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1. Digital Sovereignty: For a Schuman Data Plan

Author:
Arno Pons
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
On 9 January, the European Commission launched the first cooperation and monitoring cycle for the achievement of the European Union’s digital decade by 2030. If, in the digital field, Europe faces issues of sovereignty, it is because it has left the sector open for over twenty years to the American Tech giants, who have imposed a game whose rules that have never been understood here. Either because these rules were inaccessible to the European Union (Moore and Metcalfe laws), or because we accepted that there were no rules of the game (code is law).
Topic:
Markets, Science and Technology, Infrastructure, Law, European Union, Data, European Commission, and Digital Sovereignty
Political Geography:
Europe

2. Energy investment in a time of inflation

Author:
Charles Lichfield and Joseph Webster
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
High rates of inflation across the world are forcing central banks to reluctantly tighten monetary policy despite accompanying recession risks. Moreover, restricted credit access could jeopardize energy investments, particularly for capital-intensive clean energy projects, potentially rendering the world more vulnera­ble energy to price shocks, which are a significant contributor to the current crisis. This paper briefly considers the macroeconomic drivers of inflation in late 2022, including Russia’s war in Ukraine and uncertainties around energy supply, supply-chain resets, and lingering COVID-19 disruptions, before examining the persistent energy underinvestment of the past decade and how this has left markets exposed to varying degrees. As such, this paper also considers how private capital can accelerate cleaner energy adoption, suited to different markets’ unique conditions and needs. Bor­rowing costs will rise, but this doesn’t have to bring the transition to a standstill. With the Great Moderation of low volatility, interest rates, and inflation perhaps a relic of the past, assets offering inflation protection, such as infrastructure, may become increas­ingly attractive to investors. There is a fear that global inflation will sharply curtail energy investment into emerging markets. The fear is justified. Higher interest rates in developed markets mean higher rates of return which will lure emerging markets investors back to the US and Europe. Still, it’s not all bad news for emerging markets. Quasi-state actors like Pension and Sovereign Welfare funds are interested in very long term, high-yield projects—two criteria to which emerging market energy infrastructure correspond. Disruptions to interest rates and inflation, triggered in part by energy underinvestment, will cause disparate impacts in different markets. Inflation is not, perhaps, everywhere and always a mone­tary phenomenon. Energy investment faltered from 2014 to 2020, despite low interest rates. Meanwhile, aggre­gate supply shocks—first due to COVID, then from Putin’s invasion of Ukraine—have pressured energy production and prices, raising inflation and necessitating interest rate hikes. The consequences of persistent energy underinvest­ment are now becoming apparent. The need for new energy infrastructure cannot be met without private investment. This was the case when infla­tion was lower; it is even more important now.
Topic:
Environment, Markets, Oil, Governance, Gas, Economy, Investment, Inflation, and Energy
Political Geography:
Global Focus

3. Building Resilience? The Cybersecurity, Economic & Trade Impacts of Cloud Immunity Requirements

Author:
Matthias Bauer
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
EU Member States should call on the EU’s Cybersecurity Agency (ENISA) and the European Commission to abandon immunity requirements in the proposed EU Cloud Certification Scheme (EUCS). With immunity requirements in the EUCS, the EU risks opening a Pandora’s box, paving the way for data localisation, foreign ownership restrictions, and local establishment requirements in digital industries globally leading to rising trade tensions. ENISA’s current proposal could increase policymakers’ appetite for data localisation in the EU. It would empower the European Commission and Member State authorities to exclude foreign businesses from domestic cloud services markets and set a dangerous precedent for any data-intensive sector. The list of “sectors of high criticality” could be logically extended to both existing services (e.g., financial services) and to new technologies and business models, such as IoT in the energy and healthcare sectors, and autonomous driving in the transport sector. Non-EU jurisdictions would be pressured to respond in kind. EUCS immunity requirements would increase cloud adopters’ exposure to cybersecurity risks. Data localisation often creates obstacles to an integrated management approach towards cybersecurity risks. Country of headquarter and foreign ownership restrictions in the proposed EUCS risk removing global frontier cybersecurity technologies from Member State markets. Excluding these and other EU and non-EU companies from EU Member States could result in a long-lasting security deficit of EU cloud adopters vis-à-vis organisations that are still able to use reliable and often best-practice cloud services offered by providers from outside EU Member States. Immunity requirements in the EUCS are discriminatory by design. They could provoke retaliatory measures by EU trading partners, either unilaterally or through WTO or bilateral FTA (e.g., UK-EU) Dispute Settlement. Local establishment requirements and foreign ownership restrictions would by design discriminate against foreign cloud providers. US-headquartered companies, which currently serve more than 75% of the EU market, would be most affected by EU immunity requirements.[1] Depending on US preferences and the scope of the proposed EUCS, the EU could be subject to retaliatory tariffs of up to USD 12 billion worth of EU goods exports or equivalent restrictions for EU services exports to the US. Other governments could lodge complaints via the WTO as well (e.g., Singapore, Japan, Canada and others, where cloud development is advancing rapidly). EU suppliers are currently in no position to manage a broad-based transition to cloud, and thus such requirements would delay significant efficiency and security gains that current foreign suppliers could offer. A blanket exclusion of non-EU cloud vendors would also likely undermine Europe’s objective to achieve a 75% cloud adoption rate for EU enterprises. Sensitive European businesses and public sector organisations would have to delay migration and make do with legacy systems for a very long time. Contrary to large countries, these negative impacts would be much more pronounced for smaller EU Member States, which lack the presence of large domestic incumbents and generally rely much more on an open international trading regime for digital services. ENISA’s cloud certification scheme should be limited to technical and transparency requirements. Immunity requirements for non-personal data should be addressed in bilateral initiatives such as the EU-US Trade and Technology Council (TTC) or agreements requiring a company that sought to offer services of the highest level of sensitivity to be headquartered in a country granted adequacy with EU data protection rules, or a country that is an adherent to the OECD’s Trusted Government Access principles, or (concerning the US) a participant in the upcoming Trans-Atlantic Data Privacy Framework. Excluding foreign companies from operating in the EU would have far-reaching consequences. If that is the intent, it should require a sound legal analysis and the decision should be taken through a formal legislative procedure at the EU level.
Topic:
Economics, Markets, European Union, Cybersecurity, Digital Economy, Trade, and Resilience
Political Geography:
Europe

4. How best to ensure international digital competition cooperation

Author:
Christophe Carugati
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Large digital firms pose similar competition issues worldwide, such as promoting their own services over those of rivals, or imposing unfair terms and conditions. Competition authorities have opened several antitrust investigations and policymakers have proposed digital competition regulations to tackle these issues. G7 competition authorities have called for several years for international cooperation on digital markets. They want competition cases and laws around the world that are consistent and work together. However, the question of how this can be done remains. A toolbox for international cooperation in competition enforcement already exists, but it does not provide for cooperation in competition policy and has shortcomings in relation to competition enforcement. Current and proposed legislation targets the largest digital firms to tackle the characteristics of digital markets, such as multi-sidedness, and the same or very similar behaviours, such as self-preferencing. Legislation in different jurisdictions addresses these issues with similar rules. While there is some convergence, some rules diverge in substance and some are at high risk of divergence in interpretation. Inconsistency is thus likely to arise from a divergence of interpretation rather than substance. The solution would be to ensure a coherent approach to competition in digital markets. This could be done by developing a framework based on four elements: (1) adoption of common legal phases for future digital competition laws to ensure clarity; (2) adoption of a common legal interpretation through guidance drafted by international forums, such as the International Competition Network (ICN); (3) adoption of common technical requirements developed in the context of ICN technical workshops, when the rules require it; and (4) the implementation of an international monitoring committee within the ICN to evaluate whether competition authorities and courts enforce the rules consistently. The impact of the framework might be limited because of the non-binding nature of the approach, and the focus on specific competition-related legislation, excluding laws that can also address the issues, such as civil law. Countries can overcome these limitations if they are willing to cooperate to ensure a consistent approach.
Topic:
Markets, Digital Economy, Digital Cooperation, and Competition
Political Geography:
Global Focus

5. Rational Eviction: How Landlords Use Evictions in Response to Rent Control

Author:
Eilidh Geddes and Nicole Holz
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
As housing prices rise, cities are turning to rent control policies, hoping to ensure longterm affordable housing. Typically, rent control policies require leases to be renewed at statutorily limited rent increases. Rent control policies reduce the returns from operating in the rental market, creating well‐​studied incentives for landlords to leave the rental market. Many rent control policies—including San Francisco’s—feature vacancy decontrol provisions, which allow landlords to reset rents to market rates when tenants move. These policies limit the reductions in returns to operating in the rental market but create incentives for landlords to induce tenant turnover, possibly through evictions. The more tenants move, the more often a landlord can raise rents to market rates.
Topic:
Markets, Economy, Eviction, Housing, and Rent
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

6. Green Hydrogen Industrial Value Chains: Geopolitical and Market Implications

Author:
Nicola De Blasio and Laima Eicke
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
The global transition to a low-carbon economy and adopting the needed clean energy technologies at scale will significantly impact existing value chains1 and transform production-to-consumption lifecycles. Regulatory and business models will need to rapidly evolve to manage the resulting substantial cost challenges and dramatic shifts in stakeholder interactions while continuing to create value. Green hydrogen2 is likely to play a pivotal role in a carbon-free future, as its adoption will enable the decarbonization of energy-intensive industrial processes whose emissions are hard to abate through simple electrification—such as steel and cement production. However, to take advantage of the economic opportunities created by its adoption at scale, countries will need to rethink the roles they could play in a new energy landscape and define strategic industrial policies accordingly. Our research3 shows how successful industrial policies must reflect a country’s potential value chain positioning in future green hydrogen markets and elucidates macro geopolitical trends that could reshape international relations as countries compete for industrial leadership, market shares, and opportunities for job creation.
Topic:
Markets, Economy, Carbon Emissions, Value Chains, Hydrogen, and Green Economy
Political Geography:
Global Focus

7. Slippery Fish: Enforcing Regulation under Subversive Adaptation

Author:
Andres Gonzalez-Lira
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
Correcting market failures and improving economic efficiency often require curbing undesirable behaviors of market agents who act to maximize their private benefits. Examples include actions that affect ecosystems, such as deforestation, pollution, and overexploitation of natural resources; actions that affect community health, such as drunk driving and open defecation; or actions that undermine government performance, such as corruption and tax evasion. Enacting and enforcing regulations is the most direct strategy to deter such behaviors. Implementing this strategy requires strong institutions to enforce laws, plus sophisticated policing to track agents’ reactions to enforcement so that rules are robust enough to curb the undesirable behavior even when regulated agents try to game the new system.
Topic:
Environment, Government, Markets, Regulation, and Adaptation
Political Geography:
Global Focus

8. The Regulatory Costs of Being Public

Author:
Michael Ewens, Kairong Xiao, and Ting Xu
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
An important explanation for the significant decline in the number of publicly listed companies in the United States is the increased burden of disclosure and governance regulations. Indeed, practitioners often point to heightened regulatory costs as the culprit of the disappearing public firms, while major deregulations such as the 2012 Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act were directly motivated by perceived costs of being public. Thus, understanding the role of regulations in the cost of being public and the decline in the number of public firms can address concerns about possible capital market dysfunction.
Topic:
Markets, Governance, Regulation, and Business
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

9. Economic Security in Emerging Markets: A Look at India, Vietnam, and Indonesia

Author:
Matthew Goodman, Matthew Reynolds, and Julianne Fittipaldi
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
With the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic, supply chain resilience has emerged as a policy priority of the United States and its allies. The issue of supply chains has also raised the profile of emerging economies that offer possible alternatives to China as production platforms for multinational firms. This report surveys economic security policy developments in three major emerging economies: India, Vietnam, and Indonesia. It finds that all are attempting to take advantage of this new focus on supply chain resilience, while (to varying degrees) balancing the economic security risks posed by China’s rise. The United States and its allies have an opportunity to work with these emerging economies to shape their decisions about trade, investment, and technology policies in ways that promote mutual economic security and enhance international economic rules and norms.
Topic:
Security, Economics, Emerging Markets, International Trade and Finance, and Markets
Political Geography:
Indonesia, India, Asia, Vietnam, and Asia-Pacific

10. Boom-bust Cycles Revisited: The Role of Credit Supply

Author:
Hyo Sang Kim, Sangyup Choi, and Yuri Kim
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
This study investigates the impacts of credit supply on economic growth and financial crisis. Excess credit supply can make the economy and financial markets more vulnerable. While credit supply can drive economic growth by reallocating resources, it can also make the economy and financial markets more fragile. Asset prices sharply fall when deleveraging occurs in the case of a negative shock to the financial or real sector in a system where credit is excessively supplied. Furthermore, economic activity might be substantially reduced, extending the length and breadth of the recession.
Topic:
Markets, Financial Crisis, Economy, Economic Growth, and Credit
Political Geography:
Global Focus

11. The European Union renews its offensive against US technology firms

Author:
Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Megan Hogan
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
The European Union's proposed Digital Markets Act (DMA) contemplates extensive regulation of "gatekeeper" digital platforms—firms that perform a "core platform service" in the European Union (defined as online intermediation, online search, social networking, video sharing, electronic communication, cloud services, or online advertising), have a significant impact on the EU internal market, serve as an important gateway between business users and end-users, and enjoy an entrenched and durable position. Although at least one European firm could qualify as a gatekeeper, Hufbauer and Hogan say, the DMA discriminates against American technology firms by singling them out for the label of "gatekeepers." The European Commission’s proposed DMA targets both US tech giants such as Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple, and Microsoft and smaller (albeit huge) US tech firms such as Airbnb and PayPal. The authors say the EU goal is to confer competitive advantage on European digital firms, breaching the EU commitment to national treatment of foreign firms, violating their intellectual property rights, and imposing high expenses on the "gatekeepers." At the same time, France is planning to enact its own steep barriers against US and other foreign cloud services.
Topic:
Markets, Science and Technology, European Union, Economy, and Digital Policy
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America

12. Exchange Rate Predictability Based on Market Sentiments

Author:
Hyo Sang Kim, Eunjung Kang, Yuri Kim, Seongman Moon, and Huisu Jang
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
It is well-known that exchange rates are difficult to forecast using observed macro-fundamental variables. This discrepancy between economic theory and empirical results is called the Meese and Rogoff puzzle. The purpose of this study is to address this puzzle from a new approach. Rather than pursuing a linkage between macro-fundamentals and exchange rates, we focus on the market sentiment index as a factor that could possibly enhance exchange rate predictability. The analysis folds into three phases. First, we conducted an assessment of the traditional exchange rate predictability model, as well as the augmented traditional model incorporating the market sentiment index. Second, we predicted the exchange rate by applying the market sentiment index, based on the contrarian opinion investment strategy commonly used by foreign exchange dealers. Finally, we analyzed if the machine learning model incorporating both economic fundamentals and market sentiment index could enhance the predictability of the exchange rate.
Topic:
Economics, Markets, and Exchange Rates
Political Geography:
Global Focus

13. Securing alternative gas supplies and addressing critical infrastructure gaps in Europe

Author:
Richard L. Morningstar, András Simonyi, Olga Khakova, and Paddy Ryan
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The Kremlin’s weaponization of natural gas exports to Europe as winter approaches has shattered any illusions that Russia could be a reliable supplier. Europe urgently needs to import gas from other suppliers to heat its homes and power its industry. In doing so, Europe can build a more secure and sustainable energy system while cutting off funds for Moscow’s war machine. Painfully high energy prices are already having a serious impact on quality of life and economic development in Europe. New natural gas supplies and expanded interconnections to bring them to market will drive down the costs of energy and reduce the likelihood of social unrest over energy poverty. The surest means to end Russia’s energy leverage over Europe include accelerating the green transformation, curtailing gas demand, and boosting energy efficiency. However, the continent cannot implement these changes overnight. Gas remains instrumental in Europe’s transition from dirtier fossil fuels, electrification of power-hungry sectors, and integration of large-scale intermittent renewables. Natural gas will likely remain a critical part of Europe’s power baseload for at least the medium term. Procuring an adequate supply of gas in the short to midterm is not at odds with the energy transition. Europe must cultivate alternative suppliers, build non-Russian-oriented import infrastructure, and accelerate decarbonization in tandem to boost energy security and affordability. Sourcing gas from non-Russian suppliers will sustain longer-term decarbonization efforts and prevent regression back to dirtier fuels amid the energy crunch. To diversify their energy systems, European states must determine how much Russian gas can be replaced and from where, as well as what new infrastructure will be necessary to enable new imports. The European Union (EU) needs to clearly articulate the anticipated natural gas supply gap to identify investment opportunities for the relevant market players. This issue brief examines potential sources of alternative gas supplies, the infrastructure required to bring new supplies to European consumers, and the financial and regulatory mechanisms needed to support diversification efforts. It offers recommendations for measures that European countries decoupling their energy supplies from Russia should take to give themselves the best chances of succeeding.
Topic:
Environment, Markets, Oil, Gas, Energy, and Energy Transition
Political Geography:
Europe

14. The Impacts of EU Strategy Autonomy Policies – A Primer for Member States

Author:
Matthias Bauer
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
EU governments should be much more sceptical and critical of the EU’s strategic autonomy agenda and the new polices intended to achieve the EU’s “long-term” industrial and technological ambitions. The long-term costs for Member States’ economies and the process of economic convergence are largely ignored by the agenda. Negative impacts of strategic autonomy on trade openness and the international rules-based trading system are also greatly understated. Many EU strategic autonomy ambitions are inherently guided by a “European Union First” impulse. Policymakers follow the assumption that EU values are superior to those in other parts of the world and EU regulation should be different from third countries. Major strategic autonomy aspirations represent a relapse of the EU to the old policy of EU member states designing and enforcing their own laws without considering the economic and political costs of regulatory fragmentation and economic disintegration from others. Recent strategic autonomy policies are estimated to create income losses in the EU of between 0.08% and 0.15% of EU27 GDP. These losses correspond to short-term economic harm resulting from changes in the use of productive resources in the EU. Long-run impacts, which reflect losses to productivity and innovation, could be up to 3 to 5 times higher with national income per capita falling by up to 0.5% to 0.75%. The costs are not evenly distributed across the EU27. Larger countries like France and Germany are less impacted than smaller ones, notably Ireland and the Baltic states. The impacts on Ireland, for example, are close to 4 times bigger than they are for France, the impacts on Estonia close to twice those on Germany. Strategic autonomy ambitions have failed to account for negative impacts on developing countries. To the extent that the EU’s policy stance further fragilizes rules-based multilateralism, there are longer-term impacts stemming from a less certain legal environment and higher barriers for cross-border trade and investment. EU strategic autonomy policies have the effect of empowering vested interests in developing countries to engage in lobbying for their own protectionist policies. Accordingly, EU strategic autonomy policies risk encouraging the diffusion of protectionist policies globally, particularly in countries with weak institutional capacity. EU Member States should examine their options and ask themselves whether there are better long-term strategies to pursue than those currently proposed at the EU level, strategies guided by the spirit of an open society – a society embracing the principles of free trade, non-discrimination, and economic freedom. Europe’s policymakers should aim for closer market integration and regulatory cooperation with trustworthy international partners such as the G7 and the larger group of the OECD countries. It is in the EU’s self-interest to advocate for a rules-based international order with open markets. It is neither in the EU’s economic nor its political interest to disintegrate from partner countries.
Topic:
Markets, Treaties and Agreements, European Union, Trade, and Strategic Autonomy
Political Geography:
Europe

15. Don’t look only to Brussels to increase the supply of safe assets in the European Union

Author:
Francesco Papadia and Heliodoro Temprano Arroyo
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
A sufficient supply of safe assets denominated in euros is critical if the European Union is to achieve full banking and capital markets union while fostering the euro’s international role. The European debate on developing the supply of safe assets has so far focused on the possible creation of a common safe asset. This has tended to underplay the potential contribution of sovereign assets. Expanding the supply of national safe assets, notably through the gradual implementation of fiscal and growth-oriented structural policies in euro-area countries, leading to upgrading of their sovereign ratings, provides a promising, and perhaps more feasible, option. An upgrade to triple A of those euro-area countries that are currently rated double A could produce substantially more safe assets than most common safe asset proposals, including those based on the development of ‘synthetic’ safe assets. There has been a remarkable increase in the share of supranational assets in the stock of euro-based safe assets since 2008, reflecting downgrades in sovereign ratings and the EU’s financial responses to the euro-area crisis and the pandemic. However, safe assets in euro remain dominated by those issued by euro-area governments. Although common safe assets have certain advantages over national safe assets, reflecting their built-in risk diversification properties, there is currently not much political appetite for such proposals. Meanwhile, sovereign safe assets already offer many of the advantages of common safe assets. Sound fiscal policies and growth-stimulating reforms, which are in any case desirable, should be implemented to improve the credit ratings of euro-area sovereigns. This might not be politically feasible in the short-term, given the difficult economic environment currently faced by the EU, but it should be a key component of the EU’s medium-term safe asset strategy. Should the political consensus be found to create a common safe asset, such an asset could be incorporated into the euro area’s existing safe asset system, reinforcing its positive effects.
Topic:
Debt, Markets, Monetary Policy, European Union, Regional Integration, European Monetary Union, and Banking
Political Geography:
Europe

16. An assessment of Europe’s options for addressing the crisis in energy markets

Author:
Conall Heussaff, Simone Tagliapietra, Georg Zachmann, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, wholesale prices for electricity and gas in the European Union have risen five to fifteen-fold, with severe impacts for households and businesses. The crisis is also creating liquidity problems for energy companies, with contagion risks for the financial sector. In response, European governments have taken a range of actions. Some have introduced measures at retail level, while others have introduced windfall-profit taxes on energy companies. Some countries have provided emergency liquidity to energy companies facing soaring collateral costs. Some energy companies have even been nationalised. Emergency-intervention proposals should be evaluated against three principles. First, energy supply must meet demand at prices that do not cause major damage to the European economy. Second, the most vulnerable consumers must be protected. Third, measures should be consistent with the case for investment in a sustainable energy system, in order to safeguard Europe’s ability to decouple structurally from fossil-fuel imports. Gas price caps have been proposed as an emergency measure in different forms: a cap on Russian gas only, a cap on gas used in electricity generation, a cap on all wholesale gas. All entail significant risks. The first might lead to a full stop of Russian gas into the EU. The second might increase gas demand from the electricity sector. The third might raise gas demand and also undermine Europe’s ability to attract much-needed gas supplies. Instead of capping gas prices, the EU should engage collectively with external gas suppliers and negotiate new long-term contracts with provisions to limit price volatility. A September 2022 European Commission proposal involving electricity demand reduction, a revenue cap on inframarginal generation, solidarity payments from fossil-fuel companies and consumer support measures, is broadly positive, notably because it emphasises demand reduction. However, it is not sufficient. A more comprehensive plan needs to ensure that all countries bring forward every available supply-side flexibility, make real efforts to reduce gas and electricity demand, keep their energy markets open and pool demand to get a better deal from external gas suppliers. In the longer term, measures to split the markets for energy generated from renewables and fossil fuels should be examined.
Topic:
Markets, European Union, Energy Sector, and Green Economy
Political Geography:
Europe

17. A grand bargain to steer through the European Union’s energy crisis

Author:
Ben McWilliams, Giovanni Sgaravatti, Simone Tagliapietra, and Georg Zachmann
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Europe’s energy system faces unprecedented physical and institutional stress. The policy response so far has been excessively nationally focussed and could undermine the goals of calming energy markets over the next 18 months and achieving ambitious decarbonisation targets. At the basis of the crisis is a post-COVID-19 global energy imbalance. While demand bounced back quickly as economies re-opened, supply did not. A particular challenge is that the reducing supply of fossil fuels in line with climate targets has not been matched by a commensurate reduction of fossil-fuel demand. Russian manipulation of European natural gas markets since summer 2021, exploiting its significant market power, has deepened the crisis. Finally, events including weak French nuclear output and the ongoing drought, which has cut hydropower generation, have further escalated the situation. In response to high and volatile prices and forced demand reduction, European governments have tended to opt for narrow and uncoordinated measures that prioritise national security of supply and affordability over an integrated European approach. Subsidising energy consumption instead of demand reduction has been a common and misguided approach. Governments run the risk that energy consumption subsidies become unsustainable, eroding trust in energy markets, slowing action in sanctioning Russia and increasing the cost of the net-zero transition. An integrated European approach and a coordinated plan is essential to address the crisis. European Union leaders must strike a grand energy bargain based on four broad principles: (i) all countries bringing forward every available supply-side flexibility, (ii) all countries making comprehensive efforts to reduce demand, (iii) a political committing to maintain energy markets and cross-border flows, (iv) compensation for the most vulnerable consumers. This grand bargain can be the first step on a new course towards united energy policy at EU level.
Topic:
Markets, European Union, Crisis Management, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe

18. Australia’s semiconductor national moonshot

Author:
Alex Capri and Robert Clark
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Australia has recently been forced to cross a Rubicon. Its wholehearted embrace of global free trade and just-in-time supply chains has had to confront the hard reality of geopolitics. In many parts of the world, geopolitics is choking free trade, and China—Australia’s largest trading partner—has shown itself particularly willing to use trade coercively and abrogate its free trade commitments, not just with Australia, but with countries all around the world. Advanced technologies are at the centre of this geopolitical struggle, because of the risk that withheld supply poses to national economies and security. As Covid-19 disruptions have demonstrated, the risks are not even limited to deliberate coercion. In this environment, bold action is warranted. Continuing to do what we did before is not an option because it will undermine the national interest. A new approach is needed that’s in part heretical to our old market-based approach but is driven by necessity: government intervention that works in tandem with industry expertise and drive. In this important policy brief, Alex Capri and Robert Clark lay out a vision for Australia to secure its place in the global semiconductor industry—an industry they describe as ‘the single most important technology underlying leading-edge industries’. Their proposal is to stimulate A$5 billion of semiconductor manufacturing activity through A$1.5 billion of government investment and financial incentives. Those subsidies and tax concessions would mirror similar initiatives such as the US ‘CHIPS’ and ‘FABS’ Acts, but are focused on Australia’s interests. They identify a logical niche for Australia that would initially establish a distributed commercial compound semiconductor foundry capability across Australia via a public–private partnership. In the longer term, they propose establishing a commercial silicon complementary metal-oxide semiconductor foundry at mature process scale. Government intervention in a market shouldn’t be made lightly, but Capri and Clark make a compelling case to do so. If policymakers agree that Australia needs access to semiconductors and that their supply from elsewhere can’t be guaranteed, then intervention is imperative. This policy brief lays out a ‘moonshot’ to get Australia there.
Topic:
Markets, Trade, Supply Chains, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:
Australia and Australia/Pacific

19. The Price Cap on Russian Oil Exports, Explained

Author:
Catherine Wolfram, Simon Johnson, and Łukasz Rachel
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
If you’ve taken an introductory economics class, you were probably left with the strong impression that price caps are bad – they distort demand and discourage producers from supplying the market. So, why has Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, the consummate economist, advocated so strongly for a price cap on Russian oil? The answer is that this price cap is different from the standard cap discussed in introductory economics classes. A standard price cap applies to all goods traded in a market. For example, in some countries there are price caps on bread for everyone or diesel for farmers or rent controls on housing. Such caps lead to excess demand for the good and insufficient supply, leading to shortages at the capped price. If prices are constrained, other non-price mechanisms, like first-come-first-served, are required to allocate the good. All too frequently, the result is empty bakery shelves or fuel shortages or difficulties finding housing. To understand why the cap on Russian oil is different, we first need to provide background on Russian oil trade and the proposed price cap.
Topic:
Economics, Markets, Oil, Exports, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

20. Uncertain prospects for sovereign wealth funds of Gulf countries

Author:
Julien Maire, Adnan Mazarei, and Edwin M. Truman
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
Among the best-known sovereign wealth funds (SWFs)—government-owned or controlled investment vehicles—are those funded by hydrocarbon revenues in the member economies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which comprises all the Arab countries in the Persian Gulf except Iraq, namely Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. This Policy Brief compares the GCC SWFs with each other and with other funds in terms of their transparency and accountability on the fifth SWF scoreboard, available here. Several factors, including the decline in oil prices in recent years, have slowed the growth of the GCC’s SWFs. This slower growth could further diminish their governance and transparency standards, which are already weaker than those of other SWFs. Efforts to improve their governance and accountability will be important to garner public support for these SWFs.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Government, Markets, Governance, Regulation, and Capital Flows
Political Geography:
Middle East and Gulf Nations

21. Sovereign wealth funds are growing more slowly, and governance issues remain

Author:
Julien Maire, Adnan Mazarei, and Edwin M. Truman
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
In the last two decades, sovereign wealth funds (SWFs)—funds accumulated by a government that are invested in whole or in part abroad to benefit the country in the future—have faced increased public scrutiny over their investment patterns, financial results, and governance. This Policy Brief updates and expands a prototype scoreboard rating the transparency and accountability of SWFs, which Truman established in 2007. This fifth edition of the scoreboard shows that the average scores continued to improve for the 64 SWFs examined, but governance issues remain. New funds have emerged—many of them government holding companies or strategic investment funds—but the growth of assets under management by SWFs has slowed, in some cases partly because of withdrawals to help finance expenses related to the COVID-19 pandemic, raising questions about their future role.
Topic:
Government, Markets, Sovereign Wealth Funds, Governance, Regulation, and Capital
Political Geography:
Global Focus

22. Home advantage: How China’s protected market threatens Europe’s economic power

Author:
Agatha Kratz and Janka Oertel
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
China’s vast yet protected home market has allowed some of its firms to acquire a scale that provides them with significant advantages when they compete in other markets. These firms are able to undercut European companies both in the EU and around the world, including in sectors key to Europe’s future economy and security, from energy to telecommunications. The EU urgently needs to incorporate the concept and reality of this ‘protected home market advantage’ into its thinking on China. Europe can defend its own industries by adopting an integrated policy approach, working with like-minded partners around the world, and even prising open closed parts of China’s domestic market. The EU should also look to enhance its single market – both as a defensive measure and a way to improve its strategic sovereignty.
Topic:
Markets, European Union, Economy, Business, and Industry
Political Geography:
China and Europe

23. Accounting for climate policies in Europe’s sovereign debt market

Author:
Marta Dominguez-Jimenez and Alexander Lehmann
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
International debt investors increasingly demand assets that are aligned with environmental, social and governance objectives. Sovereign debt is being belatedly swept up in this change. This huge asset class represents a uniquely long-term claim and funds a wide range of public expenditure, both brown and green. Public capital expenditures will be a central part of the roughly €3 trillion investment budget needed to pay for the European Green Deal. European Union countries have so far met investor appetite for climate-aligned assets through sovereign green bonds, the issuance of which has rapidly grown since 2017. The EU itself will also issue green bonds in large volumes. However, because of some inherent flaws in such instruments and as their still-weak frameworks, these bonds are unlikely to meet the environmental criteria demanded by investors, and will complicate established principles in sovereign debt management. Much more comprehensive information is needed on the climate related aspects of the public budgets of EU countries. Greater transparency in this respect would support stability and improve the functioning of capital markets, given that sovereign debt plays a pivotal role in all investor portfolios and also in regulatory and monetary policy. Adoption by sovereign issuers of green budgeting principles, based on a common taxonomy of sustainable activities, would enhance transparency. It could also be driven by investors who, under new EU rules, must disclose the climate-related aspects of all financial instruments offered in the capital market.
Topic:
Climate Change, Debt, Markets, Sovereignty, European Union, Finance, and Sustainability
Political Geography:
Europe

24. Using Advance Market Commitments for Public Purpose Technology Development

Author:
Alan Ho and Jake Taylor
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Over the last year, there has been a renewed focus on improving American competitiveness in key fields of science and technology. Numerous bills and executive initiatives have been implemented or proposed to dramatically increase investment into science and technology. Recent examples, including the Endless Frontiers and the Clean Futures Act, use a wide variety of policy tools to advance research and development (R&D) along multiple axis. Here we consider the free market portion of these tools, in which the private sector plays a key role in determining topic and direction, while the public sector supports these activities through high-level directives, conditional contracts, and other mechanisms. While other approaches such as public purpose consortia and R&D tax credits have been considered elsewhere, here we focus on Advance Market Commitments. Advance Market Commitments (AMCs)are a powerful policy tool that can be used to ensure that America can retain leadership in technology fields such as climate change, computing, and medicine. In an AMC, a U.S. agency commits to buying some specified new technology before that technology exists. This provides a price, specification, and framework for evaluation that can streamline decision making and funding approaches in the private sector and accelerate progress towards well defined technical outcomes without being directed about the underlying solution and steps along the path. As such, AMCs represent a powerful option for ground-up technological building where private investment replaces the role of more traditional, blue sky government funding, and the larger market for the resulting product is jump-started by an initial government market.
Topic:
Markets, Science and Technology, and Vaccine
Political Geography:
Global Focus

25. South Korea’s New Southern Policy as an Open Regime: A View from Southeast Asia

Author:
Aaron Jed Rabena
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
There are four ways on how the NSP Plus could be further improved. First, to avoid policy limitations and maximize the room for supply chain resiliency and functional cooperation, the coverage of the NSP countries can be expanded apart from ASEAN and India. Second, South Korea can employ the concept of Third-Party Market Cooperation (TPMC) or the pursuit of joint ventures or partnerships with other countries in maximizing capacity-building in third countries (NSP countries). Third, South Korea can help strengthen ASEAN institution-building, regionalism and internal balancing by applying a similar policy framework to the Brunei-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA) just as it does to the Mekong Region. Fourth, there needs to be more reciprocity or two-way interaction in the NSP so as to not make it seem that ASEAN is only on the receiving end of South Korean generosity. Finally, it is important to note that a change in the South Korean administration does not necessarily spell the end of the NSP just as the US’ Pivot or Rebalance to Asia of the Obama Administration was remodeled to the Indo-Pacific under the Trump administration.
Topic:
Markets, Regional Cooperation, and ASEAN
Political Geography:
India, Asia, South Korea, and Southeast Asia

26. Xi Jinping’s Evergrande Dilemma

Author:
John Lee
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Evergrande is one of the top-two real estate developers in a still highly fragmented Chinese sector. Its main strategy is to achieve ever-increasing scale (rather than profitability) in order to move ahead of and crowd out commercial competitors. It has also amassed the largest land reserves of all Chinese developers, which were financed through massive borrowings. By 2018, Evergrande held 822 pieces of undeveloped land in 228 cities, with a planned gross floor area of 3.28 billion square feet of new homes—the equivalent of 10 percent of Germany’s entire housing stock. It paid $75 billion just for this undeveloped land. Although Evergrande’s market share is only around 4 percent, its borrowings stand out. Its current balance sheet liabilities amount to an estimated 2 percent of China’s gross domestic product (GDP), while its off-balance-sheet liabilities could be another 1 percent of China’s GDP. This makes Evergrande the most indebted property developer in the world. Burdened by this debt, struggling to meet its debt interest and repayment obligations, and viable only if property asset values and sales continue to increase, Evergrande faces possible financial collapse—an event bound to have flow-on effects for the Chinese economy. However, the unusually high global interest in Evergrande has arisen because its woes are increasingly seen as symptomatic of those faced by the broader Chinese economy, which is struggling with enormous levels of indebtedness and overreliance on the real estate sector. Debt held by nonfinancial institutions in China increased from about 115 percent of GDP in 2010 to around 160 percent of GDP currently. This is the most rapid and largest increase in a 10-year period for any major economy and makes the level of debt held by Chinese nonfinancial institutions one of the highest in the world. The real estate sector accounts for around 15 percent of GDP, while property services account for another 14 percent—the highest in any developing economy. The share of the real estate sector as a proportion of GDP was only about 4 percent in 1997 and 9 percent in 2008. Since 2008, up to a third of all domestic fixed investment has gone into real estate, and up to half of total national debt is linked to the real estate sector.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Debt, Economics, Markets, and Business
Political Geography:
China and Asia

27. How IP Rights Keep Markets Free

Author:
Jonathan M. Barnett
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
It is elementary that secure protection of property rights is a necessary precondition for efficient markets that drive economic growth. Yet this principle is not always recognized in the case of markets for intangible goods. Rather, intellectual property rights are often characterized as a monopoly franchise that stands at odds with free-market competition. Following this view, IP rights at best provide a justifiable means to incentivize innovation but are prone to abuse by incumbents seeking to block entrants. This standard narrative overlooks an inconvenient fact. As I show in a new book, Innovators, Firms, and Markets: The Organizational Logic of Intellectual Property, incumbents and other large firms in US technology markets have regularly advocated against stronger forms of patent protection and, in certain industries, have resisted patent protection entirely. This lobbying strategy poses a puzzle: Why would dominant firms resist the opportunity to operate under the umbrella of a legal monopoly? This policy memo analyzes the counterintuitive IP policy preferences of large technology firms and, in resolving this apparent anomaly, shows that patents tend to enhance competitive intensity by enabling idea-rich but capital-poor innovators to challenge idea-poor but capital-rich incumbents. Contrary to widespread assumptions, IP rights are far closer to the familiar property rights that support tangible goods markets rather than the monopoly grant to which they are often (and misleadingly) analogized. These insights, which are based on over a century’s worth of US innovation history, raise significant concerns about the IP-skeptical trajectory that policymakers have pursued since the mid-2000s.
Topic:
Markets, Intellectual Property/Copyright, Law, and Criminal Justice
Political Geography:
Global Focus

28. Merger Review Regimes in the ASEAN Region and Case Analysis of Grab-Uber Merger

Author:
Yungshin Jang and Gu Sang Kang
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
In 2018, the largest yet cross-border M&A deal between digital platforms in Southeast Asia was reached, namely the Grab-Uber M&A case. The local digital platform Grab consolidated the regional operations of San Francisco, California-based Uber, a development which had significant effects on competition and consumer welfares in the Southeast Asia digital market. The competition authorities in the region independently initiated their investigation and started to deliberate the merger case to determine the anti-competitive effects on their domestic market, and to decide whether this transaction should be restricted or approved. Even though the two merging and merged firms completed their transactions, each authority applied different logic and imposed different remedies in deciding the case. Authorities in some member states such as Singapore and the Philippines decided that the Grab-Uber merger was anti-competitive, while others such as Indonesia and Viet Nam considered the merger not anti-competitive. Upon this backdrop, this article reviews the competition policies and laws of four major ASEAN countries – Indonesia, Singapore, Viet Nam, and the Philippines – from institutional and legal perspectives, focusing on M&A review regimes. Then, we briefly introduce how these com-petition authorities decided on the Grab-Uber merger case, also analyzing the competition effects of the case on the ride-hailing market in the countries. Based on the analysis results, we propose overseas competition policies for Korea.
Topic:
Markets, Economy, Business, ASEAN, Economic Competition, and Mergers and Acquisitions
Political Geography:
Indonesia, South Korea, Vietnam, Philippines, and Singapore

29. Korea’s Strategy on Trade Agreements with Developing Countries in Africa and the Pacific Regions

Author:
Meeryung La
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
As the US-China trade conflict intensifies, high dependence on US and China has been pointed out as a potential risk to the Korean economy. This calls for trade policies including diversification of trading partners and the establishment of a new model for trade agreements suitable to such diversified partners. Meanwhile, the necessity for such policies grows as protectionism spreads globally and trade order changes after the Covid-19 pandemic. Africa and the Pacific (AP) regions, the main areas of interest in this report, have been excluded from Korea’s FTA network despite their high growth potential and strategic significance. Most countries in the AP regions are geographically distant from Korea and mostly underdeveloped, so we have approached the region only in terms of development cooperation. Currently, trade agreements and systems for trade and investment with AP countries are insufficient, and the size of economic cooperation with these countries remains small. However, Africa has high market potential, owing to various factors such as its high population growth, middle-class growth, and transition to digital economy, while the Pacific island countries have abundant fisheries and marine resources, and wield voting power in international organizations. In this regard, it is necessary to build the foundation for cooperation with AP countries in the mid-to-long term. Against this backdrop, this study seeks mid- to long-term strategies to promote trade cooperation with AP countries. First we consider introducing and expanding nonreciprocal arrangements for developing countries in the AP regions, as currently provided to United Nations-defined least developed countries. Then we consider introducing a reciprocal trade agreement, for example, an FTA. As a result, we found that it is necessary to introduce an FTA model suitable for developing countries in the AP regions instead of introducing further nonreciprocal agreements. Based on the results of the study, this paper proposes strategic directions for trade cooperation with the AP regions, and furthermore, provides policy suggestions that should be included in the agreement with those countries.
Topic:
Markets, Treaties and Agreements, Partnerships, Digital Economy, Economy, and Trade
Political Geography:
Africa, Asia, South Korea, and Asia-Pacific

30. Changes in the Regional Structure of China's Domestic Market and Implications

Author:
Jihyun Jung, Won Seok Choi, Hong Won Kim, and Joohye Kim
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
In response to intensifying conflict with the United States and the shock of Covid-19, China reinforced its strategy to expand domestic demand. China's domestic market is an important factor affecting Korea's exports and economic growth. Accordingly, a large body of research has been conducted in Korea on China's expansion policy and changes in its domestic market. However, most studies have analyzed changes in China's consumer market, import market and imported items, limiting the overall understanding of China's domestic economy. In addition, most studies on China's regional domestic market have analyzed the market segmented by region. Recognizing this gap, this study expanded the scope of analysis of the domestic market in China to the entire domestic final demand, and analyzed inter-regional trade relations and other economic relations based on an inter-regional input-output analysis, which has rarely been attempted in analyses of the Chinese domestic market. In addition, the changes in the regional structure of the Chinese import market and Korea's competitiveness were analyzed using Chinese trade statistics. In particular, by synthesizing the changes after the global financial crisis, a turning point in China's economic structure, we project future changes in the regional economic structure of China, which emphasizes the independence of its domestic economy. In addition, in the era of US-China conflict, the study aimed to select regional markets meaningful to Korea, and to present strategic directions toward China focusing on regional cooperation and approaches into the domestic market.
Topic:
Markets, Economy, Regional Economy, and Domestic Market
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and South Korea

31. Analysis of Determinants of Foreign Capital Flow: Focused on Interest Rate and Exchange

Author:
Deok Ryong Yoon, Wongho Song, and Jinhee Lee
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
As the linkage between domestic and foreign financial markets grows stronger, concerns have been raised about the inflow and outflow of foreign investment capital as a source of financial instability whenever the financial market becomes unstable. Considering that opening the capital market is not an option, it becomes essential to examine the determinants of foreign investment to maximize the benefits of foreign capital inflows and outflows for sound growth in the real sector as well as the financial sector. Accordingly, this study attempts to produce evidence-based policy implications by empirically analyzing the determinants of the inflow and outflow of foreign investment funds.
Topic:
Foreign Exchange, Markets, Capital Flows, Investment, and Interest Rates
Political Geography:
Global Focus

32. RCEP Is Not Enough: South Korea Also Needs to Join the CPTPP

Author:
Jeffrey J. Schott
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
The benefits of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) for South Korea are limited and need to be supplemented by more comprehensive agreements that deepen Korea’s ties to strategic allies in the Asia-Pacific region. RCEP's most important achievement is its new regional content rule that will encourage deeper integration of supply chains across the 15 markets, a key benefit for Korean industries invested in the region. But Schott notes that the pact also has significant limitations. To complement RCEP, he recommends that South Korea move forward with two other trade negotiating priorities, membership in the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and upgrading the Korea-US Free Trade Agreement (KORUS), the latter aimed at encouraging US reengagement in the Asia-Pacific integration pact.
Topic:
Markets, Treaties and Agreements, Partnerships, Regional Integration, and Economic Policy
Political Geography:
Asia and South Korea

33. Collateral benefits? South Korean exports to the United States and the US-China trade war

Author:
Mary Lovely, David Xu, and Yinhan Zhang
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
This Policy Brief assesses the extent to which the United States increased its imports from South Korea after the US imposition of tariffs on Chinese exports. Korea benefited from this shift in US imports, although the increase was relatively small in most sectors. The authors use highly disaggregated US import and tariff data to examine adjustments in US purchases of manufactured goods from its trade partners. Their analysis indicates that Korea made a small gain in the US market following the levying of US tariffs on Chinese exports, with Korea’s share of overall US manufacturing imports rising 0.9 percent and its share of US manufacturing imports subject to trade war tariffs rising 1.0 percent. Gains were spread across a variety of manufacturing sectors—such as wood products, textiles and apparel, and machinery—reflecting both the choices made by US officials regarding which Chinese exports to tax and the nature of preexisting trade relationships between South Korea and the United States.
Topic:
Markets, Economy, Trade Wars, and Exports
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America