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Begin New Search Topic Treaties and Agreements Political Geography Russia Content Type Policy Brief Publication Year within 10 Years

1. In Europe’s defence: Why the EU needs a security compact with Ukraine

Author:
Gustav Gressel
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Security support and other help from Western partners made a concrete difference to Ukraine’s ability to resist Russia’s 2022 invasion and, in some cases, retake territory. Had the EU established a security compact that provided security assistance in a range of areas, Ukraine could have been even more successful in its resistance. A security compact would have enabled Europeans to send more comprehensive packages of support, as they would have already addressed major questions about how to respond to a Russian attack. The West and Ukraine have both learned a significant amount about what support they should consider. The EU should now establish a security compact that enhances assistance for Ukraine. Joint planning between European armed forces and the Ukrainian defence industry to agree schedules for the replacement of key arms would free up equipment to be supplied to Ukraine. The EU should consider drawing up security compacts with Moldova and Georgia, both of which are vulnerable to Russian aggression.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Treaties and Agreements, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia

2. In Russia's Hands: Nagorno-Karabakh after the ceasefire agreement

Author:
András Rácz
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
Nearly five months have passed since the 9 November 2020 ceasefire that ended the second Nagorno-Karabakh war. The conflict broke out as a culmination of tensions that had been mounting for years, and had already resulted in two smaller flare-ups (one in April 2016 and another in July 2020). The war took a heavy toll on the lives of Azerbaijani and Armenian civilians, as well as claiming the lives of altogether more than 5,000 fighting personnel, and resulted in the displacement of approximately 70,000 Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh. This Brief analyses to what extent the ceasefire agreement has provided the ground for a lasting, stable and sustainable settlement. While the overall stability of a post-conflict situation may depend on a range of factors, this analysis focuses on three main variables that could affect the resilience of the post-war status quo in the medium and long run. The first and second of these – the stability of the present post-war territorial configuration and the uncertain future legal status of the parts of Nagorno-Karabakh that continue to be administered by the separatist de facto authorities – constitute underlying, inherent weaknesses of the ceasefire agreement. The third and probably most important factor is the Russian peacekeeping contingent deployed to Azerbaijan in order to maintain the ceasefire, because it brings in Russia’s political will as an independent variable that could fundamentally shape the overall settlement process. The deployment of Russian troops into Azerbaijan deserves special attention, because there is a theoretical possibility that it may lead to a new ‘freezing’ of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution process, instead of politically settling the conflict itself. The core problem is that should Moscow decide to keep its troops on Azeri soil even after their original five-year mandate expires, it is unlikely that Azerbaijan could prevent such a scenario. The Brief is structured as follows: in the first section, the weaknesses of the ceasefire agreement are analysed, while in the following section the role and potential future outcomes of the Russian peacekeeping mission are examined. The concluding section offers a forward-looking perspective on the post-war status quo.
Topic:
Treaties and Agreements, War, Peacekeeping, Conflict, and Ceasefire
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and Nagorno-Karabakh

3. How to Think About the China-Russia Partnership

Author:
James Sherr and Frank Jüris
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Since the conclusion of the Treaty on Good-Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation in 2001, the balance of power between China and Russia has appreciably shifted in favour of the former, but their common definition of the enemy and the complementarity of their core interests remains as strong as it ever was. If the China-Russia relationship is not an alliance, then what is it, and what are its limits? In the Xi-Putin era, apprehension and ambition have transformed the ‘axis of convenience’ into an axis of necessity. But will ‘strategic partnership’ prove important or irrelevant to potential conflicts in Taiwan, Belarus or Ukraine? How much should be made of divergences of approach in Central Asia and the Arctic, where China’s rise leaves no stone unturned? To what extent will Russia continue to welcome the growth of China’s power — to the point of nuclear parity with the United States and, by extension with Russia itself?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Treaties and Agreements, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, Geopolitics, Alliance, and Emerging Powers
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, Taiwan, Asia, Arctic, and United States of America

4. The Reappearance of Consensus: Implications of Israel-Russia Agreements over Syria

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett held their first face-to-face talks on October 22 in Sochi, Russia. The summit talks, called by Putin, were slated for only two hours but lasted for about five hours, reflecting the two sides’ interest in enhancing coordination about several common issues, and warming up the Israeli-Russian relations which cooled down since Bennett rose to power.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Treaties and Agreements, Syrian War, and Consensus
Political Geography:
Russia, Middle East, Israel, and Syria

5. Georgia’s Europeanization challenged from within: Domestic foreign policy discourses and increasing polarization

Author:
Salome Minesashvili
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Georgia`s foreign policy, especially the implementation of international agreements, is best understood in the context of domestic contestation among alternative foreign policy views. • Nativist views exert increasing influence on the Georgian public. Georgia’s European partners should engage the Georgian public through civil society support and people-to-people contacts, to build trust and facilitate open debate. • The exclusive character of differing foreign policy positions further fuels the extreme political polarization. The government and opposition should be encouraged to come together over shared democratic values, instead of playing up the differences. • Pluralism and tolerance should be encouraged in the public and media debate.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Treaties and Agreements, Public Opinion, Europeanization, and Polarization
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Georgia

6. Is There a Threat of a Repeated Deployment of Nuclear "Eurorockets" from the Cold War Period in Europe?

Author:
Miroslav Tuma
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institute of International Relations Prague
Abstract:
Will the U.S. unilateral withdrawal from the American-Soviet INF Treaty of 1987 become a possible reality? The Treaty prohibits ground-launched shorter and the middle-range missiles (500–5,500 kms) with nuclear or conventional warheads. The Treaty´s security significance and its main parameters, the legal framework of the withdrawal and the reasons of both parties for accusing each other of violating the Treaty, are discussed in the article as well. In its conclusion, the article, among other things, explains the context of the possible termination of the Treaty, and its consequences for the U.S.-Russia arms-control architecture. Motto: “ A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.” (A joint statement of the American president Ronald Reagan and the Soviet highest representative Mikhail Gorbachev from their first meeting in Geneva in January 1985)
Topic:
International Relations, Nuclear Weapons, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and United States of America

7. U.S. Nuclear Excess: Understanding the Costs, Risks, and Alternatives

Author:
Kingston Reif and Alicia Sanders-Zakre
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
In a little-noticed comment before his controversial July 2018 summit meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Helsinki, U.S. President Donald Trump characterized his government’s multi-hundred billion dollar plans to replace the aging U.S. nuclear arsenal as “a very, very bad policy.” He seemed to express some hope that Russia and the United States, which together possess over 90 percent of the planet’s nuclear warheads, could chart a different path and avert renewed military and nuclear competition. The Helsinki meeting, however, did not produce any agreement on nuclear weapons and Trump has so far shown little interest in a different nuclear spending path. Quite the opposite, in fact.“We have far more money than anybody else by far,” Trump said last October. “We’ll build [the U.S. nuclear arsenal] up until” other nuclear-armed states such as Russia and China “come to their senses.” Citing a deteriorating international security environment, the Trump administration is pursuing a significant expansion of the role and capability of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. In addition to continuing full speed ahead with its predecessor’s plans to replace the nuclear triad and its associated warheads on largely a like-for-like basis, the administration is proposing to broaden the circumstances under which the United States would consider the first use of nuclear weapons, develop two new sea-based, lowyield nuclear options, and lay the groundwork to grow the size of the arsenal. At the same time, key U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control agreements, which serve to regulate the nuclear balance and prevent unconstrained nuclear competition, are now in serious doubt. The Trump administration has announced the United States will leave the landmark 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in August 2019 unless Russia returns to compliance with the pact, and expressed hostility towards extending the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START). New START expires in 2021 but can be extended by up to five years subject to the agreement of Washington and Moscow. In short, the Trump administration is preparing to compete in a new nuclear arms race while simultaneously increasing the likelihood of such a contest. The projected cost of the proposed nuclear spending spree is staggering and it is growing. The United States currently plans to spend nearly $500 billion, after including the effects of inflation, to maintain and replace its nuclear arsenal over the next decade, according to a January 2019 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report. This is an increase of nearly $100 billion, or about 23 percent, above the already enormous projected cost as of the end of the Obama administration. Over the next 30 years, the price tag is likely to top $1.5 trillion and could even approach $2 trillion. These big nuclear bills are coming due as the Defense Department is seeking to replace large portions of its conventional forces and internal and external fiscal pressures are likely to limit the growth of—and perhaps reduce—military spending. “We’re going to have enormous pressure on reducing the debt which means that defense spending—I’d like to tell you it’s going to keep going up—[but] I’m not terribly optimistic,” Alan Shaffer, deputy under secretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment, said in February 2019. This report outlines the ways in which the Trump administration’s nuclear strategy is unnecessary, unsustainable, and unsafe. It describes three realistic options to reduce spending on nuclear weapons while still maintaining a devastating nuclear deterrent. Scores of billions of dollars could be saved or redirected to higher priorities by eliminating, delaying, or scaling back the administration’s proposals for new delivery systems, warheads, and infrastructure.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, International Security, Nonproliferation, Denuclearization, and Arms Race
Political Geography:
Russia and United States

8. Renewed Arms Race, the NPT, and the New Start Treaty After the End of the INF Treaty

Author:
Elif Beyza Karaalioğlu
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Global Political Trends Center (GPoT)
Abstract:
The U.S. decision to withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty left world observing about what might happen next. Indeed, the demise of the INF Treaty points out to an uncertainty on arms control and it brings new questions regarding international security. In the light of recent developments on the INF Treaty, this study attempts to make an analysis on the possible impacts of the end of the INF Treaty on international security. This study argues that the collapse of the INF Treaty raise concerns for renewed arms race and the withdrawal from the INF Treaty inevitably brings other treaties such as the NPT and the New START into close consideration.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Treaties and Agreements, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Russia, North America, Global Focus, and United States of America

9. The Iran Nuclear Deal: A Monumental Mistake by the Obama Administration or a New Beginning?

Author:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:
07-2015
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:
The nuclear deal reached between Iran and the P5+1, China, France, Germany, Russia, the United States and the United Kingdom, will be scrutinized by diplomats, military experts and politicians for months and years to come. Statesmen and politicians will interpret the deal differently and each will vie to use the argument which suites the audience and the domestic base she/he represents. However, the psychological, economic, political, and military implications of the deal on the United States, Europe and many Middle Eastern countries will be monumental. The deal will impact the balance of power in the Middle East and will change its dynamics forever, change the dynamics of the energy markets in Europe, Thus creating tension between Russia and Europe, and will ignite a fierce security debate between Democrats and Republicans in the United States on the culture of regime change and the use of force. The deal will bring the subject of regime change to the political forefront in the US and will raise a serious question on whether the use of force is the only effective mechanism to change the behavior of states in order to achieve favorable outcomes. Both Republicans and Democrats used force as a tool for regime change, however the Obama administration is a advocating for new means: diplomacy.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Regime Change, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, United Kingdom, Iran, Middle East, France, and Germany

10. Bumps on Russia’s Road to the Eurasian Economic Union: Postponed Integration, Costly Enlargement and Delayed International Recognition

Author:
Stanislav Secrieru
Publication Date:
07-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Eurasian integration has been formally elevated to a new level. On 29 May, Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan signed in Astana the founding treaty of the Eurasian Economic Union. However, problems related to integration, enlargement and international cooperation with the EEU indicate the effort is far from a point of no return. Despite the upbeat mood in Moscow, integration remains weak and selective, and in several important fields has been shelved until 2025. At the same time, the enlargement process has encountered security-related obstacles and triggered additional costs for Russia.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Treaties and Agreements, and European Union
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

11. TSG IntelBrief: Economic Drivers of an Iran Nuclear Deal

Publication Date:
11-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Soufan Group
Abstract:
There are clear and compelling economic imperatives for Iran to accept a nuclear agreement with the P5+1 (U.S., Britain, France, Russia, China, and Germany) by a November 24 deadline. The Iranian public has chafed under comprehensive sanctions since 2010 and expect President Hassan Rouhani to deliver a nuclear agreement that enables the economy to recover and grow. U.S. and other P5+1 officials stress the economic opportunities for Iran that will result, including the eventual re-opening of Iran's oil and gas sector to foreign investment. Major international firms are poised to re-enter the Iranian market in the event of a nuclear deal, although firms will initially be cautious due to lingering uncertainty.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Arms Control and Proliferation, Islam, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Middle East