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Begin New Search Topic Diplomacy Political Geography Syria Content Type Policy Brief Publication Year within 25 Years

1. Present Challenges: Will Syria return to the Arab League fold?

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
On April 15, 2023, Saudi Arabia hosted a meeting that included the foreign ministers of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, Egypt, Iraq, and Jordan. The main topic on the agenda was the region’s relations with Syria and the possibility of returning to the Arab League fold after the suspension of its membership in November 2012. The visit of Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al-Saud, on April 18, to Damascus raised the question of whether recent diplomatic movements with Syria may pave the way for attending the Arab League Summit set to be held on May 19.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Syrian War, Normalization, Bashar al-Assad, and Arab League
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

2. Encircling Damascus: Iran’s Foreign Minister Visits Lebanon, Syria, and Turkey

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
Iranian Foreign Minister, Hossein Amirabdollahian, has made a surprise visit to Ankara, Beirut, and Damascus, reflecting his country’s increased engagement in the region. His trip to Ankara replaced a postponed trip to Moscow, where he was set to meet with his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Syrian War, Engagement, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Lebanon, and Syria

3. Politicking in Doha: But will the Syrian opposition shift to more pragmatic diplomacy?

Author:
Malik al-Abdeh and Lars Hauch
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
The Syrian Opposition Coalition (SOC) and the Syrian Negotiation Commission (SNC) are in dire need of internal renewal and a new political strategy given the deadlock of UN-led peace negotiations. A forthcoming opposition gathering on 4 February in Doha with more than 80 Syrian opposition leaders, activists and academics might offer an opportunity to do so. However, the event’s public face is Riyad Hijab, who is no longer part of the SOC and is seen as pursuing an internal leadership takeover. It is likely that the event will be part of a series that seeks to create a new centre of opposition without creating a new opposition body. Yet, neither Hijab’s internal politicking nor possible legitimacy/efficiency gains from implementation of a parallel SOC internal reform plan will generate a new political strategy for the opposition. This requires creative and pragmatic diplomacy that focuses on, for example, negotiating crossline arrangements between all conflict parties that improve local security and facilitate travel, trade and aid to improve the desperate situation of the Syrian people — in line with the UN’s call for a ‘safe, calm and neutral environment’ (SCNE). The habits of dialogue and compromise that can gradually develop in this manner could be leveraged at a later stage to address the more complex issues of power sharing and reconstruction once an appropriate window of opportunity has opened up.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Syrian War, and Peace
Political Geography:
Middle East, Syria, and Doha

4. What choices remain for the United States in Syria?

Author:
Nate Rosenblatt and Jomana Qaddour
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Syria is home to one of the world’s most complex conflicts. The chaos caused by the Syrian regime and its allies — within Syria, across the Middle East, and beyond — poses immediate and enduring threats. Considering its foreign policy promise to defend democracy and human rights, the Biden administration does not have the luxury of ignoring what happens in Syria. Accepting that there are fewer options for the United States today than there were ten years ago does not mean normalizing the Assad regime or turning a blind eye to Russian and Iranian efforts to tip the balance of power in the region. In a new issue brief from the Atlantic Council’s Syria program, “What Choices Remain for the United States in Syria?,” Nate Rosenblatt and Jomana Qaddour describe the challenges the United States faces in Syria, including Russia’s attempt to expand the UN Strategic Framework as well the struggle to keep the UN humanitarian border crossings open in northern Syria. The memo then lays out the three potential strategies in Syria: one prioritizing the withdrawal of US forces, a second protecting humanitarian access and ensuring progress on limited, critical files, and a third maintaining US support for, as well as coordination with, partners to dial up the pressure on the Syrian government and its allies. The paper ultimately argues that the Biden administration should seize this opportunity to establish a clear strategy in Syria by aligning its defense, development, and diplomatic capabilities with those of its global allies and partners to shape a better outcome in Syria.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Human Rights, International Organization, Politics, United Nations, Syrian War, and Resilience
Political Geography:
Middle East, Syria, North America, and United States of America

5. What Russian-Israeli cooperation in Syria?

Author:
Dima Course
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Since 2015, Russia has largely supported the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria against di- verse opposition. At the same time, Israel has continued its policy of limited military intervention – predominantly air strikes against Iranian targets and proxies, many of which are Russia’s partners in Syria. The Israeli strategy of attacking Iranian targets in Syria is not new. For example, Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) destroyed Assad’s nuclear reactor in 2007. Rus- sia has also been present in Syria for a long time, but until 2015, its presence was limited and it did not play a significant role in relations with Israel. Since 2015, however, the situation has changed sig- nificantly. Russian aviation and air defence began op- erating actively on the side of Assad’s regime. From the beginning, the media in both Russia and Israel hypothesized that the activation of Russian forces in Syria would interfere with the activities of the Israeli Air Force. Moreover, Israeli officials regularly voiced complaints that the Russians were actually interfering and hindering IDF operations in Syria. At the same time, the two sides have cooperated to a degree, enabling frequent attacks by the Israeli Air Force against targets in Syria affiliated with Iran. This Policy Brief offers a comparative analysis of Russian and Israeli interests in the context of the Syr- ian conflict. It contends that cooperation between the two countries has been a win-win situation for both sides, while having little influence on Russian-Israeli relations more generally.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Bilateral Relations, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, Middle East, Israel, and Syria

6. Turkey’s interventions in its near abroad: The case of Idlib

Author:
Erwin van Veen
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
The trigger for the Turkish Operation Spring Shield in northern Idlib in February 2020 was to prevent the Syrian conflict – especially extremists and refugees – spilling over into Turkey as the result of a new regime offensive. A deeper driver of the operation was Ankara’s desire to draw a line against further regime advances that might jeopardise Turkish territorial gains across northern Syria. Millions of Syrian internally displaced persons (IDPs) and the Islamist group Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) were the main – although unintended – beneficiaries of the operation. Tactically, Operation Spring Shield was a success because of a surge in Turkish military resources in northern Idlib, Ankara’s willingness to use them, and the speed with which Turkey acted. Strategically, it helped a great deal that Russia decided to stand aside for a few days. Russian-Turkish diplomacy resumed after battlefield conditions had shifted in Turkey’s favour and Syrian regime forces were stopped in their tracks. In the short term, Operation Spring Shield can be considered as having brought a measure of humanitarian and geopolitical stabilisation by clarifying Turkey’s red lines to Damascus, Tehran and Moscow, and by bringing about a new equilibrium between Russiansupported forces and Turkish forces in Syria. The operation did not negatively affect Turkey’s relationship with its NATO partners, the EU or the US. This was in part because the operation highlighted the limitations of the Astana process – a diplomatic initative in which Turkey, Iran and Russia pursue opposing aims vis-à-vis the Assad regime – from which these actors are excluded. In the medium term, the impact of Operation Spring Shield will depend on the permanence of the Turkish presence, the level of Turkish developmental investment and the evolution, as well as the place, of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in the future governance of northern Idlib.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Refugees, Military Intervention, and Regional Power
Political Geography:
Russia, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

7. Greece and Israeli-Turkish relations

Author:
George Tzogopoulos
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:
This essay by Dr. George Tzogopoulos, focuses on the multidimensional nature of Greek-Israeli relations. The understanding of the depth of these relations can explain why the two countries – along with Cyprus – are interested in coming closer. On the other hand, the effort of Israel and Turkey to normalize bilateral ties – already under way since 2016 – is a logical development that deserves attention. However, it is not related to the future evolution of Greek-Israeli collaboration. The evolution of Greek-Israeli relations in the last decade and trilateral Greece-Israel-Cyprus summits outline the common interest of the three countries to enrich their cooperation. Israel and Turkey have started since 2016 to normalize their relations. This is an ongoing process that has evolved in a period during which Greece, Israel and Cyprus charted a joint course in the Eastern Mediterranean. Israel and Turkey are expected to find a modus vivendi by agreeing on some issues and disagreeing on others. A potential Turkish-Israeli collaboration against Iran in Syria might pave the way for new synergies between Israel and Turkey. This is a highly controversial and complicated matter that entails risks for Ankara.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Europe, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Israel, Greece, and Syria

8. A Short-Term Diplomatic Agenda for the Syrian Puzzle

Author:
Charles Thépaut
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
If Biden wants to create additional leverage before attempting difficult negotiations with Russia, he will need to display strategic patience by partnering with allies on ten preliminary issues. The Syria policy of President-elect Joe Biden’s incoming administration remains relatively mysterious. Five contradictory factors may frame it. First, Syria has never really been a U.S. policy priority in the Middle East, and renewing the international framework to halt Iran’s nuclear program seems to be Biden’s top regional goal. In addition, the repeated pledge to “end endless wars” has created broad American consensus against a bigger footprint abroad, and the coronavirus pandemic will further reduce the White House’s bandwidth for Syria. Second, the United States has lost significant leverage in Syria due to the policies of the Obama and Trump administrations. For instance, when faced with a Turkish cross-border operation in the northeast late last year, U.S. troops partially withdrew, thus blurring the previously stable frontlines between Russian, Turkish, and American forces. Third, Biden has praised the light U.S. force posture in northeast Syria. Contrary to other prominent Democrats, he argues that the “by, with, and through” strategy employed against the Islamic State remains a good model for American military action in the Middle East. This may indicate a willingness to keep a small contingent on the ground to support local partners. Fourth, key figures in Biden’s campaign—including Tony Blinken, his current nominee for secretary of state, and Jake Sullivan, his nominee for national security advisor—have publicly reflected on mistakes made in Syria during the Obama administration. Notably, Blinken has stated that he cannot imagine a policy of reengaging with Bashar al-Assad. Fifth, when U.S. legislators passed the Caesar Act last year, they built in mechanisms that were intended to resist change by future administrations. Therefore, economic sanctions targeting the Assad regime are likely here to stay. At first glance, these factors do not seem to leave much room for a particularly new Syria strategy, suggesting that the status quo policy will persist. Yet Washington has more leverage than it realizes, so long as it is willing to abandon the self-defeating logic of recent years.
Topic:
Civil War, Diplomacy, Conflict, and Syrian War
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

9. Washington’s Stance on Syria and Iraq and The Widening Rift with Kurds in Iran

Author:
Baraa Sabri
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Over the last four years, Kurds in Iran have watched Kurdish communities in Syria and Iraq continue to suffer losses at the hands of hostile forces, disoriented by the turbulent shifts in Washington’s decision-making. It once seemed that the United States would support change in Iran beneficial to the country’s Kurds, but now a series of decisions by American leadership in Syria and Iraq have left many Kurdish political leaders in Iran afraid and discontented with U.S. policy in the region. Two moments during the Trump presidency particularly have soured and confused perceptions of the United States among Kurds in Iran. First, Iranian Kurds watched as the Trump administration allowed Shia militias hostile to Iraqi Kurds to take the city of Kirkuk in October 2017. Two years later, Kurds watched again as the Trump administration allowed the Turkish forces to invade northeastern Syria, driving local Kurds to flee their homes. These two moments pushed Iranian Kurds to doubt Washington’s potential contributions to the improvement of Kurdish rights in Iran. There now exists a political rift between U.S. and Iranian Kurdish leadership that may force Iranian Kurds to re-think their diplomatic position. Unfortunately for both groups, it seems that no one will benefit from such a rift—except for the Iranian government.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Minorities
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, Syria, Kurdistan, and United States of America

10. A strategy to rescue diplomacy on Syria

Author:
Mona Yacoubian
Publication Date:
02-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution
Abstract:
The Syrian crisis is rapidly turning into a humanitarian and security nightmare with regional and possibly global implications. The conflict is now firmly entrenched in a military stalemate. While "stalemate" conveys a sense of stasis, the impasse translates into the deepening deterioration of conditions on the ground. Meanwhile, the supercharged sectarian dynamic emanating from Syria is severely threatening regional stability, particularly in Iraq and Lebanon, which have both witnessed significant increases in sectarian violence.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Humanitarian Aid, International Cooperation, and Sectarian violence
Political Geography:
United Nations and Syria