rare official who holds to ethical standards risks being rendered entirely ineffectual. In this wide-ranging Policy Note, experts Sardar Aziz and Bilal Wahab outline the dispiriting state of Iraqi politics and how the United States can respond. To achieve the scaled-down goals of maintaining sovereignty and accountability, they argue, American officials must be creative, working with Iraqi institutional actors while simultaneously engaging with less central figures such as apolitical military commanders and the business community.
Topic:
Politics, Reform, Democracy, State, and Shia Islam
Political Geography:
Iraq and Middle East

348. An Heir and a Spare? How Yemen’s “Southern Hezbollah” Could Change Iran’s Deterrent Calculus

Author:
Michael Knights
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Since October 27, the Houthis have launched three medium-range ballistic missiles at Israel, a first since Saddam Hussein fired Scud missiles into the country in 1991. The Yemen-based jihadists have also launched at least eight salvos of cruise missiles and long-range explosive drones focused on the southern port of Eilat. Moreover, they have attacked U.S. assets directly during the Hamas-Israel war, shooting down one MQ-9 Reaper drone and routing numerous missiles near Navy vessels. If Iran continues to develop the group’s capabilities, the Houthis may provide the broader “axis of resistance” with a potent new chess piece. In this timely Policy Note, Michael Knights assesses the rising Houthi threat and explains how the United States and its allies can respond more assertively and effectively. A revamped policy would recognize the intimate alliance between the Houthis and Iran—which has never been a “marriage of convenience,” as some analysts have imagined—and seek to counter the group’s aggression with the goal of securing U.S. interests and providing a better future for the Yemeni people.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Energy Policy, Deterrence, and Houthis
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, Yemen, Palestine, United States of America, and Gulf Nations

349. Exploiting a "Vast Jihad Arena": The Islamic State Takes Territory in Mali

Author:
Aaron Y. Zelin and Sarah Cahn
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
In April, Islamic State fighters in Mali seized villages surrounding the city of Menaka, marking the group’s first territorial conquest since losing its final Syrian foothold in 2019. The human cost of these advances has been steep. By May, at least 150,000 individuals had reportedly been displaced, and civilians have been subjected to targeted killings, kidnappings, and looting. The offensive occurred amid a string of regional of security setbacks: namely, France’s August 2022 military withdrawal (which followed the Malian junta’s expressed preference for Russia’s Wagner Group), the April 2023 dissolution of the UN mission in Mali, and the junta’s decision earlier this month to form a tripartite alliance with Burkina Faso and Niger, thereby undermining the French-led G5 Sahel framework designed to thwart jihadist actors in the region. In this amply illustrated Policy Note, Aaron Zelin and Sarah Cahn explain that while the United States may have limited room for maneuver in Mali today, it can promote regional stability and U.S. national interests by pursuing further sanctions against local Islamic State officials and exploring constructive arrangements with nearby African states.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, Islamic State, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Africa, North Africa, and Mali

350. The Palestinian Authority Thirty Years After Oslo

Author:
Neomi Neumann
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
As Palestinians and Israelis mark the thirtieth anniversary of the Oslo Accords, it is worth pausing to examine what remains of the original promise contained in the agreement (hint: something does remain). More than that, it is worth examining whether those remnants can survive the many challenges facing the Palestinian Authority, especially those likely to emerge “the day after” President Mahmoud Abbas exits the stage.
Topic:
Politics, Reform, Democracy, Palestinian Authority, and Israeli–Palestinian Conflict
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, and Palestine