Content Type: Policy Brief / Political Geography: Russia / Publication Year: within 5 Years / Topic:

1. The third EU-NATO joint declaration (10 January 2023): Was it worth the delay?

Author:: Loïc Simonet
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:: Triggered by the war in Ukraine, the long-awaited third joint EU-NATO declaration was signed on 10 January 2023, after months of postponement. Neither a joint strategic concept nor a plan of actions, the document primarily sends a strong political message of transatlantic unity with regards to the gravest threat to Euro-Atlantic security in decades. Although it recognises the value of a stronger and more capable European defence, it marks the primacy of NATO as European security provider, therefore being seen as a defeat for EU’s strategic autonomy. China’s first ever mention in a joint EU-NATO declaration sparked a nervous reaction in Beijing.
Topic:: Security, NATO, European Union, Strategic Autonomy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, and Ukraine

2. The Impacts of the Russo-Ukranian War on Latin America in the Age of Strategic Competition

Author:: Guido Torres
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: As we enter the second year of the Russo-Ukranian war, it is prudent that the foreign policy community examine the impacts of the conflict on other regions, including Latin America. Despite the distance between Latin America and Ukraine, the conflict has disrupted the region and exacerbated the negative impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. COVID-19 disproportionately affected Latin America’s fragile socioeconomic, fiscal, and political situation. For example, Brazil, a major regional economic powerhouse, was one of the worst-struck countries in the region, and the pandemic significantly impacted its economy. The country’s GDP contracted by 4.1% in 2020, and unemployment reached a record high of 14.1% in the first quarter of 2021. The pandemic also impacted Brazil’s fiscal situation, with the country’s debt reaching 90% of GDP. Brazil’s downturn is not an isolated incident, albeit a microcosm of the region. In addition, the instability allowed authoritarian regimes to further consolidate control in places like Nicaragua, Venezuela, and El Salvador. For instance, leaders like El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele capitalized on the chaos of the pandemic and a desperate citizenry to strengthen his power. Furthering the impacts on domestic politics, the confluence of the pandemic and war in Ukraine disrupted global supply chains, agriculture production, and energy resources. Moreover, as tensions between the West and nations such as Russia and China continue to grow, globalization is becoming increasingly divided. This will likely lead to further political turmoil and socioeconomic disparity in Latin America, which has already been compounded by the war and the lackluster COVID-19 recovery efforts. With these repercussions still lingering, a lack of economic and trade development, an intensifying energy crisis, and rampant inflation prevailing in 2023, the region’s outlook remains bleak.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Conflict, Strategic Competition, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Latin America

3. The promises and perils of law-making as the way to strengthen societal resilience

Author:: Amelie Theussen
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: Societal resilience is seen as a key answer to the deteriorating security situation, especially in the Baltic Sea region. States often employ new laws in an attempt to strengthen resilience, but is legislation the best way to build stronger societies? There is an underlying mismatch between the dynamism of resilience and the static nature of laws. Resilience entails the capacity to bounce back flexibly from crises. Laws should be formulated so as to nurture such flexibility. Democratic accountability might be at risk when laws are used in the quest for strengthened resilience.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Resilience, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Baltic States

4. Cluster Bombs: What is the potential impact of American weapons on Ukraine’s counteroffensive?

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: The US Department of Defense officially announced on July 7, 2023, that the US would provide cluster bombs to Ukraine as part of a new military assistance package to support Kyiv in its counteroffensive against Russia. Cluster munitions are weapons that consist of a container that opens in mid-air to scatter up to 600 explosive submunitions or bomblets over a wide area. Most of these weapons are known for their lack of precision guidance, meaning they are not individually directed toward specific targets. Estimates suggest that these weapons' failure rate (dud rate) during conflicts ranges from 10% to 40%, posing a significant risk to civilians, especially because they can explode later upon contact or movement.
Topic:: Weapons, Military Aid, Russia-Ukraine War, and Cluster Bombs
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

5. A Surprising Shift: Is Somalia choosing Moscow over Washington?

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: Somali Foreign Minister Abshir Omar Jama made a surprise visit to Moscow on May 26, 2023, to meet with several Russian officials, including his counterpart Sergey Lavrov. His visit raised several questions regarding motives and implications, particularly in light of the Russian top diplomat’s statements about Russia’s readiness to supply Mogadishu with the necessary military equipment for its ongoing war against the terrorist group Al-Shabaab.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Engagement, Al-Shabaab, and Military Aid
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, Somalia, and United States of America

6. Restraining Moscow: What are the repercussions of Wagner's rebellion for the Russo-Ukrainian war?

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: Yevgeny Prigozhin, the chief of the Russian private military contractor group Wagner, announced that his forces had crossed the Ukrainian border into the city of Rostov-on-Don in southern Russia, threatening to destroy anyone who would obstruct their path, including Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu if necessary. In an official speech delivered on the morning of June 24, 2023, Russian President Putin confirmed that what had happened was a stab in the back, instructing the security and military forces to neutralize the "traitors," referring to Prigozhin himself. He called on Russian security to arrest Prigozhin on charges of inciting a civil war. Wagner issued a statement in response to Putin's speech, affirming that Putin had chosen the wrong path and that Russia would soon have a new leader. In an official speech delivered on the morning of June 24, 2023, Russian President Vladimir Putin confirmed that what had happened was a stab in the back, and instructed the security and military forces to neutralize the "traitors," referring to Prigozhin himself. He called on Russian security to arrest Prigozhin on charges of inciting a civil war. In response to Putin's speech, Wagner issued a statement affirming that Putin had chosen the wrong path and that Russia would soon have a new leader. The defection of Wagner and the involvement of its forces in the conflict have significant implications for the Russo-Ukrainian war. The actions of Wagner and the response from the Russian government signal internal divisions and potential shifts in power dynamics within Russia. The situation remains highly volatile, and the repercussions of these events on the ongoing war are yet to unfold fully.
Topic:: Wagner Group, Military, Russia-Ukraine War, and Yevgeny Prigozhin
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

7. Messages to Washington: The significance of China's push for a new world order during President Jinping's Moscow visit

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: Chinese President Xi Jinping, on March 20, 2023, arrived in Moscow on a three-day state visit to meet Russian President Vladimir Putin, drawing harsh criticism from the West. Western countries consider the visit as explicit support to the Russian leader. During the visit, China and Russia signed numerous agreements to show their willingness to reinforce their bilateral relations.
Topic:: Security, Bilateral Relations, Economic Cooperation, Multipolarity, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, and United States of America

8. A Long Shot: Chances of reviving the JCPOA following FM’s Moscow visit

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: Iranian foreign minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian, on March 29, 2023 led ministry officials and a member of the parliament on a visit to Moscow where he met with Russian counterpart Sergie Lavrov to discuss ways of reinforcing bilateral relations and matters of common concern.
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, JCPOA, and Cooperation
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Iran, and Middle East

9. European Mercenaries: Will Congo use Wagner in its conflict with Rwanda?

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: Tensions broke out between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda in January 2023 after an exchange of accusations of non-compliance with their peace agreement signed in the Angolan capital Luanda in November 2022. The development came after Kinshasa announced that it uses private military firms to counter growing security threats. Kigali regarded this move as a declaration of war.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Conflict, Wagner Group, and Private Military Companies (PMCs)
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Rwanda

10. The war in Ukraine: Adapting the EU’s security and defence policy

Author:: Dick Zandee and Adaja Stoetman
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:: Russia’s war in Ukraine is violating the rules-based international order and poses a significant threat to European security. The EU and NATO have responded by taking coordinated action. The measures taken have varied from unprecedented sanctions on Russia to assisting Ukraine with the delivery of arms and ammunition. The war in Ukraine has led to an even stronger focus on collective defence, which was already put in motion after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. Furthermore, the European security architecture has witnessed a significant change with Finland (and later this year Sweden) joining the North Atlantic Alliance. At the Vilnius Summit (11-12 July 2023), NATO has taken new decisions to strengthen its deterrence and defence posture
Topic:: NATO, European Union, International Order, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

11. A Dead-End War: Russian Failure and Ukrainian Destruction

Author:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:: With all parties still clinging to their demands, there is no end in sight to the war: Russia wants to cement its control over four Ukrainian provinces, win recognition of its sovereignty over Crimea, and secure guarantees for Ukrainian neutrality. Ukraine wants a definitive end to hostilities, the withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukrainian territory (including Crimea), and negotiations on its strategic future.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Conflict, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

12. Russia’s War Economy

Author:: András Rácz, Ole Spillner, and Guntram Wolff
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: Sanctions are a strong signal of Western resolve to oppose Russia’s war against Ukraine and have significantly weakened its ability to wage war. But Russia is adapting, turning its economy into a war economy, ramping up military production, and adjusting to sanctions. This Policy Brief looks at Russia’s economic adjustment with a focus on the shifting of resources to war purposes and the effect of sanctions on military production.
Topic:: Sanctions, Economy, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

13. Leveraging Islam and Internal Conflict: Strategies and Consequences in Russia’s War Against Ukraine

Author:: Miriam Katherine Heß
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: Assessment of the president of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov; the inner-Chechen conflict; and Chechen fighters on both sides in Russia’s war against Ukraine reveals how internal conflicts become crucial for international structures and how transnational dynamics – such as foreign fighter flows – pose challenges to the interplay of national and international law. By anticipating the effects of the Russian invasion of Ukraine beyond the Zeitenwende in Germany and Europe, policy-makers will increase readiness and preparedness for the ongoing but also post-war period.
Topic:: Islam, Conflict, Foreign Fighters, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Central Asia

14. Toughening Financial Sanctions on Russia: Enforcing Energy Sanctions and Reducing Shadow Reserves Effectively

Author:: Guntram Wolff, Benjamin Hilgenstock, and Elina Ribakova
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: Financial sanctions are key in enforcing restrictions on Russian energy exports – in particular the G7/EU oil price cap regime –, due to financial institutions’ critical role in cross-border transactions. While the energy sanctions regime is having an impact on export earnings and budget revenues, evidence for potentially widespread violations is also emerging. Moreover, favorable external dynamics have allowed Russia to accumulate substantial assets abroad – “shadow reserves” –, which need to be kept out of reach of the regime.
Topic:: Governance, Sanctions, European Union, International Order, Energy, Geoeconomics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Eurasia

15. Coping with Technology Sanctions in the Russian Financial Sector

Author:: Alexandra Prokopenko
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: The Russian financial sector has taken a double hit from sanctions – both in infrastructure (affecting financial transactions) and in technology (affecting the hardware and software). Infrastructural sanctions imposed by Western countries in reponse to the war on Ukraine (de-SWIFTing, overcompliance, and breaking of correspondent relationships) affected their operational activity. Moreover, the Russian government banned the use of foreign software and equipment imports, which has been a drag on business development. The financial sector was able to withstand the first shock. However, the most recent restrictions on access to advanced technologies, especially from the US and the EU, will lead to import substitution based on technologies of yesterday.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Governance, Sanctions, European Union, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Eurasia

16. Whose Zeitenwende? Germany Cannot Meet Everyone’s Expectations

Author:: Kristi Raik and Martin Quencez
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: Russia’s full-scale of invasion of Ukraine pushed Germany to fundamentally revise its foreign and security policy, including its assumptions about European security, its relations with major powers, and its role as a mediator of intra-European disputes. The Zeitenwende’s level of ambition entails a profound reckoning of the failure of past policies, and has to be both European and global. Germany bears a special responsibility for strengthening European defense vis à vis Russia, reducing Europe’s vulnerabilities vis à vis China, maintaining a strong transatlantic alliance while also preparing Europe for a possible reduced US commitment in the future, and ensuring a coherent EU.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Germany

17. Economic sanctions against Russia: How effective? How durable?

Author:: Jeffrey J. Schott
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: Economic sanctions by Western democracies against Russia have not stopped the war and attacks on Ukrainian civilians. Together with continued economic and military support for Ukraine, however, sanctions are blocking Russian president Vladimir Putin from achieving his territorial objectives. Sanctions have contributed to a sharp compression of Russian imports; forced Russia’s military and industry to source from more costly and inefficient suppliers at home and abroad; and slowly begun to squeeze Russian government finances. The G7 countries must sustain and augment their efforts, including by confiscating frozen reserves of the Central Bank of Russia to help fund Ukraine’s reconstruction. G7 policymakers need to derive lessons from the current crisis about the utility of sanctions in conflicts between major powers. Maintaining coherent and coordinated sanctions against large and powerful target countries is critical for the effectiveness and durability of the policy. Deploying sanctions against such rivals also requires a long-term commitment to the implementation and enforcement of the trade and finance restrictions. Sanctions impose costs on both the target country and those imposing the sanctions, so Western policymakers need to offset those costs via domestic support or tax relief to sustain political support over time for sanctions in big power conflicts.
Topic:: Sanctions, Economy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

18. Integrating US and allied capabilities to ensure security in space

Author:: Nicholas Eftimiades
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: Over the last two decades, the world entered a new paradigm in the use of space, namely the introduction of highly capable small satellites, just tens or hundreds of kilograms in size. This paradigm has forever changed how countries will employ space capabilities to achieve economic, scientific, and national security interests. As is so often the case, the telltale signs of this global paradigm shift were obvious to more than just a few individuals or industries. Air Force Research Laboratory’s Space Vehicles Directorate began exploring the use of small satellites in the 1990s. The Air Force also established the Operationally Responsive Space program in 2007, which explored the potential use of small satellites. However, both research efforts had no impact on the US Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) satellite acquisition programs. The advancement of small satellites was largely driven by universities and small commercial start-up companies.1 The introduction of commercial and government small satellites has democratized space for states and even individuals. Space remote sensing and communications satellites, once the exclusive domain of the United States and Soviet Union, can now provide space-based services to anyone with a credit card. Eighty-eight countries currently operate satellites, and the next decade will likely see the launch of tens of thousands of new satellites.2 Commercial and government small satellites have changed outer space into a more contested, congested, and competitive environment. The United States has shared space data with its allies since the dawn of the space age.3 Yet it also has a history of operating independently in space. Other domains of warfare and defense policy are more closely integrated between the United States and its allies and partners. The United States has military alliances with dozens of countries and strategic partnerships with many more.4 In recent years, there have been calls to coordinate with, or even integrate allied space capabilities into US national security space strategy and plans. In this regard, the US government has made significant advances. However, much work needs to be done. There is pressure on the United States to act quickly to increase national security space cooperation and integration, driven by rapidly increasing global capabilities and expanding threats from hostile nations and orbital debris. This paper examines the potential strategic benefits to US national security of harnessing allied space capabilities and the current efforts to do so, as well as barriers to achieving success. The paper identifies pathways forward for cooperating with allies and strategic partners on their emerging space capabilities and the potential of integrating US and allied capabilities.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, National Security, European Union, and Space
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Canada, North America, and United States of America

19. The EU can manage without Russian liquified natural gas

Author:: Ben McWilliams, Giovanni Sgaravatti, Simone Tagliapietra, and Georg Zachmann
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: The European Union has committed to eliminate all Russian fossil-fuel imports by 2027. Progress has been made, with sanctions on oil and coal already introduced. The glaring exception is natural gas, on which the EU has so far refrained from imposing limitations, owing to greater dependence on Russia. Nevertheless, pipeline gas imports have fallen by four-fifths following Russia’s weaponisation of gas supplies. However, Russia’s exports of liquified natural gas (LNG) to the EU have increased since the invasion of Ukraine. The EU needs a coherent strategy for these LNG imports. Our analysis shows that the EU can manage without Russian LNG. Anticipated impacts are not comparable to those felt in 2022 as Russian pipeline gas dried up. The regional impact would be most significant for the Iberian Peninsula, which has the highest share of Russian LNG in total gas supply. Meanwhile, the global LNG market is tight, and we anticipate that Russia would find new buyers for cargos that no longer enter Europe. We discuss the options available to the EU. Wait-and-see implies delaying any action until 2027, while soft sanctions would discourage additional purchases but not break long-term contracts. We argue instead for an EU embargo on Russian LNG, to reduce exposure to an unreliable and adversarial entity, and to limit the extent to which EU consumers fund the Russian state. The embargo may be designed to allow purchases only if they are coordinated via the EU’s Energy Platform, with limited volumes and below market prices. This could be accompanied by the implementation of a price cap on Russian LNG cargos that use EU or G7 trans-shipment, insurance or shipping services.
Topic:: European Union, Gas, Energy, and Green Economy
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

20. Information Manipulation and Repression: A Theory and Evidence from the COVID-19 Response in Russia

Author:: Natalia Lamberova and Konstantin Sonin
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Cato Institute
Abstract:: The COVID-19 pandemic has called for provision of public goods and services that require a high state capacity, including producing and distributing vaccines, enforcing mask mandates, limiting potential super‐spreader events, and so on. The rationale for public intervention was that private actions, such as getting vaccinated, wearing masks, and avoiding large gatherings, have benefits to broader society, so they are likely to be undersupplied by individuals on their own. In these circumstances, one might expect the power of the state coercing others into compliance to be beneficial. Are authoritarian leaders, less constrained by institutions and less accountable to voters, better equipped to deal with health emergencies?
Topic:: Authoritarianism, Repression, Public Health, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Russia and Eurasia

21. The Ukraine War & European Security: How Durable Is America’s Strategy?

Author:: Zachary Paikin
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: More than a year after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the morale of the United States and its Western allies appears high.1 Spurred into action by Moscow’s act of aggression, NATO appears more united, the EU has seemingly become more of a geopolitical actor, and Ukraine has resisted and repulsed the Russian onslaught to a degree that few initially thought possible. The Biden administration has thus far laudably managed to ramp up assistance to Kyiv without directly confronting Moscow. However, while the current U.S. policy toward Russia and Ukraine may be sustainable for some time, that does not mean it will never run out of road. Sanctions against Russia — a major global economy — have been ramped up to a level previously unseen, but they have not been effective in compelling Moscow to change course. The United States and its allies have yet to agree on what they deem to be an acceptable endgame to the war. Great power or not, Russia will remain a populous, powerful and potentially disruptive actor in Europe. Without clearly and credibly proposing policies that can lower the temperature, and without beginning to envisage what a future European security order might look like, the United States risks prolonging the conflict — with potentially unforeseeable consequences if popular war–weariness continues to grow.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, Sanctions, European Union, Strategy, Military Aid, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

22. Paths to a Ceasefire in Ukraine: America Must Take the Lead

Author:: Anatol Lieven
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: Barring an improbable complete victory for Ukraine or Russia, the conflict in Ukraine will end, or more likely be suspended, in the form of a compromise. The fighting is therefore now essentially about the geographical and political lines along which this compromise will be drawn. These will become much clearer once the results of the forthcoming Ukrainian counter–offensive are known, and the aftermath of the offensive will be the time for an intensive diplomatic effort to bring about a ceasefire. Ideally, this compromise should take the form of a peace settlement like Northern Ireland’s in 1999, that would end the war and allow the creation of a stable, consensual and peaceful security order in Europe. More likely, however, is a ceasefire that (as in the cases of Kashmir, Korea, and Cyprus) will freeze the existing battle–line, wherever that runs. Such a ceasefire will in any case be necessary if talks aimed at a formal peace settlement are to take place; and even if such a treaty cannot be reached, such a ceasefire, if far from ideal, might still prove reasonably stable and permanent. Both the U.S. and Ukrainian administrations stated after it began that the war would inevitably end in a negotiated peace. In the first month of the war President Volodymyr Zelensky put forward peace proposals that included suspending the issues of Crimea and the eastern Donbas for future negotiation. Since then, however, both Ukraine and Russia have adopted positions that make any agreement between them exceptionally difficult. Given these circumstances, the United States must play the greatest role in achieving a ceasefire.
Topic:: Conflict Resolution, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Strategic Engagement, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

23. Defense Contractor Funded Think Tanks Dominate Ukraine Debate

Author:: Ben Freeman
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: Think tanks in the United States are a go–to resource for media outlets seeking expert opinions on pressing public policy issues. But think tanks often have entrenched stances; a growing body of research has shown that their funders can influence their analysis and commentary. This influence can include censorship — both self-censorship and more direct censoring of work unfavorable to a funder — and outright pay–for–research agreements with funders. The result is an environment where the interests of the most generous funders can dominate think tank policy debates. One such debate concerns the appropriate level of U.S. military involvement in the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Since Vladimir Putin’s illegal and disastrous decision to launch a full–scale invasion of Ukraine, the United States has approved approximately $48.7 billion in military spending.1 Despite the very real risk that escalations could lead to direct U.S. military involvement in the war, few think tanks have critically scrutinized this record setting amount of U.S. military assistance. Within the context of public debate about U.S. military involvement in the Ukraine war, this brief investigates Department of Defense (DoD) and DoD contractor funding of think tanks, those organizations advocacy efforts for policies that would benefit those funders, and the media’s predominant reliance on think tanks funded by the defense sector. The analysis finds that the vast majority of media mentions of think tanks in articles about U.S. arms and the Ukraine war are from think tanks whose funders profit from U.S. military spending, arms sales and, in many cases, directly from U.S. involvement in the Ukraine war. These think tanks also regularly offer support for public policy solutions that would financially benefit their funders without disclosing these apparent conflicts of interest. While this brief did not seek to establish a direct causality between think–tank policy recommendations and their arms industry funding in the case of the Ukraine war, we find a clear correlation between the two. We also found that media outlets disproportionately rely on commentary from defense sector funded think tanks.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Think Tanks, Russia-Ukraine War, and Military-Industrial Complex
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, and United States of America

24. The Future of European Security

Author:: Anatol Lieven
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: In three online sessions in May, the Quincy Institute convened a working group of leading experts on European foreign and security policies to discuss the stance of European countries concerning the war in Ukraine, “de-risking” the relationship with China, and the chances of an autonomous European approach to these issues. The group also discussed the much longer-term possibility of a new security architecture in Eurasia including Russia and China. The meetings of the working group took place under Chatham House rules, whereby participants are not individually cited. The following report therefore reflects a consensus of the group, but not necessarily the views of each individual member. Members of the working group were generally in agreement that as long as present circumstances continue, European countries are expected to take little independent action in the security domain, either individually or collectively. Genuine moves towards military self–sufficiency remain inhibited by resistance to pooling resources, and the fact that it is much cheaper simply to rely on the United States for defense. In addition, Washington has never brought really heavy pressure on the Europeans to provide for their own security, because the U.S. establishment and military–industrial complex see great advantages in keeping them in a position of dependence, even if this is extremely costly for U.S. taxpayers.1 Consequently, the European countries (which in this case really means France and Germany) are highly unlikely to adopt a determined autonomous initiative for a ceasefire in Ukraine. On the other hand, opinion was divided on how far European countries will be willing to follow the United States towards the economic and military containment of China, at least if this seems to involve them in serious losses and dangers. It was also pointed out that present circumstances will not last forever, and may not even last for very long. Several possible occurrences could change European attitudes. These include developments on the battlefield in Ukraine; a shift in Sino-U.S. relations towards actual conflict; a new global economic crisis; or a drastic acceleration of the effects of climate change. Given these potential developments, the group concluded that the United States should refrain from putting excessive pressure on Europe in areas where this could cause both severe economic damage and a backlash in European public opinion. This means, in the first instance, putting pressure on Germany to break off important economic links to China. In future, however, it could also mean U.S. refusal to support a ceasefire in Ukraine even if a majority of European states and populations desired one. U.S. policymakers should remember that the war in Ukraine is taking place in Europe, not North America and that the United States has a vital interest in maintaining Europe’s prosperity and democracy. The United States must not endanger them in the pursuit of its own narrow and short–term geopolitical goals. Finally, the group agreed that international affairs experts must not allow themselves to become trapped by contemporary issues and assumptions, because they might prove (as has often been the case) to be relatively temporary and contingent. Precisely because the situation today is so dire, it is important both to examine the past to see how we got to where we are, and to think imaginatively and independently about ideas for a better international system for our descendants.
Topic:: European Union, Military Spending, Strategic Autonomy, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

25. Russia after the Wagner mutiny: Yevgeny Prigozhin and the Kremlin’s gamble with the monopoly on violence

Author:: Jussi Lassila and Margarita Zavadskaya
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Vladimir Putin’s system is built on risk-averse loyalty and needs informal actors who can compensate for the inefficiency of official actors and partially satisfy the regime’s ambitious geopolitical visions. In Prigozhin’s mutiny, the same factors that had protected the regime’s integrity and deepening autocracy turned out to be vulnerabilities. The elimination of Prigozhin does not resolve this structural weakness but only shifts the problem elsewhere. Private military company (PMC) Wagner operated in Ukraine as an autonomous unit of the Russian army with more discretion on the ground and certain organizational advantages. However, PMCs should not be seen as private armies, but as extensions of the bureaucratic army or attempts to produce “pockets of efficiency”. The decentralization of armed groups weakens their ability to act against the political leadership. At the same time, this can be a ticking time bomb that critically weakens the state’s monopoly on violence.
Topic:: Armed Forces, Conflict, Wagner Group, Russia-Ukraine War, and Yevgeny Prigozhin
Political Geography:: Russia and Eurasia

26. Russia and Kazakhstan in the global nuclear sector: From uranium mining to energy diplomacy

Author:: Marco Siddi and Kristiina Silvan
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Amidst heightened geopolitical competition and low-carbon energy transformations, several states, notably China and countries in the Global South, have decided to invest in nuclear power, seeing it as a secure and low-emission alternative to fossil fuels. Kazakhstan is the world’s largest producer and exporter of unenriched uranium. It has been a reliable supplier to the West for decades, but its nuclear sector is closely linked to Russia’s, which has caused some concern in the European Union and the United States. Russia is a major player in the field thanks to its global exports of enriched uranium and nuclear technology. Its state nuclear company Rosatom has a large portfolio of international customers and numerous projects, mainly outside the West. Russia’s nuclear sector has become an important aspect of its energy diplomacy. While the nuclear sector has not been sanctioned, geopolitical tensions and instability in uranium-producing countries have increased security of supply risks for the West, which relies heavily on imports of both uranium and nuclear fuel.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Mining, Post-Soviet Space, Nuclear Energy, and Energy
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, Kazakhstan, and Asia

27. Pursuing justice for international crimes in Ukraine: A patchwork of multi-level and long-running efforts

Author:: Katja Creutz
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: The Russian aggression against Ukraine has triggered debates and initiatives on how to address crimes under international law committed in and against Ukraine, including war crimes and the crime of aggression. A single institution capable of dealing with all international crimes is nonetheless lacking. Tens of thousands of alleged war crimes have been reported and documented, part of which the Ukrainian courts themselves are handling. The massive caseload requires international assistance, in addition to which the ICC is also investigating alleged war crimes. The international community is divided in regard to the investigation and prosecution of the crime of aggression. As the ICC lacks jurisdiction with respect to this crime in this particular situation, European states are advancing a special ad hoc tribunal. Nonetheless, the majority of countries globally, particularly in the Global South, find it hard to support the initiative. The discussion on the best way to proceed with regard to addressing the crime of aggression committed by Russia is ongoing. Many problematic issues are being debated, ranging from political desirability to the issue of head of state immunities.
Topic:: Human Rights, International Law, United Nations, War Crimes, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

28. The changing dynamics of the G7, G20 and BRICS: Informal multilateral cooperation is increasingly important in an era of strategic competition

Author:: Juha Jokela and Alana Saul
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Increasing strategic competition among major powers has had a negative effect on the efficacy of formal multilateral cooperation. This has also been reflected in informal forums such as the G7, G20 and BRICS. Yet some new dynamics have emerged. Since Russia was excluded from the G8 in 2014, the G7 has become a key forum for Western cooperation. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has further geared the group towards a stronghold of Western economies and democracies. The BRICS group has continued to meet at leaders’ level, and has consolidated its position. Despite variation in its members’ interests, the group aims to balance the G7, and its importance for China and Russia has been elevated. Currently, the G20 constitutes a forum in which strategic competition can potentially be managed. Along with the G7 and BRICS countries, other powers play an increasingly notable role. The dynamics of the group also displays an increasing “Southernization” of informal multilateral cooperation.
Topic:: European Union, Democracy, Multilateralism, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

29. Russian blackmail and the Black Sea Grain Initiative: The (limited) impact of the war in Ukraine on global food security

Author:: Timo R. Stewart
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Ukraine and Russia are both major exporters of foodstuffs and fertilisers. Consequently, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 led to fears of an impending food crisis, particularly in the Middle East and North Africa. Prices did indeed rise steeply in March 2022 as Russia blockaded Ukrainian ports. Although global food prices remain elevated, they have fallen over the past year. This is partly due to mitigating measures, particularly the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI). However, prices were already high before the war due to the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic. The BSGI was further extended in March until May 2023 at least. Each deadline gives Russia a new opportunity to press for concessions on sanctions, as Ukraine sorely needs the export revenues, and there is ongoing concern regarding world food prices. While a continuation of the BSGI is highly preferable, it is also important to note that the initial food crisis fears were somewhat overblown. Russia’s leverage is limited. Higher food prices do take a toll on the poorest, but world food markets also have a high degree of flexibility and thereby resilience. Scuttling the deal would also incur costs for Russia and is therefore unlikely to happen.
Topic:: Governance, Multilateralism, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

30. Russian aggression and the European Arctic: Avoiding the trap of Arctic exceptionalism

Author:: Harri Mikkola, Samu Paukkunen, and Pekka Toveri
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: In its efforts to limit the Western defence posture in the Arctic, Russia has successfully exploited the “High North, low tension” mantra and the notion of the Arctic as an exceptional region of peace and cooperation. At the same time, Russia has managed to build its position of relative strength in the Arctic through systematically developing its military capabilities. To create a threat of escalation, Russia has also used offensive military exercises and disruptive hybrid operations against the Western Arctic states in the region. Arctic economic resources and military assets continue to play an essential role for Russia in pursuing its strategic goals, and for its ability to carry out acts of aggression. Through regional cooperative practices, the West has unintentionally facilitated this capacity. The West has limited its military activity in the Arctic to mitigate tensions. This has been a one-sided effort. The Western Arctic states should thus focus on building comprehensive deterrence in the region.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Military Affairs, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Arctic

31. The war-induced exodus from Russia: A security problem or a convenient political bogey?

Author:: Margarita Zavadskaya
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Since 24 February 2022, around 800,000 Russians have left Russia in reaction to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The largest proportion of new migrants was accepted by Kazakhstan, Georgia, Turkey, and Armenia. War-induced migration should be handled like any other migration, whether it involves asylum-seekers, economic migrants, or repatriates. Excessive politicization and fearmongering around migration, including political refugees and political oppositionists, is counterproductive, as it feeds into Kremlin propaganda and belligerent narratives. While there may be concerns about espionage or saboteurs, the primary focus should be on the socio-economic impact of Russian immigration. For the receiving states, especially in the post-Soviet space, the Russian migrants pose a socio-economic challenge rather than a political one. With an increasing probability of cross-border repression – persecution or intimidation of political migrants abroad – it is essential that the EU adopts a consistent response towards political migrants, including those from Russia.
Topic:: Security, Refugees, Borders, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

32. Russia’s regime transformation and the invasion of Ukraine: From a failed blitzkrieg to war as the new normal

Author:: Jussi Lassila
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Russia’s increasingly dictatorial and Soviet-nostalgic political leadership sees the invasion of Ukraine not only as a necessity when it comes to prevailing in the conflict with the West, but also as a chance to break free from Western influences. Vladimir Putin is acting as a referee in the elite’s hidden competition, which has been transformed into open rivalry in the context of the war. The competition over who is the most loyal to Putin’s war policy radicalizes the political discourse throughout. The Kremlin’s key challenge is to maintain the balance between citizens’ political apathy and the mobilization of society required in times of war. Civic passivity is central to the regime’s security, while justifying the continuation of the poorly progressing war requires an increasing militarization of society. The Russian public’s approval of the war has gradually diminished, and efforts to mobilize society in revenge for perceived losses have not changed the trend. Hence, Russia’s poor military success is thus far the fastest way to vitiate the legitimacy of Putin’s war regime.
Topic:: Security, Authoritarianism, Vladimir Putin, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

33. Nuclear deterrence in the Ukraine war: Diplomacy of violence

Author:: Jyri Lavikainen
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Russia’s nuclear blackmailing has been the primary reason why NATO has not intervened in the Ukraine war. However, the US nuclear deterrence has allowed the West to resist Russia’s nuclear coercion, which has resulted in an unprecedented delivery of military aid to Ukraine. The US has reacted to Russia’s nuclear coercion by emphasizing its readiness to retaliate if Russia uses nuclear weapons. The war progresses in line with the historical tradition of limited wars where the opposing sides regulate the conflict by issuing threats in a game of nerves. Russia’s nuclear deterrence strategy is failing because it uses nuclear deterrence for something it is not suited for: as a coercive tool in a protracted war of conquest. As long as such threats can be countered with a threat to retaliate, their credibility is low because the benefits cannot outweigh the costs in the vast majority of circumstances. The deterrence dynamic still allows more room for manoeuvre for the supporters of Ukraine. The West should increase the military aid delivered to Ukraine with the goal of defeating Russia.
Topic:: NATO, Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and United States of America

34. In a State of Denial: The Air War in Ukraine

Author:: Francesca Verville and Catarina Buchatskiy
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Ukraine’s ability to repel one of the world’s leading military powers has surprised the world. Since the full-scale invasion in February 2022, neither Russia — despite its superiority in numbers and capabilities — nor Ukraine has been able to establish air superiority. With fewer and less capable air domain assets, Ukraine has instead been obliged to adopt the less costly and inherently defensive strategy of ‘air denial.’ However, for it to remain successful will require Ukraine to sustain continuous air defence operations and the West to commit to a steady supply of military assistance. Mutual air denial is essentially an attritional form of warfare from which Russia is likely to draw greater benefits and a strategy which forces Ukraine to make difficult choices regarding the targets it wants to deny. The F-16, albeit not a silver bullet, offers the prospect of enabling Ukraine’s air forces to more effectively exploit openings in Russia’s defences and to strike Russian forces and their logistics. However, unlike previous provisions of Western military assistance, the decision to give Ukraine F-16s moves past the more short-term view of helping it meet the immediate needs of the war. The effort spent training Ukrainian pilots, ground crews, and logisticians will have long-term value in supporting Ukraine’s air defence needs and deterring any renewed Russian aggression.
Topic:: Air Force, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

35. The EU’s Magnitsky Act Obsolete in the Face of Russia’s Crimes in Ukraine?

Author:: Steven Blockmans
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Despite the mounting evidence of the most serious of human rights violations being conducted by Russian forces on Ukrainian soil, the EU has chosen not to use its new Magnitsky Act to blacklist the perpetrators and their commanders. Instead, the EU has preferred to respond to Russia’s ‘dumb’ bombs with increasingly ‘dumb’ sanctions. This Brief explains why, after decades of work to smarten up its restrictive measures, the politicisation of human rights sanctions and the high threshold of evidentiary standards make it very hard for the Council to rely on evidence gathered from transition countries where the justice sector is still vulnerable to widespread corruption and political cronyism.
Topic:: Human Rights, International Law, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

36. Prospects for Ukraine’s NATO Membership

Author:: Henrik Larsen
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: At the Vilnius Summit, Allies will focus primarily on their commitments to deter Russian aggression against NATO territory. But NATO seems unable to resolve the bigger strategic issue of how to secure Ukraine. If its own riskaversion prevents it from giving Ukraine a clearer pathway to membership, NATO may leave Ukraine disillusioned. A deterrence and defence partnership that guarantees the strengthening of Ukraine’s military capability for as long as required currently seems to be the most realistic scenario.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Deterrence, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

37. Defence Spending

Author:: Margarita Šešelgytė
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Russia’s war in Ukraine has highlighted Europe’s military weakness. But the changes to threat assessments that followed Russia’s brutal full-scale invasion have also created an opportunity for European Allies to reassess their defence spending. If they are serious about defence, they will need to address the impact of decades of persistent underinvestment, not least because higher defence spending will be key to the credibility of the new defence plans to be agreed at the Vilnius Summit. Allies should thus review and revise their defence investment pledge. If they do not do this now, it will be more difficult once the war in Ukraine ends.
Topic:: NATO, Defense Spending, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

38. NATO’s Posture on the North-East Flank

Author:: Toms Rostoks
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: At NATO’s Madrid Summit in June 2022, the Allies agreed to bolster enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) by deploying “additional robust in-place combat-ready forces on our eastern flank, to be scaled up from the existing battlegroups to brigade-size units where and when required, underpinned by credible rapidly available reinforcements, prepositioned equipment, and enhanced command and control”.1 The Baltic states had fought hard for a more robust NATO military presence to deter Russia and to provide a realistic chance of defending every square inch of NATO territory against a Russian attack. It has turned out, however, that moving from battlegroups to brigades—and thus towards forward defence— has been more difficult than the Baltic states anticipated.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, and Baltic States

39. Iran’s Defence Industry: What’s in Stock for Russia?

Author:: Tato Kvamladze
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Albeit heavily sanctioned and exhausted by the Islamic revolution and the war with Iraq, Iran has managed to upbuild a self-sufficient defence industry from the ashes and demonstrate a robust weapon system manufacturing capacity over the last decades. It started with low-tech reverse-engineering of 3rd generation fighters and tanks and ended with indigenously producing high-accuracy and long-range ballistic missiles. Although Tehran has exported $435 million worth of weaponry, its arms trade is not a source of revenue, but a foreign policy tool to bolster its allies and proxies in the region and beyond. Supplying weapons to Russia, however, is a unique case that signals Moscow’s desperation and inability to achieve its military objectives in Ukraine. In 2022, after years of military cooperation with Russia, Teheran finally had an opportunity to provide support to Moscow, when the exhausted and depleted Russian army requested – and immediately received – unmanned combat aerial vehicles that are now used to target critical civilian infrastructure. Further economic cooperation between two rogue states might also extend to (nuclear) technology transfers, which for now remains an Achilles’ heel for Teheran. For as long as the war in Ukraine lasts, the Kremlin will have a reliable partner who can deliver an assortment of weapons needed on short notice.
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Arms Trade, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Iran, Ukraine, and Middle East

40. The Missing Pieces of a Kerch Bridge Strike: Give Ukraine What It Needs to Isolate Crimea and Gain the Initiative

Author:: Bryan Clark and Can Kasapoglu
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: The war in Ukraine is at a critical juncture both on the ground and in the capitols of Ukraine’s main supporters. Aid to Kyiv is now a point of contention in the United States Congress, which had to remove Ukraine support from a short-term funding package to avoid a government shutdown. Overseas, China’s intensified aggression toward its neighbors and Hamas’s terror campaign against Israel are beginning to stretch US attention and resources across multiple theaters. With half of Ukraine’s post-invasion military and humanitarian assistance coming from the United States, softening support in Washington could cause other North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies to pare back their contributions as well. To sustain US and NATO support and put Russia on the defensive going into winter, Ukraine’s military will need to change the dynamics of a counteroffensive that has been slow to retake Russian-held territory. Cutting off Crimea from Russia and forcing Moscow’s troops to protect an isolated peninsula is the kind of change that would prove Ukraine is able to win the war, rather than merely fight to a draw. With the “land bridge” across southern Ukraine already under attack, the Kerch Strait bridge carries much of the ammunition and supplies going into Crimea. If the bridge were impassable, Russia would need to redouble its efforts to defend southern Ukraine, drawing troops away from the east and north and potentially enabling Kyiv to make more rapid gains along those fronts before winter. Ukraine has already attacked the Kerch Bridge several times during the war, with air-launched missiles, drone boats, and semisubmersibles. The most successful strike, via a truck bomb, damaged the bridge but did not stop its use. Eliminating the 12-mile-long span as a factor in the war will require a sustained series of long-range strikes structured to defeat Russian defenses and supported by a few new pieces of Western military hardware.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Missile Defense, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

41. Escape from the Syrian Labyrinth: A Road Map

Author:: Michael Doran and Omer Ozkizilcik
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: The Ukraine war has led Americans to rediscover what first drew them, some seven decades ago, into a military alliance with the Turks: Turkey’s indispensability as a counterweight to Russia. However, even as Washington and Ankara have found common cause in Ukraine, they continue to work at cross purposes in Syria. In a demonstration of bold, fresh, and practical thinking, Turkish scholar Ömer Özkizilcik offers us a road map for aligning American and Turkish policies there too. But first, to set the stage for Özkizilcik’s plan, Hudson Senior Fellow Michael Doran surveys the strategic logic and the diplomatic context that make the road map compulsory reading.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Military Intervention, and Syrian War
Political Geography:: Russia, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

42. A New Black Sea Strategy for a New Black Sea Reality

Author:: Luke Coffey and Can Kasapoglu
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: With Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, there is a new geopolitical reality in the Black Sea region. Following the capture of the Ukrainian city of Mariupol in May, Russia has effectively turned the Sea of Azov into a Russian lake and is also seeking maximum control of the Black Sea. Turkey has reminded the world of Ankara’s regional importance by closing the Turkish Straits to the belligerent parties’ vessels (in practice the Russian Navy, except for the platforms home-ported in the Black Sea), which it carried out under authority granted by the 1936 Montreux Convention. Despite the overwhelming odds, Ukraine has been able to deliver significant blows to the Russian Navy—most sensationally by sinking the Black Sea Fleet’s flagship Moskva missile cruiser and by striking Russian platforms with unmanned surface combatants in October. Black Sea geopolitics is a complex phenomenon. Any comprehensive regional political-military policy must therefore offer a multidomain strategy. This report will focus on the maritime agenda. Future reports will present findings on air warfare and land warfare trends in the broader Black Sea region.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, and Black Sea

43. America’s Response after Russian Suspension of New START

Author:: Rebeccah L. Heinrichs and Marshall Billingslea
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: This week’s news that Russia will suspend participation in the New START nuclear treaty follows the State Department’s January announcement that Russia is in breach of New START and its obligation to allow inspection activities on its territory. Since the Cold War, the United States has led efforts to promote nuclear non-proliferation and to create a transparent and stable dynamic between Moscow and Washington regarding our nuclear weapons forces. But the Russians have repeatedly demonstrated a willingness to violate the terms of our agreements. While the United States has sought to decrease our reliance on nuclear weapons in our military strategies, Russia has gone the other way. Russia is developing, testing, and fielding new delivery systems within traditional categories like road-mobile and silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles. But it has also developed novel systems like nuclear-capable hypersonic glide vehicles that raise questions about their intent. And its large arsenal of non-strategic nuclear weapons remains outside the bounds of any treaty. As we’ve seen in Ukraine, Russia uses the threat of nuclear employment to coerce nations in wars of aggression that Russia has chosen. Moscow appears to have lowered the nuclear threshold. The best path for peace is for the United States to maintain credible deterrence options. This provides incentives for our adversaries to engage in diplomacy.
Topic:: Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, Military, and New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START)
Political Geography:: Russia, North America, and United States of America

44. NATO’s Black Sea Frontier Is the Southern Shore of the Caspian Sea

Author:: Luke Coffey
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has led to a renewed focus on the geopolitical importance of the Black Sea. What the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has overlooked is Russia’s use—often in coordination with Iran—of the Caspian Sea to advance its war aims in Ukraine. The Caspian Sea offers Russia a strategic depth to strike targets far afield in a relatively safe manner, is currently the only way for Russia to reinforce its Black Sea Fleet, and serves as a transport conduit allowing Iran to deliver military assistance to Russia for use against Ukraine. As Admiral Sir Tony Radakin, the United Kingdom’s chief of the defence staff, recently said, “The flow of Iranian weapons to Russia’s war in Ukraine demonstrates that there is no easy geographical distinction on matters of defense.”1 In the context of regional security, military planners in the United States and NATO should see the most extreme point of the alliance’s Black Sea frontier as the southern shoreline of the Caspian Sea.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Alliance, and Strategy
Political Geography:: Russia, Iran, Caspian Sea, and Black Sea

45. Eritrea’s Growing Ties with China and Russia Highlight America’s Inadequate Approach in East Africa

Author:: Joshua Meservey
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: China and Russia have recently increased their engagement with Eritrea, a small but strategically located country in East Africa. Meanwhile, American influence in the region is amid a yearslong slide. Despite the obvious risks, the United States has failed to muster a committed response and has even taken some counterproductive measures that demonstrate a lack of strategic thinking. If these trends continue, a vital region may fall under the conclusive influence of Washington’s primary geopolitical competitors.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, China, Eritrea, and United States of America

46. Keeping the lights on: The EU’s energy relationships since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine

Author:: Szymon Kardas
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: Since the start of Russia’s all-out invasion of Ukraine, the EU has sought to rapidly reduce its dependence on Russian gas and oil. Many alternative major suppliers to Europe stepped up as ‘friends in need’ in the first year of the war, helping the EU plug the gap. The EU’s climate goals direct it to encourage the development of renewable energy sources – meaning it must also cultivate ‘friends indeed,’ which can supply clean energy as well as gas and oil. The countries best able to fulfil both short-term needs and long-term ambitions are Norway and the US, which have stable supplies of gas and are making progress in clean energy. The EU and member states have the instruments and investment resources to advance the potential of other supplier countries as well – to help them too transform from ‘friends in need’ to ‘friends indeed.’
Topic:: Climate Change, Oil, European Union, Gas, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

47. Steppe change: How Russia’s war on Ukraine is reshaping Kazakhstan

Author:: Marie Dumoulin
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine came as an additional shock for Kazakhstan, which had already experienced serious domestic unrest in January 2022. Kazakhstan has consistently distanced itself from Russia’s aggression and diversified its relationships with various countries, while preserving its bilateral relationship with Moscow. The war has further highlighted the need for political reforms in Kazakhstan, yet complicated the government’s ability and willingness to implement them. Kazakhstan is now cautiously navigating political change both domestically and in its foreign policy. The EU has shown interest in engaging more with Kazakhstan. It can help the country to overcome this critical juncture by encouraging and supporting its genuine domestic transformation.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Central Asia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan

48. The art of vassalisation: How Russia’s war on Ukraine has transformed transatlantic relations

Author:: Jeremy Shapiro and Jana Puglierin
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has revealed Europeans’ profound dependence on the US for their security, despite EU efforts at achieving “strategic autonomy.” Over the last decade, the EU has grown relatively less powerful than America – economically, technologically, and militarily. Europeans also still lack agreement on crucial strategic questions for themselves and look to Washington for leadership. In the cold war, Europe was a central front of superpower competition. Now, the US expects the EU and the UK to fall in line behind its China strategy and will use its leadership position to ensure this outcome. Europe becoming an American vassal is unwise for both sides. Europeans can become a stronger and more independent part of the Atlantic alliance by developing independent capacity to support Ukraine and acquiring greater military capabilities.
Topic:: European Union, Geopolitics, Transatlantic Relations, Strategic Autonomy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

49. Fragile unity: Why Europeans are coming together on Ukraine (and what might drive them apart)

Author:: Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: A recent multi-country poll for ECFR suggests that Europeans have come closer together in their support for Ukraine. Europeans now agree that Russia is their adversary or rival. Three factors have supported this remarkable coming together: Ukrainian successes in the first year of the war; the way the war has united the political left and right; and the perceived return of a strong West led by the US. But these factors are fragile and European leaders should be careful in their optimism. European policymakers should take advantage of this unity to equip Ukraine, while doing everything they can to mitigate divisions caused by changing circumstances at home and abroad.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Regional Integration, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

50. United West, divided from the rest: Global public opinion one year into Russia’s war on Ukraine

Author:: Timothy Garton Ash, Ivan Krastev, and Mark Leonard
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: A new poll suggests that Russia’s war on Ukraine has consolidated ‘the West;’ European and American citizens hold many views in common about major global questions. Europeans and Americans agree they should help Ukraine to win, that Russia is their avowed adversary, and that the coming global order will most likely be defined by two blocs led respectively by the US and China. In contrast, citizens in China, India, and Turkiye prefer a quick end to the war even if Ukraine has to concede territory. People in these non-Western countries, and in Russia, also consider the emergence of a multipolar world order to be more probable than a bipolar arrangement. Western decision-makers should take into account that the consolidation of the West is taking place in an increasingly divided post-Western world; and that emerging powers such as India and Turkiye will act on their own terms and resist being caught in a battle between America and China.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, Multipolarity, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

51. Sustain and prosper: How Europeans can support Ukraine

Author:: Marie Dumoulin, Lykke Friis, Gustav Gressel, and Leo Litra
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: The EU has already provided unprecedented support to Ukraine as it fights its existential war against Russia. But this war will not end any time soon. The EU and member states urgently need to ramp up and accelerate their military assistance for the long war and make stronger commitments to Ukraine’s long-term security. This will require them to develop their military-industrial capabilities. In addition, they should develop bilateral security arrangements with Ukraine and work towards bringing the country into NATO once the war is over. Ukraine’s EU accession, however, will ultimately be more transformative for the country. The EU therefore needs to ensure it is truly fit for enlargement to up to 36 states and take concrete steps towards making Ukraine a member state. The EU should view this support for Ukraine as an opportunity to enhance its military production facilities, raise its geopolitical profile, secure its neighbourhood, and stabilise the contour and modus operandi of a larger European Union.
Topic:: Security, NATO, European Union, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

52. Democratic defence: How Italy can lead the fight against Russian disinformation

Author:: Gabriele Carrer, Teresa Coratella, and Silvia Samorè
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: New research for ECFR suggests pro-Russia and pro-China narratives are present in online and traditional forms of discourse in Italy. It finds that forms of anomalous activity spiked just ahead of the country’s 2022 general election. Despite the shock to Italian foreign policy caused by Russia’s war on Ukraine, economic ties between the countries remain. Moreover, the political environment in Italy remains conducive to Russian influence, with the leaders of four of the five largest parties in parliament prone to echoing talking points favourable to Moscow or advocating for “peace” while suggesting the withdrawal of military support to Ukraine. Italy has been slow to put in place the structures needed to combat foreign influence. The new governing coalition appeared to place little value on tackling the problem, but it has now started to build on the more considerable progress made under former prime minister Mario Draghi. Italy should seize opportunities to strengthen the battle against disinformation, such as: encouraging the next European Commission to incorporate this task into its mandate; and placing the topic in Rome’s forthcoming G7 presidency programme.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Democracy, Disinformation, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Italy

53. Keeping America close, Russia down, and China far away: How Europeans navigate a competitive world

Author:: Jana Puglierin and Pawel Zerka
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: Russia’s war on Ukraine has shown European citizens that they live in a world of non-cooperation. But their cooperative foreign policy instincts are only slowly adapting to this new reality. Europeans want to remain neutral in a potential US-China conflict and are reluctant to de-risk from China – even if they recognise the dangers of its economic presence in Europe. However, if China decided to deliver weapons to Russia, that would be a red line for much of the European public. Europeans remain united on their current approach to Russia – though they disagree about Europe’s future Russia policy. They have embraced Europe’s closer relationship with the US, but they want to rely less on American security guarantees. European leaders have an opportunity to build public consensus around Europe’s approach to China, the US, and Russia. But they need to understand what motivates the public and communicate clearly about the future.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America

54. Feeling the chill: Navigating Arctic governance amid Russia’s war on Ukraine

Author:: Joanna Hosa
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: Russia’s war on Ukraine has highlighted the strategic importance of the Arctic and upended structures of cooperation between the western Arctic states and Russia, including the Arctic Council. The Arctic Council includes six organisations of indigenous peoples alongside the eight Arctic states, providing a platform for inclusive governance and the recognition and representation of the Arctic’s indigenous population. The participation of indigenous peoples in Arctic governance is key to upholding Europe’s values-based foreign policy and effective governance in the region, particularly against the backdrop of Russia’s values war with the West. The war has divided the Arctic into two camps – one including the Western Arctic states and the other comprising the Russian Arctic – with both sides exploring alternative avenues for cooperation. In this uncertain context, European governments need to preserve indigenous peoples’ participation in existing and emerging forums of cooperation.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, and Governance
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, and Arctic

55. Culture clash: Russia, Ukraine, and the fight for the European public

Author:: Pawel Zerka
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: Russia’s war on Ukraine is a test of Europe’s values of openness, freedom, solidarity, and individual responsibility. According to ECFR’s research, European sentiment is strong in the EU today; the public holds positive attitudes towards the EU and Europe; and most governments are dedicated to European cooperation. European citizens and governments have shown unprecedented support for Ukraine, but European leaders face various dilemmas about how to handle Russian culture, disinformation, and people in the context of the war – and their responses to these challenges have consequences for European sentiment. Their approach can either reassert European values, helping to sustain European unity and support for Ukraine. Or it can undermine these values, presenting the EU as weak and hypocritical, and eroding Europeans’ confidence in the EU and solidarity with Ukraine. Rather than follow their protective instincts, European governments should display confidence in liberalism and in the European civil society which, over the past year, has demonstrated its resilience.
Topic:: Culture, Public Opinion, Disinformation, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

56. Advancing military mobility in Europe: An uphill battle

Author:: Mihai Sebastian Chihaia
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:: Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has put military mobility on top of the EU and NATO agendas. The return of traditional military threats and a renewed interest in territorial defence call for greater attempts to eliminate obstacles preventing armed forces from swiftly moving across EU borders. This Policy Brief maps the actions taken at the EU level to develop military mobility over the past years, with emphasis on the EU Action Plan 2.0. It identifies and analyses current EU objectives, outlines key challenges, and provides recommendations to enhance military mobility in Europe. Several challenges are analysed by the author, which should be urgently addressed by the EU and the member states, especially in relation to the Action Plan 2.0. These include limited funding for dual-use transport infrastructure projects at the EU level, administrative and regulatory barriers, and the lack of political will in the member states to enhance military mobility. Furthermore, the paper provides a SWOT Analysis of military mobility in Europe and the following recommendations are put forward: The commitment to advancing military mobility needs to be long-term. Military mobility needs to be complemented by a civilian dimension. EU member states should urgently prioritise developing military mobility plans. Undergo a lessons-learned process from the movement of military equipment in the context of EU and allies’ support to Ukraine. Regions and cities’ network of exchanges at the European level should include discussions on funding and dual-use infrastructure. Consider setting up an EU-NATO Centre of Excellence dedicated to military mobility in Europe.
Topic:: NATO, European Union, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

57. European energy solidarity: strengthening the EU’s crisibility

Author:: Aline Bartenstein
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: By default, when the EU is hit by a crisis, member states tend to have a national sovereignty reflex. When Italy was hit hard by the Covid-19 pandemic, the first reaction was to close its borders and restrict the export of urgently needed medical equipment. National interest superseded the call for European solidarity. Although member states have repeatedly managed to unite and – in the face of the polycrisis – developed a certain crisibility, no one would have been surprised if member states had preferred to seek their own advantage when Russia started the war in Ukraine on 24 February 2022. Nearly one year later, member states are (still) united – some declaring this as never before – and a gas or electricity crisis has so far been averted. This unity, which certainly threatened to crumble in the face of Hungarian opposition, German hesitancy, and the different approaches to dealing with the war, leads us to the question of what is different this time? Certainly, the EU's identity has been profoundly challenged by the war since its peacekeeping credentials – the EU is even a recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize – were perceived to be at risk. Was is this identity-threatening experience that united the member states? Or was it the recognition of Russia as a common foe that strengthened the bond between them?
Topic:: Sovereignty, European Union, Solidarity, Energy, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Italy

58. Geopolitical and Technocratic: EU International Actorness and Anne PINTSCH Russia’s War Against Ukraine

Author:: Anne Pintsch and Maryna Rabinovych
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 marked the start of the largest and most brutal war at the heart of the European continent since World War II. It inevitably came as a “cold shower” for the EU and Member States’ politicians, demonstrating with absolute certainty the fragility of the international and European security order. The EU responded to the invasion with unprecedented sanctions against Russia and Belarus and multifaceted resolute support to Ukraine. The latter included the breaking of many previously existing taboos, such as the first ever use of the European Peace Facility to procure weapons for a third country at war or offering collective protection to about 8 million Ukrainian citizens and residents, fleeing the war
Topic:: European Union, Geopolitics, Resilience, Technocracy, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

59. Judging Putin

Author:: Arnaud De Nanteuil
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: The publication of an international arrest warrant against Vladimir Putin on 17 March 2023 by the Second Pre-Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Court (ICC) has caused a stir. Although the institution is far from immune from criticism (it has long been accused of being "strong with the weak and weak with the strong"), this is a major change in the Court's policy as it is the first warrant ever issued against the sitting leader of a permanent member of the UN Security Council; a member who, moreover, in a chilling irony of history, played a key role in the Nuremberg Trial. In some respects, this is a gamble, given the many obstacles that stand between this historic event and a possible conviction of Vladimir Putin. But this arrest warrant is also a way to put the ICC back in the centre of the game, even though until now it seems to have been largely denied the possibility of judging the main perpetrator of the war of aggression against Ukraine and its disastrous humanitarian consequences.
Topic:: International Law, War Crimes, International Criminal Court (ICC), Vladimir Putin, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

60. Russia’s Yes Vote on Syria Aid Will Come With a Price

Author:: Anna Borshchevskaya and Andrew J. Tabler
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Moscow’s willingness to approve another UN extension has more to do with advancing normalization between Turkey and the Assad regime than helping Syrian civilians, who will remain hostage to Russian demands if nothing is done before the next vote this summer. On January 9, the UN Security Council unanimously approved Resolution 2672 extending the provision of cross-border humanitarian aid into northwest Syria for another six months. In the immediate term, the vote is good news for Syrian civilians suffering through one of their worst energy crises since the beginning of the civil war in 2011. But the main problem persists—absent an alternative mechanism outside the Security Council, cross-border aid will remain bound to Russia’s increasing political and security demands in Syria, which are ultimately tied to the situation in Ukraine as well. Many were surprised by Moscow’s decision to approve the new resolution. Over the years, Russia has repeatedly threatened to veto previous resolutions, and the West has largely given in to its demands by steadily diluting the aid mechanism. From that perspective, this month’s vote appeared to be a welcome sign of the Biden administration’s willingness to stand its ground on Syria despite dealing with a complex Russian challenge in Ukraine. Moscow did not even resort to its frequent tactic of abstaining from the final vote in order to signal its displeasure with the mechanism.
Topic:: Humanitarian Aid, UN Security Council, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: Russia, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

61. Women, Peace and Security and the 2022 National Security Strategy

Author:: Hans Hogrefe and Cassandra Zavislak
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Our Secure Future
Abstract:: This brief examines the inclusion of the Women, Peace and Security agenda in the Biden Administration’s 2022 National Security Strategy, and compares it to the ways in which the Trump Administration’s 2017 National Security Strategy addresses the full participation of women in our national security interests.
Topic:: Security, National Security, Women, Inequality, Peace, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: Russia, China, North America, and United States of America

62. Turkey’s Growing Ukrainian and Russian Communities

Author:: Sude Akgundogdu and Collin Trissel
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Since the 1990s, Turkey has become a major destination for tourists and migrants from Ukraine, Russia, and other former Soviet states. Yet Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine set into motion an even greater wave of migrants from both countries. Those fleeing the crisis have used myriad channels to enter and remain in Turkey, from obtaining “golden visas” to applying for protection. Going forward, their presence could have a sizable effect on future socioeconomic ties between the three countries.
Topic:: Economics, Migration, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, and Middle East

63. The Price Cap on Russian Oil Exports, Explained

Author:: Catherine Wolfram, Simon Johnson, and Łukasz Rachel
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: If you’ve taken an introductory economics class, you were probably left with the strong impression that price caps are bad – they distort demand and discourage producers from supplying the market. So, why has Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, the consummate economist, advocated so strongly for a price cap on Russian oil? The answer is that this price cap is different from the standard cap discussed in introductory economics classes. A standard price cap applies to all goods traded in a market. For example, in some countries there are price caps on bread for everyone or diesel for farmers or rent controls on housing. Such caps lead to excess demand for the good and insufficient supply, leading to shortages at the capped price. If prices are constrained, other non-price mechanisms, like first-come-first-served, are required to allocate the good. All too frequently, the result is empty bakery shelves or fuel shortages or difficulties finding housing. To understand why the cap on Russian oil is different, we first need to provide background on Russian oil trade and the proposed price cap.
Topic:: Economics, Markets, Oil, Exports, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

64. The bear in the room: Russia's role in the UN Security Council - and what It means for the West

Author:: Elias Götz and Jonas Geji Kaas
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: The Kremlin attaches great importance to its role in the United Nations (UN) Security Council. This provides an opening for Western countries to use the Council as an arena for diplomatic competition with Russia. At the same time, the body serves as a much-needed venue for discussion and crisis management at a time of heightened geopolitical tensions.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, United Nations, UN Security Council, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Eurasia

65. With energy at play in the Ukraine war, everybody pays

Author:: Izabela Surwillo and Veronika Slakaityte
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: Despite sustained efforts to turn towards the West, as a major transit country dependent on cheap gas, Ukraine has been particularly vulnerable to Russian pressure. Now, with the outbreak of war in Ukraine, the EU’s problematic dependence on the Russian petrol state is under stress, as diversification of energy supply from non-Russian sources in the wake of war will incur high economic costs for the EU in the near future. The Russian attack on Ukraine has put the EU’s lenient policy towards Russia into question and has highlighted its problematic overdependence on Russian oil and gas. On the 12th day of the war in Ukraine, with Russia under tough Western sanctions, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak stated: ‘We have every right to take a matching decision and impose an embargo on gas pumping through the Nord Stream 1 gas pipeline.’ The International Energy Agency (IEA) has urged the EU neither to extend nor to sign new contracts with Gazprom. Meanwhile the EU is exploring policy options for diversification of gas supply. Russia currently supplies over 40% of the EU’s gas and nearly a third of its oil, leaving the EU exposed to economic and political pressure. Energy blackmail primarily concerns gas supply, as replacing Russian gas with other sources cannot be executed immediately due to insufficient gas infrastructure and market conditions (i.e. limited availability of liquified gas). While oil can be transported by land and sea, meeting the EU’s energy demand will nevertheless require both diversification of energy supply routes and speeding up of its energy transition. This process will prove challenging and costly. Phasing out the EU–Russia energy cooperation after the Russian invasion of Ukraine also marks a major shift in continental energy politics that affects all the parties. For Russia, the loss of the European market implies a huge loss of revenue and a deepening future dependence on China. Ukraine finds itself once again caught in the middle. For years Ukraine increasingly sought greater energy independence from Russia and deeper integration with the EU energy market. Meanwhile, the construction of pipelines such as Nord Stream 2, circumventing Ukraine as a transit state for Russian gas, made Ukraine even more vulnerable because it sent a clear signal to Moscow that energy trade with Europe would not cease, even following the annexation of some Ukrainian territories by Russia in 2014. During the current war, Moscow is claiming that Russia is doing ‘everything in its power’ to keep the flows through Ukraine to the EU stable. However, the damage being done to Ukrainian energy infrastructure and its economy at large is still hard to estimate.
Topic:: Oil, European Union, Gas, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

66. Russia´s comprehensive approach and the increased use of the Wagner Group challenges the West in Africa

Author:: Karen Philippa Larsen and Flemming Splidsboel Hansen
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: In the 2010s, Russia gradually returned to the African continent, where the Soviet Union was an influential actor for decades. The culmination of Russia’s public reorientation to Africa so far has been the high profile Russia-Africa Summit held in Sochi in October 2019. In his opening address to the Summit, Russian President Vladimir Putin noted how “representatives of all 54 African states and leading regional organizations are gathered here. This is indeed the first meeting of such a scale, and this is a convincing testament to the mutual desire to develop contacts in all directions, to strengthen the multifaceted partnership”. Russia has many interests in Africa. One fundamental interest relates to the international distribution of power. As a self-defined great power with an ambition to extend its influence still further beyond its immediate regional setting, Russia is almost compelled to attempt to gain a stronger presence in Africa. Both trade and the exploration of energy and minerals support this ambition, but its other tools include economic support (including by writing off debt), military support (for instance through the provision of training assistance or even the deployment of troops), as well as political support (for instance by using Russia’s weight as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council to publicly defend regimes under pressure or even to prevent the passing of critical statements or the introduction of sanctions). To illustrate, in January 2022, the Russian delegation to the United Nations strongly opposed the introduction of new sanctions against the interim government in Mali, noting that “we have always been guided by the principle of African solutions to African problems”. Other interests relate to trade (with a turnover of USD 20bn in 2020) and to the exploration of natural resources. Within the field of trade, Russian arms exports stand out. In the years 2016-2020, Russian arms exports to African states accounted for 18 per cent of all Russian arms exports, a 23 per cent increase over the period of 2011-2015. By contrast, Russia’s share of the global arms market decreased by 22 per cent in the decade of 2011-2020. This latter development is a clear sign of a very competitive market, and it suggests that emerging markets, such as Africa, will become increasingly important to Russian arms producers. The main importers are Egypt, Algeria, and Angola (where Russian producers supply 41 per cent, 69 per cent, and 64 per cent, respectively, of national imports).
Topic:: Wagner Group, Military, and Private Military Companies (PMCs)
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, Eurasia, and Denmark

67. The impacts of the pandemic on investment flows in BRICS countries: a preliminary analysis based on UNCTAD global investment reports

Author:: Ana Garcia, Rafaela Mello, Victor Fernandes, Maria Eduarda Lopes, João Carmino, and Felipe Queiroz
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: BRICS Policy Center
Abstract:: In 2020, with the advent of the pandemic, the lockdown and social isolation actions implemented by governments in order to contain the contagion of the virus had an impact on the economies, reducing the speed of execution of existing investment projects and hindering the prospect of new ones. In this sense, the flow of direct investments around the world fell by 35% in 2020, reaching US$ 1 trillion, compared to US$ 1.5 trillion in the previous year, according to UNCTAD. Based on this observation, the present research aims to understand the main trends around the investment flow related to the BRICS countries, in order to assess how the Covid-19 pandemic impacted the dynamics of investments in the world, and especially, in emerging economies. To this end, the reports produced by UNCTAD from 2019 to 2022 regarding global investment flows were analyzed, in order to understand how the scenario was before the pandemic and what dynamics were underway before the health crisis, but it also allowed to understand what transformations occurred with the course of the pandemic, in addition to signaling paths and trends for the future.
Topic:: Economy, Investment, COVID-19, BRICS, and Health Crisis
Political Geography:: Russia, China, India, South Africa, and Brazil

68. Geoeconomics of Polarisation: Can BRICS eclipse western global economic power?

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: The 14th BRICS summit concluded on June 24 amid Western sanctions on Russia and rising tension between China and the US over Taiwan. The two-day event took place via video and was hosted by Beijing.
Topic:: Economy, BRICS, Polarization, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, India, Taiwan, South Africa, Brazil, and United States of America

69. The Russian Role! The domestic and regional dimensions of the military coup in Burkina Faso

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: In January 24, 2022, members of the army in Burkina Faso announced their seizure of power and the dismissal of Burkinabé President Roch Marc Kaboré. One of the officers who seized power delivered a statement on state television, signed by Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba, Head of the Patriotic Movement for Safeguard and Restoration (MPSR), announcing the overthrow of the government, thus joining Burkina Faso to Mali and Guinea, in the third military coup in West Africa in just eight months.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, Coup, and Military
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, France, and Burkina Faso

70. Realising the EU Rapid Deployment Capacity: opportunities and pitfalls

Author:: Dick Zandee and Adaja Stoetman
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:: When the European Union’s Strategic Compass had almost been completed in late February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine. Consequently, the language on Russia in the Compass text was adapted to a more bellicose content. However, the military level of ambition remained unchanged as it had already been agreed informally by the EU member states. At the end of March, when the Council formally adopted the Compass, the EU Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC) became the new focal point for crisis management tasks in the context of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Although the attention of strategists, defence planners and armaments experts has shifted further towards strengthening collective defence as a result of the war in Ukraine and the outcome of the NATO Madrid Summit, instability in the areas to Europe’s south and south-east remains the norm rather than the exception. The EU RDC has to provide the EU with the military capability to be deployed in crisis situations when needed, also taking into account that the United States (US) is less likely to act in Europe’s southern neighbourhood in the future. Ambitious targets have been set with regard to the flexible composition of the RDC and to the timeline of its initial operational status in 2025. This policy brief examines the milestones to be reached towards the year 2025 – in other words ‘what should be done in the near future’. Three aspects are given particular attention: the question of using the existing format of the EU Battlegroups as building blocks for the RDC; the issue of how to speed up decision-making; and the question of capability shortfalls. This is followed by conclusions on the opportunities and pitfalls that the EU and its member states may encounter up until 2025 and beyond.
Topic:: NATO, European Union, Troop Deployment, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

71. Strict and Uniform: Improving EU Sanctions Enforcement

Author:: Kim B. Olsen and Simon Fasterkjær Kjeldsen
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: For as long as the EU has been using sanctions as a foreign policy instrument, countering violations has been a challenge. With the EU rapidly expanding the breadth and depth of its sanctions, its institutions and member states must find ways to ensure stricter and more uniform enforcement to deter violations, enhance efficiency, and ensure a more level playing field for economic actors. The stakes are high: the success of the EU’s response to Russia’s military aggression hinges largely on effective sanctions, and the long-term legitimacy of the tool itself depends on its enforcement.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Governance, Sanctions, European Union, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Eastern Europe

72. North Africa Can Reduce Europe's Dependence on Russian Gas by Transporting Wasted Gas Through Existing Infrastructure

Author:: Mark Davis, Perrine Toledano, and Thomas Schorr
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment
Abstract:: North Africa can reduce Europe's dependence on Russian gas by transporting wasted gas through existing infrastructure.
Topic:: Energy Policy, Oil, Military Strategy, Natural Resources, Gas, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

73. Bridging U.S.-Led Alliances in the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific: An Inter-theater Perspective

Author:: Luis Simon
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Although U.S. strategic competition with China and Russia is often presented as a challenge with two separate fronts, this brief argues that the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific theaters are increasingly linked. Insofar as preserving a favorable balance of power in these two regions hinges largely on U.S. power, and as long as they both continue to exercise a significant pressure on U.S. defense resources, their alliance and deterrence architectures should be looked at from an inter-theater perspective. Thus, optimally managing atwo-front challenge would require a serious effort to bridge U.S.-led alliances in both regions.
Topic:: International Cooperation, Hegemony, Alliance, Strategic Competition, Rivalry, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

74. International Legal Options for Prevention and Justice in Ukraine

Author:: Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
Abstract:: This March 2022 Fact Sheet presents international legal options for international criminal justice and prevention in Ukraine.
Topic:: United Nations, Accountability, Justice, International Criminal Court (ICC), and Universal Jurisdiction
Political Geography:: Russia and Ukraine

75. Russia, Ukraine and international Law

Author:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: Russian actions in Ukraine since 2014, and the tensions to which they have led, obscure the legal aspects of these attacks thereby opening the way to propaganda and approximations. To contribute to a better understanding of what is at stake, this contribution is limited to the legal aspects of an otherwise eminently political issue. This in fact heralds a spectacular break in the international order and a violation of commitments and treaties signed by a member of the Security Council of the United Nations that have not been witnessed since the Second World War[1].For a long time, Russian diplomacy was attached to the strict and formal respect of the rules of international law, sometimes "clinging" to them in a bid to resist the demands made by the different populations. Even during the succession of the USSR, this constant was respected. However, the actions in Crimea and Donbass since 2014 have marked the abandonment of this formalism, while the Kremlin's diplomacy is promoting the need to conclude new treaties with the United States and European states so that Russia can endorse its claims.
Topic:: International Law, Conflict, Norms, Annexation, and Disputes
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

76. Has Europe’s hour come?

Author:: Antoine Cibirski
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: “Europe’s hour has come”, said a Luxembourg minister in 1991 at the beginning of the Yugoslav wars. The context seemed favourable: an initially peripheral crisis, a relative lack of interest on the part of Russia, a green light from the United States which was even encouraging invention by the Western European Union (WEU), the majority of whose activities were taken over by the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), and later by the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). America's 'pet project' at the time was not yet Asia, but rather the management of the decay of the Soviet world, without much interest in the Western Balkans. In response, some Europeans 'held back' and feared an unfavourable division of tasks: 'noble' collective defence missions reserved for NATO and peacekeeping missions, considered 'subordinate', for Europe. Strategic prescience! Four years later, we had witnessed the bombing of civilians, the siege of Sarajevo, broken ceasefires, failed mediations and Srebreniça. We had experienced the humiliations inflicted on a UN force (UNPROFOR) that had a timid mandate and overly restrictive rules of engagement. The British and French were in the field this time round, but not the Germans. The Dayton Peace Agreement, which only France calls "the Dayton-Paris agreement" (a formal concession by Bill Clinton to Jacques Chirac) was largely a Pax Americana. In the American camp, Richard Holbrooke had pulled the strings and decided everything, by ruthlessly relegating the European leaders, including Carl Bildt, Jacques Blot and Pauline Neville-Jones[1].
Topic:: European Union, Conflict, and Integration
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

77. World food crisis: between withdrawal and responsibility, Europe must choose

Author:: Emmanuelle Ducros
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: The profound destructuring of world food markets as a result of Russia's war on Ukraine is forcing all of the world's agricultural powers to question their place on the world stage of satiety - or hunger. This is primarily the case in Europe.
Topic:: Food, Hunger, Armed Conflict, and Economic Crisis
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

78. Hackers, Hoodies, and Helmets: Technology and the changing face of Russian private military contractors

Author:: Emma Schroeder, Gavin Wilde, Justin Sherman, and Trey Herr
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: The first time Russia invaded Ukraine in the twenty-first century, the Wagner Group was born. The now widely profiled private military company (PMC) played an important role in exercising Russian national power over the Crimea and portions of the Donbas—while giving Moscow a semblance of plausible deniability. In the near decade since, the Russian PMC sector has grown considerably, and is active in more than a dozen countries around the world. PMCs are paramilitary organizations established and run as private companies—though they often operate in contract with one or more states. They are profit-motivated, expeditionary groups that make a business of the conduct of war.1 PMCs are in no way a uniquely Russian phenomenon, yet the expanding footprint of Russian PMCs and their links to state interests call for a particularly Russian-focused analysis of the industry. The growth of these firms and their direct links to the Kremlin’s oligarch network as well as Moscow’s foreign media, industrial, and cyber activities present a challenge to the United States and its allies as they seek to counter Russian malicious activities abroad. As signals intelligence and offensive cyber capabilities, drones and counter-drone systems, and encrypted communications become more accessible, these technologies will prove ever more decisive to both battlefield outcomes and statecraft. More exhaustive research on these issues is necessary. The ongoing conflict resulting from Russia’s second invasion of Ukraine in this young century seems likely to shape the conduct of Russian foreign policy and security behavior for years to come—and these firms will play a part. The activities of these PMCs include high-intensity combat operations, as evidenced in Syria in 2018 and Ukraine in 2022, and a mix of population control, escort and close protection, and local direct-action activities, as seen in Libya, Mali, and elsewhere.2 Given the sourcing and dependence of Russian PMCs on Russian military service personnel and no small influence of Russian doctrine, the questions to reasonably ask include: How do changes in the Russian conduct of war and adoption of new technologies influence these PMCs? Moreover, how might these technological changes influence the role these PMCs play in Russian strategic goals and activity abroad?
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Innovation, Wagner Group, Russia-Ukraine War, and Private Military Companies (PMCs)
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, Middle East, and Africa

79. Beyond munitions: A gender analysis for Ukrainian security assistance

Author:: Cori Fleser
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: From the hospitals of Mariupol to the streets of Bucha, the Russian war in Ukraine has extracted an unacceptably high cost, while banding NATO allies and partners together in an unprecedented tide of support. In bilateral and multilateral security assistance packages, the transatlantic community has sent Ukraine javelins, High-Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARs), and all manner of weapons to defend against the Russian invasion. Still, Russia’s war continues against the nation of Ukraine and its people. So how should future military assistance account for the different impacts of the war on Ukrainian civilians? What strategies remain for NATO allies and partners to enhance their support beyond weapons and materiel? The answers lie in using gender analyses to zero in on the unique human security challenges facing Ukraine. When we overlook the role of gender in conflict, we miss the opportunity to both lead with our values and make our military support more effective. Applying a gender analysis to our security assistance is a solution that allies and partners have already agreed to implement in forums from the United Nations to NATO. In fact, it’s a tool that many allies have already developed within their own militaries. Now is the time to employ it in support of Ukraine. This starts with acknowledging the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) Agenda. The WPS Agenda, passed under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 in 2000, recognizes the disproportionate impact of conflict on women and girls, and their critical role in reconstructing societies. Militaries can apply gender analyses to better understand and tailor assistance to the unique security environments in which they operate. To help policymakers think through how a gender analysis can shape what security assistance should look like—and, in many cases, how allied militaries can implement solutions at scale, and consistent with political decisions that have already been made—we are proud to offer this issue brief. Our intention is to demonstrate to global decision makers that incorporating gender can and should be integrated in real-time conflicts to achieve real results. Our support to Ukraine must not waver, but more can be done to mitigate the severe impact of Russia’s war on the Ukrainian people. Allies and partners already have the political mandate to integrate the WPS Agenda into their operations. They already have the tools, training, and technical expertise to implement it in the field. The next step is making this common practice. This issue brief spells out ten steps for how to do so in Ukraine.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Women, Partnerships, Resilience, Society, Gender, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

80. Sweden and Finland are on their way to NATO membership. Here’s what needs to happen next.

Author:: John R. Deni
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: Sweden and Finland have just cleared a big hurdle on their path to NATO membership with the US Senate’s overwhelming vote to welcome them into the Alliance. While several other allies still need to ratify the expansion, Finnish and Swedish membership in NATO is now not a question of whether but when. Even though some analysts have posited that these two countries—especially Finland, which has an 830-mile border with Russia—bring disqualifying liabilities, most Alliance leaders, NATO-watchers, and European security experts argue these newest aspirants will strengthen the Alliance. This is especially so in terms of military capabilities and capacity, but also in terms of strategic culture and geostrategic outlook. Nonetheless, in the days, weeks, and months after Finland and Sweden officially become members, there is an array of subsequent questions that these two aspirants, other allies, and NATO as an organization will need to consider—and ultimately answer. After examining the key strengths that Finland and Sweden are likely to bring into NATO, this issue brief will consider several of these critical topics. These include defense planning, operational planning, and readiness concerns.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, National Security, Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, Finland, and Sweden

81. Advancing a framework for the stabilization and reconstruction of Ukraine

Author:: Patrick Quirk and Prakhar Sharma
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: Russia’s illegal and unprovoked war on Ukraine has shattered peace on the European continent and created tectonic shifts in the transatlantic security architecture. The Kremlin’s invasion has decimated Ukraine’s economy and infrastructure, and left tens of thousands of innocent civilians wounded or dead as part of a war-crime ridden military campaign. At the time of writing, Kyiv is making slow advances in the South and East with the help of significant Western military and economic aid, yet the outcome of the conflict continues to hang in the balance. A prolonged stalemate and some variation of a negotiated settlement seem most likely, with a Russian victory remaining a distant possibility.1 Absent an absolute Kremlin victory, Ukraine will need to stabilize vast swathes of its territory and reconstruct the social and industrial infrastructure therein.2 Due to their proximity to Ukraine and long-standing economic, political, and social connections, transatlantic allies and partners will most likely be deeply involved in this effort and will be significantly affected by its end result. The purpose of this issue brief then is to help Ukrainian, North American, and European policymakers consider stabilization and reconstruction needs and have a playbook in place regardless of the circumstances or outcome.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Science and Technology, Reconstruction, Economy, Business, Innovation, Resilience, Russia-Ukraine War, and Stabilization
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and United States of America

82. Arms racing under nuclear tripolarity: Evidence for an action-reaction cycle?

Author:: Matthew Kroenig
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: Conventional wisdom suggests that the world is approaching a tripolar arms race among the United States, Russia, and China. As Russia attempts to dramatically revise the post-Cold War security environment in Europe, China is expected to increase its nuclear arsenal to at least 1,500 warheads by 2035. In 2021, the then-commander of US Strategic Command, Admiral Richard, laid out the challenge of nuclear tripolarity before Congress testifying that: “for the first time in our history, the nation is on a trajectory to face two nuclear-capable, strategic peer adversaries at the same time.” In this issue brief, the Scowcroft Center’s Matthew Kroenig challenges the evidence for action-reaction arms races in the post-Cold War period but warns we may be facing one in this new tripolar nuclear environment.
Topic:: Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Missile Defense, Deterrence, and Multipolarity
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America

83. A European policy mix to address food insecurity linked to Russia’s war

Author:: Georg Zachmann, Pauline Weil, and Stephan von Cramon-Taubadel
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: The Russian war against Ukraine has put at risk a significant share of global food exports, and has contributed significantly to strongly rising global food prices. This has made poor, food-import dependent countries more vulnerable, with potentially serious humanitarian consequences. The crisis also has negative security, migration and foreign policy repercussions for the European Union. The EU and its members have a number of policy levers to address the crisis. These include agricultural, trade, environment, aid, energy, fiscal and foreign policy. However, in the complex interplay of local and global, agricultural and non-agricultural markets, apparently simple solutions can have significant unintended consequences and policy trade-offs must be taken into account. While EU agricultural policy can address the crisis directly by adjusting production, energy policies also have an impact on food security through the complex relationship between the food and energy systems. Energy is an input to food production but also, as bioenergy, competes for agricultural commodities. Fiscal policy can discourage inefficient food consumption and food waste, while trade policy and aid can improve the allocation of agricultural production factors (eg fertilisers) and products. Increasing information sharing on food stocks and building trust are prerequisites for trade policy and diplomacy to limit export restrictions, thus alleviating some of the price pressures on international markets. The crisis highlights food-system fragilities when confronted with global conflicts, climate change and economic shocks. Policies should seek to increase shock-resilience, for example by reducing structural rigidities in production, trade and consumption patterns, and by encouraging sustainable production in import-dependent countries. This is especially important considering that most food production is locally consumed. Only 20 percent of the global cereals volume is traded, making the current shock significant in terms of globally traded volumes (Ukraine represents 10 percent of the global grain market), but not relative to overall volume (Ukraine represents 2 percent of global grain production).
Topic:: European Union, Food Security, Exports, Russia-Ukraine War, and Green Economy
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

84. How have sanctions impacted Russia?

Author:: Maria Demertzis, Benjamin Hilgenstock, Ben McWilliams, Elina Ribakova, and Simone Tagliapietra
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has triggered a series of sanctions imposed by the European Union, the United States and others. Sanctions included restrictions on Russia’s financial industry, its central bank and its coal and oil exporters, in addition to general export controls. Meanwhile, foreign companies have withdrawn voluntarily from the Russian market as a result of a ‘self-sanctioning’ trend. We assess the impact these sanctions have had on Russia’s economy in the immediate aftermath of the invasion and more structurally. Russian fiscal revenues have not suffered from sanctions sufficiently to reduce the length of this war. Effective management by the Bank of Russia has prevented financial instability and has therefore also protected the real economy. However, this picture of economic containment is coming to an end. Russia’s fiscal revenues are now beginning to take a hit; given the breadth of sanctions, the economy will suffer in the medium to long term. The voluntary departure of a large number of western firms, eventual energy decoupling by the EU and Russia’s inability to find equal alternatives will damage the Russian economy severely. As the Russian economy closes in on itself, it will become harder to find reliable data to evaluate the extent of the hit. Still greater sanctions coordination across the globe is needed to isolate the Russian economy, limit the flow of income into Russian coffers and therefore help stop the war.
Topic:: Governance, Sanctions, Economy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

85. Will Ukraine’s refugees go home?

Author:: Uri Dadush and Pauline Weil
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: About 15 percent of the population has fled Ukraine since the start of the Russian aggression in February 2022. Nearly 4 million Ukrainians have already registered in European Union countries. Based in part on evidence that few refugees return voluntarily to poor countries once they settle in rich countries, even once security is re-established at home, it can be expected that large numbers of Ukrainian refugees are likely to remain in European host countries, and will likely be joined by others, including many men that remained to fight when the conflict is over. Ukraine already has a long history of emigration. Its shattered economy, the likelihood of a protracted conflict and significant uncertainty with regard to its final status reinforce the argument that most refugees will not return and many more will join them. EU nations must prepare for. There will be large short-term costs and long-term economic gains from Ukrainian immigration in Europe. The best way to help Ukraine, and to moderate the likely outflow of its people, will be to assist in the country’s reconstruction, and not to place artificial impediments to the immigration of individuals who have already suffered greatly.
Topic:: Migration, Governance, Reconstruction, Refugees, Economy, Trade, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

86. The Threat of New Wars in the Caucasus: A Good Case for U.S. Restraint

Author:: Anatol Lieven and Artin DerSimonian
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: The decline of Russian power due to military defeats in Ukraine risks leading to increased violence and instability in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The effects of this can already be seen in the flare–up of fighting between Azerbaijan and Armenia, inadequately checked by Russian peacekeepers. This shift in power creates a temptation for Washington to increase its involvement in the region in an effort to end Russian influence there. This temptation should be resisted. The United States has no vital national interest in this region — certainly not ones that are worth the risk of new wars. The conflicts in the southern Caucasus are deeply intractable, and have roots that long predate the Soviet collapse and indeed the Soviet Union itself. They were not created by Russia, and cannot be solved by the United States. Increased support for Georgia risks empowering a new attempt by Georgia to retake its lost territories by force, leading to another war with Russia, the outcome of which would be uncertain and highly dangerous. Increased support for Azerbaijan threatens Armenia and would create a fierce backlash in the Armenian–American community. Instead, the United States should continue to play a helpful but limited diplomatic role, aimed not at solving these disputes but at reducing tensions and preventing new eruptions of violence.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Territorial Disputes, Conflict, and Instability
Political Geography:: Russia, Caucasus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, United States of America, and Nagorno-Karabakh

87. Children of War: The Ukrainian Case

Author:: Isabella Martin
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: The war in Ukraine has imposed considerable physical, mental, and emotional damage on children. It is critical to provide mental health and psychosocial support (MPHSS), as well as to reinforce psychological and social infrastructure—in Ukraine and countries hosting refugees—to help them cope with the immediate trauma of war and promote resilience for future reconstruction efforts. Severe damage to civilian infrastructure has left many children without access to schools, healthcare resources, and support networks within care facilities, while those who have fled Ukraine risk falling victim to human trafficking and exploitation. Moreover, children are targets of the Kremlin’s efforts to erase the Ukrainian identity, brutally executed through oppressive policies such as forced school curriculum in the occupied territories and atrocious practice of ’filtration’, with children separated, abducted, and then put up for adoption in Russia. Inside and outside of the country, Ukraine’s youth are left extremely vulnerable to abuse, with the consequences to their mental health to last for generations—and to affect the nation’s post-war recovery—if not taken care of already today. Without developing proper coping mechanisms in children and adolescents now, the trauma imposed on the young generation will hinder rebuilding efforts and undermine societal institutions. It is thus imperative to support MHPSS initiatives and contribute to a resilient society in post-war Ukraine.
Topic:: Security, Civil Society, Education, Health, War, Children, Resilience, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

88. Preparing for the Final Collapse of the Soviet Union and the Dissolution of the Russian Federation

Author:: Luke Coffey
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the resignation of Mikhail Gorbachev as president of the Soviet Union in 1991 marked the start of the USSR’s collapse—but not the collapse itself. While the USSR ceased to exist as a legal entity after 1991, the collapse of the USSR is still happening today. The two Chechen Wars, Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, the on-and-off border skirmishes between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and the 2020 Second Karabakh War between Armenia and Azerbaijan are just a few examples showing that the Soviet Union is still collapsing today. However, future historians will likely describe Russia's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine as the most consequential moment, if not the final moment, of the Soviet Union’s collapse. When the war in Ukraine will end is unknown, but it will likely mark the dissolution of the Russian Federation (the legal successor of the Soviet Union) as it is known today. Russia has undeniably suffered a major blow to its economy, devastation to its military capability, and degradation of its influence in regions where it once had clout. The borders of the Russian Federation will likely not look the same on a map in 10 or 20 years as they do now. As the final collapse of the Soviet Union plays out and as the Russian Federation faces the possibility of dissolving, policymakers need to start planning for the new geopolitical reality on the Eurasian landmass. The goal of this policy memo is not to advocate for regime change in Russia—this will be a matter for the Russian people. Nor does this paper predict exactly how Russia and the broader Eurasian region will emerge after the final collapse of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Russian Federation. Instead, it establishes realistic goals for Western policymakers, outlines assumptions on which these goals are based, and highlights the questions that decision-makers should ask now to better prepare for the future.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and History
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Eurasia

89. Broken Dream: The oligarch, Russia, and Georgia’s drift from Europe

Author:: Régis Genté
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: Georgia’s relationship with the West has deteriorated over the last year and a half. The Georgian government’s actions have prevented the country from becoming a candidate for EU membership. Three-quarters of Georgians see themselves as pro-Western; only a tiny proportion of the population is pro-Russian. Oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili appears to be largely responsible for this dissonance between Georgian foreign policy and public opinion. Through his control of the Georgian Dream party and the government, Ivanishvili may be attempting to manoeuvre Georgia into Russia’s sphere of influence. It is still possible for the EU to work with Georgia. But the bloc should condition the financial and political support it provides – starting with the 12 points that Brussels designated in June 2022.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, European Union, and Oligarchy
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Caucasus, and Georgia

90. The old is dying and the new cannot be born: A power audit of EU-Russia relations

Author:: Kadri Liik
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: Policymakers across the EU agree Russia poses a multifaceted threat to their security. Europeans have responded quickly to the challenges posed by the war in Ukraine, but they lack a ‘theory of victory’. They have no shared view about how the conflict is likely to end. No single EU member state is guiding Russia policy; a ‘leaderless unity’ has emerged. This could provide the bloc with a form of dispersed strength – but a change in US leadership could expose the weakness of this situation. EU policymakers do not believe that Europeans have the means to bring about regime change in Russia; at the same time, they are unable to foresee a stable future relationship with a Putin-led Russia. Policymakers are uncertain how Russia’s war on Ukraine will affect their interaction with other parts of the world, including China and the global south. This could prevent Europeans from mounting a more effective global response. Europeans should re-examine the support they give to Russians fleeing the regime – emigrés represent an important connection to Russian society, which will be valuable whoever occupies the Kremlin.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

91. Cold winter: How the EU can help Moldova survive Russian pressure and protect its democracy

Author:: Andrew Wilson
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: Russia has long used gas prices and supply to put pressure on Moldova. It did so again when the country elected pro-European president Maia Sandu in 2020 and her parliamentary majority in 2021. Moldova occupies a significant geostrategic position with regard to the war in Ukraine, as a key ally and neighbour to that country’s immediate west. The Moldovan government has made some progress on its reform agenda, all while dealing with the impacts of the war, including looking after refugees and handling increased transit of goods across its territory. If the government can get through this winter, in 2023 it should be able to further diversify its energy options and make stronger progress on reform of the judiciary, defence, and security. The EU should support the Moldovan government in its endeavours. The country remains highly vulnerable to Russian pressure but financial assistance in the short term and support for reform in the long term will help it make progress, including towards eventual EU membership.
Topic:: Reform, European Union, Democracy, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Moldova

92. “Russia’s war in Eastern Europe is a central threat to the international architecture”

Author:: Luca Niculescu
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: n the short, medium and long term, what dangers does Russia's attack on Ukraine pose to the European Union? Is there a different perception of these dangers/threats in Eastern Europe? The Russian aggression in Ukraine, which began more than three months ago, has come at a complex time at both European and global level. Dealing with the consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic already required a great deal of effort, imagination and mobilisation on the part of states and citizens. Transformations and reforms have been launched to respond to the new reality and to allow for a sustainable, environmentally friendly recovery. It was in this context that we witnessed the return of war to the European continent after 77 years of peace, with unprecedented suddenness and violence. Russia's war in Eastern Europe is not a conflict relegated to the periphery of political reality, but in its present form is a central threat to the international architecture as we know it.
Topic:: NATO, European Union, Threat Perception, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, and Eastern Europe

93. Strategic dependencies, a question of sovereignty

Author:: Eric Maurice
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: The Russian aggression against Ukraine triggered a massive response from Europeans and their Western allies. Instead of direct military intervention, which would have carried the risk of an armed or even nuclear escalation with Russia, the EU's response has taken the shape of sanctions against the Russian regime in many sectors of the country's economy, with the stated aim of weakening the government's ability to finance the war. The five packages of European sanctions adopted since the end of February in coordination with the sanctions of the G7 countries, have "devastated the Russian economy", deems Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. The sanctions, in particular the exclusion of most Russian banks from the Swift financial messaging system, the ban on market transactions with the Russian Central Bank and the embargo on the sale of certain equipment, are having an impact because they rely on the economic and financial strength of the West and, conversely, on Russia's dependence on Western financial markets and foreign technology. Yet, after two months of war, the Russian regime continues its offensive despite numerous casualties, several tactical defeats and the impact of sanctions. Sanctions have so far failed to stop the fighting, or even to change the behaviour of the Russian President. And for the Europeans there is the question of the final stage of possible sanctions, an embargo on Russian oil and gas, which would deprive the regime of about €100 billion a year (€99 billion in 2021). In early April, EU High Representative Josep Borrell lamented that Europeans had bought €35 billion worth of gas from Russia since the war began. The reluctance of some member states, most notably Germany, to take the decisive step of an embargo highlights the fact that the other side of the EU's economic strength is its dependence on Russian hydrocarbons, which is hampering its decision-making capacity and leaves it at the mercy of supplies being cut off in retaliation for sanctions. While the Commission claims to be geopolitical and the President of the Council considers the European Union's strategic autonomy to be "the aim of our generation", recent events have raised the question of its capacity to act through economic power and sanctions and its dependence on the outside world. They are forcing Europeans to rethink their relationship with the economy and trade.
Topic:: Sovereignty, Sanctions, Gas, Military Intervention, Russia-Ukraine War, and Dependency
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

94. Reception of Ukrainian refugees. Between emergency responses and long-term solutions

Author:: Ramona Bloj and Stefanie Buzmaniuk
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: By mid-April 2022, more than 7.1 million Ukrainians had been forced to move within their country. More than 4.6 million people have had to flee Ukraine since 24 February when the Russian invasion began (Figure 1). In total, more than a quarter of the population has been forced to leave their homes as a result of Russia's aggression. For Europe, this is the largest movement of a population since the Second World War, and the challenges for neighbouring countries - Moldova[1], Romania, Poland, Hungary and Slovakia - hosting the largest numbers of refugees are significant, from securing temporary accommodation and immediate access to health care, to ensuring children's education and access to labour markets.
Topic:: Humanitarian Aid, Refugees, Borders, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

95. From the Russian Pact to the Green Deal?

Author:: Gilles Lepesant
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: Russia's invasion of Ukraine has, among other things, caused an energy crisis comparable to the oil crisis of the 1970s, one that goes beyond oil however since Russia is also a major supplier of gas and coal. By 2021, it was the EU's largest supplier of all three fossil fuels. The military hostilities started in a context dominated by price pressures induced by global economic recovery and by an abnormally low level of storage sites in Europe. In this context a policy of diversification as part of RepowerEU was launched in view - as put forward by the European Commission - to do away with the supply of fossil fuels from Russia by 2030. Beyond the quest for new short-term suppliers, the question of a radical acceleration of the energy transition in Europe in favour of low-carbon energy sources and sobriety is now being asked. This paper highlights the opportunity for Europeans to break not only with their dependence on Russia but also, and above all, with fossil fuels. It outlines the challenges to be met by underlining the extent to which the current stage of energy decoupling from Russia marks a turning point and closes several decades of close interdependence between Russian deposits and the European economies.
Topic:: European Union, Fossil Fuels, Green Deal, Energy Crisis, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

96. The Black Sea, the spectre of a new Iron Curtain?

Author:: Radu Magdin
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: For thousands of years, the Black Sea has been a place of meetings and exchange. It has often been the natural border between empires. Now, together with the Baltic Sea, it is the place where East and West, the United States (through NATO), the European Union, Turkey and Russia still meet on open terrain.
Topic:: NATO, History, European Union, Geopolitics, Borders, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Russia, Turkey, United States of America, and Black Sea

97. “In Russia today the whole media sphere has been destroyed."

Author:: Katerina Abramova
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: What role does media play in informing the Russian population about the war in Ukraine? I would like to emphasise that no problems can be solved until people realise that there is a problem. If independent media and independent journalists stop telling the truth about what is going on in Ukraine some people will just be left with state propaganda, others will just know nothing. Most governments thought the war would not last more than half a year. But it is far from being a short and victorious one as Moscow had planned, so people are starting to ask questions. Some analysts say that in the autumn ordinary citizens will start to feel some of the consequences, as they prepare, for example, their kids for school; they will have to pay more because of inflation and the effects of the sanctions. For the media it is simply very important to give people the opportunity to know what’s going on.
Topic:: Media, Journalism, Exile, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Eurasia

98. The end of European dependence on Russian fossil fuels

Author:: Ramona Bloj
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: The Russian war in Ukraine is entering its eighth month. As winter approaches, the question of energy and Europe's dependence on Russian hydrocarbons, which has dominated European debate since the invasion began on 24 February, is turning into a major challenge for the 27 Member States. The latter must strike a delicate balance between reducing consumption, relieving pressure on consumers and making a genuine transition to deal with climate change
Topic:: Climate Change, European Union, Fossil Fuels, Energy Crisis, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

99. Nationalism, Sovereignism, Virilism: the sources of Russia's war against Ukraine

Author:: François Hublet
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: Because war is the ultimate negation of all autonomy, all freedom and, a fortiori, all democracy, maintaining peace is the first of political necessities. Post-war Europe[1] knew this only too well. In the industrial age, education for peace and tolerance has become the condition for the survival of humanity: according to Adorna, "all political education must have at its centre the demand that Auschwitz cannot be repeated[2]”, not only because horror is imprescriptible, but because, in the absence of consistent education, it is destined to reproduce itself and sweep away the entire civilisation in which it is rooted. With the return of war in Europe, the question of collective education cannot be eluded. The mental patterns that led - directly or indirectly - to the massacres in Ukraine will have to be questioned in depth, lest any future peace be obliterated in advance, since "no peace treaty can be considered as such, if it secretly reserves for itself some subject for starting war again[3]”
Topic:: Nationalism, Sovereignty, History, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

100. What is President Putin so afraid of?

Author:: Francisco Juan Gomez Martos
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: Faced with the brutal and unjustified military aggression of Putin's Russia against Ukraine, the vast majority of European citizens have realised what seemed unlikely until now: the possibility of a war in Europe[1]. A cruel and devastating war, both materially and morally, a war of occupation of a sovereign country and a free people. Undoubtedly the aggressor will be held accountable for his crimes before the international community and nothing will be forgotten. The EU is watching, perplexed but united and in solidarity with the heroic struggle of the Ukrainian people who are valiantly defending their independence and their freedom, which is also ours. The borderline between Western civilisation based on values and respect for human rights and authoritarian regimes that trample on the dignity of their citizens has been crossed in the blood of the victims, many of whom are civilians. The European Union, as a global actor, is facing its limits as it tries to curb the hideous logic of war against which it was built 72 years ago.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, European Union, Democracy, Vladimir Putin, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

Search

Search Constraints

Search Results

Refine your search

Topic

Political Geography

Content Type

Publishing Institution

Author

Publication Year

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS