Content Type: Policy Brief / Political Geography: Russia / Publication Year: within 10 Years

1. Russia’s Yes Vote on Syria Aid Will Come With a Price

Author:: Anna Borshchevskaya and Andrew J. Tabler
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Moscow’s willingness to approve another UN extension has more to do with advancing normalization between Turkey and the Assad regime than helping Syrian civilians, who will remain hostage to Russian demands if nothing is done before the next vote this summer. On January 9, the UN Security Council unanimously approved Resolution 2672 extending the provision of cross-border humanitarian aid into northwest Syria for another six months. In the immediate term, the vote is good news for Syrian civilians suffering through one of their worst energy crises since the beginning of the civil war in 2011. But the main problem persists—absent an alternative mechanism outside the Security Council, cross-border aid will remain bound to Russia’s increasing political and security demands in Syria, which are ultimately tied to the situation in Ukraine as well. Many were surprised by Moscow’s decision to approve the new resolution. Over the years, Russia has repeatedly threatened to veto previous resolutions, and the West has largely given in to its demands by steadily diluting the aid mechanism. From that perspective, this month’s vote appeared to be a welcome sign of the Biden administration’s willingness to stand its ground on Syria despite dealing with a complex Russian challenge in Ukraine. Moscow did not even resort to its frequent tactic of abstaining from the final vote in order to signal its displeasure with the mechanism.
Topic:: Humanitarian Aid, UN Security Council, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: Russia, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

2. Women, Peace and Security and the 2022 National Security Strategy

Author:: Hans Hogrefe and Cassandra Zavislak
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Our Secure Future
Abstract:: This brief examines the inclusion of the Women, Peace and Security agenda in the Biden Administration’s 2022 National Security Strategy, and compares it to the ways in which the Trump Administration’s 2017 National Security Strategy addresses the full participation of women in our national security interests.
Topic:: Security, National Security, Women, Inequality, Peace, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: Russia, China, North America, and United States of America

3. European energy solidarity: strengthening the EU’s crisibility

Author:: Aline Bartenstein
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: By default, when the EU is hit by a crisis, member states tend to have a national sovereignty reflex. When Italy was hit hard by the Covid-19 pandemic, the first reaction was to close its borders and restrict the export of urgently needed medical equipment. National interest superseded the call for European solidarity. Although member states have repeatedly managed to unite and – in the face of the polycrisis – developed a certain crisibility, no one would have been surprised if member states had preferred to seek their own advantage when Russia started the war in Ukraine on 24 February 2022. Nearly one year later, member states are (still) united – some declaring this as never before – and a gas or electricity crisis has so far been averted. This unity, which certainly threatened to crumble in the face of Hungarian opposition, German hesitancy, and the different approaches to dealing with the war, leads us to the question of what is different this time? Certainly, the EU's identity has been profoundly challenged by the war since its peacekeeping credentials – the EU is even a recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize – were perceived to be at risk. Was is this identity-threatening experience that united the member states? Or was it the recognition of Russia as a common foe that strengthened the bond between them?
Topic:: Sovereignty, European Union, Solidarity, Energy, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Italy

4. Geopolitical and Technocratic: EU International Actorness and Anne PINTSCH Russia’s War Against Ukraine

Author:: Anne Pintsch and Maryna Rabinovych
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 marked the start of the largest and most brutal war at the heart of the European continent since World War II. It inevitably came as a “cold shower” for the EU and Member States’ politicians, demonstrating with absolute certainty the fragility of the international and European security order. The EU responded to the invasion with unprecedented sanctions against Russia and Belarus and multifaceted resolute support to Ukraine. The latter included the breaking of many previously existing taboos, such as the first ever use of the European Peace Facility to procure weapons for a third country at war or offering collective protection to about 8 million Ukrainian citizens and residents, fleeing the war
Topic:: European Union, Geopolitics, Resilience, Technocracy, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

5. Judging Putin

Author:: Arnaud De Nanteuil
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: The publication of an international arrest warrant against Vladimir Putin on 17 March 2023 by the Second Pre-Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Court (ICC) has caused a stir. Although the institution is far from immune from criticism (it has long been accused of being "strong with the weak and weak with the strong"), this is a major change in the Court's policy as it is the first warrant ever issued against the sitting leader of a permanent member of the UN Security Council; a member who, moreover, in a chilling irony of history, played a key role in the Nuremberg Trial. In some respects, this is a gamble, given the many obstacles that stand between this historic event and a possible conviction of Vladimir Putin. But this arrest warrant is also a way to put the ICC back in the centre of the game, even though until now it seems to have been largely denied the possibility of judging the main perpetrator of the war of aggression against Ukraine and its disastrous humanitarian consequences.
Topic:: International Law, War Crimes, International Criminal Court (ICC), Vladimir Putin, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

6. Economic sanctions against Russia: How effective? How durable?

Author:: Jeffrey J. Schott
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: Economic sanctions by Western democracies against Russia have not stopped the war and attacks on Ukrainian civilians. Together with continued economic and military support for Ukraine, however, sanctions are blocking Russian president Vladimir Putin from achieving his territorial objectives. Sanctions have contributed to a sharp compression of Russian imports; forced Russia’s military and industry to source from more costly and inefficient suppliers at home and abroad; and slowly begun to squeeze Russian government finances. The G7 countries must sustain and augment their efforts, including by confiscating frozen reserves of the Central Bank of Russia to help fund Ukraine’s reconstruction. G7 policymakers need to derive lessons from the current crisis about the utility of sanctions in conflicts between major powers. Maintaining coherent and coordinated sanctions against large and powerful target countries is critical for the effectiveness and durability of the policy. Deploying sanctions against such rivals also requires a long-term commitment to the implementation and enforcement of the trade and finance restrictions. Sanctions impose costs on both the target country and those imposing the sanctions, so Western policymakers need to offset those costs via domestic support or tax relief to sustain political support over time for sanctions in big power conflicts.
Topic:: Sanctions, Economy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

7. Integrating US and allied capabilities to ensure security in space

Author:: Nicholas Eftimiades
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: Over the last two decades, the world entered a new paradigm in the use of space, namely the introduction of highly capable small satellites, just tens or hundreds of kilograms in size. This paradigm has forever changed how countries will employ space capabilities to achieve economic, scientific, and national security interests. As is so often the case, the telltale signs of this global paradigm shift were obvious to more than just a few individuals or industries. Air Force Research Laboratory’s Space Vehicles Directorate began exploring the use of small satellites in the 1990s. The Air Force also established the Operationally Responsive Space program in 2007, which explored the potential use of small satellites. However, both research efforts had no impact on the US Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) satellite acquisition programs. The advancement of small satellites was largely driven by universities and small commercial start-up companies.1 The introduction of commercial and government small satellites has democratized space for states and even individuals. Space remote sensing and communications satellites, once the exclusive domain of the United States and Soviet Union, can now provide space-based services to anyone with a credit card. Eighty-eight countries currently operate satellites, and the next decade will likely see the launch of tens of thousands of new satellites.2 Commercial and government small satellites have changed outer space into a more contested, congested, and competitive environment. The United States has shared space data with its allies since the dawn of the space age.3 Yet it also has a history of operating independently in space. Other domains of warfare and defense policy are more closely integrated between the United States and its allies and partners. The United States has military alliances with dozens of countries and strategic partnerships with many more.4 In recent years, there have been calls to coordinate with, or even integrate allied space capabilities into US national security space strategy and plans. In this regard, the US government has made significant advances. However, much work needs to be done. There is pressure on the United States to act quickly to increase national security space cooperation and integration, driven by rapidly increasing global capabilities and expanding threats from hostile nations and orbital debris. This paper examines the potential strategic benefits to US national security of harnessing allied space capabilities and the current efforts to do so, as well as barriers to achieving success. The paper identifies pathways forward for cooperating with allies and strategic partners on their emerging space capabilities and the potential of integrating US and allied capabilities.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, National Security, European Union, and Space
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Canada, North America, and United States of America

8. The EU can manage without Russian liquified natural gas

Author:: Ben McWilliams, Giovanni Sgaravatti, Simone Tagliapietra, and Georg Zachmann
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: The European Union has committed to eliminate all Russian fossil-fuel imports by 2027. Progress has been made, with sanctions on oil and coal already introduced. The glaring exception is natural gas, on which the EU has so far refrained from imposing limitations, owing to greater dependence on Russia. Nevertheless, pipeline gas imports have fallen by four-fifths following Russia’s weaponisation of gas supplies. However, Russia’s exports of liquified natural gas (LNG) to the EU have increased since the invasion of Ukraine. The EU needs a coherent strategy for these LNG imports. Our analysis shows that the EU can manage without Russian LNG. Anticipated impacts are not comparable to those felt in 2022 as Russian pipeline gas dried up. The regional impact would be most significant for the Iberian Peninsula, which has the highest share of Russian LNG in total gas supply. Meanwhile, the global LNG market is tight, and we anticipate that Russia would find new buyers for cargos that no longer enter Europe. We discuss the options available to the EU. Wait-and-see implies delaying any action until 2027, while soft sanctions would discourage additional purchases but not break long-term contracts. We argue instead for an EU embargo on Russian LNG, to reduce exposure to an unreliable and adversarial entity, and to limit the extent to which EU consumers fund the Russian state. The embargo may be designed to allow purchases only if they are coordinated via the EU’s Energy Platform, with limited volumes and below market prices. This could be accompanied by the implementation of a price cap on Russian LNG cargos that use EU or G7 trans-shipment, insurance or shipping services.
Topic:: European Union, Gas, Energy, and Green Economy
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

9. Information Manipulation and Repression: A Theory and Evidence from the COVID-19 Response in Russia

Author:: Natalia Lamberova and Konstantin Sonin
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Cato Institute
Abstract:: The COVID-19 pandemic has called for provision of public goods and services that require a high state capacity, including producing and distributing vaccines, enforcing mask mandates, limiting potential super‐spreader events, and so on. The rationale for public intervention was that private actions, such as getting vaccinated, wearing masks, and avoiding large gatherings, have benefits to broader society, so they are likely to be undersupplied by individuals on their own. In these circumstances, one might expect the power of the state coercing others into compliance to be beneficial. Are authoritarian leaders, less constrained by institutions and less accountable to voters, better equipped to deal with health emergencies?
Topic:: Authoritarianism, Repression, Public Health, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Russia and Eurasia

10. The third EU-NATO joint declaration (10 January 2023): Was it worth the delay?

Author:: Loïc Simonet
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:: Triggered by the war in Ukraine, the long-awaited third joint EU-NATO declaration was signed on 10 January 2023, after months of postponement. Neither a joint strategic concept nor a plan of actions, the document primarily sends a strong political message of transatlantic unity with regards to the gravest threat to Euro-Atlantic security in decades. Although it recognises the value of a stronger and more capable European defence, it marks the primacy of NATO as European security provider, therefore being seen as a defeat for EU’s strategic autonomy. China’s first ever mention in a joint EU-NATO declaration sparked a nervous reaction in Beijing.
Topic:: Security, NATO, European Union, Strategic Autonomy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, and Ukraine

11. The Impacts of the Russo-Ukranian War on Latin America in the Age of Strategic Competition

Author:: Guido Torres
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: As we enter the second year of the Russo-Ukranian war, it is prudent that the foreign policy community examine the impacts of the conflict on other regions, including Latin America. Despite the distance between Latin America and Ukraine, the conflict has disrupted the region and exacerbated the negative impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. COVID-19 disproportionately affected Latin America’s fragile socioeconomic, fiscal, and political situation. For example, Brazil, a major regional economic powerhouse, was one of the worst-struck countries in the region, and the pandemic significantly impacted its economy. The country’s GDP contracted by 4.1% in 2020, and unemployment reached a record high of 14.1% in the first quarter of 2021. The pandemic also impacted Brazil’s fiscal situation, with the country’s debt reaching 90% of GDP. Brazil’s downturn is not an isolated incident, albeit a microcosm of the region. In addition, the instability allowed authoritarian regimes to further consolidate control in places like Nicaragua, Venezuela, and El Salvador. For instance, leaders like El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele capitalized on the chaos of the pandemic and a desperate citizenry to strengthen his power. Furthering the impacts on domestic politics, the confluence of the pandemic and war in Ukraine disrupted global supply chains, agriculture production, and energy resources. Moreover, as tensions between the West and nations such as Russia and China continue to grow, globalization is becoming increasingly divided. This will likely lead to further political turmoil and socioeconomic disparity in Latin America, which has already been compounded by the war and the lackluster COVID-19 recovery efforts. With these repercussions still lingering, a lack of economic and trade development, an intensifying energy crisis, and rampant inflation prevailing in 2023, the region’s outlook remains bleak.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Conflict, Strategic Competition, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Latin America

12. The promises and perils of law-making as the way to strengthen societal resilience

Author:: Amelie Theussen
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: Societal resilience is seen as a key answer to the deteriorating security situation, especially in the Baltic Sea region. States often employ new laws in an attempt to strengthen resilience, but is legislation the best way to build stronger societies? There is an underlying mismatch between the dynamism of resilience and the static nature of laws. Resilience entails the capacity to bounce back flexibly from crises. Laws should be formulated so as to nurture such flexibility. Democratic accountability might be at risk when laws are used in the quest for strengthened resilience.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Resilience, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Baltic States

13. Cluster Bombs: What is the potential impact of American weapons on Ukraine’s counteroffensive?

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: The US Department of Defense officially announced on July 7, 2023, that the US would provide cluster bombs to Ukraine as part of a new military assistance package to support Kyiv in its counteroffensive against Russia. Cluster munitions are weapons that consist of a container that opens in mid-air to scatter up to 600 explosive submunitions or bomblets over a wide area. Most of these weapons are known for their lack of precision guidance, meaning they are not individually directed toward specific targets. Estimates suggest that these weapons' failure rate (dud rate) during conflicts ranges from 10% to 40%, posing a significant risk to civilians, especially because they can explode later upon contact or movement.
Topic:: Weapons, Military Aid, Russia-Ukraine War, and Cluster Bombs
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

14. A Surprising Shift: Is Somalia choosing Moscow over Washington?

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: Somali Foreign Minister Abshir Omar Jama made a surprise visit to Moscow on May 26, 2023, to meet with several Russian officials, including his counterpart Sergey Lavrov. His visit raised several questions regarding motives and implications, particularly in light of the Russian top diplomat’s statements about Russia’s readiness to supply Mogadishu with the necessary military equipment for its ongoing war against the terrorist group Al-Shabaab.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Engagement, Al-Shabaab, and Military Aid
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, Somalia, and United States of America

15. Restraining Moscow: What are the repercussions of Wagner's rebellion for the Russo-Ukrainian war?

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: Yevgeny Prigozhin, the chief of the Russian private military contractor group Wagner, announced that his forces had crossed the Ukrainian border into the city of Rostov-on-Don in southern Russia, threatening to destroy anyone who would obstruct their path, including Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu if necessary. In an official speech delivered on the morning of June 24, 2023, Russian President Putin confirmed that what had happened was a stab in the back, instructing the security and military forces to neutralize the "traitors," referring to Prigozhin himself. He called on Russian security to arrest Prigozhin on charges of inciting a civil war. Wagner issued a statement in response to Putin's speech, affirming that Putin had chosen the wrong path and that Russia would soon have a new leader. In an official speech delivered on the morning of June 24, 2023, Russian President Vladimir Putin confirmed that what had happened was a stab in the back, and instructed the security and military forces to neutralize the "traitors," referring to Prigozhin himself. He called on Russian security to arrest Prigozhin on charges of inciting a civil war. In response to Putin's speech, Wagner issued a statement affirming that Putin had chosen the wrong path and that Russia would soon have a new leader. The defection of Wagner and the involvement of its forces in the conflict have significant implications for the Russo-Ukrainian war. The actions of Wagner and the response from the Russian government signal internal divisions and potential shifts in power dynamics within Russia. The situation remains highly volatile, and the repercussions of these events on the ongoing war are yet to unfold fully.
Topic:: Wagner Group, Military, Russia-Ukraine War, and Yevgeny Prigozhin
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

16. Messages to Washington: The significance of China's push for a new world order during President Jinping's Moscow visit

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: Chinese President Xi Jinping, on March 20, 2023, arrived in Moscow on a three-day state visit to meet Russian President Vladimir Putin, drawing harsh criticism from the West. Western countries consider the visit as explicit support to the Russian leader. During the visit, China and Russia signed numerous agreements to show their willingness to reinforce their bilateral relations.
Topic:: Security, Bilateral Relations, Economic Cooperation, Multipolarity, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, and United States of America

17. A Long Shot: Chances of reviving the JCPOA following FM’s Moscow visit

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: Iranian foreign minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian, on March 29, 2023 led ministry officials and a member of the parliament on a visit to Moscow where he met with Russian counterpart Sergie Lavrov to discuss ways of reinforcing bilateral relations and matters of common concern.
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, JCPOA, and Cooperation
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Iran, and Middle East

18. European Mercenaries: Will Congo use Wagner in its conflict with Rwanda?

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: Tensions broke out between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda in January 2023 after an exchange of accusations of non-compliance with their peace agreement signed in the Angolan capital Luanda in November 2022. The development came after Kinshasa announced that it uses private military firms to counter growing security threats. Kigali regarded this move as a declaration of war.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Conflict, Wagner Group, and Private Military Companies (PMCs)
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Rwanda

19. The war in Ukraine: Adapting the EU’s security and defence policy

Author:: Dick Zandee and Adaja Stoetman
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:: Russia’s war in Ukraine is violating the rules-based international order and poses a significant threat to European security. The EU and NATO have responded by taking coordinated action. The measures taken have varied from unprecedented sanctions on Russia to assisting Ukraine with the delivery of arms and ammunition. The war in Ukraine has led to an even stronger focus on collective defence, which was already put in motion after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. Furthermore, the European security architecture has witnessed a significant change with Finland (and later this year Sweden) joining the North Atlantic Alliance. At the Vilnius Summit (11-12 July 2023), NATO has taken new decisions to strengthen its deterrence and defence posture
Topic:: NATO, European Union, International Order, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

20. A Dead-End War: Russian Failure and Ukrainian Destruction

Author:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:: With all parties still clinging to their demands, there is no end in sight to the war: Russia wants to cement its control over four Ukrainian provinces, win recognition of its sovereignty over Crimea, and secure guarantees for Ukrainian neutrality. Ukraine wants a definitive end to hostilities, the withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukrainian territory (including Crimea), and negotiations on its strategic future.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Conflict, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

21. Russia’s War Economy

Author:: András Rácz, Ole Spillner, and Guntram Wolff
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: Sanctions are a strong signal of Western resolve to oppose Russia’s war against Ukraine and have significantly weakened its ability to wage war. But Russia is adapting, turning its economy into a war economy, ramping up military production, and adjusting to sanctions. This Policy Brief looks at Russia’s economic adjustment with a focus on the shifting of resources to war purposes and the effect of sanctions on military production.
Topic:: Sanctions, Economy, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

22. Leveraging Islam and Internal Conflict: Strategies and Consequences in Russia’s War Against Ukraine

Author:: Miriam Katherine Heß
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: Assessment of the president of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov; the inner-Chechen conflict; and Chechen fighters on both sides in Russia’s war against Ukraine reveals how internal conflicts become crucial for international structures and how transnational dynamics – such as foreign fighter flows – pose challenges to the interplay of national and international law. By anticipating the effects of the Russian invasion of Ukraine beyond the Zeitenwende in Germany and Europe, policy-makers will increase readiness and preparedness for the ongoing but also post-war period.
Topic:: Islam, Conflict, Foreign Fighters, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Central Asia

23. Toughening Financial Sanctions on Russia: Enforcing Energy Sanctions and Reducing Shadow Reserves Effectively

Author:: Guntram Wolff, Benjamin Hilgenstock, and Elina Ribakova
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: Financial sanctions are key in enforcing restrictions on Russian energy exports – in particular the G7/EU oil price cap regime –, due to financial institutions’ critical role in cross-border transactions. While the energy sanctions regime is having an impact on export earnings and budget revenues, evidence for potentially widespread violations is also emerging. Moreover, favorable external dynamics have allowed Russia to accumulate substantial assets abroad – “shadow reserves” –, which need to be kept out of reach of the regime.
Topic:: Governance, Sanctions, European Union, International Order, Energy, Geoeconomics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Eurasia

24. Coping with Technology Sanctions in the Russian Financial Sector

Author:: Alexandra Prokopenko
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: The Russian financial sector has taken a double hit from sanctions – both in infrastructure (affecting financial transactions) and in technology (affecting the hardware and software). Infrastructural sanctions imposed by Western countries in reponse to the war on Ukraine (de-SWIFTing, overcompliance, and breaking of correspondent relationships) affected their operational activity. Moreover, the Russian government banned the use of foreign software and equipment imports, which has been a drag on business development. The financial sector was able to withstand the first shock. However, the most recent restrictions on access to advanced technologies, especially from the US and the EU, will lead to import substitution based on technologies of yesterday.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Governance, Sanctions, European Union, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Eurasia

25. Whose Zeitenwende? Germany Cannot Meet Everyone’s Expectations

Author:: Kristi Raik and Martin Quencez
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: Russia’s full-scale of invasion of Ukraine pushed Germany to fundamentally revise its foreign and security policy, including its assumptions about European security, its relations with major powers, and its role as a mediator of intra-European disputes. The Zeitenwende’s level of ambition entails a profound reckoning of the failure of past policies, and has to be both European and global. Germany bears a special responsibility for strengthening European defense vis à vis Russia, reducing Europe’s vulnerabilities vis à vis China, maintaining a strong transatlantic alliance while also preparing Europe for a possible reduced US commitment in the future, and ensuring a coherent EU.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Germany

26. The Ukraine War & European Security: How Durable Is America’s Strategy?

Author:: Zachary Paikin
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: More than a year after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the morale of the United States and its Western allies appears high.1 Spurred into action by Moscow’s act of aggression, NATO appears more united, the EU has seemingly become more of a geopolitical actor, and Ukraine has resisted and repulsed the Russian onslaught to a degree that few initially thought possible. The Biden administration has thus far laudably managed to ramp up assistance to Kyiv without directly confronting Moscow. However, while the current U.S. policy toward Russia and Ukraine may be sustainable for some time, that does not mean it will never run out of road. Sanctions against Russia — a major global economy — have been ramped up to a level previously unseen, but they have not been effective in compelling Moscow to change course. The United States and its allies have yet to agree on what they deem to be an acceptable endgame to the war. Great power or not, Russia will remain a populous, powerful and potentially disruptive actor in Europe. Without clearly and credibly proposing policies that can lower the temperature, and without beginning to envisage what a future European security order might look like, the United States risks prolonging the conflict — with potentially unforeseeable consequences if popular war–weariness continues to grow.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, Sanctions, European Union, Strategy, Military Aid, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

27. Paths to a Ceasefire in Ukraine: America Must Take the Lead

Author:: Anatol Lieven
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: Barring an improbable complete victory for Ukraine or Russia, the conflict in Ukraine will end, or more likely be suspended, in the form of a compromise. The fighting is therefore now essentially about the geographical and political lines along which this compromise will be drawn. These will become much clearer once the results of the forthcoming Ukrainian counter–offensive are known, and the aftermath of the offensive will be the time for an intensive diplomatic effort to bring about a ceasefire. Ideally, this compromise should take the form of a peace settlement like Northern Ireland’s in 1999, that would end the war and allow the creation of a stable, consensual and peaceful security order in Europe. More likely, however, is a ceasefire that (as in the cases of Kashmir, Korea, and Cyprus) will freeze the existing battle–line, wherever that runs. Such a ceasefire will in any case be necessary if talks aimed at a formal peace settlement are to take place; and even if such a treaty cannot be reached, such a ceasefire, if far from ideal, might still prove reasonably stable and permanent. Both the U.S. and Ukrainian administrations stated after it began that the war would inevitably end in a negotiated peace. In the first month of the war President Volodymyr Zelensky put forward peace proposals that included suspending the issues of Crimea and the eastern Donbas for future negotiation. Since then, however, both Ukraine and Russia have adopted positions that make any agreement between them exceptionally difficult. Given these circumstances, the United States must play the greatest role in achieving a ceasefire.
Topic:: Conflict Resolution, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Strategic Engagement, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

28. Defense Contractor Funded Think Tanks Dominate Ukraine Debate

Author:: Ben Freeman
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: Think tanks in the United States are a go–to resource for media outlets seeking expert opinions on pressing public policy issues. But think tanks often have entrenched stances; a growing body of research has shown that their funders can influence their analysis and commentary. This influence can include censorship — both self-censorship and more direct censoring of work unfavorable to a funder — and outright pay–for–research agreements with funders. The result is an environment where the interests of the most generous funders can dominate think tank policy debates. One such debate concerns the appropriate level of U.S. military involvement in the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Since Vladimir Putin’s illegal and disastrous decision to launch a full–scale invasion of Ukraine, the United States has approved approximately $48.7 billion in military spending.1 Despite the very real risk that escalations could lead to direct U.S. military involvement in the war, few think tanks have critically scrutinized this record setting amount of U.S. military assistance. Within the context of public debate about U.S. military involvement in the Ukraine war, this brief investigates Department of Defense (DoD) and DoD contractor funding of think tanks, those organizations advocacy efforts for policies that would benefit those funders, and the media’s predominant reliance on think tanks funded by the defense sector. The analysis finds that the vast majority of media mentions of think tanks in articles about U.S. arms and the Ukraine war are from think tanks whose funders profit from U.S. military spending, arms sales and, in many cases, directly from U.S. involvement in the Ukraine war. These think tanks also regularly offer support for public policy solutions that would financially benefit their funders without disclosing these apparent conflicts of interest. While this brief did not seek to establish a direct causality between think–tank policy recommendations and their arms industry funding in the case of the Ukraine war, we find a clear correlation between the two. We also found that media outlets disproportionately rely on commentary from defense sector funded think tanks.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Think Tanks, Russia-Ukraine War, and Military-Industrial Complex
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, and United States of America

29. The Future of European Security

Author:: Anatol Lieven
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: In three online sessions in May, the Quincy Institute convened a working group of leading experts on European foreign and security policies to discuss the stance of European countries concerning the war in Ukraine, “de-risking” the relationship with China, and the chances of an autonomous European approach to these issues. The group also discussed the much longer-term possibility of a new security architecture in Eurasia including Russia and China. The meetings of the working group took place under Chatham House rules, whereby participants are not individually cited. The following report therefore reflects a consensus of the group, but not necessarily the views of each individual member. Members of the working group were generally in agreement that as long as present circumstances continue, European countries are expected to take little independent action in the security domain, either individually or collectively. Genuine moves towards military self–sufficiency remain inhibited by resistance to pooling resources, and the fact that it is much cheaper simply to rely on the United States for defense. In addition, Washington has never brought really heavy pressure on the Europeans to provide for their own security, because the U.S. establishment and military–industrial complex see great advantages in keeping them in a position of dependence, even if this is extremely costly for U.S. taxpayers.1 Consequently, the European countries (which in this case really means France and Germany) are highly unlikely to adopt a determined autonomous initiative for a ceasefire in Ukraine. On the other hand, opinion was divided on how far European countries will be willing to follow the United States towards the economic and military containment of China, at least if this seems to involve them in serious losses and dangers. It was also pointed out that present circumstances will not last forever, and may not even last for very long. Several possible occurrences could change European attitudes. These include developments on the battlefield in Ukraine; a shift in Sino-U.S. relations towards actual conflict; a new global economic crisis; or a drastic acceleration of the effects of climate change. Given these potential developments, the group concluded that the United States should refrain from putting excessive pressure on Europe in areas where this could cause both severe economic damage and a backlash in European public opinion. This means, in the first instance, putting pressure on Germany to break off important economic links to China. In future, however, it could also mean U.S. refusal to support a ceasefire in Ukraine even if a majority of European states and populations desired one. U.S. policymakers should remember that the war in Ukraine is taking place in Europe, not North America and that the United States has a vital interest in maintaining Europe’s prosperity and democracy. The United States must not endanger them in the pursuit of its own narrow and short–term geopolitical goals. Finally, the group agreed that international affairs experts must not allow themselves to become trapped by contemporary issues and assumptions, because they might prove (as has often been the case) to be relatively temporary and contingent. Precisely because the situation today is so dire, it is important both to examine the past to see how we got to where we are, and to think imaginatively and independently about ideas for a better international system for our descendants.
Topic:: European Union, Military Spending, Strategic Autonomy, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

30. Russia after the Wagner mutiny: Yevgeny Prigozhin and the Kremlin’s gamble with the monopoly on violence

Author:: Jussi Lassila and Margarita Zavadskaya
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Vladimir Putin’s system is built on risk-averse loyalty and needs informal actors who can compensate for the inefficiency of official actors and partially satisfy the regime’s ambitious geopolitical visions. In Prigozhin’s mutiny, the same factors that had protected the regime’s integrity and deepening autocracy turned out to be vulnerabilities. The elimination of Prigozhin does not resolve this structural weakness but only shifts the problem elsewhere. Private military company (PMC) Wagner operated in Ukraine as an autonomous unit of the Russian army with more discretion on the ground and certain organizational advantages. However, PMCs should not be seen as private armies, but as extensions of the bureaucratic army or attempts to produce “pockets of efficiency”. The decentralization of armed groups weakens their ability to act against the political leadership. At the same time, this can be a ticking time bomb that critically weakens the state’s monopoly on violence.
Topic:: Armed Forces, Conflict, Wagner Group, Russia-Ukraine War, and Yevgeny Prigozhin
Political Geography:: Russia and Eurasia

31. Russia and Kazakhstan in the global nuclear sector: From uranium mining to energy diplomacy

Author:: Marco Siddi and Kristiina Silvan
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Amidst heightened geopolitical competition and low-carbon energy transformations, several states, notably China and countries in the Global South, have decided to invest in nuclear power, seeing it as a secure and low-emission alternative to fossil fuels. Kazakhstan is the world’s largest producer and exporter of unenriched uranium. It has been a reliable supplier to the West for decades, but its nuclear sector is closely linked to Russia’s, which has caused some concern in the European Union and the United States. Russia is a major player in the field thanks to its global exports of enriched uranium and nuclear technology. Its state nuclear company Rosatom has a large portfolio of international customers and numerous projects, mainly outside the West. Russia’s nuclear sector has become an important aspect of its energy diplomacy. While the nuclear sector has not been sanctioned, geopolitical tensions and instability in uranium-producing countries have increased security of supply risks for the West, which relies heavily on imports of both uranium and nuclear fuel.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Mining, Post-Soviet Space, Nuclear Energy, and Energy
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, Kazakhstan, and Asia

32. Pursuing justice for international crimes in Ukraine: A patchwork of multi-level and long-running efforts

Author:: Katja Creutz
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: The Russian aggression against Ukraine has triggered debates and initiatives on how to address crimes under international law committed in and against Ukraine, including war crimes and the crime of aggression. A single institution capable of dealing with all international crimes is nonetheless lacking. Tens of thousands of alleged war crimes have been reported and documented, part of which the Ukrainian courts themselves are handling. The massive caseload requires international assistance, in addition to which the ICC is also investigating alleged war crimes. The international community is divided in regard to the investigation and prosecution of the crime of aggression. As the ICC lacks jurisdiction with respect to this crime in this particular situation, European states are advancing a special ad hoc tribunal. Nonetheless, the majority of countries globally, particularly in the Global South, find it hard to support the initiative. The discussion on the best way to proceed with regard to addressing the crime of aggression committed by Russia is ongoing. Many problematic issues are being debated, ranging from political desirability to the issue of head of state immunities.
Topic:: Human Rights, International Law, United Nations, War Crimes, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

33. The changing dynamics of the G7, G20 and BRICS: Informal multilateral cooperation is increasingly important in an era of strategic competition

Author:: Juha Jokela and Alana Saul
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Increasing strategic competition among major powers has had a negative effect on the efficacy of formal multilateral cooperation. This has also been reflected in informal forums such as the G7, G20 and BRICS. Yet some new dynamics have emerged. Since Russia was excluded from the G8 in 2014, the G7 has become a key forum for Western cooperation. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has further geared the group towards a stronghold of Western economies and democracies. The BRICS group has continued to meet at leaders’ level, and has consolidated its position. Despite variation in its members’ interests, the group aims to balance the G7, and its importance for China and Russia has been elevated. Currently, the G20 constitutes a forum in which strategic competition can potentially be managed. Along with the G7 and BRICS countries, other powers play an increasingly notable role. The dynamics of the group also displays an increasing “Southernization” of informal multilateral cooperation.
Topic:: European Union, Democracy, Multilateralism, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

34. Russian blackmail and the Black Sea Grain Initiative: The (limited) impact of the war in Ukraine on global food security

Author:: Timo R. Stewart
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Ukraine and Russia are both major exporters of foodstuffs and fertilisers. Consequently, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 led to fears of an impending food crisis, particularly in the Middle East and North Africa. Prices did indeed rise steeply in March 2022 as Russia blockaded Ukrainian ports. Although global food prices remain elevated, they have fallen over the past year. This is partly due to mitigating measures, particularly the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI). However, prices were already high before the war due to the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic. The BSGI was further extended in March until May 2023 at least. Each deadline gives Russia a new opportunity to press for concessions on sanctions, as Ukraine sorely needs the export revenues, and there is ongoing concern regarding world food prices. While a continuation of the BSGI is highly preferable, it is also important to note that the initial food crisis fears were somewhat overblown. Russia’s leverage is limited. Higher food prices do take a toll on the poorest, but world food markets also have a high degree of flexibility and thereby resilience. Scuttling the deal would also incur costs for Russia and is therefore unlikely to happen.
Topic:: Governance, Multilateralism, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

35. Russian aggression and the European Arctic: Avoiding the trap of Arctic exceptionalism

Author:: Harri Mikkola, Samu Paukkunen, and Pekka Toveri
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: In its efforts to limit the Western defence posture in the Arctic, Russia has successfully exploited the “High North, low tension” mantra and the notion of the Arctic as an exceptional region of peace and cooperation. At the same time, Russia has managed to build its position of relative strength in the Arctic through systematically developing its military capabilities. To create a threat of escalation, Russia has also used offensive military exercises and disruptive hybrid operations against the Western Arctic states in the region. Arctic economic resources and military assets continue to play an essential role for Russia in pursuing its strategic goals, and for its ability to carry out acts of aggression. Through regional cooperative practices, the West has unintentionally facilitated this capacity. The West has limited its military activity in the Arctic to mitigate tensions. This has been a one-sided effort. The Western Arctic states should thus focus on building comprehensive deterrence in the region.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Military Affairs, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Arctic

36. The war-induced exodus from Russia: A security problem or a convenient political bogey?

Author:: Margarita Zavadskaya
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Since 24 February 2022, around 800,000 Russians have left Russia in reaction to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The largest proportion of new migrants was accepted by Kazakhstan, Georgia, Turkey, and Armenia. War-induced migration should be handled like any other migration, whether it involves asylum-seekers, economic migrants, or repatriates. Excessive politicization and fearmongering around migration, including political refugees and political oppositionists, is counterproductive, as it feeds into Kremlin propaganda and belligerent narratives. While there may be concerns about espionage or saboteurs, the primary focus should be on the socio-economic impact of Russian immigration. For the receiving states, especially in the post-Soviet space, the Russian migrants pose a socio-economic challenge rather than a political one. With an increasing probability of cross-border repression – persecution or intimidation of political migrants abroad – it is essential that the EU adopts a consistent response towards political migrants, including those from Russia.
Topic:: Security, Refugees, Borders, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

37. Russia’s regime transformation and the invasion of Ukraine: From a failed blitzkrieg to war as the new normal

Author:: Jussi Lassila
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Russia’s increasingly dictatorial and Soviet-nostalgic political leadership sees the invasion of Ukraine not only as a necessity when it comes to prevailing in the conflict with the West, but also as a chance to break free from Western influences. Vladimir Putin is acting as a referee in the elite’s hidden competition, which has been transformed into open rivalry in the context of the war. The competition over who is the most loyal to Putin’s war policy radicalizes the political discourse throughout. The Kremlin’s key challenge is to maintain the balance between citizens’ political apathy and the mobilization of society required in times of war. Civic passivity is central to the regime’s security, while justifying the continuation of the poorly progressing war requires an increasing militarization of society. The Russian public’s approval of the war has gradually diminished, and efforts to mobilize society in revenge for perceived losses have not changed the trend. Hence, Russia’s poor military success is thus far the fastest way to vitiate the legitimacy of Putin’s war regime.
Topic:: Security, Authoritarianism, Vladimir Putin, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

38. Nuclear deterrence in the Ukraine war: Diplomacy of violence

Author:: Jyri Lavikainen
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Russia’s nuclear blackmailing has been the primary reason why NATO has not intervened in the Ukraine war. However, the US nuclear deterrence has allowed the West to resist Russia’s nuclear coercion, which has resulted in an unprecedented delivery of military aid to Ukraine. The US has reacted to Russia’s nuclear coercion by emphasizing its readiness to retaliate if Russia uses nuclear weapons. The war progresses in line with the historical tradition of limited wars where the opposing sides regulate the conflict by issuing threats in a game of nerves. Russia’s nuclear deterrence strategy is failing because it uses nuclear deterrence for something it is not suited for: as a coercive tool in a protracted war of conquest. As long as such threats can be countered with a threat to retaliate, their credibility is low because the benefits cannot outweigh the costs in the vast majority of circumstances. The deterrence dynamic still allows more room for manoeuvre for the supporters of Ukraine. The West should increase the military aid delivered to Ukraine with the goal of defeating Russia.
Topic:: NATO, Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and United States of America

39. In a State of Denial: The Air War in Ukraine

Author:: Francesca Verville and Catarina Buchatskiy
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Ukraine’s ability to repel one of the world’s leading military powers has surprised the world. Since the full-scale invasion in February 2022, neither Russia — despite its superiority in numbers and capabilities — nor Ukraine has been able to establish air superiority. With fewer and less capable air domain assets, Ukraine has instead been obliged to adopt the less costly and inherently defensive strategy of ‘air denial.’ However, for it to remain successful will require Ukraine to sustain continuous air defence operations and the West to commit to a steady supply of military assistance. Mutual air denial is essentially an attritional form of warfare from which Russia is likely to draw greater benefits and a strategy which forces Ukraine to make difficult choices regarding the targets it wants to deny. The F-16, albeit not a silver bullet, offers the prospect of enabling Ukraine’s air forces to more effectively exploit openings in Russia’s defences and to strike Russian forces and their logistics. However, unlike previous provisions of Western military assistance, the decision to give Ukraine F-16s moves past the more short-term view of helping it meet the immediate needs of the war. The effort spent training Ukrainian pilots, ground crews, and logisticians will have long-term value in supporting Ukraine’s air defence needs and deterring any renewed Russian aggression.
Topic:: Air Force, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

40. The EU’s Magnitsky Act Obsolete in the Face of Russia’s Crimes in Ukraine?

Author:: Steven Blockmans
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Despite the mounting evidence of the most serious of human rights violations being conducted by Russian forces on Ukrainian soil, the EU has chosen not to use its new Magnitsky Act to blacklist the perpetrators and their commanders. Instead, the EU has preferred to respond to Russia’s ‘dumb’ bombs with increasingly ‘dumb’ sanctions. This Brief explains why, after decades of work to smarten up its restrictive measures, the politicisation of human rights sanctions and the high threshold of evidentiary standards make it very hard for the Council to rely on evidence gathered from transition countries where the justice sector is still vulnerable to widespread corruption and political cronyism.
Topic:: Human Rights, International Law, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

41. Prospects for Ukraine’s NATO Membership

Author:: Henrik Larsen
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: At the Vilnius Summit, Allies will focus primarily on their commitments to deter Russian aggression against NATO territory. But NATO seems unable to resolve the bigger strategic issue of how to secure Ukraine. If its own riskaversion prevents it from giving Ukraine a clearer pathway to membership, NATO may leave Ukraine disillusioned. A deterrence and defence partnership that guarantees the strengthening of Ukraine’s military capability for as long as required currently seems to be the most realistic scenario.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Deterrence, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

42. Defence Spending

Author:: Margarita Šešelgytė
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Russia’s war in Ukraine has highlighted Europe’s military weakness. But the changes to threat assessments that followed Russia’s brutal full-scale invasion have also created an opportunity for European Allies to reassess their defence spending. If they are serious about defence, they will need to address the impact of decades of persistent underinvestment, not least because higher defence spending will be key to the credibility of the new defence plans to be agreed at the Vilnius Summit. Allies should thus review and revise their defence investment pledge. If they do not do this now, it will be more difficult once the war in Ukraine ends.
Topic:: NATO, Defense Spending, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

43. NATO’s Posture on the North-East Flank

Author:: Toms Rostoks
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: At NATO’s Madrid Summit in June 2022, the Allies agreed to bolster enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) by deploying “additional robust in-place combat-ready forces on our eastern flank, to be scaled up from the existing battlegroups to brigade-size units where and when required, underpinned by credible rapidly available reinforcements, prepositioned equipment, and enhanced command and control”.1 The Baltic states had fought hard for a more robust NATO military presence to deter Russia and to provide a realistic chance of defending every square inch of NATO territory against a Russian attack. It has turned out, however, that moving from battlegroups to brigades—and thus towards forward defence— has been more difficult than the Baltic states anticipated.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, and Baltic States

44. Iran’s Defence Industry: What’s in Stock for Russia?

Author:: Tato Kvamladze
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Albeit heavily sanctioned and exhausted by the Islamic revolution and the war with Iraq, Iran has managed to upbuild a self-sufficient defence industry from the ashes and demonstrate a robust weapon system manufacturing capacity over the last decades. It started with low-tech reverse-engineering of 3rd generation fighters and tanks and ended with indigenously producing high-accuracy and long-range ballistic missiles. Although Tehran has exported $435 million worth of weaponry, its arms trade is not a source of revenue, but a foreign policy tool to bolster its allies and proxies in the region and beyond. Supplying weapons to Russia, however, is a unique case that signals Moscow’s desperation and inability to achieve its military objectives in Ukraine. In 2022, after years of military cooperation with Russia, Teheran finally had an opportunity to provide support to Moscow, when the exhausted and depleted Russian army requested – and immediately received – unmanned combat aerial vehicles that are now used to target critical civilian infrastructure. Further economic cooperation between two rogue states might also extend to (nuclear) technology transfers, which for now remains an Achilles’ heel for Teheran. For as long as the war in Ukraine lasts, the Kremlin will have a reliable partner who can deliver an assortment of weapons needed on short notice.
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Arms Trade, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Iran, Ukraine, and Middle East

45. The Missing Pieces of a Kerch Bridge Strike: Give Ukraine What It Needs to Isolate Crimea and Gain the Initiative

Author:: Bryan Clark and Can Kasapoglu
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: The war in Ukraine is at a critical juncture both on the ground and in the capitols of Ukraine’s main supporters. Aid to Kyiv is now a point of contention in the United States Congress, which had to remove Ukraine support from a short-term funding package to avoid a government shutdown. Overseas, China’s intensified aggression toward its neighbors and Hamas’s terror campaign against Israel are beginning to stretch US attention and resources across multiple theaters. With half of Ukraine’s post-invasion military and humanitarian assistance coming from the United States, softening support in Washington could cause other North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies to pare back their contributions as well. To sustain US and NATO support and put Russia on the defensive going into winter, Ukraine’s military will need to change the dynamics of a counteroffensive that has been slow to retake Russian-held territory. Cutting off Crimea from Russia and forcing Moscow’s troops to protect an isolated peninsula is the kind of change that would prove Ukraine is able to win the war, rather than merely fight to a draw. With the “land bridge” across southern Ukraine already under attack, the Kerch Strait bridge carries much of the ammunition and supplies going into Crimea. If the bridge were impassable, Russia would need to redouble its efforts to defend southern Ukraine, drawing troops away from the east and north and potentially enabling Kyiv to make more rapid gains along those fronts before winter. Ukraine has already attacked the Kerch Bridge several times during the war, with air-launched missiles, drone boats, and semisubmersibles. The most successful strike, via a truck bomb, damaged the bridge but did not stop its use. Eliminating the 12-mile-long span as a factor in the war will require a sustained series of long-range strikes structured to defeat Russian defenses and supported by a few new pieces of Western military hardware.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Missile Defense, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

46. Escape from the Syrian Labyrinth: A Road Map

Author:: Michael Doran and Omer Ozkizilcik
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: The Ukraine war has led Americans to rediscover what first drew them, some seven decades ago, into a military alliance with the Turks: Turkey’s indispensability as a counterweight to Russia. However, even as Washington and Ankara have found common cause in Ukraine, they continue to work at cross purposes in Syria. In a demonstration of bold, fresh, and practical thinking, Turkish scholar Ömer Özkizilcik offers us a road map for aligning American and Turkish policies there too. But first, to set the stage for Özkizilcik’s plan, Hudson Senior Fellow Michael Doran surveys the strategic logic and the diplomatic context that make the road map compulsory reading.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Military Intervention, and Syrian War
Political Geography:: Russia, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

47. A New Black Sea Strategy for a New Black Sea Reality

Author:: Luke Coffey and Can Kasapoglu
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: With Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, there is a new geopolitical reality in the Black Sea region. Following the capture of the Ukrainian city of Mariupol in May, Russia has effectively turned the Sea of Azov into a Russian lake and is also seeking maximum control of the Black Sea. Turkey has reminded the world of Ankara’s regional importance by closing the Turkish Straits to the belligerent parties’ vessels (in practice the Russian Navy, except for the platforms home-ported in the Black Sea), which it carried out under authority granted by the 1936 Montreux Convention. Despite the overwhelming odds, Ukraine has been able to deliver significant blows to the Russian Navy—most sensationally by sinking the Black Sea Fleet’s flagship Moskva missile cruiser and by striking Russian platforms with unmanned surface combatants in October. Black Sea geopolitics is a complex phenomenon. Any comprehensive regional political-military policy must therefore offer a multidomain strategy. This report will focus on the maritime agenda. Future reports will present findings on air warfare and land warfare trends in the broader Black Sea region.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, and Black Sea

48. America’s Response after Russian Suspension of New START

Author:: Rebeccah L. Heinrichs and Marshall Billingslea
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: This week’s news that Russia will suspend participation in the New START nuclear treaty follows the State Department’s January announcement that Russia is in breach of New START and its obligation to allow inspection activities on its territory. Since the Cold War, the United States has led efforts to promote nuclear non-proliferation and to create a transparent and stable dynamic between Moscow and Washington regarding our nuclear weapons forces. But the Russians have repeatedly demonstrated a willingness to violate the terms of our agreements. While the United States has sought to decrease our reliance on nuclear weapons in our military strategies, Russia has gone the other way. Russia is developing, testing, and fielding new delivery systems within traditional categories like road-mobile and silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles. But it has also developed novel systems like nuclear-capable hypersonic glide vehicles that raise questions about their intent. And its large arsenal of non-strategic nuclear weapons remains outside the bounds of any treaty. As we’ve seen in Ukraine, Russia uses the threat of nuclear employment to coerce nations in wars of aggression that Russia has chosen. Moscow appears to have lowered the nuclear threshold. The best path for peace is for the United States to maintain credible deterrence options. This provides incentives for our adversaries to engage in diplomacy.
Topic:: Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, Military, and New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START)
Political Geography:: Russia, North America, and United States of America

49. NATO’s Black Sea Frontier Is the Southern Shore of the Caspian Sea

Author:: Luke Coffey
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has led to a renewed focus on the geopolitical importance of the Black Sea. What the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has overlooked is Russia’s use—often in coordination with Iran—of the Caspian Sea to advance its war aims in Ukraine. The Caspian Sea offers Russia a strategic depth to strike targets far afield in a relatively safe manner, is currently the only way for Russia to reinforce its Black Sea Fleet, and serves as a transport conduit allowing Iran to deliver military assistance to Russia for use against Ukraine. As Admiral Sir Tony Radakin, the United Kingdom’s chief of the defence staff, recently said, “The flow of Iranian weapons to Russia’s war in Ukraine demonstrates that there is no easy geographical distinction on matters of defense.”1 In the context of regional security, military planners in the United States and NATO should see the most extreme point of the alliance’s Black Sea frontier as the southern shoreline of the Caspian Sea.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Alliance, and Strategy
Political Geography:: Russia, Iran, Caspian Sea, and Black Sea

50. Eritrea’s Growing Ties with China and Russia Highlight America’s Inadequate Approach in East Africa

Author:: Joshua Meservey
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: China and Russia have recently increased their engagement with Eritrea, a small but strategically located country in East Africa. Meanwhile, American influence in the region is amid a yearslong slide. Despite the obvious risks, the United States has failed to muster a committed response and has even taken some counterproductive measures that demonstrate a lack of strategic thinking. If these trends continue, a vital region may fall under the conclusive influence of Washington’s primary geopolitical competitors.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, China, Eritrea, and United States of America

51. Keeping the lights on: The EU’s energy relationships since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine

Author:: Szymon Kardas
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: Since the start of Russia’s all-out invasion of Ukraine, the EU has sought to rapidly reduce its dependence on Russian gas and oil. Many alternative major suppliers to Europe stepped up as ‘friends in need’ in the first year of the war, helping the EU plug the gap. The EU’s climate goals direct it to encourage the development of renewable energy sources – meaning it must also cultivate ‘friends indeed,’ which can supply clean energy as well as gas and oil. The countries best able to fulfil both short-term needs and long-term ambitions are Norway and the US, which have stable supplies of gas and are making progress in clean energy. The EU and member states have the instruments and investment resources to advance the potential of other supplier countries as well – to help them too transform from ‘friends in need’ to ‘friends indeed.’
Topic:: Climate Change, Oil, European Union, Gas, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

52. Steppe change: How Russia’s war on Ukraine is reshaping Kazakhstan

Author:: Marie Dumoulin
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine came as an additional shock for Kazakhstan, which had already experienced serious domestic unrest in January 2022. Kazakhstan has consistently distanced itself from Russia’s aggression and diversified its relationships with various countries, while preserving its bilateral relationship with Moscow. The war has further highlighted the need for political reforms in Kazakhstan, yet complicated the government’s ability and willingness to implement them. Kazakhstan is now cautiously navigating political change both domestically and in its foreign policy. The EU has shown interest in engaging more with Kazakhstan. It can help the country to overcome this critical juncture by encouraging and supporting its genuine domestic transformation.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Central Asia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan

53. The art of vassalisation: How Russia’s war on Ukraine has transformed transatlantic relations

Author:: Jeremy Shapiro and Jana Puglierin
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has revealed Europeans’ profound dependence on the US for their security, despite EU efforts at achieving “strategic autonomy.” Over the last decade, the EU has grown relatively less powerful than America – economically, technologically, and militarily. Europeans also still lack agreement on crucial strategic questions for themselves and look to Washington for leadership. In the cold war, Europe was a central front of superpower competition. Now, the US expects the EU and the UK to fall in line behind its China strategy and will use its leadership position to ensure this outcome. Europe becoming an American vassal is unwise for both sides. Europeans can become a stronger and more independent part of the Atlantic alliance by developing independent capacity to support Ukraine and acquiring greater military capabilities.
Topic:: European Union, Geopolitics, Transatlantic Relations, Strategic Autonomy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

54. Fragile unity: Why Europeans are coming together on Ukraine (and what might drive them apart)

Author:: Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: A recent multi-country poll for ECFR suggests that Europeans have come closer together in their support for Ukraine. Europeans now agree that Russia is their adversary or rival. Three factors have supported this remarkable coming together: Ukrainian successes in the first year of the war; the way the war has united the political left and right; and the perceived return of a strong West led by the US. But these factors are fragile and European leaders should be careful in their optimism. European policymakers should take advantage of this unity to equip Ukraine, while doing everything they can to mitigate divisions caused by changing circumstances at home and abroad.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Regional Integration, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

55. United West, divided from the rest: Global public opinion one year into Russia’s war on Ukraine

Author:: Timothy Garton Ash, Ivan Krastev, and Mark Leonard
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: A new poll suggests that Russia’s war on Ukraine has consolidated ‘the West;’ European and American citizens hold many views in common about major global questions. Europeans and Americans agree they should help Ukraine to win, that Russia is their avowed adversary, and that the coming global order will most likely be defined by two blocs led respectively by the US and China. In contrast, citizens in China, India, and Turkiye prefer a quick end to the war even if Ukraine has to concede territory. People in these non-Western countries, and in Russia, also consider the emergence of a multipolar world order to be more probable than a bipolar arrangement. Western decision-makers should take into account that the consolidation of the West is taking place in an increasingly divided post-Western world; and that emerging powers such as India and Turkiye will act on their own terms and resist being caught in a battle between America and China.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, Multipolarity, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

56. Sustain and prosper: How Europeans can support Ukraine

Author:: Marie Dumoulin, Lykke Friis, Gustav Gressel, and Leo Litra
Publication Date:: 10-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: The EU has already provided unprecedented support to Ukraine as it fights its existential war against Russia. But this war will not end any time soon. The EU and member states urgently need to ramp up and accelerate their military assistance for the long war and make stronger commitments to Ukraine’s long-term security. This will require them to develop their military-industrial capabilities. In addition, they should develop bilateral security arrangements with Ukraine and work towards bringing the country into NATO once the war is over. Ukraine’s EU accession, however, will ultimately be more transformative for the country. The EU therefore needs to ensure it is truly fit for enlargement to up to 36 states and take concrete steps towards making Ukraine a member state. The EU should view this support for Ukraine as an opportunity to enhance its military production facilities, raise its geopolitical profile, secure its neighbourhood, and stabilise the contour and modus operandi of a larger European Union.
Topic:: Security, NATO, European Union, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

57. Democratic defence: How Italy can lead the fight against Russian disinformation

Author:: Gabriele Carrer, Teresa Coratella, and Silvia Samorè
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: New research for ECFR suggests pro-Russia and pro-China narratives are present in online and traditional forms of discourse in Italy. It finds that forms of anomalous activity spiked just ahead of the country’s 2022 general election. Despite the shock to Italian foreign policy caused by Russia’s war on Ukraine, economic ties between the countries remain. Moreover, the political environment in Italy remains conducive to Russian influence, with the leaders of four of the five largest parties in parliament prone to echoing talking points favourable to Moscow or advocating for “peace” while suggesting the withdrawal of military support to Ukraine. Italy has been slow to put in place the structures needed to combat foreign influence. The new governing coalition appeared to place little value on tackling the problem, but it has now started to build on the more considerable progress made under former prime minister Mario Draghi. Italy should seize opportunities to strengthen the battle against disinformation, such as: encouraging the next European Commission to incorporate this task into its mandate; and placing the topic in Rome’s forthcoming G7 presidency programme.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Democracy, Disinformation, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Italy

58. Keeping America close, Russia down, and China far away: How Europeans navigate a competitive world

Author:: Jana Puglierin and Pawel Zerka
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: Russia’s war on Ukraine has shown European citizens that they live in a world of non-cooperation. But their cooperative foreign policy instincts are only slowly adapting to this new reality. Europeans want to remain neutral in a potential US-China conflict and are reluctant to de-risk from China – even if they recognise the dangers of its economic presence in Europe. However, if China decided to deliver weapons to Russia, that would be a red line for much of the European public. Europeans remain united on their current approach to Russia – though they disagree about Europe’s future Russia policy. They have embraced Europe’s closer relationship with the US, but they want to rely less on American security guarantees. European leaders have an opportunity to build public consensus around Europe’s approach to China, the US, and Russia. But they need to understand what motivates the public and communicate clearly about the future.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America

59. Feeling the chill: Navigating Arctic governance amid Russia’s war on Ukraine

Author:: Joanna Hosa
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: Russia’s war on Ukraine has highlighted the strategic importance of the Arctic and upended structures of cooperation between the western Arctic states and Russia, including the Arctic Council. The Arctic Council includes six organisations of indigenous peoples alongside the eight Arctic states, providing a platform for inclusive governance and the recognition and representation of the Arctic’s indigenous population. The participation of indigenous peoples in Arctic governance is key to upholding Europe’s values-based foreign policy and effective governance in the region, particularly against the backdrop of Russia’s values war with the West. The war has divided the Arctic into two camps – one including the Western Arctic states and the other comprising the Russian Arctic – with both sides exploring alternative avenues for cooperation. In this uncertain context, European governments need to preserve indigenous peoples’ participation in existing and emerging forums of cooperation.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, and Governance
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, and Arctic

60. Culture clash: Russia, Ukraine, and the fight for the European public

Author:: Pawel Zerka
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: Russia’s war on Ukraine is a test of Europe’s values of openness, freedom, solidarity, and individual responsibility. According to ECFR’s research, European sentiment is strong in the EU today; the public holds positive attitudes towards the EU and Europe; and most governments are dedicated to European cooperation. European citizens and governments have shown unprecedented support for Ukraine, but European leaders face various dilemmas about how to handle Russian culture, disinformation, and people in the context of the war – and their responses to these challenges have consequences for European sentiment. Their approach can either reassert European values, helping to sustain European unity and support for Ukraine. Or it can undermine these values, presenting the EU as weak and hypocritical, and eroding Europeans’ confidence in the EU and solidarity with Ukraine. Rather than follow their protective instincts, European governments should display confidence in liberalism and in the European civil society which, over the past year, has demonstrated its resilience.
Topic:: Culture, Public Opinion, Disinformation, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

61. Advancing military mobility in Europe: An uphill battle

Author:: Mihai Sebastian Chihaia
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:: Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has put military mobility on top of the EU and NATO agendas. The return of traditional military threats and a renewed interest in territorial defence call for greater attempts to eliminate obstacles preventing armed forces from swiftly moving across EU borders. This Policy Brief maps the actions taken at the EU level to develop military mobility over the past years, with emphasis on the EU Action Plan 2.0. It identifies and analyses current EU objectives, outlines key challenges, and provides recommendations to enhance military mobility in Europe. Several challenges are analysed by the author, which should be urgently addressed by the EU and the member states, especially in relation to the Action Plan 2.0. These include limited funding for dual-use transport infrastructure projects at the EU level, administrative and regulatory barriers, and the lack of political will in the member states to enhance military mobility. Furthermore, the paper provides a SWOT Analysis of military mobility in Europe and the following recommendations are put forward: The commitment to advancing military mobility needs to be long-term. Military mobility needs to be complemented by a civilian dimension. EU member states should urgently prioritise developing military mobility plans. Undergo a lessons-learned process from the movement of military equipment in the context of EU and allies’ support to Ukraine. Regions and cities’ network of exchanges at the European level should include discussions on funding and dual-use infrastructure. Consider setting up an EU-NATO Centre of Excellence dedicated to military mobility in Europe.
Topic:: NATO, European Union, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

62. Turkey’s Growing Ukrainian and Russian Communities

Author:: Sude Akgundogdu and Collin Trissel
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Since the 1990s, Turkey has become a major destination for tourists and migrants from Ukraine, Russia, and other former Soviet states. Yet Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine set into motion an even greater wave of migrants from both countries. Those fleeing the crisis have used myriad channels to enter and remain in Turkey, from obtaining “golden visas” to applying for protection. Going forward, their presence could have a sizable effect on future socioeconomic ties between the three countries.
Topic:: Economics, Migration, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, and Middle East

63. The Development Response to Kleptocracy and Strategic Corruption

Author:: Josh Rudolph
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: Kleptocracies do not stop at their own borders. The same actors, networks, tactics, and resources that they wield to prevent democracy and rule of law from sprouting at home are also repurposed for foreign aggression. While cronies, oligarchs, and lesser operatives do get rich in the process, “strategic corruption” is chiefly a geopolitical weapon directed by autocratic regimes to secretly undermine the sovereignty of other countries. The three most common manifestations of strategic corruption vary on a spectrum of how directly and boldly they violate sovereignty and subvert democratic processes. Starting with the most indirect and chronic form of strategic corruption, Russia and China invest “corrosive capital” throughout Eastern Europe and the Belt and Road Initiative, respectively. They use corrupt patronage networks and opaque business dealings to spread their kleptocratic model of authoritarian governance. Those corrupt investments are usually also supported by tactics of “malign influence,” like when a minister or politician receives bribes or economic threats until they censor their political speech, advance a foreign policy initiative, or otherwise subordinate the legitimate sovereign interests entrusted to them by their own people in favor of the interests of a foreign power. Finally, the most direct and acute form of strategic corruption involves financial methods of election interference and other tactics of corrupting democratic processes. Often funded with the proceeds of kleptocracy, election interference through covert political financing has become the bailiwick of Kremlin-directed oligarchs. Separate from those three manifestations of strategic corruption—corrosive capital, malign influence, and election interference—China and Russia try to hide their dirty money and malign activities by pressuring foreign journalists into silence through surveillance, thuggery, and lawsuits. Western foreign assistance has not yet offered a coherent response to kleptocracy and strategic corruption, but that is starting to change under the Biden administration. Building resilience to this transnational threat through foreign aid will require four new approaches that are more political and coordinated than traditional development assistance. First, aid should be informed by local political analysis. More important and less used than technical reviews of laws and institutions, political analysis should center anti-corruption efforts around known corrupt activity. That starts by asking sensitive questions about which individuals, institutions, and sectors are the most corrupt, how extensively their networks of wealth and power span, and which corrupt figures must be held accountable to thoroughly purge grand corruption. Second, aid should be responsive to political shifts, scaling up and down, respectively, in response to windows of opportunity for anti-corruption reform and times of backsliding toward kleptocracy. Third, aid responses to kleptocracy should be coordinated at the regional and global levels, similarly to how grand corruption operates across borders through transnational networks of actors and tools. Fourth, anti-corruption programming should be deeply integrated across the traditional sectors of assistance, particularly health, infrastructure, energy, climate, and security. Some of these new approaches are already being prioritized under the Biden administration’s new strategy to combat corruption, particularly coordinating across tools and sectors to fight transnational corruption. But operationalizing this mission will be no small endeavor, given that anti-corruption assistance is delivered through a notoriously technocratic and apolitical bureaucracy built during the Cold War to aid socioeconomic development in individual countries steadily over decades. But getting this right offers the key to defending democracies from autocratic aggression, showing how democracy can deliver, and even helping bring foreign policy and domestic politics into alignment for the first time in a generation.
Topic:: Corruption, Development, Finance, and Kleptocracy
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eastern Europe, and Global Focus

64. Russia, Ukraine and international Law

Author:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: Russian actions in Ukraine since 2014, and the tensions to which they have led, obscure the legal aspects of these attacks thereby opening the way to propaganda and approximations. To contribute to a better understanding of what is at stake, this contribution is limited to the legal aspects of an otherwise eminently political issue. This in fact heralds a spectacular break in the international order and a violation of commitments and treaties signed by a member of the Security Council of the United Nations that have not been witnessed since the Second World War[1].For a long time, Russian diplomacy was attached to the strict and formal respect of the rules of international law, sometimes "clinging" to them in a bid to resist the demands made by the different populations. Even during the succession of the USSR, this constant was respected. However, the actions in Crimea and Donbass since 2014 have marked the abandonment of this formalism, while the Kremlin's diplomacy is promoting the need to conclude new treaties with the United States and European states so that Russia can endorse its claims.
Topic:: International Law, Conflict, Norms, Annexation, and Disputes
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

65. Has Europe’s hour come?

Author:: Antoine Cibirski
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: “Europe’s hour has come”, said a Luxembourg minister in 1991 at the beginning of the Yugoslav wars. The context seemed favourable: an initially peripheral crisis, a relative lack of interest on the part of Russia, a green light from the United States which was even encouraging invention by the Western European Union (WEU), the majority of whose activities were taken over by the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), and later by the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). America's 'pet project' at the time was not yet Asia, but rather the management of the decay of the Soviet world, without much interest in the Western Balkans. In response, some Europeans 'held back' and feared an unfavourable division of tasks: 'noble' collective defence missions reserved for NATO and peacekeeping missions, considered 'subordinate', for Europe. Strategic prescience! Four years later, we had witnessed the bombing of civilians, the siege of Sarajevo, broken ceasefires, failed mediations and Srebreniça. We had experienced the humiliations inflicted on a UN force (UNPROFOR) that had a timid mandate and overly restrictive rules of engagement. The British and French were in the field this time round, but not the Germans. The Dayton Peace Agreement, which only France calls "the Dayton-Paris agreement" (a formal concession by Bill Clinton to Jacques Chirac) was largely a Pax Americana. In the American camp, Richard Holbrooke had pulled the strings and decided everything, by ruthlessly relegating the European leaders, including Carl Bildt, Jacques Blot and Pauline Neville-Jones[1].
Topic:: European Union, Conflict, and Integration
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

66. World food crisis: between withdrawal and responsibility, Europe must choose

Author:: Emmanuelle Ducros
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: The profound destructuring of world food markets as a result of Russia's war on Ukraine is forcing all of the world's agricultural powers to question their place on the world stage of satiety - or hunger. This is primarily the case in Europe.
Topic:: Food, Hunger, Armed Conflict, and Economic Crisis
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

67. North Africa Can Reduce Europe's Dependence on Russian Gas by Transporting Wasted Gas Through Existing Infrastructure

Author:: Mark Davis, Perrine Toledano, and Thomas Schorr
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment
Abstract:: North Africa can reduce Europe's dependence on Russian gas by transporting wasted gas through existing infrastructure.
Topic:: Energy Policy, Oil, Military Strategy, Natural Resources, Gas, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

68. Bridging U.S.-Led Alliances in the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific: An Inter-theater Perspective

Author:: Luis Simon
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Although U.S. strategic competition with China and Russia is often presented as a challenge with two separate fronts, this brief argues that the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific theaters are increasingly linked. Insofar as preserving a favorable balance of power in these two regions hinges largely on U.S. power, and as long as they both continue to exercise a significant pressure on U.S. defense resources, their alliance and deterrence architectures should be looked at from an inter-theater perspective. Thus, optimally managing atwo-front challenge would require a serious effort to bridge U.S.-led alliances in both regions.
Topic:: International Cooperation, Hegemony, Alliance, Strategic Competition, Rivalry, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

69. International Legal Options for Prevention and Justice in Ukraine

Author:: Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
Abstract:: This March 2022 Fact Sheet presents international legal options for international criminal justice and prevention in Ukraine.
Topic:: United Nations, Accountability, Justice, International Criminal Court (ICC), and Universal Jurisdiction
Political Geography:: Russia and Ukraine

70. Russia’s Losing Hand in Ukraine

Author:: Seth G. Jones, Philip G. Wasieleswki, and Joseph S. Bermudez Jr.
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The United States and its partners and allies should be prepared to conduct a sustained diplomatic, economic, military, and humanitarian campaign that supports Ukraine and raises the financial and military costs for Moscow of meddling in Ukraine—both now and in the future. Russia has several weaknesses that can be exploited, and Ukrainian nationalism and Western resolve could present formidable, long-term problems for Moscow.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Military Intervention, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

71. Saving Energy in a Hurry Reducing Dependence on Russian Hydrocarbons Requires Resolute Demand and Supply Sides Action

Author:: Cédric Philibert
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: Facing Russia’s aggression on Ukraine, European countries have enacted economic and financial sanctions against Russia. • However, heavily dependent on Russian gas, European countries fear possible countersanctions. • On the other hand, Russia is heavily dependent, first and foremost, on oil exports, but also, yet to a lesser extent, on gas exports to Europe. Oil and gas represent more than half its total export revenues. • European countries should distinguish two policy needs: reducing their dependence on Russian gas to mitigate the impacts of possible countersanctions; reducing the demand for Russian oil to increase the economic pressure on Russia. • Reducing demand for Russian oil can be much easier for European countries to endure and can be done immediately with an active involvement of the civil society, from companies to citizens. It would ease the cost impacts on European citizens and give them ways to express their solidarity with Ukraine.
Topic:: Security, Oil, Sanctions, European Union, and Gas
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

72. Fiscal support and monetary vigilance: Economic policy implications of the Russia-Ukraine war for the European Union

Author:: Olivier Blanchard and Jean Pisani-Ferry
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:: The economic shock from the war in Ukraine is forcing Europe to face difficult policy choices, according to Olivier Blanchard and Jean Pisani-Ferry. Governments must decide how best to soften the blow of higher energy and food prices, and how much to rely on debt finance. The European Central Bank must decide how to balance the fight against inflation with the need to sustain aggregate demand, in the face of decreases in real income. The authors analyze the impact of the war on the European economy, discuss the pros and cons of policy options, and call for coherence in balancing sanctions, fiscal measures, and monetary policy. They argue for the use of transfers rather than across-the-board subsidies and point to the room for debt finance. They show the potential role of tripartite wage agreement and also argue that monetary policy can remain on its current trajectory but be ready to adjust.
Topic:: War, European Union, Economy, and Fiscal Policy
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

73. How Russia Fights

Author:: Nicolò Fasola
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: Until this year’s renewed aggression on Ukraine, over-reliance on catchy labels such as “hy- brid war” has led many observers and deci- sion-makers to under-appreciate (if not disregard com- pletely) one undeniable fact: that over the last 20 years, the Kremlin has achieved its key strategic goals mainly through kinetic military means. Notwithstanding a weak tactical performance, Rus- sia won the 2008 “August war” against Georgia in only five days and successfully imposed its own regional set- tlement. In 2014, the annexation of Crimea, while sup- ported by the promotion of favourable socio-political conditions, was carried out and secured militarily; even more so in the Donbas campaign, where Russian propa- ganda suffered from serious limitations. Finally, the role of the Russian military in Syria beginning in 2015 was evident, albeit frequently reduced solely to the use of the Aerospace Forces. Notably, and besides obvious differences linked with the specifics of each theatre, the military interventions that Russia has conducted since 2008 display a consistent modus operandi. An analysis of these experiences can help illuminate what Russia is doing today and might do in the future, thus enabling NATO to fine-tune its posture on the Eastern flank. This Policy Brief draws on an expanded research project regarding Russia’s approach to war, as well as on a wealth of Russian-language military essays and commentary – deliberately highlighting the way the Russian military thinks of and practises war on its own terms.
Topic:: War, Military Strategy, Military Intervention, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

74. Rethinking NATO engagement in the Western Balkans

Author:: Ismet Fatih Cancar
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: Recently NATO Secretary General Jens Stolten- berg recognized Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) as a possible frontier for Russian activities fol- lowing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.1 These activities, best illustrated by the threat from the Russian ambas- sador to Sarajevo of a Ukrainian scenario should BiH seek NATO membership, raises an important question: why is BiH of particular importance to the Euro-At- lantic Alliance? First, the Western Balkans is unfinished business for NATO and for countries in the region that have recognized NATO integration as a strategic goal. Second, other actors, primarily Russia and China, have established interests that compete with NATO’s en- gagement in the Western Balkans. Third, the interests of these external actors undermine Euro-Atlantic se- curity on the eastern flank. As a result, there are bene- fits for NATO in increasing cooperation with BiH and the Western Balkans in order to prevent the possible return of conflict to the region.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Alliance
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Balkans, and North America

75. Is Russia a threat in emerging and disruptive technologies?

Author:: Katarzyna Zysk
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: jor stakeholders, including the United States, China, and Russia, is of paramount impor- tance to the transatlantic community. The Russian authorities, including Vladimir Putin, perceive gaining or losing ground in this rapidly advancing technolog- ical competition in existential terms: either a nation will successfully ride the wave, or it will be crushed by it. Emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs), and their mutual convergence, are increasingly regarded as sources of strategic and operational advantages in fu- ture warfare. They create a new set of conditions and potentially consequential defence applications that may increase Russia’s – and other key actors’ – military ad- vantage over competitors. Accordingly, EDTs may al- ter the trajectory and character of future warfare and human involvement in it. Stakes seem high for both national and international security, with a likely impact on deterrence, arms control, and strategic stability, as well as the distribution of power in the international system, along with Russia’s share of it. One of the key objectives during Putin’s presiden- cy has been to rebuild the country’s military capacity. A large-scale modernization programme launched in 2008 has focused on strengthening the nuclear arse- nal and reducing the conventional inferiority that took hold in the military organization during its post-Cold War decay. The Russian authorities have been con- cerned, however, that it would take too long to catch up with the West’s military development. Conversely, EDTs promised a rapid, non-linear way to close the capability gap. As a result, Russia has been systemati- cally expanding its pursuit of cutting-edge military and dual-use technologies. This Policy Brief explores Russia’s technological eco- system with examples of the major programmes and strategies that have been prioritized to pursue excel- lence in EDTs. It examines constraints that affect EDT development, including the impact of the invasion of Ukraine, and considers what possible implications Rus- sian EDT development may entail for NATO.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Science and Technology, Military Strategy, and Alliance
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and North America

76. The war in Ukraine and the future of Russia-China relations

Author:: Marcin Kaczmarski
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: The China-US rivalry, observed since late 2017, has pushed Moscow and Beijing closer togeth- er, but it has not transformed their relation- ship. One reason is the persistent cautiousness of both states, another is Moscow’s lack of capabilities to offer genuine support to China in such areas as the econo- my, trade or technology. The official rhetoric, boasting about the relationship being “better than an alliance”, in reality hides real obstacles to a more substantial co- operation. The first “post-pandemic” in-person meeting be- tween Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping on 4 February 2022 seemed to have opened the new era in Sino-Rus- sian relations. The joint communication was unusually ideologised, with both states claiming their democratic traditions. China offered support for Russia’s “legiti- mate security concerns” in Europe and opposed fur- ther NATO enlargement. Russia reciprocated by sup- porting China in Asia. The slogans of the relationship having “no limits” or no “red lines” dominated the post-summit narratives. Russia’s war against Ukraine has pushed the Si- no-Russian relationship into uncharted waters. Mos- cow’s failure to secure a quick victory has put Beijing in an uncomfortable position. The future direction of Sino-Russian cooperation will depend heavily on the length of the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the ultimate decision of Beijing as to what extent (if at all) to prop up Russia economically. Regardless of whether Beijing decides to assist Mos- cow in bypassing Western sanctions, the unravelling of the Sino-Russian relationship is highly implausible. We can expect either China’s explicit economic support for Russia or the maintenance of close political ties without economic support. In the first scenario, Russia’s dependence on China would increase dramat- ically, diminishing Moscow’s room for manoeuvre in foreign policy and ultimately turning Russia into Chi- na’s asset in the latter’s global rivalry with the US. In the second scenario, Russia would remain an autono- mous actor, pursuing close political cooperation and normative anti-Western convergence with China, but increasingly isolated and weakened economically. It is only domestic political change in Russia, the end of Vladimir Putin’s personal rule in particular, that would provide Moscow with an opportunity to reassess the relationship with China.
Topic:: International Cooperation, War, Military Strategy, Bilateral Relations, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia

77. Cool Change Ahead? NATO's Strategic Concept and the High North

Author:: Elizabeth Buchanan
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine not only revived NATO unity, it also bolstered the case for NATO’s enduring mission of deterrence and defence. In the High North, NATO’s mission objectives are precariously balanced. For the Alliance, the High North is an enduring component of Cold War history, as well as a flank in terms of NATO’s 360-degree security thinking. Of course, the High North is also a strategic frontier for renewed NATO-Russia competition. This Policy Brief examines NATO’s High North challenges and considers strate- gic priorities for the Alliance’s forthcoming Strategic Concept.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and North America

78. Russia’s “total confrontation” on the Eastern flank

Author:: Marc Ozawa
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: For the second time in less than a year, Russian troops have gathered on Ukraine’s border in alarming numbers raising concerns of a possible invasion. In the meantime, Russia is posing conditions that are unacceptable to the West. Unless NATO, allies and Partners respond appropriately, the chain of events that Russia has initiated could inadvertently trigger a conventional war between Ukraine and Russia. If this were to happen, there is the real risk that some allies could be drawn into the conflict. This underscores the need for the Alliance, in tandem with the EU, national governments, and the private sector, to deepen coop- eration and respond in a timely, unified and coordi- nated fashion. At the same time, it is more important than ever that NATO, allies, and Partners understand Russia’s intentions. This raises the need for a return to regular and sustained dialogue with Russia. The right response for NATO will depend on changing circum- stances – namely Russia’s actions, the progress of di- plomacy, and the Alliance’s collective will to support Ukraine.
Topic:: Security, Military Strategy, Military Intervention, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

79. How to make the EU Energy Platform an effective emergency tool

Author:: Walter Boltz, Klaus-Dieter Borchardt, and Thierry Deschuyteneer
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: Uncertainty about the supply of Russian natural gas is causing extremely high and volatile European gas and electricity prices. European Union countries may struggle to import sufficient volumes of natural gas at reasonable prices. During the summer, the imperatives are to fill storage sites sufficiently in a coordinated manner and to organise sufficient import volumes to replace a substantial share of gas that might no longer come from Russia. Coordination is essential to ensure that disruptions during difficult winter months do not lead to a break-up of the EU internal gas market with potentially serious political repercussions. One part of the EU response is establishment of an EU Energy Platform for the purchase of gas, LNG and hydrogen. This aims to pool demand to leverage the bloc’s economic clout, international outreach to reliable partners and efficient use of existing infrastructure. EU leaders have backed the plan but it has not yet been translated into a feasible scheme. The platform should be developed into an effective emergency tool to safeguard gas supply in case Russian flows stop. We detail two complementary proposals to achieve this. First, there should be EU-wide auctioning of remuneration for filling storage sites in specific regions. Companies would remain responsible for all stages of the value chain, benefitting from remuneration and in return offering the market operator some control over how this gas is released during winter months. Second, EU demand for additional LNG quantities, and the sourcing of this on international markets, should be coordinated through a platform, creating a transparent market for these volumes. These mechanisms would resolve the prevention paradox and prevent free-riding. If EU countries buy gas jointly, they will find it much easier to let markets allocate scarce volumes across borders in case of a complete stop to Russian supplies. . This would reduce the risk of energy market fragmentation, as well as the subsequent energy security, economic and political impacts of a shock that would hit member states very differently.
Topic:: Oil, European Union, Gas, and Energy
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

80. 2022, Xi Jinping’s Annus Horribilis: Or is it?

Author:: Christopher K Johnson
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Asia Society
Abstract:: The year 2022 is proving to be a difficult one for China and for President Xi Jinping. Choices like Xi’s embrace of Russia and the zero-COVID policy have prompted sporadic outbursts from the Chinese public and a backlash abroad. Unsurprisingly, this has spawned speculation that Xi is facing political difficulties at home that could hamstring or even disrupt his plan to remain China’s top leader after the 20th Party Congress later this year. Despite the real challenges Xi and the party have faced in 2022, however, this paper will argue that such narratives rest on a series of faulty assumptions about the impetus for Xi’s consolidation of power, the presence of powerful opposition voices within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) system, and the judgment that Xi’s policy approach amounts to a series of blunders that may help his critics as they try to diminish him at the party congress.
Topic:: Economy, Domestic Politics, Olympics, Xi Jinping, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Russia, China, and Asia

81. Phoenix or Icarus? European strategic autonomy in light of Ukraine

Author:: Erwin van Veen
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:: With all eyes on the next Russian move in Ukraine, the notion of European strategic autonomy is experiencing a revival. At first glance, this seems overdue given that talks between Washington and Moscow bypass Brussels entirely. But beyond a limited use for the concept to help mitigate vulnerabilities resulting from dependencies and credibly malign actors that can exploit them, the notion remains surplus to requirements. Broad use of the term ‘EU strategic autonomy’, as is in vogue, risks giving populism and nationalism an unnecessary impulse. It also risks unmooring the EU from its collaborative and compromise-oriented essence because it depicts the world outside the EU as a swamp where danger lurks behind every tree. If EU Member States want a more assertive and capable set of institutions that act on their behalf, they should just get on with their unfinished business – the Single European Market, industrial/digital policy, fiscal transfers and defence/security policy.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, European Union, Strategic Autonomy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

82. On a Collision Course: Russia’s Dangerous Game in Ukraine

Author:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:: While Russia demands a written guarantee that Ukraine will not be offered NATO membership, Western countries are warning it of dire consequences if it launches a war on Ukraine. The balance of power between the two parties, Russia and the West, may remain on the verge of collapse, leaving Ukraine unstable and Ukrainian leadership unable to control the entire country.
Topic:: NATO, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

83. The End of the Post-Cold War Era: Russia's Adventure in Ukraine Reshapes the Entire World Order

Author:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:: Whether Russian adventure in Ukraine proves to be a success or a failure, the integration of Russia into Europe has come to a halt. Europe will face division once again, albeit along lines that differ greatly from those of the Cold War.
Topic:: NATO, Integration, Post Cold War, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

84. War in Ukraine enters its second month: serious implications and far-reaching changes

Author:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:: The Russian invasion of Ukraine in its second month witnessed several developments, including the failure of the Russian forces to achieve a quick and decisive military victory and the Russian leadership's reduction of its primary objectives.
Topic:: Military Affairs, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

85. Ukraine: Toward a Prolonged War of Attrition Fuelling Great Power Competition

Author:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:: Russia and China no longer need to play by the rules of the Euro-American international order. It is therefore likely that in this uncertain period of flux, the major four powers will vie to win friends and allies, giving second-tier powers like Turkey and India more influence if they can ably manage their foreign relations and avoid unnecessary alignment with any of the four major powers.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Power Politics, Strategic Competition, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

86. If Russia Uses Migration as a Weapon, Europeans Should Respond In Kind

Author:: Alia Fakhry, Roderick Parkes, and András Rácz
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: Around 442,000 people have so far fled Ukraine – not just to the EU, but also to neighbors like Moldova. This is a humanitarian issue, and should not be conflated with “migrant instrumentalization” (MI), whereby a state pushes people across a border to coerce the EU to change position. Yet Russia is likely to employ MI in this way, especially if it moves deep into Western Ukraine. Drawing on an in-depth study, we show how the EU can meet this specific threat.
Topic:: Security, Migration, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Central Asia, and Ukraine

87. Designing a Geo-Economic Policy for Europe

Author:: Markus Jaeger
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: Geo-economic policies have become an increasingly important feature of international politics – and not just since the war in Ukraine. The EU has proposed an economic anti-coercion tool to deter third-party coercion. This policy brief analyses the risks and benefits as well as the challenges related to the EU’s proposed deterrence policy based on a review of the academic literature on coercion and the effectiveness of economic sanctions.
Topic:: Sanctions, Coercion, Geoeconomics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Germany

88. Sea Change for Europe’s Security Order: Three Future Scenarios

Author:: Christian Mölling, Tyson Barker, David Hagebölling, Afra Herr, and Kai Kornhuber
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: The war of aggression that Russia launched against Ukraine in February has destroyed the European security order. The German government has defined this moment as a sea change (Zeitenwende) for its foreign and security policy. It still must envisage and shape a new order. Key factors are whether Europe will be united in strategic policy areas, and how Russia will position itself.
Topic:: Security, Climate Change, Science and Technology, European Union, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Central Asia, and Eastern Europe

89. The Economics of Great Power Competition: Why Germany Must Step Up on Defense

Author:: Markus Jaeger
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: Without a sound economic foundation, political and military ambitions cannot be sustained. This also applies to the geopolitical competition between the United States and its rivals. So far, America and its allies are economically ahead of Russia and China. But where Russia’s long-term outlook is weak, China’s economic might is rapidly increasing. Despite the war in Ukraine, Washington will have to focus its resources on Asia. In Europe, Germany, with its large financial and economic base, should lead on military spending and enhanced security.
Topic:: NATO, Geopolitics, Geoeconomics, and Competition
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Germany, and United States of America

90. Using Information to Influence the Russian War in Ukraine

Author:: Valentin Weber
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: Future scenarios for the war in Ukraine explore how the use of information could affect the cohesion of Russia and of the West in the medium term. The four possible variations of Russian/Western cohesion – high/high, low/high, high/low, low/low – indicate how each side would define the outcome of the conflict. These possible outcomes, in turn, generate lessons about how a liberal West might use information to tip the scales on an autocratic Russia.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Digitization, Information, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

91. Sanctions Against Russia: Five Lessons from the Case of Iran

Author:: Stefan Meister and David Ramin Jalilvand
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has led to the most comprehensive economic sanctions imposed on a country of this size since the end of the Second World War. Yet sanctions are only an effective tool of foreign and security policy if they are embedded in a sustainable political strategy that considers the cost-benefit analysis for both sides. Looking at the sanctions against Iran can be helpful when it comes to learning lessons about how to deal with Russia.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Sanctions, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Iran, Eurasia, and Ukraine

92. Avoiding the Dangers of a Protracted Conflict in Ukraine

Author:: Anatol Lieven, Sarang Shidore, and Marcus Stanley
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: A protracted conflict in Ukraine looks increasingly plausible. Russia continues to launch attacks on military and civilian targets, and the United States and its partners are increasing shipments of arms to the Zelensky government. Washington is reportedly making plans to support long-term guerrilla warfare against Russian forces, should Kyiv fall. The current path toward a protracted war in Ukraine is highly undesirable and is laden with grave risks to the interests of the United States, Ukraine, and the international community. Such risks include: • a high cost in Ukrainian lives and suffering and the destruction of Ukraine — its infrastructure, institutions, and social fabric; • radicalization of Ukrainian society and a consequent civil war; • escalation to a great-power war, potentially involving nuclear weapons and pitting NATO against Russia, thereby threatening U.S. national security; • a weakening of NATO’s cohesion; • a prolonged global recession that strikes the U.S. as hard as it will any other nation. The United States and its allies should avoid these destructive outcomes by prioritizing support for the Ukrainian government to achieve a diplomatic settlement. Such a settlement will result in a more secure outcome for Ukraine, the United States, the European allies, and the rest of the world. While the details of such a settlement lie beyond this brief’s scope, the progress of Ukrainian–Russian talks indicates that a settlement providing for meaningful sovereignty and independence for Ukraine is possible. Avoiding a protracted conflict also implies that the United States should not adopt maximalist objectives, such as regime change in Moscow or the complete and decisive defeat of Russia. It should instead deploy sanctions to build up Ukraine’s negotiating leverage.
Topic:: NATO, Conflict, Escalation, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

93. The Lobbying Battle Before the War: Russian and Ukrainian Influence in the U.S.

Author:: Ben Freeman
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: • Russian President Vladimir Putin’s fateful decision to launch a full-scale invasion of Ukraine has united much of the world in condemnation of this unprovoked assault on a sovereign nation. In Ukraine, the war has already caused rampant destruction, the deaths of thousands of civilians, and the displacement of millions, while tens of thousands of soldiers on both sides of the conflict have been killed or wounded. The U.S. has imposed crippling sanctions on Russia’s energy and financial sectors while providing tens of billions of dollars in military assistance to Ukraine. • Behind the headlines of these U.S. foreign policy decisions lies a major, but little-discussed, factor in foreign policy: lobbying. Nearly every action the government has taken regarding Russia and Ukraine has been the object of considerable attempts at influence by U.S.-based lobbyists for Ukraine and Russia. Based on an exhaustive analysis of all Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) and Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) documents filed by organizations registered to work on behalf of Ukrainian and Russian clients in 2021, this brief offers a number of key findings, including: ° Nine organizations were registered under FARA to work on behalf of Russian clients in 2021, while 11 were working for Ukrainian clients. ° Those organizations reported making just 21 contacts on behalf of their Russian clients and 13,541 contacts on behalf of their Ukrainian clients. ° Russian clients paid over $42 million to firms representing them, (although $38 million of this went to Russian state media), while Ukrainian clients paid just over $2 million to the firms working on their behalf. ° Ukrainian lobbying efforts add up to more than four times the amount of work the Saudi lobby (among the largest foreign lobbies in Washington) and other prominent groups have reported in any year—due in large part to a notable gap in transparency. ° The pro-Ukraine lobby appears to have achieved far more contacts than the pro-Russia lobby with less money spent, an anomaly that could be explained by the pro-Russia lobby using a less transparent statute—the LDA—for reporting its lobbying efforts and the greater zeal shown by some pro-Ukraine lobbyists.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Influence, Lobbying, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and United States of America

94. NATO’s Tunnel Vision

Author:: George Beebe
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: Despite Russia’s violent rejection of a NATO-centric Europe, the United States should still pursue its vision of a continent that will one day be “peaceful, whole, and free.” The alternative is a blood-soaked division of the continent, constantly prone to escalation into a direct conflict with Russia. The United States needs to adopt a different approach to achieving its vision, as follows: • The path to peace must begin with settling the conflict in Ukraine, and the key to a settlement is securing Ukraine’s independence as a neutral state outside NATO. • If Europe is to be whole, NATO cannot serve as its overarching security arm. NATO should focus on defense of its existing members, not expanding its ranks or operating out of area, including against China. • Over time, our goal should be evolution toward a U.N. Security Council-type arrangement in Europe that includes both NATO and non-NATO members. The price of admission for Russia must be good faith compliance with the terms of a settlement in Ukraine. • If Europe is to be free, we must recognize that a stable security environment in Europe is a prerequisite for the ex-Soviet states gradually becoming more liberal. The best means of ensuring that Europe is free is by revitalizing democracy within the West itself.
Topic:: Security, NATO, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

95. Managed Competition: A U.S. Grand Strategy for a Multipolar World

Author:: George Beebe
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has accelerated pre-existing momentum toward a multipolar global order. In response, the Biden administration effectively rallied NATO and ensured that Russian forces cannot resubjugate Ukraine. But it has not anchored its tactical moves in a broader strategy to safeguard America’s most critical interests. As a result, we are fast headed toward a two-front geopolitical faceoff in which a belligerent Russia and a rising China are cooperating closely with each other against the United States. In a world in which power is shifting from the West toward the East and Global South, the United States is enmeshed in a proxy war with the world’s largest nuclear power, and Americans face mounting political and social challenges at home, a dangerous gap has emerged between Washington’s global ambitions and its ability to achieve them. The United States had a large margin for strategic error during its era of post-Cold War global primacy, when it faced no significant great power challengers. It has no such cushion today. America needs to rethink its grand strategy. This should involve the following elements: • Recognize that attempts to isolate and weaken Russia and China are likely to fail. The combination of Russia’s vast natural resources and China’s economic heft and centrality to global commerce present a challenge far different from what we faced during the Cold War, when the Soviet Union posed a military and ideological threat but was economically feeble. • Avoid promoting regime change or otherwise undermining political and economic stability in Russia and China, which could have serious blowback effects in the United States. The United States’ economic health is to a great degree dependent on that of China. Information technology has made us vulnerable to external subversion at a time when American society is dangerously divided and mistrustful of key institutions. • Instead, pursue a strategy of managed competition, in which our rivals are not only counterbalanced by American power and alliances, but also are constrained by agreed rules of the game that are tailored to an era in which advances in precision weaponry, cyber technology, and artificial intelligence pose significant new threats to stability. • Be more selective about where the United States should focus its involvement. As a seapower dependent on trade and robust international partnerships, the United States must remain engaged with the world. But Washington can no longer afford to squander its resources on quixotic democratization crusades or on policing regions that are not central to America’s own well-being. Greater burden sharing by allies and partners is essential. • Aim to gain a breathing spell abroad so that we can focus on healing our domestic wounds and advancing prosperity at home. This also means that the United States should avoid framing its global challenges in terms of an existential battle between democracy and authoritarianism.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Grand Strategy, Strategic Competition, and Multipolarity
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, and United States of America

96. Assessment of the role of Caspian Basin in reducing of EU's oil dependence in the light of Russian Ukraine War

Author:: CESD Research Team
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Economic and Social Development (CESD)
Abstract:: In the background of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, European Union (EU) agreed to ban the overwhelming majority of Russian oil imports. Since the beginning of the invasion, the West decided to make Moscow pay economically for its aggression. Nevertheless, the decision aimed at the energy sector was quite challenging since the bloc relies on Russia for 25% of its oil and 40% of its natural gas.
Topic:: Oil, European Union, Imports, Russia-Ukraine War, and Energy Sector
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Caspian Sea

97. How to Maintain International Unity on Ukraine (Part II)

Author:: Sarah Cliffe, Hanny Megally, Karina Gerlach, Faiza Shaheen, and Leah Zamore
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center on International Cooperation
Abstract:: This piece is the second part to our analysis published in early April on what it would take to maintain international unity on Ukraine. In the first analysis, we noted the large number of countries that abstained from or voted against the resolution suspending Russia’s membership in the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council, including nine out of the ten most populous countries in the world.
Topic:: United Nations, Conflict, Multilateralism, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

98. Development Competition is Heating Up: China’s Global Development Initiative and the G7 Partnership for Infrastructure and Global Alliance on Food Security

Author:: Sarah Cliffe and Karina Gerlach
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center on International Cooperation
Abstract:: Economic development issues are becoming increasingly geopolitical, as the form and importance of today’s agreement in Turkey on grain exports between Russia and Ukraine demonstrates. While today’s crucial agreement and the war of food security narratives between Russia and the West rightly grab the latest headlines, outside of the media spotlight development competition is also heating up between China and the West.
Topic:: Development, Infrastructure, Food Security, Strategic Competition, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Turkey, and Ukraine

99. The Ukraine Example: Circumstances Matter for Effective Security Assistance

Author:: Ethan Kessler
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:: US aid would not have been nearly as effective without Ukraine’s efforts to improve its military prior to the 2022 Russian invasion. US security assistance to Ukraine since Russia’s all-out invasion in February 2022 has been substantial, but was not sufficient to guarantee Ukraine’s initial military success in the war. Data reveals that US security assistance to Ukraine, which mainly consisted of nonproliferation-related aid before 2014, increased after Russia’s invasion of Crimea that year. However, Ukraine’s failures against Russia in Crimea and later in eastern Ukraine were largely due to an undermanned, underequipped, and undertrained Ukrainian military. Ukraine’s focus on remedying these problems, along with increased combat experience, principally drove Ukrainian military improvements by 2022. These internal changes, as well as Russia’s poor military organization and force employment in the first phase of its 2022 invasion, are essential for understanding the contributions of US equipment and weapons to Ukrainian military successes. These lessons are instructive not only for US security assistance to Ukraine, but also for the many other settings where US security assistance is a prominent policy tool.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and United States of America

100. Memo on an "Economic Article 5" to Counter Authoritarian Coercion

Author:: Ivo H. Daalder and Anders Fogh Rasmussen
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:: The world's democracies need a way to fight back against coercive economic actions by authoritarian governments, argue Ivo Daalder and Anders Fogh Rasmussen. Increasingly, authoritarian countries are using economic coercion against democracies. In recent years, China’s economic coercion of Lithuania and Australia stands out as a prominent example. Russia uses economic levers to achieve geopolitical aims, notably by weaponizing its natural resources. The aim of such coercion is to bend the will of democratic countries. This is a test for the free world. In response, we propose an Economic Article 5 among democracies to counter authoritarian coercion.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Authoritarianism, Economy, Business, and Trade
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS