Search

Begin New Search Topic Security Content Type Policy Brief Publication Year within 10 Years

201. Protecting the environment in times of armed conflict

Author:
Finn Stepputat and Jairo Munive
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Armed conflicts cause immense immediate harm to the people affected by them. Therefore, it seems only natural to focus exclusively on the human consequences, downplaying the environmental harm caused by armed conflicts. And although, in some cases, degraded environment and depleted resources like water or fertile soil can be at the root of armed conflict, the environment is frequently a ’silent victim’. However, conflicts can and do cause long-term damage to the environment, whether directly or incidentally, harming people’s health and livelihoods. Attacks and explosive remnants can cause water and soil contamination, or release pollutants into the air. The war in Ukraine, for example, has caused damage to internationally protected wetlands, national parks, and biospheres, and threatens to damage nuclear power plants. During recent fighting in Gaza, incendiary artillery shells set fire to hundreds of tons of toxic pesticides, fertilizers, chemicals, and other farming materials, causing groundwater contamination. Armed conflict can also result in further indirect environmental degradation. When people flee to camps or cities, the need for food and traditional cooking fuels such as firewood and charcoal can contribute to deforestation and resource depletion. Furthermore, armed conflict occupies government capacities. Environmental protection is not always high on states’ agendas, and they may themselves be involved in the unregulated exploitation of natural resources to sustain armed conflict. But all things being equal, armed conflict risks reducing states’ capacity for protecting the environment, controlling the exploitation of natural resources, and managing forcibly displaced populations during and after conflict. A case in point is Libya, a country affected by long-term armed conflict, where oil spills from ill-maintained power plants, oil fields and offshore installations have resulted in widespread pollution.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Environment, United Nations, and Natural Resources
Political Geography:
Global Focus

202. How renewable energy transitions impact power structures in local communities

Author:
Maria-Louise Clausen
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
International donors often see renewable energy transitions in fragile and conflict-affected states as a building block for peace and development. But donor-supported transitions to small-scale renewable energy generation can both mitigate and exacerbate local conflict dynamics and undermine the central state. In fragile and conflict-affected states, it is often difficult for the central authorities to protect large-scale energy infrastructure from attacks and sabotage, and thus guarantee long-term stability. Moreover, local communities often use fuel-driven generators to supplement the state-driven national grid, but national diesel supply lines are also vulnerable to disruptions. Consequently, international donors increasingly support small-scale renewable energy generation as a climate friendly alternative to centralised and state-led energy generation. Solar photovoltaic (PV) in particular has become a widely promoted, affordable and accessible technology for local energy generation.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, Development, Water, Non State Actors, Governance, Inequality, Renewable Energy, and Energy Transition
Political Geography:
Global Focus

203. Mapping the “Women, Peace and Security” agenda in Latin America: a comparison of the UN’s National Action Plans

Author:
Paula Drumond, Tamya Rebelo, Isa Mendes, and Ana Velasco
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
BRICS Policy Center
Abstract:
Adopted on October 31, 2000 by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Resolution 1325 has since then been one of the main references for the development, strengthening, and expansion of policies aimed at promoting gender equality, giving rise to the so-called Women Peace and Security (WPS) agenda. This Policy Brief aims to map and systematize the diffusion of the WPS agenda in Latin America. This analysis aims to reflect on the contours of the agenda in the region and deepen the understanding of how Latin American countries engage with this global normative framework. Based on an analysis of the National Action Plans (NAPs) adopted so far by countries in the region (Chile, Argentina, Paraguay, Brazil, El Salvador, Guatemala and Mexico), the work reveals how the agenda is being adopted in these different contexts, seeking to identify existing convergences and particularities. The mapping and analysis of the NAPs are organized around three main aspects: (i) their elaboration process and the actors involved; (ii) the content, objectives, and measures adopted; and (iii) implementation and monitoring strategies. The goal is to offer a general diagnosis of the national engagements with the agenda, summarizing the main advances, limitations, and recommendations to promote its implementation in the region.
Topic:
Security, Development, United Nations, Women, Peace, and Equality
Political Geography:
Latin America

204. Holding the Hard-line: What is behind Iran’s seizure of Greek ships in Arabian Gulf?

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
On May 27, Iran seized two Greek tankers, named “Prudent Warrior” and “Delta Poseidon”, in the Arabian Gulf. Forces from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) descended on the tankers and ordered them to sail to Bandar Abbas port. Onboard the tankers were 49 crew members. Greece described the operation as ‘piracy’. The seizure seems to be a reprisal for Greece’s role earlier in the month assisting the US impounding a Russian-flagged tanker transporting Iranian oil and carrying 19 crew.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Sanctions, Maritime, and Shipping
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Greece

205. International Support: How the Taliban are trying to uproot ISIS in Afghanistan

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
The Taliban and the Islamic State in Iraq & Syria (ISIS) seem to have shifted their focus. Latest reports coming from American security and defence intelligence agencies have indicated that, despite the US withdrawal from Afghanistan six months earlier, terrorist groups, such as ISIS and al-Qaeda are less likely to make the country a launchpad for international terrorist attacks against the West. These reports contradicted earlier statements made by senior US Pentagon officials. They had maintained that the newly formed branch of ISIS, the Islamic State Khorasan Province (or ISKP), would launch attacks on American and Western soil as early as 12 months within the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan.
Topic:
Security, Taliban, Violent Extremism, Islamic State, and Coordination
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, South Asia, and United States of America

206. Policing the police: The EU’s struggle to strengthen the Libyan security sector

Author:
Matteo Colombo and Nienke van Heukelingen
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
More than ten years after the ousting of Gaddafi, the Libyan police under the Ministry of Interior are still struggling to effectively carry out their duties across the country. Drawing from 25 interviews conducted with experts, Libyan police officers, civil servants of the Ministry of Interior, and EU officers between June and August 20221, our research found four main obstacles facing the Libyan police force in Western Libya. These are: i) the proliferation of armed groups; ii) divisions within the ruling elite; iii) administrative mismanagement in the security system; and iv) the presence of alternative conflict-resolution mechanisms. It also emerged that each area comes with its own challenges. Against that background, this policy brief calls for a change in EU policies. We suggest that EU member states align on specific and measurable goals and take a more adaptive and incremental approach. More specifically, the EU could consider identifying a set of measurable and achievable objectives and adapting its policies to the different contexts in which it operates, tailoring its priorities and timescales to different locations.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Armed Forces, European Union, and Police
Political Geography:
Libya and North Africa

207. Gas and Energy Security in Germany and Central and Eastern Europe

Author:
Guntram Wolff and Alexandra Gritz
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
Russia’s weaponization of gas supplies caused a shock to the energy security of Central and Eastern Europe. Countries responded by increasing alternative gas supplies and LNG import capacity. Gas flows shifted from the east-west axis to west-east and north-south axes. In the short term, the usage of coal is rising; in the longer term, renewable and nuclear energy. Mitigating the effects of this shock requires the EU to prioritize policies that foster the integrity and security of its energy market.
Topic:
Security, Natural Resources, European Union, Gas, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Eastern Europe, Germany, and Central Europe

208. An Alternative Approach to U.S. Sahel Policy

Author:
Alex Thurston
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
The Sahel region of Africa is in freefall. Upwards of 19 million people need humanitarian assistance, five coups have occurred since 2020, jihadists and militias are killing thousands, and security forces and Russian mercenaries abuse civilians with impunity. The Sahel’s primary external actor, France, pursues intensive counterterrorism with the aim of helping Sahelian national authorities to reassert legitimacy; France also seeks to retain influence over its former colonies. But French policy has floundered. Anti-French sentiments drove France mostly out of Mali, one epicenter of the Sahel crisis, and many other Sahelians resent perceived French encroachments on their sovereignty. The United States lacks a real policy for the Sahel. Rather, U.S. policy drifts and reacts. Important humanitarian and development programs are overshadowed by securitized rhetoric and undermined by the considerable U.S. military activity in the Sahel, including vestiges of the “War on Terror.” The White House’s 2022 National Security Strategy, its Africa Strategy, and a forthcoming Sahel Strategy envision diverse efforts going beyond counterterrorism, but they read as laundry lists of priorities rather than as concrete plans of action. The vagueness of existing policy risks allowing obsolete assumptions and programs to continue.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Counter-terrorism, and Military
Political Geography:
Africa, France, Mali, and Sahel

209. A Restraint Recipe for America’s Asian Alliances and Security Partnerships

Author:
Michael D. Swaine and Sarang Shidore
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
As Sino–American relations deteriorate, risks of conflict between Washington and Beijing are growing. A major war would be terrible for both the United States and the region while setting back critical goals, like the fight to stop climate change. Avoiding a war while safeguarding vital U.S. interests ought to be a priority. But while many in the United States want to strengthen alliance structures as a means of deterring China and to make Taiwan a de facto security ally, those who espouse a strategy of Restraint believe this approach endangers Americans and undermines their prosperity. A policy of Restraint is predicated on the view that alliances are not ends in themselves, but a means of bolstering U.S. security. This brief analyzes the utility of America’s Asian alliances and security partnerships from a Restraint perspective under two scenarios. The first and preferred scenario is that of the United States and China walking back from their current march toward confrontation to achieve a stable, if still significantly competitive, relationship. The second and more likely scenario is a much sharper and sustained rivalry with China becoming a regionally strong, possibly in many ways dominant, power.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Partnerships, and Alliance
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, East Asia, Asia, and United States of America

210. Children of War: The Ukrainian Case

Author:
Isabella Martin
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The war in Ukraine has imposed considerable physical, mental, and emotional damage on children. It is critical to provide mental health and psychosocial support (MPHSS), as well as to reinforce psychological and social infrastructure—in Ukraine and countries hosting refugees—to help them cope with the immediate trauma of war and promote resilience for future reconstruction efforts. Severe damage to civilian infrastructure has left many children without access to schools, healthcare resources, and support networks within care facilities, while those who have fled Ukraine risk falling victim to human trafficking and exploitation. Moreover, children are targets of the Kremlin’s efforts to erase the Ukrainian identity, brutally executed through oppressive policies such as forced school curriculum in the occupied territories and atrocious practice of ’filtration’, with children separated, abducted, and then put up for adoption in Russia. Inside and outside of the country, Ukraine’s youth are left extremely vulnerable to abuse, with the consequences to their mental health to last for generations—and to affect the nation’s post-war recovery—if not taken care of already today. Without developing proper coping mechanisms in children and adolescents now, the trauma imposed on the young generation will hinder rebuilding efforts and undermine societal institutions. It is thus imperative to support MHPSS initiatives and contribute to a resilient society in post-war Ukraine.
Topic:
Security, Civil Society, Education, Health, War, Children, Resilience, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

211. The Role of Development Actors in Responding to Environment and Security Links

Author:
Karen Meijer and Katongo Seyuba
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
Despite growing interest among development actors to integrate links between the environment, climate, peace and security into their policies and activities, practical approaches to addressing environment-related security risks are lagging behind awareness at policy level. This policy brief provides insights into how donors can incentivize implementing organizations to further develop and apply these practical approaches. It recommends support that: (a) facilitates engagement between implementing organizations and local communities, and prioritizes local knowledge and solutions; (b) builds new partnerships between implementing organizations from both the environment or climate side and the security or peacebuilding side; (c) enables the sharing of good practices and lessons learned on how to address environment-related security risks at various levels; (d) promotes the inclusion and prioritization of environment–security links in country-level policies; and (e) is more flexible in implementation, as well as engages in long-term commitments and funding.
Topic:
Security, Development, Environment, Risk, and Donors
Political Geography:
Global Focus

212. The old is dying and the new cannot be born: A power audit of EU-Russia relations

Author:
Kadri Liik
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Policymakers across the EU agree Russia poses a multifaceted threat to their security. Europeans have responded quickly to the challenges posed by the war in Ukraine, but they lack a ‘theory of victory’. They have no shared view about how the conflict is likely to end. No single EU member state is guiding Russia policy; a ‘leaderless unity’ has emerged. This could provide the bloc with a form of dispersed strength – but a change in US leadership could expose the weakness of this situation. EU policymakers do not believe that Europeans have the means to bring about regime change in Russia; at the same time, they are unable to foresee a stable future relationship with a Putin-led Russia. Policymakers are uncertain how Russia’s war on Ukraine will affect their interaction with other parts of the world, including China and the global south. This could prevent Europeans from mounting a more effective global response. Europeans should re-examine the support they give to Russians fleeing the regime – emigrés represent an important connection to Russian society, which will be valuable whoever occupies the Kremlin.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

213. Unknown Knowns How the Bush Administration Traded Failure for Success in Iraq

Author:
David Cortright, George A. Lopez, and Alistair Millar
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Fourth Freedom Forum
Abstract:
This is the story of a road not taken, how the United States discarded a proven system of United Nations weapons inspections and multilateral sanctions and opted for an unnecessary war in Iraq. The saga of what happened twenty years ago may seem like ancient history to some, but many negative consequences are still evident. From the imposition of sanctions on Iraq in 1990 until the calamitous invasion in 2003, our research team produced a steady stream of reports and publications documenting the most significant policy failure by the United States since the Vietnam War.1 With the twentieth anniversary of the invasion approaching, it is time for a fresh look at those events to assess the strategic and ethical implications of the decisions made then and their relevance for today. George W. Bush was gripped by a messianic zeal to overthrow Saddam Hussein by force.2 The president and his advisers were determined to implement a policy of armed regime change regardless of all evidence, logic, or reason.3 The White House concocted a false narrative of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of a dictator with supposed links to al-Qaida.4 Bush ignored the unequivocal conclusion of the U.S. intelligence community that Iraq had nothing to do with either 9/11 or al-Qaida.5 The result of the administration’s campaign of deception was a costly war of choice that ended in “strategic defeat,” to cite the conclusion of the U.S. Army history of the war.6 Many studies have examined what went wrong in Iraq,7 but few have looked at the alternative security approaches that were available at the time. We examine those alternatives here to document that the war was unnecessary and to highlight the policy advantages of multilateral nonmilitary security strategies.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Multilateralism, Iraq War, and George W. Bush
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

214. Baluch Nationalist-Separatist Militant Alliance Threatens Pakistani Security Forces

Author:
Farhan Zahid
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Pakistan’s restive Baluchistan province has experienced a fresh wave of nationalist-separatist terrorist attacks since 2019, with new targets indicating shifting trends. Baluch nationalist–separatist militant groups have not only ramped up their attacks, but also have changed strategy and formed a new alliance. The implications of this are a steep incline in attacks against the Pakistani security forces.
Topic:
Security, Nationalism, Insurgency, Non State Actors, Islamism, and Separatism
Political Geography:
Pakistan and South Asia

215. Food Subsidy and the National Food Security Act

Author:
Jenny Susan John, Avani Kapur, and Mohammad Hamza Farooqui
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Centre for Policy Research, India
Abstract:
Food Subsidy is provided by the Government of India (GoI) for the supply and distribution of foodgrains and other essential commodities. The National Food Security Act (NFSA) 2013, ensured nutritional security became a right by providing adequate quantities of quality food at affordable prices to two-thirds of India’s population. Against the backdrop of the COVID-19 pandemic, this brief uses government data to analyse: Allocations, releases, and expenditures under Food Subsidy; Trends in storage/stocking, procurement and distribution of foodgrains; Coverage under NFSA; Trends in foodgrain allocation, offtake and distribution under the Pradhan Mantri Garib Kalyan Anna Yojana (PMGKAY); Status of adult malnutrition in India.
Topic:
Security, Food, Budget, COVID-19, and Subsidies
Political Geography:
South Asia and India

216. Thirty years of Visegrád Group

Author:
Ivan Iliev
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:
In February 1991, at a meeting of the Czechoslovak, Polish and Hungarian presidents, the decision to create an alliance of three Central European countries was made. In 1993, the division of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republics and the establishment of in 1335, attended by King of Bohemia, King of Hungary and King of Poland. Hundreds of years later, former Communist-bloc countries in Central Europe desired to overcome historical animosities between states and nations in this region, believing that joint efforts of relatively small countries would make their goals more achievable. The V4 was also established because post-Communist countries realized that they the independent Slovak Republic and the Czech Republic transformed the tripartite cooperation into a four-party alliance - V4. The name refers to a meeting, which took place near Budapest (at the castle in Visegrád), Hungary, could together boost the socio-economic transformation and join the European Union. Indeed, the V4 has accelerated cooperation and boosted the friendship among the Central European states throughout the years. Today, V4 is a regional structure of four EU and NATO member states that in general share similar economic, cultural and social values. V4 members recognize it as the alliance that strengthens the coordination mechanism to find similar positions on European policy, foreign policy, economic or cultural cooperation, and regional development. Visegrád Group, or shortly called the V4, marks 30 years of existence this year. This unique sort of cooperation has achieved some crucial goals but also failed in reaching cooperation on some EU topics. In the following lines, we will look at these achievements and failures, but will also explain where Visegrád is today and what should be done in order to make this alliance of Central European countries functioning better.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Europe, Poland, Hungary, and Czech Republic

217. The Era of German Chancellor Angela Merkel: What Was and What Remains?

Author:
Thomas Brey
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:
After the general election in Germany at the end of September, Angela Merkel will step down as Chancellor at the age of 67. She held this most important political office in Germany for almost exactly 16 years (2005-2021). She will thus equal the record of her former political mentor and Chancellor Helmut Kohl (1982- 1998). In 2021, she was named “Most PowerfulForbes for the tenth time in a row. In 2015, the US magazine Time named her “Person of the Year” on its cover. Merkel has received the highest state honors from Italy to Peru, from Portugal to Israel. In 2011, she was awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom - one of the two highest state decorations in the USA. The world’s honorary doctorates are legion. Merkel had a picture-perfect professional career, although by today’s standards she became politically active for the first time relatively late, at the age of 35. In the final phase of the GDR, she became involved in the opposition. As “Kohl’s girl” (“Kohls Mädchen”) she became Minister for Women’s Affairs as early as 1989, then Minister for the Environment (1994-1998), CDU General Secretary (1998-2000) and finally Party Chair (until 2018). She completed her studies in East Germany with a highly praised dissertation. When she became Chancellor in 2005, she was the first woman to hold the office and the first Chancellor from East Germany.
Topic:
Security, Governance, Hegemony, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Europe and Germany

218. Current State of Ukraine’s Play within the Geopolitical Map of Europe

Author:
Iuliia Osmolovska
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:
The beginning on November has been rich on worrysome developments in Eastern Europe and around Ukraine in particular. With reports of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) of continued and evergrowingnumberofceasefireviolationson the frontline in Donetsk and Lugansk regions - climbing to more than 750 daily on 12th and 13th November - satellite data on suspicious build-up of Russian forces near the Ukrainian border and respective US warning its EU allies of Russia’s potential invasion in Ukraine, migrant crisis on Polish-Belarussian border leading to aggressive land and aerial border patrol checks by joint Belarus and Russia military forces - the whole security landscape of Eastern Europe becomes ever more shaky and troublesome. Spiced up with undeclared energy war in Europe and Troyan Horse of Nord Stream 2, muscle stretching in the Black Sea, still-to-be-defined political configuration and policies of the new German government, turbulent presidential run-up France, everything leads to ideal mulled waters for perfect fishing. At first glance, all the mentioned presents rather gloomy picture of unfavorable setting, in which Ukraine has to operate nowadays. Russia seemingly has a tactical upper hand it its confrontation with the West and enjoys this advantage. Yet, this could be true, if we ignore some fundamental systemic changes. They are firmly shaping irreversibility of Ukraine’s pro- Western orientation and ever further steady integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures, thus leaving tiny fading prospect for potential return of Ukraine into Russian orbit of influence. Recent poll data demonstrate that 62% of Ukrainians support the country’s integration into the EU, while 58% support Ukraine’s membership in NATO. The number of Ukrainians, who see better guarantees in Ukraine’s membership in NATO has risen to 55% in 2020 (compared to 26% for neutral status and 5% for a military union with Russia and other CIS countries).
Topic:
Security, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

219. AUKUS Security Pact: Setting the Rivalry with China in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Krševan Antun Dujmović
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:
The announcement of the trilateral security pact between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, known by the acronym AUKUS, intended to enhance cooperation between the three countries in the Indo- Pacific region in defense and security, has sent shockwaves throughout the world, especially the UK for the Royal Navy of Australia. The nuclear fueled submarines will be armed by conventional weapons, the number of acquired vessels will be at least eight, and as a typically Australian request, part of the vessels will be constructed in Australia’s naval shipyards. So far, the US, the UK, Russia, China, France in China and Europe. The key element of the AUKUS pact, signed on 15th September 2021, is the acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines from the US and and India are the only six countries that have commissioned nuclear-powered submarines. Furthermore, before signing the AUKUS pact, the UK was the only country in the world with which the US was sharing the nuclear propulsion technology, under the Mutual Defense Agreement signed back in 1958. The supply of Australia with British and American nuclear-powered attack submarines, as the most delicate part of the AUKUS pact, attracted by far the most of media attention and provoked China’s aggressive reaction. Even more, the three nations security pact, which is in principal intended to bring “enhanced trilateral security partnership for the 21st century”, has made Beijing particularly worried as China fears that this triple alliance is pointed directly against it. The three countries intend to step up their cooperation in the security and defense sector, and apart from cooperation in industrial production of new military equipment, AUKUS also envisages a broad cooperation in the fields where the three countries feel particularly threatened by China’s staggering growth, and they include cyber security, quantum computing and artificial intelligence.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Alliance, Conflict, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
United States, China, United Kingdom, Europe, Asia, Australia, North America, and Indo-Pacific

220. Pugwash Note on Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone

Author:
Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
Abstract:
Denuclearization of Korean Peninsula is one of the most important security issues that the countries in the region, including the US, will face. Given the ongoing development of nuclear and missile programs in Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and increasing tensions between nuclear weapon countries (US, Russia and China) in the region, it is critically important to reduce risk of nuclear war in the region and to find a way to resolve a current deadlock in negotiations between DPRK and the US for denuclearization of Korean Peninsula. This paper proposes a comprehensive approach to peace and stability in the region as well as a phased denuclearization of Korean Peninsula and eventually establishing Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) in the region
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Korean Peninsula

221. Pugwash Note on Nuclear Arms Control and Disarmament

Author:
Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
Abstract:
In early 2021 there is every reason to say that the global arms control and disarmament process, despite earlier achievements, has reached a critical point. The complete or de facto demise of key arms control treaties (such as the ABM Treaty, the CFE Treaty, and the INF Treaty) has left a vacuum in the arms control architecture, thus triggering new challenges for crises and global stability. The Open Skies Treaty is facing an existential threat. The Chemical Weapons Convention is also in a difficult situation, particularly in relation to the Syrian problem and the alleged poisoning of certain Russian personalities. The CTBT, concluded 25 years ago, is shamefully not yet in force. The only existing arms control treaty between the US and Russia is now New START, which was due to expire on 5 February 2021 since its renewal had proved to be impossible under the Trump Administration. But now it is well-known that the prospects for this treaty are much better (see below). The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is also under serious threat. And this is not only just because of the poor situation with respect to the implementation of Article VI which requires “each of the parties to pursue negotiations in good faith on measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control”. There are also some unresolved crisis situations: a very important one is around the Iranian nuclear deal (JCPOA), and more generally about the issue of the creation of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East (see On the Iran Nuclear Agreement and Middle East Security, December 2020). Moreover, there is the very critical situation on the Korean Peninsula and the problem of creating a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Northeast Asia (see Note on Northeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, January 2021). On the other hand, imminent extension of the New START Treaty will be a very positive signal, including for the NPT Review Conference. Pugwash also welcomes very much the entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons on 22 January 2021 (see Pugwash Note on the Entry into Force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, 21 January 2021). But it is also clear that, for some time to come, it will have to exist without any of the states which possess nuclear weapons (or even those that host American nuclear weapons), and more generally probably without any state allied to a nuclear-weapon state. This situation could generate another line of tension within the NPT. As a result, the NPT Review Conference, now rescheduled for August 2021, will be very relevant and care should be exercised in order to avoid concerning results.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Global Focus

222. Iraq’s National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism

Author:
Kamaran Palani
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Middle East Research Institute (MERI)
Abstract:
Four years after the military defeat of the so-called Islamic State, pre-existing conditions associated with the risk of violent extremism continue unabated in Iraq. The current national strategy to counter violent extremism needs a comprehensive revision to include the context, needs and realities of the country’s different regions.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Violent Extremism, Counter-terrorism, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Iraq and Middle East

223. Teaching the WPS Agenda in a Changing Security Landscape: Women, Peace and Security Curriculum Consortium

Author:
Erin Cooper
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Our Secure Future
Abstract:
UN Security Council Resolution 1325 was unanimously supported in 2000. Twenty years in, even with such broad ranging support, progress towards the goals of Women, Peace and Security (WPS) has been slower than expected. In Canada and the United States, there is a legal mandate to incorporate Women, Peace and Security in the military and civil service sector, but implementation has been met with many challenges. Trainings and educational programs on WPS are created in silos such as academia, military, government, etc., and are often ad hoc. WPS and gender-based analysis must be mainstreamed throughout the entirety of the defense sector. Professional military education (PME) was identified as a key area to target to ensure a broader knowledge base and application of the WPS agenda. Key Findings: Introduce gender analysis/gender-based analysis plus (GBA+) early in the career of military and civil service members, treating it as a core capacity integrated throughout all levels and aspects of training and education; Start with the gender assessment of a situation to mainstream gender at the beginning of a decision-making or project design process; Integrate gender analysis/GBA+ and the WPS framework in operational military planning and training scenarios as taught by PME; Prioritize cross-pollination between PME, academic institutions, and policymakers for successful integration across the field; “real-world” applications, curriculum design, terminology/vocabulary, research, and theory should all inform each other; Ensure frequent consultation with civil society to design, monitor, and evaluate implementation of strategy and commitments; Professionalize the field with regular convenings and budget support that demonstrate institutional commitment to gender analysis/GBA+ and integration.
Topic:
Security, Armed Forces, WPS, Civil Servants, and Gender
Political Geography:
Global Focus

224. Busting myths about KSF transition into a defence force

Author:
Florian Qehaja and Ramadan Ilazi
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:
It has been close to three years since Kosovo’s institutions moved forward with the decision to start the process of transition of the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) from a disaster relief mandate into a defence force. However, this move by the Kosovo’s leadership driven by massive public support was viewed with scepticism by some of the traditional allies of the country who feared that the decision would lead to instability. So, did the instability occur as a result of this decision? A short answer is - no. Looking back at the process, it is clear that the consequences some feared of the transition of the KSF into a defence force for Kosovo were exaggerated - to say the least - and it seems the decision was, nothing less or more than a regular technocratic move of the Kosovan institutions. Some, might even argue that actually the process of transition of the KSF mandate has helped societal cohesion in Kosovo and as such strengthened stability of the country. In other words, fearmongering discourse about the KSF transition showed to be ungrounded and the decision proved more benefits than expected to date.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and Armed Forces
Political Geography:
Eastern Europe and Kosovo

225. The Biden Agenda: How the new administration can help Western Balkans out of stagnation

Author:
Muhamet Brajshori
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:
President Biden’s administration has shown signs of seeking to focus in the region by having a nor-mative-based policy in place to addresses issues that empower the region and help the region by undertaking reforms and making progress on Euro-Atlantic integration. One of the main aspects of this re-engagement will be the sensitive political issues that hold the region in deadlocks, such as the complicated relations between Kosovo and Serbia, and the risk that Bosnia and Herzegovina will turn into a totally failed state in the heart of Europe. A key element of Washington’s engagement will be closer coordination with European allies to complete the remaining open issues in the Western Balkans. But the challenges are immense and the expectations are high.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Regional Integration, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:
Eastern Europe, Kosovo, Serbia, Balkans, United States of America, and Bosnia and Herzegovina

226. Addressing Needs, Promoting Peace: A Proposal for an International Incentives Package for Israeli-Palestinian Peace

Author:
Lior Lehrs, Moien Odeh, Nimrod Goren, and Huda Abu Arqoub
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
Abstract:
peace processes and have the potential to contribute to the advancement of Israeli-Palestinian conflict resolution. A team of Israeli and Palestinian policy experts developed a joint proposal for an international package of incentives for peace. The proposal defines the central needs of the parties that the incentives package must address, focusing on security, recognition and legitimacy, religious rights, economic prosperity and domestic needs. It examines which international actors can be relevant in addressing those needs and should be part of an international incentives package, elaborating on the potential role of the US, the EU, and the Arab and the Muslim world. The proposal also discusses when and how a package of incentives should be introduced and delivered, and what should be the international mechanism required to promote it.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, European Union, Peace, and Incentives
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and United States of America

227. Mexico's First Women, Peace and Security National Action Plan: An Assessment

Author:
Daniela Philipson García and Ana Velasco Ugalde
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Women In International Security (WIIS)
Abstract:
On January 11, 2021, the Mexican government presented its first National Action Plan (NAP) on Women, Peace and Security (WPS).1 The NAP is part of Mexico’s feminist foreign policy, launched in January 2020, and it is a joint effort of the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs, the Secretariat of Defense (which encompasses the Army and the Air Force), the Secretariat of the Navy, the Secretariat of Security and Citizen Protection and the National Institute for Women (INMUJERES). An interagency group is responsible for coordination, monitoring and evaluation of the NAP, which is subject to an overall review in 2024. In this policy brief, we analyze Mexico’s NAP and make three arguments. First, NAPs are not only relevant for a country’s foreign policy and international engagements but are also significant for a country’s domestic security. Unfortunately, Mexico’s NAP is almost exclusively outward focused and does little to address Mexico’s own security challenges and their impact on women, LGBTQ and nonbinary persons. Second, we argue that the NAP’s outward-facing objectives are limited to a Western format that overlooks local contexts. Third, the most effective NAPs are those that have active civil society engagement. We therefore advocate for a formal, institutionalized and expanded role for Mexican civil society organizations. We conclude with recommendations for the Mexican government and civil society organizations and sketch what a more innovative and inclusive NAP could look like.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Women, LGBT+, Peace, WPS, and Civil Society Organizations
Political Geography:
Mexico

228. Reflections on Success Hope for a Women, Peace and Security Future

Author:
Molly Hamilton
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:
By interweaving an analysis of the achievements with reflections from Women, Peace and Security (WPS) giants, this Policy and Practice Brief (PPB) seeks to flip the narrative around by focusing on the achievements in advancing and promoting women’s participation in peace processes, and highlighting all the reasons to celebrate the advances in the WPS agenda.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Women, Peace, and WPS
Political Geography:
Africa

229. Northeast Asia Defense Transparency Index 2020-21

Author:
M. Patrick Hulme and Tai Ming Cheung
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
Abstract:
Growing distrust in East Asia, especially in the security arena, is increasingly critical as new and long-standing hotspots— including the Taiwan strait, Korean peninsula, East China Sea, and South China Sea—become more volatile. The need for confidence-building measures is clear, and a central tool of confidence building is defense transparency. The Defense Transparency Index (DTI), a project of the University of California’s Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, ranks six countries on their efforts to promote transparency in defense and national security, including the People’s Republic of China, Japan, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), the Republic of Korea, and the major external powers most involved in the region—the United States and Russia.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Geopolitics, and Transparency
Political Geography:
Russia, Japan, Taiwan, East Asia, Asia, North Korea, Korea, East China, and United States of America

230. At the Nexus of Participation and Protection: Protection-Related Barriers to Women’s Participation in Northern Ireland

Author:
Catherine Turner and Aisling Swaine
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Peace Institute
Abstract:
The protection of women in armed conflict and their participation in peace and security activities are central pillars of the women, peace, and security (WPS) agenda. Overall, however, the WPS agenda has overlooked the relationship between participation and protection. This perpetuates a false binary between the participation of women as leaders with agency and the protection of women as victims of conflict. It also misses the gendered, context-specific, and conflict-related protection risks that accompany women’s participation. Finally, it overlooks the critical link between the harms women experience and their low levels of representation. This paper considers the intersection between women’s participation and protection in the context of Northern Ireland. While often assumed to be free of “global policy” concerns such as WPS, Northern Ireland starkly illustrates the intrinsic connections and tensions between women’s leadership and protection in conflict and post-conflict situations. After providing an overview of these connections and tensions more broadly, this paper examines the participation and protection of women in Northern Ireland since the 1998 Good Friday Agreement. It draws from twenty-five semi-structured interviews with women in leadership positions in Northern Ireland. The paper concludes that gender inequalities and gendered insecurities intersect with sectarianism, the legacy of violence, and political crises arising from power-sharing arrangements under the peace agreement. These, in turn, intersect with emerging technologies such as social media to stymy women’s participation across all areas of post-conflict political life. While these findings underscore the continued relevance of the WPS agenda, they also signify that deeper engagement with gendered protection issues is required if the agenda is to substantively advance women’s equality and participation in the longer term.
Topic:
Security, Gender Issues, Women, and Peace
Political Geography:
Europe and Northern Ireland

231. Women, Peace, and Security Mandates for UN Peacekeeping Operations: Assessing Influence and Impact

Author:
Lisa Sharland
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Peace Institute
Abstract:
Peacekeeping mission mandates now routinely include language on women, peace, and security (WPS). Despite this progress, negotiations in the Security Council on the inclusion of WPS language in mandates have at times been contested, and it is not always clear that more detailed or “stronger” language on WPS in mandates translates to changes in peacekeeping missions. The language included in mandates can even perpetuate stereotypes, including the assumption that every uniformed woman is responsible for implementing a mission’s WPS mandate. This paper explores the different elements of the WPS agenda that are included in peacekeeping mandates, assesses the factors that influence the inclusion of language on WPS, examines the drivers behind the implementation of the WPS agenda in the field, and assesses the impact that mandate language has on uniformed women peacekeepers. It concludes by considering how the Security Council and other stakeholders could advance the WPS agenda through mission mandates, including by: Proposing WPS language early in the Security Council’s mandating process; Facilitating engagement between country experts and WPS experts in member states’ permanent missions to the UN; Using informal consultations to understand the needs of women affected by conflict; Including language in mandates that reflects the contributions of both women and men to operational effectiveness; and Ensuring that approaches to WPS in the Security Council consider the full spectrum of gender.
Topic:
Security, United Nations, Women, Conflict, Peace, and UN Security Council
Political Geography:
Global Focus

232. Perceptions and Lived Realities of Women Police Officers in UN Peace Operations

Author:
Liezelle Kumalo
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Peace Institute
Abstract:
Over the past decade, the UN has undertaken several initiatives to increase the number of women police officers deployed to peace operations. Collectively, these initiatives have increased the proportion of women police officers deployed to UN missions. However, women police still face challenges deploying to missions and effectively contributing to mission mandates. This paper interrogates the experiences, concerns, and needs of women police officers deployed to UN peace operations. First, it analyzes progress on including more women in UN police forces. Second, it provides arguments for including more women police officers. Third, it describes the multifaceted challenges that women police officers face both before and during deployment. Finally, it provides recommendations for how police-contributing countries (PCCs) and the UN can move toward a shared, sustainable approach to the full, equal, and meaningful participation of women police officers in peacekeeping. While the UN often argues for deploying more women peacekeepers because they will increase missions’ operational performance, this rationale risks reinforcing some of these challenges by perpetuating stereotypes about the role of women in missions. Missions should instead focus on women police officers’ right to deploy. To ensure women have this right, both PCCs and missions need to foster an enabling working environment and address structural barriers to women’s participation.
Topic:
Security, United Nations, Peacekeeping, Women, Peace, and Police
Political Geography:
Global Focus

233. Elevating the Australia-Japan Strategic Partnership to “a new level”: challenges and responses

Author:
Thomas S. Wilkins
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Japan Institute Of International Affairs (JIIA)
Abstract:
In November of 2020, Australian Prime Minster Scott Morrison was the first head of government to physically visit Japan to meet with his new counterpart Yoshihide Suga since the latter’s assumption of office for the annual summit meeting of their bilateral strategic partnership. Commentators were surprised that Mr Morrison would travel internationally in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, but his determination to do so, enduring quarantine measures upon his return, was indicative of the high value that Australia ascribes to its “Special Strategic Partnership” with Japan. At a time of simmering strategic rivalr y in the Indo-Pacific region, Canberra places a premium on its close collaborative relationship with Tokyo, as both countries confront similar challenges in navigating the turbulent and unstable regional environment. It is in this context they affirmed their intent ‘to elevate bilateral security and defence cooperation under the Special Strategic Partnership to a new level.
Topic:
Security, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, Australia, and Oceania

234. NATO's Eastern Flank: Retooling the US-Baltic Security Link

Author:
Andris Banka
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
In recent years NATO has markedly increased its presence in the Baltic states. Relatively “light”, yet highly diverse multinational forces have been placed across the Alliance’s frontline with an underly- ing objective: to deter Russia. In this effort, the United States has served as a critical ballast. The Pentagon has directed sophisticated military exercises and rotated US service members throughout the region. These mea- sures, however, often did not align with US President Donald Trump’s spoken words nor written tweets. This obvious dichotomy disoriented Allied governments and shook bedrock assumptions about US security commitments. As political power changes hands in Washington, this lends an opportunity for a retooling of the transatlantic partnership. Domestically, incoming US President Joe Biden ran on the platform “Build Back Better”. In the spirit of that slogan, this Policy Brief lays out policy cor- rectives that both sides of the Atlantic could pursue to strengthen the US-Baltic security link.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

235. Policy Papers by Women of Color: A New Normal: Redefining National Security Beyond 2020

Author:
Maritza T. Adonis, Heather Ashby, Amber A. Demery, Heather Yang Hwalek, and Pratima T. Narayan
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Women of Color Advancing Peace, Security and Conflict Transformation (WCAPS)
Abstract:
It is with great pleasure that I bring you the latest edition of the Women of Color Advancing Peace, Security, and Conflict Transformation (WCAPS) Policy Papers. Looking back to when we began the WCAPS publications, the original goal was to highlight the expertise and the viewpoints of women of color on issues of peace, security, conflict transformation, and foreign policy. It was also to open the door to an opportunity for women of color to be published. What I have observed during my many years in Washington is that it is often challenging for women of color to be published. Many times, I have been asked “how do I get published,” in a space that has left out many women of color. One of the goals of WCAPS is to open doors for women of color that have been closed before. I wanted to ensure we are represented in all the different forums of policy change that exist. I was happy when we began to work on our first publications in 2019 that led to three simultaneous publications in February 2020. Since that time, we not only published the Policy Papers by Women of Color as an ongoing policy journal, but reports, op-ed, statements, and many other articles by WCAPS members. I am happy to see our members now being sought for writing and publications in the fields of peace, security, conflict transformation, and foreign policy. In so many ways, WCAPS is becoming an organization increasingly relied upon to provide authors, as well as experts, panelists, mentors, speakers, and more. WCAPS is also sought after for its members to join other organizations, and WCAPS members are increasingly in positions and roles that were not previously open to young girls and women of color. Once again, WCAPS and women of color are leading the way. We will continue to do so.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, National Security, Women, Feminism, Peace, WPS, Girls, and Women of Color
Political Geography:
Global Focus

236. Providing security in Iraq - what do Iraqis think?

Author:
Maria-Louise Clausen
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Denmark assumed leadership of NATO Mission Iraq in late 2020. The Iraqi people’s perceptions of their personal security and of those who provide it can impact the success of this mission. A recent survey provides new insights. At a time of political turmoil and insecurity in Iraq, NATO has vowed to step up its commitment in the region. This happens at a time of increased resistance to the US presence in Iraq, and a deteriorating security situation due to the escalation of the conflict between the US and Iran taking place on Iraqi soil, as well as signs of an Islamic State resurgence. Security is a major concern in Iraq. When respondents were asked to select their most important concern for the Iraqi government to address, the most common choice was ‘maintaining security and stability’ (30.5%), closely followed by the job situation (27.5%), and corruption (26.2%). This should be read in conjunction with the fact that 71.7% of respondents stated that they experience their personal security as currently either only partially or not at all ensured. This was most pronounced among the surveyed Shias, with only 18.8% indicating that they feel fully or partly secure in contrast to 46.7% of Sunni respondents.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Democratization, Diplomacy, International Organization, Non State Actors, Fragile States, Violence, Peace, Police, and Justice
Political Geography:
Iraq, Europe, Middle East, and Denmark

237. Trying to govern the ungovernable: International Law on cyber and information operations in Russian

Author:
Asbjørn Thranov and Flemming Splidsboel Hansen
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Russia has proposed an international regime governing the use of cyber and information operations. However, ‘digital sovereignty’ means something very different in Moscow than it does in Washington. In September 2020, the Russian authorities launched a new initiative to regulate the use of cyber and information operations by states. The Russian President, Vladimir Putin, introduced the debate by suggesting that Russia and the USA lead the way by signing a bilateral agreement restricting their activities in the field of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs). The two states, so Putin suggested, should establish regular dialogue and set up a ‘hot line’. Putin also proposed a new agreement on cyber and information operations that should ‘exchange guarantees against interference in the internal affairs of the other side, including into electoral processes, inter alia, by means of the ICTs and high-tech methods’. Shortly afterwards, the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, added more details. In a statement, he drew a dark picture of the world ‘facing a real cyber pandemic’, pointing to the risk of cyber attacks against critical infrastructure and the interference by some states in the internal affairs of other states. ‘It is high time’, so he claimed, that the international community agreed on a regime to regulate the use of ICTs. Russia has proceeded to promote the new initiative at the current 75th session of the UN General Assembly, which has responded with a decision to renew the mandate of the open-ended working group on the security and use of ICTs in 2021-2025.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, International Organization, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Internet, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America

238. To Beat China On Tech In Emerging Markets, Learn From It: Competing with China on 5G and future technologies

Author:
Luke Patey
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Recommendations: The US, South Korea, Japan, and the EU can pool resources to level the playing field with China and offer new finance options for developing countries seeking to upgrade their communications and technology infrastructure. The US should look to the India and Vietnam model and help other nations develop domestic capacities that lower dependencies on Huawei and other foreign tech providers over time. Open RAN is no silver bullet to compete with China. Its potential will only be fully realized in the mid and long run, after high integration costs, security gaps, and other problems are worked out.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Development, Politics, Science and Technology, Power Politics, Economy, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

239. Small states’ security strategies need an international energy dimension: What can be learned from the Danish Nord Stream and Baltic Pipe negotiations?

Author:
Trine Villumsen Berling
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Denmark encountered a number of unforeseen obstacles when negotiating the Nord Stream and Baltic Pipe gas pipelines, and the country ended up standing exposed and alone. A better politics of energy alliances and better strategic preparation are key lessons for small states like Denmark when dealing with the problematic combination of security and energy. RECOMMENDATIONS: Small states should include energy in strategic documents pertaining to foreign and security policies, as energy is a tool in the security toolbox of the great powers. Self-sufficiency in energy does not mean that a country is shielded from the dynamics of international energy. Small states should strive to build enduring political alliances focused on energy. Small states should prioritise sending experts to the NATO Centre of Excellence for Energy Security in order to stay on top of the international security situation concerning energy.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Energy Policy, Environment, Oil, Natural Resources, European Union, Gas, and Minerals
Political Geography:
Europe, Denmark, and Baltic States

240. Making women count, not just counting women: Creating a more effective security sector in Iraq requires increased inclusiveness

Author:
Maria-Louise Clausen and Ekatherina Zhukova
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
A priority for NATO Mission Iraq is to further the Women, Peace and Security agenda as one of the mission’s activities. This effort should focus on raising awareness of the operational benefits of equal opportunities and diversity and not just counting the number of women involved. RECOMMENDATIONS: Formulate a clear mandate for WPS functions in the mission that positions the WPS agenda as an integral element of NMI’s other activities. Support awareness-raising programmes and initiatives to transform social norms, including patriarchal gender norms and institutional socio-political constraints on female participation. Support the transparent qualifications-based recruitment and employment of women and prioritize the focus on inclusive work environments, both mentally and physically. Incorporate intersectional and masculinity perspectives in the work on WPS to avoid creating an image of WPS as a foreign-backed agenda that is only of, by and for elite women.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Democratization, Diplomacy, International Organization, Non State Actors, Women, Fragile States, Violence, Peace, Police, and Justice
Political Geography:
Iraq and Middle East

241. Risks of technology use in humanitarian settings: Avoiding harm, delivering impact

Author:
Adam Moe Fejerskov, Maria-Louise Clausen, and Sarah Seddig
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
The use of emerging technology in humanitarian settings carries significant risks. The complexity of these risks entails a need to understand and imagine risks beyond those commonly associated with a particular technology, field, or implementing organization. Recommendations: Apply an extensive interpretation of what risks may look like, where, when, for whom, and how they might occur. The indiscernible nature of risks related to technology use means identifying or imagining these moves beyond existing organizational experiences. Recognize that technology-related risks can emerge across the data chain and are not only relevant for engineering or operational staff.
Topic:
Security, Democratization, Development, Migration, Poverty, Science and Technology, Capitalism, Inequality, Conflict, Borders, Violence, and Peace
Political Geography:
Global Focus

242. What to do about China? Forging a compromise between the US and Europe in NATO

Author:
Mikkel Runge Olesen
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
The Biden administration is likely to adopt a less chaotic US approach to the NATO alliance concerning China. European members should utilize this calmer time to develop viable strategies on how to tackle non-conventional threats from China within the Alliance in concert with the US. RECOMMENDATIONS: NATO members should: Continue to develop their own strategies and procedures against non-conventional Chinese threats in the domains of cyber, influence activities, and trade and investments. Resist the temptation to fall into inertia in determining how NATO should deal with China after the fear of a US withdrawal from NATO has subsided. Work with the Biden administration to develop NATO’s role in relation to China further on grounds that are acceptable on both sides of the Atlantic.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, and International Organization
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Denmark, and United States of America

243. Nuclear submarines and central heating: What Russia wants in the Arctic

Author:
Flemming Splidsboel Hansen
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
A survey of current Russian strategies and military thinking about the Arctic points to clear separate military and development goals. Leading Russian military commentators usually include both in their analyses, often highlighting the softer development aspect of security. Moreover, much of the military writing identifies broad possibilities for international co-operation in the Arctic. Key findings Russian military commentators usually insist that all relevant actors need to act with care to avoid a deterioration of the situation in the Arctic. Russian military writing contains a strong focus on the development of the Russian Arctic. Russian military writing identifies broad possibilities for co-operation in both the military and civilian fields.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Climate Change, Diplomacy, Environment, International Organization, Oil, Power Politics, Gas, and Minerals
Political Geography:
Russia and Arctic

244. European strategic autonomy: From misconceived to useful concept what can we learn from the Northern outlook?

Author:
Christine Nissen and Jessica Larsen
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
The concept of ‘European strategic autonomy’ is girdled by myths and resistance. These common misconceptions can be overcome by member states to strengthen the EU in the face of today’s challenging security environment. RECOMMENDATIONS: Ways forward for the concept of strategic autonomy: Level of ambition: strategic autonomy should not be seen as an end in itself but as a means to protect and promote common values and interests across strategically important EU policy areas. Geography: strategic autonomy should enable the EU to undertake activities, in particular in the immediate European neighbourhood. Policy scope: strategic autonomy should encompass the entire spectrum of foreign and security policy, and not just defence.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, International Organization, European Union, and Strategic Autonomy
Political Geography:
Europe and Denmark

245. Greenland’s minerals to consolidate China’s rare earth dominance? No green future without China

Author:
Per Kalvig and Hans Lucht
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Rare earth elements (REEs) are vital for communications, the green energy transition and defense, but are produced almost exclusively in China. As the projected REE mines in southern Greenland inch closer to realization, Denmark and its EU partners remain sidelined from future supply chains for raw materials. Key findings: Rare earth elements (REEs) are vital to daily life, communications, green energy and defense. Yet, REEs and products containing REEs are almost exclusively controlled and produced by China. Significant long-term strategic state or supra-state support is required to challenge Chinese dominance of the REE sector and reduce the vulnerability of European and American energy supplies. In the absence of REE industries in Europe or America, the two REE projects in South Greenland, with their potential to become significant suppliers of REE, will most likely supply Chinese-controlled raw materials industries.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Climate Change, Environment, Oil, Power Politics, Gas, Minerals, and Rare earth elements (REEs)
Political Geography:
China, Denmark, Greenland, Arctic, and United States of America

246. The Geopolitics of Renewable Hydrogen

Author:
Nicola De Blasio and Fridolin Pflugmann
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
The transition to a low-carbon energy system will likely shake up the geopolitical status quo that has governed global energy systems for over a century. Policymakers need to rethink the role their country could play in a new energy world. Renewables are widely perceived as an opportunity to shatter the hegemony of fossil fuel-rich states and democratize the energy landscape. Virtually all countries have access to some renewable energy resources (especially solar and wind power) and could thus substitute foreign supply with local resources. Our research shows, however, that the role countries are likely to assume in decarbonized energy systems will be based not only on their resource endowment but also on their policy choices. Renewable hydrogen is enjoying growing political and commercial momentum as a versatile and sustainable energy carrier with the potential to play a key role in the global transition to a low-carbon economy; and it is often described as the ‘missing link’ in global decarbonization—especially for energy intensive sectors where emissions are hard to abate and electrification is not the preferred solution, such as steel production, high-temperature industrial heat, shipping, aviation, and heat for buildings. But making renewable hydrogen a significant part of the world’s future energy mix will require defining new and innovative national and international policies while developing appropriate market structures aimed at spurring innovation along value chains; scaling technologies while significantly reducing costs; and deploying enabling infrastructure at scale. Success is possible, but this transformational effort will require close coordination between policy, technology, capital, and society to avoid falling into the traps and inefficiencies of the past. Renewable hydrogen can be used for both mobility and stationary applications. As a sustainable mobility energy carrier, it can power fuel-cell electric vehicles or be the base for synthetic fuels. In stationary applications, it can be used to store renewable energy, both at utility scale or off-grid, providing backup to intermittent renewable energy sources and serving as a carbon-free heating source. From a geopolitical perspective, whether future renewable hydrogen energy systems will be as concentrated as today’s oil and gas supply or decentralized like renewables is strongly related to future market structures, technology, and enabling infrastructure availability.
Topic:
Security, Energy Policy, Science and Technology, Geopolitics, Renewable Energy, and Hydrogen
Political Geography:
Global Focus

247. China: The Renewable Hydrogen Superpower?

Author:
Nicola De Blasio and Fridolin Pflugmann
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
President Xi Jinping’s pledge during the 2020 United Nations General Assembly, that China would reach peak carbon dioxide emissions by 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality before 2060, is a significant step in the fight against climate change. Since China is the world’s top contributor of greenhouse gases, there is no doubt that Beijing needs to be front and center of any effort to curb global emissions. In 2019, China accounted for almost 30 percent of global emissions, about twice as much as the second largest emitter, the United States.1 But while U.S. emissions have been on an overall decline since 2007,2 China’s have increased, raising concerns over whether Beijing can actually deliver on its targets. This reality should not distract from the fact that China is also the world’s top developer of renewables and other clean energy technologies. For example, China was the world’s largest installer of photovoltaics (PV) by 2013 and, in less than two years, also became the global leader in solar module manufacturing. At the same time, China leveraged its industrial might and economies of scale to drive down modules’ costs—which, by the end of 2018, were 90 percent lower than only ten years before. In this context, renewable hydrogen could significantly accelerate China’s transition to a low-carbon economy, increasing the likelihood of meeting its carbon neutrality goal. Renewable hydrogen offers significant advantages for China. It can help Beijing meet its climate and pollution goals—at a time when coal continues to dominate—while avoiding increased reliance on imported fuels. As a readily dispatchable means of storing energy, hydrogen can help to address intermittency and curtailment issues as renewable energy increases its share of China’s energy mix. As a sustainable mobility energy carrier, it can power fuel-cell electric vehicles or be the base for synthetic fuels. Finally, renewable hydrogen can open new avenues for developing clean technology manufactured goods for both internal and export markets. Today, most of China’s hydrogen is produced from coal via 1,000 gasifiers, accounting for 5% of the country’s total coal consumption. Hydrogen costs vary significantly as a function of production technology and prices of fossil fuels and electricity. Production from coal remains the lowest cost option: about 30 percent cheaper than hydrogen from natural gas. Therefore, reducing the carbon footprint of coal-based hydrogen will be critical in a low-carbon economy. In the medium term, coal-based hydrogen with carbon capture, utilization and storage will likely remain China’s lowest-cost clean hydrogen production pathway. Hence, the underlying question is whether Beijing will prioritize cost considerations or put its full industrial might behind the development and deployment of renewable hydrogen. In March 2019, the Chinese government took a significant step forward by announcing measures to promote the construction of hydrogen facilities for new energy vehicles. Wan Gang, who is known as China’s “father of the electric car,” called for China to “look into establishing a hydrogen society” and “move further toward fuel cells.”3 Given that Gang made a similar call two decades ago on vehicle electrification, which played a key role in China’s current battery electric vehicles market dominance, close attention is warranted.
Topic:
Security, Energy Policy, Environment, Natural Resources, Renewable Energy, and Hydrogen
Political Geography:
China and Asia-Pacific

248. Multilayered Challenges: Why are foreign oil companies planning to leave Iraq?

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
Numerous foreign oil companies have recently announced plans to sell their shares in several major oil fields in Iraq, as part of measures that may negatively impact Iraqi oil production. There are multiple explanations for this step, including unstable security and political conditions as well as Iraq's failure to pay foreign companies their dues for operating the fields, in addition to the growing Chinese influence in the oil sector.
Topic:
Security, Oil, and Business
Political Geography:
China, Iraq, and Middle East

249. A Spiraling Crisis: The different scenarios of Ethiopia’s civil war amid Tigray’s military advancement

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
Over the past nine months, Ethiopia has been reeling under a civil war that broke out between the federal government and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF). The conflict, however, saw two important developments, with the first being that the war has spilled over the region’s border into Amhara and Afar. The second development is that Addis Ababa refused to allow corridors via Sudan for humanitarian aid bound for Tigray Region. Addis Ababa took this stand despite the United Nation’s warning that 400,000 people are left on the verge of famine in the beleaguered region and that 90 per cent of the population need lifesaving food aid.
Topic:
Security, Civil War, Military Affairs, Crisis Management, and Humanitarian Crisis
Political Geography:
Africa, Ethiopia, and Tigray

250. Russian energy and grand strategy

Author:
Jakub M. Godzimirski
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
This Policy Brief presents the most recent data on the performance of the Russian energy sector and discusses its strategic importance in the current setting.
Topic:
Security, Energy Policy, and Grand Strategy
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

251. Rethinking U.S. Efforts on Counterterrorism: Toward a Sustainable Plan Two Decades After 9/11

Author:
Matthew Levitt
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
In the sixth in a series of TRANSITION 2021 memos examining the Middle East and North Africa, Matthew Levitt reimagines the U.S. counterterrorism enterprise with a view to its long-term sustainability. Since the September 11 attacks, Washington has poured funding into a largely military-led response to terrorism, but today both Democrats and Republicans stress the need to end “forever” wars, focus limited resources on protecting the homeland, and lean more on foreign partners to address terrorism in their neighborhoods. Yet any shift in posture must seek a maximum return on the twenty-year U.S. investment in counterter­rorism while also keeping up with terrorists’ exploitation of new technologies, from drones to encrypted communication to social media. This will require finding areas of policy overlap between counterterrorism and Great Power competition, and disentangling U.S. counterterrorism budgets from the military budgets on which they have been grafted over the past two decades. More broadly, the author explains, “convincing partners to share more of the counterterrorism burden will require that Washington repair its damaged credibility and demonstrate the staying power to meet its alliance commitments.” In the coming weeks, TRANSITION 2021 memos by Washington Institute experts will address the broad array of issues facing the Biden-Harris administration in the Middle East. These range from thematic issues, such as the region’s strategic position in the context of Great Power competition and how to most effectively elevate human rights and democracy in Middle East policy, to more discrete topics, from Arab-Israel peace diplomacy to Red Sea security to challenges and opportunities in northwest Africa. Taken as a whole, this series of memos will present a comprehensive approach for advancing U.S. interests in security and peace in this vital but volatile region.
Topic:
Security, Military Affairs, Counter-terrorism, Military Spending, and 9/11
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

252. Sustained Counterterrorism Efforts Remain Key to Preventing Attacks in Jordan

Author:
Saud Al-Sharafat
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
The pandemic has not ended terrorism in Jordan, and ISIS is still a significant threat. Last year’s abnormally low terrorist activity in Jordan could be interpreted as an indication that the threat of ISIS in the country has diminished significantly. Unfortunately, this is not the case; while there are several explanations for the low occurrence of terrorist attacks in Jordan in 2020, none of them point to a future in which ISIS does not continue to pose a threat to Jordanian security. On the contrary, the decrease in ISIS activity in Jordan last year was primarily a result of effective counterterrorism efforts, not the special circumstances of the pandemic or any other factor. Accordingly, Jordanian anti-terror institutions should not relax their guard. Rather, they should capitalize on their successes, expanding cooperation with their partners and enhancing their resources in combatting extremism. Jordanian security forces should be especially concerned with activities along their borders. There have been several recent international and UN reports that confirmed the rising activities of terrorist groups in countries that border Jordan. Iraq in particular has seen a recent rise in terrorist attacks, including two suicide bombings in Baghdad on January 21, 2021 that killed 32 people and injured 110 others. ISIS claimed responsibility for the attacks. In turn, ISIS's mounting activities in Iraq have led to increased terrorist activity in the Badia al-Sham region and the Jordanian Syrian-Iraqi border triangle, where terrorist militants move in small, highly mobile groups. This increase in activity has prompted Jordanian security forces to strengthen their presence on the borders with Iraq and Syria. Following a Russian air campaign in the Badia region in late February, in which Russian planes launched at least 130 air strikes in one day against terrorist groups in the area, Jordan started to strengthen and tightened its security presence on the borders to prevent infiltration of ISIS elements into Jordan. Russian strikes were especially targeted at ISIS, which extends between the governorates of Homs and Deir al-Zour at the border with Iraq.
Topic:
Security, Counter-terrorism, Peace, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Middle East, Syria, and Jordan

253. Seizing Opportunities and Strengthening Alliances in Northwest Africa: Ideas for Policy Toward Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia

Author:
Robert Satloff and Sarah Feuer
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Modest invest­ments of U.S. diplomatic capital, economic aid, and security assistance can help these three countries and advance American interests. In the third in a series of TRANSITION 2021 memos examining the Middle East and North Africa, Robert Satloff and Sarah Feuer look at the U.S. relationship with Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. All three countries are facing sharp challenges, from economic strains exacerbated by the pandemic to potential instability arising from the conflicts in Western Sahara and Libya. But this far corner of the region also offers strategic opportunities for the Biden administration to help these countries and, in turn, advance a range of key U.S. interests. “In contrast to many other areas of the Middle East, northwest Africa offers a realm in which relatively modest invest­ments of American diplomatic capital, economic aid, and security assistance can yield substantial returns, and the point of departure for the incoming administration’s bilateral engagement will, for the most part, be not one of tension but rather of opportunity,” write the authors. In the coming weeks, TRANSITION 2021 memos by Washington Institute experts will address the broad array of issues facing the Biden-Harris administration in the Middle East. These range from thematic issues, such as the region’s strategic position in the context of Great Power competition and how to most effectively elevate human rights and democracy in Middle East policy, to more discrete topics, from Arab-Israel peace diplomacy to Red Sea security to challenges and opportunities in northwest Africa. Taken as a whole, this series of memos will present a comprehensive approach for advancing U.S. interests in security and peace in this vital but volatile region.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Foreign Aid, Economy, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:
Algeria, North Africa, Morocco, Tunisia, and United States of America

254. Asset Test 2021: How the U.S. Can Keep Benefiting from Its Alliance with Israel

Author:
Michael Eisenstadt and David Pollock
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Areas for especially timely U.S.-Israel cooperation include climate resilience, agtech, and medical research, as well as longstanding work in the military and security arenas. In the fifth in a series of TRANSITION 2021 memos examining the Middle East and North Africa, Michael Eisenstadt and David Pollock assess the multifaceted strengths of the U.S.-Israel partnership and its prospects for growth under the Biden administration. Areas for especially timely cooperation include climate resilience, agtech, and medical research, as well as longstanding work in the military and security arenas. Israel’s recent normalization deals with several Arab states only further widen the horizon. “Israel is a world-class innovator in technologies that will be critical to meeting future challenges, including artificial intelligence, information technology, and cybersecurity; sustainable water, food, and energy solutions; and high-tech medicine,” explain the authors. “All these areas are supportive of America’s foreign policy priorities.” In the coming weeks, TRANSITION 2021 memos by Washington Institute experts will address the broad array of issues facing the Biden-Harris administration in the Middle East. These range from thematic issues, such as the region’s strategic position in the context of Great Power competition and how to most effectively elevate human rights and democracy in Middle East policy, to more discrete topics, from Arab-Israel peace diplomacy to Red Sea security to challenges and opportunities in northwest Africa. Taken as a whole, this series of memos will present a comprehensive approach for advancing U.S. interests in security and peace in this vital but volatile region.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, International Cooperation, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, North America, and United States of America

255. Navel Gazing? The Strategic Compass and the EU’s maritime presence

Author:
Daniel Fiott
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
Seventeen days prior to the accidental blockage of the Suez Canal on 23 March 2021 by the super container Ever Given, a French aircraft carrier strike group had passed through the canal on its way to the Indian Ocean (1). It does not take an active imagination to think what could have transpired had these naval forces become trapped in the Suez Canal following a hostile act on their navigation systems. It is only possible to envision such scenarios because maritime security is increasingly beset by geopolitical tensions. We know that the European Union is heavily dependent on maritime trade routes for power projection and its economic prosperity — 75 % of goods entering Europe do so by sea today and Europe’s navies and shipping firms rely on free navigation. However, China’s naval expansion in the Indo-Pacific, Russia’s naval presence in the High North and the Baltic, Black and Mediterranean Seas and Turkey’s hostile maritime acts in the Eastern Mediterranean call into question the relative freedoms Europeans have enjoyed at sea for decades. Of course, it remains to be seen whether the EU can generate a greater maritime presence in such a context. The Union has accrued experience in deploying naval operations, undertaking border and coastguard functions, performing maritime safety tasks, countering piracy and conducting maritime surveillance assignments. More recently, the EU has even established new maritime initiatives such as the Coordinated Maritime Presence (CMP) concept, which is designed to enhance maritime security in fragile areas such as the Gulf of Guinea. EU member states such as France, Germany and the Netherlands have also invested in national strategies and guidelines for maritime engagement in the Indo-Pacific, and the EU will follow suit by the end of 2021 with its own strategy. A new EU Arctic strategy will be released in October 2021. NATO is also about to revise its own Strategic Concept, which will undoubtedly focus on maritime issues too. At the same time, by March 2022, the EU will present a Strategic Compass for security and defence, which is in part supposed to provide clearer guidance on what type of maritime actor the Union should become. This is a challenging task. There is limited political agreement on the Union’s maritime security role, and there is uncertainty about how far the EU should geographically extend itself when it has concerns closer to home. There is also the question of limited European naval capabilities. Tackling these issues, this Brief asks how the Strategic Compass can make a tangible difference to the Union’s role as a maritime security provider. Our first port of call, however, is to better understand the contemporary nature of maritime threats, risks and challenges.
Topic:
Security, European Union, Navy, and Maritime
Political Geography:
Europe

256. The Impact of COVID-19 on CSDP: Forging Opportunity out of Crisis?

Author:
Tobias Pietz
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
When the Covid-19 pandemic began to sweep through the world in the early months of 2020, no country or international organisation had contingency plans in place to deal with a crisis that could occur anywhere and affect everybody simultaneously. In the case of the missions and operations deployed under the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), Covid-19 had a severe impact, including on Brussels-based personnel and structures, early on. In hindsight, it is easy to criticise the first three months of crisis management at the CSDP structures in Brussels as well as what operations and missions did in the field. However, the unique and novel challenge of this pandemic must never be lost sight of in any assessment of CSDP performance. The pandemic and its effect on the CSDP revealed some crucial challenges faced by EU missions and their operational and planning structures. This Brief tries to shed light on the impact that Covid-19 has had on the CSDP and points to some lessons which can be drawn from the experiences of dealing with the pandemic crisis so far.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, COVID-19, and Health Crisis
Political Geography:
Global Focus

257. Securing the Heavens: How can space support the EU's Strategic Compass?

Author:
Daniel Fiott
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
It may be customary to begin an analysis on space by referencing famous sci-fi productions such as Star Trek. Yet terms such as ‘final frontier’ or ‘to boldly go where no man has gone before’ are outdated. Today, space is used for countless civil and military applications and it is an increasingly contested and congested political and technological arena. While it is true that space is not yet home to photon torpedoes or deflector shields, reality is starting to catch up with the sci-fi world. Consider that the United States took the decision in December 2019 to create a ‘Space Force’ and in September 2020 France created an ‘Air and Space Force’, which followed on from the creation of a Space Command in 2019. Germany too took the decision in September 2020 to create an ‘Air and Space Operations Centre’. A month later, NATO created its first-ever Space Centre in Germany and in 2021 it was decided that France would host the new NATO Centre for Excellence in military space. Additionally, other EU countries such as Italy have established space-defence capacities and on 8 March 2021 France started its first-ever military space exercise, Aster X 2021.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Space, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Global Focus

258. Transatlantic relations and European strategic autonomy in the Biden era: Neglect, primacy or reform?

Author:
Ville Sinkkonen and Garret Martin
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The relief in Europe following Joe Biden’s election has been tempered by uncertainty as to how the new administration might approach transatlantic relations. This paper lays out three paths that the US could take. The benign neglect model assumes that Washington will be consumed by domestic challenges and competition with Beijing, de facto downgrading Europe as a priority. In the primacy model, the US sees its leadership as indispensable for sustaining the international order and battling authoritarianism. The US would expect Europe to follow its lead, while old reservations about European strategic autonomy would resurface. The major reform model would see a humbler US foreign policy, understanding that it cannot repair the fragile international liberal order alone. Supporting European strategic autonomy would be key in devising a new transatlantic division of labor. Domestic challenges and ingrained policy habits mean that the US will likely gravitate toward neglect or primacy in its dealings with Europe. A major reform of the transatlantic relationship, while desirable, would require significant political will and investment on both sides of the Atlantic.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Leadership, Transatlantic Relations, Autonomy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

259. The Eastern Mediterranean conflict: From Turkey-Greece confrontation to regional power struggles

Author:
Toni Alaranta
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
For several decades, the Eastern Mediterranean confict consisted of a three-part struggle over territorial wa- ters, sovereignty and exclusionary national narratives between Turkey, Greece, and the Republic of Cyprus. Its origins can be traced as far back as the Greek War of Independence in the 1830s, the Lausanne Peace Trea- ty determining the current borders of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, and the failed bicommunal federal state established in Cyprus in 1960. Regarding the Cyprus confict, the best – but ultimately lost – opportunity to resolve the issue was the 2004 Annan Plan for a bicom- munal federal state. Today, the Eastern Mediterranean confict is a multi-level and multi-actor power strug- gle that is unlikely to wane any time soon. In addition to Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus, it also includes actors such as France, Italy, Libya, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates. Tis Briefng Paper frst identifes the main actors involved, and then proceeds to analyze the key de- terminants of the confict. Te paper concludes that tension in the Eastern Mediterranean will continue in the foreseeable future. A full military confrontation is unlikely, however, as NATO can provide a necessary platform for a Greece-Turkey de-escalation. Tis is likely to prevent an actual war, but will not be enough to produce any lasting solution in the increasingly confict-ridden Eastern Mediterranean regional power struggle.
Topic:
Security, Conflict, Regionalism, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, and Greece

260. Ukraine’s Half-Hearted Reforms: What Needs to Change in the West’s Approach?

Author:
Arkady Moshes and Ryhor Nizhnikau
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Comprehensive internal reforms, along with security cooperation, are a key pillar of West-Ukraine interaction. Thus far, however, the Western effort has not sufficed to overcome the resistance of the local elites and make the reforms irreversible. High hopes raised by Volodymyr Zelensky’s election as Ukraine’s president in 2019 were short-lived. In three priority areas – anti-corruption, the judiciary and the economy – reforms have stalled. Instead, Zelensky has started to adapt the same socio-political system that the West aims to transform to his own political purposes. Western support – or even leadership – is once again becoming crucial in keeping Ukraine on the reform track. Ongoing domestic developments seriously challenge Zelensky’s administration, creating a window of opportunity for a more successful application of reform conditionality. In turn, a new US administration may be much more capable of using this emerging opportunity than its predecessor. If they are to promote reforms more efficiently, Western actors should go beyond the technocratic approach and recognize their own “ownership” of the process. Progress with reforms requires direct and high-level political engagement to enforce the implementation of agreements and to empower pro-reform forces inside the country.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Reform, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

261. Solidarity during Covid-19 at national, regional and global levels: An enabler for improved global pandemic security and governance

Author:
Mika Aaltola, Johanna Ketola, Karoliina Vaakanainen, and Aada Peltonen
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Solidarity has become a global and regional buzzword in the fght against Covid-19. As a result of the unequal and shifting disease burden and resource scarcity among countries, solidarity has manifested itself in various forms depending on the national and regional contexts and disease situations. Politicians worldwide have called for solidarity, which has taken many shapes and forms. At the nation- al and sub-national level, Covid-19 has prompted calls for communal solidarity. Solidarity, at the EU level, has often been used as a synonym for intra-EU coordination and assistance between member states as well as safe- guarding the welfare of EU citizens. In the global arena, UN and WHO leadership has been pushing for global sol- idarity to highlight the global nature and scope of the crisis, simultaneously alluding to the uneven distribu- tion of vaccines and the embedded systemic injustices in global health governance. Tis mosaic of solidarities difers from the normative ideal. In this Briefng Paper, we explore the diferent types of pandemic solidarities to understand the political dis- course during the frst year of the Covid-19 pandemic. We analyze the solidarity rhetoric of the high political leadership as well as key solidarity initiatives at three diferent governance levels: global (UN), regional (EU), and national (case Finland) to see how solidarity has been defned, in which context, and to what ends. Compared to other types of emergencies, pandemics are in a league of their own. One key characteristic of a pandemic emergency is the anxiety connected to the processes of contagion, infection, and spread. As the term ‘pandemic’ signifes, the frst line of defence at the local level has failed, as happened in the initial stage of Covid-19. Whereas natural catastrophes are usually lo- cally contained without additional concerns stemming from the fear of spread, pandemics are, to a degree, an- ti-humanitarian by their very nature. Tey usually lead to a knee-jerk reaction to step back and bufer oneself to prevent the harm from spreading.1 From this per- spective, pandemic solidarity is far more limited and qualitatively diferent. Instead of compassion for distant. others, a nearest-and-dearest approach can ensue. Tis Briefng Paper argues that lower levels of soli- darity should act as enablers for better pandemic gov- ernance at the global level. Until now, the impact of na- tional and regional solidarity has been relatively bleak. Calls for solidarity can act as empty signifers or merely as political rhetoric that is not tied to any concrete efort or action. To shed light on the meanings of solidarity, it is important to identify and distinguish the operative nature of solidarity, or lack thereof, in various contexts.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Governance, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Global Focus

262. Recognizing ‘Geoeconomic Risk’: Rethinking Corporate Risk Management for the era of Great-Power Competition

Author:
Christian Fjader, Niklas Helwig, and Mikael Wigell
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
As economic policy has become a key strategic means in great-power rivalry, states are attempting to control the economic networks that connect the world. By instrumentalizing businesses they change the risk picture for both public and private companies. The securitization of the economy entails a first source of new risk as states attempt to strengthen their control of companies in sectors considered strategic and security-sensitive. Another source of risk stems from the balkanization of the global economy, whereby it would disintegrate into separate spheres of economies decoupled from each other. The competition for control of the global standard-setting regimes constitutes an emerging area of such risk. A final source of risk is the weaponization that accelerates the use of sanctions and export controls. It entails more barriers for companies and puts pressure on the rules-based international system. A novel concept of ‘geoeconomic risk’ is therefore needed to identify, assess and mitigate these new uncertainties associated with the repurposing of the global economy.
Topic:
Security, Sanctions, Conflict, Economic Development, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
Global Focus

263. Three decades of Russian Policy in the European Part of the Post-Soviet Space: Swimming Against the Current

Author:
Arkady Moshes and Ryhor Nizhnikau
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The successful pursuit of Russia’s great-power status and its recognition by the West imply the preservation of pre-eminent positions, above all in the European part of the post-Soviet space. Since Vladimir Putin’s rise to power, the Kremlin has been making a consistent effort to reverse the earlier trend towards the weakening of Russia’s regional stance. One of the implications of this policy was the shift of the Russian-Western competition in the “common neighbourhood” towards an open stand-off after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. Russian regional policy has run counter to structural changes that could not be counter-balanced through activism, whether enticing or coercive. As a result, 30 years since the dissolution of the USSR, Russia’s regional influence as well as its attraction as a societal role model and a security provider are continuing to erode. Russia has regional clout, which is nonetheless hardly growing over time. More and more often, Moscow is encountering difficulties in achieving its goals. While post-Soviet states resist Russia’s assertiveness, non-Western players pose new challenges to its posture.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Conflict, Peace, and Post-Soviet Space
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Post-Soviet Europe

264. Waves of ambition: Russia’s military build-up in Crimea and the Black Sea

Author:
Gustav Gressel
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Russia’s capacity to carry out large-scale military operations against Black Sea states allows it to coerce and extort them. Reducing the predictability of such operations is the first step towards deterring them, because Moscow carefully weighs their risks. Western countries should increase their militaries’ interoperability with Black Sea states’ armed forces and improve the infrastructure they use to deploy reinforcements in the region. This would allow them to react to Russian military escalation in kind and thereby increase the risks for Moscow. With Ukraine and Georgia engaged in land wars against Russia, the vulnerabilities of Ukrainian and Georgian airspace and territorial waters have received relatively little attention. Western states could begin to address these vulnerabilities by establishing an international naval presence in the Black Sea. This would counter Russia’s attempts to deny other nations free use of the sea, and could help mitigate long-standing rivalries between allied states in the region. These efforts to enhance Black Sea states’ security will depend on improvements in other areas, particularly the security of government communications, counter-intelligence, the rule of law, and the fight against corruption.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Military Affairs, European Union, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Turkey, Crimea, and Black Sea

265. 100 days of Biden’s new transatlantic strategy – where does Central and Eastern Europe stand?

Author:
Danielle Piatkiewicz
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Europeum Institute for European Policy
Abstract:
In her policy paper, our research fellow Danielle Piatkiewicz provides an in-depth review of President Biden’s first 100 days in office. Piatkiewicz particularly examines Biden's new transatlantic strategy and how it affects the Central and Eastern Europe region. So far, the US administration’s focus on tackling immediate shared threats has called upon their EU allies to take a stronger role and to continue to invest in its own defense capabilities. This includes not just investing in stronger NATO cooperation, but also the strengthening of economic and security support in CEE region through various avenues. For the CEE region, it will be a true test to see how they adapt towards a Biden administration – the deterioration of democratic processes and rule of law will certainly come to haunt the region, but the question remains to what extent? For Poland and Hungary, whose relations flourished under Trump’s administration, may have to reevaluate their posture to adhere to the pro-democratic policies that the Biden administration will certainly call for, and this can lead to a splintering within the V4 particularly between Slovakia, Czech Republic and Poland and Hungary.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Economics, Transatlantic Relations, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:
Eastern Europe, Poland, Hungary, North America, Czech Republic, Central Europe, and United States of America

266. Russian Grand Strategy and how to handle it

Author:
Marc Franco
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
In many Western chancelleries, there still is a lot of hesitation and bewilderment on how to deal with Russia. A first step in defining a coherent policy vis-a-vis Russia, is trying to understand the motivation and objectives of Russian foreign policy, as well as its weaknesses.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Grand Strategy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

267. From one master of survival to another: a tardigrade’s plea for NATO2030

Author:
Tania Latici
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
A microscopic creature whose size reaches that of a grain of rice at the utmost could teach NATO more survival lessons than one would think. The tardigrade has survived all five mass extinctions and is over 500 million years old. Like NATO, the tardigrade survived the nuclear challenge and even outer space. It is hard to find a more resilient animal from which NATO can draw inspiration for its ability to adapt to and withstand the most extreme conditions. To remain relevant and powerful in a dynamic threat landscape NATO needs to do what it has always been doing: adapt. Yet by 2030 NATO not only needs to adapt. Just like the tardigrade, it needs to hyper adapt. Four areas are key: redefining defence and deterrence; agreeing on the math; internal renewal; and rebuilding public support. Money, politics and nostalgia are not enough to keep the Alliance alive. It is time to get creative.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

268. For a New NATO-EU Bargain

Author:
Thierry Tardy
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
NATO and the European Union (EU) are both engaged in a continuous cycle of adaptation, witness in 2021 the NATO 2030 process on the NATO side, and the Strategic Compass on the EU side. These two exercises aim to look forward to how both institutions can better respond to ever-changing risks and threats. One key dimension in this debate is the optimal division of tasks between NATO and the EU, so that what they do together and in a coordinated manner is bigger than what they do separately or in a disorderly way. The issue of NATO-EU cooperation is obviously not new and has been at the heart of the development of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) since the late 1990s. This ties into at least three levels of debate that pertain to: the relationship and complementarity between the two organizations; the issue of what European states do within NATO; and the broader transatlantic bond. This said, twenty years of debates and inter- institutional cooperation have fallen short of clarifying what the two institutions must do in relation to each other. Most importantly, the NATO-EU conundrum is hampered by a series of never-met objectives and pledges, as well as by frictions on issues such as duplication, overlap, European strategic autonomy and burden-sharing. Against this background, this paper takes stock of these unmet objectives and offers a broad picture of what a division of tasks between NATO and the EU could possibly look like. The analysis is intentionally bold and puts forward a number of proposals that are undeniably contentious. It nonetheless draws on an observation of long-term and more recent trends, and aims at feeding the debate about the future of the two main European security institutions and the way they can interlock better.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and European Union
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

269. Expanding the Reach of the Special Forces with a Gender-Mixed Deep Development Capability (DDC): Identifying Challenges and Lessons Learned

Author:
Nina Wilen
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
Driven by the need to adapt to a changing security environment, the Belgian Special Forces Group has developed a new gender- mixed capability in 2020, including female soldiers in the operational detachment of the unit for the first time. This brief examines the development and implementation of the project and identifies challenges for future similar capacities. It points to the need for clarification of tasks and employment conditions, while attracting male candidates is necessary to maintain the ‘mixed’ character of the capability. In conclusion it argues that overall, efforts to avoid gender instrumentalization have been successful and the creation of the capability is a first step in the direction to diversify the composition of the Special Forces, a step that is necessary to remain relevant in a complex security context.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Gender Issues, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe and Belgium

270. Breaking the Law of Opposite Effects: Europe’s Strategic Autonomy and the Revived Transatlantic Partnership

Author:
Iulian Romanyshyn
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
The post-Cold War transatlantic relations have been marked by something akin to the law of opposite effects. When the relationship is vibrant, Europe’s defence cooperation stagnates. When the relationship is in trouble, Europeans pull themselves together to advance their security and defence interests. During the Clinton presidency, Europeans comfortably outsourced military crisis management in the Balkans to Washington. In contrast, a major transatlantic rift over the Iraq war during the Bush administration triggered the adoption of the European Security Strategy and a bulk of EU military operations under the banner of the European Security and Defence Policy. EU-US relations were back on an even keel during the Obama era, the time when Europeans haphazardly reduced their defence budgets and lost a great share of their military capabilities. Enter Donald Trump. During the deepest crisis of confidence among transatlantic allies in decades, Europeans re-energized their defence integration with a set of new initiatives, such as permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund (EDF). It is therefore somewhat logical and far from unexpected that when Joe Biden emerged as the winner of the 2020 US presidential elections, there is yet again a heightened risk that Europeans would fall back into a lazy, self-defeating mindset of dependency on the US military shield. Breaking this pattern of reverse effects and avoiding European complacency is crucial for a healthy transatlantic partnership, but it requires concerted efforts on both sides of the Atlantic.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, Transatlantic Relations, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

271. EU and NATO Strategy: A Compass, a Concept, and a Concordat

Author:
Sven Biscop
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
A concordat is an agreement between the church authorities and the state that regulates the activities of the former on the territory of the latter. Since both European Defence and the Transatlantic Alliance are churches with their zealous high priests and devoted believers, the term seems apt enough for the EU-NATO package deal that I propose in this paper. The coincidence that in 2021-2022 the EU is drafting a Strategic Compass and NATO a new Strategic Concept should be put to use to mend the schism between them. Can a miracle be worked?
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and European Union
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

272. What Belgium Can Do: Proposals for the National Security Strategy

Author:
Sven Biscop and Nina Wilen
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
Belgium has never had a National Security Strategy: a single strategic vision outlining how to safeguard its national interests from external threats and challenges and to prevent the exploitation of its internal vulnerabilities. Many in Belgium intuitively feel that none is needed: Are we not shielded by the EU and NATO? And what could the world expect from this small country anyway? But the fact is that the Kingdom of Belgium is not such a small player. The geopolitical heart, and the host, of the EU, it ranks 9th out of 27 in terms of population and GDP; worldwide, it is the 12th exporting country. Hence recurring tensions between Belgium’s own – often low – level of ambition as a security actor and the expectations of its allies and partners.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Military Strategy, European Union, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Europe and Belgium

273. The EU and China: Sanctions, Signals, and Interests

Author:
Sven Biscop
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
Sanctions are much easier to use against your allies than against your enemies. A friend will want to stay in your good books, and is much more likely to modify his behaviour than an adversary, who will probably just harden his resolve to outdo you. The Trump administration liberally used sanctions against allies in Europe and Asia, who did not exactly cave in but did not want things to escalate either.1 The US trade war with China, on the other hand, cost both sides dearly, without resolving anything. In a coordinated move with the US, the UK, and Canada, the EU has adopted sanctions against four Chinese officials and one entity for violating the human rights of the Uighur people in Xinjiang province.2 That is fully legitimate: as a union of democracies, the EU has a moral duty to speak up for human rights everywhere. But are sanctions the most effective way of doing so?
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Sanctions, European Union, and Conflict
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

274. A New Start for EU-US relations?

Author:
Jim Cloos
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
The election of President Biden was greeted by sighs of relief across Europe and offered the promise of a renewed relationship. The first hundred days in the office have been impressive. The tone vis-à-vis the EU has changed radically. New perspectives of cooperation are opening up, as set out in the Commission’s December communication on “EU-US: A new transatlantic agenda for global change”. For this to be fruitful two conditions need to be met. The first and most important one is linked to the capacity of the EU to deliver and to do what it takes to be a credible and strong partner. In this sense the future of the transatlantic partnership depends more on the European side than the American one. America is a super power and will remain one. And super powers only listen to other powers that are serious. But there is also a need for changes on the U.S side. The quiet assumption, so prevalent in the U.S, that it is natural for it to lead on all major issues and for the Europeans to follow will not stand up to the requirements of today. A strong partner can and will at times have different views and even different interests and should be allowed to defend them without being accused of jeopardizing the relationship.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Treaties and Agreements, European Union, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

275. How the Strategic Compass can Incubate a European Prototype for Burden Sharing

Author:
Tania Latici
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
Much ink has been spilled calling upon Europeans to do more for their defence in the context of the transatlantic relationship. “Everybody talks about the weather but nobody does anything about it”: it used to be a fitting expression for this conundrum – no more. The Strategic Compass process is an opportunity not only to decide what umbrellas to buy but when, how, and where to use them to protect against rain, hail, snow and even sunburn. There is a dissonance, however, between the political rhetoric about a complex and unpredictable security environment requiring a 360° defence and deterrence and the practice of measuring defence and deterrence. There is also a dissonance between advocates for a clear focus on NATO’s core business of territorial defence or for a more comprehensive Alliance contribution to security. This brief makes an argument firmly in favour of the latter with a focus on Europe’s contribution. It argues that the Strategic Compass process can be an incubator for a credible European prototype for burden sharing.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

276. The Strategic Compass: Entering the Fray

Author:
Sven Biscop
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
The Strategic Compass for the EU’s security and defence policy, to be adopted in 2022, must generate immediate action. The best way of ensuring that is to prepare new capability initiatives and, potentially, new operational engagements now, so that they can be launched simultaneously with the Strategic Compass. In that light, “the development of an initial-entry force as a pool of Member State forces that train and exercise together and are made available to the EU” (as summarised in an EEAS working paper), is one of the most promising ideas on the table. How to make it work?
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, European Union, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Europe

277. Seven Steps to European Defence, Transatlantic Equilibrium, and Global Europe

Author:
Jo Coelmont
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
Panta rhei – everything flows (Heraclitus). Once again, geopolitics is in transition, and a new crossroads is being approached. While we already knew that global leadership is beyond any single country, now it appears to be beyond even any single continent – beyond an alliance of two continents even. This means that the old strategic truth, that the power that has Europe on its side has the potential to dominate the world, no longer holds. Europe no longer is the kingmaker. And that changes a lot, for the EU, the US, and the world.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and European Union
Political Geography:
Europe

278. Readiness as a Mission: Implications for Belgian Defence

Author:
Alexander Mattelaer
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
Readiness reflects the ability of the armed forces to accomplish their assigned tasks in time. Like many European counterparts, Belgian Defence disposes of some high readiness assets, but is lacking in readiness overall. This impacts its contribution to collective defence and its wider ability to support societal resilience. This Egmont Security Policy Brief explains the concept of readiness as a question of resource management and applies this to the ongoing defence review. Treating readiness as a meta- mission implies not only balancing the budgetary input parameters – investing in personnel, training, equipment and maintenance simultaneously – but also taking a selective approach towards operational engagement. Doing so will enable the force to regenerate as rapidly as possible, and boost Belgium’s ability to act both at home and abroad.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Europe and Belgium

279. Rosatom in Europe: Russia’s Trojan Horse?

Author:
Tomas Janeliūnas, Yuri Tsarik, and Andrea Bonelli
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The national security aspects of nuclear energy have long been sidelined, overshadowed by the much larger geopolitical interest in gas and oil. However, Russia’s state-owned nuclear corporation, Rosatom, which is pursuing various opportunities in Europe and globally, has become part of Russia’s broader strategy to rebuild its geopolitical influence. According to some recent estimates, Russia has spent over $92 billion to support this prong of its strategy over the last ten years. The European Union (EU), however, is not fully cognisant of or properly postured to address the geopolitical and security risks accompanying Moscow’s use of Rosatom to advance its strategic interests.
Topic:
Security, Energy Policy, European Union, Resilience, and Hybrid Threats
Political Geography:
Eurasia, Lithuania, Belarus, and Baltic States

280. #NATO2030: Regional Cooperation for a Stronger NATO

Author:
Justyna Gotkowska
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The countries of central and eastern Europe have often worked together politically and militarily to advance their security interests vis-a-vis NATO. They have been most successful when they have had a clear goal, such as joining the Alliance in the late 1990s and early 2000s or ensuring that NATO would adopt robust enhancements to its deterrence posture following Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in 2014. In the seventh of our series of policy briefs intended to shed light on some of the issues related to the Alliance’s further adaptation, Justyna Gotkowska of the Centre for Eastern Studies argues that regional cooperation has given way to efforts to enhance bilateral relations with NATO’s larger Allies. But recent developments in Europe’s security environment and security thinking require the central and eastern European countries to step up their cooperation and to make sure that their voice is heard in NATO and the EU.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and Central Europe

281. China’s Technological Rise: Implications for Global Security and the Case of Nuctech

Author:
Didi Kirsten Tatlow
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
China under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is poised to become the world’s first technology enabled totalitarian superpower. No country will be untouched by this development, including Estonia, where a Chinese state-owned technology company Nuctech specialising in “security solutions” monitors cargo crossing the NATO border with Russia using a radiation-based technology originally copied from Europe. A clear understanding of the Chinese political system shows why there is fundamental cause for concern in all this, and why Chinese technology should not be viewed as politically neutral.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, and Hybrid Threats
Political Geography:
China and Estonia

282. #NATO2030: NATO’s Force Structure and Posture

Author:
Martin Hurt
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The forces and capabilities that will be available for NATO operations in 2030 have, to a great extent, already been decided through the NATO Defence Planning Process. It is now up to individual Allies to deliver on their commitments. In the third of our series of policy briefs intended to shed light on some of the issues related to the Alliance’s further adaptation, Martin Hurt of the ICDS looks at how NATO’s force structure and posture have evolved since the end of the Cold War, and outlines the challenges of the further modernisation necessary if NATO is to keep pace with an evolving security environment.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Modernization
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

283. Advancing the Role of the OSCE in the Field of Climate Security

Author:
Niklas Bremberg and Anniek Barnhoorn
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
This SIPRI Policy Brief assesses the role of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in the field of climate security, in terms of its current and possible future commitments. Despite growing political momentum among most OSCE participating states about the need to address the issue of climate security, there appear to be divergent views on how to move forward on this important issue. Based on an assessment of recent OSCE activities linked to climate-related security risks and interviews with representatives from OSCE participating states, this policy brief suggests four avenues for the OSCE to advance its role in the field of climate security: (a) agree to new commitments; (b) engage in agenda setting; (c) strengthen the mandate of institutions; and (d) develop existing resources.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, Development, Risk, and Peace
Political Geography:
Europe

284. Winning the Geo-Tech Battle and Building the Quad Alliance in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Eric B. Brown, John Lee, and Thomas J. Duesterberg
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Under Xi Jinping, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has established as its paramount geopolitical objective the replacement of the free and open, rules-based order in Asia with an alternative world order, one that is to be dominated by the interests and values of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This decision presents a danger to the entire world, not just to any one state or group of states. For, as US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said at the March 2021 US-PRC meeting in Alaska, the alternative to a rules-based order “is a world in which might makes right and winners take all, and that would be a far more violent and unstable world for all of us.” In furtherance of its objectives, the PRC is in the midst of a large military build-up, but there is much more. For today’s CCP, political power grows not only from the “barrel of the gun,” as Mao Zedong once put it, but also from cutting-edge technologies. Thus, while Beijing pours billions into artificial intelligence and surveillance tech to impose its new “digital totalitarianism” inside the PRC, from Hong Kong to Xinjiang, it is also using its growing technological prowess to press its larger geopolitical agenda in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. It is weaponizing technology and connectivity, along with trade, finance, and other policy instruments to try to rule the key technologies and industries of the future, as well as to improve its strategic positioning and acquire political power over other countries—for instance, through its bid to dominate other nations’ most sensitive data networks, or via the export of its suite of “social stability” technologies, i.e., the “techno-tyrant’s toolkit.” In all this, the CCP’s intent is to entrench its power and Leninist norms and practices to the extent it can do so beyond the PRC’s borders, and to make other nations, or at the least their ruling elites, beholden to it. So in addition to the PRC’s militarily destabilizing activities in the West Pacific and incursions into India’s Himalayas, there is also a “geo-technological front.” If Xi’s CCP succeeds at enmeshing other countries in its expanding “PRC sphere of technological influence,” it could unlock and be able to exploit decisive military, economic, diplomatic, and ideological advantages.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Economics, and Alliance
Political Geography:
China, South Asia, East Asia, and Asia-Pacific

285. A Just Response to Beijing’s COVID-19 Abuses

Author:
David Asher, Miles M. Yu, David Feith, Matthew Zweig, and Thomas DiNanno
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Nearly 18 months after word of a deadly new virus began leaking out of Wuhan, China, the Chinese government’s response remains fundamentally hostile to international cooperation and transparency. Despite hundreds of offers of assistance, polite diplomatic entreaties, and demands for access to data by governments and health authorities across the globe, the world still knows far too little about COVID-19’s origin. As in a Dali painting, the clocks have melted but time has not stood still. China’s initial silencing and censoring of its doctors and scientists, followed by misinformation about COVID-19’s dangers—especially denials concerning the virus’s ability to be spread human-to-human, invisibly and asymptomatically—helped cost the world trillions of dollars and millions of lives. Whether one believes COVID-19 originated in a zoonotic host, a bat cave, a frozen food shipment, or a Wuhan lab’s dangerous “dual-use” research supporting undeclared bioweapons programs, the world needs answers from the Chinese Communist Party. These are answers Beijing won’t provide unless it faces a high price for refusing. For the good of public health and international security, the Biden administration and the Congress can unite in a coordinated, long-term response.
Topic:
Security, Health, Research, Transparency, Public Health, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China and Asia

286. Building a Strong and Independent Iraq: Policy Guidance for the Biden Administration

Author:
Abram N. Shulsky
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Formulating US policy toward Iraq can be a fraught matter, given all the debate and disagreement concerning the actions that brought us to the current situation. However, our policy must be formulated in light of it, regardless of views about our past actions. Policy formulation should begin with the realization that Iran has gained a predominant political and military influence in Iraq. Despite efforts of past PM Adel Abdul Mahdi and current PM Mustafa al-Kadhimi, many of the militias comprising the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) still answer to Iran, not the Iraqi government. Iran exerts widespread influence throughout the political class. Economically, Iraq remains dependent on Iran for energy;1 religious tourism from Iran to the holy sites in Karbala and Najaf is an important source of revenue; and Iran has flooded markets with cheap food and consumer goods. Although Iraqi oil production has rebounded, the economy remains relatively moribund and the level of basic public services is poor. (That Iraq flares off its natural gas at the same time it is importing it from Iran to produce electricity2 highlights the economic disfunction.) Popular discontent boiled over in 2019, leading to widespread protests. The protests took on an anti-Iranian aspect, and Iran-aligned PMF units attacked the protestors.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Agriculture, Economics, Government, Politics, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, and United States of America

287. Give Lisbon a chance: How to improve EU foreign policy

Author:
Fraser Cameron
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:
After almost three decades of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and a decade since the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS), it is high time to assess whether EU foreign policy has indeed become “more visible, more coherent and more effective”, as stated in the Lisbon Treaty. Despite most media and experts having a rather disdainful view, there have been some successes. And the increasingly bleak geopolitical situation has a led to growing recognition in EU member states that they must try and work together if Europe is to become an international actor, defend multilateralism and maximise its influence on the world stage. But that understanding has not always been on display in recent years. Clearly, there remain significant challenges in coordinating the foreign policies of 27 member states, each with their own interests, traditions and capabilities. Fraser Cameron (EPC Senior Adviser), therefore, argues that the EU should have more modest ambitions. Instead of harbouring grand ideas, it could take small yet concrete steps in the direction of a more coherent and effective EU foreign policy. In this Policy Brief, he puts forward ten practical ideas.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Regional Cooperation, European Union, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Europe

288. Assessing SSR Opportunities and Challenges During the Transition in Mali

Author:
Flore Berger
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF)
Abstract:
Five months after the coup d'état in Mali, the main questions about the 18-month transition period - Who will be the key players? What will the priorities be? - have been answered. But while the transition period opens up new opportunities, there remain many challenges and obstacles to significant progress in security sector reform.
Topic:
Security, Governance, Reform, Leadership, Coup, and Transition
Political Geography:
Africa and Mali

289. The Impact of Climate Change on Global and Local Security Governance

Author:
Flavia Eichmann
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF)
Abstract:
Climate change presents a major threat not only to sustainable development and global biodiversity but also to peace and security. Security sectors around the world are increasingly faced with the challenges of climate security risks, given their traditional role in disaster risk prevention, management, and response - but also in migration and border management, conflict prevention and peacebuilding.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, Environment, and Governance
Political Geography:
Global Focus

290. Climate Change and Its Impact on Security Provision - The Role of Good Security Sector Governance and Reform

Author:
Hans Born
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF)
Abstract:
While it is clear that SSG/R must play a role in responding to climate change, a greater understanding of how to translate this into practice is required. This policy brief seeks to identify concrete entry points for SSG/R in addressing climate-related security risks, and outlines means for influencing policy in this direction.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, Environment, Governance, and Reform
Political Geography:
Global Focus

291. EU sets new course for the Arctic

Author:
Laurent Mayet
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
The European Union's strengthened engagement in the Arctic, presented on 13 October, marks two new directions in the Union's diplomatic positioning: a strategic and security turn, and the absolute priority given to the fight against climate change.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, Diplomacy, and European Union
Political Geography:
Europe and Arctic

292. Peace and Security 2025

Author:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
On the one hand, 2025 is just around the corner while, on the other hand, it seems far, far away. In Part I of this publication, experts and associates from the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) paint a picture of possible futures in five areas by presenting scenarios that depict potential developments in the period up to 2025. The discussion will include suggestions on what can be done to prevent these scenarios from becoming a reality. In Part II, authors will make specific suggestions on how we can effectively respond to the peace and security environment out to 2025 by using appropriate leadership, crisis management and strategic foresight approaches.
Topic:
Security, Conflict, Peace, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Global Focus

293. The post-Brexit EU-UK relationship: an opportunity or challenge for cyber security?

Author:
Ellie Templeton and Robert Dewar
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
With multiple post-Brexit pathways that could still be pursued following the recent adoption of the new security agreements, the EU-UK cyber security relationship is still evolving. Value must be placed on collaboration to tackle shared cyber threats, the role EU institutions play in bringing cyber security actors together, and Britain’s former contribution to European security. These factors strongly indicate that, although new opportunities may present themselves, there will likely be irreversible losses for collective cyber resilience due to Brexit. In order to work towards a new, valuable relationship model, it is recommended that both the EU and UK uphold professional, transparent and non- political security cooperation going forward, whilst remaining open to flexible operational support in the unpredictable and ever-changing cyber threat landscape. Ultimately, within an international system affected by “instability, insecurity and uncertainty”,61 it remains to be seen what opportunities and challenges arise, and if the resulting relationship, whether based on one specific pathway or a combination of all three, could constitute an effective EU relationship model for non-EU entities in the cyber security field.
Topic:
Security, Regional Cooperation, European Union, Cybersecurity, and Brexit
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

294. Global NATO: What Future for the Alliance's Out-of-area Efforts?

Author:
Antoine Got
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
While modest in scope, the efforts briefly discussed above illustrate a desire not to rescind NATO’s role in the promotion of international – as opposed to strictly regional – stability. Notwithstanding this, there is room for improvement. Above all, the non-kinetic nature of these initiatives signals that NATO is still hesitant to reattempt ambitious crisis-management endeavours involving large-scale troop deployments or combat operations abroad. This is coherent with previous policy, of course, considering that responsibility for security provision should remain regionally – if not locally – owned. This hesitancy is likely to endure as a consequence of the withdrawal from Afghanistan. As a result, the threshold for orchestrating military operations abroad will likely remain high. At the same time, NATO should not entirely forgo such endeavours. For while international support for SSR and capability-building are certainly vital to deliver long-term resilience, stability and the rule of law, these activities are not panaceas. Pre-crisis activities, including early preparation and prevention, are crucial in helping to reduce the known risks that can lead to or aggravate a crisis or conflict. But to conceive of prevention activities as alternatives to emergency response and management would be misguided. Crises are an unpredictable and unavoidable part of contemporary international relations, and an over- reliance on prevention activities can obfuscate the wider set of non- Article 5 instruments at NATO’s disposal to defend allied interests and protect foreign populations against violence. NATO can apply this holistic array of tools for the best possible outcome before, during and after conflict. NATO should also recognise that support for out-of-area crisis management does not necessarily require large-scale, high-risk and expensive foreign troop deployments, and that a middle ground exits between this and the political costs of inaction. With the ongoing sense of anti-interventionism in the West and the hybridisation of warfare, NATO can achieve considerable gains with low-cost, low-footprint forms of military intervention that rely on remote airpower, special operations, and the force-multiplying potential of local partners, which NATO can arm, train, and support logistically to fight against common enemies. Remote warfare and “over-the-horizon” counter-terrorism combined with local capacity-building can provide a middle ground between the costs of inaction and those of over-reaction, while constructively re-establishing the primacy of NATO as an international security provider.24 Most importantly, the alliance should not restrict the scope of its out- of-area activities because of fear that more engagement could lead to the organisation being unwillingly dragged into an Afghanistan-type conflict. NATO has drawn several lessons from this experience and is unlikely to repeat the mistakes of the past. To remain a prominent crisis- management actor, it must continue its efforts to engage proactively with the world.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Intervention
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

295. Poland and the United States: What’s right, what’s not, and what’s next

Author:
Daniel Fried and Jakub Wiśniewski
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Around the time of President Joe Biden’s first trip to Europe in June 2021, US-Polish relations experienced a short, but intense, rough patch. Missteps on both sides caused the problems, including fears on the Polish side of a high-handed US attitude and a general lack of consultation on issues (like Nord Stream 2) that Poland regards as critical. Some Poles started questioning the good faith of their biggest ally. The US side, for its part, thought Poland was ignoring US overtures and assuming the worst of the United States. Draft legislation that would target the largest US investment in Poland (the TVN television network) generated US concerns about both the investment climate in Poland and political pressure on independent media. In short order, wiser counsel emerged on both sides, and top-level discussions may ease the sense of tension. 1 But, the episode suggests that problems have developed in what has been (and should remain) one of the closest transatlantic relations. Both the United States and Poland need to look hard at what this relationship can do for both countries and for the transatlantic relationship, and at the sources of problems.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Politics, Bilateral Relations, and Resilience
Political Geography:
Eastern Europe, Poland, North America, and United States of America

296. Addressing instability in Central America: Restrictions on civil liberties, violence, and climate change

Author:
Maria Fernanda Bozmoski, María Eugenia Brizuela de Ávila, and Domingo Sadurní
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Citizens across Latin America and the Caribbean are rising up in protest. Political frustration and economic stagnation are fueling social discontent exacerbated by the continued COVID-19 pandemic and the slow health response. In Central America, restrictions on civil liberties, high rates of gender-based violence and extortion, and worsening climate change are compounding the lack of economic opportunities and pervasive corruption seen in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. In the year of its bicentennial, can northern Central America chart a new path, in partnership with the United States, to tackle the sources of social instability that are forcing migrants to seek a better life? In July 2021, the Joseph Biden administration released the US Strategy for Addressing the Root Causes of Migration in Central America report. Three of its five pillars call for the United States and northern Central American countries to work together to respect human rights and a free press, counter violence at the hands of criminal organizations, and combat sexual and gender-based violence.1 To ensure a sustained and effective implementation of this strategy, especially on these three pillars, the United States will need to find new ways to work closely with northern Central American governments, domestic and international private sectors, and organized civil-society groups. Following consultations with the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center’s Northern Triangle Advisory Group (NTAG), this brief highlights the importance of implementing a holistic, multisector approach to mitigate gender-based violence, protect civil liberties and human rights, and build climate resilience. This brief is the third in a three-part series by the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center and DT Institute that provides policy recommendations for the United States and its northern Central American partners to address the root causes of migration.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, Diplomacy, Politics, and Partnerships
Political Geography:
Latin America

297. What role for NATO in the Sahel?

Author:
Chloe Berger
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Since the collapse of the Libyan regime in 2011, the Sahel region has gradually gained significance within the NATO environment. The chaos in Lib- ya has accelerated the interconnection of North African and Sahelian dynamics, creating a complex environment with serious implications for both the stability of North Africa and the Mediterranean Basin. The Sahel region suffers from a paradoxical situation. In view of the multiple national (Sahel armed forces), regional (African Union (AU), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)) and internation- al actors (United Nations, European Union, and also non-African states) present on the ground, the situation is often dubbed a “security traffic jam”. Some NATO Allies who have traditionally wielded influence in this region, have also invested in regional stabilization and development efforts for a long time. For the first time at the June 2021 NATO Summit, Al- lies have explicitly voiced their concerns over the “dete- riorating situation in the Sahel region”.1 As the “newest addition” in this already “crowded” environment, and at a time of review of its Strategic Concept, the Alli- ance must demonstrate its added value; identify “niche” areas where it can complement and strengthen existing efforts; while considering the Sahelian countries’ aspira- tions and specific needs.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Africa, Europe, North America, and Sahel

298. Biden’s nuclear posture review: what's in it for NATO?

Author:
Andrea Chiampan
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
The Biden administration has formally start- ed a review of the US nuclear weapons poli- cy known as Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). The NPR is a public policy document that each US administration has published since 1994 during the first months in office and that is scheduled to be released in 2022. NPRs are important public statements: they set out the administration’s views on the role of nuclear weapons in US grand strategy. NPRs are also crucial signalling documents. They provide insight into an administration’s understanding of the prevailing geo- political environment – including perceived risks and threats – and convey US intentions to allies and adver- saries alike. Given NATO’s significant reliance on US extended deterrence, the elements of continuity and change that the new NPR will propose will inevitably have direct effects on NATO’s defence posture.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

299. The future of NATO

Author:
Thierry Tardy
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
NATO’s reflection process (NATO 2030), as well as the decision to revisit the Alliance’s Strategic Concept in 2022 pose two sets of questions: the first pertains to the organization’s adap- tation to tomorrow’s security environment; the second is on whether there is agreement inside the Alliance on the kind of organization to be built, and what its prin- ciples and methods should look like. This Policy Brief examines these two levels of ques- tions to identify five possible directions in which the Alliance might move: continuity; refocusing on collec- tive defence; morphing into a security organization; standing up to China; and marginalization.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

300. NDC@70: more relevant than ever

Author:
Stephen J. Mariano
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
The information revolution put brick and mortar academic institutions under pressure to adapt, and the COVID pandemic has increased atten- tion on higher education models – business, intellectu- al, and philosophical. As the NATO Defense College (NDC) turns 70, and the Alliance ponders a new Stra- tegic Concept, it is worth reviewing the NDC model and value of education more broadly. General Dwight D. Eisenhower created the College in 1951 to prepare military and civilian officials for duty in NATO posts or in NATO-related positions in their capitals. War col- leges in France, the United States, and the United King- dom provided the conceptual basis for the NDC, but the NATO equivalent would have two differences: the NATO College would focus on Alliance issues more than national colleges, and consensus-building would be a key part of its education method. Seventy years later, the College still prepares military and civilian officials to assume positions of responsibility within NATO and that preparation has always included acquiring geo-stra- tegic knowledge and building relationships. NDC@70 means reflecting on how senior leaders acquire knowl- edge, develop skills, and strengthen relationships in to- day’s challenging period with rapid rates of technologi- cal change and increasingly segmented societies.
Topic:
Security, NATO, International Cooperation, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Europe and North America