The EastWest Institute (EWI) has released Afghan Narcotrafficking: A Joint Policy Assessment, the sixth and final report from the institute’s Joint U.S.-Russia Working Group on Afghan Narcotrafficking, which provides a comprehensive and updated assessment of the Afghan drug trade and the role that both the United States and Russia might be able to play in countering this shared threat.
The EastWest Institute (EWI) today announced the launch of its latest report, Afghan Narcotrafficking: Illicit Financial Flows. The fifth in a six-part series, this report has been developed to assist policymakers and scholars to better comprehend the nature of illicit flows of goods and services from and into Afghanistan and their relation to drug smuggling. The report provides a comprehensive review and analysis of the opiate trafficking economy as well as recommendations and strategies to counter, control and reduce the supply-side of opiate narcotics around the world.
Topic:
International Political Economy and Narcotics Trafficking
On March 13, 2017, the EastWest Institute (EWI), in concert with the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), convened the first ever conference on prospects for infrastructure cooperation between the United States and China. This conference, held in Beijing, brought together a U.S. delegation comprising investment and infrastructure experts—some of whom have advised the Trump administration on infrastructure—with Chinese counterparts from a number of private sector and state-owned enterprises. Discussion throughout the conference focused on the policy priorities of the Trump Administration; the Trump administration’s vision for the development of U.S. infrastructure; the current state of U.S.-China relations; and opportunities, challenges and recommendations for U.S.-China infrastructure cooperation.
Disputes over water constitute a major area of disagreement between Israel and Palestine. The uncoordinated and irresponsible environmental actions on both sides have created serious ecological and humanitarian hazards that require rapid, yet sustainable action. Those who argue that the water problem can be resolved only as part of a comprehensive peace deal between the Israelis and Palestinians fail to recognise both the urgency and the potential of cross-border water cooperation. The bottom line of this Flanking Cooperative Idea is that because water- and sanitation-related issues extend both horizontally across national borders and vertically across various sectors, environmental cooperation can be used to create positive linkages with and spill-overs into other policy fields with the potential to initiate new forms of collaboration in currently deadlocked areas, including the field of disarmament and non-proliferation.
States in the Middle East/Gulf should consider practical, ready-to-start measures to address the technical and organisational aspects of regional security and bypass the political disagreements on a regional weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone (WMDFZ). Firstly, establishing a comprehensive expert group on the verification of arms control, non-proliferation, and disarmament would increase confidence in the ability to sustain the provisions of a zonal arrangement. Secondly, creating a regional security centre would provide an institutional mechanism that would facilitate the conversation from within the region and enhance cooperation.
In view of the failure of efforts to convene a conference on a zone free of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery vehicles (DVs) in the Middle East (WMD/DVs-free zone), the Arab countries and the Russian Federation proposed that the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General appoint a special representative to lead the preparatory process for the conference. A process facilitated by such a UN envoy would be compatible with consultations among regional states, including Israel, as advocated by the United States (US). Also, it would allow for broad discussions on both the regional security context and disarmament issues. Such a process would also be an opportunity for submitting contributions from nuclear-weapon states, relevant international organisations, and providers of ideas at the Track II level.
This Policy Forum issue summarises the achievements and deficits of the Glion/Geneva informal consultation process and describes the currently held divergent positions of major players. With reference to several necessary conditions for success, the authors make concrete proposals for a compromise-oriented new NPT cycle that does not repeat the mistakes of the past.
Long considered a natural partner for peace through economic diplomacy and bilateral trade agreements, business has increasingly become ignored or demonised.
The private sector comprises a wide diversity of organisations and is the part of the economy that is not run by a state, but by individuals and companies for profit.
Small businesses/micro-companies serve as a good starting point for a conflict resolution process because they often constitute the only form of economic activity in a conflict zone.
MNCs have a range of options to respond to conflict, but cannot openly take part in conflict resolution and peacebuilding initiatives, and rarely become involved officially. Track Two diplomacy is their more likely area of involvement.
The United Nations has frequently supported the view that the private sector can be a powerful agent of change. However, the UN still engages only two players in conflict resolution and peacebuilding: civil society/NGOs and armed actors. UN peace operations have never been expressly mandated to consult with business or use its influence to build peace.
Combining the resources, expertise and leverage of all possible actors would produce a more formidable force for peace. World affairs would benefit from integrating the private sector into a new UN system of governance; new routes are possible for a truly inclusive approach, recognising the business sector’s positive contribution to sustainable peace through informal mediation and collaborative engagement.
The Libyan Political Agreement (LPA)1 also known as the Skhirat Agreement has been bedeviled with significant deficiencies from its onset. In part, it was vouched for irrespective of the fact that necessary domestic support was not garnered pursuant to its approval - vital security sector actors missing at the negotiation table. This Policy Brief discusses how it has failed thus far and gives options for inclusive renegotiations given Libya is at a pivotal point with every action of the UNbacked Government of National Accord (GNA) key going forward in the country’s quest for sustainable peace and unity. The Agreement as it stands is largely not a panacea to any of Libya’s political and security predicaments with the battle against the Islamic State won in Sirte