Content Type: Policy Brief / Political Geography: Syria / Publication Year: 3 selected

1. Russia’s Yes Vote on Syria Aid Will Come With a Price

Author:: Anna Borshchevskaya and Andrew J. Tabler
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Moscow’s willingness to approve another UN extension has more to do with advancing normalization between Turkey and the Assad regime than helping Syrian civilians, who will remain hostage to Russian demands if nothing is done before the next vote this summer. On January 9, the UN Security Council unanimously approved Resolution 2672 extending the provision of cross-border humanitarian aid into northwest Syria for another six months. In the immediate term, the vote is good news for Syrian civilians suffering through one of their worst energy crises since the beginning of the civil war in 2011. But the main problem persists—absent an alternative mechanism outside the Security Council, cross-border aid will remain bound to Russia’s increasing political and security demands in Syria, which are ultimately tied to the situation in Ukraine as well. Many were surprised by Moscow’s decision to approve the new resolution. Over the years, Russia has repeatedly threatened to veto previous resolutions, and the West has largely given in to its demands by steadily diluting the aid mechanism. From that perspective, this month’s vote appeared to be a welcome sign of the Biden administration’s willingness to stand its ground on Syria despite dealing with a complex Russian challenge in Ukraine. Moscow did not even resort to its frequent tactic of abstaining from the final vote in order to signal its displeasure with the mechanism.
Topic:: Humanitarian Aid, UN Security Council, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: Russia, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

2. Present Challenges: Will Syria return to the Arab League fold?

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: On April 15, 2023, Saudi Arabia hosted a meeting that included the foreign ministers of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, Egypt, Iraq, and Jordan. The main topic on the agenda was the region’s relations with Syria and the possibility of returning to the Arab League fold after the suspension of its membership in November 2012. The visit of Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al-Saud, on April 18, to Damascus raised the question of whether recent diplomatic movements with Syria may pave the way for attending the Arab League Summit set to be held on May 19.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Syrian War, Normalization, Bashar al-Assad, and Arab League
Political Geography:: Middle East and Syria

3. Encircling Damascus: Iran’s Foreign Minister Visits Lebanon, Syria, and Turkey

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: Iranian Foreign Minister, Hossein Amirabdollahian, has made a surprise visit to Ankara, Beirut, and Damascus, reflecting his country’s increased engagement in the region. His trip to Ankara replaced a postponed trip to Moscow, where he was set to meet with his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Syrian War, Engagement, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Lebanon, and Syria

4. Escape from the Syrian Labyrinth: A Road Map

Author:: Michael Doran and Omer Ozkizilcik
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: The Ukraine war has led Americans to rediscover what first drew them, some seven decades ago, into a military alliance with the Turks: Turkey’s indispensability as a counterweight to Russia. However, even as Washington and Ankara have found common cause in Ukraine, they continue to work at cross purposes in Syria. In a demonstration of bold, fresh, and practical thinking, Turkish scholar Ömer Özkizilcik offers us a road map for aligning American and Turkish policies there too. But first, to set the stage for Özkizilcik’s plan, Hudson Senior Fellow Michael Doran surveys the strategic logic and the diplomatic context that make the road map compulsory reading.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Military Intervention, and Syrian War
Political Geography:: Russia, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

5. From aid to inclusion: A better way to help Syrian refugees in Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan

Author:: Kelly Petillo
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: The number of Syrian refugees attempting to enter Europe has doubled in the last two years. This shift is driven by growing hostility towards Syrian refugees in host states Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan. Governments in these countries are ratcheting up the political rhetoric and deploying new ways to force Syrians to return. Home-grown economic and social pressures, and problems caused by the pandemic and Russia’s war on Ukraine, contribute to these tensions. Europeans’ support for Syrian refugees remains humanitarian-led and short-termist. The EU and its member states should switch to a longer-term ‘inclusion’ approach that helps Syrians live in dignity in their host countries. This new approach would also benefit local communities, as well as discourage Syrians from making the dangerous journey to Europe.
Topic:: Humanitarian Aid, Refugees, Syrian War, Integration, and Inclusion
Political Geography:: Europe, Turkey, Middle East, Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan

6. A "System of Systems" Approach to Countering Drones: Examining Recent Operations from the Middle East to Ukraine

Author:: Eric Feely
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Drones have proliferated over the past decade, offering a cheap, effective precision-strike capability and leading to an inflection point wherein the United States can no longer count on complete air superiority. As former U.S. Central Command head Kenneth McKenzie put it, “Until we are able to develop and field a networked capability to detect and defeat [drones], the advantage will remain with the attacker.” The United States and other countries have therefore begun investing in counter-drone systems to complement and augment legacy air defense systems that have already proven effective in the role. Conflicts in the Middle East, Ukraine, and elsewhere suggest that progress in drone technology will require corresponding adjustments in counter-drone capabilities to fill gaps and lower the costs of interception. In this lavishly illustrated Policy Note, Eric Feely details counter-drone approaches used in recent conflicts and what they could mean for the future of warfare. Military officials, he writes, are not seeking a silver bullet on this front, but rather advances based on existing layered, interoperable systems capable of providing kinetic and nonkinetic solutions.
Topic:: Security, Weapons, Drones, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Middle East, Syria, and Gulf Nations

7. Turkish Backlash: How Street Interviews Spread Anti–Syrian Refugee Sentiment

Author:: Sude Akgundogdu
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: In early February, two major earthquakes shook Turkey’s southeast, as well as parts of Syria, claiming at least 45,000 Turkish lives in what has become the biggest natural disaster in modern Turkish history. The country’s most pressing challenge is to provide relief for the more than 13 million citizens who live in areas directly affected by the tremors. In the meantime, however, in addition to exposing egregious zoning and building code violations, the powerful quakes have revealed new dimensions of anti-Syrian feeling in Turkey. In the days that followed, gruesome videos circulated on social media showing vigilantes battering individuals they accused of looting in the affected provinces. Syrian refugees have seen their noncitizen status exacerbated by local resentment, resulting in limited access to earthquake relief resources; they have likewise been especially vulnerable to the vigilantism. “Looting” and “Syrian” have become synonymous in some corners of social media, fueling public resentment centered on the refugee population. But hate directed at Syrians on the Turkish web is nothing new. Turkey has seen an overall uptick in anti-refugee violence since 2021, often targeting Syrians. In a particularly violent episode in August 2021, residents of the Altindag district in Ankara vandalized and looted Syrian-run businesses and homes. Across 2022 and into 2023, even before the earthquakes, hate crimes against Syrians have continued to increase. Turkey hosts at least 4 million refugees—3.7 million of them Syrian nationals or stateless people who have migrated from Syria. This is an almost 5 percent addition to Turkey’s existing population, which stood at about 74 million before their arrival, making it the largest influx to Turkey since the Balkan Wars of 1912–13, amid the Ottoman Empire’s collapse. Since the Syrian war began in 2011, the Turkish government has welcomed large numbers of Syrian refugees and given them “temporary protected status.” While the public in general welcomed them, since Turkey fell into recession in 2018, tolerance has worn thin. This public unease has found expression in a media trend known as “street interviews,” which simultaneously spread intolerance and misinformation regarding Turkey’s Syrian refugee population. By way of context, the Turkish government has cracked down on conventional media over the past decade and a half, giving loyal media a monopoly on information and pushing Turkish citizens to seek alternative sources of news. Creative new initiatives have emerged as a result, some anchored in social media, and while these can fill gaps and contribute in meaningful ways, some, such as street interviews, are quasi-journalistic and can disseminate dangerous messages. If the Turkish government does not ease its hold over the media, other such trends will likely persist and continue shaping public opinion, hurting chiefly Turkey’s vulnerable Syrian population.
Topic:: Public Opinion, Refugees, Discrimination, Syrian War, and Hate Speech
Political Geography:: Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

8. Disaster Dynamics: Assessing Middle East Responses to the Turkey-Syria Earthquake and Other Destructive Events

Author:: Sarah Cahn and Erik Yavorsky
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: The massive earthquake that killed more than 50,000 people in Turkey and Syria as of February 28—one of the worst Middle East natural disasters in recent memory—has touched the hearts of leaders and peoples across the world, triggering a flow of urgently needed humanitarian support. Regional states, too, have provided rescue and relief assistance. From the outset, however, politics has played an important role in shaping the scope and direction of such aid. In fact, the politics of humanitarian aid follows a pattern discernible based on previous regional responses to crises, including the 2020 Beirut port explosion and—before it—the 2014 Gaza war.
Topic:: Natural Disasters, Foreign Aid, and Earthquake
Political Geography:: Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

9. THE DAY AFTER: Anticipating trouble in the event of a US withdrawal from Syria

Author:: Jomana Qaddour
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: With approximately nine hundred troops in northeastern and southeastern Syria, the United States ostensibly aims to prevent the reemergence of the Islamic State group (IS). The withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan, initiated by the Trump administration and completed by the Biden administration, was followed by the rapid collapse of the pro-Western government of Afghanistan and its replacement by the Taliban. This has led to questions about what will happen if and when US forces withdraw from northeastern Syria. A new issue brief by Atlantic Council’s Senior Fellow Jomana Qaddour examines the social, political, and economic implications and the challenges to US presence in Syria. While the US military presence remains limited in number, this report also underscores how aggregate US influence is much more potent than a force number of nine hundred suggests. US troop presence has enhanced counterterrorism operations, obstructed IS and Iranian smuggling routes, and facilitated humanitarian aid and economic benefits to a population in Syria that would be languishing under even more dire conditions. It can be argued that it has also limited local violence and halted a resurgence of public IS activities. According to the most recent Syria policy review, US presence is limited to the goal of counterterrorism operations, which implies that it is a conditions-based, not calendar-based deployment. Those conditions should include local Syrian forces that can reasonably deny IS a safe haven from which to plot terrorist attacks against the United States and its allies. It is well known that the Assad regime is not likely to provide the necessary capability to assure the United States and its allies that it can prevent IS’s return. In reality, there is little room to positively read the reassertion of Syrian government control over northeastern Syria; and withdrawal from Syria would be a serious gamble for US national security concerns in Syria and the region.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Islamic State, and Syrian War
Political Geography:: Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

10. Attacks on Hospitals from Syria to Ukraine: Improving Prevention and Accountability Mechanisms

Author:: Elise Baker and Gissou Nia
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: When Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022, it soon began implementing one of its frequent—and criminal—tactics that it had already been using in its military intervention in Syria: bombing healthcare and medical facilities. Syrian government forces first began targeting health workers in Syria in 2011 at the start of the Syria crisis, and Russia joined them in targeting the healthcare system upon its official entrance to the conflict in 2015. Over the course of the conflict, over 90 percent of 601 recorded attacks on medical facilities were attributable to either Syrian or Russian forces. In Ukraine, Russia has reportedly perpetrated more than 200 attacks on healthcare facilities and ambulances since the start of the invasion. The well-documented pattern of targeted attacks on healthcare in Syria and Ukraine undermines long-established and hard-won provisions under international humanitarian law intended to protect civilians during conflict. Despite the scale of the problem, which extends beyond Syria and Ukraine, there has been no prominent criminal prosecution of any alleged perpetrators of attacks on healthcare in any conflict, no establishment of a UN mandate dedicated to this issue, and no task force created by national governments specifically aimed at prevention of and accountability for these crimes. The international community’s failure to compel meaningful action to stop the criminal practice of targeting healthcare in conflict after conflict has resulted in continued deaths of health workers and civilian populations. In a new issue brief by the Atlantic Council Strategic Litigation Project‘s Elise Baker and Gissou Nia, the two propose recommendations to UN bodies, the World Health Organization, national governments and other institutions and decision makers for concrete actions to prevent future attacks and advance accountability for past ones.
Topic:: Syrian War, Accountability, International Community, Hospitals, and Atrocity Prevention
Political Geography:: Europe, Ukraine, Middle East, and Syria

11. Rhetoric Meets Reality in Jawlani’s Push for Self-Sufficiency

Author:: Aaron Y. Zelin
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: As a key UN vote approaches, Washington should push Turkey to help promote a diverse, balanced economy in HTS-controlled northwest Syria. On July 10, a United Nations vote will decide the future of the cross-border aid mechanism for northwest Syria, an area run by the jihadist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). The mechanism—which facilitates aid to northwest Syria via Turkey without having to go through Damascus—faces the prospect of nonrenewal for the first time since it was created in 2014, as a consequence of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. A failure to renew the mechanism would exacerbate an already daunting humanitarian situation in northwest Syria, where some three-fourths of the population consists of internally displaced persons (IDPs). While aid will likely continue on a far more limited basis if Russia vetoes the mechanism, from a U.S. perspective a more self-reliant HTS-run territory requiring less international assistance would actually be far preferable to a situation in which aid renewal remains subject to periodic dramas. Over the past roughly six years, HTS has transformed itself from an al-Qaeda branch into something resembling a typical regional state governing body, with the group engaging in human rights violations and embracing inflammatory rhetoric. To begin with, it has focused increasingly on developing local institutions and the economy. The group’s strides in governance have been facilitated, in part, by the March 2020 Turkey-Russia ceasefire agreement, which more or less froze the conflict line. Since then, HTS leader Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani has reiterated the value he places on self-sufficiency and constructing a new polity and society that does not rely on outside help. If HTS and its civilian-led Syrian Salvation Government (SSG) actually followed through on Jawlani’s ideas, locals could find other avenues to support themselves. Yet one must acknowledge at this point that HTS has not matched its lofty rhetoric with efforts to develop indigenous capabilities. Instead, it has worked hard to monopolize economic power.
Topic:: Politics, Terrorism, Reform, Democracy, and Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)
Political Geography:: Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

12. Arab Syrian IDPs of Tal Rifaat also Want to Go Home

Author:: Rena Netjes
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: The involvement of Turkish military forces in Northern Syria could allow thousands of Syrians to return to their homes after being forced out by the YPG, the SDF, and other entities for many years. In the West, there has been strong opposition to a newly planned Turkish/Syrian National Army (SNA) military operation in northern Syria. Yet for many displaced Arabs from Tal Rifaat, Manbij, and the surrounding villages, they are welcoming the idea of the liberation of their towns and villages. In fact, they have been asking the Turkish-backed SNA to liberate their area for years. Outside articles often focus exclusively on the Kurdish residents of northern Syria and emphasize that another military operation will automatically mean displacement of the Kurdish population. Yet the area constitutes a mix of Arab and Kurd-dominated towns, and Arab residents have their own history of displacement. In 2016, the entire Arab population was displaced in Tal Rifaat, a (historically) majority Arab town on the west side of the Euphrates, in a coordinated military operation by Russia, the Syrian regime, and militants from the People’s Defense Units (YPG) from Afrin. The YPG also attempted to connect the majority Kurdish enclaves of Kobani and Afrin through majority Arab areas, triggering a refugee flow of Arabs mainly from the two towns and surrounding villages to the Turkish border.
Topic:: Syrian War, Internal Displacement, Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), and Military
Political Geography:: Turkey, Middle East, Syria, and Tal Rifaat

13. Beyond Turkey’s ‘zero problems’ policy Motives, means and impact of the interventions in Syria, Libya and the South Caucasus

Author:: Nienke van Heukelingen and Bob Deen
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:: Since the Arab uprisings in 2011, but especially after the failed coup d’état in 2016, Turkey’s foreign policy has shifted from ‘zero problems’ to the pursuit of strategic depth and autonomy in its neighbourhood. In 2020, Syria, Libya and the South Caucasus became three theatres for Ankara’s new hard-power tactics, a policy that may well be here to stay (at least until the elections in 2023). This policy brief explores the strategic motives, the means of intervention and the impact of Turkish operations in these three conflict areas. While Turkey’s strategic considerations, modalities and consequences vary greatly from case to case, certain parallels can be drawn. They reveal an overall pattern of a much more assertive Turkey that is increasingly willing to deploy a combination of political and military means to secure its strategic objectives in its immediate neighbourhood.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Conflict, Strategic Interests, and Hard Power
Political Geography:: Turkey, Libya, Syria, and South Caucasus

14. Politicking in Doha: But will the Syrian opposition shift to more pragmatic diplomacy?

Author:: Malik al-Abdeh and Lars Hauch
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:: The Syrian Opposition Coalition (SOC) and the Syrian Negotiation Commission (SNC) are in dire need of internal renewal and a new political strategy given the deadlock of UN-led peace negotiations. A forthcoming opposition gathering on 4 February in Doha with more than 80 Syrian opposition leaders, activists and academics might offer an opportunity to do so. However, the event’s public face is Riyad Hijab, who is no longer part of the SOC and is seen as pursuing an internal leadership takeover. It is likely that the event will be part of a series that seeks to create a new centre of opposition without creating a new opposition body. Yet, neither Hijab’s internal politicking nor possible legitimacy/efficiency gains from implementation of a parallel SOC internal reform plan will generate a new political strategy for the opposition. This requires creative and pragmatic diplomacy that focuses on, for example, negotiating crossline arrangements between all conflict parties that improve local security and facilitate travel, trade and aid to improve the desperate situation of the Syrian people — in line with the UN’s call for a ‘safe, calm and neutral environment’ (SCNE). The habits of dialogue and compromise that can gradually develop in this manner could be leveraged at a later stage to address the more complex issues of power sharing and reconstruction once an appropriate window of opportunity has opened up.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Syrian War, and Peace
Political Geography:: Middle East, Syria, and Doha

15. The Hurriyet Leaks: Ankara ceasing opportunity for rapprochement with Damascus

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: In a recent report published by Turkish newspaper, Hurriyet, unnamed sources have said Ankara is mulling over opportunities to facilitate a dialogue with the Syrian government. Sources at the Syrian Foreign Ministry have strongly denied such reports however, labelling them as mere political red herring, as Turkey’s presidential elections loom on the horizon.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Refugees, Syrian War, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

16. What choices remain for the United States in Syria?

Author:: Nate Rosenblatt and Jomana Qaddour
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: Syria is home to one of the world’s most complex conflicts. The chaos caused by the Syrian regime and its allies — within Syria, across the Middle East, and beyond — poses immediate and enduring threats. Considering its foreign policy promise to defend democracy and human rights, the Biden administration does not have the luxury of ignoring what happens in Syria. Accepting that there are fewer options for the United States today than there were ten years ago does not mean normalizing the Assad regime or turning a blind eye to Russian and Iranian efforts to tip the balance of power in the region. In a new issue brief from the Atlantic Council’s Syria program, “What Choices Remain for the United States in Syria?,” Nate Rosenblatt and Jomana Qaddour describe the challenges the United States faces in Syria, including Russia’s attempt to expand the UN Strategic Framework as well the struggle to keep the UN humanitarian border crossings open in northern Syria. The memo then lays out the three potential strategies in Syria: one prioritizing the withdrawal of US forces, a second protecting humanitarian access and ensuring progress on limited, critical files, and a third maintaining US support for, as well as coordination with, partners to dial up the pressure on the Syrian government and its allies. The paper ultimately argues that the Biden administration should seize this opportunity to establish a clear strategy in Syria by aligning its defense, development, and diplomatic capabilities with those of its global allies and partners to shape a better outcome in Syria.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Human Rights, International Organization, Politics, United Nations, Syrian War, and Resilience
Political Geography:: Middle East, Syria, North America, and United States of America

17. What Russian-Israeli cooperation in Syria?

Author:: Dima Course
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: Since 2015, Russia has largely supported the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria against di- verse opposition. At the same time, Israel has continued its policy of limited military intervention – predominantly air strikes against Iranian targets and proxies, many of which are Russia’s partners in Syria. The Israeli strategy of attacking Iranian targets in Syria is not new. For example, Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) destroyed Assad’s nuclear reactor in 2007. Rus- sia has also been present in Syria for a long time, but until 2015, its presence was limited and it did not play a significant role in relations with Israel. Since 2015, however, the situation has changed sig- nificantly. Russian aviation and air defence began op- erating actively on the side of Assad’s regime. From the beginning, the media in both Russia and Israel hypothesized that the activation of Russian forces in Syria would interfere with the activities of the Israeli Air Force. Moreover, Israeli officials regularly voiced complaints that the Russians were actually interfering and hindering IDF operations in Syria. At the same time, the two sides have cooperated to a degree, enabling frequent attacks by the Israeli Air Force against targets in Syria affiliated with Iran. This Policy Brief offers a comparative analysis of Russian and Israeli interests in the context of the Syr- ian conflict. It contends that cooperation between the two countries has been a win-win situation for both sides, while having little influence on Russian-Israeli relations more generally.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Bilateral Relations, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia, Middle East, Israel, and Syria

18. Creativity Wanted: Countering the extraterritorial effects of US sanctions

Author:: Clara Portela
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: Scarcely familiar with sanctions as a policy tool, much of the European public has followed the headlines about international sanctions with some puzzlement. After the UN lifted sanctions on Iran following the conclusion of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), why was it necessary to create a channel for bilateral trade, the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX), following the US withdrawal from the deal in 2018? Why is Iran insisting that the US lift sanctions ‘in practice, not verbally or on paper’? How did the US Senate approval of new legislation targeting Nord Stream 2, a pipeline under construction between Russia and Germany, bring work to an immediate standstill in late 2019? Why do European banks and private companies fear the US Department of the Treasury’s sanctions enforcement agency, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)? If sanctions regimes are endowed with humanitarian exemptions, why do humanitarian agencies report difficulties in getting aid to places like Syria ? As it turns out, these are ramifications of the same phenomenon: the extraterritorial effects of US sanctions. The present Brief examines these effects, describing why they pose a challenge to the EU. It then outlines the responses that have been activated or are being contemplated to counter them, explaining why an effective remedy remains elusive. The Brief concludes by indicating possible ways forward.
Topic:: Humanitarian Aid, United Nations, Sanctions, and Transnational Actors
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Syria, and North America

19. How the Islamic State Sees the Future: Why the end of times does not mean the end

Author:: Florence Gaub
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:: One would not exactly think of the Islamic State (IS) as a future-oriented organisation: it uses medieval-sounding language and barbaric methods and preaches an archaic lifestyle. In reality, however, it is very much a forward-looking organisation with clear ideas not just on what the future will bring, but on what it should bring. In fact, it is this attitude towards the future that has not only enabled its past successes, but also allowed the organisation to persist and endure since losing its territory in Syria and Iraq – and, most importantly, what will determine its next steps and ambition. Understanding how IS conceives its own future will enable law enforcement authorities to take the necessary precautions ahead of time. This Brief first outlines why it is crucial to understand how the future as an organising principle shapes the strategy and posture of terrorist organisations, and shows that terrorist organisations lacking such a concept will lose traction faster than those that do. It goes on to examine IS’s future concept pre-and post-loss of its territory and to elaborate why it was and is an attractive future. Lastly, it seeks to anticipate the future trajectory IS will take based on its articulation of an eschatological vision of the future.
Topic:: Terrorism, Islamic State, and Future
Political Geography:: Iraq, Middle East, North Africa, and Syria

20. Still Not There: Global Violent Deaths Scenarios, 2019–30

Author:: Gergely Hideg and Anna Alvazzi del Frate
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Small Arms Survey
Abstract:: The year 2018 was characterized by a decrease in lethal violence in several of the world’s hotspots, primarily due to a significant de-escalation of the armed conflicts in Iraq, Myanmar, South Sudan, and Syria. The homicide rate also decreased marginally due to population growth outpacing the nominal increase in killings between 2017 and 2018. These two trends jointly resulted in a modest positive change in the rate of violent deaths globally in 2018 which, at 7.8 violent deaths per 100,000 population, is at its lowest since 2012. Still Not There: Global Violent Deaths Scenarios, 2019–30, a Briefing Paper by the Survey’s Security Assessment in North Africa (SANA) project provides an updated trend analysis of global violent deaths and develops global-level scenarios for the years leading to 2030. Based on 2018 figures from the Small Arms Survey’s Global Violent Deaths (GVD) database, the paper also includes a specific analysis of developments in Northern Africa and the five nations of the G5 Sahel region. It finds that under a business-as-usual scenario, Northern Africa’s violent death rate would remain relatively stable by 2030. By contrast, under the same scenario, the fatality rate in the G5 Sahel region would increase significantly.
Topic:: Arms Control and Proliferation, Conflict, Violence, and Death
Political Geography:: Africa, Iraq, Syria, Myanmar, and South Sudan

21. Likely Escalation: Potential war over Syria’s Daraa Province after Russian roadmap

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 08-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: Between August 2and August 18, clashes erupted between the Syrian regime army and the armed opposition groups in Daraa province in southern Syria, after the Syrian regime threatened military action against the groups if they do not commit to a roadmap proposed by Russia, which eventually aims to help the Syrian army retake control on the southern parts of the country.
Topic:: Geopolitics, Refugees, Syrian War, Armed Conflict, and Escalation
Political Geography:: Russia, Middle East, Syria, and Daraa

22. Common Perceptions: Discovering the consensus between King Abdullah and Putin regarding the future of Southern Syria

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: A Jordanian-Russian summit was held on August 23 in Moscow, during which several files pertaining to Lebanon and Palestine were discussed. However, the crisis in Southern Syria was on top of the list of discussions. This summit was preceded by several Jordanian decisions, which are believed to mark the beginning of some change in Jordanian policy toward Syria and toward the region in general.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Syrian War, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:: Russia, Middle East, Syria, and Jordan

23. The Reappearance of Consensus: Implications of Israel-Russia Agreements over Syria

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: Russian President Vladimir Putin and Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett held their first face-to-face talks on October 22 in Sochi, Russia. The summit talks, called by Putin, were slated for only two hours but lasted for about five hours, reflecting the two sides’ interest in enhancing coordination about several common issues, and warming up the Israeli-Russian relations which cooled down since Bennett rose to power.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Treaties and Agreements, Syrian War, and Consensus
Political Geography:: Russia, Middle East, Israel, and Syria

24. Moscow's Central Role: Have the Rules of Engagement Changed in Syria after the recent Israeli Strikes?

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 08-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: On July 19, 22 and 25, Israel carried out three strikes in less than one week using surface-to-air missiles against Syria. These strikes are considered the first of their kind executed by the new Israeli "Bennett-Lapid" government. Although this type of strikes is not novel, the Russian reaction to it was different this time. The Russian Ministry of Defense engaged in the scene for the first time, sending indirect messages to Israel. This made analysts refer to a possible shift in the rules of engagement in Syria. The understandings between Moscow and Tel Aviv were based on Moscow turning a blind eye to Israeli fighters launching airstrikes in Syria against Iranian targets, in return for Israel not targeting Syrian regime forces or Russian forces, which provide direct support to the Syrian army against the armed opposition. The Russian position reflected a clear desire to weaken the Iranian military presence in Syria, particularly with the escalation of rivalry between Moscow and Tehran over economic and military influence there.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, and Economy
Political Geography:: Russia, Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Syria

25. Curtailing Tehran: Breaking down the validation of Israeli conjectures if Damascus is constraining Iranian military activities

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: The Israeli ‘Walla’ news website published a report that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has reorganized the deployment of military forces in Syria, and has restricted the movement of Iranian forces internally in order to prevent internal frictions and achieve peace and stability. Walla deems the change in Damascus’s stance towards Iran to be in response to the political, economic and military pressures implored on the former. The website has also indicated that the Iranian presence in Syria has also weakened for other reasons, including the continuous Israeli and US pressures on Iranian presence there. While there were no sources confirming such notions, considering the policies of regional and international powers’ concerning the Syrian crisis, there might be some truth to this notion, pushing Damascus to embrace such tactics.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Military Affairs, Political stability, and Peace
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Syria

26. Variant Requirements: Discovering the recent policies of the MENA countries regarding nationality and citizenship

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: The political and technical dimensions of granting or revoking nationality have recently escalated in several countries of the region. This is associated with a number of motives relevant to enhancing the state’s global position, as reflected in the UAE granting nationality to competent scientists, doctors, intellectuals, specialists and talented individuals, to encourage the flow of investment into the country. The Jordanian government adopted the same approach to improve the internal economic conditions. The Algerian government justified this course to confront terrorist operations and irregular migration that caused tensions in the relations with the EU countries. Furthermore, the Sudanese transitional government withdrew the Sudanese nationality by naturalization, especially from Syrians, as some were obtained through illegal procedures. Israel also passed the Law of Return this March in an attempt to enhance the demographic structure of the country.
Topic:: Government, European Union, Citizenship, and Nationality
Political Geography:: Sudan, Middle East, Israel, Algeria, North Africa, Syria, Jordan, and United Arab Emirates

27. Mounting Turmoil: Is Lebanon witnessing a deterioration of the influence of Hezbollah and Iran?

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: The Lebanese internal arena is experiencing escalating instability. This is clearly reflected in the influence of political forces, especially Hezbollah, which is under internal and external pressures as a result of the faltering formation of the government. The balance of power is drawing more to be in favor of the Bashar al-Assad regime over the past few years. In addition to its continued involvement in the Syrian conflict, Hezbollah identifies with the Iranian public discourse on many regional and international issues, particularly during the escalation of tensions with the US and Israel.
Topic:: Politics, Conflict, and Hezbollah
Political Geography:: Iran, Lebanon, and Syria

28. Multifaceted Challenges: The political dimension of the physicians’ crises in the region

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: Although the difficulties’ health personnel face, are quite similar to those of workers in other fields, the political dimensions of physicians ’crises in the region have increased remarkably. Medical doctors are kidnapped in some hotbeds of several Arab armed conflicts to provide treatment for some Militia members, in addition to their indirect involvement in military confrontations in Northeastern Syria through Turkey. Moreover, there is a gap between the medical syndicate and the political authorities regarding the actual number of COVID-19 cases, which was quite evident in Turkey. Medical doctors in some states of the region suffer from delayed payment of their salaries as a result of the decline in oil prices as well as the decline in the financial budgets of their countries. This leads to what is known as the ‘brain drain’, in addition to their contracting diseases such as the coronavirus due to their presence on the front lines confronting the epidemic with short medical supplies. The lives of medical doctors in some countries are endangered, as they get exposed to repeated attacks by community members due to the absence of adequate security measures. The crises of medical doctors in the region are by no means a recent phenomenon, but their features evolve according to different regional conditions and the emergence of transnational epidemics. The Middle East reflects a variety of crises that physicians are exposed to, particularly in hotbeds of tension.
Topic:: Health, Crisis Management, COVID-19, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:: Turkey, Middle East, Libya, North Africa, and Syria

29. A new momentum for EU-Turkey cooperation on migration

Author:: Nienke van Heukelingen
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:: This policy brief considers how to move forward with the (financial element of the) EU-Turkey statement agreed in 2016, under which the first tranche of 3 billion euros will end mid-2021. In order not to reverse the progress achieved and to continue the work on improving the resilience of the 4.1 million refugees in Turkey, there is an urgent need for the European Union and Turkey to agree on a new financial framework. One that builds on the current, generally successful framework – the EU Facility for Refugees in Turkey (FRiT) – but which would divide the burden between Turkey and the EU more equally. Both blocs would, moreover, do well to look into the possibilities of extending the area of cooperation to Idlib. In that area, which is currently under Turkey’s military control, almost three million internally displaced persons (IDPs) currently lack adequate shelter and essentials, which could potentially lead to various displacement scenarios. Neither of those decisions will be easy and will require serious support from all EU member states, but the fact is Turkey remains essential in pursuing the EU’s core interest: preventing another refugee flow into Europe.
Topic:: International Cooperation, Migration, European Union, Refugees, and Borders
Political Geography:: Europe, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

30. Fruitless cherry picking?: EU engagement with the Syrian opposition (Etilaf)

Author:: Lars Hauch
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:: This policy brief examines the EU’s engagement and relationship with Syria’s main political opposition umbrella, the Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (Etilaf), which was founded in late 2012. It discusses the EU’s engagement strategies with the Etilaf and their impact on its development in the context of the Syrian conflict. The brief highlights that the EU did not substantiate the international legitimacy it granted the organisation early on during the conflict with policies that would have allowed it to expand its domestic legitimacy and capabilities. This policy contributed to developments in which the Etilaf rapidly lost its original potential. While the Etilaf today faces a range of structural and operational challenges that need to be addressed, the brief nevertheless recommends EU institutions and Member States to increase their support for the Etilaf and the Interim Government linked with it, if a number of conditions can be met. Such support will help maintain and develop these bodies into a viable centre of political opposition to the Assad regime. Practically speaking, this objective can be pursued by piloting conditional EU support to areas of northwestern and northern Syria that are nominally under the control of the Interim Government. It also requires building a partnership with Turkey to jointly support local Syrian administration(s) in the same areas.
Topic:: Politics, European Union, Conflict, Syrian War, Bashar al-Assad, and Opposition
Political Geography:: Europe, Middle East, and Syria

31. Turkey’s interventions in its near abroad: The case of Idlib

Author:: Erwin van Veen
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:: The trigger for the Turkish Operation Spring Shield in northern Idlib in February 2020 was to prevent the Syrian conflict – especially extremists and refugees – spilling over into Turkey as the result of a new regime offensive. A deeper driver of the operation was Ankara’s desire to draw a line against further regime advances that might jeopardise Turkish territorial gains across northern Syria. Millions of Syrian internally displaced persons (IDPs) and the Islamist group Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) were the main – although unintended – beneficiaries of the operation. Tactically, Operation Spring Shield was a success because of a surge in Turkish military resources in northern Idlib, Ankara’s willingness to use them, and the speed with which Turkey acted. Strategically, it helped a great deal that Russia decided to stand aside for a few days. Russian-Turkish diplomacy resumed after battlefield conditions had shifted in Turkey’s favour and Syrian regime forces were stopped in their tracks. In the short term, Operation Spring Shield can be considered as having brought a measure of humanitarian and geopolitical stabilisation by clarifying Turkey’s red lines to Damascus, Tehran and Moscow, and by bringing about a new equilibrium between Russiansupported forces and Turkish forces in Syria. The operation did not negatively affect Turkey’s relationship with its NATO partners, the EU or the US. This was in part because the operation highlighted the limitations of the Astana process – a diplomatic initative in which Turkey, Iran and Russia pursue opposing aims vis-à-vis the Assad regime – from which these actors are excluded. In the medium term, the impact of Operation Spring Shield will depend on the permanence of the Turkish presence, the level of Turkish developmental investment and the evolution, as well as the place, of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in the future governance of northern Idlib.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Refugees, Military Intervention, and Regional Power
Political Geography:: Russia, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

32. Sustained Counterterrorism Efforts Remain Key to Preventing Attacks in Jordan

Author:: Saud Al-Sharafat
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: The pandemic has not ended terrorism in Jordan, and ISIS is still a significant threat. Last year’s abnormally low terrorist activity in Jordan could be interpreted as an indication that the threat of ISIS in the country has diminished significantly. Unfortunately, this is not the case; while there are several explanations for the low occurrence of terrorist attacks in Jordan in 2020, none of them point to a future in which ISIS does not continue to pose a threat to Jordanian security. On the contrary, the decrease in ISIS activity in Jordan last year was primarily a result of effective counterterrorism efforts, not the special circumstances of the pandemic or any other factor. Accordingly, Jordanian anti-terror institutions should not relax their guard. Rather, they should capitalize on their successes, expanding cooperation with their partners and enhancing their resources in combatting extremism. Jordanian security forces should be especially concerned with activities along their borders. There have been several recent international and UN reports that confirmed the rising activities of terrorist groups in countries that border Jordan. Iraq in particular has seen a recent rise in terrorist attacks, including two suicide bombings in Baghdad on January 21, 2021 that killed 32 people and injured 110 others. ISIS claimed responsibility for the attacks. In turn, ISIS's mounting activities in Iraq have led to increased terrorist activity in the Badia al-Sham region and the Jordanian Syrian-Iraqi border triangle, where terrorist militants move in small, highly mobile groups. This increase in activity has prompted Jordanian security forces to strengthen their presence on the borders with Iraq and Syria. Following a Russian air campaign in the Badia region in late February, in which Russian planes launched at least 130 air strikes in one day against terrorist groups in the area, Jordan started to strengthen and tightened its security presence on the borders to prevent infiltration of ISIS elements into Jordan. Russian strikes were especially targeted at ISIS, which extends between the governorates of Homs and Deir al-Zour at the border with Iraq.
Topic:: Security, Counter-terrorism, Peace, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Middle East, Syria, and Jordan

33. In the Service of Ideology: Iran's Religious and Socioeconomic Activities in Syria

Author:: Oula A. Alrifai
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: The dalliance between the Assad family and Iran’s Shia clerics began in the 1970s. But whereas the Syrian leader held leverage in those days predating Iran’s Islamic Revolution, the tables have now been turned. Observers of the decade-long Syria war understand the indispensable role Tehran has played in ensuring the Assad regime’s survival. But they may be less familiar with its stunning breadth—or its historical roots. The dalliance between the Assad family and Iran’s Shia clerics began in the 1970s, when the shah was still in power in Iran and then president Hafiz al-Assad, a member of the marginalized Alawite sect, sought religious legitimacy to lead his majority-Muslim country. But whereas the Syrian leader held leverage in those days predating Iran’s Islamic Revolution, the tables have now been turned. Lately, Tehran’s relationship with Damascus can be described as one of strategic dominance. In this deeply researched Policy Note, analyst Oula Alrifai, a former Syrian asylee, lays bare the extent of Iranian infiltration of Syrian religious and socioeconomic life. She details the spread of Twelver Shia ideology through seminaries, congregation halls, and academic institutions, while demonstrating Iran’s massive economic clout in Syria through initiatives such as the Marota City housing project. For Washington, only a determined effort to blunt Iranian influence can help deliver much-deserved peace for the Syrian people and enduring stability for the region.
Topic:: Religion, History, Authoritarianism, Ideology, Syrian War, and Proxy War
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, and Syria

34. Syria at the Center of Power Competition and Counterterrorism

Author:: Aaron Y. Zelin
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Even as U.S. policymakers must stay focused on the Assad regime’s culpability, they also face a complex web of power dynamics in which Russia, Turkey, Iran, Israel, and other actors are attempting to secure their various interests. After a decade of civil war in Syria, the core antagonist remains the Assad regime, which in 2011 ruthlessly suppressed peaceful protestors and has since tortured and executed tens of thousands of detainees. The regime also bears responsibility for fostering the growth of the Islamic State, in part by releasing Syrian jihadists at the start of the war. Yet even as U.S. policymakers must stay focused on Assad’s culpability, they also face a highly complex web of power dynamics in which Russia, Turkey, Iran, Israel, and other actors are attempting to secure their various interests. In this Policy Note, expert Aaron Zelin details how the world’s counterterrorism and Great Power challenges converge in Syria, and how they must be addressed holistically. To this end, he proposes policies on the diplomatic, humanitarian, legal, economic, and military fronts that can calm the fears of U.S. allies such as Israel, Jordan, and Turkey, and perhaps inspire a more robust opposition, backed by a diverse set of local and diaspora activists.
Topic:: Counter-terrorism, Syrian War, Strategic Competition, and Proxy War
Political Geography:: Russia, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

35. Kidnapping and Extortion in Regime-Controlled Syria

Author:: Kenneth R. Rosen
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Interviews reveal how Syrian officials are extorting their people. It is sometimes difficult to conceptualize what the dire situation of Syria’s economy means for those who live there. Some 100 tankers of fuel flow across Lebanon’s border into Syria, but the persistent lack of gas limits families' ability to heat their homes, which, in regime-held areas, already face large-scale electricity blackouts that last for hours. Likewise, hot water is a commodity afforded only to those with financial means and connections, and it is a luxury to take a hot shower in many parts of Syria. Meanwhile, on Facebook, a UNHCR tarp is for sale and women are selling their hair to feed their families—just two examples of the type of entrepreneurship needed to weather abounding hardships in a country that has known only war for the last decade. Over the summer, the Syrian pound collapsed as U.S. sanctions continue to deter international support for the government of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Meanwhile, the coronavirus pandemic has likewise furthered the collapse of the country’s economic infrastructure. As Syrians search for means of generating income, officials employed by the regime have gained access to funds through extortion. A common form of this extortion is the forced detention of individuals whose families must then bribe officials for either visitation rights or the release of their loved ones. A report from January underscores the scale of such extortion operations, which have remained a staple in regime tactics for years, though they are especially prevalent now given the country’s ongoing war and collapsed economy. The report—produced by the Association of Detainees and the Missing in Sednaya Prison—surveyed more than 1,200 prisoners and families. Respondents said that bribes rose as high as nearly $3 million at one jail, though the range varied. Visitation or release fees were usually a few thousand dollars or less, but bribes would be increased for families living outside of Syria, averaging about $30,000. The report underscored how these payments—far greater than the average public sector annual salary of roughly $150 per month, according to Qassioun, a Syrian newspaper —could feed the country’s security apparatus and the regime through guards, judges, military personnel, and middlemen who facilitate the negotiations. “The Syrian Arab Army is the primary party that is responsible for these types of arrests,” says to the report.
Topic:: Crime, Economy, Syrian War, and Abductions
Political Geography:: Middle East and Syria

36. Development Cooperation with Conflict-Affected MENA Countries: Refocussing on the Social Contract

Author:: Mark Furness and Annabelle Houdret
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:: State–society relations are in flux across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), nearly a decade after the Arab uprisings. The protests and revolts that swept the region in 2011 arose from widespread rejection of the post-independence Arab social contracts. These were based on redistribution of rents from natural resources and other forms of transfers and subsidies, as “compensation” for acquiescence to political and economic authoritarianism. In several MENA countries, including Iraq, Libya, Syria and Yemen, but also in Algeria, Lebanon and Palestine, the old social contracts have been destroyed by civil conflicts and internationally sponsored wars, which in some cases predated the 2011 uprisings. Since broken social contracts are at the root of conflict in the MENA region, supporting new social contracts should be the core objective of development cooperation with the region’s most conflict-affected countries. But “post-conflict reconstruction” often ignores the fact that conflicts do not end with peace agreements, and conflict-affected societies need more than reconstructed infrastructure, institutional capacity and private sector investment if they are to avoid violence in the future. Development agencies term this kind of cooperation “resilience”: promoting political, economic, social and environmental stability, rather than risking uncontrollable, revolutionary transformation. However, resilience has often provided cover for short-term measures aimed at preserving the position of particular actors and systems. Development cooperation needs to get beyond reconstruction and resilience approaches that often fail to foster the long-term stability they promise. By focussing on the social contract, development cooperation with conflict-affected countries can provide a crucial link between peacebuilding, reconstruction and longer-term socioeconomic and political development. It can thereby contribute not only to short-term, but also to long-term, sustainable stability. Using the social contract as an analytical lens can increase understanding not only of what donors should avoid doing, but also where they should concentrate their engagement during transitions from civil war. Practical examples from challenging contexts in the MENA region suggest that donors can make positive contributions in support of new social contracts when backing (a) stakeholder dialogues, (b) governance and reforms, and (c) socioeconomic inclusion. In Libya, the socioeconomic dialogue process has brought stakeholders together to outline a new economic vision for the country. The Municipal Development Programme in Palestine focusses on improving the accountability and delivery of local institutions. The Moroccan Economic, Social and Environmental Council provides an example of a process that engages previously marginalised groups. These programmes are all examples of targeted efforts to build cooperation among the groups that make up MENA societies. They aim to broaden decision-making processes, and to increase the impact of specific measures with the ultimate objective of improving state–society relations. They could be adapted for other fragile contexts, with external support. In backing more of these kinds of activities, donors could make stronger contributions to sustainable, long-term peace- and state-building processes in conflict-affected MENA countries.
Topic:: Development, Natural Resources, Conflict, Peace, and Social Contract
Political Geography:: Iraq, Middle East, Libya, Yemen, Palestine, Algeria, North Africa, Lebanon, and Syria

37. Rethinking Transnational Terrorism: An Integrated Approach

Author:: Martha Crenshaw
Publication Date:: 02-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:: The 2011 civil war in Syria attracted thousands of fighters from at least seventy countries to join the Islamic State. Al-Shabaab carried out large-scale attacks on civilian targets in Uganda and Kenya as retribution for the deployment of peacekeeping forces in Somalia. In this report, Martha Crenshaw considers the extent to which civil war and foreign military intervention function as a rationale for transnational terrorism, and how understanding the connections between terrorism, civil war, and weak governance can help the United States and its allies mount an appropriate response.
Topic:: Terrorism, War, Non State Actors, Islamic State, Transnational Actors, Peace, and Al-Shabaab
Political Geography:: Uganda, Kenya, Africa, Middle East, Syria, Somalia, and United States of America

38. Greece and Israeli-Turkish relations

Author:: George Tzogopoulos
Publication Date:: 05-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: This essay by Dr. George Tzogopoulos, focuses on the multidimensional nature of Greek-Israeli relations. The understanding of the depth of these relations can explain why the two countries – along with Cyprus – are interested in coming closer. On the other hand, the effort of Israel and Turkey to normalize bilateral ties – already under way since 2016 – is a logical development that deserves attention. However, it is not related to the future evolution of Greek-Israeli collaboration. The evolution of Greek-Israeli relations in the last decade and trilateral Greece-Israel-Cyprus summits outline the common interest of the three countries to enrich their cooperation. Israel and Turkey have started since 2016 to normalize their relations. This is an ongoing process that has evolved in a period during which Greece, Israel and Cyprus charted a joint course in the Eastern Mediterranean. Israel and Turkey are expected to find a modus vivendi by agreeing on some issues and disagreeing on others. A potential Turkish-Israeli collaboration against Iran in Syria might pave the way for new synergies between Israel and Turkey. This is a highly controversial and complicated matter that entails risks for Ankara.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: Europe, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Israel, Greece, and Syria

39. Gone Without a Trace: Syria’s Detained, Abducted, and Forcibly Disappeared

Author:: Hanny Megally and Elena Naughton
Publication Date:: 05-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ)
Abstract:: In most cases, to be imprisoned in Syria is to disappear. Tens of thousands of people, if not more, have been unlawfully taken prisoner or held incommunicado in the context of the Syrian conflict. This policy paper examines the dark reality of detentions in Syria, its impact on those who are detained and their families, and recommends a set of urgent steps that should be taken to assist families in obtaining information about the whereabouts of their loved ones, gaining access to them, and achieving their prompt release. While most parties to the Syrian conflict are complicit in carrying out arbitrary and incommunicado detentions, including both state and non-state actors, the vast majority of detention-related violations since 2011 have been carried out by the Syrian state. The policy paper – a joint project of ICTJ and the Center on International Cooperation (CIC) at New York University – draws from a variety of sources, including the authoring organizations’ longstanding work on Syria and engagement with Syrian victims, as well as inputs from interviews and an expert roundtable in The Hague, Netherlands, in October 2019. The paper looks in depth at the main government security agencies responsible for arrests and detentions in Syria and shows how the regime weaponizes the law to criminalize political activity, to maintain absolute control over the Syrian population, and to justify arrests and detentions of peaceful demonstrators, political opponents, and human rights activists, all behind a facade of legality. It shows how, at every level, the system works in contravention of fundamental principles of human rights law designed to protect individuals from unlawful and arbitrary deprivation of liberty, including rights guaranteed in the international declarations and conventions to which Syria is a party. The paper provides additional information about nonstate actors who over the course of the conflict are known to have abducted and detained not only opposing armed forces, including Syrian army, but many civilians. From there, the paper goes on to examine the harsh realities facing families of those who have been detained, abducted, and forcibly disappeared in Syria and what must be done to begin addressing the rights of these victims, which have been so seriously violated. It looks at four primary areas of action that must be considered urgent for Syrians: (1) official acknowledgment of detentions and the disclosure of information about the whereabouts and fate of the forcibly disappeared and abducted; (2) detainee releases; (3) access to detention facilities by monitoring groups; and (4) addressing the consequences of enforced disappearance on families. The paper concludes with comprehensive recommendations for what can and should be done, now and in the future by the Syrian regime and other parties to the conflict, as well as the international community. On an urgent basis, it recommends among other things the immediate release of all those arbitrarily detained as well as vulnerable prisoners such as the sick, women, the elderly, children, and the disabled; unimpeded access by the International Committee of the Red Cross to all places of detention; and the sharing of lists specifying the status and location of detainees held by the Syrian government and other nonstate actors. In the long-term, it proposes creating among other things an independent mechanism for reviewing the remaining cases of detention, safe centers where families can request information about the fate of their loved ones, and rehabilitation programs where released individuals can access psychosocial and other vital services. These and other critical steps are a matter of extreme urgency, as the paper makes plain, if there is to be any possibility of lasting peace in Syria.
Topic:: Reform, Youth, Criminal Justice, Memory, Institutions, Justice, Engagement, Gender, and Truth and Reconciliation
Political Geography:: Middle East and Syria

40. Challenges and opportunities for conflict resolution with Salafi jihadi armed groups

Author:: Veronique Dudouet and Karin Göldner-Ebenthal
Publication Date:: 03-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Berghof Foundation
Abstract:: This policy brief highlights recommendations for evidence-based policy making on pathways to conflict de-escalation with Salafi jihadi armed groups. It proposes a more nuanced public discussion of the topic. This brief draws mainly on the research report “Dialogue with Salafi jihadi armed groups: Challenges and opportunities for conflict de-escalation” which concludes a two-year research project based on case studies in Somalia, Syria and Mali.
Topic:: Conflict Resolution, Conflict Prevention, Islam, Religion, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:: Middle East, North Africa, Syria, Somalia, and Mali

41. Idlib and Its Environs: Narrowing Prospects for a Rebel Holdout

Author:: Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi
Publication Date:: 02-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: During the war years in Syria, the northwest, specifically Idlib, has become a site of heavy internal displacement. Observers on the ground recognize the green buses traveling to Idlib carrying migrants who have refused reconciliation agreements with the Damascus regime. Since around 2014, a range of jihadist, Islamist, and Salafi actors have wielded control in the area, the most recent being the al-Qaeda offshoot Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which has ruled—ineffectively and brutally—through its so-called Syrian Salvation Government. But the group's reign is unlikely to last long if current trends persist. The regime's recent move against the town of Maarat al-Numan suggests plans for a broader takeover in the northwest, aided by Russian firepower and other allies such as Iran. In this Policy Note filled with local insights, jihadism expert Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi presents the current scene in and around Idlib province, the last Syrian outpost still run by independent rebels. Absent an intervention by Turkey, the Assad regime will likely prevail in a campaign that quashes the insurgency at a high humanitarian cost.
Topic:: Al Qaeda, Displacement, Military Intervention, Conflict, and Syrian War
Political Geography:: Russia, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Syria, and Idlib

42. Establishing a Response Ratio for Iranian and Proxy Attacks

Author:: Michael Knights
Publication Date:: 02-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Enhancing deterrence and protecting Americans in Iraq and Syria requires a more formalized system for rationing out retaliatory strikes at the proper intensity, time, and place. When U.S. airstrikes targeted Kataib Hezbollah militia personnel and senior Iranian military figures on December 29 and January 3, they were releasing long-pent-up retaliation for a range of provocations by Iraqi militias. Yet while these powerful blows may have injected some caution into enemy calculations, such deterrence is likely to be a wasting asset. The most proximal trigger for the strikes—the killing of an American civilian contractor during Kataib Hezbollah’s December 27 rocket attack on the K-1 base in Kirkuk—was just one in a series of increasingly risky militia operations against U.S. facilities. Only good fortune has prevented more Americans from dying in attacks conducted since then, including January 8 (when Iranian ballistic missiles struck the U.S. portion of al-Asad Air Base, causing more than a hundred nonlethal traumatic brain injuries), January 26 (mortar strike on the dining hall at the U.S. embassy in Baghdad), January 31 (rockets fired at the U.S. site at Qayyarah West), February 10 (explosive device thrown at a U.S. logistical convoy south of Baghdad), and February 13 (rocket attack on U.S. site at Kirkuk). The United States has seemingly communicated to Tehran that it will strike Iraqi militias and Iranian targets if any Americans are killed, but this redline has opened up a dangerous gray zone in which Iran and its proxies are emboldened to continue their nonlethal attacks. Besides the fact that such high-risk attacks are destined to result in more American deaths at some point, they will also produce many more injuries if permitted to continue, as seen in the January 8 strike. More broadly, they will limit U.S. freedom of movement in Iraq and Syria, undermining the point of being there in the first place. This situation is unacceptable—the United States needs a way to deter such behavior even when attacks fall short of killing Americans. When faced with similar challenges in past decades, the U.S. military established reckoning systems that matched the punishment to the crime, with useful levels of predictability, proportionality, and accountability.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Military Affairs, Assassination, and No-Fly Zones
Political Geography:: Iraq, Iran, Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

43. Latest Battle for Idlib Could Send Another Wave of Refugees to Europe

Author:: Fabrice Balanche
Publication Date:: 02-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Various displacement scenarios may unfold as the fighting escalates, each carrying a high risk of negative humanitarian and economic consequences even if the parties live up to their promises. The battle for Idlib province, the last stronghold of Syrian rebel forces, is heating up again. As Turkish troops clash with Assad regime forces and displaced civilians continue piling up along the border, various foreign and domestic players are considering moves that could send hundreds of thousands of refugees to other parts of Syria, northern Iraq, or Europe.
Topic:: Refugees, Displacement, Conflict, and Syrian War
Political Geography:: Iraq, Europe, Turkey, Syria, and Idlib

44. Syria’s Economic Crisis Sparks Rare Protests in Regime Territory

Author:: Oula A. Alrifai
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Besides highlighting Assad’s financial mismanagement, the recent unrest gives the international community a genuine opportunity to push for transition while bolstering the more prosperous local administration in the northeast. Since mid-January, shop owners, government employees, students, and even children have been gathering in the streets of various Syrian communities to express their frustration with the Assad regime’s economic policies and untruths. Although the protests remain small for now, the fact that they have persistently carried on in the middle of regime-controlled territory highlights Bashar al-Assad’s potential vulnerability on these issues. In Suwayda, a Druze-majority province in the south, residents have protested the sharp drop in the value of the Syrian pound/lira and the deteriorating economic situation in general. In the central-western town of Salamiya, protestors were seen chanting “we want to live.” And in the Suwayda town of Shahba, demonstrators raised loaves of bread in the air while openly criticizing Bouthaina Shaaban, Assad’s political and media advisor. The latter protest was partly spurred by a recent interview on the pro-Assad television network al-Mayadeen, where Shaaban not only claimed that the country’s current economy is “fifty times better than what it was in 2011,” but also declared that “Syrians are self-sufficient in everything.” In response, protestors sarcastically noted that her comments referred to her own household’s economy, not Syria’s. Elsewhere, former agriculture minister Nour al-Din Manna described Shaaban’s remarks about the war-torn country as “hard to believe,” and a closer look at the country’s finances supports this disbelief.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Economics, Syrian War, and Currency
Political Geography:: Middle East, Lebanon, Syria, and United States of America

45. The Syrian Safe Zone and International Law

Author:: Bríd Ní Ghráinne
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Institute of International Relations Prague
Abstract:: On Wednesday 9 October 2019, Turkey launched a cross-border operation in Northern Syria. Turkey justified its actions as a response to an ‘imminent terrorist threat’ from Kurdish-led forces. Its operation was directed at pushing back these groups from its border and creating a ‘safe zone’ in Syria where up to two million Syrian refugees can be resettled. This reflection aims to assess whether the Turkish operation to establish the safe zone was lawful; and whether the resettlement of Syrian refugees in the safe zone is in conformity with international law.
Topic:: Human Rights, International Law, Refugees, Syrian War, and Humanitarian Crisis
Political Geography:: Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

46. HTS Leader al-Julani’s New Strategy in Northwestern Syria

Author:: Rami Jameel
Publication Date:: 10-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:: Abu Mohammed al-Julani’s Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) has recently escalated its crackdown on jihadists groups and figures in the Idlib province of northwestern Syria (Step News, October 5). The formation of HTS from al-Nusra Front in January 2017 was accompanied by a declaration that the group was severing its relationship to al-Qaeda and that it was no longer the Syrian branch of the global jihadist organization (Almodon, January 27, 2017). Al-Nusra’s repeated claims that it was breaking with al-Qaeda did not convince many policymakers or analysts, and the group remained designated as a terrorist organization by both the United Nations and the international powers who have influence in Syria.
Topic:: Non State Actors, Islamism, Jihad, and Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)
Political Geography:: Middle East and Syria

47. Drone attacks against critical infrastructure: A real and present threat

Author:: Scott Crino and Conrad "Andy" Dreby
Publication Date:: 05-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: The use of drones as weapons in the Middle East and North Africa has grown rapidly in recent years, especially as non-state actors from the Houthis in Yemen to militants in Syria seek to level the playing field. Often powered by widely available commercial technology, these systems present a real and present security challenge. What should policymakers do to adapt to this new threat? How can they best structure defenses and leverage available technology to protect key assets? “Drone Attacks Against Critical Infrastructure,” by Dr. Scott Crino and Conrad “Andy” Dreby, addresses these questions and more. Crino is founder and CEO and Dreby is director of red-teaming at Red Six Solutions, LLC. The authors analyze developments in the use of weaponized drones in the Middle East and beyond, exploring how regional policymakers can adapt to mitigate this threat.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Weapons, and Drones
Political Geography:: Middle East, Syria, and Gulf Nations

48. Immanent Conflict without Immanent War

Author:: Helle Malmvig and Jakob Dreyer
Publication Date:: 02-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: • Denmark should focus its attention on the border region between Iraq and Syria, which presents a high risk of insurgency, and is where the main Danish military contingency has been deployed since 2015. • Given the likely partial US withdrawal from Iraq, NATO and European governments should prepare for taking on new tasks and responsibilities. • The US-led coalition should allow and prepare SDF to negotiate alternative political/security arrangements, as SDF may have difficulty sustaining its presence in Syria.
Topic:: Non State Actors, Fragile States, Islamic State, Syrian War, and Proxy War
Political Geography:: Iraq, Middle East, and Syria

49. Beyond UN Security Council action: Treating Idlib as protracted crisis

Author:: Erwin van Veen
Publication Date:: 06-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:: On 10 July 2020, UN Security Council Resolution 2504 expires.1 It authorises humanitarian access from Turkey into northwest Syria. Should it not be extended, a humanitarian catastrophe will almost certainly occur. Fortunately, intense lobbying is already underway to avoid such an outcome. But other actions are essential beyond the resolution’s renewal. Key among those is the need for a shift in approach: instead of handling northwest Syria as a humanitarian emergency, the area should be treated as a protracted crisis to reflect the absence of a short-term solution to the predicament of its four million residents, including 2.7 million internally displaced. In practice, this means that much more humanitarian aid should be delivered through local Syrian organisations, reliable mechanisms for cross-line aid operations should be introduced, and the ground should be prepared for more EU engagement with Turkey and Russia. Without such actions, human suffering and its exploitation are bound to increase.
Topic:: United Nations, Syrian War, Crisis Management, and Humanitarian Crisis
Political Geography:: Middle East, Syria, and Idlib

50. Waiting for blowback: The Kurdish question and Turkey’s new regional militarism

Author:: Engin Yüksel
Publication Date:: 09-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:: Recent Turkish interventions in parts of Syria, Iraq and Turkey itself, look like pushing various Kurdish armed forces and political groupings towards ‘defeat’ via a concerted regional strategy that combines battlefield action with repression and co-optation. But the ‘anti-terrorist’ frame and tactics that Ankara uses in a bid to solve its Kurdish problem feature many sticks and no compromises to improve Kurdish collective minority rights. It is likely that this approach will inhibit peaceful resistance and fail to reduce support for armed groups like the PKK and PYD despite their own authoritarian practices. Moreover, Turkey’s new regional militarism risks escalating conflict across the Middle East because of the complex international and transnational contexts in which Ankara’s interventions take place.
Topic:: International Affairs, Non State Actors, Conflict, and Kurds
Political Geography:: Iraq, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

51. Idlib: The New Strategic Nucleus of the Battle over Syria

Author:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:: 03-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:: After Turkey’s unsuccessful ultimatum set for the Syrian regime and its Russian ally to commit to the Sochi Agreement, Ankara has targeted the Assad regime and its allies’ locations along the de-escalation zone by launching Operation Spring Shield. Russia has capitalized on Turkey’s anger by offering an agreement establishing new facts on ground during a Turkish-Russian summit on March 5th.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Armed Forces, Geopolitics, Conflict, and Syrian War
Political Geography:: Russia, Turkey, Middle East, Syria, United States of America, and Idlib

52. Iran's successful transnational network: Iranian foreign policy utilizes partners

Author:: Maria-Louise Clausen
Publication Date:: 11-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: In Western and Middle Eastern capitals there is growing concern over the growth of Iran’s transnational network. In the last decade, Iran has exploited the weaknesses of other states to expand its influence through relationships with state and non-state actors in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen, but what characterizes this network? Key take-aways: The group of state and non-state actors referred to as proxies of Iran is diverse, and important nuances are lost by approaching them all solely as proxies. Whereas sectarian affinity plays a role, Iran’s ability to portray itself as anti-imperialist and as fighting oppression transcends sectarian boundaries. Iran’s transnational network is multifaceted, pragmatic and diverse, as each relationship reflects each member’s capabilities, history and importance to Iran.
Topic:: Non State Actors, Sectarianism, Conflict, and Proxy War
Political Geography:: Iraq, Iran, Yemen, Lebanon, Syria, and United States of America

53. Do or Die: COVID-19 and Imprisonment in Syria

Author:: Hanny Megally, Leah Zamore, and Tayseer Alkarim
Publication Date:: 06-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center on International Cooperation
Abstract:: The COVID-19 pandemic poses a dire risk to the tens of thousands of people imprisoned in Syria’s archipelago of prisons and detention facilities, many in conditions so ghastly that they constitute crimes against humanity. These facilities function as overcrowded torture chambers by design. Thousands have already died in detention due to such circumstances, and those still living are especially vulnerable to the spread of coronavirus. If COVID-19 is permitted to take hold, the devastation among the prison population will be swift and fatal. Nor will it stop at the prison walls. What can be done to avert a catastrophe that threatens not only the up to 100,000 who may still be alive in detention, but also the war-weary Syrian population at large? This briefing outlines a two-step approach to averting the looming disaster, calling first and foremost for immediate and large-scale prisoner releases, because no prevention or mitigation efforts will succeed unless the challenges presented by overcrowding are addressed. While releases are underway, the living conditions of those who remain imprisoned must be radically transformed to safeguard health and prevent the pandemic from taking hold.
Topic:: Prisons/Penal Systems, Humanitarian Crisis, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Middle East and Syria

54. Last Refuge or Last Hour? COVID-19 and the Humanitarian Crisis in Idlib

Author:: Leah Zamore and Tayseer Alkarim
Publication Date:: 05-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center on International Cooperation
Abstract:: The humanitarian crisis in northern Syria is on the verge of becoming a COVID-19 catastrophe. A decade of conflict has left the healthcare system in ruins—and millions of displaced people in Idlib province were already suffering due to a lack of shelter and sanitation. Now, with the coronavirus pandemic posed to spread to an area with just 600 doctors and fewer than 50 adult ventilators for four million people, the situation is dire. Why is Idlib the last refuge for internally displaced Syrians, and what can donors, international humanitarian actors, and local organizations do to ensure that they are not left behind as the world grapples with COVID-19? This policy briefing by Tayseer Alkarim, Hanny Megally, and Leah Zamore delves into roots of the humanitarian crisis in Idlib, details the current capacity of the exhausted healthcare system amid the ongoing conflict, and examines what these constraints mean for mounting a response to the spread of the coronavirus. The briefing explains how donors and international humanitarian organizations can take action now to support local institutions, increase testing and treatment capacity, improve availability of PPE and public information, and press for an immediate ceasefire. The plight of Idlib is one of the most complex humanitarian dilemmas of our time, influenced by prolonged conflict, a looming COVID-19 outbreak, and the ongoing failure of the international community to take effective action. A further failure to minimize the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on Idlib will cost lives—and risk global health security further by allowing the virus to spread in one of the places that is least-equipped to contain it.
Topic:: Health, Conflict, Humanitarian Crisis, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Middle East, Syria, and Idlib

55. Society max: How Europe can help Syrians survive Assad and coronavirus

Author:: Julien Barnes-Dacey
Publication Date:: 04-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: After nine years of conflict, the US is mounting a ‘maximum pressure’ campaign against Syria, seeking the regime’s demise. But, with Assad having effectively won the war, he is unlikely to succumb to US economic pressure. Assad bears responsibility for the country’s freefall but this strategy will further accelerate societal collapse, especially as coronavirus looms, and will not deliver a transition. European governments should pivot to a longer-term strategy focused on protecting those societal forces that are still standing and that can help salvage a better future aligned with European interests. This should include increased – and cautious – support to them within government-controlled Syria. The unpredictability of the Trump administration means persuading the US down this track is not impossible – Europeans should seek to influence Washington to widen space for societal support.
Topic:: Sanctions, Conflict, Syrian War, Coronavirus, COVID-19, and Bashar al-Assad
Political Geography:: Europe, Middle East, and Syria

56. A new Gaza: Turkey’s border policy in northern Syria

Author:: Asli Aydıntaşbaş
Publication Date:: 05-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: Turkey now controls a long stretch of Syrian territory along its southern border that hosts nearly four million people, most of them Sunni Arabs. The challenges for Turkey there include a difficult balancing act with Russia, the huge financial costs of direct rule, the presence of radical Islamist factions, and the lack of a modus vivendi with the Kurds. Turkey faces the risk of the “Gazafication” of the area – the emergence of a militarily controlled territory that is perennially poverty-stricken and unstable. EU member states can find ways to cooperate with Turkey to support stabilisation in parts of the safe zone, without violating their interests and core principles. They should single out the Euphrates Shield Zone for stabilisation work, on the understanding that other areas captured from the Kurds are politically sensitive for European governments and voters alike. Europe should aim to strike a grand bargain with Turkey: in return for targeted European reconstruction aid to the safe zone, the country would lift its veto on stabilisation in Kurdish-controlled areas, allow trade between these zones, or agree to Kurdish participation in the UN-led political process on Syria.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Treaties and Agreements, Border Control, Geopolitics, and Syrian War
Political Geography:: Turkey, Middle East, Gaza, Syria, and Idlib

57. The End of German Ostpolitik: What a Change in Germany’s Russia Strategy Might Look Like

Author:: Stefan Meister
Publication Date:: 09-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: Relations between the European Union (EU) and Russia have hit a new low after the attempted poisoning of Alexei Navalny and the Kremlin’s continued support for Belarusian president Alexander Lukashenko, despite massive electoral fraud in that country. A new Russia policy in Berlin will require a paradigm shift, using incentives and leverage to improve Germany’s negotiating position with Moscow. The Nord Stream 2 pipeline project should be under intense scrutiny. If Moscow shows itself unwilling to cooperate, construction should be stopped.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Partnerships, Leadership, and Negotiation
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Libya, Germany, and Syria

58. Prospects for Syrian Kurdish Unity: Assessing Local and Regional Dynamics

Author:: Sirwan Kajjo
Publication Date:: 10-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: In October 2019, the U.S. troop withdrawal and subsequent Turkish invasion of northern Syria upended Kurdish plans in the region. But a year later, the major Syrian Kurdish rivals—the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and Kurdish National Council (KNC)—are coming together after a lengthy estrangement. This past June, representatives from the two blocs announced a new understanding to govern Syria’s northeast, in talks mediated by the Syrian Democratic Forces. The negotiations are aimed at creating a representative Kurdish-led leadership that could prevent further Turkish military interventions while also reducing Syrian-regime and Russian influence. But the PYD and KNC’s differing approaches to governance, as well as divergent alliances, pose serious challenges. In situating this timely Policy Note, Sirwan Kajjo offers a revealing history of Kurdish politics in Syria, especially in the post-Arab Spring period. Despite the uncertain outcome of the talks, for which activity resumed in late summer, both sides assert that a positive course can only be ensured by a strong U.S role.
Topic:: Military Intervention, Syrian War, and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)
Political Geography:: Turkey, Middle East, Syria, Kurdistan, and United States of America

59. A Short-Term Diplomatic Agenda for the Syrian Puzzle

Author:: Charles Thépaut
Publication Date:: 12-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: If Biden wants to create additional leverage before attempting difficult negotiations with Russia, he will need to display strategic patience by partnering with allies on ten preliminary issues. The Syria policy of President-elect Joe Biden’s incoming administration remains relatively mysterious. Five contradictory factors may frame it. First, Syria has never really been a U.S. policy priority in the Middle East, and renewing the international framework to halt Iran’s nuclear program seems to be Biden’s top regional goal. In addition, the repeated pledge to “end endless wars” has created broad American consensus against a bigger footprint abroad, and the coronavirus pandemic will further reduce the White House’s bandwidth for Syria. Second, the United States has lost significant leverage in Syria due to the policies of the Obama and Trump administrations. For instance, when faced with a Turkish cross-border operation in the northeast late last year, U.S. troops partially withdrew, thus blurring the previously stable frontlines between Russian, Turkish, and American forces. Third, Biden has praised the light U.S. force posture in northeast Syria. Contrary to other prominent Democrats, he argues that the “by, with, and through” strategy employed against the Islamic State remains a good model for American military action in the Middle East. This may indicate a willingness to keep a small contingent on the ground to support local partners. Fourth, key figures in Biden’s campaign—including Tony Blinken, his current nominee for secretary of state, and Jake Sullivan, his nominee for national security advisor—have publicly reflected on mistakes made in Syria during the Obama administration. Notably, Blinken has stated that he cannot imagine a policy of reengaging with Bashar al-Assad. Fifth, when U.S. legislators passed the Caesar Act last year, they built in mechanisms that were intended to resist change by future administrations. Therefore, economic sanctions targeting the Assad regime are likely here to stay. At first glance, these factors do not seem to leave much room for a particularly new Syria strategy, suggesting that the status quo policy will persist. Yet Washington has more leverage than it realizes, so long as it is willing to abandon the self-defeating logic of recent years.
Topic:: Civil War, Diplomacy, Conflict, and Syrian War
Political Geography:: Middle East and Syria

60. Varied Reactions in Syria to Biden Victory

Author:: Baraa Sabri
Publication Date:: 12-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: This snapshot of reactions should inform leadership in Washington to focus on increasing its commitment to supporting allies and punishing adversaries. While Syrians all closely watched the U.S. elections, there was no single, homogeneous view among them about the outcome of a Biden victory versus a Trump one. Many Syrians’ views differ depending on their geographic location and the entity that governs their region in the fractured country. Given this fractured public reaction, a better understanding of Syria’s future in relation to the new U.S. administration requires analysis of Syrian reactions from four different blocs: the regime in Damascus, the Kurdish bloc east of the Euphrates, Islamist militias in northwestern Syria, and ISIS.
Topic:: Public Opinion, Elections, Syrian War, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:: Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

61. In Search of a Semi-Autonomous Region in Northeastern Syria

Author:: Kenneth R. Rosen
Publication Date:: 10-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: It is possible to conflate the development of an autonomous region of northern Iraq with one in northeastern Syria; as a colleague on this forum noted recently, the Kurds in northeastern Syria have suffered, and continue to suffer, greatly. But while they are allies who “by, with, and through” have helped to bring ISIS down to a regional crumb in an ever-growing platter of fractured groups, what the United States owes or can offer the Syrian Kurds is much different than what was secured in the early days of the 1990s in Iraq, in the midst Saddam's massacres of Kurds.
Topic:: Politics, Syrian War, Autonomy, and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)
Political Geography:: Middle East, Syria, Kurdistan, and Rojava

62. Washington’s Stance on Syria and Iraq and The Widening Rift with Kurds in Iran

Author:: Baraa Sabri
Publication Date:: 09-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Over the last four years, Kurds in Iran have watched Kurdish communities in Syria and Iraq continue to suffer losses at the hands of hostile forces, disoriented by the turbulent shifts in Washington’s decision-making. It once seemed that the United States would support change in Iran beneficial to the country’s Kurds, but now a series of decisions by American leadership in Syria and Iraq have left many Kurdish political leaders in Iran afraid and discontented with U.S. policy in the region. Two moments during the Trump presidency particularly have soured and confused perceptions of the United States among Kurds in Iran. First, Iranian Kurds watched as the Trump administration allowed Shia militias hostile to Iraqi Kurds to take the city of Kirkuk in October 2017. Two years later, Kurds watched again as the Trump administration allowed the Turkish forces to invade northeastern Syria, driving local Kurds to flee their homes. These two moments pushed Iranian Kurds to doubt Washington’s potential contributions to the improvement of Kurdish rights in Iran. There now exists a political rift between U.S. and Iranian Kurdish leadership that may force Iranian Kurds to re-think their diplomatic position. Unfortunately for both groups, it seems that no one will benefit from such a rift—except for the Iranian government.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Minorities
Political Geography:: Iraq, Middle East, Syria, Kurdistan, and United States of America

63. Partial Local Autonomy in Southern Syria: Conditions, Durability, and Replicability

Author:: Alexander Decina
Publication Date:: 11-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:: In July 2018, Daraa Governorate, once home to an array of rebel groups and local governance councils, supported by significant international assistance, was partially recaptured by the Government of Syria (GoS). Through a combination of force and negotiations, the GoS has restored control over key routes and infrastructure, although a number of former rebel groups have retained limited autonomy in their own communities. Since then, poor security and economic conditions, inadequate services, and competition between and among GoS security actors and former opposition factions have challenged the status quo in Daraa, but, by and large, the situation has held. These negotiated outcomes – and the GoS’s willingness to accept them – were predicated upon multiple factors, including the relatively moderate nature of southern opposition factions, Russian and Israeli military postures, and the historical connections of the Military Intelligence Directorate (MID) in Daraa. While lessons learned from the south are important, the particular conditions and outcomes i
Topic:: Security, Governance, Local, and Autonomy
Political Geography:: Middle East and Syria

64. Local Cross-line Coordination in Syria

Author:: Natasha Hall, Benjamin Smith, and Thomas McGee
Publication Date:: 10-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:: Throughout the eight-year-long conflict in Syria, the movement of people and goods—including vital foodstuffs, medicines, equipment, and fuel—has often been severely restricted by periods of prolonged fighting. Yet in many areas, local arrangements, historical circumstances, and key actors have facilitated trade and movement across the lines of conflict. This report examines four cross-line areas in Syria and draws lessons for how these local dynamics might affect the resolution of the larger conflict and these communities in the long term.
Topic:: Conflict, Syrian War, Mobility, and Peace
Political Geography:: Middle East and Syria

65. Disentangling from Syria's Civil War

Author:: Benjamin H. Friedman and Justin Logan
Publication Date:: 05-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: The United States intervened in Syria’s civil war in two ways: (1) anti-Assad efforts—through aid to rebels to help foster regime change and with airpower, troops and support to a militia—and (2) anti-ISIS efforts—through aid to the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to destroy the Islamic State’s territorial caliphate. The first mission was an ill-considered failure, the second a success.
Topic:: Conflict Resolution, Civil War, Military Strategy, Peacekeeping, Military Affairs, Military Intervention, and Peace
Political Geography:: Russia, United States, Iran, and Syria

66. Shifting Cultural Norms to Address GBV

Author:: SVRI
Publication Date:: 11-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Sexual Violence Research Initiative
Abstract:: Gender-based violence (GBV) is rooted in harmful gender norms and attitudes – unspoken social rules of behavior that are maintained by the approval or disapproval of a group. Gender roles and norms that condone violence against women are deeply embedded to varying degrees throughout most societies in the world, and are predictive of violence perpetration. Without changes in norms, laws and other interventions to reduce and prevent GBV can prove ineffective. Evidence indicates that transforming gender norms and power relations is one of the most effective ways of tackling violence against women.
Topic:: Gender Issues, Culture, Women, Gender Based Violence, and Sexual Violence
Political Geography:: Bangladesh, Cambodia, Nepal, Syria, Jordan, and Peru

67. Signposts for an Islamic State Comeback in Iraq

Author:: Michael Knights
Publication Date:: 10-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Despite the damage wrought by the U.S. withdrawal from Syria, the main drivers of Islamic State resurgence in Iraq can still be restrained by local U.S. engagement, which is now even more vital than before. The gross uncertainty surrounding the future of counterterrorism operations in northeast Syria is raising understandable fears of an Islamic State comeback in Iraq. After all, the IS resurgence of 2011-2014 was partially driven by the chaotic war conditions in Syria, and suppressing the group there will be extremely challenging in the coming months amid U.S. withdrawal and Turkish invasion. Another resurgence in Iraq is hardly inevitable, however—the country is subject to different internal drivers, and the United States is still well-positioned to lead international support of Baghdad’s counterterrorism efforts. Yet Washington will need to stay engaged and urgently address new problems if it hopes to prevent another disastrous insurgency.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Military Affairs, Counter-terrorism, and Islamic State
Political Geography:: Iraq, Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

68. The Islamic State in Syria After the U.S. Withdrawal

Author:: Aaron Y. Zelin
Publication Date:: 10-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Recent U.S. decisions have seemingly ignored the degree to which the group is continuing its insurgent attacks and reorganizing its supporters inside increasingly vulnerable detention facilities. In contrast to President Trump’s statements over the past half-year, the Islamic State has yet to be defeated outright. True, the group is nowhere near as capable as it was in 2015, but it is steadily rebuilding its capacities and attempting to break thousands of its supporters out of detainment. The vacuum created by the U.S. withdrawal and Turkish invasion will create more space for those efforts, while compounding the original problem of states being unwilling to deal with their citizens who joined IS and remain in Syria. To avoid becoming known as the administration that allowed IS to reemerge and, perhaps, conduct mass-casualty attacks in Europe or elsewhere, President Trump and his cabinet should take urgent action to salvage and mobilize their surviving ties with Washington’s longtime partner against IS, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Military Affairs, Violent Extremism, and Islamic State
Political Geography:: Iraq, Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

69. What Is Iran Up To in Deir al-Zour?

Author:: Oula A. Alrifai
Publication Date:: 10-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Tehran and its proxies have been exerting hard and soft power in northeast Syria, combining military consolidation with economic, social, and religious outreach in order to cement their long-term influence. On September 30, Syria and Iraq reopened their main border crossing between al-Bukamal and al-Qaim, which had been formally closed for five years. The circumstances surrounding the event were telling—the ceremony was delayed by a couple weeks because of unclaimed foreign airstrikes on Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps targets in east Syria following the Iranian attack against Saudi oil facilities earlier that month. What exactly have the IRGC and its local proxies been doing in Deir al-Zour province? And what does this activity tell us about Iran’s wider plans there?
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Education, Military Strategy, Geopolitics, Conflict, and Soft Power
Political Geography:: Iraq, Iran, Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

70. Don't Write Off Iraq

Author:: Bilal Wahab and Barbara A. Leaf
Publication Date:: 09-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Even as Baghdad works to rein in militias that invite outside attacks, Washington needs to be patient with the country’s contradictions in the near term and give space for it to exert sovereignty in the long term. As President Trump met with Iraqi president Barham Salih today on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, they were no doubt buoyed by their governments’ mutual conclusion that the recent attack on Saudi oil facilities in Abqaiq did not originate from Iraq. Initial concerns about that possibility were well founded—a previous attack on a major Saudi pipeline was carried out from Iraqi territory this May, and multiple Iraqi militia facilities have been struck since June, reportedly by Israel. Each of these developments was linked to Shia “special groups” with known ties to Iran. On July 1, Iraqi prime minister Adil Abdulmahdi ordered these and other militias to fold themselves under state authority, but so far he has been unable to impose order on them. The government has also failed to prevent them from threatening neighboring countries at Iran’s presumed behest—an especially dangerous lapse given that Iraqi authorities cannot protect the territory these militias hold from external retaliation. To keep other countries from turning Iraq into a proxy battleground, Baghdad needs to rein in the unruliest militias. This is a tall order because Tehran has spent fifteen years building them into a parallel force of its own. Given the willingness these “special groups” have shown when asked to attack U.S. troops, fight on the Assad regime’s behalf in Syria, or secure other Iranian interests, they risk implicating Iraq in Tehran’s regional confrontations with the United States, Saudi Arabia, and/or Israel.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Non State Actors, and Proxy War
Political Geography:: Iraq, Iran, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United States of America, and Gulf Nations

71. A Decisive Vote for Humanitarian Support in Syria

Author:: Dana Stroul and Charles Thépaut
Publication Date:: 12-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Renewing the UN cross-border mechanism is crucial to helping millions of needy Syrian civilians, preventing Russia and Assad from weaponizing aid deliveries, and safeguarding future international assistance efforts. On December 19, the UN Security Council is expected to vote on the renewal of Resolution 2449, which authorizes the delivery of cross-border humanitarian aid to Syrians without the Assad regime’s permission. The outcome will determine whether the regime is allowed to approve and entirely control who receives UN aid, and in what areas of the country it is available. If the resolution is not renewed, aid delivery will become yet another tool for shifting the war’s trajectory in President Bashar al-Assad’s favor, with dire implications for civilians living in areas not under regime control. The recent Security Council debate over the resolution reflects broader developments inside Syria. Russia has coordinated with China to argue that current battlefield trends are in the regime’s favor, attempting to use the aid debate as a means of coercing political recognition of Assad. Others have proposed adding a fifth crossing along the northern border at Tal Abyad to address the increased needs of Syrian civilians trapped in the latest Turkish military operation. UN Security-General Antonio Guterres has recalled how essential the mechanism is to reaching people in need.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Humanitarian Aid, International Law, United Nations, and Syrian War
Political Geography:: Middle East, United Nations, Syria, and United States of America

72. Kurdish Reactions to Their Abandonment in Syria

Author:: Bilal Wahab
Publication Date:: 10-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: The U.S. withdrawal of troops from northeast Syria has placed Kurdish fighters in a near-impossible situation, while alarming Kurdish communities in other countries, but Washington can still take steps to mitigate the damage. On October 21, footage of Kurdish civilians heckling withdrawing U.S. troops in both Iraq and Syria offered a rare and disturbing sight. This scene was facilitated by President Trump’s October 6 decision to unilaterally withdraw U.S. forces from Syria, in effect paving the way for the Turkish military to cross the Syrian border three days later and attack the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Thereafter, a safe haven quickly became a war zone. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 180,000 people have now been forced from their homes. James Jeffrey, the U.S. administration’s envoy to Syria, told Congress on October 22 that the fighting has resulted in hundreds of SDF deaths, a likely war crime by a pro-Turkish militia, and the escape from prison of more than a hundred Islamic State (IS) fighters. The U.S. action has unsurprisingly left the Syrian Kurds feeling abandoned and exposed against the militarily superior Turkish army and its Arab militias. On a deeper level, America appears to have entirely lost Kurdish sympathy and trust, while at the same time failing to either deter or appease Turkey. Rather than ameliorate matters, President Trump has poured salt on the wound. He responded to backlash against his policy by claiming the Kurds were “no angels” and that they had failed to contribute to the Allied cause in World War II, while characterizing their Syrian military campaign as a fight over “long-bloodstained sand.”
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, Military Affairs, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Iraq, Turkey, Middle East, Syria, United States of America, and Rojava

73. Making Sanctions Smarter: Safeguarding Humanitarian Action

Author:: Alice Debarre
Publication Date:: 12-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Peace Institute
Abstract:: In recent decades, sanctions have increasingly been used as a foreign policy tool. The UN Security Council has imposed a total of fourteen sanctions regimes alongside those imposed autonomously by the EU, the US, and other countries. Despite efforts to institute more targeted sanctions regimes, these regimes continue to impede or prevent the provision of humanitarian assistance and protection. This policy paper focuses on the impact of sanctions regimes in four countries: the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Syria, Afghanistan, and Somalia. It aims to assist the Security Council, relevant UN organs, UN member states, humanitarian actors, and other stakeholders in ensuring that humanitarian activities are safeguarded in contexts in which sanctions regimes apply. While there are no straightforward solutions, the paper offers several ways forward: Including language that safeguards humanitarian activities in sanctions regimes; Raising awareness and promoting multi-stakeholder dialogue; Conducting better, more systematic monitoring of and reporting on the impact of sanctions on humanitarian activities; Developing more and improved guidance on the scope of sanctions regimes; and Improving risk management and risk sharing. This paper is accompanied by an issue brief that provides further detail on the types of impact sanctions can have on humanitarian action.
Topic:: Humanitarian Aid, Sanctions, and UN Security Council
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, North Korea, Syria, Somalia, United States of America, and European Union

74. We Need to Distinguish Between Local and Globalist Foreign Fighters

Author:: Maja Touzari Greenwood
Publication Date:: 03-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: The broad definition of the term ‘foreign fighter’ causes operational problems for risk assessments. It is therefore important for security officials to identify significant variations by classifying actors into major categories. RECOMMENDATIONS ■When assessing the risk of continued security threats from foreign fighters, it is crucial to distinguish strategically between foreign fighters who join local rebel groups and those who join globalist groups. ■Ways should be provided for foreign fighters who have joined local rebel groups to ‘opt out’ and return home after the end of fighting in order to discourage them from becoming globalist foreign fighters and to stem potential flows of foreign fighters to new theatres of conflict.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Terrorism, and Fragile States
Political Geography:: Middle East and Syria

75. Eagles riding the storm of war: The role of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party

Author:: Nick Grinstead, Christopher Solomon, and Jesse McDonald
Publication Date:: 01-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:: The Eagles of the Whirlwind are one of the many militias that have fought on the part of President Assad’s forces in the Syrian civil war. The regime allowed it to defend and police Syrian territory and, in some cases, to fight alongside the Syrian Arab Army on the frontlines. The group proved to be a capable and effective paramilitary auxiliary. What makes the Eagles of interest is that its parent political party - the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) – was able to increase the space for its political activities in exchange for the battlefield services of its militia. This is not a mean feat under the authoritarian system of decades of Assad-rule that brooked no political diversity whatsoever. It is all the more remarkable because the SSNP has historically been a political rival to the Syrian Ba’ath party. This policy brief analyses the main interests and dynamics by which the SSNP managed to translate the battlefield support and achievements of the Eagles into ministerial positions and open recruitment rallies for party members across regime-held territory. It also examines the SSNP as a novel form of support to the Assad regime that traded greater political auton¬omy for paramilitary mobilization in support of the regime - without, so far, resulting in a more permanent role for the Eagles in the Syrian security architecture. While accepting greater political autonomy for the SSNP was a price the Assad regime was willing to pay for extra auxiliary fighting capacity, it remains to be seen how durable the SSNP’s hard-won autonomy will be.
Topic:: Security, Non State Actors, Authoritarianism, Syrian War, Militias, and Bashar al-Assad
Political Geography:: Middle East and Syria

76. Turkey in northwestern Syria: Rebuilding empire at the margins

Author:: Erwin van Veen and Engin Yüksel
Publication Date:: 06-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:: This policy brief analyses the official discourse and actual practices of Turkish control and reconstruction in northwestern Syria. It finds that Turkey pursues a strategy that seeks to achieve control and influence through a mix of military occupation and fullscale reconstruction based on the logic of Turkification and the deployment abroad of the domestic apparatus of the Turkish state. The main objective of this strategy is to contain and undo the politico-territorial gains of the Syrian Kurds. In the process, Turkey largely bypasses the Syrian National Coalition. While this ‘reconstruct-the-buffer-zone’ strategy has been comparatively successful in the Al-Bab-Azaz-Jarablus area, it is running into trouble in the Kurdish-dominated Afrin area due to heavy-handed Turkish tactics of repression and the insurgency campaign that was launched by the Syrian Kurds. Yet, the nature of Turkish reconstruction engagement suggest it is there to stay, which in turn is likely to prolong the Syrian conflict. It will also create several problems from an EU policy perspective, including repression of Syria’s Kurds, an uncertain future of Syrian refugees in Turkey and violation of international law.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Conflict, Syrian War, and Kurds
Political Geography:: Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

77. Can Assad win the peace?

Author:: Nour Samaha
Publication Date:: 05-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: As Syria transitions into a post-conflict phase, its government is trying to survive in much the same way it has over the last eight years. This involves a series of short-term fixes, heavy reliance on foreign allies, and a process of endurance it calls the “long breath”. Damascus wants to create a functional system that serves its ambitions, particularly its desire to re-establish strong central control rather than succumb to external demands. Crippling Western sanctions have led to increasingly drastic shortages of fuel and electricity, disrupting the supply – and increasing the price – of essential goods such as food. As a result, the state is increasingly relying on an array of racketeers, oligarchs and war profiteers to circumvent the sanctions, further entrenching Syria’s corruption networks. The West’s expectation that an economic war will eventually force the regime to acquiesce to its demands is short-sighted and counterproductive.
Topic:: Corruption, Sanctions, Conflict, Syrian War, and Bashar al-Assad
Political Geography:: Middle East and Syria

78. How the United States Can Still Keep Faith With Its Best Allies in Syria

Author:: David Pollock
Publication Date:: 01-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: As the United States prepares to withdraw its 2,000 troops from Syria, it has one last essential mission to accomplish. Those U.S. forces have fought successfully, hand in hand, with 60,000 Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) against Islamic State terrorists for the past four years. And President Trump’s latest statement about this, on January 2, noted his desire to protect these Kurds. So, despite all obstacles, the United States should still try to protect that brave and loyal militia in the short term, and secure a safer medium-term future for the Syrian Kurds and their local partners.
Topic:: International Security and International Affairs
Political Geography:: Syria

79. The displacement dilemma: Should Europe help Syrian refugees return home?

Author:: Jasmine El-Gamal
Publication Date:: 03-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: European governments must decide when and how to protect Syrian refugees who are voluntarily returning home They should do so using their remaining levers of influence in Syria, in line with European interests and UNHCR protection parameters. European engagement on voluntary refugee returns should be limited, cautious, and conditional. Europe must work with Middle Eastern host countries to prevent forced refugee returns. European governments must talk to all relevant stakeholders in the Syrian conflict, particularly Russia.
Topic:: International Cooperation, International Affairs, and Refugee Crisis
Political Geography:: Syria

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS