Search

Begin New Search Topic Defense Policy Content Type Policy Brief Publication Year within 1 Year

1. Rebooting the Entente: An Agenda for Renewed UK-France Defense Cooperation

Author:
Alice Billon-Galland and Élie Tenenbaum
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The Franco-British Summit on March 10th, 2023, will mark a much-needed reset in bilateral cooperation, following years of strained relations. With a recently re-elected French president and a new British Prime minister, both sides are committed to making this summit a success and re-launching a positive agenda for bilateral cooperation. The summit, the first since Sandhurst in 2018, will focus on three key topics: migration, energy, and foreign policy. Defense cooperation will also be addressed, as it remains the cornerstone of the bilateral relationship, though it may take a less prominent part than on previous occasions. Rebooting the Entente: An Agenda for Renewed UK-France Defense Cooperation Download 1.38 Mo Several concrete topics for joint work should therefore be discussed and agreed, from strategic discussions on European security frameworks to joint operational deployments and capability projects. It is crucial to ensure that the symbolic reset of the bilateral relationship at the summit leads to a realistic yet ambitious defense roadmap, with concrete commitments and deliverables. As the Franco-British Summit approaches, defense cooperation remains the cornerstone of the bilateral relationship. As the war in Ukraine continues, it increases the rationale for resuming closer UK-France defense cooperation. Lessons needs to be drawn from the Lancaster House Treaties : overly ambitious and structuring plans are less likely to succeed than pragmatic, budget-conscious and ready-to-use projects. The need to prepare for high-intensity warfare opens new perspectives for capability development in all domains and for operational cooperation across the globe. This Briefing is part of a joint Chatham House-IFRI research project, the "Cross-Channel Strategic Dialogue", investigating prospects for UK-France defence and security cooperation.
Topic:
Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and High Intensity Warfare
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, Ukraine, and France

2. Harnessing allied space capabilities

Author:
Robert Murray, Tiffany Vora, and Nicholas Eftimiades
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The United States’ vast network of alliances and partnerships offers a competitive advantage—this is especially evident in outer space. Often characterized as a global commons, space holds value for all humankind across commercial, exploration, and security vectors. As technological advancements trigger a proliferation in spacefaring nations, the United States and its allies and partners are confronted with new challenges to and opportunities for collective action. This series examines how US space strategy can recognize the comparative advantages of allies and partners in space and best harness allied capabilities.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, International Trade and Finance, National Security, Science and Technology, Space, Institutions, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:
Europe, Eurasia, Canada, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

3. Integrating US and allied capabilities to ensure security in space

Author:
Nicholas Eftimiades
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Over the last two decades, the world entered a new paradigm in the use of space, namely the introduction of highly capable small satellites, just tens or hundreds of kilograms in size. This paradigm has forever changed how countries will employ space capabilities to achieve economic, scientific, and national security interests. As is so often the case, the telltale signs of this global paradigm shift were obvious to more than just a few individuals or industries. Air Force Research Laboratory’s Space Vehicles Directorate began exploring the use of small satellites in the 1990s. The Air Force also established the Operationally Responsive Space program in 2007, which explored the potential use of small satellites. However, both research efforts had no impact on the US Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) satellite acquisition programs. The advancement of small satellites was largely driven by universities and small commercial start-up companies.1 The introduction of commercial and government small satellites has democratized space for states and even individuals. Space remote sensing and communications satellites, once the exclusive domain of the United States and Soviet Union, can now provide space-based services to anyone with a credit card. Eighty-eight countries currently operate satellites, and the next decade will likely see the launch of tens of thousands of new satellites.2 Commercial and government small satellites have changed outer space into a more contested, congested, and competitive environment. The United States has shared space data with its allies since the dawn of the space age.3 Yet it also has a history of operating independently in space. Other domains of warfare and defense policy are more closely integrated between the United States and its allies and partners. The United States has military alliances with dozens of countries and strategic partnerships with many more.4 In recent years, there have been calls to coordinate with, or even integrate allied space capabilities into US national security space strategy and plans. In this regard, the US government has made significant advances. However, much work needs to be done. There is pressure on the United States to act quickly to increase national security space cooperation and integration, driven by rapidly increasing global capabilities and expanding threats from hostile nations and orbital debris. This paper examines the potential strategic benefits to US national security of harnessing allied space capabilities and the current efforts to do so, as well as barriers to achieving success. The paper identifies pathways forward for cooperating with allies and strategic partners on their emerging space capabilities and the potential of integrating US and allied capabilities.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, National Security, European Union, and Space
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Canada, North America, and United States of America

4. Beyond launch: Harnessing allied space capabilities for exploration purposes

Author:
Tiffany Vora
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The “United States Space Priorities Framework,” released in December 2021, confirmed the White House’s commitment to American leadership in space.1 Space activities deliver immense benefits to humankind. For example, satellite imaging alone is crucial for improvements in daily life such as weather monitoring as well as for grand challenges like the fight against climate change. Such breakthrough discoveries in space pave the way for innovation and new economies on Earth. Exploration is at the cutting edge of this process: it expands humankind’s knowledge of the universe, transforming the unknown into the supremely challenging, expensive, risky, and promising. US allies and partners accelerate this transformation via scientific and technical achievements as well as processes, relationships, and a shared vision for space exploration. By integrating these allied capabilities, the United States and its allies and partners set the stage for safe and prosperous space geopolitics and economy in the decades to come. However, harnessing the capabilities of US allies and partners for space exploration is complex, requiring the balance of relatively short-term progress with far-horizon strategy. Space exploration has changed since the US-Soviet space race of the 1960s. In today’s rapidly evolving technological and geopolitical environment, it is unclear whether the processes, relationships, and vision that previously enabled allied cooperation in space, epitomized by the International Space Station (ISS), will keep pace. Here, China is viewed as the preeminent competitor for exploration goals and capabilities—as well as the major competitor for long-term leadership in space.2 This development drives fears of space militarization and weaponization, prompting protectionist legislation, investment screening, and industrial policies that can disrupt collaboration among the United States and its key allies and partners.3 Further complication stems from the rise of commercial space, with opportunities and challenges due to the decentralization, democratization, and demonetization of technologies for robotic and crewed space exploration. This paper serves as a primer for current US space exploration goals and capabilities that will be critical to achieving them. It highlights arenas where US allies and partners are strongly positioned to jointly accelerate space exploration while also benefitting life on Earth. This paper concludes with recommended actions—gleaned from interviews with international experts in space exploration—for the US government as well as allied and partner governments to increase the number and impact of global stakeholders in space exploration, to remove friction in collaboration, and to guide the future of space toward democratic values.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, National Security, Science and Technology, European Union, Partnerships, and Space
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

5. How allied Sweden and Finland can secure Northern Europe

Author:
Anna Wieslander, Eric Adamson, and Jesper Lehto
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
NATO is approaching its ninth round of enlargement. The accession of Sweden and Finland—two solid democracies and defenders of the international-rules based order—into the Alliance will strengthen the core of the transatlantic community. Their NATO membership opens up new opportunities to bolster regional deterrence and defense in Northern Europe, increase transatlantic burden sharing, and secure the Alliance as a whole in ways not previously possible. This issue brief sets the stage by suggesting that the Alliance use the accession of Sweden and Finland to create an ambitious deterrence-by-denial “bubble” over Northern Europe. Such a strategy does not merely include military capabilities but must be underpinned by civil robustness and resilience that stretch across NATO territory. Operationally, allies in Northern Europe should prepare to assume greater responsibility as first responders in case of a severe security situation, below or at the level of Article 5. For this to succeed, political cooperation and agenda setting must intensify among Northern European allies.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Alliance, and Resilience
Political Geography:
Finland, Sweden, and Northern Europe

6. The promises and perils of law-making as the way to strengthen societal resilience

Author:
Amelie Theussen
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Societal resilience is seen as a key answer to the deteriorating security situation, especially in the Baltic Sea region. States often employ new laws in an attempt to strengthen resilience, but is legislation the best way to build stronger societies? There is an underlying mismatch between the dynamism of resilience and the static nature of laws. Resilience entails the capacity to bounce back flexibly from crises. Laws should be formulated so as to nurture such flexibility. Democratic accountability might be at risk when laws are used in the quest for strengthened resilience.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Resilience, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Baltic States

7. Governing Outer Space – legal issues mounting at the final frontier

Author:
Hjalte Osborn Frandsen
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
In 2022, the private space firm SpaceX successfully launched 61 rockets, adding hundreds of satellites to its burgeoning, globe-spanning mega-constellation. SpaceX´s Starlink-project now comprises more than 3,000 satellites. For comparison, the European Space Agency launched six rockets in 2022 and operates less than 50 satellites in total. In the span of a few years, private space companies have dethroned nation states as the dominant actors in outer space. Today the vast majority of satellites are owned and controlled by commercial companies. During the first months of the Russian assault on Ukraine, several commercial space companies stepped in to provide vital satellite images and space-based Internet in support of the Ukrainian defense. This exemplifies the three currently dominant trends of human space activities: expansion, securitization and privatization. The global space industry is undergoing the most fundamental and swift changes since the original space race ended when Neil Armstrong placed the first boot marks on the moon in 1969. The rapid changes raise a number of serious governance issues in areas such as national security, environmental protection and the rule of law in outer space. Denmark, Europe and the international community at large all have an acute interest in insisting on space being a global commons in which conduct can and should be regulated to benefit all of humanity – not just a few profit-seeking billionaire-owned space companies. Developments in the space industry are fast and accelerating. As with other global governance issues, like climate and cyber issues, achieving global accord on new regulations for space activities will be difficult and time-consuming, so prudent policymakers should get started right away.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Governance, Law, and Space
Political Geography:
Global Focus

8. What shall we do with the suspected pirates? Why piracy prosecution doesn't always work

Author:
Jessica Larsen
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
In African waters, incidents of piracy still far outweigh apprehensions, leaving few suspects to prosecute. Those who are prosecuted may face either impunity or legal uncertainty, because the illegal act of piracy is difficult to prove in some cases. There are steps that the states involved in counter-piracy should take to address these challenges. Piracy has been a constant issue of concern since the early 2000s in the waters off East and West Africa, albeit with numbers of incidents fluctuating with seasons and geography. The international community has in both theatres developed a practice, where international navies patrol the waters and hand over suspects for prosecution in regional states. But bringing piracy suspects to justice faces many challenges. This policy brief points to the main issues and possible solutions.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Water, Governance, Piracy, and Maritime
Political Geography:
Africa

9. From “Forward ­Presence” to ­“Forward Defense”: Germany Must Strengthen ­NATO’s Northeastern Flank in Lithuania

Author:
Aylin Matlé
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
Issues of deterrence and defense along NATO’s northeastern flank have been a greater focus of NATO members since the ­Russian attack on Ukraine began. Particularly in the Baltic States, there is a determination to protect every inch of the Alliance’s territory against a possible Russian attack. To prevent such a ­scenario, NATO is making military adjustments to which Germany will have to increase its contribution.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Europe, Lithuania, and Germany

10. German Defense Spending: A Repeat of the Past Instead of a New Era

Author:
Christian Mölling, Torben Schütz, and Sören Hellmonds
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
The historic aspiration of Germany’s Zeitenwende – the new era in its foreign and security policy – will fail without the proposed funding. The growing tension between its demands for the Bundeswehr and missing resources is already driving Germany back to the old and shortsighted approach of cutting and stretching budgets and fragile procurement plans. The country needs a security decade: a ten-year systematic spending effort that closes its substantial security gap. Without sustainable funding for military security and other existential government tasks, Germany will continue to pose a risk to itself and others.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Budget, and Defense Spending
Political Geography:
Europe and Germany

11. Climate change and security: Preparing for different impacts

Author:
Emma Hakala
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
As the disastrous impacts of climate change are already visible, the need to respond to them becomes increasingly urgent. Yet there is still a lack of understanding about the comprehensive security impacts of climate change. Climate security impacts tend to be complex as they often take shape through chains of compounded effects. This makes them difficult to fully comprehend, and in the absence of adequate situational awareness, policy responses are likely to fall short. The paper aims to contribute to a better understanding of climate security by providing concrete illustrations of potential direct, cascading and transition impacts. Impacts like forest fires, a heatwave in Europe and increased wind energy production all challenge Finland’s security in various ways, such as threatening human health and livelihoods, fuelling political polarisation and creating new supply chain risks. Strategic foresight, international cooperation and well-planned climate policy can help to counteract climate risks.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Climate Change, and Governance
Political Geography:
Global Focus

12. The role of space technologies in power politics: Mitigating strategic dependencies through space resilience

Author:
Markus Holmgren
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Space activity is experiencing a boom with the scope and importance of space technologies and services fuelling rapid growth upon growth. While the space boom is catalysing transferral of the ownership of previously public infrastructure and capabilities to corporate control, many space technologies have critically important military and civilian applications. As the importance of space sectors grows, both public and private cyberoperations targeting space infrastructure proliferate. This makes it more difficult to attribute the perpetrators of cyber operations. The United States’ lead in the space sector is increasing. Starlink, a satellite internet constellation operated by the US-based company SpaceX, will serve to bind many nations to one more US-controlled communication architecture. As a result of the implications of space technologies for comprehensive security, building space resilience is becoming paramount. States must diversify their supply of space-related services and tighten cooperation with like-minded states.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Economic Policy, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:
Europe and Finland

13. Russian aggression and the European Arctic: Avoiding the trap of Arctic exceptionalism

Author:
Harri Mikkola, Samu Paukkunen, and Pekka Toveri
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
In its efforts to limit the Western defence posture in the Arctic, Russia has successfully exploited the “High North, low tension” mantra and the notion of the Arctic as an exceptional region of peace and cooperation. At the same time, Russia has managed to build its position of relative strength in the Arctic through systematically developing its military capabilities. To create a threat of escalation, Russia has also used offensive military exercises and disruptive hybrid operations against the Western Arctic states in the region. Arctic economic resources and military assets continue to play an essential role for Russia in pursuing its strategic goals, and for its ability to carry out acts of aggression. Through regional cooperative practices, the West has unintentionally facilitated this capacity. The West has limited its military activity in the Arctic to mitigate tensions. This has been a one-sided effort. The Western Arctic states should thus focus on building comprehensive deterrence in the region.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Affairs, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Arctic

14. Mexico’s domestic decay: Implications for the United States and Europe

Author:
Lauri Tahtinen
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) has challenged Mexico’s democratic institutions, including the electoral commission INE, and relies on the military to run sectors of the economy and to provide internal security. Recognizing the continuing strategic importance of its southern neighbor, the United States is attempting to “friend-shore” American industry to Mexico despite trade disputes. Mexico’s economic convergence with the US is giving way to ideological divergence. In the past year, Mexico has called NATO’s stance on Ukraine “immoral” and openly aligned with the leftist, anti-US dictators of Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. Mexico’s internal development and shifting external stance could spark a return to a United States focused on the protection of its 19th-century borders instead of its 20th-century global footprint. European attention to the future of Mexico can help diversify the country’s trade and other partnerships, as well as shine a light on its democratic decay.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Democracy, Europe, and Economic Policy
Political Geography:
Europe, Latin America, North America, Mexico, and United States of America

15. NATO and the Indo-Pacific Region

Author:
Iro Särkkä
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Amid Russia’s war in Ukraine, NATO has paid much less attention to global security issues, such as China’s potentially menacing activities in the Indo-Pacific region. But there too, the deteriorating geopolitical environment calls for NATO to take a stronger cooperative and consultative role. This brief explores why NATO is deepening cooperation with the Indo-Pacific partners. It discusses both NATO’s and individual Allies’security concerns in the region and compares them with those of Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and New Zealand (the AP4).1 It also outlines the development of NATO’s Indo-Pacific partnerships with the AP4 as part of its cooperative security agenda, from the early 2000s to the present day. Finally, it considers how NATO’s cooperative security dialogue is likely to develop in the future and what might be expected at the forthcoming Vilnius Summit.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Deterrence, Strategic Planning, and Defense Spending
Political Geography:
Europe, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

16. Military Command and Control

Author:
Gintaras Bagdonas
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
NATO's current military Command and Control (C2) structure was designed for forces engaged in crisis management and expeditionary operations, not territorial defence. It will thus not be suitable for implementing NATO’s new regional defence plans, or for building credible deterrence and defence. A new military C2 structure that clarifies the geographical areas of responsibility of the Joint Force Commands (JFCs) and treats the Baltic Sea region as indivisible is needed. NATO must also improve C2 at the tactical level through the establishment of tactical- (component-) level commands, perhaps building upon the existing corps headquarters. The Baltic states, meanwhile, are establishing divisional structures which will further develop their military capabilities and give them new opportunities to act with Allies under corps command. They may, however, face challenges in implementing these ambitious plans due to a shortage of resources.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Military, and Command and Control
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America

17. NATO’s new Defence Plans

Author:
Mārtiņš Vargulis
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
NATO’s Vilnius Summit, the second summit to be held in the Baltic states after the one in Riga in 2006, will be a pivotal event with immense importance for the security of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. NATO summits are crucial milestones for the Alliance. Political guidance for operational plans, priorities for strengthening defence capabilities, and policies guiding NATO’s daily business are agreed at the highest level. The Vilnius Summit will play a vital role in reflecting on the progress made since the last summit in Madrid, seeking consensus on various key issues, and providing taskings for further work. These include several items that are critical from the perspective of the three Baltic states.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Europe, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, and Baltic States

18. NATO’s Posture on the North-East Flank

Author:
Toms Rostoks
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
At NATO’s Madrid Summit in June 2022, the Allies agreed to bolster enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) by deploying “additional robust in-place combat-ready forces on our eastern flank, to be scaled up from the existing battlegroups to brigade-size units where and when required, underpinned by credible rapidly available reinforcements, prepositioned equipment, and enhanced command and control”.1 The Baltic states had fought hard for a more robust NATO military presence to deter Russia and to provide a realistic chance of defending every square inch of NATO territory against a Russian attack. It has turned out, however, that moving from battlegroups to brigades—and thus towards forward defence— has been more difficult than the Baltic states anticipated.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Baltic States

19. French Nuclear Policy

Author:
Jean-Louis Lozier
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
France’s independent nuclear deterrence has been the main pillar of its defence strategy for sixty years. The French nuclear policy, as well as its European and allied dimensions, however, tends to be misunderstood abroad, including by those who rely on French military involvement in the pursuit of their national security goals. French nuclear deterrence is, first and foremost, strictly conceived as defensive. It is designed to protect the country’s vital interests and ensure its sovereignty and freedom of action, with the fundamental purpose to prevent a major war that would threaten those vital interests. In the wake of the war in Ukraine and Russian nuclear sabre-rattling, the value of French deterrent for European security has been raised once again. Not so long ago, President Emmanuel Macron confirmed that France’s vital interests have a European dimension. Allies must understand that France does not intend to replace the U.S. extended deterrence but rather wishes to enhance and strengthen Europe’s common defence in a more uncertain security environment. Hence, there should be a shared interest to engage in a strategic dialogue on common threats and challenges before they have materialised.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Europe and France

20. New Compact, Renewed Impetus: Enhancing the EU’s Ability to Act Through its Civilian CSDP

Author:
Timo Smit
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
In May 2023, European Union (EU) member states adopted a new compact to further strengthen the EU’s civilian Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The new Civilian CSDP Compact succeeds the compact established in 2018 and is in line with the 2022 Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, in particular its objective to increase the EU’s ability to act whenever crises emerge. While most stakeholders agree that the old compact was a worthwhile initiative, EU member states under-delivered on the commitments to increase national contributions and raise the number and share of seconded personnel in civilian CSDP missions. The new compact doubles down on these commitments—not only by renewing them but also by refining them, and by raising the level of ambition when it comes to capability development and increasing women’s representation. Among other things, this has implications for the review process of the new compact, which this paper recommends that the European External Action Service and EU member states consider before setting the process in motion.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, European Union, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Europe

21. Primer: Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s Visit to the United States

Author:
John Lee
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
While Ukraine, Gaza, and climate change will feature heavily on the agenda during Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s visit to Washington, DC, the most important and enduring issue between the two countries is progressing AUKUS (Australia–United Kingdom–United States) as the key ANZUS (Australia–New Zealand–United States) contemporary alliance initiative. If the AUKUS arrangement stalls and fails to have a meaningful impact on the strategic and military balance of power, then America’s regional allies and partners will lose faith that a reinvigorated American-led alliance system can serve as a check on Chinese power. America’s slow progress to reform the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) is an immense frustration for Australian and American proponents of AUKUS. However, concerns regarding inadequate investment in the American military industrial base are reasonable and legitimate. Australian defense policy is underfunded and lacks urgency despite defense analysts’ assessment that the strategic environment is rapidly deteriorating. Australian underperformance will increase skepticism of AUKUS in both countries. Both countries need to undertake much more detailed scenario planning and commit to the agreed sharing of burdens and responsibilities to deter or defeat China.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and AUKUS
Political Geography:
Australia, North America, and United States of America

22. The Missing Pieces of a Kerch Bridge Strike: Give Ukraine What It Needs to Isolate Crimea and Gain the Initiative

Author:
Bryan Clark and Can Kasapoglu
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The war in Ukraine is at a critical juncture both on the ground and in the capitols of Ukraine’s main supporters. Aid to Kyiv is now a point of contention in the United States Congress, which had to remove Ukraine support from a short-term funding package to avoid a government shutdown. Overseas, China’s intensified aggression toward its neighbors and Hamas’s terror campaign against Israel are beginning to stretch US attention and resources across multiple theaters. With half of Ukraine’s post-invasion military and humanitarian assistance coming from the United States, softening support in Washington could cause other North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies to pare back their contributions as well. To sustain US and NATO support and put Russia on the defensive going into winter, Ukraine’s military will need to change the dynamics of a counteroffensive that has been slow to retake Russian-held territory. Cutting off Crimea from Russia and forcing Moscow’s troops to protect an isolated peninsula is the kind of change that would prove Ukraine is able to win the war, rather than merely fight to a draw. With the “land bridge” across southern Ukraine already under attack, the Kerch Strait bridge carries much of the ammunition and supplies going into Crimea. If the bridge were impassable, Russia would need to redouble its efforts to defend southern Ukraine, drawing troops away from the east and north and potentially enabling Kyiv to make more rapid gains along those fronts before winter. Ukraine has already attacked the Kerch Bridge several times during the war, with air-launched missiles, drone boats, and semisubmersibles. The most successful strike, via a truck bomb, damaged the bridge but did not stop its use. Eliminating the 12-mile-long span as a factor in the war will require a sustained series of long-range strikes structured to defeat Russian defenses and supported by a few new pieces of Western military hardware.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Missile Defense, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

23. Time to Recalibrate America’s Middle East Policy

Author:
Raphael BenLevi and Michael Doran
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Our understanding of reality in the Middle East has changed significantly in the last seven years. At a conference on US-Israel relations in 2016, then Secretary of State John Kerry highlighted, now famously, the impossibility of Israel making peace with the Gulf states. In an obvious reference to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his associates, Kerry said, “I’ve heard several prominent politicians in Israel sometimes saying, ‘Well, the Arab world is in a different place now. We just have to reach out to them. We can work some things with the Arab world, and we’ll deal with the Palestinians.’” Kerry dismissed Netanyahu’s thesis with total certainty: “No. No, no, and no. I can tell you that I’ve talked to the leaders of the Arab community. There will be no advanced and separate peace with the Arab world without the Palestinian process and Palestinian peace. Everybody needs to understand that. That is a hard reality.” Just two years later, Netanyahu refuted Kerry’s view of reality by, with the help of President Donald Trump, signing the Abraham Accords with Bahraini Foreign Minister Abdullatif bin Rashid Al-Zayani and Emirati Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed Al-Nahyan. But the flaws that Trump and Netanyahu revealed were not Kerry’s alone. Nor were the flaws limited to thinking about Arab-Israeli relations. Trump and Netanyahu were attacking the entire strategic belief system of the Obama administration, which had identified reconciling with Iran and brokering a Palestinian-Israeli peace as the two top priorities of the United States in the Middle East. In the Trump-Netanyahu conception, the Abraham Accords were the cornerstone of a regional alliance that aimed not just to improve relations between Israel and its neighbors but also to contain Iran militarily and to prevent it, through the application of hard power, from acquiring a nuclear weapon. With a Middle East staff consisting almost entirely of veterans of the Obama administration, the Biden administration intended to prove the utility of Obama’s effort to reconcile with Iran. It therefore rejected the Trump-Netanyahu view of the accords as a key component of an Iran-containment strategy. However, the accords have fashioned a new “hard reality” of Arab-Israeli coordination that the administration cannot ignore. That reality includes formal Israeli representation at US Central Command, the military’s combatant operations command responsible for, among other things, deterring Iran. In other words, beneath the umbrella of the United States military, the Israeli military and its Arab counterparts are now liaising daily. Weren’t Trump and Netanyahu pursuing this outcome? The simple answer is no. To prevent trilateral military cooperation among the Arab states, Israel, and the United States from turning into a coalition designed to pressure Iran regarding the aggression of its proxy forces and the expansion of its nuclear weapons program, the Biden administration instructed CENTCOM to focus exclusively on defensive measures and integrated missile defense, and to avoid any offensive countermeasures against Iran. But defending against an aggressor with only a shield is impossible. Arming oneself with a sword is also necessary. Enter Raphael BenLevi, the director of the Churchill Program for Strategy, Statesmanship and National Security at the Argaman Institute of Tikvah Fund Israel. BenLevi is at the forefront of a new generation of foreign policy strategists in Israel who have come of age in an era when what seemed like a “hard reality” to the generation of John Kerry is now obviously history. In this article, he lays out a strong case for the potential of the kind of trilateral cooperation to which the Biden administration, under the weight of stale ideas, has turned a blind eye.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Middle East, North America, and United States of America

24. Transparency and Accountability: US Assistance to Ukraine

Author:
Rebeccah L. Heinrichs
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Americans are raising questions about the tracking and oversight of aid to Ukraine. Russia has long sought to dominate Ukraine, and wherever Russia hooks its tentacles, corruption naturally follows. By helping Ukraine defeat Russia on the battlefield, the United States can strike a major blow against corruption in Europe. In the meantime, the US government is carefully tracking American aid to Ukraine. The Department of Defense (DoD) established a Security Assistance Group Ukraine last fall that tracks military shipments. (By contrast, the US did not establish a similar effort in Afghanistan until seven years into the war). Moreover, Congress required significant reporting on oversight and accountability in each major assistance package passed to date: the four Ukraine supplementals, the FY2023 NDAA, and the FY2022 and FY2023 omnibus bills. Specifically, Congress mandated the creation of a list of all security assistance and defense articles provided to Ukraine—and enhanced monitoring of that equipment once it enters Ukraine. Congress also mandated that the DoD reports on all end-use of military equipment. As of this writing, the DoD has found no evidence of Ukraine diverting US-supplied defense equipment. This makes basic sense: a smaller, weaker country like Ukraine could not defeat its much larger Russian adversary if Western weapons were not reaching the front lines. Indeed, Ukraine’s battlefield successes follow a basic rhythm. In June, the US released Harpoon coastal defense systems to Ukraine. Later that month, the British Defense Ministry announced that Ukraine used this Western system to sink a Russian ship on its way to Snake Island, causing the Russians to abandon the strategic outpost. The HIMARS launcher, first sent last summer, propelled Ukraine’s counteroffensives in the south and east, enabling Ukraine to liberate Kherson and take back major territories in the Kharkiv region. And the US shipment of over 100 M777 Howitzers proved effective against Russian equipment at a time when the Ukrainians were running dangerously low on artillery systems. Still, in keeping with its responsibilities, the new Republican majority in the House is standing watch and directing new efforts. Earlier this month, Mike Rogers, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, led a congressional delegation to Romania and Poland to oversee the distribution of Ukraine aid. Following the trip, the bipartisan group of lawmakers agreed that they “came away with a clear understanding of the various safeguards the US government, in partnership with the Ukrainians and other nations, have put in place to ensure each article is accounted for and tracked to the frontline of the war.” Because Congressman Rogers sees oversight as a top priority of his committee, he will press the point in an oversight hearing on Tuesday, February 28.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Alliance, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

25. NATO’s Black Sea Frontier Is the Southern Shore of the Caspian Sea

Author:
Luke Coffey
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has led to a renewed focus on the geopolitical importance of the Black Sea. What the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has overlooked is Russia’s use—often in coordination with Iran—of the Caspian Sea to advance its war aims in Ukraine. The Caspian Sea offers Russia a strategic depth to strike targets far afield in a relatively safe manner, is currently the only way for Russia to reinforce its Black Sea Fleet, and serves as a transport conduit allowing Iran to deliver military assistance to Russia for use against Ukraine. As Admiral Sir Tony Radakin, the United Kingdom’s chief of the defence staff, recently said, “The flow of Iranian weapons to Russia’s war in Ukraine demonstrates that there is no easy geographical distinction on matters of defense.”1 In the context of regional security, military planners in the United States and NATO should see the most extreme point of the alliance’s Black Sea frontier as the southern shoreline of the Caspian Sea.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Alliance, and Strategy
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Caspian Sea, and Black Sea

26. The System Is Blinking Red over Iran

Author:
Jonathan Schachter
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
In his testimony to the 9/11 Commission, then-CIA Director George Tenet described the harrowing intelligence picture that had emerged in the summer of 2001. “The system was blinking red,” he famously recalled. What followed, of course, was the well-documented, multi-agency failure to prevent an avoidable disaster that changed the course of history. The system is blinking red again, and the American response appears frighteningly familiar. Earlier this month, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed that its inspectors in Iran had discovered uranium particles enriched to about 84 percent purity. Most reports have noted that this is just shy of the 90 percent level generally considered to be “weapons grade.” Others correctly point out that uranium enriched to around 80 percent fueled the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945. Almost no one mentions that Iran has no civilian need to enrich uranium in the first place. During the nearly four years leading up to the IAEA’s finding, Iran has engaged in increasingly grave violations of its international nuclear obligations, only some of which derive from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Iran still refuses to cooperate with at least three separate IAEA investigations of undeclared nuclear materials, activities, and sites, in violation of its commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. With Iran’s long history of nuclear lawbreaking, the discovery of undeclared, highly enriched uranium is unsurprising. Iran does not have a peaceful uranium enrichment program. Uranium enrichment remains part and parcel of the regime’s effort to develop and maintain the ability to produce and deliver nuclear weapons on demand. Rather than dismantling Iran’s illegally built military enrichment program, the JCPOA decriminalized it. Even if the US had not withdrawn from the JCPOA in 2018, the deal’s limited and temporary terms explicitly permit Iran to expand its enrichment capability and capacity and increase its stockpile of enriched uranium, legally and without limitation, by the end of this decade. In a February 24 interview with CBS News, the current CIA director, William Burns, downplayed the danger. He reaffirmed that “we don’t believe that the Supreme Leader in Iran has yet made a decision to resume the weaponization program that we judge that they suspended or stopped at the end of 2003.” The materials Israeli intelligence spirited out of a Tehran warehouse (the “Atomic Archive”) in 2018, which Israel shared with the United States, raise disturbing questions about the assessment Burns presented and its persistence. The archive materials showed that the regime did not stop or suspend its weaponization program in 2003, but, in the Iranians’ own words, modified it. What had been a crash program geared toward testing a nuclear device on a short timeline became a dispersed, long-term effort—part clandestine, part under the cover of civilian research—to develop and maintain capabilities relevant to the production of nuclear weapons. The program went from sprint to marathon, though both have a nuclear weapons finish line. More broadly, the archive showed that the Iranian nuclear weapons program was more advanced and comprehensive than previously understood. Israel and the United States became aware of how much so 15 years after the fact and only thanks to one of the most stunning intelligence coups in modern history. Despite this long lag and the long odds of repeating such an intelligence feat, Burns seems to believe that we will know in near-real time if and when Iran’s leader decides to switch the program back to an even shorter nuclear sprint. This belief seems to reflect, as the saying goes, the triumph of hope over experience. Perhaps this too is unsurprising. The JCPOA was always built on little more than hope. The largely unspoken logic behind the agreement was that an engaged, wealthier Iran would lose interest in nuclear weapons before the deal’s restrictions expired. Iran quickly proved the optimists wrong. In the years immediately after striking the deal, Tehran increased defense spending by more than 30 percent; offered substantially more support to terrorist groups like Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis; and intensified its aggression across the region. Iran continues to develop missiles and, as Burns pointed out, the associated ability to deliver a nuclear warhead. Now Iran is using the same uranium enrichment infrastructure guaranteed by the JCPOA to violate its terms. The Biden administration’s policy toward Iran reflects a clear and consistent preference for diplomacy over the use of force, and understandably so. But the White House treats the two as contradictory, rather than complementary. For over two years, the administration has demonstrated its reticence to use, or even credibly threaten to use, force against Iran. Manifestly undeterred, Iran has continued and accelerated its drive toward the nuclear threshold. Meanwhile, the war in Ukraine and Iran’s provision of weapons to Russia mean that even if the IAEA Board of Governors were to refer Iran’s nuclear crimes to the United Nations Security Council, Russia surely would veto any punitive measure toward the Islamic Republic. In other words, America’s soft-handed approach and global events are making a diplomatic solution less likely. If Washington continues on its current path, the world almost certainly will face a nuclear-armed Iran, a war to prevent that eventuality, or both. It is not too late to act. First, the United States can press its European partners to activate the JCPOA’s snap-back mechanism, which is not subject to a Russian (or Chinese) veto. Doing so would reimpose international sanctions and the UN arms embargo on Iran that the deal lifted in 2020. It also would prevent the planned lifting of the UN missile embargo on Iran in October of this year. Second, the president, his administration, and Congress can make clear that the United States and its allies can and will use force to prevent Iran from violating its nuclear obligations. The United States would not be moving its red lines, but rather enforcing them. Doing so would send a powerful message to Iranian leaders that they have already crossed America’s red lines and need to back down. Such a threat might not be effective. But without a credible American commitment to use force, no diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear problem is possible. This moment could be America’s last chance to change course on Iran. If it does not, one wonders what Director Burns and his colleagues in the administration might say in their future testimony about why they failed to act when the system was blinking red on their watch.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

27. Empowering Ukraine Prepares Us for China

Author:
Rebeccah L. Heinrichs
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
China is America’s number one adversary due to Beijing’s willingness and capability to undermine US security, freedom, and prosperity. One pressing way China could strike a blow against US interests would be to violently force Taiwan to unify with mainland China. Doing so would immediately cause a global recession and rupture the US alliance architecture in the Pacific. It would also clear the way for China to contest US interests in the global commons far beyond the region. Some policymakers who are rightly concerned about the threat China poses to Taiwan argue that the United States should stop aiding Ukraine and instead divert attention, support, and weapons to Taiwan. While proponents of this argument are right to convey a sense of urgency and focus on some points that are true, their position overlooks key facts that make its simplistic zero-sum formulation unrealistic and self-defeating. For example, their argument does not sufficiently grapple with the connection between the China and Russia threats to US interests and allies, the responses of allies and how their perspectives affect outcomes, and the way the US budgetary and weapons delivery systems function.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Spending, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Ukraine, Taiwan, and Asia

28. The Chinese Communist Party’s Campaign on University Campuses

Author:
Ellen Bork
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The People’s Republic of China (PRC)’s influence activities at American universities have received considerable scrutiny from the US government, Congress, and media over the past several years. Many of them operate under the auspices of its united front, a loose network of entities for which there is no American equivalent.1 The united front is a Leninist concept the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) adopted from the Soviet Union in the earliest phase of the party’s development. United front activities “control, mobilize, and otherwise make use of individuals outside the party to achieve its objectives . . . domestically and internationally.”2 In recent years, General Secretary Xi Jinping has reinvigorated the united front, drawn it more tightly under his control, and directed it to serve an ambitious agenda to project Chinese power globally and undermine liberal democratic norms. China’s influence activities are part of the country’s subnational united front agenda, which targets not only universities but also state and local governments, private businesses, and civic organizations, in line with Mao Zedong’s directive to “target local entities in order to weaken the national core.” Some of China’s united front efforts, including Confucius Institutes and Chinese Student and Scholar Associations, have experienced declines and exposure. This is not as significant as it might seem. The CCP has a record of responding to united front failures by regrouping and doubling down. US intelligence agencies have warned that China is intensifying influence efforts at the subnational level. Several factors complicate America’s ability to respond effectively to China’s united front activities at American universities. Under America’s federal system, states, cities, and educational and civic institutions have no responsibility for and little experience in defending against national security threats. For much of its relationship with the PRC, the US minimized the fundamental differences between the US democratic and Chinese communist political systems. American leaders encouraged not only trade and investment but also participation in activities that served the PRC’s political, ideological, and other agendas. Furthermore, Washington largely accepted the CCP’s conflation of itself with China and the Chinese people, enabling it to cast its critics—including those in the US and elsewhere in the West—as “anti-China,” xenophobic, or racist. The Trump administration began countering united front activities, including by educating the American public, state and local officials, and university administrators about the threat they pose. Despite the bipartisan consensus on China that has emerged in recent years, the Biden administration has not maintained the same priority on countering united front efforts.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Education, National Security, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

29. Avoid a Sequester and Fully Fund a Preeminent Military

Author:
Rebeccah L. Heinrichs and Kennedy Lee
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
In early summer 2023, President Joe Biden and Speaker of the House Kevin McCarthy (R-CA) reached an agreement to raise the debt ceiling and avert a government default. While compromise is necessary, the deal included caps on overall spending at fiscal 2022 levels and made no exception for national defense. The United States is in the beginning of a tumultuous time: a new cold war with China and Russia. Washington ought to be moving with a great sense of urgency and national purpose to rebuild its defense industrial base (DIB), modernize its nuclear forces to meet the dynamic threats, grow the US Navy, and upgrade critical space systems, among other things. The caps on military spending undermine America’s ability to support its immediate interests in Ukraine and limit its capacity to deter future aggression and expansion by the People’s Republic of China (PRC), further violence by China’s junior partner Russia, and rogue action by the Islamic Republic of Iran and North Korea. The debt deal caps US military spending at $886 billion, which may initially appear to be a raise, but effectively flattens the Pentagon budget over the next two years. The dollar amount is 3.2 percent higher than last year’s request and will rise by 1 percent next year for a total of $895 billion in fiscal year 2025. But when accounting for inflation, the cap amounts to a significant cut in real terms over last year’s budget. The projected figures suggest that US defense spending could fall below 3 percent of gross domestic product for the first time since the 1990s’ “peace dividend.” The budget that the Pentagon submitted for this year should be $23 billion higher just to keep pace with the current rate of inflation. This is before factoring in the budget increases necessary to keep up with the evolving threat environment, including an ongoing land war in Europe and a Chinese Communist Party with revanchist ambitions in the Indo-Pacific. Raising the stakes, the deal also included a provision that triggers an automatic sequester against the budget, including the military: an indiscriminate 1 percent cut if the House and Senate fail to pass 12 annual spending bills by midnight on New Year’s Eve. The military has only now begun to recover from the effects of the sequester that occurred in 2013 as a result of the 2011 Budget Control Act (BCA). Another one now, at a time of acute and immediate threats from multiple adversaries, could have catastrophic effects. Congress would be wise either to urgently amend the bill or to prioritize the imperative of avoiding a second sequester over all other political matters. Then Congress should pass supplemental funding measures to ensure the Department of Defense (DoD) has the resources it needs to address the significant shortfalls that already exist and that the Obama-era sequestration only exacerbated.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Military Spending, and Military
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

30. Patchwork procurement? How to bridge parallel initiatives in EU joint defence procurement

Author:
Cédric Lombaerts and Lucrezia Sala
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:
The EU’s defence-industrial base was conceived during peacetime and, because of the ensuing market fragmentation, does not seem fit for purpose to deal with wartime. In an attempt to remedy this, the EU launched several parallel joint defence procurement initiatives (EDIRPA, EDIP, the three-track approach under the European Peace Facility). Between these initiatives, it is easy to lose sight of the forest in the trees of joint procurement. How do these parallel tracks of procurement tie in together? Are they not fragmenting collaborative procurement efforts even further? This CEPS Policy Brief sheds clarity on the interplay between these initiatives and suggests four pragmatic paths towards an overarching joint defence procurement framework while playing into the most salient deadlocks in joint defence procurement today.
Topic:
Defense Policy, European Union, and Procurement
Political Geography:
Europe