Hirak has been the relegation of the Islamists because the protesters showed no interest in an Islamist ideology. They are opposed to foreign interference and have warned the West, particularly the former colonial power France, from interfering in their movement.
The fate of the “Russian Energy Strategy Up to 2035” paper—a key
document defining the country`s strategic priorities in this critically important industry and submitted by Russia’s Energy Ministry every five
years—illustrates well the contradictory predicament of Russia’s energy
sector. In 2015, after two years of preparations, the latest version was
submitted to the government, but national authorities have not approved it until now. Behind the scenes, many conflicting interests prevent the setting of a clear and coherent long-term vision.
For much of its four decades, the Islamic Republic of Iran has been
blessed with a weak political opposition. While Iran has faced competent and powerful foreign enemies—such as Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, the
United States, and Israel—its Iranian political challengers, both domestically and abroad, have been largely fragmented, unrealistic in their aims, and sometimes as authoritarian as the regime. But, though few credible Iran watchers argue that opposition groups and figures arrayed against Tehran’s establishment pose a serious threat, Iran treats
them as if they are mortal dangers to the regime. This paper attempts
to sketch out the landscape of the various major political opposition
groups, and begin to grapple with the question of why Iran perceives
them as such a challenge
Like every country, Russia has a very specific demographic footprint; its fertility, mortality, and migration rates, as well as its
age composition, all affect its performance domestically and on
the world stage. Russia’s current demographics were shaped by
its history, particularly crises like World War II, and its future will be
deeply affected by conditions like its dropping fertility rate and aging
population
Perhaps the most famous quote from Thucydides is “the strong do what
they can, the weak suffer what they must.”1
For thousands of years, it has been accepted that the weak must comply or face the fate of the Melians. Today, the technology of the Fourth Industrial Revolution may be revising that truth. It is creating a wide range of small, smart, cheap weapons that can provide small states combat power previously reserved to major powers
This brief emerged from discussions during an Atlantic Council Global
Energy Center roundtable on European energy security held in Brussels
on March 27, 2019, as well as other events and individual meetings with
government officials, private sector executives, and leading academics
in the global energy sector. The collective dialogues and key takeaways
are reflected in this brief. Because the conversations took place under the
Chatham House Rule, the information will not be attributed to any specific individual. The brief will provide a current assessment of EU energy security focusing on the role of gas markets, while future briefs in the European Energy Security series will take a closer look at other critical issues impacting European energy security. Following these briefs, a final report in 2020 will propose specific recommendations for the US and EU governments on how to address transatlantic energy security issues.
uring the Cold War, the Soviet Union posed a challenge to the United States throughout the entire world, including in the Middle East.
Soviet activity in the Middle East, though, was also a challenge for many
US allies in the region, and beyond. Soviet influence in the Middle East
expanded during the 1950s and 1960s, in particular, as many in the Arab
world became angry about US support for Israel, and as several pro-Western Arab governments were overthrown and replaced by anti-Western
ones that actively sought Soviet support. Due to several factors, however,
many of the gains made by the Soviets in the Middle East ended up being
lost. These included: the defection of Gamal Abdel Nasser’s successor in
Egypt, Anwar Sadat, from the Soviet to the US camp; Washington’s successful 1970s-era diplomacy in bringing about an Israeli-Egyptian peace
agreement; genuine fear of the Soviet threat on the part of Saudi Arabia and other Arab monarchies; the 1979 Iranian Revolution, in which the
downfall of a pro-Western regime did not lead to the rise of a pro-Soviet
one, but to the rise of one that was both anti-American and anti-Soviet;
and, finally, the collapse of both communism and the Soviet Union itself
from 1989 to 1991
Topic:
International Cooperation and International Affairs
For much of its four decades, the Islamic Republic of Iran has been
blessed with a weak political opposition. While Iran has faced competent and powerful foreign enemies—such as Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, the
United States, and Israel—its Iranian political challengers, both domestically and abroad, have been largely fragmented, unrealistic in their aims, and sometimes as authoritarian as the regime. But, though few credible Iran watchers argue that opposition groups and figures arrayed against Tehran’s establishment pose a serious threat, Iran treats
them as if they are mortal dangers to the regime. This paper attempts
to sketch out the landscape of the various major political opposition
groups, and begin to grapple with the question of why Iran perceives
them as such a challenge.
As the world enters an era of great-power competition, the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) faces a renewed challenge
from an old adversary. A Europe whole, free, and at peace is
now at risk as Russian aggression challenges the traditional
rules-based world order. Russia’s activities in and against Ukraine and
Georgia, rampant intrusion on Western democratic processes and political discourse, blatant assassination attempts on NATO soil, support
for rogue regimes in Syria and Iran, and military deployments and force
accumulation in Kaliningrad and Crimea, as well as in the Sea of Azov,
demonstrate that the threat is as real and compelling as it ever was
Topic:
International Organization and International Affairs
As energy markets and technologies rapidly change, international oil companies (IOCs) are facing a set of interconnected challenges that will fundamentally affect their business models. From changes in the supply and demand picture, to shifts in how energy is produced and consumed, to public pressure to decrease greenhouse gas footprints, companies have a wide range of issues to consider as they decide how to prepare for an unpredictable future. In a new issue brief, “Navigating the Energy Transition: International Oil Company Diversification Strategies,” Global Energy Center Senior Fellow David Koranyi provides a macro picture of select IOC’s strategic (re)thinking and explores some of the strategies IOCs have undertaken to diversify their portfolios and prepare for the unfolding energy transition.
Topic:
International Relations, International Political Economy, and International Affairs